CHAPTER 5
The Struggle for Jerusalem:
The
Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty
Prior to the signature of the peace treaty between
Jordan and Israel, the PNA made a last attempt to have paragraph
3 rescinded from the treaty by raising the issue at the United
Nations, where the DOP was filed as an official document.
The permanent observer of
Palestine to the United Nations, Dr. Nasser al-Kidwa, sent an
official letter1 to the Secretary General of the United Nations
and to the President of the Security Council warning that the
inclusion of that paragraph in the final peace treaty would have
grave consequences. Al-Kidwa rejected the issue of separation
between religious supervision and political issues in East
Jerusalem because such separation "can only serve the
illegal fait accompli created by the Israeli
government."2 Jerusalem, he affirmed, continues to be an
indivisible part of the Palestinian Territories occupied by
Israel in 1967. Hence, the inclusion of this paragraph
constitutes a "clear violation" of the commitments made
by Israel in the DOP. Therefore, al-Kidwa said that the
Palestinians "...demand the immediate return to the status
quo ante and respect for the DOP." He warned that
otherwise great damage will befall the credibility of the
existing agreements and the peace process.
Palestinian objections to the
clause on Jerusalem notwithstanding, Israel and Jordan signed a
peace treaty on 26 October 1994 in the presence of the US
President Bill Clinton and many Arab and foreign guests and
dignitaries. The treaty was the second comprehensive peace treaty
between an Arab country and Israel.
Paragraph 3 of the Washington
Declaration, which triggered off the Jordanian-Palestinian
dispute, was carried over into Article 9 of the peace treaty. The
role given to Jordan by Israel to supervise the Muslim holy
places in Jerusalem once again became the focus of the conflict
between the PNA and Jordan and between Chairman Arafat and King
Hussein.4 Article 9 of the treaty was also one of the main
reasons why the opposition in Jordan rejected the treaty.5
In Palestine, there was mass
rejection of the Israeli-Jordanian treaty. Demonstrations took
place in the towns of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and
Jerusalem, where the Jordanian and Israeli flags were burned and
the picture of King Hussein was torn.6
In this latest dispute there were
no qualitative changes in the arguments put forward by the
Jordanian and Palestinian sides. Thus, according to President
Clinton, the issue was not raised by Chairman Arafat at their
meeting on 26 October.7 Immediately after the signing of the
treaty, there was an escalation in hostility of the statements
and threats made by Chairman Arafat and King Hussein. Two
statements in particular warrant attention.
The first was made by Arafat on
the eve of the signing of the treaty at the Islamic University in
Gaza, where he lambasted the Jordanian-Israeli treaty's clause on
the issue of Jerusalem before an audience of more than 3,000
students, faculty members and guests. In his speech, Arafat
called on the Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein by name,
saying
"...let Hussein and Rabin
hear me, Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine whether they like
it or not, whether they will it or not, and those who do not like
this, let them go and drink the water of the sea of Gaza."8
He continued by saying that
"Jerusalem is not merchandise to be bought and sold".9
Meanwhile, King Hussein maa direct
reference before Jordanian army officers to the events of 1970,
better known as "Black September", when the Jordanian
army drove the forces of the Palestinian resistance out of
Jordan, saying
"I do not want to go back to
pains, tragedies and sufferings. The events of 1970 were not
between us and our Palestinian brothers. Those who were
responsible at that time [for these events] were responsible for
the Lebanese [civil] war and who are responsible for the very
many things that befell this umma (nation) until now and that
befell Palestine."10
Despite these antagonistic
statements, the overall position adopted by the PNA was less
emotional and more reasonable than its previous position, an
indication that a resolution to this mounting dispute was being
sought.
The position of the PNA can be
outlined on three levels. First, when talking about the treaty,
only Israel's position was condemned as a "flagrant
violation"11 of the DOP. This was also clear in the official
letter mentioned above sent by the Permanent Observer of
Palestine to the Secretary General of the UN and to the President
of the Security Council. This position had been held by the PNA
throughout.
Second, the position of the PNA
was more conciliatory towards Jordan. On 29 October 1994, three
days after the signing of the Jordan-Israeli treaty, the Council
of Ministers of the PNA met in its weekly cabinet session under
the chairmanship of President Yasser Arafat. The Council
expressed its desire to develop and to strengthen
Palestinian-Jordanian relations and reaffirmed its reservations
about the treaty, especially concerning the articles that deal
with "Jerusalem, refugees, water and economic
affairs."12 Even though there were now issues to be
contested in the treaty, in addition to that of Jerusalem, the
tone of the statement was more conciliatory: the statement did
not "condemn" the Jordanian position but only expressed
"reservation" about it. This was also made clear by
Faisal Husseini, the minister responsible for the Jerusalem
portfolio, who said that the Palestinians "do not oppose the
Jordanian-Israeli treaty, but hope that some articles in it will
not jeopardise the inalienable Palestinian rights in
Jerusalem."13
Third, the position of the PNA has
become clearer in rejecting separation between political
sovereignty over Jerusalem and the custodianship over the holy
places in the city. Israel has been crusading for such
separation, and maintains that Jerusalem is its "eternal
capital". The statements made by Rabin14 and Peres15 in this
regard following the signature of the treaty reaffirm this
position.
Chairman Arafat rejected this
separation of functions in a public speech in Gaza. He said that
"Jurisdiction is for God all
over the universe. His Chair engulfs all the heavens and earth
and not only Jerusalem. Jurisdiction over the universe is God's,
but sovereignty over Jerusalem and jurisdiction over Jerusalem is
for the Palestinian people."16
Sa'eb Ereqat, PNA Minister of
Local Government, said that
"despite the importance of
the religious sites in Jerusalem, Jerusalem will continue to have
a dimension of sovereignty. It is necessary to talk about the
withdrawal of the Israeli troops from East Jerusalem in
accordance with the principles mentioned in Security Council
resolution 242 which affirm the inadmissibility of occupying
territory by force."17
In the above-mentioned letter of
Dr. al-Kidwa, the PNA considered the separation to be in the
service of the illegal faits accomplis created by the
Israeli Government in the city. The Union of Palestinian Writers
in the Gaza Strip considered
"the simplification of the
conflict over Jerusalem, and changing this conflict from one over
total sovereignty to an issue of religious and political sharing
is nothing but a consolidation of [the Israeli]
occupation."18
The Jordanian side was also in a
conciliatory mood, even though their position concerning their
right to supervise the holy places did not change. The new
element in the Jordanian position was the public acknowledgement
at the highest level, and at a very important world forum, that
Jordan would relinquish this right to the PNA following agreement
on the final status of Jerusalem between Israel and the PLO. This
position does not represent a qualitative change in the Jordanian
position, but it indicates that Jordan is more conciliatory and
is willing to give up its religious role to the PNA.
This position was made public by
Crown Prince Hassan on 2 November 1994 in Casablanca, where he
was heading his country's delegation to the Economic Summit on
the Middle East and North Africa. The Prince said that he
"would like to put an end to the dispute over Jerusalem
because there is no justification for it". He said,
"when the negotiations
between the Palestinians and Israel result in an agreement on the
final status on the City of Jerusalem, we are committed to
transfer Jordan's guardianship of these places to the Palestinian
Authority."19
The Palestinian side immediately
praised this statement. In separate statements, the Palestinian
Minister of Economy, Ahmad Qrei'a (Abu Ala'), and the Minister of
Religious Affairs, Sheikh Hassan Tahboub, welcomed the Crown
Prince's declaration.20
This conciliatory position also
made it possible for Chairman Arafat to telephone King Hussein on
the eve of his first official and public visit ever to Israel to
exchange the ratified peace treaty with Rabin. When he announced
this development, the King said he was happy to have spoken to
Arafat. On 13 November, the Chairman praised the Jordanian
decision to hand over the religious role to the PNA. It seems
thus that the dispute between Jordan and the PNA is being
contained.
CONCLUSION
The Battle For
Jerusalem: A Programme of Action For Peace
Jerusalem, according to the renowned Palestinian
poet, Mahmoud Darwish, is "the richest city in
meaning"1 the world over. Jerusalem has rich meaning in the
minds and hearts of the Palestinian people and the entire Arab
nation, as well as a central role in the minds and hearts of
Muslims, Christians and Jews throughout the world.
The success or failure of the
peace process between the PLO and Israel, and to a great extent
between the Arab states and Israel, depends on the way the issue
of Jerusalem is treated. Chairman Arafat's call, made over a year
ago, to immediately start the process of negotiation on Jerusalem
is appropriate because it reflects the Palestinian people's
concern about the success of the peace process.
Jerusalem should not be delayed to
the final status negotiations if it is at all possible to discuss
the issue. Jerusalem should be a standing issue on the agenda of
any negotiations between the PLO and Israel, rather than being a
bone of contention in the mass media whenever there is a
statement by one of the parties, as is currently the case. In our
minds Jerusalem means first and foremost peace. Those who ask to
postpone its discussion in fact are asking to postpone the
arrival at peace. Those who propose postponing discussion of the
issue are prolonging and escalating the dispute to dangerous
levels. Peace cannot be achieved until the issue of Jerusalem is
discussed thoroughly and a successful solution is found. In this
sense, Jerusalem is the key to peace not only in Palestine but
also in the Arab and Muslim world as a whole.
Opening the door of peace - with
Jerusalem as the key - is a process that demands courage,
willpower and resolution to overcome difficulties on the
emotional and political levels. But those who have decided to
make `the peace of the brave' should not shy away from adopting
similarly brave steps that are required for the peace of
Jerusalem. The key to this is genuine confidence-building
measures.
Confidence-building measures are
not a luxury in the peace process in the Middle East. They are a
daily necessity, with the whole peace process at stake if these
measures do not succeed in normalising life in the area.
Confidence-building measures are, however, a two-way-street.
Israel is grossly mistaken if it thinks that Palestinians have to
provide confidence-building measurefor Israelis, while receiving
nothing in return.
Peace has to be viewed as just,
permanent and comprehensive by the peoples concerned and not only
by the political elites in the area. In order for this to happen,
people have to learn, grasp and feel that they are benefiting
from peace, otherwise the process may collapse.
The first rule in this sharing and
learning process is that the Israelis have to recognise, once and
for all, that they cannot change the rules of the game at will,
while at the same time asking the PNA to comply with the DOP. It
has taken Israel almost five decades and one-hundred years of war
and bloody conflicts to come to one decision: the recognition of
the Palestinian people. The hope is that it will not require
another five decades of bitter and bloody conflicts for the
Israelis to recognise the fact that Jerusalem is not theirs
alone. Israel must start educating its public that Jerusalem has
to be shared on all levels, in particular the political,
jurisdictional and sovereignty levels, with the Palestinian
people.
The starting point for this
educational process is the recognition that the UN Partition
Resolution 181 (III) of 1947 remains valid. It was Abba Eban, the
former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, who described this
resolution as the birth certificate of Israel. By the same token,
it is also the birth certificate of the State of Palestine, which
has yet to be created on the ground in Palestine after it was
declared by the Palestine National Council (PNC) on 15 November
1988 in Algiers. The Palestinian Declaration of Independence and
the subsequent peace initiative were based on this resolution and
accepted the partition of Jerusalem.
This resolution is therefore the
basis for the sharing of Palestine and Jerusalem. The Palestinian
people, as represented by the PLO, took this courageous step
exactly forty years after the Palestinian catastrophe, the first
Israeli-Arab war in 1948, and the loss of the major part of
Palestine to its Jewish inhabitants who created the State of
Israel.
The second factor to be taken into
consideration is that only two countries in the world have
recognised the results of the historical developments that led,
on the one hand, Israel to occupy West Jerusalem and declare it
its capital, and on the other, that led Jordan to hold East
Jerusalem and maintain it within the West Bank as part of Jordan.
It has to be recognised that these two developments were not
recognised by the world community, except by Britain and Pakistan
in the case of Jordan. Israel, after 48 years of occupying the
western part of Jerusalem and 29 years of occupying the eastern
part of the city, has not received a single recognition of that
status, not even from its staunchest supporters, in particular
the USA.
East Jerusalem, including the Old
City, is integral to the West Bank, and is its heart, connecting
the northern and southern parts. Palestinian life is centred
around Jerusalem, religiously, politically, economically,
culturally, commercially and socially. Israeli life, meanwhile,
is centred around Tel Aviv. If Israel does not recognise this
fact and return East Jerusalem to its Palestinian owners, the
peace process will not be consummated. Neither the Palestinian
people, nor any of the Arab people, will look upon the settlement
to be just, permanent or comprehensive.
If Israel does not recognise this
fact, it would be appropriate for the Palestinian side, as well
as the Arab parties, to open the whole question of Jerusalem on
the basis of UN Resolution 181 (III), thus denying legitimacy to
the Israeli claim to West Jerusalem.
Israel has to recognise that it
occupied, not liberated, East Jerusalem in 1967, when it occupied
the other Palestinian and Arab Territories. There are many UN
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions that reaffirm
this on a yearly basis, in addition to the resolutions to the
same effect adopted by international agencies and fora. Without
recognising this, the question of Jerusalem will continue to be
disputed for ages to come, even if a peace agreement is reached.
If official Israel recognises this
fact, it will lead to a psychological breakthrough in the
political debate in Israel that will facilitate a just solution
to the question of Jerusalem. Continued occupation or annexation
of Jerusalem, in defiance of all norms and rules of international
law and the spirit of peace, will lead to strengthened resistance
to occupation. Recent terrorist attacks - such as the massacre at
the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron or the massacres perpetrated by
suicide attacks carried out by Muslim extremists - serve as a
reminder what may come in the absence of a just settlement.
Extremists on both sides, Israelis and Palestinians, will be
nourished by the failure to find a just and acceptable solution
to the question of Jerusalem.
For the peace process to be
maintained, various mechanisms must be developed. Most important
among these should be the holding of regular summit meetings
between the leaders of the PLO/PNA and the Israeli government.
Meetings which have taken place so far between the two have
depended on the goodwill of the Israeli Prime Minister. A modus
vivendi should be found where the wishes and needs of both
sides will be respected on an equal basis. All topics can and
should be discussed at these meetings, even those that seem to be
insoluble. The Israeli Prime Minister should not use these
meetings to punish, penalise or reward the PNA for failing in its
serious endeavors to curb acts of violence committed in Israel by
residents of the Palestinian territory. Such an Israeli practice
not only embarrasses the PNA in front of its constituencies but
also emphasises its place as the weaker party in the peace
equation.
There are successful precedents
for this suggestion. During the 1970s, French President Valery
Giscard d'Estang and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt met
regularly, providing the opportunity for both sides to discuss
all problems between them. Such meetings also provided a healthy
atmosphere for forging confidence-building measures between the
two nations, transforming them into the fulcrum for western
European cooperation and integration. Furthermore, the meetings
provided a forum where the two leaders could get to know each
other better and to learn one another's idiosyncrasies, interests
and way of thinking. They thus helped to overcome the
difficulties in Franco-German understanding, and quickened the
pace of German re-integration into the western European
community.
It is extremely important to
enable all Palestinian leaders to return to Palestine, and it is
equally important for Palestinian leaders to be conscious of the
importance of their coming back home. Since the return of
President Arafat to Gaza, Palestine has become the centre of the
Palestinian political movement. Other Palestinian leaders have to
follow suit if they want to remain in the centre of activity.
Israel should not hinder the return of these leaders to the
Palestinian Territories, as their return is in the interest of
peace in the long run.
The PLO/PNA have to be very clear
in addressing the issues of peace when talking to the Palestinian
people. They must adopt open and clear policies on the issue of
Jerusalem. The clearer they are and the more open they are, the
more the PLO/PNA will have support and trust among the
Palestinian, Arab and Muslim peoples.
The PLO/PNA must make it clear
that negotiations are over the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East
Jerusalem only. This is the outer limits of peace as agreed with
the Israelis, and therefore excludes other Palestinian claims,
such as in Haifa, Jaffa, Nazereth and Safad. This is very
sensitive in view of the emotional repercussions that it entails,
not only for the people, but also for the decision makers. It
might cost a huge loss in terms of popularity and votes. But
clarity, openness and truthfulness will bring more gains in the
long run. A campaign of education has to be embarked upon to
explain the possible and the impossible. At any rate the PLO/PNA
must tell our people that East Jerusalem is within the realm of
the poss, even within the realm of the probable, if we work
together for the success of the peace process, and for the
accurate implementation of the agreements that have been signed
thus far.
If we are not direct, clear and
truthful we will not be able to address the issues. Our emotions
and our capabilities will come into direct conflict. It is
necessary that our deeds match our words. We should not create
higher expectations than we can fulfill. It is better to tell our
people what we can do, no matter how bitter or difficult that
might be. Being clear and direct instills self-confidence, and
will establish the credibility of the PNA among people in the
long run.
Economic projects alone might
create jobs and raise the standard of living, but they are not
the only answer to the question of opposition. The PLO/PNA has to
start its own politico-ideological campaign on all levels,
including the mass media, in order to face the challenge. Hence,
a marriage of sound economic policies with the right political
campaign will be a more successful answer to the opposition.
Claiming Jerusalem in general
terms might be emotionally satisfying but will lead nowhere
politically. The PLO is not the sole actor on the scene and for
that matter not the strongest. The Palestinian side should be
clear, direct and open that what is being sought is East
Jerusalem. They should be clear that in East Jerusalem we are
ready to share a common destiny of peace, where free access to
the holy places will be guaranteed not only by the Palestinian
police force, but by a combined international force composed of
all interested parties, among them the Palestinian and Israeli
police forces.
We should make it clear to our
people in East Jerusalem, which is to be the capital of the State
of Palestine, that life cannot be separated in terms of functions
such as health care, roads and communications, electricity,
telephone lines, tourism and commerce, industry and freedom of
movement.
We should make it clear that we
have to learn to live together. Joint municipal councils should
exist where necessary, while separate Palestinian and Israeli
municipal councils should operate in neighbourhoods which are
exclusively Palestinian or Israeli. There should be two
municipalities for the Palestinian Arab and the Israeli sectors,
with a joint council for arbitrating differences. Common proceeds
from taxation and other joint public enterprises should be shared
equally in a joint fund for the development of the city.
Political sovereignty and jurisdiction should be given to each
community: Palestinian in the Old City and East Jerusalem, and
Israeli in West Jerusalem. Two capitals in one city. Chandigar in
India and Rome (the Vatican) are successful precedents.
The success or failure of the
peace for Jerusalem also depends on the other actors, namely
Israel, the Arab countries and the international community, and
in particular the USA.
Israel has to be convinced, and it
has to convince itself, that peace with the Palestinian people
depends on the achievement of a solution to the question of
Jerusalem that is acceptable to the Palestinian people. A
solution seen to have been imposed on the Palestinian leadership
will not be viable.
Faithful implementation of the DOP
will be a necessary first step in the right direction. Israel
cannot constantly claim that the Palestinian leadership has to
adhere to the DOP when it itself violates all the articles in the
DOP, especially the timetable for implementation. According to
the DOP, Jerusalem is an issue for the final status negotiations,
whether these start now or later in 1996. Thus Israel must stop
all policies and measures that can affect the final outcome of
the negotiations on Jerusalem. They have to stop all their
policies with regard to settlements, especially the expropriation
of Palestinian land and the building of by-pass roads. Israel has
to stop the illegal increase in the Jewish population of East
Jerusalem which has risen from zero before the June war to
168,000 at present.
The Arab countries have to help in
this regard. One of the aims of the peace process is to forge
normal relations between the states in the region, including
Israel. Arab countries should be called upon to make a linkage
between normalisation of relations with Israel and progress in
negotiations on the question of Jerusalem. Diplomatic relations
that Israel seeks with the Arab states should be also linked to
diplomatic relations between these countries and the PNA. Only
thus can Israel understand the limitation of its power in the
peace process, as well as the unexplored opportunities that a
successful peace process can open up for them in the region and
the world at large.
For this policy to be successful,
the PLO diplomatic and political machine has to work in full gear
to mobilise Arab support on the leadership and popular levels.
Chairman Arafat, and those who work in foreign affairs in the
PLO/PNA, including the PLO representatives all over the Arab
world, have to start a campaign of active engagement with their
counterparts in the Arab world. Chairman Arafat has resumed his
shuttle visits to all Arab countries, after all the months that
he has dedicated to the establishment of the PNA in the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank since July 1994.
Personal contacts in many cases
have been more successful than exchanging letters, sending
official memorandums and attending regional conferences. These
methods should not be put aside but should be strengthened with
the personal touch of the decision-makers, the chemistry of
idiosyncrasies and the discussions that open up new vistas where
official papers cannot penetrate.
The PLO/PNA also have to approach
the international community in a way that will facilitate better
communication of the Palestinian position. Here also the PLO/PNA
must not drop the personal diplomacy that it mastered in the
1970s and 1980s, which brought the PLO political and diplomatic
support from a very wide range of countries in Asia, Africa and
Latin America.
The issues of peace, especially
Jerusalem, need such activity on the part of Chairman Arafat, who
has very good personal and political relations with the heads of
state and government in these countries. These relations were
nourished during the many visits by the Chairman to these
countries that produced crucial political and diplomatic support
regionally and internationally when the PLO was in dire need of
such support. Since the signing the DOP, Chairman Arafat has not
been able to visit many of these countries. This could give the
impression that the PLO/PNA is not giving enough attention to old
friends who stood on the side of the Palestinian cause in
difficult periods.
All these countries have a stake,
in one way or another, in the success of the peace process in the
Middle East. Muslims and Christians among them have also a major
interest in the final arrangements on the issue of Jerusalem. And
in the final analysis, Palestinians need world support of the
Palestinian position on Jerusalem at the United Nations, whether
in the General Assembly, the Security Council or other
international conferences and meetings.
It is accepted now as common
knowledge that delays in providing international economic
assistance to the PNA have a direct effect on the efforts of the
Authority to accelerate the economic reconstruction of the
territories. It should be the main aim of the PLO/PNA negotiators
to overcome those difficulties that impede a greater flow of
economic assistance. Thisis a two-way road. The donor community
must take into consideration the particular situation of the
territories that make it very difficult for the PNA to fulfill
the conditions put by the donor community.
But this does not absolve the PNA
from doing all it can to smooth relations with the donor
community, especially in terms of credibility, transparency and
accountability. Any time lost detracts from the programmes of
economic reconstruction and is at the expense of the Palestinian
people. Programmes of economic reconstruction and assistance to
Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem should remain at the top of
the agenda of the aid programmes between the PLO and the donor
community. The experience of the September 1994 Paris meeting's
failure to provide economic assistance to Palestinian
institutions in Jerusalem should not deter the Palestinian
negotiators from retaining such assistance within the framework
of Palestinian economic policy and reconstruction strategy. This
should remain a priority, even if the PLO/PNA has to negotiate on
this with Israel. However, implementation should be in
Palestinian hands.
The PLO/PNA should also approach
foreign countries or communities that own property in Jerusalem
that has been expropriated by the Israelis in order to reclaim
this property. Many religious endowment funds in East Jerusalem
owned by Greeks, Russians, Indians, Turks, European and others
have been confiscated by the Israeli authorities as Palestinian
property. The PLO/PNA should encourage these owners to reclaim
their property as a mechanism to roll back the Israeli
expropriation of Palestinian property.
A similar policy should be adopted
by the PLO towards Palestinian citizens whose property has been
confiscated by the Israeli authorities. It is important in the
struggle for Jerusalem that Palestinians who hold foreign
citizenship claim their personal property confiscated by the
Israeli authorities. Citizens of countries which recognise and
have good relations with Israel can sue the relevant Israeli
department or ministry in Israeli courts or, failing that, in the
courts in the countries of their citizenship.
The PLO/PNA must encourage such
persons and provide assistance to make such claims. This
necessitates the establishment in the PLO/PNA of a department
that specialises in these matters. Precedents in this regard are
available. Tunisia has a ministry that deals with property of
Tunisians confiscated during the French occupation, and with
French and other foreign property left in Tunis after the French
withdrawal from the country. The creation of such a ministry will
be a necessity when the time comes to deal with absentee property
on a wider level.
The PLO/PNA has to develop
policies to encourage Palestinian Jerusalemites to remain living
and working in the city. Therefore all Palestinian institutions
existing in East Jerusalem must be maintained, enlarged and
provided with all forms of assistance, be they economic, social,
cultural or informational. Job creation should be high on the
agenda as it is in the other Palestinian territories. In order to
combat Israeli attempts to empty East Jerusalem of its
Palestinian inhabitants, it is important for the PLO to transform
Jerusalem into a centre of attraction to its people. Housing
projects and development of the Palestinian infrastructure in the
city should be implemented through the Palestinians responsible
in East Jerusalem, in order to avoid disputes with Israel on
these projects. This will create more jobs to attract "Arab
labour" from the city and its surroundings.
The PLO/PNA should give more
attention to the religious institutions, Muslim and Christian in
the Old City of Jerusalem, and to developing social policies for
their workers. A detailed maintenance and reconstruction policy
for all holy sites and cultural centres should be made, together
with the necessary funds. In this regard, the PLO/PNA have to
double their efforts within the Organisation of Islamic
Conference (OIC) so that more assistance and exchange of
personnel, ideas and material be made available. Approaching
individual philanthropists and benefactors should become a policy
of the PLO.
On the Christian level at least
two important activities should be undertaken by the PLO/PNA.
First, the PLO/PNA should encourage the revival of the
inter-Christian Committee in East Jerusalem, which has become
dormant over the years because of rivalries between the churches.
The PLO can help this committee function as an important bulwark
in rolling back the policies of confiscation and Judaisation
implemented by the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem.
Second, the PLO/PNA should be an
active participant in the celebrations for the second millennium
of the birth of Jesus Christ. The Vatican and the other Christian
churches are heading the preparations. Pope John Paul II has
declared that he wishes to visit the Holy Land and Jerusalem on
that occasion. Israel is establishing a national committee to
participate in the preparations and the celebrations. The PLO/PNA
cannot be a latecomer to these preparations. The PLO should start
a national committee and establish its contacts with the
concerned parties immediately. Not only can the PLO consolidate
its role in Jerusalem by such action, but it will also foster its
political claims to the Old City as the capital of the State of
Palestine.
The PLO/PNA succeeded in making
the Palestinian elections in East Jerusalem the focus of the
Palestinian democratic process. The Israeli behaviour towards the
Palestinian elections and voters in East Jerusalem was
irrational. It not only violated what had been agreed upon in
terms of facilitating the election process, but also turned the
election centres in East Jerusalem into military barracks to
deter Palestinians from casting their votes. The statements of
the international observers during the election process on 20-21
January 1996 were the best evidence of Israeli violations. These
elections are, however, the best proof that Jerusalem has been
confirmed on the agenda of the final status negotiations.
Jerusalem is the centre of the
Palestinian territory linking its northern and its southern
parts. It is the cultural and religious centre of the Palestinian
people. Whether Israel likes it or not, this has to be made very
clear, not only to the Palestinian people, but also to the
Israeli people. Tel Aviv is the centre of Israeli life, not
Jerusalem, despite the claims to the contrary by the Israelis.
The Palestinians cannot concede East Jerusalem. Jerusalem is the
other side of the coin of peace. Without it, peace will be
incomplete at best.