The

Occupied

Palestinian

Territory

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
PASSIA is an independent, non-profit Palestinian institution, unaffiliated with any government, political party or organization, which undertakes research on the Question of Palestine and its relationship to international affairs. PASSIA encourages the publication of various research studies on the Question of Palestine which reflect a plurality of perspectives and methods in a context of academic freedom.

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Preface

This information paper is part of PASSIA’s research programme for 1993. It aims to provide up-to-date information on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for the benefit of the local and international communities as well as all those interested in the Question of Palestine. Much has been written about Palestine by Palestinians and others. However, information about the land on which Palestinians are establishing national authority is dispersed and often difficult to locate. PASSIA has therefore attempted to contribute to the process whereby local institutions take responsibility for collating and publicising information in order to increase understanding of the land and its people.

Producing an information paper on the Occupied Palestinian Territory is not an easy task. In the atmosphere and circumstances of occupation, which imposes restrictions on freedom of expression, education, organisation, movement and communications, information has become a coveted possession. In other countries, much information comes as a by-product of state functions such as local and
national taxation, customs and census operations, and the publication of annual reports and accounts by public and private sector bodies.

It is interesting to note in this context the fusion of primary and secondary sources: for example, many authors prefer to quote figures, published by a Palestinian or a non-governmental organisation, which are derived from Israeli statistics. This gives the false impression that there is a wealth of information about the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Information, we must remember, is not a commodity to be traded, but something which people create and circulate in the course of their activities, and which requires critical judgement and imagination if it is to be made use of.

This guide is far from being comprehensive. It has a clear bias for secondary sources which are published and are readily available in the English language. Some topics are discussed at a greater level of detail than others, for the simple reason that more published material is available about them.

**Israeli statistics** Israel includes in its national Abstract of Statistics a separate section entitled "Judea, Samaria and Gaza Area". This does not contain any information on Israelis or their activities in the OPT, such information is included with data on Israel. By excluding "annexed" East Jerusalem and dividing the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israeli statistics are limited in their utility. Moreover, as the Central Bureau of Statistics notes, most data are unreliable since 1988 due to difficulties in data collection. Some data, such as trade between the OPT and Israel, are presented only until 1987. Without the data-gathering capacity which comes with national authority, Palestinian sources can provide only limited data on the OPT economy. Israeli official figures of the OPT population are estimates based on the census which the Israeli military authorities conducted immediately after the 1967 war. They treat "annexed" East Jerusalem separately from the rest of the OPT, including it with data on Israel. Some CBS observations need to be treated with caution.
West Bank administrative districts Some publications refer to the three districts of the West Bank, Nablus, Jerusalem and Hebron. Others refer also to the districts of Bethlehem, Jericho, Tulkarm and Jenin. These were sub-districts used by the Jordanian administration, the first two in Jerusalem district, the latter two in Nablus district (the three other sub-districts, Tubas, Qalqilya and Salfit, all in Nablus district, are rarely used). Some sources use the divisions of the Israeli military administration, which simplifies district boundaries, treats "annexed" Jerusalem as part of Israel, divides non-annexed Jerusalem district between Bethlehem, Jericho and Ramallah districts, and extends Jericho district north and south to include the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea coast.

A note on tables Some figures are given here "rounded" for the sake of readability; thus they are not reproduced exactly as shown by the sources and may not add up exactly to the totals shown.

A note on maps Maps included in this paper are drawn by Jan de Jong, geographic researcher from Holland.

I. Geographical features

The Occupied Palestinian Territory consists of two main regions known as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Its capital is East Jerusalem. Its borders are the "Green Line", the Armistice Line drawn in 1949 between the areas under control of Arab and Jewish forces after the 1948 war.

Between 1948 and 1967, the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian administration; the West Bank was under Jordanian administration and formally annexed between 1950 and 1988. Israel has occupied these two areas since June 1967. Israel "annexed" 70 square kilometers of the West Bank in 1967. This comprised the East Jerusalem municipal area of the Jordanian period plus surrounding land. This annexed area is now commonly referred to as East, or Arab, Jerusalem. No UN resolution has overturned General Assembly Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947 which determined that "The City of Jerusalem shall
be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations". Under this plan, a referendum was to be held after ten years to seek the views of the city’s residents as to whether the international regime should continue, or be modified.

As a proportion of all Palestine, 26,300 km², the OPT forms less than one quarter, just over 6,000 km². Compared to the area allocated to the proposed Arab state under the UN partition plan for Palestine of 1947, the area of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (hereafter OPT) is considerably smaller. Under the UN partition plan, the Arab state extended north to the Galilee and south to Bir a-Saba (Beersheba). Its "West Bank" reached further south and west from Jerusalem, to connect it physically to a larger "Gaza Strip" which reached farther north than today’s Gaza Strip and south-west well into the Naqab (Negev) desert.

It is convenient to divide the OPT into four main regions, the Gaza Strip, the northern, central and southern West Bank (Nablus, Jerusalem and Hebron regions respectively). Eight districts in the West Bank are named after their main cities: Jenin, Tulkarm and Nablus in the north, Jerusalem, Jericho Ramallah and Bethlehem in the centre, and Hebron in the south.

A very diverse topography characterises the country: the coastal dunes of Gaza, the fertile plains of the north-west and the Jordan Valley, the terraced hills of the northern and southern highlands, and the rocky semi-desert of the eastern slopes leading to the Dead Sea. The Mediterranean climate, generally one of hot, dry summers and short, wet, cool winters, varies considerably in average temperature and rainfall with altitude and distance from the Mediterranean. Jabal Asur, eight kilometers north-east of Ramallah in the north-central West Bank is the highest point at 1,022 meters; the northern part of Hebron city lies at a height of over 1,000 meters. Close to the Mediterranean, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Gaza and their
surrounding plains lie at an altitude of less than 100m. In the eastern West Bank, the relief drops sharply to the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea coast, the latter at 390m below sea level.

With an area of 5,700 km², the West Bank is 130km long and 45-50km wide on average, although this falls to 20km at its narrowest point around Jerusalem. One main upland ridge extending from south of Jenin to south of Hebron, forms the “backbone of Palestine”. It is crossed by valleys (wadis), cut by water courses; the largest include the intensively-farmed Fara’a Valley and the historic Kidron Valley running south-east from Nablus and Jerusalem respectively. This hill range is separated from the Galilee mountains in the north by the Marj Ibn ‘Amer plain and ends north of Bir Saba (Beersheva) and the Naqab (Negev) Desert. To the east lies the Jordan Valley, part of the great Syrian-East African Rift. Surface rocks seen in the West Bank are mostly marine sediments, limestone, dolomite and chalk. Because these rocks are porous, most water is contained in underground rock layers forming systems known as aquifers.

Parallel to the upland ridge, and to the north, lies Palestine’s coastal plain, now mostly within Israel. The Gaza Strip forms the southern part of the plain. A smaller section lies within the West Bank, the richly cultivated area around Jenin and Tulkarm. With sufficient rainfall and a topography including narrow but fertile valleys and the characteristic terraced slopes, the uplands were and still are able to support productive farming, particularly olive and fruit trees, and vegetables. Between central uplands and the Jordan Valley are the eastern foothills, mostly dry with little population but traditionally used as grazing ranges. Because of its semi-tropical climate, farming in the Jordan Valley relies on irrigation. Since then Israel has established military observation posts and civilian settlement in the Jordan Valley but the land has remained sparsely populated, with Jericho as the only major population centre. The 1967 war displaced thousands of Palestinians from this area.

The Gaza Strip is 45 km long and 6-13 km wide, with an area of 363 km². Historically, Gaza City and Khan Younis were major
centres on the overland trading route between Egypt and Syria. Gaza City remained a busy port during the British Mandate. In spite of its small size, the average annual rainfall varies markedly, from 350 mm in the north to only 150 mm per year in the south of the Strip. Gaza is known for its citrus plantations and other agricultural produce.

Aside from roads built to serve Israeli settlement, the traditional road network consists of two main roads which run north-south from Jenin to Hebron and Dhaheriya, and along the Jordan Valley, and two east-west links from the two Jordan River bridges, from the Damieh bridge to Nablus, Tulkarm and Qalqilya, and from the Allenby bridge to Jerusalem, Ramallah and Latrun.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupied Palestinian Territories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>area 6,000 km$^2$</td>
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<tr>
<td>population 2.2 million</td>
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<td>of which refugees 1.0 million</td>
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</tbody>
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Palestine was the name applied by Herodotus and other Greek and Latin writers to the Philistine coastland, and sometimes also to the territory between it and the Jordan Valley. Early in the Roman Empire, the name Palestina was given to the region around Jerusalem. The Byzantines in turn named the province west of the Jordan River, stretching from Mount Carmel in the north to Gaza in the south, Palestina Prima. Despite history's emphasis on the repeated invasions of tribes or empires, a great measure of continuity is still visible today. Numerous Palestinian village names pre-date the disruptive "invasions" and stand where villages have stood for thousands of years. So too the way of life of today's Palestinian villages testifies to the ancient traditions of subsistence agriculture, clustered house construction and distinctive folklore. Jericho has been a living city for nine thousand years. Bronze Age sites visible today tell of the Canaanite culture which dominated the eastern Mediterranean. Since then, Palestine has absorbed the influence of many civilisations,
including the Greek from which some of the names of its cities and villages derive.

Prophet Muhammad and his followers turned in their prayers to Jerusalem, not to Mecca. According to the Koran, Muhammad was miraculously transported in nocturnal flight from Mecca to Jerusalem, to this day the prophet’s spiritual journey is celebrated throughout the Muslim world. The Arabs captured Jerusalem from the Byzantines in 637 A.D. The Byzantine province of Palaestina Prima became the administrative and military province of Filastin—the Arabic name for Palestine since then.

Palestine has been a distinct area for centuries. Even in the tenth century, Palestine was known as a separate province, the most fertile of the Syrian provinces, with its capital in Ramleh.

Palestine was particularly honored by Umayyad Arab dynasty (661-750), whose capital was Damascus. Mu’awiya (661-680), the founder of the dynasty, had himself proclaimed caliph in Jerusalem. One of his successors, the fifth Umayyad caliph, Abd al-Malik (685-705), built the magnificent Mosque of the Dome of the Rock over the rock from which the Prophet Muhammad had ascended to heaven; Abd al-Malik’s son Walid (705-715) built the adjacent al-Aqsa Mosque. The Mosque of the Dome of the Rock, a dazzling synthesis of Byzantine, Persian, and Arab architecture, is the earliest surviving Muslim monument anywhere. The area of the two mosques became known as al-Haram al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary).

The Abbasid dynasty (750 -1225) with its seat in Baghdad, succeeded the Umayyads. Arab and Muslim rule over Palestine was interrupted by the Crusader invasion and the establishment of the United Kingdom of Jerusalem (1099-1187). The counter-Crusades, led by Saladin (died 1193) and his successors, persisted until 1291, when the last Frankish strongholds, Caesarea and Acre, were retaken.
In 1260 power passed from the hands of Saladin’s descendants, the Ayyubids, to those of the Mameluke sultans of Egypt. From that date until the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517, Palestine remained part of the Mameluke Kingdom.

From 1516 until the end of World War I, the whole region of western Asia was part of the Ottoman Empire. The majestic superstructure of the walls encircling the Old City of Jerusalem, built by the Ottoman sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66), attests to Jerusalem’s standing in Ottoman eyes.

Palestine was not a single Ottoman province. Southern Palestine was governed from Jerusalem; Northern Palestine was part of a separate province whose capital was Beirut. Although provincial governors and religious judges were usually Turkish representatives dispatched from Constantinople, most of the lower-level Ottoman administrators in Palestine—mayors, police and religious officials—were Arabs. Prominent local families, whose public service helped them to consolidate large landholdings, traded high offices from generation to generation.

Palestine was a quiet corner of the Ottoman Empire. There were Christian churches as well as mosques in the larger towns, and several small communities of Jewish scholars supported by foreign contributions. A steady traffic of pilgrims—Christian, Muslim and Jewish—travelled the railroad from Jaffa, on the coast, to Jerusalem. Jerusalem has European religious establishments, European clinics, schools and consuls. Palestine retained a high degree of autonomy until western powers once more invaded the area during the First World War and took control from the Ottomans. This coincided with the rise of national aspirations of the Arab populations of the Ottoman Empire. In Palestine, the Arab population’s early 20th century intellectual tradition included both a national identity and a sense of unity with other Arabs engaged in anti-colonial struggle. Britain, which had received a League of Nations mandate over Palestine after World War I, frustrated the aspirations of Arab nationalists, and in contradiction to its promises to the Arabs for Independence [Sherif
Hussein of Mecca and Sir Henry MacMahon Correspondence in 1915]. Britain incorporated into the Mandate the 1917 Balfour Declaration which supported the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. However, the Palestinian national leadership adhered to its goal, the creation of an independent Palestinian state, in which all were equal citizens, regardless of creed, race or origin.

Jewish immigrants of the 1930s were primarily industrialists and investors who effected a lasting impact on the core of Jewish settlement along the coast. As early as 1930, British officials were aware of the deterioration of quality of life for the Arabs as a result of Jewish colonisation, land acquisition and exclusive use of Jewish workers on farms and factories. During the Mandate, most of the cultivable land was already cultivated by Arab farmers, although Zionists publicly portrayed Palestine as a wasteland.

In the late 1930s, tensions flared up under the weight of economic hardships in the Arab population. After a protracted struggle, British troops quelled the Arab uprising of 1936-39. This was a severe setback for the Arab national movement in Palestine. British Government's white book of 1939 promised an Independent Palestine after ten years, and restrictions on Jewish immigration and land acquisition. This marked the start of a growing antagonism between Jewish militants and the British mandate government.

Despite increased Jewish immigration before and during the Second World War, Palestinians formed two-thirds of the population until 1948. Most were farmers, though by then many thousands lived as urban dwellers in the eight principal Arab cities.

After the World War II, the Jewish immigrants, who had already formed a self-governing community, received crucial moral and material support for establishing a Jewish authority in Palestine. A special committee of the UN, instructed to find a solution to the problem of Palestine, recommended partition of the country into two states: an Arab state and a Jewish state. Its proposal allotted more than half of the land to the Jewish community, which at the time
possessed no more than 7%. While the Jewish community accepted partition, expressing reservations only over the proposed borders, the Palestinian community strongly rejected it, reiterating the demand for undivided, an independent state.

Immediately after the UN adopted the partition plan in 1947, Arab and Jewish populations clashed. Although making up only one third of the country’s inhabitants, the Jewish community was far better equipped and organised than the Palestinian community or the surrounding Arab states who, while proclaiming support for the Palestinian cause, proved to be incompetent.
Map 1 shows the distribution of the population in Palestine in the closing days of Turkish Ottoman rule. At that time, the population numbered less than one million, of which more than 90% was Arab. Poor drainage on the coastal plain and drier conditions in the east concentrated habitation along the hilly upland ridge. Low lying marginal areas with sufficient rainfall, however, became prime settling ground for the Jewish colonial movement (triangles on the Map).

Map 2 Demographic developments in the next 30 years did not alter the pattern of Arab and Jewish communities in the country. But high Jewish immigration in the 1930s drastically increased the proportion of Jewish inhabitants to 30% of the total population, mainly concentrated in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem. The map shows how much of the marginal lands in the north and west had been acquired by Jewish individuals and corporate bodies, mainly from absentee landowners.
DISTRIBUTION OF ARAB AND JEWISH POPULATION IN ISRAEL, WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP JAN. 1967

- Arab population
- Jewish population
- Land under Israeli sovereignty
- Armistice (Green) Line 1949

Haifa
Tel Aviv/Jaffa
WEST BANK
Nablus
Hebron
GAZA STRIP
Gaza

DISTRIBUTION OF ARAB AND JEWISH POPULATION IN ISRAEL, WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP 1992

- Arab population
- Jewish population
- Land under Israeli sovereignty (Israel) or control (Occupied Territories)
- Armistice (Green) Line 1949

Tel Aviv/Jaffa
Gaza

- Arab population
- Jewish population
- Land under Israeli sovereignty (Israel) or control (Occupied Territories)
- Armistice (Green) Line 1949
Map 3 depicts the situation at the eve of the 1967 war. It shows the dramatic change in population distribution resulting from the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49. Large areas conquered by Israel witnessed the forced flight of the indigenous Palestinian population (south of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, the coastal plain, areas in the Galilee around Nazareth). These areas were settled by new Jewish immigrants. However, Palestinian Arab population remained dominant along the central uplands. Much of this, the West Bank, remained under Arab rule until 1967, along with the Gaza Strip.

Map 4. Israeli conquest of the last remaining areas of Palestine in 1967 opened the way for Jewish settlement there. The focus for settlement was East Jerusalem, which Israel had annexed with its immediate surroundings. The picture of changing population distribution emerging is one in which the area of Palestinian population is further fragmented, a pattern of increasingly isolated areas of Arab population surrounded by Jewish settlements.
After the State of Israel was proclaimed at the eve of British withdrawal in May 1948, the Israeli army, under a unified command, secured its hold over the originally mixed coastal area, displacing most of the Palestinian Arabs. Israeli forces proceeded to conquer areas allocated to the proposed Arab state and more than half of the designated international zone of Jerusalem. Israeli-controlled territory separated the Arab-held Gaza Strip in the south-west of Palestine, from the Arab-held territory in the highlands between Jenin and the Hebron hills. While Egypt retained control of the former area, Jordan incorporated the latter as the West Bank of the Kingdom. A new influx of Jewish immigrants began to populate the majority of Palestine under Israeli rule on the other side of the Armistice ("Green") Line, taking the place of Palestinian refugees.

After 60 years of organised immigration, in late 1948, Zionists achieved a Jewish majority. Between the start of the 1948 war and the Armistice in 1949, they cleared all but 130,000 Arabs from inside the Armistice lines, and displaced 780,000 Arabs to the margins of Palestine or neighbouring countries. These and their descendants are now over two million Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq Egypt and elsewhere. Many of these refugees are stateless. Those living in the Gaza Strip retain only their original Palestinian nationality. Many have been given Jordanian citizenship, both those living on the West Bank and in Jordan.

Despite the attempts to suppress the Palestinian nationalist activity in Arab states and Israel, such activity continued after the "Catastrophe" of 1948. In 1948, the Arab Higher Committee in Palestine organised a national congress in Gaza which formed a Government of All Palestine which functioned until 1957. A few years later, in 1964, the Palestine National Congress in Jerusalem resolved to establish the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

In 1967, Israeli forces occupied the remainder of Mandatory Palestine, the two areas known as the West Bank and Gaza Strip or the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Palestinian sustained resistance to occupation culminated in late 1987 with the Intifada.
urban-dwellers, landed families and business-people joined in opposition to the policies of the Israeli occupation. In the West Bank and Gaza, the autonomous organisational infrastructure grew in strength, assisted by Jordan’s disengagement in July-1988. Despite the human cost, through the Intifada Palestinians have reaffirmed their national identity and pride and set themselves firmly on the path to freedom and independence.
III. Population

There is no reliable census data about the population of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Palestinian sources estimate it to be 2.2-2.3 million in 1992.

One Palestinian source (NHP) gives a figure of 2,239,000, divided by districts as shown in Table 1. Its projected population for the year 2002 is 3.2 million. Another source (ATF/ARC) gives a slightly higher figure of 2,246,000 (both sources provide a breakdown of the population of every town, village and camp in the OPT). A third Palestinian source (PSP) uses a slightly higher estimate of 2,265,000 for 1990 (1,492,000 in the West Bank and 773,000 in the Gaza Strip). Palestinian estimates are based on projections from the Jordanian census of 1961 and/or the Israeli census of 1967 (NHP, PSP).
Palestinian Occupied Territory

Of an estimated 5.8 million Palestinians worldwide, those living in the OPT constitute more than one third. Almost one third of Palestinians live in Jordan, 20% in Arab countries, 13% in Israel and 8% in the rest of the world (Center for Policy Analysis 1992).

Israeli population statistics

Israeli official statistics are inaccurate (see introduction) and give a lower figure for the OPT population than Palestinian sources. They estimate the population at the end of 1992 as 2 million, including 142,000 in East Jerusalem, and at the end of 1991 as 1.8 million, excluding East Jerusalem - just over 1.1 million in the West Bank and just under 700,000 in the Gaza Strip.

Population density and growth

Population density, around 370 persons per km² overall, differs greatly between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with approximately 260 and 2,100 persons per km² respectively (PSP). One of the most crowded places in the world, the Gaza Strip has a population density of 3,590 persons per km², if one discounts the 38% of Israeli-controlled land (PDP) Gaza city has a population density of 14,000 person per km².

Like many non-industrialised countries, the OPT has a very young population. Half the population is below the age of 15, putting great pressure on present and future education and health services and housing. Over 60 percent of the Palestinian population was born after 1967 and has known only the circumstances of military occupation.

Birth rates in 1991 were around 50 per thousand population: 46.5 per 1,000 in the West Bank and 56.1 in the Gaza Strip. Though fluctuating, birth rates have remained relatively constant overall between 1968 and 1991, at 41-47 in the West Bank and 42-56 in Gaza (CBS 1992).
Population growth increased notably when for the first time in 1991 there was a substantial positive immigration balance, that is, difference between residents' departures and entrances. This can be attributed to contracting employment opportunities abroad and returnees from the Gulf. Population growth is now around 5% compared to 0-3% previously (see Tables 2 and 3).

Urban-Rural Characteristics

Traditional Palestinian society was one where the majority of the population lived in villages and engaged in agriculture. In 1967, close to 70% of the population was rural. In the seventies and eighties, the ratio of rural to urban population fell due to migration to cities, especially to Nablus and Hebron, and East Jerusalem (though non-Jerusalemites could not move to "annexed" Jerusalem). This movement was encouraged by the expansion of transportation and availability of wage labour in Israel, and locally in construction and services. However, Israeli restrictions on Palestinian construction and industrial development limited urbanisation. This resulted in the characteristic pattern of the daily movement of workers from refugee camps and villages to Israel. Palestinian society changed with the shift to wage labour which relegated farming to second place.

In spite of these changes, the rural character of the society remains; 40% of the population, excluding the 17% who live in refugee camps, still live in around 440 villages ranging in size from hamlets of a few houses to small towns of up to 20,000 inhabitants. Today, excluding camps, only one quarter of the population lives in the four main centres, (Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron, and Gaza) and another one quarter lives in villages of less than 5,000 inhabitants.

What is defined as urban centres depends not only on their population, but on their social and economic characteristics and functions. Palestinian planners (PSP) use a category of "semi-urban" to denote villages which have taken on urban characteristics. In these centres live 5% of the population. Thus half the non-camp population is now urban or semi-urban and only 35% rural (see Table 4).
Gaza Strip, where there are only nine villages, considering the large refugee camps as urban areas, over 90% of the population is urban. After Gaza, Jerusalem is the most urbanised of the four major regions, followed by Hebron. In the northern West Bank (Nablus region), almost 60% of the population continue to live in villages.

Extending from north of Ramallah to south of Bethlehem, the greater Arab Jerusalem area has the most concentrated population, with 300,000 Palestinians.

Cities and towns

Each of the four main districts has characteristic features. Gaza is a sprawling city of over 200,000 people, including Shati (Beach) camp, which as its name suggests lies along the sandy shore. East Jerusalem is the largest city of the West Bank, followed by Nablus in the north with around 120,000 inhabitants and by Hebron, in the south, with 100,000 inhabitants. Nablus is an industrial centre, producing soap, oils, sweets, building materials and other manufactures. Because of the large number of villages in the good farmland surrounding the city, it is an active market centre. Hebron is the industrial and commercial center for the southern West Bank and a place of religious pilgrimage. All four cities have universities and colleges. Two other Gaza Strip cities, Khan Younis and Rafah, each have 90,000 inhabitants, with refugees making up a large proportion of their population. Gaza refugee camps have more inhabitants than most old West Bank cities. While more refugee camps are located in the West Bank, they are smaller and dispersed over a larger area than in Gaza, where they are a more dominating feature of the landscape.

There are six smaller cities in the West Bank with populations of 25-30,000: the adjoining cities of El-Bireh and Ramallah in the central region, the agricultural and commercial centres of Jenin, Tulkarm and Qalqilya in the north. Bethlehem, just south of Jerusalem, is a pilgrimage and tourist center with tourism-related industries predominating. It also has a university. Ramallah and El-Bireh, in addition to being market and service centres, have light
industries. Smaller towns in the West Bank include Beit Sahour and Beit Jala neighbouring Bethlehem to the east and west; Halhoul, north of Hebron, and Dura and Yatta, south of Hebron; and Jericho, one of the most ancient cities in the world, in the Jordan Valley (see Table 5).

Emigration

Between 1967 and 1986, more than a quarter of a million Palestinians emigrated from the West Bank and Gaza Strip (PASSIA 1990). Annual emigration by 1986 represented around 40% of natural population growth. Many young Palestinians seek employment in the Arab world or the West but plan eventually to return. The groups most likely to emigrate are refugees who reside outside camps, and the middle class, including Christians and urban dwellers, especially in the Jerusalem and Ramallah areas. Reasons for emigration vary, but the most obvious are the lack of suitable employment and opportunities for business and professional advancement. A relatively high level of education, together with the presence of family members abroad, seem to be factors that specifically encourage emigration among middle class Palestinians, particularly Christians.

After the Gulf war, Kuwait and other Gulf states expelled tens of thousands of Palestinians, most of whom had worked there for years. There were in early 1992 in the OPT an estimated 25-27,000 returnees from the Gulf (ATF/ARC, ILO 1992). This influx coincided with the worsening economic crisis in the OPT, and many returnees subsequently went to Jordan to await better circumstances.

Refugees

Approximately 45% of the population of the OPT are registered refugees, although only 17% of the total population of the OPT lives in refugee camps. Since 1948, the number of Palestinian refugees has tripled due to natural population growth and the additional refugees of the 1967 war. By 1992, there were some 2.6 million Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. Only 38% of Palestinian refugees in the
Middle East, approximately one million people, live in the West Bank and Gaza. Of these, only 40% live in refugee camps.

According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the number of registered Palestinian refugees at the end of 1951 was 880,000. By 1960, this had risen to 1.1 million, most of whom lived in refugee camps, and by 1968, to 1.4 million.

In terms of the proportion of refugees who have moved out of camps and the proportion relative to the general population, there is a marked difference between the West Bank, where one quarter (26%) of refugees live in 19 camps, and the Gaza Strip, where just over half (55%) live in eight camps. Refugees form 35% of the population in the West Bank, but 73% in the Gaza Strip (see Table 7).

**Refugee camps**

Most refugee camps in the OPT were established between 1948 and 1953. Shufat camp, the only camp in annexed Jerusalem, was established in 1965 for relocation of refugees who had settled in Jerusalem’s crowded Old City after 1948. Camps in the northern areas, Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm, accommodated refugees from Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, their surrounding villages and the Galilee. Refugees from Lyd and Ramle regions are to be found mainly in Balata camp. Most refugees from southern and central Palestine live in the camps of the Hebron and Bethlehem areas.

Aqbat Jabr and Ein Sultan Refugee Camps had populations of 27,700 and 18,900 refugees respectively prior to the June War of 1967, but the fighting forced the majority of camp residents to Jordan. Also near Jericho one can still see the rubble of Nuwaimeh camp, which had a population of over 5,000 until it was deserted during the 1967 war.

Most of the Gaza refugee population originate from the coastal and southern parts of Palestine. In the Gaza Strip as a whole, the
influx of refugees resulted in enormous pressure on land use, housing, health and education services. Five of the eight camps have populations larger than most towns in the West Bank; the largest, Jabalia, is home to 65,000 people. Although now nearly half the refugee population have moved out of camps, they are still severely overcrowded and physical conditions are extremely poor, with cramped housing, many unpaved streets and open sewers. Camps in the West Bank are generally smaller, with populations ranging from 1,000 to 15,000. UNRWA, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, is responsible for refugee camps. It provides health and education services, water and electricity supply, sanitation, and building control.
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation is the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Since the 60s, the PLO has been the focus of Palestinian political loyalty and action, has forged strong links with Palestinians in the OPT, and constituted an umbrella organization for the various resistance groups. In the most significant moves of recent years, the Palestine National Council, the overall policy-making body, passed the Palestinian Declaration of Independence on 15 November 1988. At the UN General Assembly in December 1988, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat called for peaceful co-existence between the two states, Palestine and Israel.
Background

In May 1964, following the Arab summit of that year which gave a regional backing for a Palestinian entity, 422 Palestinian national figures meeting in Jerusalem founded the Palestine Liberation Organisation. They laid down the structure of Palestine National Council, PLO Executive Committee, National Fund and a Palestine Liberation Army, and approved a Palestinian National Covenant and Basic Law. In 1968, the Second PNC meeting included representatives of resistance organisations and Palestinian nationalist groups which had grown in the 1950s and 60s. In 1969, commando groups joined the third PNC, which elected as chairman Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fatah).

Structure

Of 482 PNC members, 180 reside in the OPT and are unable to attend meetings due to Israeli travel and legal restrictions. Their names have never been publicised. PNC members represent political groups, different geographical areas and refugee communities, and various professional bodies including unions of farmers, lawyers, students, workers, doctors, women, engineers, journalists, writers, artists and teachers. Represented in the PNC are Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestine People’s Party, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the PFLP General Command, the Baathist group Saiqa, and other smaller factions and groups.

Elected by the PNC, the 12-member PLO Executive Committee implements PNC decisions and speaks and acts on behalf of the Palestinian people. All executive committee members, with the addition of others elected by the PNC, form the 95-member PLO Central Council which meets several times a year to review the activities of the Executive Committee. Executive Committee members have Ministerial positions in the various PLO departments. These include departments responsible for foreign affairs, higher education,
military, the Occupied Territories, national relations (with Arab states), popular organisations, information and culture, administration, social affairs, economics and planning, health and finance (the National Fund). Finance comes from three main sources: tax deducted from Palestinian workers via Arab governments, direct contributions from Arab governments, and contributions of friendly governments and individuals.

Landmarks

Between 1967 - 87 the PLO was involved in a variety of resistance activities against Israeli occupation. Most notable was the PLO involvement in the battle of Karamah in March 1968. In late 1970, civil war in Jordan between the PLO (and its supporters) and the Jordanian Government weakened, if not crushed, the PLO base in Jordan. One outcome of this was mass migration of Palestinians to Lebanon. Reflecting their dismay with the Jordanian Government a group of Palestinians formed Black September (named after the month in which the civil war began) in order to retaliate against Jordanian decision makers involved in the events surrounding the civil war. In the 1970’s the PLO established a strong base for Palestinians in Lebanon and increased the strength of the organizational infrastructure. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon in order to destroy the PLO infrastructure and to eradicate its mini-state institutions. As a result PLO members dispersed into other Arab countries and the headquarters of the PLO became situated in Tunis where it has remained until the present day.

In 1987 the Intifada ushered a new chapter of Palestinian resistance to end Israeli occupation. In addition to introducing new forms for resisting occupation, the leadership of the Intifada initiated a political programme the core of which is the establishment of an Independent Palestinian State beside Israel. In an attempt to accommodate international demands, and to reassert its authority the PNC declared the Independence of the State of Palestine in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. The declaration of Independence gained recognition from scores of states but the
territory on which the state was proclaimed remained under Israeli military control. In pursuance of its accomodative policy the PLO consented to Palestinian participation in the Peace Talks under the co-sponsorship of the U.S. and Russia in 1991.

**Municipalities**

Local government in the form of Municipal and village councils have existed in Palestine since the Mandate. Municipal and village councils have responsibility for the following: supply of water, electricity and waste disposal; establishment and maintenance of schools; planning, building control, construction and maintenance of roads within their boundaries; and control of public markets and other facilities. Thirty cities and towns in the OPT have municipal councils (see Table 8). There are around 80 village councils, although prior to 1967, there were over one hundred. Nablus, one of the largest municipalities, employs 950 people.

When in 1976 the Israeli authorities decided to allow 23 municipal elections, 88,000 people voted, 72% of those eligible. Nationalist pro-PLO candidates won in most cities and towns in the West Bank. In 1982, the Israeli occupation authorities disbanded most of the elected councils, who had refused to cooperate with the new Israeli "civilian administration". The Israeli Civilian Administration has limited the powers of Municipal councils and has solidified its control over policies, budgets and areas of jurisdiction.

In Gaza, the history of the municipal system under Israeli occupation is more bleak: the last municipal election in Gaza was held in 1946. Using the pretext that British Mandatory regulations gave the Commissioner sole authority over elections, appointments and dismissals, the Israeli authorities twice dismissed the Gaza city mayor, for refusing to link the city to the Israeli electricity network and for refusing to extend municipal services to Nusseirat refugee camp. At present, Gaza, like many municipalities in the OPT, is run by an Israeli officer who acts as mayor.
Higher Councils

Higher Councils have been established by Palestinians as bodies through which they can exercise their national authority. The Higher Education Council dates from 1977. In addition to it, Higher Councils currently exist for Housing, Measurements and Specifications, and Culture and Media. Those in the process of being formed include Higher Councils for Agriculture, Health and Industry.

Legal System

During the Mandate, with the exception of religious courts, the British authorities retained all legislative, executive and judicial powers. After 1950, Jordan applied its legal system to the West Bank, while Gaza was left with an amalgam of Ottoman and British legal systems.

Courts of Law

Palestinian courts based on religious authority, either Islamic sharia or church courts, deal with marriage, divorce, dowry, inheritance and other family matters. Local civil courts established under British and Jordanian administrations continue to function. However, this system is severely constrained. Judges in local courts are Palestinian, but appointed by the Israeli military authorities. This, along with allegations of corruption and the absence of supervisory bodies over judges and lawyers, gives the courts little credibility. This has created what lawyers regard as legal chaos, without any regular process for resolving disputes.

In 1967, the Israeli military authorities assumed control of the judicial system. They excluded from the jurisdiction of local civil courts matters relating to state land and "security offences" (generally all cases involving Palestinians and Israelis or the Israeli authorities). These courts deal with all other civil and criminal cases between Palestinians, although with limited police force to enforce judgements. Since the Intifada these courts have dealt mainly with civil claims,
because the army has taken over traffic control and other matters from the police and court system. In 1987, 75% of matters entered were road traffic cases (21% were criminal cases and the remainder other civil cases, enforcement of contracts, debts, damages, CBS 1992). Local courts follow Jordanian (in Gaza, Egyptian) law as it has been changed by Israeli military orders. The Israeli authorities do not allow them to use Jordanian amendments made since 1967, although Jordanian law has seen many major changes since 1967, such as the new Civil Code and laws relating to labour rights, rent control, condominiums and commercial practices.

The military authorities can remove any file from the local court to the military court. Although Israel "allows" Palestinians to challenge Israeli administrative action in the Israeli High Court, there are very few instances of success because the Court does not interfere with substantive decisions of the military authorities. Under international law, the High Court has no jurisdiction in the OPT.

With annexation in 1967, the Israeli authorities dissolved Jerusalem district court and removed the appeal court from East Jerusalem to Ramallah. In annexed Jerusalem, the Israeli Ministry of Justice administers local and district courts. Jerusalem Palestinians wishing to take legal action must use the Israeli court in Jerusalem or the Ramallah local court.

Military courts (see Chapter 13 below) are run and staffed by the Israeli military authorities. Apart from dealing with criminal cases, cases involving claimed "state" land, and violations of the Jordanian Antiquities Law (which is often a pretext to prevent Palestinian building), the military courts also hear cases where Palestinians challenge the Israeli authorities, such as appeals against land confiscation, tax demands, house demolition orders, or refusal of permits for enterprises.
Palestinian Occupied Territory

Lawyers boycott

Most Jerusalem Palestinian lawyers have boycotted the Israeli legal system including its courts since 1967, refusing to recognize Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem. Although some lawyers are now working, almost 300 still boycott the courts. Most are involved in civic life, in politics or professional, educational or charitable institutions. Some still provide legal advice and assist clients in negotiations with other parties, but without the basis of court rulings or enforcement action. They were joined in the boycott by many lawyers from the West Bank outside Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. However, many lawyers have returned to work in military courts in order to ameliorate as far as possible the conditions of detainees.

Land registration

In the late 1920s, the British started formal land registration, concentrating on the Jordan Valley and the north of Palestine, where there was good land and greater demand for clarity of title to allow Jewish purchase and settlement. Although the Ottomans and British recorded all land holdings for taxation purposes, by 1967, only just over one third of West Bank land was formally registered. Located in Ramallah, the West Bank land register holds formal and fiscal records. In 1979, the Israeli authorities began declaring unregistered land as “state” land, taking it under their control. Palestinians have no access to records of declared state land. Moreover, since 1979, the Ramallah register is no longer open to the public, only to owners or those with their power of attorney.

Like other central services, Israel moved the register of land and immovable property from East Jerusalem to its register in West Jerusalem after 1967. Today, few Palestinians use the Israeli register. In 1991, an Israeli raid on the East Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce and confiscation of records disrupted the unofficial alternative system of registration of transfers.
Israeli Military Administration and Annexation

Since June 1967, Israel has administered the Occupied Palestinian Territories, except annexed Jerusalem, through its Military Commanders of the Central and Southern Districts, responsible for the West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively, and military governors in various localities.

Israeli officials generally use the term "administered areas", in line with Israel's refusal to acknowledge that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are occupied territory on the grounds that Israel did not capture them from their sovereign rulers. Its Military Government exercises legislative, judicial and executive powers. Palestinians and international bodies have repeatedly demanded that Israel uphold international law related to military occupation, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, and have called for international protection for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

Between June 1967 and the end of 1992, the Israeli military authorities had issued 1,369 military orders (for the West Bank, with an equivalent set numbered separately for Gaza) dealing with all areas of Palestinian life in the Occupied Territories (JMCC 1993). They refer to absentee property, agriculture, banking, courts and lawyers, currency transactions, emergency and security provisions, employment, health, industry, insurance, land, planning, taxation and customs, and water. Despite Israel's international legal obligation as an occupying power to retain the law in force immediately before occupation, its military orders ammend over 100 Jordanian laws and Egyptian law. Many orders and directives are not published. Palestinian analysts have identified four stages in the Israeli military authorities' legislative changes in the West Bank (Shehadeh 1993). Within the first month of occupation, the military authorities issued orders giving itself all legislative, executive and judicial power, and control over major areas of life. By 1971 they had assumed control over the legal and judicial system, over land and other immovable property, water and natural resources, banking, imports and exports, municipal and village councils, identity cards, permits to drive, travel
or practice a profession, freedom of the press and assembly. From 1971 to 1982, military orders amended Jordanian law to facilitate sale of land to Jews, transferred planning powers to the military authorities, established the Civil Administration (see below) and a separate system of local government for Jewish settlements. Orders made settlers in the West Bank subject to Israeli civilian law, as if they were living in Israel, although later defining them as local residents to enable them to work in the West Bank without work permits.

Since the early 1980s, military orders have restricted planting of certain crops, further extended Israeli law to settlers, established local courts in settlements, allowed appointment of Israelis as mayors to previously elected positions, and further restricted the Palestinian press, residency rights, commerce, currency transactions, export and import.

**Civil Administration**

In November 1981, Israel established the Civil Administration. This partly differentiated the functions of governing the Palestinian population under occupation from military operations. The initiative was in line with Israel’s autonomy proposals of the 1979 Camp David Agreement.

Still subordinate to the Israeli military command, with all legislative and judicial power vested in the Military Commanders, and ultimately accountable to the Ministry of Defence, the Civil Administration controls various aspects of Palestinian life. It took over health, education, agriculture, construction, planning and other departments. It collects taxes, enforces residency laws, and operates a system of permits for travel, businesses, construction and so on. In establishing the Civil Administration, Israel aimed to separate a realm of overall powers which would remain with Israel even if Palestinians were granted autonomy. Palestinians therefore refused to extend legitimacy to it. This was an important factor in Israel’s 1982 decision to dismiss municipal councils in the Occupied Territories. Taxes imposed on Palestinians formed 88% of the Civilian Administration income in 1992 (ILO).
Planning and housing

Many Palestinian communities in the Occupied Territories, particularly refugee camps, villages and old city centres, suffer acute overcrowding, poor housing, and dilapidated infrastructure such as roads and drains. Especially in Palestinian neighbourhoods of annexed Jerusalem and rural villages, Israeli zoning plans permit building in limited areas. This takes account of neither of traditional land ownership patterns nor the needs of a growing population. Another factor for most people is lack of financial resources. Apart from limited outside support for cooperatives in the 1980s, all construction is privately financed. Extended families are therefore forced to share houses, a situation not suited to changing social conditions and labour mobility. Rents are particularly high in Jerusalem, and everywhere the rental sector is very limited.
Palestinian Occupied Territory

Israel has demolished around 2,300 Palestinian houses since 1987 alone, either as collective punishment or for infringement of planning regulations (PHRIC). According to the Housing Council, over 100,000 new housing units are immediately needed in the OPT. In July 1992 the European Community granted the Housing Council $37 million, enough for 1,200 units, little over one percent of requirements.

Israel has assumed all planning powers in the OPT through its Civil Administration and, in annexed Jerusalem, its Municipality and Interior Ministry. In practice, most resources are devoted to planning of Jewish settlements and enforcing restrictions on Palestinian building. Planning is one area in which Israel has selectively used British and Jordanian laws to the detriment of Palestinians as far as control over land use is concerned. For example, it defines all land outside village cores as "agricultural" where building, even of farm buildings, is not permitted. It also prevents Palestinian building in the vicinity of roads (see Coon 1992). Most village families cannot therefore use their land for building. Delays in preparing plans and in processing applications to build are perhaps the most effective instruments of this policy. Those who wish to build can choose to continue to wait or to proceed and run the risk of demolition.

UNRWA, although it controls building permits inside camps, reports that the Israeli planning authorities have by various means delayed construction of several of its health and education facilities.

**Household size and housing density**

Households are generally large and crowded. Some indications are that more than 40% of households have seven or more members; the average household size is more than six persons, with more than two persons per room; one third of households have three or more persons per room (see Table 10).
Of the many factors influencing overall social and health conditions, infrastructure is one of the most significant. Waste disposal and water supply are among the major problems in the OPT, particularly in rural areas.

Many Palestinian communities have no piped water and use rain-fed cisterns. Very few have sewage systems and many had no garbage disposal system. Most do not have constant electricity supplies, and depend on local networks which operate for a few hours each day, use home generators or have no electricity (for an overview of infrastructure and public utilities, see PDP 1992). Lack of such basic services has been confirmed by Palestinian research on primary health care and services in rural communities (see Table 10). Israeli statistics include reference to possession of household amenities and equipment as an indicator of standard of living (see Table 11). They indicate that a significant proportion of houses lack heating facilities and bathrooms. Most houses have no means of heating water other than solar panels, which are not effective during winter. Very few houses have telephones, although around one half of households have a television set.

Most international funding agencies have neglected infrastructural development because of its direct links to Israel control of basic resources: water, electricity, roads and other communications. Particular needs include improving existing utility and communications networks: public transport, rural roads, telecommunications, electricity and water supply, sewerage and solid waste disposal; and renovation of old and historic buildings.

Water

Around 70% of homes have piped water, supplied via municipalities, UNRWA and village councils from the Ramallah Water Company, which has its own wells and supplies much of the central region, and from the Israeli company, Mekorot. Much of the population,
especially in rural villages and in Gaza, receive piped water at very low pressure for only part of the day. High losses from ageing pipelines, Israeli constraints on developing new sources and discriminatory pricing policy contribute to high prices and shortages of water. Much of the Gaza water supply, due to overpumping and the water deficit, has levels of nitrates and other salts potentially injurious to health. Compared to Palestinians, Israeli settlers consume at least three times more water per person and pay considerably less for water; Israel allocates settlers around seven times more water per person (WBGA).

**Electricity**

In the West Bank, the long-established East Jerusalem-based Jerusalem District Electricity Company, JDEC, owned by Palestinian shareholders and municipalities, are the principal suppliers of power. Diesel generators used in many villages and by some municipalities are the only power generating capacity in the OPT. Before 1967, the JDEC supplied much of the West Bank. Israeli policy to remove this capacity, combined with lack of capital and expertise, have forced JDEC to cease generating and to buy from the Israeli grid at higher prices than Israeli bulk customers. Palestinians pay between 15% and 40% more than Israelis, who consume 13 times more electricity per head than Palestinians in the OPT. Around 40% of the rural population have electricity for only a few hours per day. Poor quality transformers and low tension networks cause power losses, current fluctuations and low voltages, and mean increased costs passed to consumers.

Israel has refused to allow JDEC to operate its diesel generators obtained in the early 1980s. They requires permission for any Palestinian installations, while the Israeli Electric Company proceeds with its works, including interference with Palestinian installations and confiscation of land.
Sanitation

Less than ten percent of the rural population live in the few towns and refugee camps with piped sewage systems (HDIP). Overall, only around 30% of houses are connected to sewage systems. Most of the remainder rely on cesspits. Only 12 of 29 municipalities have sewage networks, but only one, Ramallah, has a treatment plant. Effluent from other urban areas runs into the ground or valley water courses. Most piped systems use septic tanks, which often overflow causing sewage contamination of surrounding land and sub-surface water. Although the UN has begun to install sewage networks in some refugee camps, in most camps sewage runs into open drains which pass close to houses and discharge into open pools, usually located nearby, or, in Gaza, into the sea.

In cities and camps, municipalities and UNRWA organise garbage collection. Four-fifth of communities in the West Bank, including most villages, do not have garbage containers or collection services (HDIP), and therefore people dispose of garbage on wasteland or by burning. Even where collection is organised, there are no treatment plants, only open dumps.

Communications

An estimated, 40% of West Bank roads are below acceptable operational standards, due to a lack of maintenance and new construction. In the Gaza Strip, despite its small size, almost half of roads are unpaved. In Gaza, the lower road density, 0.26 km per 1,000 population compared with 1.8 km in the West Bank, reflects the higher population density. Around 10% of households in OPT have a private car, a level suppressed by Israeli taxes on sales and import, road tax, and control of vehicle and driving licences. There is no operating rail system in the OPT. Public transport consists of buses and shared taxis. Buses operate on a franchise system, which like many buses themselves, dates from the Jordanian administration, and the majority of companies operate only one or two buses. Absence of subsidies leads operators to abandon less profitable routes,
leaving at least 150 villages with no bus service, although some villages run unlicensed systems of pickup vans and taxis.

Settler traffic adds to the burden on dilapidated existing roads. Only within Municipality boundaries have Palestinians responsibility for roads. Israel pays only part of the cost of road maintenance in rural areas, villagers or international donors the rest. Because Jerusalem is the natural centre for the OPT network, transport is disrupted more generally by Israel’s ban on persons and vehicles entering annexed Jerusalem without a special permit, even in transit.

Passengers and goods travel to Jordan across the Allenby and Damiya bridges and to Egypt through the Rafah border crossing, all of which are controlled by the Israeli military. Travel through these points is hampered by searches of people and goods, closures on Israeli holidays, Israeli fees and permit requirements, and daily quotas of bridge crossings. Airline passengers to the Arab world must travel via the bridges and Amman. Qalandia airport, the only operating airport in the OPT, is used for Israeli domestic flights; its annexation to Israel in 1967 was one of the reasons for the strangely-shaped border of annexed East Jerusalem.
6.1. Introduction

After 1948, the majority of good agricultural land came under the control of Israel. Traditionally based on agriculture and to a lesser extent on small craft industry and quarrying, the economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip suffered neglect under Jordanian and Egyptian administration and Israeli occupation. In the absence of capital investment in agricultural or industrial development, and with the expansion of the labour market in Israel in the 1970s and 80s, many Palestinians found work in Israel. In 1970, the Israeli Ministry of Defence in its report *Development and the Economic Situation in the Occupied Territories* stated: *The areas are a supplementary market for Israeli goods and services on the one hand and a source of factors of production, especially unskilled labour, for the Israeli economy on the other.*
Prior to accelerated Soviet Jewish immigration of 1990-92 and the Gulf War, over 100,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip worked in Israel. Along with the flow of remittances from migrant workers abroad, this permitted relatively high levels of consumption which obscured the weak domestic economy of the OPT and its control by the Israeli economy. Military orders exist relating to all aspects of economy including taxation, currency, capital transfer, operating permits, use of water and other natural resources.

From 1991 on, successively more severe Israeli movement restrictions have reduced dramatically Palestinian wage income from Israel. This, combined with the cut in remittances from the Gulf, and the halt of exports to the Gulf, have caused a deepening economic crisis. In 1992, hopes of economic stability resulting from the peace process and returnees from the Gulf, Jordan and the US, brought a slight increase in construction and international tourism, though not in the economic base of agriculture and manufacturing.

In the Gaza Strip, economic dependence on Israel is especially apparent. Around 60% of the Gaza GNP at the beginning of the intifada came directly or indirectly from work in Israel, which explains how the GNP grew under occupation, though without investment in the economy. But only in certain sectors such as construction and agriculture do Israeli employers depend on Gaza Strip workers. Most of Gaza imports come from Israel and 90% of its exports go there. Israel encourages Gazan citrus production and sub-contracting industry in the interests of its economy. Gaza has no other export outlet and a small domestic market because of the low buying power of its population. There is therefore a severe marketing problem for manufactured goods and agricultural products, resulting in very low prices.

6.2. Land and water

In terms of agricultural potential, as determined by topography and rainfall, we can identify five main zones of the West Bank and Gaza.
Forming more than half of the OPT area, some 3,500 km², is the central highlands, characterised by high rainfall of 400-700mm, slopes prone to erosion, and small plateaus used for field crops and summer vegetables. With an area of 1,500 km², the eastern slopes are suitable for grazing, and, despite the lower rainfall of around 250mm, for some field crops. Three smaller zones of 400 km² or less are fertile plains, potentially highly productive especially of winter vegetables and fruit given adequate water, the semi-coastal zone, which benefits from a high average annual rainfall of around 600mm; the Gaza coastal zone, and the Jordan Valley, which have a low rainfall of 100-400mm, varying with latitude, but many springs and wells.

During the occupation, Israel has severely restricted the primary resources vital to the development of Palestinian agriculture, namely land and water. In addition to expropriation or military closure of over half of the land area of the OPT, including most grazing land, the Israeli authorities have exercised firm control over Palestinian use of water and have diverted water resources for use in Israel and its settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Thus the area of irrigated land has declined, despite an overall increase in the area under cultivation as a result of increased attention to farming during the Intifada.

Through military orders, the Israeli military authorities control all existing and new water installations. They have destroyed Palestinian wells and dried up supplies by digging and pumping from deeper wells for Israeli use. As a result, in Gaza, water extracted by Palestinian wells has exceeded recharge, leading to a water deficit, a drop in the water table and an increase in salinity to levels incompatible with citrus cultivation. Israel has permitted no Palestinian deep wells and very few shallow wells, and enforces metering and consumption quotas.

What is commonly perceived as an absolute shortage of water in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is rather a problem of distribution. Israel diverts the Jordan river and the natural flow west into Gaza,
and exploits heavily the West Bank underground sources, especially in the northern West Bank. One quarter of Israel's consumption has its source in West Bank aquifers, representing at least 80% of the resources of the West Bank (PSP). Water resources of the OPT consist of the annual average renewable water balance and the territorial share of the Jordan river basin water. In the West Bank, the water balance is some 800 million m$^3$, around 80 million in the Gaza Strip and the rest in the West Bank (estimated at 600-800 million m$^3$ DPA, WBGA). Some Palestinian planners estimate total resources including the Jordan to which Palestinians currently have no access at as much as at 1,080 million m$^3$ (PSP).

Various estimates are available of Palestinian consumption: from annual domestic and industrial consumption of 60 million m$^3$ (PSP, DPA) to 40 m$^3$ million (WBGA). Three-quarters of non-agricultural water supply comes from 87 artesian wells, the rest from the Israeli network, springs and cisterns. Annual consumption for irrigation is estimated at 160 million m$^3$ (PSP, DPA), 60% of which comes from over 2,000 wells, most in the Gaza Strip, and 40% from springs and surface runoff (PSP). Palestinians draw water from 295 springs (120 all-year), most in the western foothills of the West Bank.

6.3. Agriculture

Of the total area of the OPT, around 80% is cultivable or has the capacity for cultivation if reclaimed; the rest is semi-desert, some of which is suitable for grazing. On the one third of the land area which is cultivated, Palestinian farmers are engaged in production of over 60 types of crop and five of livestock, the farming patterns varying with climate and topography.

Restrictions

Apart from restrictions on use of water, several factors have hindered agricultural development: the small size of most farm holdings and plots which is caused by inheritance practices and hinders mechanisation, limited extension services, contracting marketing
possibilities for surpluses, and dependency on imported inputs and underdeveloped agro-industries. Israel requires Palestinians to have permits to operate agricultural machinery, and restricts planting of trees and flowers. In addition, farmers have sustained losses as a result of Israeli confiscation and destruction of produce and equipment, and curfews and other movement restrictions which prevent irrigation, spraying, harvesting and marketing of crops, tending to animals and securing supplies.

While agriculture contributed nearly 35% of GDP in 1968-74, this fell to 22% in 1982-85 and to only 19% by 1987 (see Table 12). Agriculture thus makes up around one fifth of GDP.

**Workers and farmers**

In 1989, according to Israeli statistics, agriculture employed around 42,000 farmers and labourers, including nearly one third in the West Bank and one fifth in the Gaza Strip of all employed persons. A pattern becoming more prevalent in recent years is of a family farm where adult men have other employment and work on the farm part-time. In the Jordan Valley, most farmers are share-tenants, with seasonal agricultural labourers used at harvest. In the central highlands, most farmers are independent smallholders who have a low level of capital assets, depend on draft animals and family labour, with hired labourers for the olive harvest. In the northern semi-coastal area there are more tenant farmers, and a higher level of mechanisation (mostly leased machinery).

**Cultivated land**

Approximately one third of the land of the OPT is cultivated. Of this, one tenth is irrigated. Despite the high population density, half of the land of the Gaza Strip is cultivated, compared to just under one third of that of the West Bank. Overall, the area of cultivated land in the West Bank is 5% less than it was 20 years ago, although it increased during the Intifada due to the drive for economic self-sufficiency (cultivated area was 2,023 km² in 1973, 1,755 km² in 1989 and 1,913 km² in 1998).
km² in 1991. While the area of rainfed cultivation in the West Bank fell gradually, the area irrigated rose to a peak in the mid-80s but fell, according to Israeli figures, by almost one fourth during the Intifada (from 104 km² in 1986 to 80 km² in 1991).

Reclamation of the sizeable proportion of land which could be cultivated requires, in addition to the technical aspects of reducing erosion and securing water supplies, the development of marketing, credit and an organisational basis such as cooperatives.

**Irrigated land**

Just over half of the 215 km² of irrigated land is in the coastal zone in the Gaza Strip, the rest in the Jordan Valley, and the semi-coastal zone plains around Jenin and Tulkarm. Now only 4% of West Bank cultivated land is irrigated, although it is estimated that 500 km² has the potential for irrigated cultivation given sufficient water and markets. This would more than triple the irrigated area. Around 60% of West Bank irrigated land is used for vegetables such as potatoes, tomatoes, eggplant, peppers, and cucumber, and most of the remainder for citrus fruit. In the Gaza Strip, half of irrigated land produces citrus, the remainder vegetables.

**Rainfed cultivation**

Non-irrigated crops, constituting 90% of cultivated land, consist of fruit trees (60% of this area), principally olives, grapes and plums, and the more traditional almonds and figs. Grapes and plums became popular with farmers when the Israeli market was open to them, but now face marketing problems. Field crops are relatively insignificant in terms of market value but have traditional importance and satisfy basic needs for food and animal fodder. Most important in terms of area today are wheat, barley, lentils and the fodder crop karsaneh (vetch). Tomatoes are the most widely planted vegetable crop. Gaza Strip rainfed crops include non-citrus fruit, field crops and vegetables (DPA).
Each West Bank district has some 300,000-370,000 dunums of rainfed cultivation, but differ in that the Hebron region produces the most field crops, Jenin the most vegetables, Tulkarm the most fruit.

**Trends in production**

Since the 1970s, the most notable changes in agriculture, at least in the West Bank, have been a decrease in the cultivation of field crops and most fruits except olives and melons, and increased cultivation of vegetables. Livestock production has grown in importance relative to crop production, with the value of livestock products (poultry meat, eggs, mutton and milk) constituting by 1990, 45% of agricultural production overall compared to 41% in 1985 (CBS 1991). This more varied cultivation pattern has enabled increased consumption of local produce, in keeping with the political impetus to reduce dependency on Israel. Because Israel restricts exports, surpluses have to be sold at the local market’s depressed prices. Domestic surpluses usually exist in white meat and eggs, because of the expansion of poultry farming in recent years, and shortfalls in red meat and milk because the shortage of pasture has limited farming of cattle and sheep. Apiculture (bee-keeping), which already exists on a small scale, has development potential, with the high demand for honey and large areas of flowering plants and trees.

**Value of production**

Agricultural production was valued at $500,000 in 1990 by Israeli statistics (see Table 13). In terms of value, the most important crops grown in the West Bank were olives, vegetables, particularly tomatoes, cucumbers, marrows and potatoes, citrus fruit, grapes, bananas and figs. Sheep milk, poultry and sheep meat are the highest value animal products. Most important Gaza products were vegetables, particularly tomatoes and potatoes, and citrus fruit, followed by eggs and poultry meat.
Marketing

Israel prohibits Palestinians from marketing West Bank and Gaza agricultural produce in Israel and Jerusalem without a permit, to protect Israeli agriculture from the lower prices of Palestinian produce. Some Gaza citrus fruit, around one fifth of crop production in 1989, is sold to Israeli juice factories. Israeli produce is sold freely in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, although the amount has fallen substantially since the Intifada. Trade between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is obstructed by Israeli movement restrictions, adding to the imbalances between supply and demand in the local market. Since 1967, and especially since 1987, Israeli hurdles to export, combined with Jordanian restrictions, political change and competition from other Mediterranean countries, have substantially limited access to previous markets: the West Bank depended on Jordan and the Gulf States while Gaza depended upon the Eastern bloc and Iran.

In 1988, the EC decided to allow direct imports of Palestinian goods, including agricultural produce, on equal terms with Israeli producers. This followed long negotiations over the use of Israeli ports for Palestinian exports. As a result, around 2,300 tons of produce were exported to the EC in 1988 and 5,500 tons in 1989. However, the volume exported to the EC has remained low. More recent direct exports to Europe of citrus and olive oil have been beset by problems, particularly delays. Besides requiring export permits and customs duties, an additional Israeli obstacle to agricultural exports are the delays for searches, paperwork, Israeli holidays, which damage perishable goods at the Jordan river bridges and at ports. This highlights the poor transport and storage infrastructure, the lack of refrigerated trucks for example. As an alternative to Israeli ports, there is discussion of the future possibility of developing Gaza’s port facilities. Since 1990, Palestinian and international organisations have begun to tackle some of the main limitations, by establishing a market information centre to assist Palestinian exporters, and constructing cooling, grading and packing facilities.
Fisheries

Fishing contributed substantially to the economy of the Gaza Strip before 1979. Since then production has fallen because of restrictions on the length of coastline along which Gazans may fish: exclusion from the north Sinai coast after Israeli withdrawal in 1979, and from the coast adjacent to Israeli Gaza strip settlements from 1985, combined with a limit, changed periodically, on the distance offshore within which they may fish. Environmental changes since 1991 have increased catches considerably, bringing fish to 4% of animal production in the Strip. Apart from lifting restrictions, improved harbourage, handling and processing (cooling, canning), boat building and maintenance, have been identified as requirements in order further to develop the industry (DPA).

Institutions: Cooperatives and Committees

Traditionally, local agricultural marketing cooperatives have promoted agriculture through providing loans and grants to farmers and until 1987, they were the main source of agricultural credit. Cooperatives aim to advance production and marketing techniques that will facilitate the marketing of agricultural produce. Dating from the 1920s, the cooperative movement later became part of the Jordanian Cooperative Organisation and the Egyptian movement. Agricultural cooperatives form the majority, around 350 of 750, formal registered cooperatives. Israel has made it difficult to register new cooperatives. Most active cooperatives are located in the West Bank, particularly in the north.

In the OPT, various organisations working in agriculture participate in the Agricultural Coordinating Committee, responsible for overall planning and development. These include the popular committees, which are active in extension work, applied research and training. Involvement of popular committees began with the establishment in 1983 of the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees, followed during the Intifada by the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, the Agricultural Services Centre and
the Palestinian Farmers Union. Formerly part of the Jordanian Ministry, the Department of Agriculture, now controlled by the Israeli Civil Administration, has limited extension facilities, oriented to animal disease control.

6.4. Manufacturing

Extractive industries include stone quarries, a traditional industry of Jerusalem, now concentrated in the Hebron area, and crushed aggregate quarrying, found particularly in the Ramallah area. Manufacturing is dominated by stone cutting and dressing; food, beverages and tobacco; textiles, clothing and leather (mainly subcontracting for Israeli firms); non-metallic minerals; metal processing; plastics and chemicals. Industry is found in most cities, though little in Jenin and Jerusalem.

Industry's share of GDP has remained at around 8% and its share of employment at around 16% since the 1970s (PSP and see Table 12). Industry is mostly small-scale. Average employment per establishment is very low, at around four persons. In 1990, of 4,200 industrial units, only 30 employed 50 or more people (CBS). Around half of around manufacturing establishments employ only family members of the owners. Most of the larger industrial plants in the West Bank were operating at one half of their capacity even in 1989, before feeling fully the effects of the intifada and Gulf crisis.

Because the West Bank and Gaza lack mineral and oil resources, manufacturers import most raw materials from or through Israel, except stone, olive oil, processed also as soap, and olive wood for souvenirs. Around half of manufacturing is sub-contracting for Israeli firms, for example the textile workshops concentrated in the Tulkarm area, footwear, concentrated in Nablus and Hebron, soft drinks and wood products such as furniture. Other factories import raw materials for production of products for local consumption including tahina, flour and bread, animal feed, dairy products and tobacco. Between 1967 and 1980, the number of manufacturing establishments fell by one third. However, a high proportion of
establishments, at least in some regions, date from after 1967 (two-thirds of those in Bethlehem and Hebron), most from the relatively prosperous 1980s.

Textiles, clothing and leather had in 1990 the largest share of industrial employment at 37%, with 16% in metal processing and 13% in food, beverages and tobacco (CBS). This last sector, however, contributes the most industrial revenue.

Problems of industry are, principally, poor markets, plus the lack of capital and credit and poor infrastructure, low labour productivity and little industrial training (one recent survey found that 85% of workers in industry had no vocational or higher education).

**Gaza strip industry: comparing Palestinian and Israeli data**

Manufacturing is an example of the need to treat numbers with caution. According to Israeli statistics (CBS 1991) there are almost 2,000 industrial units in the Gaza Strip, with over 13,000 workers. Palestinian sources record less than half of this (740 units with around 7,000 workers), that is, works registered with the Union of Industrialists (see Table 15). It appears that CBS under-records the number of textile/clothing workers, presumably many in small unregistered workshops, but records food production units not included in Palestinian figures.

Typical "industrial plants" are sewing workshops of a dozen people which bring cut cloth from Israel and return it there for finishing. A smaller number of workshops produce for the local market: they manufacture and finish clothes, weave or dye cloth, or make food products. Other plants make plastics, foam and the like for other industries, locally or in Israel.

**Restrictions**

Restrictions imposed by the occupying authorities are designed to protect Israeli industry. Even advisors to the Israeli government admit
that this policy cannot be justified in such terms because of the relatively small scale of the OPT economy compared to Israel and the benefits which could accrue to the Israeli economy if Israel switched to a more liberal policy (Ben Ezra 1991). Israeli policy restricts Palestinian production directly, through restrictive licensing of production units and control of imports and of marketing in Israel and abroad. All foreign trade must pass through Israeli ports or airports or the Israeli-controlled Jordan bridges. Israel demands that all exports and imports from the OPT require a permit, and imposes taxes and customs duties, bureaucratic delays. Israel requires Hebrew labelling of the few products which are permitted to be marketed in Israel or annexed Jerusalem.

Although Israel relaxed its granting of operating permits in 1991, and the Civil Administration had granted around 360 permits for all types of industry by early 1993, and lifted restrictions on import of capital, this is expected to make little contribution without broader change in the economic climate. Most licences granted are for concerns already operating. Licensing remains a problem secondary to that of the viability of enterprises in terms of markets, infrastructure and available capital.

Taxation by Israel remains a major obstacle. There is no regular administrative or legal procedure for resolving disputes over tax assessments. Faced with businesses which often do not keep detailed accounts, the Israeli authorities have resorted to arbitrary methods of collection, from army raids, to negotiations in which the final amount paid varies with one’s bargaining skills. Many irregular workers discover that Israeli employers have recorded them as self-employed only when they receive income tax demands. As the ILO (1992) notes: the common practice seems to be for the authorities to issue exaggerated assessments, calculated arbitrarily, and to enforce payment using intimidatory methods.

Israeli policy also has indirect negative effects: the OPT is a free market for Israeli products, which harms local industry; the continuing instability and uncertain future, are disincentives to investment.
Prospects

Palestinian economists have recommended various strategies for economic growth: import-substitution to reduce consumption of Israeli products; extending trade links abroad to reduce dependence on the Israeli market and increase export earnings; and developing the tourist sector to give early returns and boost the service and productive sectors. An export-led policy has been proposed in order -through trade agreements with such as the EC and Canada- to generate income to invest in selected production which substitutes for Israeli imports, including the established industries, food processing (to utilise the agricultural surplus of fruit and vegetables, and fish from Gaza), pharmaceuticals, and clothing. Delinking from the Israeli economy also requires investment in infrastructure and transport.

However, growing Palestinian industry requires protection from Israeli competition until productivity improves and production is diversified. Political authority over economic matters, continued international support and direct bilateral economic relations with other countries or markets are vital. Positive political developments will restore the confidence of potential investors in Palestine, including Palestinian private capital in the diaspora.

Popular economy

Particularly significant since the Intifada is the growth of the popular or informal economy, a wide range of initiatives in small-scale industry, agriculture, crafts and services, linked to popular political and social movements. It includes informal cooperatives, production projects of "grassroots" organisations, and household economy cooperatives. Such ventures aim to strengthen the more marginal elements of the population, to facilitate equitable distribution of resources, including profit-sharing; broad-based participation, especially that of women; developing human resources; and meeting the development needs of the community.
6.5. Employment

According to the ILO, the total labour force of the OPT in 1990 was 308,000 (200,000 in the West Bank and 108,000 in the Gaza Strip); of these, some 110-120,000, worked in Israel before the Gulf war, around one third of West Bank workers but an estimated 70% of Gaza workers (see Table 16).

In 1990, according to Israeli statistics, 36% of the OPT workforce worked in Israel. Of these, the majority (64,000, 61%) worked in construction. Israeli figures only give the number of registered workers, excluding many thousand who worked in Israel "illegally" until 1991. Their annual earnings of $615 million formed 30% of GNP in 1990.

Almost half of workers in Israel were unskilled - or semi-skilled manual workers, working in industry, transport, building and agriculture. The majority of the rest were skilled workers in industry, transport and construction, or employed in agriculture and services (CBS 1992). Only 5% are in "white collar" jobs, 3% in sales and 2% in administrative, clerical, professional or technical work. Those who work locally are more likely to work in "white collar" occupations (around 17% in sales and 16% in professional, technical, clerical or administrative work). Compared to the local workforce, those working in Israel tend to be younger but include very few women.

Wages in Israel are higher than in the OPT, especially in construction work where wages are above average. Average daily wages per employee in 1990 in the OPT were NIS 29 and in Israel NIS 46 (an overall average of NIS 35, approximately $US 13, CBS 1992). However, Palestinian workers earn about half what Israelis earn for the same work (JMCC 1992, quoting Histadrut).

Regional patterns

Because of their agricultural productivity and proximity to Israeli farming areas, the Jenin and Tulkarm regions have the highest
percentage of agricultural workers both locally and in Israel. Regions with the highest proportion of construction workers are Hebron, Bethlehem and Jericho, for those working in Israel, and Ramallah for those working locally (CBS 1992). Also significant are the differences in the proportion of those working in Israel; this varies from only 18% in Nablus district, where the local agricultural and manufacturing economy is stronger, to 45% in Tulkarm and 41% in Gaza (CBS 1992).

Local employment

Labour-intensive subcontracting dominates domestic industrial employment, forming 40% of industrial employment in 1987; but economists note a shift to capital-intensive production with low labour requirements.

Locally, the largest occupational groups, including just over one-quarter each of workers, are agriculture and skilled work in industry, construction, transport, and so on. Thus the type of work available differs between Israel and the OPT: 80% of agricultural workers but only 24% of construction workers worked locally in 1990. Most workers in the OPT work in public services (37%) and industry (21%) while of those who work in Israel, most work in construction (62%) (CBS, see Table 17).

Restrictions on workers in Israel

Since the early 1970s, the Israeli economy had an increasing demand for Palestinian workers and absorbed nearly 70% of the overall increase in the Palestinian workforce during that period. Until 1990, there was relative freedom of movement into Israel, and the authorities, by failing to enforce the requirements of worker registration, permitted employers to evade their legal responsibilities and encouraged the predominant pattern of daily contracts.

In 1990, Israel began substantially to limit the number of Palestinians working in Israel, attempting, with limited success, to
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replace them with native Israelis and Soviet immigrants. Many thousands of workers lost their jobs in Israel in 1991 due to Israeli movement restrictions and a new system of compulsory work permits, given only after registration with the Israeli Employment Offices. This led to an estimated 35% unemployment rate. Only around 55,000 workers had permits to work in Israel by mid-1991. Although this had risen to 78,000 by mid-1992, at least 30,000 had lost work in Israel. These are approximate numbers: they refer to the number of permit holders, many of whom may not have steady employment. Israeli figures, while underestimating unemployment, do show a marked increase, at least in the West Bank, in 1990-91, from 3.6% to 10.3% (CBS 1992).

One recent survey (PHRIC September 1992), found that in 1990, around 60% of workers were not registered with the authorities, employed instead through agents or the "spot markets" at major intersections where employers pick up day labourers. This suggests that the number of workers in Israel before the Gulf War was higher than official statistics indicate. In 1991, of those who lost their employment in Israel, none had within six to nine months found other stable work. Most were in family businesses, farming their land or working as day labourers. Of those who had found work locally, 90% had suffered a drop in wages.

Sectoral variations in the impact of the work permit system included a trend towards greater concentration in agriculture and construction, and away both from services, where less specialised skills are required and contact with the public more likely, and from industry, previously a sector of stable employment for Palestinians but one to which Israel is encouraging immigrants.

During 1992 and 1993, the Israeli government continued progressively to reduce the Palestinian workforce in Israel by restricting the numbers allowed to pass military checkpoints; the military authorities enforced restrictions particularly strictly to prevent Gaza workers leaving through the two tightly controlled entrances to the Strip. The Israeli military can most easily control movement of
workers in and out of Gaza. Some (West Bank) workers continued to enter Israel or Jerusalem illegally without permits until the complete closure of the Occupied Territories in March 1993.

**Labour conditions and trade unions**

Palestinian unions are prohibited from operating in Israel. Palestinian workers in Israel pay compulsory dues to the Israeli Histadrut labour union, but are not permitted to be members of it.

Palestinians who work in Israel pay tax but are entitled to fewer benefits than Israelis: only those for work-related injury, employer bankruptcy and maternity (if giving birth in Israel). Israelis receive nine other benefits. Around one fifth of wages Palestinians earn in Israel, an estimated $1-2 billion since 1967, is deducted to a fund, supposedly for Civil Administration services in the OPT (JMCC 1992), although there are no public accounts showing what happens to the money.

**Women in employment**

Official figures estimate that women form ten percent of the workforce, but do not include most women working in home-based work. Including these, the proportion of women in the workforce is 25% (Womens Studies Centre), of whom 46% are under 20 years. Very few, less than 500 women, work in Israel. Most women work in the service sector, and, in the West Bank, in agriculture. Many also work in a variety of types of home-based production, from piece-rate sewing for subcontractors, to cooperative food processing, to embroidery and gardening. Although women are represented in all professional associations, they form more than ten percent of members only in the unions of pharmacists and dentists.

**6.6. Finance**

In the OPT, two currencies are in use, the Jordanian Dinar and the New Israeli Shekel. Until 1992, Israeli military orders strictly
controlled currency transactions and the flow of capital from abroad. Israel closed all Arab banks in 1967 and refused to reopen them except under the control of the Israeli central bank. As a result, most Palestinians kept savings in Jordan, although suffering losses with the devaluation of the dinar in 1988-89. Israeli banks, which operated in the Occupied Territories until the Intifada, restricted credit to Palestinians.

Although subject to Israeli and Jordanian restrictions and supervision, two banks now operate, the Cairo-Amman Bank in the six main cities of the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) and the Bank of Palestine in Gaza city and Khan Younis. Money changers have to some extent taken over functions of financial institutions and perform a variety of services for businesses and the general public.

Many local Palestinian NGOs specialize in extending credit for agricultural, industrial and other productive and service-oriented ventures including cooperatives. Among these are the Arab Development and Credit Company (ADCC) and the United Arab Agricultural Company, non-profit companies oriented to the agricultural sector; and the Economic Development Group (EDG) and the Technical Development Center (TDC), which cover enterprises in a range of economic sectors. All started in 1987-89; they provide relevant training in business management, and receive funds from the EC, the Welfare Association, several western governments and non-governmental organisations, and Arab funds.

6.7. Economic trends

Data on the OPT economy

Palestinian institutions are currently attempting to improve local information about the OPT economy. Israeli statistics generally separate data for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and excludes East Jerusalem and Jewish settlements, all economic data about which is included with Israel’s domestic product. Difficulties in data collection make the data unreliable, especially from 1988. The statistical
abstract for the OPT states that "some of the estimates are based on partial data and on evaluations". It notes the low reliability of several items, including import and export of goods and services from Israel. Because there are no customs between Israel and the OPT it is difficult to measure the volume of transactions between them.

CBS Judea, Samaria and Gaza Area Statistics include the following: estimates at current and constant prices of expenditure on gross domestic product and its components; disposable national income; breakdown of private consumption expenditure; gross domestic capital formation; exports and imports of goods and services; estimates of domestic production by branch and disposable private income. Collection problems precluded calculation of changes in private consumption, capital formation and export and import in the West Bank for 1988-90 and in Gaza for 1988; 1987 is the last year for which GDP is calculated. Israeli statistics omit the product of olive presses and stone quarries. Israeli statistics for 1968-87 are used as the source for UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

Major trends

Israeli estimates of Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Product and their components, imports and exports and the national current account are shown in Tables 18-21. Gaza has a lower ratio of GDP to National Disposable Income, and of GDP to GNP, reflecting respectively the higher proportion of remittances from abroad and of wage income from Israel. Domestic product and disposable national income per capita fell between 1987 and 1990, because of decreasing income from work abroad, including Israel. Comparing 1989/90 with 1986/87, the main trends identified in Israeli statistics (CBS 1991) are shown in Table 20. National disposable income per capita was in the West Bank NIS 4,700 (US$1,800), Gaza Strip NIS 3,000 ($1,200) (CBS 1991); using Palestinian rather than Israeli population estimates gives a lower estimate of around $1,100 per capita.
Imports and exports

Long before the Intifada, the OPT economy was becoming weaker, with exports falling or rising more slowly than imports. In value terms, the OPT in 1987 imported three times more than it exported: total imports in 1987 were worth approximately US $1050 million, exports $390 million (ILO). For dealings with Israel only, the value of exports was well under one third that of imports (see Table 20). In 1987, just over 90% of imports came from or through Israel.

Overall, during the 1980s, the OPT balance of trade fell from a positive balance of 36.6 million to a negative balance of 95.5 million (exports fell from 118.8 to 47.9 and imports rose from 82.2 to 143.4). By 1991, exports to Jordan, mainly agricultural produce and products, had fallen to nearly one third of their 1980 value (ILO, quoting CBS). Between 1983 and 1987, at constant prices, exports fell by 3% in the West Bank but rose by 10% in Gaza, and imports rose in the West Bank by 29% and in the Gaza Strip by 14% (CBS 1991).

During the Intifada, according to Israeli estimates for 1990, available for the Gaza Strip only, there has been dramatic drop in both imports and exports. Exports fell to 31% of the 1987 value at constant prices in 1987-90, to NIS 127m; imports fell to 66% of 1987 value, to NIS 850m (CBS 1991). Imports from and through Israel dropped gradually during this period, from $900 million in 1987 to $700 million in 1988 to $550 million in 1989. Looking at foreign trade from 1970 to 1987, imports always far exceeded exports, and both exports and imports rose steadily, except for a marked dip during the Israeli recession of 1984-85 (UNCTAD, see Table 22).
6.8. Assistance

Introduction

Although international inter- and non-governmental relief agencies have worked among Palestinian refugees since 1948, many such organizations, with the addition of governments, began only in the late 1970s to assist the Palestinian people under occupation. This has taken the form of programmes implemented directly, and of support for a whole spectrum of indigenous organisations.

Apart from Palestinians living outside Palestine, two main funding sources contributed to the rise of many local organisations especially after 1979 and the Camp David Agreement. These were funds from Arab countries through the Joint Palestinian Jordanian Committee, until 1982, and the continuing funding from the US government through Private Voluntary Organisations. Other international, American and European funders increased their involvement in the 1980s.

Governmental Assistance

Bilateral assistance from governments

Bilateral assistance comes to the OPT from many governments (see UNDP 1992, Table 23), including those of Australia, Austria, Britain, Belgium, France, Italy, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden. Apart from direct contact through Embassies and Consulates, governments channel assistance through NGOs, UNRWA and UNDP. Government contributions to various sectors in 1991-92 are shown in Table 25.

European governments, although continuing to devote most resources to health and education, have begun to fund major infrastructure projects such as the water and sewerage system in Bethlehem, Beit Sahour and Beit Jala funded by the Italian and German governments.
USAID, the US government's aid programme, operates in the OPT through several private voluntary organisations (giving assistance of $7 million per year since 1978). Recent USAID contributions were to the following: water, electricity supply, roads and sewerage (through CDP, CRS and SCF); agricultural cooperatives, research, credit and machinery, and developing crop and animal production (ANERA, CDP, CRS and SCF); industrial zones, marketing facilities and business credit and development (ANERA, SCF).

At least until 1991, much funding for institutions came from OPEC, the Arab Fund in Kuwait, the Islamic Development Bank, and other donors based in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. In the early 1980s, the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Committee, established to support Palestinian "steadfastness" under occupation, contributed substantially to education, housing and municipalities, but little to industrial or agricultural production. Only $400 million, 40% of its intended total, reached the West Bank because of oil states' failure to meet their commitments.

**Multilateral assistance: the European Community**

EC assistance in 1993 was in the order of ECU 15 million. In July 1992, the EC granted ECU 60 million ($57m) emergency funds after the Gulf war in addition to ECU 13 million general assistance through a wide variety of organisations. Of the ECU 60 million, ECU 29 million went to the Palestinian Housing Council, 13 million for industry, agriculture and tourism via four Palestinian credit institutions, 12 million towards a new UNRWA hospital in Gaza, and six million for education, export credits and technical assistance.

While in the 1970s and 80s, the EC donated over $185 million to the Occupied Territories through UNRWA, only since 1990 has it given direct assistance (in that year $6.6 million to institutions engaged in social welfare, education and economic development).
Intergovernmental organisations

UNDP

UNDP, the UN Development Programme, has worked in the OPT since the UN General Assembly in 1978 called on it to establish a programme to improve the social and economic conditions of Palestinians. After consultation with parties including Israel and the PLO, UNDP established its OPT programme in 1980. UNDP's financial contribution has been matched by governmental donors, principally Italy and Japan. Its total budget to 1991 was $US 53.5 million, for 1992-96, $15 million; annual expenditure rose from less than $1 million to $14 million in 1992. Unlike its work in other countries, UNDP in the OPT funds capital expenditure and implements projects directly. Since 1980, the programme’s emphasis has shifted from health and education towards infrastructure, agriculture and industry. It has established mechanisms for identifying development assistance needs and strategies, preparing sectoral assessments, improving local coordination, planning and policymaking. UNDP assistance includes the following:

- **agriculture**: training and technical assistance; modernising irrigation; construction of a packing and grading plant in Gaza; establishing a marketing services centre; emergency distribution of inputs;

- **industry**: quality control facilities for olive oil; Nablus light industry zone; management training, consultancy and credit for industrial and business development; citrus processing plant in Gaza; training for the ceramics and tourist industries and for Chambers of Commerce;

- **water and sanitation**: hydrological laboratories in Gaza; infrastructure and maintenance training for sewage disposal and recycling in the northern Gaza Strip; improving water supply in West Bank rural areas; equipping a new well for the Ramallah Water Company; improving sewerage in Balata camp;

- **electricity**: providing generators for West Bank rural areas;

- **health**: equipment for health institutions and ambulances; training for specialist physicians; supporting training and residential centres for disabled young people; expansion of Princess Alia hospital, Hebron;

- **education**: equipment and training for kindergartens and vocational
training centres; building new school classrooms;  
This is in addition to training for housing construction; facilities for  
youth activities; equipment for municipalities; training and equipment  
for women’s production projects.

**UNICEF**

Also active in the OPT since 1980, UNICEF supports work in  
immunization and other aspects of primary health care, water and  
sanitation, early childhood development, and training of health  
personnel. Its emergency physiotherapy programme run jointly with  
UNRWA has treated several thousand Intifada casualties. UNICEF’s  
1992-94 plan has three strategic aims: an integrated communications  
approach to supporting those who care for children; strengthening the  
capacities of local organisations; and inter-agency cooperation in  
information, policy and programmes. It applies this in three  
programmes: child health, basic education and childhood disability  
and rehabilitation. UNICEF produces valuable research material on  
issues related to its activities, such as its 1992 report on immunisation  
coverage among under-fives in the West Bank.

**UNRWA**

Registered refugees entitled to services of the UN Relief and Works  
Agency are those who lost their home and means of livelihood as a  
result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, and their descendants. Less  
than one third of Palestine refugees now live in the 61 UNRWA  
camps.

UNRWA’s total field budget for the OPT in 1992 was $122.8  
million: for the Gaza Strip US$ 69.9 million, of which 57% was  
devoted to education and 20% to health, and for the West Bank,  
which falls under a separate administration, $ 52.9 million, 46%  
spent on education and 26% on health (the remainder being  
emergency relief, social services and operational costs). In 1991-92,  
due to the worsening economic situation, UNRWA increased its  
emergency assistance, to include food distribution to over 300,000
families; this was despite UNRWA’s aim to encourage self-help. Economic hardship was generally greater in the Gaza Strip, where over 10% of refugees were in UNRWA special assistance programme by mid-1992.

One of the innovative services in camps, the 25 women’s programme centres, 14 in Gaza, run production projects and offer training in production skills, legal rights, home maintenance and related fields.

In 1988, during the Intifada, UNRWA began an expanded programme of assistance worth $65 million to promote sustainable employment and improve environmental conditions in camps in the OPT. To support small-scale enterprises, it runs revolving loan funds and organises training for credit and other local institutions. By the end of 1992, UNRWA in Gaza had financed 70 projects a total of $1.6 million. UNRWA partially completed in 1992 sewage networks in West Bank camps Dheisheh and Amari and work is proceeding or planned in six others. UNRWA Gaza opened a Department of Environmental Affairs in January 1993 to tackle the interrelated problems of sewerage, floodwater drainage, solid waste disposal, vermin control, and ground water quality; and to prepare a strategic plan for water supply and sanitation (see UNRWA 1993, UN 1992).

Non-governmental assistance

European NGOs

Over 100 European non-governmental organisations have their own programmes of assistance or support projects of local Palestinian organisations in the OPT. These include religious orders, churches, charities, development and research institutes and solidarity groups. Most specialise in health, rehabilitation and education, but an increasing number support projects in the areas of agriculture, human rights and information, community and economic development. Among European organisations, German Institutions i.e. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and others which assist Palestinian institutions
including PASSIA, Arab Though Forum, Bir Zeit University, the Order of St. John (Britain), Les Oeuvres Hospitalières Françaises de l'Ordre de Malte, and the Swedish Organisation for Individual Relief. Diakonia (Sweden), Enfants Réfugiés du Monde (France), Medical Aid for Palestinians (Britain), Médecins Sans Frontières (Belgium/Netherlands) and Save the Children Fund (Britain) are among organisations with major programmes in health and education. Other major European supporters of Palestinian development include NOVIB and ICCO (the Netherlands), Salaam Children of the Olive Tree (Italy) and other Italian NGOs coordinated by COCIS, the Society for Austro-Arab Relations and UN Association International Service (Britain).

Many European churches contribute through the Middle East Council of Churches, whose regional committees include the International Christian Committee in the West Bank and the Near East Council of Churches in Gaza. Programmes of these two committees include health centres, community health, vocational training and other activities related to community development. European organisations also run well-known institutions such as the Talitha Kuma school in Beit Jala, the Shiloah School for the blind in Bethlehem, the Efta school for the deaf and dumb in Bethlehem, and the Caritas baby hospital in Bethlehem. European churches also support local branches of the YMCA and YWCA, the Holy Land Christian Mission and church-run schools.

North American NGOs

Major US-based non-profit agencies working in the OPT and funded by governmental and non-governmental sources, have the following programmes.

(ANERA) American Near East Refugee Aid aims to strengthen Palestinian institutions such as municipalities, cooperatives, charitable societies and educational institutions. ANERA has committed over $15 million to projects in agriculture, health, industry and education for 1990-94.
Cooperative Development Project (CDP) funds agricultural cooperatives throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) supports primary health, health institutions, training and health education, training of veterinarians, emergency relief, and community and resource centres. AMIDEAST specialises in training and education. Save the Children Federation (SCF) has worked in the West Bank and Gaza since 1978, initially on large infrastructure projects in conjunction with municipalities and other official institutions. SCF now focuses on small-scale community-based cross-sectoral projects, emphasising self-reliance and community responsibility. Projects span conservation and development, health and nutrition, education and human resource development. SCF has since 1986 run a loan programme. It is pioneering locally-managed low-tech water and sewerage facilities, and income-generating projects which help cover operating costs of community services.

Many US-based organizations working in the OPT are supported not by US government funds but by North American churches and other groups and individuals. These include the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC); the ACCORD foundation; and the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) which runs legal aid and other services.

World Vision, an international Christian relief and development agency based in the US, has been active in the OPT since 1975. It supports community and family development in villages, schools, vocational training, children's homes, health services, rehabilitation, human rights, legal advice and humanitarian aid. Several other North American NGOs, many run and supported mainly by Palestinians, fund projects in the OPT. These include the following. Canada: the International Relief and Development Foundation (health projects); MAP Canada (health services); the Canada Palestine Association (health and social services); Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation (health); Organisation Canadienne pour la Solidarité et le Développement (multi-sectoral).
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**United States:** the American Society for Medical Aid; the Jerusalem Fund (health and education); Middle East Children’s Alliance (health and education); NAJDA: Women Concerned About the Middle East (women’s projects); the Naim Foundation (health and social services); the Near East Foundation (health education and research); Palestine Aid Society; Palestine Solidarity Committee; United Holy Land Fund (education, health), United Palestine Appeal (education, health, community development); and the US Organisation for Medical and Educational Needs (education, health), and the Ford Foundation.

**International and Palestinian organisations**

Of other international organisations active in the OPT, the Lutheran World Federation is known mainly for its Augusta Victoria Hospital in Jerusalem. Founded in 1949 to assist displaced persons, the Pontifical Mission for Palestine, an agency of the Holy See, supports institutions for the care of the sick, disabled, children and aged people, educational institutions and small business and self-help projects. It complements this with information and coordination work. Other Palestinian sources abroad include the Welfare Association (Switzerland) and the Shoman Foundation (Jordan).

**NGO coordination**

Several NGO coordinating bodies exist: the Network of European NGOs in the Occupied Territories NENGOOT (of people working with European NGOs and Europeans working in the OPT) which has organised fora for discussion of development strategies in the OPT; the Association of International Voluntary Agencies AIVA, which includes representatives of major NGOs (including those with US government funding); and CCINGO, the Coordinating Committee of International NGOs, which is oriented to producing information about the human rights and development situation in the OPT. Based in Geneva, the ICCP with its regional bodies coordinates the work of NGOs on the question of Palestine especially at the UN level.
Territory of the State of Israel as proposed by the United Nations in November 1947.


The frontiers of the State of Israel according to the Armistice agreements of 1949.
VIII. Education

Under the British, Jordanian and Egyptian administrations, school and training college education developed to serve the majority of the population and reached what is generally regarded as a relatively high level. Since 1967 Palestinians have established eight universities, several colleges and extended preschool education.

Schools

Under Egypt and Jordan, elementary and preparatory level schooling, the first nine years, were compulsory and, in government schools, free. Today, three administrative systems govern education: UNRWA runs elementary and preparatory schools in refugee camps and in villages with a high proportion of refugees. Palestinian and international charitable organisations run many private schools.
Around two-thirds of school students in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and just under half in the Gaza Strip attend government schools, formerly run by the Jordanian or Egyptian governments, and since 1967 by the Israeli occupation authorities. Schools follow Jordanian and Egyptian curricula, although with Israeli censorship of textbooks. There, some private schools also offer British or French examination syllabuses. Rejection of government schools in annexed Jerusalem coming under the control of the Israeli Ministry of Education and the Arab Education Department of Jerusalem Municipality, led students to move to the private sector. This imposed a considerable burden on private schools, whose share of students increased from 24% to 55% between the 1967 and 1991.

There are over 250 UNRWA schools in the OPT (in 1992, 153 in the Gaza Strip and 98 in the West Bank), with over 140,000 students (over 100,000 in the Gaza Strip, over 40,000 in the West Bank). According to Israeli figures (CBS 1992), government schools teach overall almost two-thirds of students, UNRWA schools one quarter and private schools one-tenth. However, UNRWA schools have almost half of Gaza students, and government schools three-quarters of West Bank students (see Table).

**Preschool**

Only around 25% of children attend pre-school facilities, which number around 470, 350 in the West Bank and 120 in the Gaza Strip. All are run by religious or charitable organisations or women’s popular committees. Initiatives to develop early childhood services include the joint Early Childhood Committee of the Women’s Committees, and two Early Childhood Resource Centres, in Jerusalem and Gaza city, involved primarily in in-service training and development of curricula, teaching materials and toys. They, among other centres, have conducted research into the effects of the Intifada and occupation on children and on education. Bethlehem University’s School Development Project provides consultancy on early childhood, working with schools on curriculum development, teacher training, and parental involvement. In Gaza, the Quakers Childhood...
Development Programme includes an early childhood resource centre in Bureij camp and a programme of counselling to parents.

**School education during the intifada**

Since the start of the *Intifada* in 1987, according to local educators, there has been a significant drop in student and teacher motivation and in educational standards, due to prolonged school closures, strikes, curfews and other disruptions. Palestinian children lost 35-50% of school days in 1988-92 because of school closures and curfews (Educational Network).

In UNRWA schools, West Bank students lost 17% of school days in 1991-92, Gaza students 12%, and as much as 40% in 1990-91. Overcrowding forced almost half of UNRWA classes in the West Bank and 70% in Gaza to operate double shifts. Returnees from Kuwait and the Gulf and students transferring from government schools added to overcrowding.

Several weeks into the *Intifada*, in February 1988, the Israeli authorities ordered all Palestinian schools to close. Although staff had access to private schools, government teachers had no access to their premises nor to salaries. Teaching began again in May 1988, with a curriculum restricted to examinable subjects due to *Intifada* strike hours, until the next round of closure orders in July. Teachers tried to rebuild the alternative schooling system, hindered by Israel’s outlawing popular committees and the preparation of distance-learning material later in 1988. Since then, closure orders, army raids on and commandeering of school buildings have continued to disrupt schooling. Teachers’ morale fell, especially those in government schools who faced financial insecurity, while administrators of private schools faced financial crises because parents could not pay fees.

Although the number of school students has more than doubled in the West Bank since 1967, Israel has neglected buildings and other facilities, leading, according to Palestinian educators, to overcrowding, and a shortage of at least 15% in classroom
accommodation by 1992, inadequate maintenance, sanitary facilities, heating, and play space. Most schools have neither libraries nor science labs, sports, arts or other extra-curricular activities (PDP). Organised recreational activities for children are very limited. UNRWA Youth Activities Centres in refugee camps reopened in 1992 after being closed for "security" reasons and ran youth summer camps in coordination with the YMCA. Some private schools also hold short summer camps.

**Initiatives in education**

Since the effects of the Intifada became more widely recognised, educators, particularly in private and UNRWA schools, have begun to remedy some of the problems by in-service training, distance learning, remedial and compensatory education, improving and updating curricula and teaching materials. Some teachers now work part-time as trained counsellors to deal with children with behavioural or learning difficulties. Some initiatives in education aim to solve immediate problems, others to effect major changes in philosophy and methods.

Educational development projects initiated in recent years (see Educational Network 1992) include several teachers' and curriculum development centres and programmes: the Mawrid Teachers' Development Centre, the Centre for Applied Research in Education, and the Self-Learning Project, all based in Ramallah; the Lutheran schools Education for Awareness and Involvement programme, run jointly with Bir Zeit university; UNICEF's Basic Education Programme run in conjunction with local institutions, and Bethlehem University's Science Resource Centre. Hebron University Graduates Union also researches education issues. Networking between educators is conducted through these organisations, and the Ramallah-based Educational Network, which produces a useful quarterly newsletter in English.

Several schools for children with speech, vision or hearing difficulties exist in the West Bank, concentrated in the Bethlehem area
under the administration of churches and charitable organisations. In Gaza, the Blind Friends Association provides education for blind children; the UNRWA/Pontifical Mission Center for the Blind provides elementary education and vocational training.

**Higher education**

The following universities were established after 67: Bethlehem University, Al Najah National University (Nablus), Hebron University, Birzeit University near Ramallah, Gaza’s Islamic and Azhar Universities, and Al Quds (Jerusalem) University. Universities and community colleges are independent institutions, funded by donations and student fees, admitting students generally on the basis of *tawjihi* (Jordanian leaving examination) results. Each of the eight universities offer four-year undergraduate programmes leading to the degrees of Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Science. The Israeli authorities closed universities from 1988 and gradually permitted them to reopen from 1990, Birzeit only in 1992. Colleges offer two-year programmes in a variety of fields including education, languages, religion, arts and technical subjects.

The 21 colleges in the OPT include community colleges, UNRWA training centres, and government training colleges dating from before 1967, now run by the Israeli Civil Administration. In addition, there are several training centres run by NGOs such as the YMCA. In the 13 community colleges, curricula are as those of Jordan. Community colleges account for the majority of college student numbers. UNRWA operates two teacher training colleges in the West Bank and two technical training centres, one in Qalandya, Jerusalem, and one in Gaza city. Of colleges run by the Israeli Civil Administration, three provide teacher training. Kadoury College in Tulkarm and Al-Arroub College in Hebron, although originally established as agricultural colleges, now offer a variety of subjects. In higher education, besides physical facilities, educators note that improvements are required in administration, staff training, and research programmes (PDP).
Formed in 1977 by academics, professionals, and representatives of charitable organizations, the Palestinian Council for Higher Education is the body responsible for the development of Palestinian higher education. Its objectives are: coordinating and developing the work of existing Universities; establishment of new universities and institutions of higher education; conducting research for the improvement of higher education; developing the capabilities of higher education staff; funding and assisting institutions of higher education in the Occupied Territories; representing all institutions of higher education locally and internationally; and coordinating the work of the general education sector.

**Vocational training**

Looking at available statistics on tertiary education, it is clear that a low proportion of the population receive post-secondary education in technical and vocational subjects. Approximately 20% of school leavers go on to tertiary education. However, of around 24,850 post-secondary students in 1991-92, two-thirds (66%, 16,400) were enrolled in universities, and only one third in other centres (6,200 in community colleges and 2,250 in other training colleges and centres) (Palestinian Council for Higher Education).

Vocational centres have in the past tended to serve the needs of the migrant labour market, particularly to Gulf states. Since 1992, there has been an effort to promote vocational training, concentrating on students with disabilities, and on the requirements of key industries. Several local charitable societies, the YMCA, YWCA, YMMA and YWMA also run vocational centres teaching secretarial and computer skills, languages, sewing, embroidery, home economics and other crafts. Unlike colleges and universities, some training centres accept students who do not hold tawjihi.

In the Gaza Strip there are six training centres, run by NECC, UNRWA and four by the Civil Administration, one in each city (see Abdel Shafi 1992). The UNRWA centre teaches mechanics, metalwork, welding, electrics and building trades to 600 students. It
also has courses for tawjihi holders in electronics, physiotherapy and business administration. According to UNRWA's placement office, of 1,080 former students of the centre in 1985-90, only 40% were employed locally in their trade, and 43% were working abroad. Secretarial and tailoring classes for girls are the main programmes of the NECC centre, with almost 1,500 completing these in 1967-90. Just over 500 students completed training in carpentry, smithery, welding and electrics in 1967-90. These courses, for boys under 16, run for three years and include Arabic and arithmetic. Of the students who completed NECC training between 1968 and 1990, 38% were working locally, 30% in Israel or abroad and 32% (mainly girls) were unemployed.

In both Gaza centres, there is an emphasis on building trades, related to the economic situation whereby the majority of Gaza residents who are employed in Israel work in construction. Local industry employs few workers with vocational training. Of 794 workers in factories and workshops surveyed in a recent study (Abdel Shafi 1992), only 7.5% had vocational training, 8% university education, and the rest only general school education. The three West Bank UNRWA Training Centres had just over 1,000 students in 1991-92 and offer subjects similar to the above.

Research Centres

Several independent research centres exist outside universities, such as those that specialise in women's issues and those which combine research with training and/or credit for cooperatives and small businesses. Others include the Arab Thought Forum founded by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi in March 1977 in Jerusalem which focuses on social and economic development, the Arab Studies Society, founded by Mr. Faisal Husseini in 1980 to promote study of Arab and Palestinian society and culture, the University Graduates Union Research Center in Hebron, established in 1982 and The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) founded by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi in March 1987 in Jerusalem as a Palestinian independent think-tank which focuses on various
programmes in studies and research related to Foreign Policy, strategic studies and training graduates in Diplomacy and International Affairs. The Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ) established in 1991 in Bethlehem specialised in applied research in agriculture. The Centre for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) established in 1993 in Nablus as another think-tank in the north. Other research centers specialising in the documentation, promotion and enforcement of human rights in the OPT include the Human Rights Information Centre in Jerusalem, the Gaza Centre for Rights and Law, and al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man) and the Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners.
Health services are provided by UNRWA, by charitable organisations, local and international NGOs, the private sector, and by the Israeli Civil Administration (referred to as government services). Although (international) religious and other organisations have provided health services in Palestine for decades, during the Intifada local specialists have been instrumental in formulating strategic plans for overall development of health promotion and care. However, there are still many gaps in provision, from clinic and hospital facilities, to other aspects such as mental health services, dental health care, health education, food and water testing and equipment maintenance.

Health standards

Accurate standard indicators of general health conditions are difficult to obtain due to the lack of data on the population. Planners rely on
Israeli statistics, which are inadequate for many specific purposes. However, Israeli figures indicate (NHP) that life expectancy is around 62 years for women, 60 years for men; the infant mortality rate is 40-50 per 1,000 live births (although local rural area surveys suggest a far higher rate of up to 100 (HDIP). A high proportion of mothers receive no prenatal care, and there is a high percentage of low birth weight babies. Although the infant mortality rate has halved in the past 20 years, a high proportion of infants die from preventable gastroenteritis and respiratory diseases including pneumonia, premature birth, birth trauma, or congenital abnormalities. Life expectancy has increased in the population in general by around 20 years during this century.

Health conditions in the OPT are relatively well-documented. A useful up-to-date bibliography is available, containing abstracts of 160 research papers and policy reviews of interest to researchers and planners on community health, family planning, health services, planning and policy, infectious disease, nutrition, physical therapy, health and the uprising, psycho-social health, women, mother and child health, water and sanitation and other topics.

**National Health Plan**

A major project undertaken in 1991-93, the National Health Plan for the Palestinian People, has several overall aims: to improve health status, reduce geographical, social and other disparities, increase accessibility, encourage cost-effectiveness, regulate personnel, coordinate provision, and establish a comprehensive insurance system. Public perceptions of problems and needs in health and health services, and a review of existing services and resources are investigated by the Plan. These findings, combined with the overall picture given by available data on health indicators, epidemiology, demography and economy, permitted the National Health Commission to formulate a Palestinian strategy for health and to assess what human and financial resources this requires.
Primary care

Particularly during the years of the Intifada, organisations including popular committees and charitable institutions have been instrumental in the provision of primary health services to the Palestinian population. These services are aimed at communities without health care facilities and at people seriously injured or disabled as a result of the Intifada.

In the Gaza Strip, the population is served by around 150 clinics, just under half of which are general clinics and the majority specialised mother and child, dental, physiotherapy and rehabilitation services. Apart from UNRWA and the Israeli Civil Administration, most facilities are run by charitable institutions such as the Arab Medical Association, the Benevolent Society, Joint Charitable Committee, Near East Council of Churches, Patient Friends' Society, Red Crescent Society, the Society for the Care of Disabled Children and the UNRWA/Quaker Preschool Programme.

In the West Bank, primary care services by the non-governmental sector have increased much in recent years by the active involvement of popular committees. Detailed information is now available about primary services in the West Bank (HDIP, see Table 25).

Charges vary. In government clinics, there is a high charge per consultation (except for pregnant mothers and under-threes), with the option of expensive monthly health insurance. UNRWA services are free to registered refugees. NGO clinics have low charges, private clinics higher, although far less than government clinics. Health education and home visiting are very rare; government, UNRWA and a minority of NGO clinics provide other preventive services. Vaccination for the vast majority of the population is the main contribution of the government sector. Only a small percentage of the population have access to government clinics (see Table 26). Most Palestinians do not participate in health insurance schemes run by the Civil Administration, due to the high costs and to the low quality of government facilities.
A sizeable proportion of the population live in a community with no clinic (see Table). NGOs which run facilities consist of popular committees, including the Health Services Council, Health Care Committees, Health Work Committees, Medical Relief Committees, and charitable societies such as Red Crescent Societies, Patients Friends Societies, Zakaat Charitable Societies and the Arab Women’s Society.

In the West Bank, UNRWA operated 34 health centres, 11 dental clinics, ten laboratories, three radiology centres, and 28 specialist clinics, most for diabetes and hypertension. Fewer facilities served the greater Gaza refugee population: 22 health centres including mother and child and maternity units, eight dental clinics, seven laboratories, five family planning and nine other specialist clinics.

**Hospital services**

UNRWA services include hospitalisation schemes with access (in 1990) to 194 beds in the West Bank (most in Augusta Victoria hospital, Jerusalem) and 40 in the Gaza Strip. UNRWA will begin construction of a 232-bed hospital in Khan Younis and Gaza. Some hospitals in the private sector are run by international or local charitable organisations, who charge varying fees, sometimes with concessions for needy patients. Several hospitals are owned by private physicians or institutions who provide services at higher prices (see Table 27 for details of all hospitals).

Per person, the number of hospital beds is lower than WHO standards, although the central region is much better served than others (see Table 28). Most hospitals have a nurse per bed ratio of only 0.5, two or three times lower than international standards. Government hospitals provide around 70% of hospital beds (50% in the West Bank) but have lower occupancy rates than charitable or private hospitals due to lower standards (HDIP in PDP). Although all hospitals need improved maintenance of equipment, better storage facilities, hygiene, and administration, specialised facilities are particularly lacking in the governmental sector (PDP).
Palestinian Occupied Territory

There are around 1,600 nurses and 1,200 doctors in the West Bank and around 900 nurses and 1,000 doctors in the Gaza Strip (SAAR 1993). There is no shortage of generalist physicians but specialists and technical and administrative staff are needed. There are no teaching hospitals in the OPT, although there is one college teaching nursing and laboratory science, and for doctors and nurses, there is one centre for in-service training at Maqassed Islamic Charitable Hospital in Jerusalem.

Mental health services

Apart from UNRWA’s limited child psychology/psychiatry service, and the Civil Administration’s psychiatric hospitals in Bethlehem and Gaza which provide drug and ECT treatment, there are three local institutions which provide mental health services. Established to deal with the effects of the Intifada, the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme has a clinic and outreach services. Since 1983, the Palestinian Counselling Centre in Jerusalem has trained community mental health workers, teacher counsellors and youth leaders; it runs a drop-in clinic and outreach programme and prepares educational materials for parents. Also Jerusalem-based, the Child and Family Consultation Service conducts training and counselling.

Rehabilitation

An estimated 30,000 people in the OPT require rehabilitation for disability. Because of the magnitude of Intifada-related injuries, services have expanded in recent years but are still insufficient.

At least 20 organisations provide physical therapy services, including the YMCA vocational guidance service and outreach programme, the Swedish-backed Abu Rayeh centre in Ramallah, and the Medical Relief Committees’ community based physiotherapy programme. Bethlehem University offers a degree course in physiotherapy with the support of Save the Children Fund.
UNRWA runs four community rehabilitation centres in the West Bank and one in Jabalia, Gaza. Integrated summer camps and kindergartens and vocational training are elements of its effort to integrate disabled and partially sighted children and adults into the community. Throughout the OPT, the National Committee for Rehabilitation aims to implement an integrated approach to disability and rehabilitation.
Most social service facilities are funded by international organisations or local charities, and implemented by community-based organisations. Local charitable societies, Islamic organisations and popular committees are particularly well-known for their contribution in this field. Killings, detention and injuries during the Intifada added to social service needs. In addition, following the 1991 Gulf war, loss of remittances from abroad and wages from Israel led to falling income levels and increased pressure on social services. At the same time, support from the Arab world to charitable organisations providing services decreased.

Social Welfare Departments of the Israeli Civil Administration mainly control services, through permits to operate and channel funds from abroad, rather than implementing, funding or developing them.
Due to the political status of OPT, major components of national systems are absent, such as the mortgage and social welfare programs and probation and aftercare of offenders, and child protection. There is also relatively little provision of care for the elderly. There is no basis in local law for social services other than that controlling registration and administration of charitable societies. Many charitable societies and local and international NGOs provide health and/or education services in combination with social services, for example mental health and rehabilitation services, day and residential care for children.
Institutions and Services in East Jerusalem

KEY

Institutions

Al Fajr
AMIDEAST
ANERA
Arab Studies Society
Arab Thought Forum
Al Awqaf offices
Chamber of Commerce
Dar al Tifl al Arabi
Ibrahimiyeh College
ICRC
JMCC
Mennonite Centre
Notre Dame
British Council - Al-Quds TV.
Orient House
PASSIA
PHRIC/ECRC
Planning and Research Centre
Quakers Legal Aid
Al Quds University
Sharia Court
UNDP
UNRWA
YMCA
YWCA

Services

American Colony hotel
Bus Station/Damascus Gate
Bus Station/Sultan Suleiman
Jerusalem Electricity Company
National Palace Hotel
Post Office

Hospitals

Makassed
Red Crescent Maternity
St. John Ophthalmic
St. Joseph

Religious/Cultural

Armenian Museum
Al Aqsa Library
Al Aqsa Mosque
Church of the Holy Sepulchre
Citadel
Dome of the Rock/Qubat a Sakhrah
Ecole Biblique
French Cultural Centre
Gulbenkian Library
Al Kasaba/National Theatre
Rockefeller museum

Consulates

Belgium
Britain
France
Greece
Italy
Spain
Sweden
United States
Income support given by UNRWA and various humanitarian agencies is increasingly being replaced by loans for income-generating activities, although food aid and monetary grants are still necessary for survival of the poorest. UNRWA financial assistance for "hardship" cases still goes to the majority of the refugee population. UNRWA has a special programme of emergency aid to families of people killed, injured or imprisoned and families whose houses are demolished by the Israeli military authorities. UNRWA's programme of services also includes income-generating project and training for women and disabled children. Several major centres exist for disabled people, including the Bethlehem Arab Society centre in Beit Jala, the Princess Basma Centre in Jerusalem and the Child Development Centre in Gaza.

**Charitable societies**

Charitable societies, run mainly by women, have been active in Palestinian society for generations, but especially since the 1948 war. Besides health and education, charitable societies provide care for the aged, children, and rehabilitation for disabled people and those with speech, sight or hearing impairment. Some 21 charitable societies existed by 1948. Many more formed after 1950, when the Jordanian Ministry of Social Welfare and Union of Charitable Societies began to supervise societies in the West Bank. Almost half of today's societies (188 in the West Bank in 1986), existed before 1967. In the Gaza Strip, the majority came into being after 1967 (44 of 51), because the Egyptian administration almost entirely prohibited the formation of societies. After 1967, charitables societies became engaged more in professional, social and education services and running cultural, research and other institutions. They are concentrated particularly in the urban central Jerusalem-Ramallah-Bethlehem area, in Hebron and Gaza city.

During the Intifada, charitable societies began to reorient their work in order to reduce economic dependency on Israel through production projects. They now operate under a national umbrella of the Federation of Charitable Organizations based in Jerusalem.
Charities are only part of the range of indigenous organisations in the OPT. Today’s local organisations are heirs to a long tradition of voluntary service (Nakhleh 1991). There are around 750-800 societies of various kinds in the West Bank, some registered, depending on their age, with the Jordanian or Israeli authorities. Since 1988, professional and other associations registered in Jordan have become formally independent of their Jordanian parent bodies. Those not formally registered include popular committees and "informal" cooperatives. During the Intifada, several development-oriented institutions providing credit, education and health services formed as non-profit companies rather than voluntary societies in order to act legally as corporate bodies.
Cooperatives, committees, unions

Cooperatives

Agricultural credit and marketing cooperatives have existed in the West Bank since the Mandate. Jordan registered in the West Bank over 200 between the enactment of the Cooperatives Law in 1952 and 1967. Cooperatives continued to form and be registered by Israel and Jordan (although few were allowed to register after 1979), supported by the Jordanian Cooperative Bank and subsequently by US-based organisations such as ANERA and CDP. In the 1980s, they turned mainly to non-agricultural activities (housing, home supplies, electricity, credit). There are few cooperatives in Gaza (nine, seven of which are for agricultural production and marketing) due to the less supportive environment under Egypt.
**Popular committees**

Mass-based organisations grew out of the activities of the nationalist movement in the early 1970s, when young people, took part in tree planting, harvesting, road paving, and so on. Four politically-alligned groups for voluntary work formed in the 1980s. Subsequently, popular committees became more specialised and some, particularly in health and agriculture, are now very sizeable professional organisations.

**Women’s organisations**

In the 1930s and 40s, following the lead of the Palestine Women’s Union, women established numerous organisations both to provide social services and to organise protest against British policies. With the social calamities after 1948, and after 1967, their charitable work expanded, with more emphasis on education. One example is the Arab Women’s Union, one of the oldest charitable societies, which has several local branches involved in health, education and home economy projects aimed at increasing economic independence and development. In the late 70s, a new generation of more politicised women started to organise, forming in 1978 the first Women’s Committee, part of the national movement’s network of mass organisations. In the period 1978-82 four women’s committees formed, aligned to political groups. Early childhood, health education, literacy, training and, since the Intifada, productive projects, are the main activities of the committees: the Federation of Working Women Committees; the Palestinian Women’s Committee; the Palestinian Federation of Women’s Action Committee and the Union of Women Committees for Social Work.

**Trade Unions and Professional Associations**

Palestinian trade unions in the West Bank and Gaza cover a wide range of occupations, from staff at universities to those in hospitals, municipalities, printing presses, construction, hotels and restaurants, the footwear and clothing industries. The main organisations are the
General Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank and the Workers Unity Block; the former includes around 90 unions and attends the International Conference of Free Trade Unions. The latter included 47 unions in 1992. Based in Bethlehem, the Centre for Trade Union Rights organises courses in legal, safety, economic and other issues of interest.

Few West Bank unions are registered (34 in 1992 - ILO 1992), because since 1979 the Israeli authorities have not responded to applications. In Gaza, six registered unions with a combined membership of around 2,500 in the 1980s, comprise a Federation which provides financial assistance, social facilities, organises on labour rights, and negotiates with employers.

Israel does not allow Palestinian unions to operate in annexed Jerusalem or in Israel. Thousands of Palestinians who lost jobs in Israel in recent years therefore had no unions to support their struggle to secure the severance pay and other benefits to which they were entitled. Because workers in Israel can belong neither to the Histadrut nor to West Bank and Gaza unions, this seriously brings into question the right of workers to join organisations of their own choosing (ILO 1992). As the ILO notes, there is "convincing evidence of continuing harassment and obstruction" by Israel of Palestinian trade unions. Union members and leaders continue to be subject to Israeli restrictions: arrest, administrative detention, and refusal of permission to travel. Unions face financial constraints, particularly since the Gulf War, due to members being unable to pay dues and decreased external support; this affects their ability to function effectively and, combined with continuing intimidation by the Israeli authorities, has led to decreased interest in unions among workers. However, the GFTU isremedying this by setting up sickness and pension schemes, and by greater involvement in resolving individual disputes and reaching agreements with employers.
**Professional Associations**

In the mid-1940s the first professional organisations were founded in the sphere of health, the Arab Palestinian Medical Association and the Arab Palestinian Dentists Association, were founded. Palestinian Associations in the West Bank, based in Jerusalem, and in the Gaza Strip, now cover all professional groups including agricultural engineers, artists, journalists, tour guides, dentists, engineers, lawyers, physicians, pharmacists and writers.

Chambers of Commerce in the West Bank and Gaza play an important role in coordinating the affairs of merchants, exporters and industrialists, and, apart from Unions of Industrialists, are the only employers' organisations. Among the activities undertaken by these chambers are the issuing of export licenses for Palestinian products to Jordan and the Arab world. Chambers of Commerce exist in main towns of the West Bank and in Gaza city. A European-Palestinian Chamber was recently formed in Jerusalem. Chambers are run by elected boards, although from 1977, Israel prohibited elections. Many boards have remained in office since the elections of 1965 and 1972/73. However, since 1991, elections have taken place in several Chambers including Gaza, Ramallah, Hebron, Nablus, Jericho, Jenin, Qalqilya and Tulkarm.

Elected Student Councils in major Palestinian universities and colleges have played an important role in the national mobilization against Israeli occupation since the mid 1970's.
XI. **Culture, religion, and media**

**Culture**

Artists and the media community now organise annual Palestinian cinema and theatre festivals to highlight this aspect of national life. Cultural institutions concentrate in the capital Jerusalem; they include the Kasaba/Palestinian National Theatre, which has a regular programme of theatre and film; two music schools, enabling young people to experiment from the basis of traditional Arabic forms; a gallery of experimental and unconventional artwork, and a television and film production company. Ramallah and Nablus also have cultural centres; in Gaza city, the YMCA serves as a focus for cultural activities, particularly art exhibitions.
Commercial cinemas and most sports facilities, even in Jerusalem, have been closed for several years. Outside Jerusalem, there are no theatres or cinemas, and few museums or active recreational societies or clubs. Most museums are found in or near Jerusalem's Old City, including those of the Haram a-Sharif, the Armenian and Greek Orthodox communities, and the Dar al-Tifl al-Arabi museum of Palestinian heritage. Others displaying local history, Betuna Falastini and the women's union museum, are located in Bethlehem.

Although churches and the Awqaf administer the daily life of mosque and church, all of the many important archeological and religious sites in the West Bank are under the overall control of the Israeli authorities. These include sites opened to the public in and around Jerusalem, Jericho and Hebron. Many historic sites, such as the Byzantine monasteries of the eastern slopes, remain inaccessible. Mosques and churches, including those at the Tombs of the Patriarchs in Hebron, Jacob's Well in Nablus, the Haram a-Sharif in Jerusalem and the churches of Bethlehem and Jerusalem, remain under Palestinian control. Israel's Nature Reserves authority has incorporated areas of natural beauty into its projects, particularly the valleys running between Jerusalem/Bethlehem and the Jordan Valley, and Canada Park, built on the ruins of Latrun area villages which Israeli forces destroyed in 1967.

Religion

Sunni Islam is the religion of 97% of the population, Christianity of 3%. Many education, health and social services are based around local mosques and churches. For Muslims, Jerusalem is a Holy City in which the Prophet Mohammad experienced the transfiguration of *al Isra wal Mi'raj*. Jerusalem was also the first city, before Mecca, to which the Prophet asked his followers to turn in prayers. Gracing the walled Old City, the Haram al-Sharif compound includes both the Dome of the Rock and Al Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest shrine in Islam after the mosques in Mecca and Medina. The Haram attracts large numbers of Muslims for Friday prayers, especially during
Ramadan, the holy month of fasting. Besides Jerusalem, Hebron is considered holy by virtue of the Tombs of Abraham and the Patriarchs, who are revered in Islam.

Around 65,000 Palestinians in Arab city of Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza profess Christianity. They belong to over 15 different denominations, of whom the larger communities are the Greek Orthodox (25,000), Roman Catholic (17,000), Armenian and Greek Catholic. The Christian population is concentrated in the central part of the country in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, Beit Jala, Ramallah, and in a number of mixed Muslim/Christian villages. When in 1948 Palestinians were forced from their homes, 50,000 of 71,000 Palestinian refugees were Christians, 35% of all Christians in Palestine at that time.

**Media**

Palestinian newspaper publishing in Palestine dates from the early years of this century. *Palestine* and *a-Difa’a* were the two main dailies appearing in Jerusalem throughout the British Mandate and reappeared after the partition of Palestine. In Gaza, *Akhbar Falastin* was published during the Egyptian administration. During the Jordanian administration of the West Bank, several other Arabic dailies were published in Jerusalem. *Palestine* combined with *al-Nahar* in 1965 as *al-Dustour*, published in Amman until today. *Al Difa’a* combined with *al Jihad* and reappeared under the name of *al-Quds*, published until 1967, as its name suggests, in Jerusalem. The Amman papers *Al Raiy* and *al Manar* were distributed also in the West Bank until 1967. Two weeklies published in Jerusalem until 1967, *al Masa*, and the English language *Jerusalem Times*, predecessor of the Amman *Jordan Times* and *Jerusalem Star*.

After 1967, all publishing stopped in East Jerusalem until *al Quds* received Israeli permission in November 1968. It was the only daily until 1972 when *al-Fajr* received a permit as a weekly, becoming a daily from 1974, and soon followed by *al-Shaab*. *Al-Nahar*, the fourth Jerusalem Arabic daily, appeared in March 1986.
Together, these four dailies have a total distribution of over 20,000. Many other papers have appeared since the 1970s, but most have been short-lived. *A-Nablus* bi-weekly, the first paper to publish outside Jerusalem, appeared in 1992. There is also *Al-Fajr*, an English language weekly, and a Palestinian bi-weekly in Hebrew, *Gesher*. *Al-Taliah* Arabic weekly newspaper publishes in Jerusalem, along with the weekly current affairs magazines *al-Usbu al-Jadid* and *al-Bayader al-Siyasi*. There are also monthly magazines and journals including *al-Kateb*, which specializes in literary, social and political analysis, *Abeer*, oriented towards a general readership, and *al-Raed al-Iqtissadi*, on economic affairs. Press offices exist in all main cities. Palestinians receive Jordan television and radio, and some also those of Syria and Egypt.

**Censorship**

Although the Israeli authorities censor all forms of public expression in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the most obvious form is restriction on publication and distribution of written material. These wide powers cover anything the censor considers a threat to public order. Israel enforces censorship in annexed Jerusalem and in Israel, requiring Arabic newspapers published in East Jerusalem to submit to the censor, or face withdrawal of their permit to publish (Hebrew and Israeli English language newspapers only need submit articles which cover security matters). Articles in Arabic newspapers are often cut or removed. This explains the common practice of Arab papers printing translations of articles from the Hebrew press, although even these translations may be censored. Further evidence of the arbitrary nature of the policy is that Israel often allows publication of the same material by one paper but not by another.

Outside annexed Jerusalem, restrictions are much more severe. Military orders make it illegal for any printed matter to be brought into the West Bank without a permit. Although Jerusalem newspapers with permits are distributed in the West Bank, Israel has banned several papers from distributing outside Jerusalem for limited periods during the *Intifada*. Israel has closed down, raided and confiscated...
materials from, several press offices and distributors. Although Israel holds a list of banned books, potentially more restrictive than specific prohibitions are the wider powers making illegal the import or distribution of any material without a permit or considered a risk to public order or security. Military orders prohibit printing and publishing in the non-annexed West Bank of anything with political significance, including many literary works with nationalist sentiment. Orders give soldiers wide powers of search, confiscation and arrest.

Palestinian journalists, in covering the events of Israeli occupation since 1967, and especially the Intifada, have been subject to harassment and imprisonment. Israel has also deported several journalists, and placed others under house arrest or administrative detention. By military order, the Israeli authorities force newspapers to publish their official notices free of charge. Palestinian journalists have no access to information about the Occupied Territories held by the military authorities. Nor can they for example attend military court hearings.
XII. **Human Rights Violations**

*Israeli Settlement*

Israeli policies on land and water in the OPT have been noted above in relation to the effect on the Palestinian economy. They serve the Israeli illegal colonisation of the OPT and the demands of over 250,000 Israeli settlers in 161 settlements (according to Settlement Watch there were 110,000 outside Jerusalem by the end of 1992; at the beginning of 1992 there were 97,500 in the West Bank and 3,500 in the Gaza Strip, and 140,000 in annexed Jerusalem). Compared to Palestinian sources (PHRIC January 1992) Settlement Watch gives a lower figure of 144 settlements, due to excluding annexed Jerusalem and differences in counting separate settlement sites.
Control of land and construction

Of West Bank land, Israel has declared at least one third as "state land", including land owned by Palestinians but not officially registered, and that it has appropriated for roads to serve settlements and other "public" uses. According both to government strategy and to the demands of ideologically motivated settlers, the Israeli authorities then lease particular areas of the declared "state land" for settlement construction. Much "state land", if not allocated to settlements, the military has designated "closed" as firing ranges or around army bases. Thus Israel controls at least 60% of West Bank land, in addition to more than 40% of the land in the Gaza Strip. Especially under the Likud government, much Israeli public finance has gone towards construction of houses, utility supplies in settlements and roads, and government grants for the separate settlement municipal and regional councils. Most settlements are smaller than the average Palestinian village: 107 settlements in 1992 had a population of less than 500. Most are in enclaves in or close to areas of dense Palestinian population. Jewish settler population is most concentrated in the north-west of the West Bank, in the Shomron and Elkana "blocks", in the settlement city of Ariel; north and east of Jerusalem in the fast-growing Givat Ze’ev and Ma’ale Adumim (the largest settlement with around 16,000 people in 1992); in the older settlements in the Jordan Valley/Dead Sea area; and in settlements in and around Hebron.

Policy trends

Between 1967 and 1977, apart from the immediate focus on East Jerusalem, the Labour government and private groups started over 30 settlements outside Jerusalem, most on land and army camps controlled previously by the Jordanian government. Ideologically motivated settler groups were instrumental in initiating settlements, such as Kiryat Arba in Hebron as early as 1968, and the Gush Emunim settlements from the mid-70s. While private groups aimed to establish their presence at sites of ideological significance in the West Bank uplands, Labour policy had the broader military-strategic
aim to secure Israeli control of the Jordan Valley, the Jerusalem area and along the Green Line. Labour thus followed the guidelines of the unofficial Allon Plan, and encouraged agricultural settlements in the Jordan Valley and Hebron, and "security" settlements such as Ma'ale Adumim on the high ridge just east of Jerusalem. From 1977 on, the Likud-led government policy with its aspirations to settling the whole of Palestine, doubled the number of settlements outside Jerusalem to 71 and increased the number of settlers four-fold to 120,000 within five years. A legal innovation, declaring land not formally registered to be "state land", over which Israel took control, accelerated this process from 1979 onwards, expanding the boundaries of older settlements and creating new.

Under the Likud-led governments between 1982 and 1989, came the massive growth in numbers: to 148 settlements with 72,500 settlers outside Jerusalem. At this time, moving to a settlement became something for Israelis with economic rather than ideological motivations. In particular, settlements within easy reach of Tel Aviv expanded, such as Ariel and others in the "trans-Samaria corridor".

Particularly from 1990, the government revitalised the project of bringing substantial numbers of settlers to live throughout the West Bank. Despite financial incentives, rising immigration, pressure on Israel’s housing market, and a policy of creating industrial zones to provide local employment, this had limited success except in the more accessible areas. Near the Green Line and along the Trans-Samaria line in particular, broad new highways to make settlements more attractive have destroyed Palestinian farmland and disrupted communities. Private groups are involved to varying degrees in the process, most clearly in takeovers of Palestinian properties in central East Jerusalem, but also in starting smaller "frontier" settlements and in leading settlement regional and local councils, an extension of the Israeli local government system, and building settlers into a political force within Israel. Current Labour policy is unclear, apart from a determination to increase settlement in the Jerusalem area and along the Green Line, and allowing all settlements "natural growth".
Since 1967, and despite UN resolutions condemning Israeli changes to the city, control of Jerusalem has been the cornerstone of Israeli colonisation of the West Bank. This is a many-faceted strategy, involving control of the Old City and its immediate surroundings, and building attractive suburbs with new road links in order to populate heavily both annexed East Jerusalem and the whole metropolitan area.

Settlement construction must be seen in the context of overall Israeli policy towards Jerusalem: that is to separate it from the rest of the West Bank. This strategy involves barring non-Jerusalem Palestinians from entering the city without a permit (until 1991, Israel gave general permission for any West Bank or Gaza Palestinian to visit the city, but not to live there, although many did). Another element is that Israeli law dispossesses all non-Jerusalem Palestinians of their property in annexed Jerusalem. Even if living just outside the annexed zone, a Palestinian in this context becomes an "absentee".

It is in central Jerusalem that settlers have most energetically put the legal construction of "absentee property" to their use, particularly under the more sympathetic Likud administration which gave settlers preference in the allocation of houses declared to be state property under this pretext. In 1990-92, for example, settlers provoked international outcry by taking over St. John’s Hospice in the Old city and Palestinian homes just outside the Old City walls in Silwan, and by formulating plans for new Jewish quarters to be built on state-controlled land in other Palestinian neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem. However, from the beginning of the occupation, the Israeli authorities also located official institutions in central East Jerusalem, particularly Sheikh Jarrah. With Jerusalem Municipality, the Israeli government designed a planning policy which from 1967 until today has limited Palestinian building in the city centre. One obvious consequence of this is that many institutions and businesses have located in peripheral areas such as the northern suburbs of Beit Hanina and Shufat.
With the intention of securing Israeli sovereignty over the whole Jerusalem region through demographic superiority, Israel began immediately after 1967 to populate within the annexed area, and from the mid-70s in building major urban settlements outside it. Each of the sizeable areas of former pasture land annexed is now the site of a dense Jewish suburb. These bridge the Green Line, connecting to nearby West Jerusalem neighbourhoods. Road 1, the most dramatic addition to the East Jerusalem landscape in 1992-93, serves to link the rapidly expanding northern and eastern suburban settlements directly to central Jerusalem.

**Residency**

Israel gives residency rights in the OPT only to those Palestinians present, registered and issued with identity documents by Israel at the beginning of the occupation in 1967, and to their descendants. Aside from 1948 refugees no longer in Palestine, this excluded tens of thousands of Palestinians resident in the West Bank and Gaza Strip immediately before the 1967 war. Israel allowed a minority of these to return as residents in the two years after the war, when the authorities have granted very few discretionary "family reunions". Even residents can lose this status if they remain abroad continuously for more than four years or in some cases if their papers are lost or not in order. Non-resident Palestinians marrying resident Palestinians must apply for family reunion, although between 1987 and 1989, the authorities approved less than one quarter of applications (PHRIC).

During the Intifada, Israel further reduced the already circumscribed residency status which it accords Palestinians in the OPT in the context of family reunification. For example, it ordered that children of residents if born abroad would only be registered until their fifth year, and not at all if the mother was not a resident (in most resident/non-resident marriages it is the mother who is not a resident). Israel has expelled many hundreds of "non-resident" Palestinians, the majority of whom are women with Jordanian passports married to OPT residents and their children. Petitions through human rights groups have succeeded only in an administrative
decision to allow non-resident wives and children six-month rather than three-month visits.

Movement restrictions

Although overriden by the general closure of the West Bank and Gaza in 1993, Israel had used several specific measures to limit movement of Palestinians into Israel and illegally annexed Jerusalem. Aimed particularly at workers, three such measures have been in force since 1989: "green cards" issued to selected individuals barred from Israel and Jerusalem (around 18,000 in total by mid-1992) at the discretion of the Israeli security services or Civil Administration; and the computer-coded "magnetic" cards and vehicle permits required by Gaza Strip Palestinians. In January 1991, Israel introduced a system of compulsory work permits, issued for limited periods after extensive bureaucratic procedures and valid for entry to specified regions of Israel only or for East Jerusalem. Palestinians without work permits must obtain a travel permit to enter Israel, in addition to a vehicle permit; this applies to all visits to East Jerusalem and in practice to all travel between north and south of the West Bank. On several occasions between 1990 and 1993, comprehensive closures barred all non-Jerusalem Palestinians from the capital and from Israel, even permit-holders. Because Israeli law treats settlements in the Occupied Territories as in effect part of Israel, Palestinian construction workers in these settlements require special "blue cards" issued after the same lengthy procedures.

Other Human Rights Violations

Despite years of work by local human rights organisations, and UN resolutions condemning Israeli practices, the human rights situation in the Occupied Territories continues to deteriorate. From the beginning of the Intifada until the end of 1992, the Israeli authorities had killed at least 1,119 Palestinians (excluding cases still under investigation by human rights groups), including almost 300 children, injured 127,000, detained thousands without trial, (administrative detention), and demolished over 2,200 houses. Amnesty
International's reports on the Occupied Territories have acknowledged the many violations, both collective punishment (house demolitions, curfews, closures of areas and institutions), and individual (killings, injuries, detention without trial, widespread torture and ill-treatment during interrogation). Punishment of soldiers for the murder or torture of Palestinians are rare, and sentences for violations of regulations which involve killing Palestinians are usually limited to a few months imprisonment provisions. Palestinian human rights groups continue to demand compliance with international law on the protection of persons under occupation (principally the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949).

**House demolition and sealing**

Since 1967, the Israeli authorities have sealed or demolished over two thousand homes for "security" reasons, affecting an estimated 18,000 people. Between 1981 and 1991 they demolished or sealed 1,001 homes, 90% not associated with anyone who at the time had been convicted of any crime, causing financial loss of around $US 13 million (al Haq). Demolition or sealing is usually carried out because one family member is "wanted", under interrogation, or awaiting trial, thus suspected of a "crime"; or because a violent incident has taken place nearby. In the early years of the occupation, Israel demolished at least 1,000 houses and entire villages for security reasons; the number of demolitions was relatively low in the early 80s, but increased under the Rabin "iron fist" years to 40-50 annually, and increased dramatically during the Intifada to over 200 per year. Demolitions and sealings are illegal under international law, and are considered a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war.

In addition, Israel has demolished over 2,000 buildings built without permits or in violation of Israeli planning regulations in all parts of the OPT including annexed Jerusalem.
Deportations

Since 1967, Israel has expelled approximately 1,600 Palestinians, the majority in the first six years, relatively few in 1973-84, but 105 in 1985-89 after Rabin, as Defence Minister, reactivated the expulsion policy. In the first mass expulsion of recent years, on 17 December 1992, with High Court approval, the Israeli government expelled 415 Palestinians from the OPT. Despite the UN Security Council’s resolution 799 of 18 December 1992 calling for their immediate return, in April 1993, 396 remained in Lebanon. Israel allowed 14 previous deportees to return home. Alleged to be members of Islamic organisations, the 415 were among an estimated 1,600 arrested after the kidnapping and killing of an Israeli policeman. Deportations are prohibited under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the 1945 Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal.

Killings

Since the Intifada alone, the Israeli authorities have killed - till the end of 1992 - over 1,100 Palestinians, most by gunshot, others by beating or tear gas. During 1991-92, human rights groups exposed Israel’s shoot-to-kill policy implemented by undercover units of disguised soldiers. Contrary to Israeli claims, most victims were "unarmed and pursuing non-violent activities when they were ambushed and shot repeatedly at close range" (PHRIC May 1992). Victims were apparently targeted simply because they were masked, throwing stones or on "wanted" lists.

Military legal system

In practice only Palestinians are tried in military courts, for offences related to "security" of Israelis or the Israeli army or state. Military courts are located in Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron, Jenin and Gaza city. Judges are military officers appointed by the military commander.
A study by Israeli lawyers (B'tselem 1989) found that significant injustice is caused by "inexplicable inefficiency" in the military court system, and that army procedures violate its own orders. Military orders allow detention for up to 18 days without a warrant (in contrast to 48 hours in Israel). After the authorities charge a detainee, they can hold him/her indefinitely. They can prevent a detainee from seeing a lawyer for 30 days (according to B'tselem, "a matter of custom"; and for up to 90 days with a court order). Very few people are released on bail.

Lawyers and families invariably face great difficulties in locating detainees. Courts are noisy and chaotic and there is rarely adequate translation from Hebrew. Neither lawyers, defendants nor families know when cases will be heard, and most cases are postponed because either defendant, witness or file has not been brought, or in order to conclude plea bargains, (an agreement between defence and prosecution before any conviction whereby the defendant pleads guilty and serves a sentence both parties agree on).

Despite prohibitions in international and Israeli law of torture and the use of force against detainees, either to intimidate or to extract confessions, the actual administration of military justice allows ill-treatment to proceed unchecked (B'tselem 1991). Routine methods include tying detainees in uncomfortable positions, sleep deprivation, confinement in small spaces, beating and hooding. Convincing evidence has also been gathered of the use of electric shocks. Factors leading to such practices include the long periods incommunicado, the wide powers given the General Security Service, the difficulty of challenging admissibility of evidence in court, and the official 1987 Landau Commission report which permitted the use of "moderate physical force" in interrogation related to "terrorist" activity. Very few detainees are ever charged with terrorist activities.

Conditions of detention

Around 13,000 Palestinians are being held in Israeli detention centres, two-thirds in military-run camps, in Israel and the OPT, and one-third
in 19 prisons run by the Israeli Prisons Authority, seven located in the OPT. In holding prisoners outside the OPT, Israel contravenes international law and standards. Although removing persons from occupied territory is prohibited under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Israeli High Court has approved holding OPT Palestinians in facilities in Israel.

**Administrative detention**

From the beginning of the *Intifada* until mid-1992, the military authorities issued over 14,000 administrative detention orders (B’tselem 1992). Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, administrative detention is sanctioned only as an exceptional preventive measure. But in many cases, the authorities use this measure after interrogation if they cannot obtain sufficient evidence for a trial or do not want to expose informants. In other cases, those detained are political leaders. Military Judges rarely cancel such orders on appeal. Ansar 3, a tent camp set up in the Negev desert in Israel, in 1988, is the usual place of detention. Although the Geneva Convention stipulates that detainees are to be held in better conditions than sentenced prisoners, conditions in Ansar 3 are far worse, with restricted family visits (none until late 1991), unhygienic conditions, overcrowding, lack of medical facilities, and extreme heat and cold.
Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip and Arab Jerusalem have been living under occupation for more than 26 years. Their economic, social, educational, political and psychological conditions have been negatively affected by the prolonged occupation. A sizeable portion of their land has been confiscated, a great number of people have been killed or wounded or detained. The whole fabric of Palestinian society was damaged by Israeli practices.

While suffering and pain have taken their toll over Palestinian society in its entirety, Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have not lost hope of recovering their national rights. Over the past 26 years, particularly since the intifada of December 1987, Palestinians have heroically resisted the occupation in various ways. In spite of the ongoing systematic confiscation of land, and the severe restriction on economic, social and development they have remain steadfast.
For the last two years a Palestinian Delegation is involved in peace talks with its Israeli counterpart. The objective of the Palestinian people is unmistakenly clear - to remove occupation and achieve the national and political rights of the Palestinian people. Specifically, what the Palestinian people aim to achieve is to exercise their right to self determination, and to establish their independent Palestinian State beside Israel. It is for the attainment of their national rights, without violating the rights of others, that Palestinians have been struggling.
Appendix

Table 1 Migration balance 1989-91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>W. Bank 000s</th>
<th>Gaza S. 000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS 1992

Table 2 Population and annual growth 1991-92 Israeli sources (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OPT</th>
<th>W.Bank</th>
<th>Gaza S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1599.7</td>
<td>957.0</td>
<td>642.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1681.7</td>
<td>1005.6</td>
<td>676.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% growth</td>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS 1992

Table 3 Population by Region (thousands): Palestinian sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hebron</th>
<th>284.9</th>
<th>259.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>250.6</td>
<td>231.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td></td>
<td>206.5</td>
<td>165.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td></td>
<td>198.5</td>
<td>229.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td></td>
<td>196.3</td>
<td>202.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td></td>
<td>189.9</td>
<td>197.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td></td>
<td>124.6</td>
<td>138.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td></td>
<td>768.0</td>
<td>788.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

annexed East Jerusalem

Source: (left column) ATF/ARC 1992, (right) NHP 1993.
Table 4 Urban/rural population by region (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Nablus</th>
<th>Jslm</th>
<th>Hebron</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Semi</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref. camp</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from PSP

Table 5 population of major cities

- Arrabeh 10,000
- Beit Jala 9,000
- Beit Sahour 10,000
- Bethlehem 17,000
- El Bireh 25,000
- Dura 20,000
- Gaza 220,000
- Halhoul 15,000
- Hebron 100,000
- Jenin 30,000
- Jericho 9,000
- E. Jerusalem 150,000
- Khan Younis 80,000
- Nablus 120,000
- Qabatiya 11,500
- Rafah 80,000
- Ramallah 25,000
- Qalqilya 30,000
- Tubas 15,000
- Tulkarm 30,000
- Yabad 10,000
- Yatta 10,000

Source: PASSIA archives
### Table 6: Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of Refugees</th>
<th>% of All Refugees</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
<th>% in Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>452,000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>548,000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>296,000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>999,000</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>317,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNRWA

### Table 7: Population of OPT Refugee Camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp/Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aida/B</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aqabat Jaber/Jr</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arroub/H</td>
<td>6,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Askar/N</td>
<td>9,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amari/R</td>
<td>6,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balata/N</td>
<td>14,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Jibrin/B</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureij/G</td>
<td>22,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp No. 1/N</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir Amar/R</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir al Balah/G</td>
<td>12,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dheisheh/B</td>
<td>8,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ein a-Sultan/Jr</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fara'a/N</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fawwar/H</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabalia/G</td>
<td>65,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalazone/R</td>
<td>6,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin/Jn</td>
<td>10,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalandia/R</td>
<td>6,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Younis/G</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghazi/G</td>
<td>14,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nur Shams/T</td>
<td>5,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuseirat/G</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafah/G</td>
<td>60,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shati (Beach)/G</td>
<td>51,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shufat/Js</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm/T</td>
<td>11,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: UNRWA
Table 8  Towns and cities with municipal status

central West Bank
Bani-Zayd, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Beituniya, Bethlehem, El-Bireh,
Birzeit, Deir Dibwan, Jericho, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Silwad

northern West Bank
Anabta, Arrabeh, Jenin, Qabatiya, Qalqilya, Nablus,
Salfit, Tubas, Tulkarm, Yabad

southern West Bank
Dura, Halhul, Hebron, Yatta

Gaza Strip
Deir al Balah, Gaza city, Khan Younis, Rafah

Table 9: Population with basic services by region (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>piped water</th>
<th>24h electricity</th>
<th>sewerage</th>
<th>garbage collected</th>
<th>population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>196,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>188,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>189,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan V</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>146,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HDIP

Table 10  Household size and housing density 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>W. Bank</th>
<th>Gaza S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≥ 7 pp. household</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average pp. household</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>6.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean pp. room</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 3 pp. room</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[pp. = persons per]

Source: CBS 1992
**Palestinian Occupied Territory**

**Table 11** Households with selected amenities 1991 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>W. Bank</th>
<th>Gaza S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no heating</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no bathroom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>water heating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solar only</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>running water</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in house</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with phone</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with TV</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS 1992

**Table 12** Main sectoral contributions to GDP 1987 %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WB</th>
<th>GS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agric/forestry/fish</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>publ/comm servs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industry</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS 1991

**Table 13** Agricultural production 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WB IS 000s</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Gaza IS 000s</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crops</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animals</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olives</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry meat</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grapes</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS 1991 [m = minimal]
Table 14 Gaza Strip Manufacturing 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>units</th>
<th>workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foods</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>textiles</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wood</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metal</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Tables 14 & 15 categories are abbreviated, e.g. "metal" includes all metal products]

Table 15 Gaza Strip manufacturing 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>units</th>
<th>workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>textiles</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>building mats</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foods</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metal</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wood</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chemicals</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carpets</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paper</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bamboo</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>waxing</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16  OPT workers in Israel 1990 (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>total</th>
<th>in Israel</th>
<th>% in Is</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Bank</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza S</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 16-20 Source: CBS 1991

Table 17  Persons employed locally and in Israel by occupation 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israel %</th>
<th>000s</th>
<th>WB/GS %</th>
<th>000s</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientific, academic</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other professional, technical</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin, managerial, clerical etc</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled industry, building, transport etc</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other and unskilled</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>107.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>188.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>296.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 18 Estimated Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Product, National Disposable Income 1990 (million IS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OPT</th>
<th>WB</th>
<th>GS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP:GNP</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP:NDI %</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[GNP equals gross domestic product plus factor income from abroad; national disposable income equals GNP plus current transfers from abroad.]

Table 19 Components of GDP 1987 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>W.Bank</th>
<th>Gaza S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>exports</td>
<td>12 (16)</td>
<td>18 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gross capital formation</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>govt. expenditure</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private consumption</td>
<td>64 (59)</td>
<td>60 (52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[() figures shown for comparison for 1983 where they differ significantly]

Table 20 Imports and exports 1987 (million NIS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WB</th>
<th>GS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>2,229</td>
<td>1,348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 21 Main economic trends 1987-1990 (% change)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>W Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>disposable national income*</td>
<td>+17-20</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agric product</td>
<td>+26</td>
<td>+29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ind product</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income from work outside</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>-21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[public and community services, i.e. wages of Civil Administration and public and non-profit institutions did not change significantly]
[* excluding olives value of which fluctuates greatly]

Note: in this period, total resources available to the Gaza economy (imports and GDP) declined by 16%; fixed capital formation decreased by 14%; exports of goods and services decreased by 72%.

Table 22 Current account balance 1987 (US thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OPT</th>
<th>W.Bank</th>
<th>Gaza S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>balance of goods &amp; services</td>
<td>-208.0</td>
<td>-171.8</td>
<td>-36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net unrequited transfers</td>
<td>127.9</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>current account balance</td>
<td>-80.1</td>
<td>-100.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNCTAD 1992
Table 23 Governmental assistance 1992 ($US thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy/Planning</th>
<th>1.382</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>6.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric/forestry/fisheries</td>
<td>17.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>21.668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and development finance</td>
<td>0.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing/Infrastructure</td>
<td>4.812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>73.770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>31.904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian/relief</td>
<td>11.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social conditions and equity</td>
<td>6.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>1.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and technology</td>
<td>1.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP 1992

Table 24 Schools, students and share of students by administration 1990-91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>insts</th>
<th>% students</th>
<th>W Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th>students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>99 (53)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80 (34)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jord. V.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14 (5)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>103 (49)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>67 (37)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS 1992

Table 25 Clinics & share of consultations by administration type & region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Communities</th>
<th>Clinics</th>
<th>Govt %</th>
<th>NGO/char %</th>
<th>Priv %</th>
<th>UNRWA %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>99 (53)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80 (34)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jord. V.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14 (5)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>103 (49)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>67 (37)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) established 1987 or later - Source: HDIP
Table 26 Access to government clinics and to no clinic by region (% of population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>to govt clinic</th>
<th>to NO clinic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan V.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HDIP

Tables 25 & 26 use regions of the Israeli military administration, except Jordan Valley, which Israel does not treat separately; exclude towns of Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Al Bireh, Nablus and Jericho.
Table 27 Government and non-governmental hospitals and numbers of beds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Charitable/private</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>Makassed 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Jala</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Augusta Victoria 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem psych</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>St. Joseph's 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>St. John Opth 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dajani, Muhtadi obs/gyn 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Caritas paed 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mt. David paed 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Holy Family mat 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>Muhtaseb paed 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hebron mat 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watani</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Ittihad 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafidia</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>UNRWA Qalqilya 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>St. Lukes 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shifa 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAZA</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shifa</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>Al Ahli 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Younis</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Nasser 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radwan Opth</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Breij UNRWA resp 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All general hospitals unless otherwise indicated (ophthalmic, maternity, paediatric, obstetrics/gynaecology, psychiatric, respiratory).

Source: Nammari in *Palestine: Development for Peace*
Table 28 Hospital beds per 1,000 population:
West Bank regions

North 0.5
South 0.4
Central 2.5

Source: Barghouti in Palestine: Development for Peace

Table 29 Human rights violations 1992
& during intifada (12/87-12/92)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>violation</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>intifada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>killed</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(under 16)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>injured</td>
<td>6600</td>
<td>127000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>land confiscated km²</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>408.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trees destroyed</td>
<td>25,890</td>
<td>154,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>curfew days</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>11,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>houses demolished</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>2272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative detentions</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>18,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expulsions</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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