Table of Contents
Preface
Introduction
Chapter 1 : The Sermon on
Jihad
Chapter 2
: The Jerusalem Letter
Chapter 3 : The Battle for
the Institutions in Jerusalem
Chapter 4 : The
Battle for Jerusalem: Sovereignty vs. Religious Supervision
Chapter 5 : The
Battle for Jerusalem: The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty
Conclusion : The Battle for
Jerusalem: A Programme of Action for Peace
This study on Jerusalem is an attempt to
highlight the importance of the Holy City in the peace process.
In this sense it is neither a historical, nor an academic, nor a
political study. It an is engaged Palestinian Jerusalemite's
contribution to the peace process.
The study is called the
"Struggle for Jerusalem," because first, the concept of
struggle is a process, and second, because Jerusalem is the
centre and quintessence of peace. Without Jerusalem there can be
no real peace. At best, peace will be imposed from the outside,
carrying the seeds of its own destruction. Consequently, the
quicker the Palestinian and Israeli parties arrive at an
understanding on Jerusalem, the quicker the peace process will be
finalised. The struggle for Jerusalem is also a learning process
of how to share a city that no one wants to be re-divided, but
where each party has divergent views on who should have
sovereignty in the city, and which both want as their eternal
capital. It is also a learning process of how to create
coexistence between two peoples, the Palestinian and the
Israeli-Jewish peoples.
The study is also an attempt to
provide a programme of action and ideas that will help
Palestinian decision-makers initiate policies to pre-empt Israeli
policies on Jerusalem. Until now we have reacted to Israeli
policies on Jerusalem; we need to initiate policies.
The study consists of an
introduction, five chapters and a conclusion. The Introduction
is mainly a study of Israeli measures in Jerusalem. It also draws
attention to other matters such as the United Nations resolutions
on Jerusalem, and Israeli settlement policies. Chapter 1
deals with the "Sermon on Jihad " made by
President Yasser Arafat in South Africa. Chapter 2
discusses the meaning and significance of the letter on
Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem addressed to the late
Norwegian Foreign Minister Johann Juergen Holst by Shimon Peres. Chapter
3 deals with the campaign launched by the Israelis against
Palestinian institutions contrary to this letter. Chapters 4
and 5 deal with the conflict between the Palestinian and
Israeli sides on the question of sovereignty as against religious
supervision in the city, a question which was aggravated by the
Jordanian "claim" to Jerusalem and the
Jordanian-Israeli peace accords. The study concludes with an
attempt to provide the Palestinian decision-maker with a
programme of action necessary for correcting the imbalance
between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem.
Since the signing of the Declaration of
Principles (DOP) by the PLO and the Israeli government on 13
September 1993, and the establishment of the Palestinian National
Authority (PNA) in the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, the issue of
Jerusalem has increasingly become the focal point of negotiations
between the two. Jerusalem has become the issue par excellence
on which the success or failure of Palestinian-Israeli peace
depends. Both Israel and the PLO are making Jerusalem the
yardstick by which the truthful implementation of the DOP and the
Gaza-Jericho Agreement is measured. At the same time, both Israel
and the PLO have totally different viewpoints and policies
towards the city.
For the Palestinian side,
Jerusalem is the capital of the as yet uncreated State of
Palestine, which was declared by the Palestine National Council
(PNC) on 15 November 1988. In that session, the PNC also accepted
two United Nations resolutions as the basis for a just, permanent
and comprehensive settlement. The first was General Assembly
Resolution 181 (III) of 1947, better known as the partition
resolution, by which Palestine was partitioned into two states,
Arab and Jewish. The second resolution accepted by the PNC was
Security Council Resolution 242, which inter alia,
reiterates the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by
force and calls for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in
the area and for the withdrawal of Israel from (the) territories
occupied in the course of the 1967 June war.
The PLO - which until that PNC
session rejected Resolution 242 because it calls for the
withdrawal of Israel only from (the) territories occupied in 1967
- changed its position on the resolution and accepted it as the
basis for a just, comprehensive and permanent solution to the
Middle East conflict. The resolution also became the basis of the
American initiative proposed by President George Bush in March
1991 in the aftermath of the Gulf War. That initiative was based
on the concept of land for peace and the implementation of
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The invitation to the
Madrid Peace Conference of 18 October 1991 states that both the
just, lasting and comprehensive peace as well as the permanent
status negotiations "will take place on the basis of
Resolutions 242 and 338".
Resolution 242 was a central issue
in the negotiations between the PLO and Israel. Both sides
accepted in Article I of the DOP that the permanent settlement
will be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
Equally important in this regard is that the DOP states in
Article IV that the occupied Palestinian territories of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip constitute "a single territorial
unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim
period." The relationship between the stipulations of
Resolution 242 and that of the DOP with regard to Jerusalem is
therefore very clear: The resolution calls upon Israel to
withdraw from the territories it occupied in the June 1967 war,
including East Jerusalem, and the DOP considers the occupied
territories as "a single territorial unit".
The Palestinian position on
Jerusalem is also supported by the American position as expressed
in the letter of assurances from the US Administration to
Palestinian negotiators. The principles in US foreign policy
towards the issue of Jerusalem were stated clearly:
"The US understands how
much importance Palestinians attach to the question of East
Jerusalem. Thus we want to assure you that nothing Palestinians
do in choosing their delegation members in this phase of the
process will affect their claim to East Jerusalem or be
prejudicial or precedential to the outcome of the negotiations.
The US is opposed to the
Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and extension of Israeli law
on it and the extension of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries. We
encourage all sides to avoid unilateral acts that would
exacerbate local tension or make negotiations more difficult or
preempt their final outcome.
The US believes that
Palestinians of East Jerusalem should be able to participate by
voting in elections of an interim governing authority. The US
further believes that Palestinians from East Jerusalem and
Palestinians outside the Occupied Territories who meet the three
criteria should be able to participate in the negotiations on
final status. The US supports the right of Palestinians to bring
any issue including East Jerusalem to the table.
The US believes that no party
should take unilateral actions that seek to predetermine issues
that can only be reached through the negotiations. In this regard
the US has opposed and will cto oppose settlement activity in
territories occupied in 1967 which remain an obstacle to
peace."
The PLO position on Jerusalem is
also supported by the United Nations. Following the occupation of
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem was annexed by
Israel, which embarked on a policy of Judaisation aimed at
changing the demographic character of the city. All these
measures were condemned by the United Nations. In resolution
after resolution, the General Assembly and the Security Council
of the United Nations have declared all measures taken by Israel
to change the status of Jerusalem null and void. Security Council
Resolutions 252 of 1968 and 271 of 1971 attest to that position.
Nor did the United Nations accept the Israeli Basic Law on
Jerusalem of 1980 by which Israel reaffirmed its annexation of
East Jerusalem and declared it to be its capital. In Security
Council Resolution 476 of 1980, the Security Council rejected the
Israeli Basic Law and, in the same year, Resolution 478 called on
states that have diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to move them
out of the city. This is a doubly important resolution because
the Security Council included West Jerusalem, occupied in 1948,
within its domain of action. There were no foreign diplomatic
missions accredited to Israel in East Jerusalem. The non-Arab
consulates general in East Jerusalem which were there before the
war of 1967 continued in their work after the war with a changed
mandate, dealing with the Palestinian population with an
autonomous status vis-a-vis their respective embassies and
ambassadors in Tel Aviv, the capital of Israel.
Hence, Resolution 478 (1980) questions even the Israeli position
in and on West Jerusalem.
The United Nations General
Assembly added in its resolution 35/169E of 15 December 1980
another element to resolution 478 (1980), by which it also
rejected the Israeli Basic Law on Jerusalem and confirmed
Resolution 478 (1980). The element added was that the General
Assembly not only considered the Israeli action a violation of
international law but also that it did not excuse Israel from the
application of the Fourth Geneva Convention on Jerusalem.
Since then, the question of the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Palestinian
territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including East
Jerusalem, has become an overriding theme in United Nations
resolutions. This was reaffirmed in Resolution 672 of 1990,
adopted on 12 October 1990 following the acts of violence
committed by Israeli forces against Palestinian worshippers in al-Haram
al-Sharif in East Jerusalem. Resolution 681 of 20 December
1990 specifically included East Jerusalem as part of the occupied
Palestinian Territories that are also covered by the Fourth
Geneva Convention.
More recently, following the
massacre perpetrated by a Jewish extremist at the Holy Ibrahimi
Mosque in Hebron on 25 February 1994, the adoption of Resolution
904 was delayed for 22 days in an attempt by the US
Administration and Israel not to mention East Jerusalem as part
of the occupied Palestinian territories. Finally, the US forced a
vote by paragraph on the resolution in order not to vote on the
paragraph that included East Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the
resolution was passed, reaffirming that East Jerusalem is part of
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, with the US abstaining on
that paragraph.
It is hence clear that
international legitimacy favours the Palestinian side on the
issue of East Jerusalem. Yet Israel continues actions on the
ground in order to create new faits accomplis in Jerusalem
in the hope that these changes will foreclose any attempt by the
Palestinian side to demand its share in Jerusalem. The main
mechanism in the hands of Israel is legal actions, typically
using security as a pretext. This includes confiscation of
Palestinian land and establishing settlements thereon in
Jerusalem.
The area of the city of Jerusalem
prior to the 1967 war was 6.5 km2. After nearly three
decades of Israeli occupation, the city has grown to an area of
70.5 km2, a ten-fold increase. This shows the extent
and scope of confiscation of Palestinian land in East Jerusalem
that is being carried out by the Israeli occupation authorities.
A look at the confiscated Palestinian land in East Jerusalem and
the Israeli settlements established on that land, will show that
the aim of the Israelis is not only to maintain control of the
city, but also to do away with the Arab Palestinian communities
in the area by cutting social and economical links between them
and by destroying the infrastructure of the Palestinian village.
Israel has created a cordon
sanitaire of Israeli settlements around East Jerusalem known
as the Ma'ale Adumim bloc, comprised of Ma'ale Adumim itself,
Giv'at Adumim, Mashor Adumim, Kfar Adumim, Alon, and Sha'ar
Mizrahi. This is the most important and largest bloc of Israeli
settlements in the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza
Strip, extending to the east in the direction of the Jordan
Valley, and to the north towards Ramallah. It enables Israel to
encircle Jerusalem from the east: Israel hopes to settle around
one million Israelis in the greater Jerusalem area by the year
2000.
In short, Israel has used its
dominating hand in order to cause a tremendous demographic change
in East Jerusalem, where it has increased its population from
zero Israelis before the war of 1967 to 160,000 at present.
30,000 housing units have been built for Jewish settlers in East
Jerusalem in 15 settlements. In comparison, Israel has built only
555 housing units for the Palestinian Arabs in East Jerusalem
over the same period. This has turned the Israeli Jewish
population into the majority population in East Jerusalem for the
first time in history.
Other methods have been used
successfully by Israel in order to decide the fate of Jerusalem.
The Israeli Government and the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem
have used various devious methods in order to facilitate the
confiscation of Palestinian land and property in the Holy City.
Under the pretext of developing Arab villages or neighbourhoods,
the Israelis developed a "master plan" for the city.
This was used to strangulate the Arab presence in the city, limit
and control Palestinian construction and housing plans, and
prevent population increase among Palestinians.
This mechanism of control was used
to prevent natural expansion of the area of Palestinian villages
or neighbourhoods. Israel does not allow Palestinian communities
to expand horizontally (beyond the borders of the village or
city, town or neighbourhood) or vertically (more than four
stories, whereas in Israel eight stories are allowed for
residential purposes). Second, these villages or neighbourhoods
are liable to find themselves surrounded by Israeli settlements,
further preventing expansion or communication with other
Palestinian villages and neighbourhoods. This has severe economic
and social effects on the Palestinian community.
Third, Israel has declared certain
areas as 'green areas' for public use. This should include
Palestinian neighbourhoods. However, when Israeli neighbourhoods
need expansion, Palestinian green areas are put at their
disposal. In addition, the Israelis have encouraged Palestinian
land owners to sell their property by levying exorbitant taxes.
By all these means Israel has been
able to take control of what amounts to more than 23% of the
total area of Jerusalem over the last 27 years, while the
Palestinian population has struggled to maintain only 4% of the
area of the city.
As Israeli redeployment from areas
of the West Bank drew nearer, in accordance with the Oslo, Cairo
and Taba agreements, the Israeli authorities developed new
methods to tighten their grip on Jerusalem. These methods meant
the confiscation of more Palestinian land in the West Bank and
Jerusalem. Israel developed by-pass roads under the pretext of
providing security for Israeli settlements and settlers. The aim
of these by-pass roads is to link Israeli settlements, making it
unnecessary for settlers to use roads used by the Palestinian
population.
This policy reinforced the
isolatiof Jerusalem from the West Bank. Israel built a major
by-pass road around Jerusalem, starting in the settlement of Beit
El to the north of the city, going then eastwards across many
Arab Palestinian villages to the settlement of "Vered
Yeriho" at the outskirts of Jericho. This by-pass road
closes Jerusalem from the north. Another section of the road goes
west to the Modi'in settlement established on the Palestinian
village of Latrun. From there the road crosses the green line
near Bet Shemesh and then heads southwards towards the
Palestinian villages of Sourif and Beit Ummar in the Hebron
district, returning northwards in the direction of Bethlehem and
from there eastwards towards Ma'ale Adumim, and Vered Yeriho,
completing the circle around Jerusalem.
The dangers emanating from the
Israeli policy of encircling Jerusalem are very clear. Israel
aims to exclude the Palestinian people and any of their official
or non-official representations from Jerusalem. Faisal Husseini,
responsible for the Jerusalem file in the PNA, summarised Israeli
policy as having three aims:
Israel forces the citizens of the
city to deal only with the Israeli institutions. This makes the
Palestinian population of the city accustomed to not dealing with
the Palestinian institutions in the city. This in turn will
obstruct and lead to the cessation of the work of these
institutions and their eventual closure.
The military check-points which
Israel has installed at the entrances of the city prevent any
Palestinian from entering the city unless he or she is a holder
of an Israeli identity card or a permit to enter the city.
Palestinians from other parts of Palestine have no opportunity at
all - except if by luck they are allowed to come to pray on a
Friday or a Sunday - to make any transactions in the city. This
makes Palestinians living outside the city accustomed to carrying
out their business outside Jerusalem. Simultaneously, this policy
also will make Jerusalemites accustomed to living without daily
contact with the Palestinian community outside the city. Commerce
and trade in the city has to look for new markets in Israel
itself and for new customers in the city rather than the
Palestinians from the surrounding neighbourhoods.
This means making the
international community accustomed to dealing with the
Palestinians without Jerusalem and to dealing with Jerusalem as
the Israelis dictate: a city dominated by Israel and whose fate
is decided by Israel. Many countries unfortunately have started
to bend to Israeli pressure, such as by canceling visits to
Orient House by foreign dignitaries visiting Jerusalem.
More recently, Israel has adopted
further measures against the Palestinian presence in the city,
described by an Israeli journalist as the "policy of
twisting arms".
This policy is manifested in the
following ways:
1.) The Israeli decision to
confiscate 530 acres of land from Palestinians in Jerusalem in
May 1995, which was faced with total rejection by the PNA, the
Arab Governments, the Islamic Countries, the Non-aligned
Countries and the United Nations. President Yasser Arafat quickly
and decisively pre-empted any Israeli execution of the
confiscation orders.
Faced with the threat of
suspension of the peace process with the Palestinians, the
recalling of the Jordanian Ambassador in Tel Aviv for
consultation, a meeting of the Jerusalem committee, a summit of
the Islamic countries, and a decision by the UN, Israel found
itself obliged to suspend - but not to annul - its decision to
confiscate these lands.
2.) The attempts by
Israelis to settle, with the connivance of the Israeli
Government, two hills in the Bethlehem area. This met with
protests by Palestinians everywhere. Clashes between settlers and
Palestinians at the site forced the Israeli Government to deploy
its police force to control the situation and evict the settlers.
The Israeli government, however, promised the settlers another
piece of land nearby.
3.) The demand by the
Israeli Jerusalem Municipality that Palestinian schools in East
Jerusalem should not use the emblem of the PNA on their
text-books. The Palestinian side agreed to put white labels over
the emblem.
4.) The campaign launched
in Israel against the Palestinian institutions in the Holy City.
This was a clear demonstration of the Israeli aim of domination
of the city and its feverish attempts to exclude the PLO/PNA from
the city. Israel's policy is a gross violation of the commitments
made by Shimon Peres in his letter to the late Norwegian Minister
of Foreign Affairs Holst supporting the work of Palestinian
institutions in the city. In contravention of these commitments,
Israel escalated its campaign at all levels:
At the municipal level, Likud
Mayor Ehud Olmert actively sought to hamper the activities of
Palestinian institutions. He was joined by rightist politicians
on the national level, such as Sharon and Netanyahu, as well as
by the settler movement. There were even cases in which the
government itself took official action to contribute to the
campaign. For instance, Police Minister Moshe Shahal prepared a
law to close down all Palestinian institutions in the city that
he claimed represented, functioned as part of, or were funded by
the PNA. Shahal's policy met protests from Palestinian
institutions in Jerusalem, PNA officials, and even some Israeli
officials and organisations who questioned the legality and logic
of such a move. In the final analysis, the list of
"suspected" institutions came down to three: Orient
House, the Palestinian Health Council and the Palestinian Bureau
of Statistics. A modus vivendi was achieved with the three
institutions, and the Israeli minister suspended his legal
action.
5.) The celebrations for
"Jerusalem 3000", which are an absurd example of
rewriting of history. Israel decided unilaterally to celebrate
the anniversary of 3000 years of the alleged establishment of the
city of Jerusalem by King David. For this purpose Israel
organised the celebrations under the pretext that the event is a
cultural one where all religions and walks of life can coexist
and participate. Yet the lie was too big to be accepted, even
among the friends of Israel. Jerusalem was not established by
King David. It predates King David by at least two thousand
years. Jerusalem was established by the Canaanites, whose king
gave Jerusalem its name. The European Union decided to boycott
the festivities so as not to fall into any political trap set by
the Israelis. Their presence at the Israeli festivities would
have been interpreted by the Arab and Palestinian sides as siding
with the Israelis on the question of Jerusalem, hence they would
be accused of taking a position on the future of the city
before the start of the final status negotiations between the
Israelis and Palestinians. The Christian churches in the city
decided to boycott the festivities for similar reasons. The PNA,
Palestinian institutions, and public and private figures spoke
vehemently against these festivities and called for a boycott.
Israel was angry that this
"cultural" event was boycotted by its friends. The
Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot was clear in condemning the
boycott. It praised those who attended the celebrations and
threatened those who boycotted them with having "to pay the
price in the days to come".
Many Israelis did not miss the
true intentions of the Israeli government. A leading Israeli
columnist and peace activist, Uri Avneri, wrote frankly that,
"the event is not for
reconciliation. It is an attempt at spiritual occupation, and
civilisational usurpation. It is an attempt to suppress half of
the people who are not part of the celebrations... These are
celebrations to convince ourselves and the world that Jerusalem
is Jewish only... It aims at falsifying history, stealing away
the civilisations that left their imprint on Jerusalem and
todestroy the peace process".
In short, had Israel succeeded in
making these celebrations a success, it would have created
another fait accompli in Jerusalem by which it would have
unilaterally influenced the fate of the city before the start of
the final status negotiations with the PLO/PNA. These
celebrations constituted a further contradiction of the spirit of
peace and reconciliation as well as a violation of the letter of
assurances and the Oslo Agreement.
These Israeli policies have to be
checked and changed if Israel wants peace with the Palestinians
and the Arab world, and if Israel wants to be accepted as a state
in the region and not an outside imposition. Without Jerusalem
there can be no peace. Recent negotiations on Hebron amply show
how difficult it is to arrive at a compromise solution to
sensitive and emotion-laden issues. The negotiations on Hebron
stand as an alarm to what we should expect to face when the time
comes to discuss the situation in Jerusalem.
Effective immediately, the PNA and
all those who want peace in the region, should bring about a
freeze of any action by Israel aimed at changing the demographic,
political, social, cultural and economic character of Jerusalem.
Needless to say, political pressure and international lobbying
should be used to achieve that end.
The PNA should start a reform
programme to rectify the damage to the Palestinian society caused
by Israeli policies during the long years of domination and
occupation. This reform programme can be carried out in two
phases: in the short term, to rectify immediate needs, and in the
long term, to formulate a master plan for Jerusalem. In this
regard, the creation of a Jerusalem Fund is appropriate. The aim
of such a fund should be similar to that of the Holst Fund, and
should help cover the operating costs and the budget of
Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem. Support for such a fund
should be from the PNA, the Arab countries and the donor
community at large. For that purpose, Palestinian institutions in
Jerusalem should present their programmes of action for Jerusalem
and the needs of the people they serve.
The PNA should be able to
immediately present and represent the needs of the Jerusalemites
in any negotiations with Israel, particularly the following:
1. An Israeli commitment to
respect the pledges made by Peres in his letter to Holst on the
freedom of operation of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem.
2. An Israeli commitment to
facilitate the work of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem such
as:
3. Reimbursing all financial
expenditure made by these institutions for Palestinian needs by
the PNA.
4. An Israeli commitment to
transfer funds collected as taxes from Jerusalemites back to the
Jerusalem Fund or any other Palestinian financial authority
responsible for Jerusalem.
5. An Israeli commitment to lift
the siege imposed on Jerusalem and remove the check points at the
entrances of Jerusalem. This is in the interest of peace,
coexistence and building bridges between the two peoples. Free
access to the city and freedom of movement in and out of the city
are necessary in that process.
6. Israel needs to act decisively
against the rising tide of Jewish fundamentalism and extremism in
the Jerusalem area, especially in that these threaten the peace
of Palestinian society, individuals and groups. Israel should be
able to prevent their provocations and disturbances of the peace
of the city, and to curb and defeat the blackmailing polices and
practices of the extremists.
The above is a brief introduction
to outline the unilateral Israeli policies affecting the fate and
future of Jerusalem in spite of agreements reached with the
PLO/PA. The coming chapters deal with the major topics that have
characterised the conflict over Jerusalem recently, namely since
the return of President Yasser Arafat to Palestine.
The Sermon on
Jihad
In May 1994, while in South Africa to attend the
inauguration of President Nelson Mandela, President Arafat
visited a mosque in Johannesburg to meet representatives of the
Muslim community. The meeting was arranged to discuss the
agreement between the PLO and Israel signed five days previously
in Cairo. In defending the agreement, President Arafat made the
following comments, which were recorded and made available to
Israel Radio by an unidentified person:
"You have to understand our
main battle isn't how much we can achieve from them here or
there. Our main battle is Jerusalem... You have to come and to
fight and to start a Jihad to liberate Jerusalem, the first
shrine. And, this is very important."
Israel Radio broadcast the
statement on 17 May 1994. Immediately following the broadcast, a
concerted campaign of defamation and criticism against Arafat and
his statement emanated from Tel Aviv and Washington, accusing him
of insincerity to the Declaration of Principles (DOP) and the
Cairo Agreement, signed twelve days earlier.
The PLO in Tunis and elsewhere
witnessed a rush of diplomatic contacts from western, especially
American, diplomats, with PLO officials to verify the accuracy of
this statement. On 18 May 1994, nine US Congressmen sent a letter
to Arafat on the issue, accusing him of jeopardising the whole
peace process and calling into question his commitment to a
peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Critics further
accused Arafat of wavering on commitments he made when signing
the DOP, foremost among which was that the final status of
Jerusalem is to be determined by negotiations.
For such critics, two terms in
Arafat's statement deserved attention: the term Jihad
itself and the call "to liberate Jerusalem". Both were
taken to mean "holy war" or "armed struggle",
which imply encouraging "violence" and
"terrorism". In a press briefing US Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, called on Arafat to adhere to his commitments
in the DOP calling for putting an end to "violence and
terrorism".
All the critics jumped on the
sentence mentioned above, taking it out of context and
exaggerating its meaning. Critics based their arguments on the
negative images and stereotypes already held about Arafat and the
Palestinian national movement, hoping to see themselves
vindicated in their hatred of Arafat.
As an example of this campaign of
vilification, the Women in Green (the Israeli group which
distributed the tape-recording) designed the jacket for the tape
with a photograph of Yasser Arafat wearing a Kuffiyya, the
Palestinian head-dress, and a Nazi helmet, with the inscription
of "Jihad", in Arabic and English, followed by
"Beware Israel" in Hebrew.
Yet, in the statement before the
Islamic community in Johannesburg, Arafat made his strongest
defence ever in front of a foreign audience of the Cairo
Agreement. In fact, he was mobilising support for the agreement,
calling on this Muslim audience and the entire Muslim Umma
to support the agreement. Arafat mustered all his charisma,
prestige and Islamic credentials for that purpose. He used
historical analogies from the experience of Prophet Muhammad in
order to show the audience that the signing of a peace accord
with a bitter enemy was not wrong. Furthermore, Arafat defended
the Jews and the agreement signed with Israel, saying "we
are not against the Jews", using a verse from the Holy Quran
in support of this.
Arafat's statement that
"...you have to come and to fight and to start a Jihad
to liberate Jerusalem, your first shrine" must be put in the
context of the Islamic audience. Furthermore, this is the
terminology used when talking about Jerusalem whether by
Palestinian Muslims or Christians.
Arafat also used the occasion as
an educational session in politics, and as a call for wider
political participation. He was attempting to convince the
audience that the agreement and the pledges were determined by
historical necesfollowing the Gulf war and the heavy price that
the Palestinian people, especially in Kuwait, had to pay. Hence
the acceptance of the Bush initiative and invitation to go to the
Madrid Peace Conference, despite the "very bad
conditions" imposed on the PLO and the Palestinian
delegation. He reminded the audience that the future of Jerusalem
is one of the issues to be discussed and negotiated in the final
stage of negotiations during a time "not exceeding the
beginning of the third year". This is in accordance with the
DOP.
It is also true that Arafat
questioned in the strongest possible terms the Israeli claim to
Jerusalem as well as their claim that the city is their eternal
capital. There is nothing in the agreement that forbids Arafat
from doing that. It should be noted that Arafat, who was speaking
without notes, made a terminological mistake here. Instead of
describing Jerusalem as the eternal capital, he described it as
the "permanent state". This was also the first occasion
when Arafat informed the audience of the secret letter which he
received from the Israeli side on Jerusalem (see Chapter 2).
He further claimed that the "scene" he made during the
signing ceremony in Cairo on 4 May 1994, was because of
Jerusalem.
This episode shows very clearly
how the Palestinian information machine and public relations
failed. It could have been one of the strongest exercises in
public relations both to the domestic audience, including the
fundamentalists, and externally, to the Israeli public and the
international community. This unfortunately did not happen. The
tape-recording was not even made available to the Palestinian
information departments, let alone the Palestinian public. And,
when the news broke in the international media, the reflex action
was one of escapism, shying away from commenting on the tape or
even acknowledging its existence. The episode is yet further
proof that ignorance is the strongest enemy within, even for a
just cause. Even Yasser Arafat gave various explanations of the
meaning of Jihad, in an effort to dilute the impact the
statement left on the international scene and with the Israeli
interlocutors and public.
At the expense of brevity, and
because the statement was not published in full anywhere in an
easily accessible form, following is a transcript of the full
text of the Jihad statement made by Arafat in
Johannesburg, as taken from the tape-recording being distributed
by "Women in Green" in Israel.
(In Arabic )
"In the name of God, Most Gracious, most Merciful, Glory to (God) who did take His Servant for a journey by night from the Sacred Mosque to the Farthest Mosque, whose precincts We did bless - in order that We might show him some of Our signs: for He is the One who hearth and seeth (all things"), Saddaqa Allahu al-Adhim. (Sura, XVII, 1.p.693).
Brothers, I have to thank you
for giving me this opportunity to come here to pray together and
`inshallah' (God be willing), we will pray very soon in
Jerusalem, (applause), the first shrine of the Islam. I speak
with my poor language in English, but I will try to do my best.
My brothers, after the signing
of the Agreement and we have to understand that after the Gulf
War the main conspiracy is to demolish completely the Palestinian
issue from the agenda of the international new order. This is the
main conspiracy and it was not easy because our people as you
know, had paid the price of this Gulf War. As you know, our
community in Kuwait, which was the biggest and richest community
in Kuwait, had been kicked out from Kuwait. Not only that, after
that, we have been faced by this initiative declared by President
Bush for the Madrid Conference, and it was not easy, and now we
had accept to go to Madrid Conference in spite of the very bad
conditions we had accepted to go to Madrid Conference. Why? Not
to give them the reason and the excuse to exclude the cause of
Jerusalem, the cause of Palestine. This has to be understood. And
now after this agreement which is the first step and not more
than that. Believe me there are a lot to be done. The Jihad will
continue and Jerusalem is not for the Palestinian people, it is
for all the Moslem Umma, all the Moslem Umma. You are responsible
for Palestine and Jerusalem before me. (Applause). "But
We delivered him and (his nephew) Lut (and directed them) to the
land which We have blessed for the nations." (Sura, XXI.
71, p. 837). Addressing this Ayya, verse to Abraham, But We
delivered him and (his nephew) Lut to the land which has been
blessed for the whole world.
Now after this Agreement, you
have to understand, our main battle is not to get how much we can
achieve from them here or there. Our main battle is Jerusalem,
Jerusalem, the first shrine of the Muslims. (Applause). This has
to be understood for everybody. And, for this I was insisting
before signing to have a letter from them, from the Israeli that
Jerusalem is one of the items which has to be under discussion,
and not the state, the permanent state (sic) of Israel. No. It is
the permanent state (sic) of Palestine. (Applause). Yet, it is
the permanent state (sic) of Palestine. And, in this letter, it
is very important for everybody to know, I insist to mention, and
they had written it, and I have this letter, I didn't declare, I
didn't publish it till now. In this letter, we are responsible
for all the Christian and the Moslem and the Islamic holy sacred
places. And I had insisted to mention the Christian holy sacred
place before the Islamic holy sacred place because I have to be
faithful to the Agreement between Omar Ibn Al Khattab, God bless
him, Khalifa Omar and the Patriarch Sophronius. You remember this
agreement between the Khalifa Omar and the Patriarch Sophronius?
For this I was insisting to mention in this letter the Christian
holy places beside the Islamic holy places. And here we are. I
can't, and I have to speak frankly, I can't do it alone, without
the support of the Islamic Umma, I can't do it alone. And not to
say like the Jews "Go thou, and thy Lord, and fight ye
two", (Sura V, 27, p. 249). "Go and your God to
fight alone". No, you have to come and to fight and to start
a Jihad to liberate Jerusalem, your first shrine. And, this is
very important. And, for this, in the Agreement, I insist, with
my colleagues, with my brothers, to mention that not exceeding
the beginning of the third year, and directly after the signing
of the Cairo Agreement, to start discussion the future of
Jerusalem, the future of Jerusalem. And, You saw me in the
(inaudible), while I was hesitating, when I was, you remember the
scene, you remember the picture, because I was insisting to
mention Jerusalem. And I said O.K., I don't want only from Rabin
this promise. No. I want this promise from the co-sponsors,
Christopher and Kozyrev, and the witness President Mubarak. And,
this had been done which is very important for everybody to know.
Now, here we are. There is, and
everybody has to understand that, there is a continuous
conspiracy against Jerusalem. During the next two years, which
had been mentioned, not exceeding the beginning of the third
year, they were, they will try to demolish and to change the
demographic of Jerusalem. This is very important, unless we have
to be (inaudible), cautious and to put it in our priorities and
nothing were to be priority than Jerusalem. To put it in our
first priority, not only as Palestinians, not only as Arabs, but
as Muslims and as Christians too. I had mentioned this to the
Pope and to the Patriarch of Istanbul and the Archbishop of
Canterbury. Because I told them that if you want to make your
holy Sepulcher, holy sacred Christian places. O.K. carry on with
the Israelis, with the Jews. We are not against the Jews. We have
to remember what had been mentioned in our Quran: "Of
the people of Moses there is a section who guide and do justice
in the light of truth." (Sura Vii, 159, p. 389).
"That among the nation of Musa a nation or part of the
nation, which believe in just day, the day of control." And,
for your information, there are two Jewish sects in Palestine, in
Samaria, in Nablus and Naturei Carta, in Jerusalem. Theyare
refusing to recognise the State of Israel, and they are
considering themselves as Palestinians. I am saying this to give
the proof that what they are saying, that it is their capital,
no, it is not their capital, it is our capital, it is your
capital, it is the first shrine of the Islam and of all the
Muslims. But, we are in need of your support everywhere. And this
is the message of the people of Palestine from our populations in
Jerusalem, calling for you for everybody here, not only here,
everywhere. And, I am sure, sooner or after, we will pray in
Jerusalem together. (Applause).
This agreement, I am not
considering it more than the agreement which had been signed
between our prophet Muhammad and Qureish. And you remember
Khalifa Omar had refused this agreement and considering it
"Solh ad-daniyya", in English I don't know what this is
the meaning of this "Solh ad-daniyya", but I think it
is the agreement of the very low class, something like that, I
think so, yes. But Muhammad, God bless him, had accepted it. And
we are accepting now this peace accord, but, to continue our way
to Jerusalem, to the first shrine, together, and not alone. And
we have to say clearly and obviously, that there is a very, very,
very, very difficult circumstances ahead. I will give you one
example. Do you remember after the massacre took place in the
Haram of Hebron? Do you remember? Twenty-two days the Security
Council was hesitating to accept the resolution to condemn this
massacre. You remember? Twenty-two days! You know why! For one
word. I was insisting to put in this Resolution - throughout the
occupied Palestinian land, territories, including Jerusalem. They
were trying to bargain with me, to cancel Jerusalem. I refused
and I got it. And you remember.
Again, I have to thank you, I
have to thank you from my heart, from my heart and I am telling
you frankly, from brother to brother, we are in need of you, we
are in need of you, as Muslims, as Mujahedeen. And, in this
occasion, I have to tell my old friend, my old brother Nelson
Mandela, to thank him for giving me this invitation to come, to
visit South Africa for the first time. It is a part of your
struggle, a part of your struggle, I am here. And, I am telling
again, by your names, by the names of the Islamic Umma, that we
will be beside him, and we are sure that he will continue to be
beside us. Again, I have to say "We will, without doubt,
help Our apostles and those who believe, (both) in this world's
life and on the Day when the witnesses will stand forth, Saddaqa
Allahu al-'Adhim. (Sura XI, 51, p. 1277).
"And We wished to be gracious to those who were being
depressed in the land, to make them leaders (in faith) and make
them heirs, to establish a firm place for them in the land",
(Sura, XXVIII, 5, p. 1002-3), God be willing, God be willing,
he will establish a firm place for us in the land, God be
willing, God be willing, God be willing. Brothers take note of
the verse "Never does God depart from His promise",
(Sura XXX, 5, p. 1052), "And to enter your Temple as
they had entered it before, (Sura XVII, 7, p. 695), - they
will enter the Mosque as they have entered it before,
"And to enter your Temple as they had entered it before, and
to visit with destruction all that fell into their power", Saddaqa
Allahu Al-'Adhim. (Sura XVII, 7, p. 695).
Never does God depart from His promise, Never does God depart
from his promise. Together, hand in hand, side by side until
victory until Jerusalem, until Jerusalem, until Jerusalem, Thank
you."
Israeli officialdom, however,
reacted to this statement without taking into consideration the
full text and the Islamic context of the speech. Thus, they
failed the test of sincerity, good faith and mutual trust which
the success of the peace process depends on and which in
themselves are necessary for building confidence.
On the same day that the Jihad
statement became public, Rabin and Peres expressed their anger
and apprehension. In a press briefing following his meeting with
Christopher, in Jerusalem, on 17 May 1994, Rabin responded to a
question on this statement by saying that "if indeed he has
called for a Jihad, it is a serious violation of what he
had pledged in the letter to me". The letter referred to is
the one that led to the mutual recognition between the PLO and
Israel. Rabin went on to say that such a statement "will
cast doubt on the continuation of the process between the PLO and
Israel. We will not accept a violation of the PLO commitment that
it will not engage in violence and terror." Christopher,
standing next to Rabin, accepted the answer of Rabin and said he
was waiting for clarification and continued "I simply would
endorse what the Prime Minister said".
In a press briefing after meeting
Christopher, Peres described Arafat's statement on Jihad
to be "incredible and inconceivable".
Shulamit Aloni, Israel's Minister
of Culture and Communications, and the leader of the Meretz
party, who is known for her usually courageous positions calling
for more open and direct relations between Israel and the PLO,
joined the bandwagon of critics. She said that if Arafat
"goes far in his illusions the peace process might
stop". She warned Arafat that he would not succeed and the
peace process "might continue with other officials in the
Palestinian leadership". Benjamin Netanyahu, the New
York-born leader of the Likud party, called on the Israeli
government to respond to the Arafat statement by closing down the
PLO offices in Jerusalem and preventing Faisal Husseini and Sari
Nusseibeh, two Palestinian leaders from Jerusalem, from joining
the PNA.
The Israelis lost no time in
asking for clarification of the Jihad statement. The
occasion was soon at hand. Chairman Arafat and Peres were invited
to participate in a commemoration ceremony in Oslo to honour the
people of Norway for their contribution to peace in the Middle
East. The ceremony was on the 18 May 1994, a day after the news
on the Jihad statement was released. The Norwegian chief
peace negotiator Terje Rod Larson, confirmed that the Jihad
statement would be "one of the issues that the Norwegian
side will discuss with Yasser Arafat when he arrives" in
Norway. Also, Christopher said at a press briefing in Cairo
following his meeting with President Mubarak, that he had
instructed the US Ambassador in Oslo to ask Arafat for
clarifications on the statement.
Indeed, Yasser Arafat and Peres
discussed, among other things, these issues at their meeting in
Oslo. Both confirmed this at their press conference held jointly
in Oslo following those meetings.
For his part, Arafat gave the
following interpretation of the Jihad statement. He said
that his recent statement on Jihad should be taken in its
"religious and not political meaning", and that he was
continuing his efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East.
Arafat added that some people were trying to embarrass him by
"indecent means". He addressed the journalists saying
that he might say in "an Islamic religious meaning"
that he is continuing in his Jihad in order to arrive at
peace, so that "Christians, Muslims and Jews will pray
together in Jerusalem". He further blamed fundamentalists
for changing a religious expression into a political one, and
said that he "is not responsible for that". To allay
the fears of his interlocutor, Arafat reiterated on this occasion
that he and the Palestinian people are "committed to the
implementation of the peace process" and that he
"rejects any violence in this peace process".
Peres, for his part, "took
note" of the clarifications made by Chairman Arafat on this
issue and welcomed Arafat's commitment to peace. He affirmed the
necessity that both the Palestinian and Israeli parties should
implement the DOP in "text and spirit". He added that
Chairman Arafat "is still committed to the DOP and the
ending of violence, terror and war", and declared that
"we would like to see the Palestinians as neighbours to us
living in peace and prosperity".
Taking note of Arafat's
clarification does not necessarily mean that it was acceptable in
the Israeli political context. After being apprised by Peres from
Osof these clarifications, Rabin's spokesman declared that these
are "a form of escapism" and that there was no reason
for the call for Jihad which "only increases the
difficulties of continuing the peace process."
Chairman Arafat further developed
the meaning given to the concept of Jihad in a talk he
gave at a meeting of Palestinian entrepreneurs held in Tunis, at
the beginning of June, to drum up support for the economic
build-up in the territories governed by the PNA. Chairman Arafat
differentiated between two types of Jihad, the first being
the "smaller Jihad" or "al-Jihad
al-Asghar" and the "greater Jihad" or
"al-Jihad al-Akbar". He told the audience that
he had meant the second type which means, according to the
Prophet Muhammad, the "Jihad of the soul and
cooperation with people".
To differentiate between the
"smaller" Jihad and the "greater" Jihad
is customary and not uncommon in everyday modes of expression
when one wants to underline the difficulties that lie ahead.
Thus, Arafat's interpretation of Jihad is well engraved in
the cultural milieu, religious beliefs and subconscious of the
community. It is a concept that is not exclusive to armed
struggle, irrespective of how the West conceives of it. During a
seven-hour-long telephone conversation between the delegations of
Norway, Israel and the PLO that made it possible to agree on the
DOP, Abu Mazen used the two terms "smaller" and
"greater" Jihad to underline the difficulties in
the secret negotiations and those lying ahead. On the telephone
line were Holst and Peres, talking from Stockholm, Arafat, who
was on the line from Tunis, and Rabin, who was in direct
connection with both from ?Tel Aviv. At hand were also the
members of the respective delegations. In his memoirs, Abu Mazen
recalled this episode:
"Soon, we had remembered that
the phase of the 'smaller Jihad' has ended or is about to come to
an end. It will be followed by the phase of the 'greater Jihad'.
How are we going to conduct our business? How to succeed in this
challenge? Is it possible that we succeed?"
Thus we see that Israel completely
failed to understand the meaning of this important sermon
delivered by President Yasser Arafat in defense of the DOP and
the Cairo Agreement. The Israeli government could have benefited
from Arafat's defence of the statement in order to show the good
will of the Palestinians and their efforts to push forward the
peace process. Instead it took the phrase "the Jihad
to liberate Jerusalem" out of context and threw it in the
face of Israeli and international public opinion as if it had
caught President Arafat and the PLO committing a breach of the
agreements. This sermon was one of the most important speeches in
defense of peace. It could have become the key to starting a
campaign on the importance and necessity of participation and
partnership in Jerusalem. Yet, official and non-official Israel
lacks the will and the resolution to adopt the appropriate
decision on peace in Jerusalem and for Jerusalem. This peace
cannot be realised except through participation and partnership.
It seems that Israel wants to reaffirm the stereotypes and
images, rancour and animosity, as well as historical and
religious differences in the Holy City by asserting that
Jerusalem is its eternal capital. Official and non-official
Israel know very well that such a position amounts to a
declaration of war on Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims everywhere.
It also constitutes a provocation to Christians the world over.
With such a position Israel contradicts the Oslo agreement and
the US Letter of Assurance which affirm that any unilateral
measure taken by one party cannot decide the final status of the
situation in Jerusalem.
The Battle For Jerusalem:
Sovereignty vs.
Religious Supervision
On 25 July 1994, King Hussein of Jordan, Prime
Minister Rabin of Israel and U.S. President Bill Clinton signed
the Washington Declaration, ending the state of war and
belligerency between Jordan and Israel that had lasted since
1948. President Clinton called the agreement "a new currency
of hope... in a region of peace". Rabin described it as
"the closest thing to a treaty of peace," and King
Hussein declared himself committed to "an end to the state
of war with Israel."
When the news was made public,
Chairman Yasser Arafat was one of the first to welcome the
declaration, congratulating Rabin, King Hussein and President
Clinton.
Yet the euphoria on the
Palestinian side did not last long as it became apparent that the
agreement gave Jordan a "special" role of supervising
the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. This implied excluding the
Palestinians from the efforts to find a solution for Jerusalem.
Worse, it was further proof that Israel was bent on determining
the final status of Jerusalem before the start of the
negotiations. Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian leadership were
determined to thwart that development.
4.1 The Jordanian-Israeli
Agreement
What was it about the
Jordanian-Israeli agreement that upset the PLO leadership and
what where the steps taken by the PLO to counter this? What was
the position of Jordan that triggered an atmosphere of tension
and reciprocal escalation in word and in deed? And what were
Israel's motives, what its objectives?
The Palestinian shock, surprise
and rejection was caused by paragraph 3 of the Declaration, which
reads as follows:
Israel respects the present
special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Muslim
Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiatons on the permanent
status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the
Jordanian historic role in these shrines. In addition the two
sides have agreed to act together to promote interfaith relations
among the three monotheistic religions.
This paragraph is significant in
that each of its three sentences states a policy. It contains a
statement of fact: that Israel "respects" the already
existing role of Jordan. It contains a promise: Israel "will
give" priority to Jordan's position. Finally, it contains a
programme for action: both Israel and Jordan have agreed "to
act together" to promote interfaith relations.
Also interesting is what this
paragraph omits, namely the Christian holy places. Hence, the
role of Jordan is confined to the Islamic holy sites in
Jerusalem. This situation was not only rejected by the PLO when
it negotiated the Oslo agreement with Israel, but on the
contrary, the PLO insisted on including the Christian holy places
as part of the commitment made by Israel in the Jerusalem letter
sent to the PLO. As a man of vision and history, Chairman Arafat
was walking in the footsteps of Caliph Omar, the second of the
four caliphs who ruled the Islamic Umma following the
death of the prophet Muhammad, who made a covenant on Christian
rights in Jerusalem following the Islamic conquest of the city
1400 years ago. This has always been alluded to by Chairman
Arafat in his speeches, including that on Jihad in
Johannesburg. This was reiterated after the Washington
Declaration was made public.
Taken as stated in the Washington
Declaration, we find a commitment that excludes from the outset
any "third party", namely the PLO, from a particular
role on religious supervision, no matter how important or
peripheral that supervision might be.
Secretary Christopher's comment
that the issue is "primarily a religious statement. I don't
think it should cause trouble" only underlined that the
issue was more than a religious one. In fact, his statement that
Jerusalem is left to the final status negotiations between Israel
and the PLO clearly shows that this clause was put into the
Washington Declaration with ulterior motives.
The Americans thus agreed to have
one of the outcomes of the final status negotiations be decided a
priori between Jordan and Israel, while, at the same time,
asking the PLO to stick to the DOP and discuss Jerusalem only in
the final status negotiations.
This exclusion clause is
detrimental to the Palestinian people and the PLO, as they are
the holders of any right or sovereignty over Jerusalem in all its
aspects. The Jordanian intervention could not have come at a
worstime for the Palestinians. Even in Israel this point was not
missed. On the contrary, it was said that Peres intended by such
an action to drive a wedge between the Jordanians and the
Palestinians. In the words of the Jerusalem Post,
"Diplomatic sources say
[Peres] wants thereby [emphasising Jordan's connection to Islamic
holy places in Jerusalem] to demonstrate that PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat does not have a monopoly on representing Arab
feelings."
4.2 The Israeli Position
The Israeli "concession"
of giving religious supervision to Jordan on the Islamic holy
sites represents the official policy of both the Israeli
government and opposition towards Jerusalem. Paragraph 3 of the
Washington Declaration was the application on the ground of this
policy, which was stated repeatedly by Israeli officials.The
policy holds that the city is to remain united and under total
Israeli sovereignty. Peres expressed his support of this policy
when he said that
"Jerusalem is closed
politically and open religiously. This means it will remain
united, and only as Israel's capital, not two capitals. It will
remain under Israeli sovereignty. However, when it comes to the
needs and rights of various believers, we are open to
proposals."
He reiterated this position in
connection with the debate on Israeli proposals to withdraw from
the Golan Heights. Peres said in a press conference in Washington
that, unlike the Golan, Israel is not ready to compromise its
position on Jerusalem since "the city is not for sale",
affirming that in the negotiations Jerusalem will continue to
remain closed politically but open on the religious level.
Rabin expressed the same position,
saying the city would continue to remain unified under Israeli
sovereignty and would continue to remain Israel's capital.
Further, he said the role Jordan can play is on the religious
level only and that during the final status negotiations on
Jerusalem, Israel will give Jordan the priority in supervising
the holy sites.
Ehud Olmert, the Israeli mayor of
Jerusalem and a leading figure in the opposition Likud party
welcomed the Israeli-Jordanian declaration, in particular the
granting to Jordan of the right of supervision of Islamic holy
sites. He said the most important issue was to give supervision
over the holy places to religious associations which have no
political aims and which do not claim sovereignty on the ground,
and that Israel should not allow the PLO to come near these holy
places with political aims.
The Israeli position is thus
clear: one of its main objectives is to decide a priori
the outcome of the final status negotiations on Jerusalem and to
hold back the PLO from the city. The tactic to achieve this is to
diversify and to widen the custodianship of the holy places,
whether Muslim or Christian. On the Islamic holy sites, the
Israelis were keen to widen the sharing functions as much as
possible, whether by giving that role to Jordan or by indicating
a role for Morocco, because King Hassan II is the head of the
Jerusalem Committee of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, or
by hinting such a role for Saudi Arabia or other Islamic
countries like Indonesia.
As for the Christian holy places,
the Israelis are clearly seeking other players in order to negate
PLO representation of Muslims and Christians. The Israelis had
that in mind in their discussions with the Vatican that ended
with an agreement on exchange of diplomatic relations between Tel
Aviv and the Vatican. Peres told reporters that "if we
reached an agreement with the Vatican on conducting their
religious affairs, I am sure we can reach an agreement with other
religions."
For the Palestinians, the
behaviour of Israel was an added proof of the continuous Israeli
behaviour to annul the letter and break the spirit of the DOP in
its favour. The statements made by the Israelis following the
signing of the DOP only confirmed their views that Israel is bent
on unilaterally defining the final status of Jerusalem without
any consideration of what the final status negotiations might
harbinger for Jerusalem.
4.3 The Jordanian Position
Yet, if this was the Israeli
position, then the Jordanian position was neither welcomed nor
understood by the Palestinians. It was felt that the blow had
come from fellow Arabs and Muslims against the efforts to make
the issue of Jerusalem the quintessence of the status of
negotiations with Israel on the implementation of the DOP and an
eventual peace treaty.
The exclusive role that Jordan
sought was made very clearly at the highest level in Jordan,
which was forthright in denying sovereignty over the Islamic holy
places in Jerusalem to anybody except itself (and of course the
Israelis from whom they were taking that right). Therefore, they
only could recognise God's sovereignty over Jerusalem. King
Hussein was quoted to have said that "sovereignty of the
holy places belongs to the Almighty in heaven". Jordanian
Prime Minister Majali said in an official speech at an official
ceremony attended by Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister
Peres that "Sovereignty over the holy places of Jerusalem is
only for God, and in his name, we should respect and honour that
right."
Putting aside God's sovereignty
over Jerusalem - nobody doubts that he is supreme everywhere
anyway - what then are the reasons for Jordan's claim to an
"exclusive" role and "right" in Jerusalem?
Rabin stated that giving Jordan a
special role was an Israeli initiative. This could be true since
Israel was the "donor" party, albeit giving something
that it does not legitimately own. This explanation is not
satisfactory in view of the developments.
The published statements of Peres,
Majali and President Clinton indicate a reason for granting
Jordan a special role which has even escaped the PLO and
observers of the peace process. President Clinton was direct in
naming the reason, while Peres and Majali talked about historical
allegories. Yet the message was clear: the only reason for
Jordan's claim to a special role in supervising the holy places
was not religious, but the assassination of King Abdallah in
Jerusalem at al-Aqsa Mosque on 20 July 1951. One cannot escape
the conclusion that what was promised and given to Jordan was a
kind of "compensation" that came 45 years after the
assassination.
The speeches made at the
ceremonies leading to the signing of the Declaration, suggest the
importance of King Abdullah's assassination in the
Jordanian-Israeli deal on Jerusalem.
On 20 July 1994, the
US-Israel-Jordan Trilateral Economic Committee met on the
Jordanian side of the Dead Sea. The meeting was attended by
Secretary Christopher, Prime Minister Majali of Jordan, who was
also the Jordanian Foreign Minister, and Peres, who made his
first public visit to Jordan since 1948.
At the ceremony, Peres paid
tribute to the Hashemites for their unending efforts to realise
peace with the Zionists and later with the Israelis. His
statement was full of symbolism. The date July 20 was not chosen
haphazardly, he said, but was a significant date in the history
of the Hashemites' search for peace with the Jews and the
Israelis. The importance of the date was confirmed by both Peres
and Majali, and later by President Clinton.
Peres said 20 July, on which the
meeting of the trilateral committee was taking place, "must
remind us of a place, of a date, of a destiny." On this date
in 1919, Emir Faisal Bin al-Hussein, King Hussein's great uncle,
met with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, "the leader of the Jewish
people".
After emphasising the importance
of that meeting, Peres went on to talk about King Abdallah and
his grandson, King Hussein of Jordan. He commended King Abdullah
for his "farsighted vision and appropriate judgement"
and for his policy to "offer peace before war, peace instead
of war, peace to end war." Peres declared that Abdullah
negotiated with the Israelis on these issues, which "laid a
foundation for a unique relationship, hidden and open, between
Jordan and Israel."
Having said that, Peres disclosed
the importance of the date. On July 20, 1951, King Abdullah was
assassinated in front of "his young grandson", King
Hussein. Hence, "nothing can mark his life and death more
than the arrival of peace on the very same day." Then Peres
lauded King Hussein who "inherited the destiny" of his
grandfather, and who had demonstrated "stamina in face of
uninvited dangers".
Majali agreed with Peres' speech,
saying:
"Indeed as you mentioned, Mr.
Foreign Minister, 43 years ago on the same day, the very date,
the founder of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan paid with his life
the price of his vision of peace in the holy city of Jerusalem at
al-Aqsa Mosque, at a time when emotions were running high and
events were dictating violence and warfare. The late King
Abdallah was the voice of reason, and the statesman who advocated
wise judgement. [He possessed a] deep sense of belonging to his
Sharifian Al al-Bayt lineage, and his relentless efforts to
achieve a just and honourable peace."
Majali went on to describe the
attachment to peace and the fruits that peace will bear in terms
of cooperation and coexistence and better future. Then he came to
the question of sovereignty, which he gave to God but asked the
"sons of Abraham" - Jews, Christians and Muslims,
"the adherents to the three monotheistic religions" -
to find a solution to the issue of Jerusalem.
At the signing ceremony in
Washington D.C. on 25 July 1994, President Bill Clinton announced
that King Hussein had written to him after their first meeting.
In that letter the King reminded the president about his
grandfather and his assassination at al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.
Then the President said that in the Declaration to be signed, the
role of the King as custodian of the Islamic holy places had been
preserved. The President said the following:
"Your Majesty, after our
first meeting you wrote me a heartfelt letter in which you
referred to your revered grandfather, King Abdullah. You told me
that his untimely assassination at the entrance to Jerusalem Al
Aqsa Mosque had come at a time when he was intent on making peace
with Israel. Had he completed his mission, you said to me, your
region would have been spared four decades of war. Today, 43
years after, Abdallah's grandson has fulfilled his legacy.
And in the declaration you will
sign, your role as guardian of Jerusalem's Muslim holy sites, Al
Aqsa among them, has been preserved. And Israel has agreed to
accord a high priority to Jordan's historic role regarding these
holy sites in final status negotiations."
No sooner was this declaration
made than other steps followed to underline Jordan's acquisition
of its special status over the holy places in Jerusalem. King
Hussein declared that he was going to visit the holy places and
Israel, stating to the German magazine Der Spiegel that
"the visit can take place at any time." Rabin, Peres
and the Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem had all extended invitations
to the King to visit Jerusalem. The King's statement was viewed
as an acceptance of the Israeli invitation. In addition, on his
way back from London, the King personally piloted his plane to
fly over Jerusalem's holy sites.
4.4 The Palestinian Position
The Palestinian response to giving
Jordan the special role of supervision over the holy places was
swift and characterised by condemnation and astonishment.
Chairman Arafat immediately tried to circumvent this arrangement
and his statements were very clear in rejecting this
Jordanian-Israeli understanding.
In a statement issued on 25 July
1994, distributed on the official letter head of the Chairman of
the PNA, a Palestinian source condemned this arrangement between
Israel and Jordan on Jerusalem. However, the progress made on the
Jordanian-Israeli track was welcomed.
The source gave the following
reasons for the condemnation of the arrangement:
First, because Israel is an
occupying state the Israeli government has no right to give any
role or to make any commitment on Jerusalem. Further, Israel has
no right to dispose with such an issue under international law
and the resolutions of international legitimacy, including those
of the Security Council, the UN, the Arab League, the Islamic,
African and Non-aligned Movement summits.
Second, Israel's actions
constituted a clear violation of the Israeli-Palestinian
agreement where it had been agreed that the final status of
Jerusalem and its holy places would be discussed with the
Palestinian side at the final stage of the Palestinian-Israeli
track. Israel's behaviour decided a priori the fate of
Jerusalem. Israel, by such action, tries to ignore the fact that
the issues of Jerusalem is a "Palestinian, Arab, Christian
and Islamic issue".
Third, Jerusalem is occupied territory and an indivisible part of the rest of the Palestinian Occupied Territories. This had been recently confirmed by Security Council resolution 904 (1994) adopted in March 1994 following the massacre committed at the Holy Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron on 25 February 1994. The source called on the Arab and Islamic states and the international community, especially Jordan, "to be on the alert because of the seriousness of the issue of Jerusalem in all its aspects."
Finally, the source expressed the
opinion that the Jordanian-Israeli arrangement came as a
"surprise for all."
On the level of the PNA, this
issue and that of Jerusalem have become a standing item on the
agenda of the weekly meeting of the Council of Ministers of the
PNA. The priority is to underline the fact that Jerusalem is a
Palestinian issue to be dealt with only by the Palestinians on
all matters, whether religious, political or otherwise. The other
aim is to defuse the mounting tension and escalation in
Palestinian-Jordanian relations. The Council has sent delegations
to Jordan to reach a mutually acceptable position on this issue
three times. At the first meeting of the PNA, following the
Washington Declaration, the Council of Ministers decided to
dispatch a delegation to Jordan to discuss this issue. Despite
the talk about brotherly relations and the necessity of
cooperation and coordination between the two sides, the continued
atmosphere of rising tension over who should administer the
Muslim Waqf and over the signature of the Jordanian-Israeli Peace
Treaty on 26 October 1994, suggested that these delegations came
back without conclusive results. Faisal Husseini, who was in the
first delegation said that the Palestinian delegation apprised
the Jordanian side of its position. According to Husseini, the
Jordanian side said "there is no question about Palestinian
sovereignty over Jerusalem. But Jordan wishes to continue the
role it has played in Jerusalem for a long time."
Statements made by Chairman Arafat
on the issue leave little doubt that the Israeli-Jordanian
understanding is unacceptable to the PNA. In a move unprecedented
since his return to Gaza, Arafat convened an extraordinary
meeting of the top generals of the Palestinian police and
security forces to discuss the issue and its repercussions. The
statement made after the meeting by its spokesman Colonel Khaled
Mismar suggested that not only the issue of Jerusalem was
discussed but also the readiness to defend the city, by any
means, despite the severe limitations put on the military
capability of the Palestinian security and police forces by the
DOP. Yet Mismar declared to the press that "we are honoured
to defend Jerusalem and we will not bargain over it".
Chairman Arafat was very clear on
the subject in all the statements he made to the various
delegations that came to express their welcome on his return to
the homeland. From his statements, the arguments of the PNA for
rejecting the Jordanian-Israeli understanding on Jerusalem can be
outlined. In front of a delegation from the Israeli-Palestinian
Progressive Movement for Peace, Arafat said that Jerusalem would
continue to be Arab and would not be confined to an issue of holy
places. He underlined that it is not appropriate to talk only of
the Islamic holy sites. There are also Christian holy places for
which we as Palestinians are responsible because we are 'truthful
to the Covenant " signed between Caliph Omar, the second
Muslim Caliph after the death of Prophet Muhammad 1400 years ago,
and the Byzantine Archbishop of Jerusalem at the time,
Sophronius. This theme of adhering to the Covenant of Omar is a
theme which Chairman Arafat has always referred to in his
speeches and statements. He also warned that "some people
will create for us from time to time obstacles on the road of
building our National Authority". Before a delegation of the
Union of Palestinian Writers he said
"...our right in Jerusalem is
not represented in raising a flag on the Dome of the Rock or the
Holy Sepulchre. It is a sovereign right and it is an issue of
land. It is a historical and legitimate right that cannot be
bargained. No one has the right to talk about or negotiate over
Jerusalem except the Palestinian side as represented by the
PLO".
He warned in another statement
that "our march is long before we can raise the Palestinian
flag over the mosques and churches of Jerusalem." In the
presence of a delegation from the industrial and commercial
association, Chairman Arafat was more defiant. He told the
delegation
"let them decide whatever
they want. Jerusalem will continue to remain an
Islamic-Christian-Arab Palestinian city. We are the only owners
of decision-making and of authority on all the holy places in
it."
Chairman Arafat also declared
another reason for the "official rejection" by the PLO
of paragraph 3 of the Washington Declaration. He told a
delegation of the Palestinian Red Cresent Societies that
"our official objection to the Jordanian-Israeli agreement
was because Rabin does not possess the right to decide and to
talk in the name of Jerusalem" and reminded everybody that a
vote on UNSC Resolution 904 was delayed for 22 days so that
"we should agree to a formula
that does not mention Jerusalem. We refused and the resolution
was adopted to include all the Arab occupied territories
including Jerusalem."
Chairman Arafat did not miss the
opportunity to make good use of the absence of the Christian holy
places from the Jordanian-Israeli agreement. The objection made
by Metropolitan Timothy, the Secretary to the Greek Orthodox
Patriarch of Jerusalem, to deciding the future status of
Jerusalem without consulting the Greek Orthodox Church confirms
that Arafat understands well the issue at stake. The Orthodox
Church is the largest church in Palestine in terms of following
among the Palestinian Christians. It also owns around 70% of the
holy sites, according to Metropolitan Timothy.
Arafat emphasised the
Jordanian-Israeli Agreement's failure to mention the Christian
holy places when he received important Christian delegations from
the Greek Orthodox Church of Jerusalem and from the Greek
Orthodox Church of Ramallah and Al-Bireh. He told the delegation
from Jerusalem that "we will not relinquish the City of
Jerusalem, the capital of our Palestinian state", and said
to the delegation from Ramallah and al-Bireh that
"Jerusalem is a Palestinian issue. No one, no matter who he is, should interfere in it because of the policy of non-interference in others' affairs,as part of the commitments to the decisions of the Arab league and the African and the Non-Aligned summits".
On the diplomatic level, Chairman
Arafat called the Consuls General of France and Britain, both
permanent members of the Security Council. He also met with the
Egyptian Ambassador to Israel. The issue of Jerusalem and in
particular the Jordanian-Israeli agreement were among the issues
discussed in these meetings. He asked for the support of these
countries for the Palestinian position, stressing that such
support would have far reaching consequences on pushing forward
the peace process and in particular the implementation of the
DOP.
On the regional level, Arafat
travelled to Egypt where he met first with President Mubarak and
later with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher. WAFA, which
circulated the news about the meetings on 6 August 1994, did not
elaborate on the issues discussed or the agreements reached, if
any, except to say that the issue of Jerusalem was discussed.
Yet, from the American side, Secretary Christopher stated that
Jerusalem was discussed but the US left it to the parties
concerned to arrive at an agreement. He told reporters at a press
briefing that "it is not the United States' position on this
that governs, but the position of the parties as reflected in the
Declaration of Principles."
Also on the regional level, Arafat
took the issue to a meeting with Rabin on 10 August 1994 at the
Erez check-point between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Even though
there was little information on what the two leaders discussed
during the meeting, their statements were optimistic and gave
hope that difficulties could be overcome. Rabin did not mention
the issue of Jerusalem at the press briefing following the
meeting. It was Arafat who mentioned it among the issues on which
there was no agreement. However, Ziad Abu Zayyad, a member of the
Palestinian delegation to the meeting, told reporters that Rabin
had assured the PLO leader that Israel would negotiate with them
on the political issues on Jerusalem. Zayyad said that Rabin told
Arafat, "Negotiations over Jerusalem will be conducted with
you as laid in the DOP." Yet, Zayyad confirmed that Israel
still differentiated between religious and political issues.
However, the political future of the city will be discussed
between the PLO and Israel "only in 1996 at the latest"
according to what Rabin told Arafat. It is thus clear that
Rabin's position had not changed.
Under instructions from Chairman
Arafat, the PLO adopted further measures and actions in an
attempt to circumvent the consequences of the Jordanian-Israeli
understanding on Jerusalem. Arafat instructed Dr. Nasser
al-Kidwa, Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations,
to send an official letter to UN Secretary General Dr. Boutros
Boutros Ghali, and to the President of the UN Security Council on
the issue. This was done on 29 July, with Dr. al-Kidwa asking for
its circulation as an official document of the UN.
The letter underlined the
resolutions of the Security Council on Jerusalem and the
commitments that accrue on Israel as an occupying power
therefrom. He reminded the United Nations that Jerusalem is an
indivisible part of the Palestinian territory occupied since
1967, listing then the resolutions adopted by the Security
Council in which this was confirmed: Resolutions 681 (1990), 726
(1992), 799 (1992), and 904 (1994). Second, he pointed out that
the international community has, as yet, not accepted any
"foreign sovereignty or jurisdiction" over Jerusalem.
Consequently, the Security Council in Resolutions 252 (1968), 267
(1969), 271 (1969), 298 (1971), 476 (1980), 478 (1980) considered
the Israeli measures and actions aimed at changing the
demographic character of Jerusalem as null and void and called on
Israel not only to rescind immediately these measures, but also
not to adopt such measures in the future.
Dr. al-Kidwa underlined two other
points in regard to the peace process. First, such actions by
Israel violate the DOP's call for refraining from actions that
would affect final status negotiations on Jerusalem. Second, the
permanent observer reminded Israel of its commitments made in the
Jerusalem letter sent by Peres to the late Holst on preserving,
maintaining and encouraging the Palestinian institutions in the
Holy City. Dr. al-Kidwa concluded that
"any legislation or action
that undermines these institutions and their work represents a
clear violation of this commitment, and of the letter and spirit
of the DOP and jeopardises the peace process."
On the political level, Dr.
al-Kidwa reaffirmed the PLO's commitment to the peace process,
and that the PLO otherwise welcomed the progress made thus far,
hoping that similar progress would be made on the Israeli-Syrian
and Israeli-Lebanese tracks. Finally, unlike the statement of the
information source, there was no mention of Jordan in the
permanent observer's letter. It dealt with Israel's violations of
the DOP. Hence, he called on Israel to abide by its commitments
and duties under these agreements on Jerusalem.
Chairman Arafat further called for
and instructed the Political Deof the PLO, as well as the PLO
representatives to the Arab League, Morocco and Senegal to call
respectively for the convening of extraordinary meetings of the
Council of Foreign Ministers of the League, and of the Jerusalem
Committee of the OIC and of its Presidential Bureau. He himself
sent letters on the issue to President Soharto of Indonesia in
his capacity as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In
that letter he called for a meeting of the Jerusalem Committee of
NAM or of its Coordination Bureau. He also sent a letter to the
Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity to apprise
the African countries of the gravity of the situation.
4.5 Debate at the Arab
League
On the Arab level, Arafat wanted
to have an extraordinary meeting of the Council of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of the Arab League to discuss this issue of
Jerusalem. However, only a meeting at the level of the permanent
representatives of the Arab states was convened. Arafat had to
wait for the regular session of the Council of Ministers to be
convened in the middle of September 1994 to have the issue
discussed by Arab foreign ministers.
In any case, the meeting of the
permanent representatives produced a result that was described as
satisfactory to both Jordan and the PLO. The Arab League
confirmed that the Palestinians hold sovereignty over Jerusalem
while it understood the explanations given by Jordan.
On 28 July 1994, the Arab League published a press communique summarising the deliberations on this issue. It is noteworthy that the communique referred only to the views of the Secretary General of the Arab League, Dr. Ahmad Issmat Abdul Majid, and to those of the permanent representatives of the PLO, Jordan and Egypt.
The press communique stated that
the Secretary General had invited the permanent representatives
of Palestine, Jordan and Egypt to attend a meeting at the
headquarters of the League, under his chairmanship, to discuss
the paragraph in the Washington Declaration on Jerusalem.
Secondly, the Jordanian representative explained the Hashemite
Jordanian position on the issue of the holy land and places in
Jerusalem. He stated that since the establishment of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1952, this role was uninterrupted
and aimed at the maintenance of the holy sites and their
supervision. Then he discussed the unilateral Jordanian
disengagement from the Palestinian territories in 1988. Islamic
Waqf and holy places affairs were excluded from that decision and
Jordan continued to bear the responsibility for them. He
confirmed that the Washington Declaration only underlined that
role.
However, Jordan's permanent
representative did not say why these holy places were excluded
from the Jordanian disengagement and upon whose request this
exclusion was made. He called for differentiating between
political jurisdiction and sovereignty on the one hand and the
supervision of the holy places on the other, because the two have
"two different natures." He then assured the meeting
that Jordan respects the decision of the Arab summit in Rabat of
1974 which recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people. Since then, he said,
Jordan has given every support possible to the PLO to regain the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, including Jerusalem.
The Secretary General summed up
the position where he said that paragraph 3 of the Washington
Declaration "confirms a right and does not establish that
right", and consequently, in view of the Jordanian
explanation, the political jurisdiction of the PLO on the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, including the holy places, is
evident.
The permanent representative of
Egypt expressed his "satisfaction" with the explanation
made by Jordan at the meeting. He underlined the importance of
Jerusalem to all Arabs and Muslims and that its final status
would be decided in the negotiations between the PLO and Israel.
The permanent representative of
Palestine expressed his satisfaction and thanks to the Secretary
General. He also expressed his satisfaction with the explanations
made by the permanent representative of Jordan. He promised to
convey those explanations to the Palestinian leadership. The
position expressed by the permanent representative of Jordan was
made public in an official statement by the government of Jordan
the following day and was distributed as an Arab League document
on 30 July 1994.
A few observations are in place
here. First, the reference to the assassination of King Abdallah
at al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem is absent from the Jordanian
official statement. This was the essence of their claim to
"historical" right. Even King Hussein evaded the
question put to him by Der Spiegel on the assassination of
his grandfather as a reason to have asked for this clause in the
Washington Declaration.
Second, the statement made by the
Secretary General of the Arab League in his summing up remarks
that paragraph 3 of the Washington Declaration "confirms a
right and does not establish that right" has become the
catch word in all subsequent Jordanian statements on the issue.
Third, the statement made by
Jordanian officials that the holy places were excluded from their
decision to disengage from the West Bank is correct. In fact,
this exclusion was made at the request of the PLO leadership.
Although there was no written agreement between Jordan and the
PLO on this issue, there was an understanding between King
Hussein of Jordan and Chairman Yasser Arafat at the meeting held
in Amman following the disengagement decision. The reason behind
this request was that the PLO did not want to give Israel an
alibi to annex or place the holy places under the jurisdiction
and or supervision of the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs.
It has to be recalled that at the time Israel had not yet
recognised the PLO. Since Israel's recognition of the PLO
following the Israeli-PLO agreement in September 1993, there is
no legal basis for Jordan's claim on that point.
Jordan's statement that it
possessed the religious supervision over the Islamic holy places
is correct. But what it did not say is more important: namely,
that this possession was acquired from the PLO in accordance with
the understanding explained above between the PLO leadership and
Jordan. Jordan exchanged one "donor" for another, the
PLO for Israel. This greatly disturbed the Palestinians and led
to great disillusionment and frustration and the rapid and
unprecedented escalation of tensions between the Palestinian and
Jordanian sides.
Had this paragraph not been put in
the Washington Declaration as an official text in an
international agreement, it is unlikely that the subsequent
tension and confrontation would have taken place. The exchange
was also made in a surprise manner without informing the
Palestinian side. Thus, when the Declaration was first made
public, the Palestinians welcomed this development because they
did not know of this contractual clause on Jerusalem. The
Palestinian welcome ceased immediately following the publication
of this paragraph in the Washington Declaration.
A further theme included in the
official Jordanian statement, was that religious custodianship
derives also from financial responsibility. According to the
Jordanian statements, Jordan's right to supervise the religious
affairs and Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem obtains from its
financial commitments and contributions, such as the
reconstruction of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock or
the financing of the Waqf and other Islamic religious and
educational institutions, including employees' salaries. Thus
Jordan laid great emphasis on its financial contribution to the
reconstruction of the Holy al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in 1924,
1944, 1952 and last in 1994, when King Hussein contributed around
US$7 million to the reconstruction of the Dome of the Rock.
As the dispute with the PLO
escalated, the Jordanian government released the figures of its
financial contributions and commitments to the Islamic Waqf and
employees in East Jerusalem and elsewhere in the West Bank. These
were as follows: the Jordanian Ministry of Waqadministered 950
mosques in the West Bank, of which 180 were in Jerusalem and its
suburbs. The ministry paid the salaries of 2,500 employees, of
whom 1,000 worked in Jerusalem. The annual budget of this effort
is US$17 million, of which US$5 million is destined for
Jerusalem. In fact, one of the justifications which Rabin gave
for his government's decision to give supervision of the Islamic
holy places in Jerusalem was that Jordan "has financed the
maintenance of the Dome of the Mosque of Omar."
Needless to say, this argument put
forward by Jordan does not stand by itself. Once the PLO or the
PNA take over financial responsibility for all the Islamic Waqf
and holy sites in East Jerusalem, Jordan can no longer use this
argument. In addition, King Hussein was not alone in contributing
to the reconstruction of the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque.
King Fahd of Saudi Arabia contributed a similar sum to that of
King Hussein. The Saudi King made this contribution, in
coordination with the PLO, through UNESCO. This matter was the
focus of much acrimony within UNESCO between Saudi Arabia and the
PLO on the one hand, and Jordan on the other, with the Director
General of UNESCO trying to mediate between the three parties.
Similarly, the PLO has always established, financed or helped to
finance Islamic institutions and employees in Jerusalem as well
as in the other parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Also on the Arab level, the
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Arab League met in
Cairo on 14 September 1994. The question of Palestine was on its
agenda, including paragraph 3 of the Washington Declaration. The
communique published at the end of the ministerial meeting
declared that the decisions of the Council do not reflect the
schism over this issue. Without reference to the said paragraph,
the decisions only expressed the unanimity among the Arabs that
sovereignty over Jerusalem is for the PLO and the Palestinians.
The decision, inter alia, stated that Jerusalem is an
indivisible part of the Arab and Palestinian territories occupied
in 1967. It also stated that
"the Council of the League
decides to underline the extraordinary importance of the city of
Jerusalem to the Arab and Islamic worlds and the necessity to
regain the Arab Palestinian sovereignty over it as the capital of
the independent state of Palestine."
4.6 The Islamic Position
On the Islamic level, Chairman
Arafat sent a message to King Hassan II of Morocco in his
capacity as Chairman of the Jerusalem Committee of the OIC,
soliciting that this issue be discussed and that the position of
this Committee in support of the Palestinian stand be confirmed.
He also sent a message to President Abdou Diouf of Senegal in his
capacity as the current Chairman of the OIC asking for the
convening of the Presidential Bureau of the OIC as soon as
possible in order to discuss the issue. Neither King Hassan II
nor President Diouf convened the respective meetings in due time,
which could indicate that their consultations with member
countries in the two institutions were not conclusive. It seems
the countries preferred to wait for an Arab decision on the issue
since it was primarily an inter-Arab dispute and they did not
want to contradict the position taken by the League in its July
meeting.
The Islamic countries, however,
expressed their position on this issue on two other occasions.
The first was the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the
Islamic countries in Islamabad, Pakistan. The issue of Jerusalem
was raised by the Jordanian delegation, which hoped to gain
support for its position. The Jordanians reiterated their
position as explained at the Arab League but failed to receive
the support they hoped for from the ministers. In the resolutions
on the Middle East, the OIC expressed its support of the peace
agreements reached thus far. It also expressed its support for
the PLO by reaffirming that a just and comprehensive peace cannot
be achieved "except by the total and comprehensive
withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied territories, including
Jerusalem."
The second occasion was in New
York, at a meeting of the Islamic Jerusalem Committee. This was
the first official response to the request of Chairman Arafat
sent earlier to the Chairman of the Jerusalem Committee and the
Chairman of the OIC. Dr. Hamed Al-Gabed, Secretary General of the
OIC, summarised the position of the Islamic countries by saying
that "it is necessary that Jerusalem be returned to
Palestinian sovereignty being the capital of the Palestinian
state."
4.7 Grass-roots Reactions
On the level of Palestinian mass
and grass-roots organisations, the Jordanian-Israeli
understanding found no support but only condemnation and
indignation. The feelings among the Palestinian masses were
heightened by statements made by King Hussein that he was going
to visit Jerusalem.
A number of statements were issued
by trade unions condemning this understanding. The General Union
of Palestinian Workers issued a statement expressing its
"indignation" over the agreement, considering it to be
a violation of international legitimacy and affirming that
Jerusalem remains a Palestinian issue that belongs to the PLO and
the PNA alone. According to the statement, Jerusalem was and will
continue to be the capital of Palestine.
The General Union of Palestine
Teachers, the largest Palestinian trade union, also issued a
statement condemning the Jordanian-Israeli understanding as a
violation of the Oslo Agreement between the PLO and Israel. The
statement underlined that negotiating the future of Jerusalem is
solely a Palestinian responsibility. The statement went on to say
that sovereignty over Jerusalem is a Palestinian right alone.
In addition, demonstrations were
organised in the towns of the occupied West Bank in support of
Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian position and against the
Israeli-Jordanian understanding on Jerusalem.
One of the most important
gatherings against the accord on Jerusalem took place on 22 July
1994, two days after the Jordanian-Israeli-American Trilateral
Committee was convened. The participants in the debate on the
issue gave added weight to the rejection of the understanding.
These participants were Faisal Husseini, in charge of the
Jerusalem portfolio in the PNA, Hanan Ashrawi, the former
spokesperson of the Palestinian negotiating team and then head of
an independent Palestinian human rights organisation, and Sheikh
Hassan Tahboub, Chairman of the Islamic Higher Council. Husseini
rejected outright Israel's right to distribute "authority in
Jerusalem as it thinks it wishes, such as giving Jordan
supervision on the holy sites". Ashrawi underlined that
confining the issue of Jerusalem to religious affairs aims at
maintaining the city under Israeli sovereignty. This, she said,
is not acceptable and contrary to the peace process and the DOP.
Tahboub declared that 2.2 billion Muslims the world over would
not accept Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. The meeting ended
with Husseini declaring the establishment of a national-religious
committee in "which all organisations will participate to
protect the Palestinian institutions and to confront the Israeli
schemes and plans in Jerusalem".
Fatah, the most important
Palestinian political organisation, came out very forcefully
against this understanding. Fatah's Secretary General in the West
Bank called on all Palestinian groups to unite around a programme
of action in defence of Jerusalem, and called on them to put
aside their political differences for this purpose.
A strongly worded editorial in the
bi-monthly magazine, Fatah, published by the movement in
Tunis, analysed the Jordanian-Israeli understanding. The editor
put the blame on the Israelis for attempting to drive a wedge in
Jordanian-Palestinian relations and called for coordination with
Jordan to foil this Israeli scheme. The Israeli aim was to
destroy confidence between the people and the PNA and to cause
dispute between the Government of Jordan and the PLO. The
editorial went on to say:
Paragraph 3 on Jerusalem and the
holy places was inserted by force in the Washington Declaration
in a way that does not aim to give something to Jordan, but to
jeopardise the Palestinian historical right to total sovereignty
over Jerusalem and its holy places, its capacity as the eternal
capital of the independent state of Palestine, which is calling
sincerely for a voluntary confederation with Jordan according to
the free will of the fraternal Jordanian and Palestinian peoples,
indeed of the one Jordanian-Palestinian family.
The editorial cited Thomas
Friedman of the New York Times, who made the analogy that
Jordan and Israel are like the two handles of a nut-cracker, with
Yasser Arafat as the nut. The editorial called for better
coordination with Jordan in order "to stop the effectiveness
of the Rabin wedge." It called for deepening the relations
with Jordan and defining the contours of the future between the
two peoples.
WAFA also reported the meeting of
the heads of the Christian churches in Jerusalem to discuss the
effects of the Jordanian-Israeli understanding, especially the
fact that the Christian holy places were not mentioned in that
understanding.
King Hussein's announcement that
he intended to visit the holy places in Jerusalem increased
Palestinian fears. The statement was understood as acceptance of
the invitation extended to him by Rabin. The visit was a real
possibility as the announcement came against the background of
preparations for the commemoration of the birth of the Prophet
Muhammad (al-Mawlid al-Nabawi) on 19 August 1994. The
King, according to the leaked programme, would come by helicopter
and would land near al-Aqsa mosque. He would not be accompanied
by any Jordanian official but only by some members of the royal
family to give a private character to the visit. Rabin would not
receive the King officially at the landing site; this would be
done by the Israeli mayor of Jerusalem, Ehud Olmert.
The Palestinian side did not
receive the news about the King's visit favourably. A random
survey of local personalities in the occupied West Bank town of
Hebron showed an overwhelming rejection of the King's visit,
considering it to be jeopardising Palestinian sovereignty and
weakening the Palestinian negotiating position. Faisal Husseini
called directly on the King to coordinate the visit with the
Palestinian side in addition to the Israeli side. Chairman Arafat
declared in a press briefing after meeting Secretary Christopher
that Rabin had no right to extend the invitation to the King.
Arafat said that he himself was the only one with that right
because jurisdiction on Jerusalem lies with the Palestinians
only. He said he would be happy to extend an invitation to the
King "and to all my brothers and to all my friends" to
visit Jerusalem "together with me, and this is an invitation
from me to His Majesty."
4.8 Inter-PLO Differences
Even though the overwhelming
position on the Palestinian side was rejection of the Jordanian
role of supervising religious affairs in Jerusalem, PLO leaders
expressed various views on the subject. These divergent views
gave the impression that the conflict with Jordan was Arafat's
responsibility because their statements were on the one hand
intended to defuse tension with Jordan and on the other hand
vindicated Jordan's position.
Abbas Zaki, a Fatah Central
Committee member living in Jordan, commented from Sana'a, Yemen,
that he did not find anything new in giving Jordan the religious
supervision because "Jordan is responsible for the Awqaf and
the holy places." He warned that Israel was trying to create
a dispute between the PLO and Jordan. He emphasised that the PLO
should not fall into this trap because "if this was the
final stage to adopt a decision on who has sovereignty over
Jerusalem then matters would have been different. This stage,
however, is not the final stage yet."
Abu Mazen, member of the PLO
Executive Committee and the Fatah Central Committee, said in an
interview with the Kuwait daily al-Watan on 5 August 1994,
that "there is no justification" for the
Jordanian-Palestinian argument. The misunderstanding, he said,
could be "treated through direct Palestinian-Jordanian
contacts far away from the mass media". He confirmed that
the PLO has an agreement with Jordan giving the latter
supervision of the Islamic Waqf in the West Bank following the
Jordanian disengagement decision in 1988.
Mr. Farouq Qaddoumi, head of the
Political Department of the PLO, its Foreign Minister, and member
of the Fatah Central Committee, called for postponing the dispute
and the discussion of the issue until Jerusalem is freed from
Israeli occupation. He said that "the tempest is ill-timed
because Jerusalem is at present an occupied city. When the Arabs
regain it then the issue will be discussed."
4.9 The
Jordanian-Palestinian Dispute over the Waqf
While efforts were being made to
resolve the dispute on Jerusalem, a second, closely connected
dispute broke out concerning the administration of the Waqf and
the holy places. An important development took place in this
regard when the PNA decided to appoint Sheikh Hassan Tahboub, the
Chairman of the Islamic Higher Council in Jerusalem as Minister
for Religious Affairs. Sheikh Tahboub opened his office in
Jerusalem, thus becoming the second member of the Council of
Ministers of the PNA, after Faisal Husseini, to have his office
in East Jerusalem.
Minister Tahboub declared that the
PNA had decided to make an inventory of all Islamic properties in
the Occupied Territories, in addition to the territories under
the PNA, but not in Jerusalem. The PNA to send Tahboub to Amman
to ask Jordan to transfer all the records relating to this matter
to the PNA. Tahboub declared that everything would be done in
coordination with Jordan, including the date of his departure to
Jordan.
King Hussein did not hide his
dislike of the decisions of the PNA on this issue. He criticised
the appointment of an "official" for the Awqaf and the
Islamic courts "without coordination with the Kingdom or
even without informing them beforehand". He accused the PNA,
without naming it, of jeopardising the Islamic Waqf. Following a
meeting of the Jordanian cabinet, the King said that "the
issue of Islamic Waqf is too important and serious to be played
with." He confirmed that Jordan will continue to bear its
responsibilities in this regard. The Palestinian spokesman
responded to the accusation by describing it as
"unjustifiable and (is) not in the interest of
coordination".
However, Jordan changed its
position and decided to give an inventory of the
Jordanian-administered Waqf in the Palestinian Territories.
The Jordanian decision has to be
understood in the light of the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli
negotiations on early empowerment in the rest of the Occupied
Territories, namely the West Bank. If successful, these
negotiations would result in the transfer of responsibilities in
the West Bank to the PNA. Hence, the transfer of the Islamic holy
places and Waqf in the West Bank, excluding Jerusalem, would be
only a matter of time.
According to the statement made by
Rafiq al-Khatib, director of the Al-Aqsa Mosque at the Jordanian
Ministry of Religious Affairs, most of the city of Jerusalem is
an Islamic Waqf supervised by Jordan. Half of the budget of the
ministry goes to Jerusalem and the other holy sites in the West
Bank. Jordan has spent US$485 million since it took over the
supervision in 1953. The ministry has 2,500 employees in the West
Bank, including Jerusalem. Jordan funds 60 schools teaching
Islamic religion and law, 35 mosques and several orphanages in
Jerusalem. There are around 300 dunums of land of Waqf property
in the centre of the Old City used as Islamic cemeteries, in
addition to the land on the Mount of Olives on which the Augusta
Victoria Hospital and the Maqassed Hospital are built.
Israel Radio claimed that Jordan,
because of the Palestinian position, would stop paying Waqf
employees' salaries. Jordan declared this as
"baseless". Abdussalam Abbadi, the Jordanian Minister
of Awqaf, assured that his government would continue to pay these
salaries. Despite this confirmation, the PNA decided at its
weekly cabinet meeting on 24September 1994 to pay the salaries of
all employees in the Islamic holy sites in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, and to transfer them to the Palestinian Waqf,
starting from 1 October 1994.
Jordan escalated its tone further
following this decision. In addition to the usual rhetoric about
Jordan's historic rights and supervision on the holy places,
Jordan accused the PNA of playing into the hands of the Israelis
if it continued to pressure Jordan in this manner. Any
"backing down" from the Jordanian position "would
open the door for the Israeli control of the holy places,"
said a "responsible Jordanian source." An unnamed
high-ranking Jordanian source, according to Al-Hayat, said
that "the attempt of the Palestinian Autonomy Authority to
end the Jordanian role in Jerusalem is an attempt to replace the
Jordanian presence with an Israeli presence." This,
according to the official, "will strengthen Israel's
influence at the expense of the Jordanian and Palestinian
roles." The Jordanian Minister of Awqaf and Religious
Affairs stated that "in view of the continued Israeli
occupation backing down from (Jordan's) historical rights is
impossible."
The response of the PNA was swift.
Tahboub described the Jordanian allegations as "outbidding
maneuvres". He added that it was not the Palestinians who
brought about the Israeli occupation. This was a direct allusion
to the fact that Jordan's defeat in the war of June 1967 had led
to the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem and the rest of the
West Bank. Tahboub told the Jordanians that with the existence of
the PNA there was no meaning for the continuation of their
supervision of the holy places.
Against the background of this
escalation the Jordanian cabinet made an unexpected move in the
opposite direction. It decided at a meeting chaired by King
Hussein, and upon "his recommendation", to disengage
itself, once again unilaterally, from the responsibilities over
the Islamic holy sites and Waqf in the West Bank, except for
Jerusalem. What political observers considered a
"pre-emptive" move by Jordan fell into line with the
official Palestinian position. Palestinian officials were quick
to welcome the Jordanian step as "positive and in the right
direction", as Minister Tahboub declared. Concerning
Jerusalem, Tahboub declared that the city would be discussed on
the highest political level between Jordan and the PNA "in
the light of political developments and sovereignty on
Jerusalem." The same position was confirmed to al-Hayat
by a Jordanian source who said that the Jordanian position on
Jerusalem's holy places "...will not change except within
the framework of consultation and coordination when the
negotiations start on the final status of Jerusalem."
It seems, however, that this
"consultation and coordination" was only a banner
raised to disguise the fact both the Jordanians and Palestinians
were bent on taking decisions without due consultation with the
other party. In a bid to assert their contending claims over
decision-making on Islamic affairs in Jerusalem, both Jordan and
the PNA assigned a Grand Mufti of Jerusalem following the death
of the incumbent Suleiman Ja'abari, who had been assigned one
year earlier by Jordan without due consultation with the PLO. On
15 October, Jordan appointed Sheikh Abdul Kader Abdeen, chief
justice of the Islamic courts as Mufti. The following day,
Chairman Arafat appointed the Imam of al-Aqsa Mosque, Sheikh
`Ikrima Sabri, a man known for his strong personality, to the
post. Sheikh Sabri was the Imam who led the prayers at al-Aqsa
when President Sadat of Egypt visited Jerusalem and prayed at the
Mosque in 1979.
The appointment of Sheikh Sabri as
the General Mufti of Jerusalem was welcomed by Palestinian people
of all walks of life including employees of the Ministry of
Religious Affairs and Awqaf and the Islamic clergy. In his
capacity as Mufti, Sheikh Sabri accompanied the Turkish Prime
Minister on her tour and prayer in al-Aqsa Mosque as well as
attending meetings with her at the Orient House. Hence, his
appointment by the PNA was the first test for the
Jordanian-Israeli agreement.