CHAPTER 3
The Battle For the Institutions in Jerusalem
At stake in Jerusalem, in addition to many other issues, is the Palestinian institutional presence in the city, namely the capability of the Palestinians to maintain and build their institutions without Israeli interference. However, whether Israel recognises or will recognise that presence is question-able. Arafat's statement on Jihad was not the cause of the conflict that ensued on the question of Palestinian institutions and institution-building in Jerusalem. On the contrary, it was a statement of fact on the extent to which the Israeli authorities were suffocating that presence and institution-building. Arafat, in his statement, spoke of two kinds of conspiracy against Jerusalem, political and demographic.
On the political level, Arafat described on attempt "to exclude the cause of Jerusalem"1 from the negotiating table of the international peace conference in Madrid and elsewhere. Hence, Arafat was insisting on its conclusion anywhere possible in the negotiations and in the agreements that were signed with the Israelis, whether at the Madrid conference or on the multi-or bi-lateral tracks or the United Nations.
On the demographic level, Chairman Arafat charged the Israelis with attempting "to demolish and to change the demography of Jerusalem". There is indisputable evidence that the policies of Israeli governments, whether Labour or Likud, demonstrate Chairman Arafat's charges in this regard. His reference to the secret letter on Jerusalem has to be understood in this context.
Peres, in the letter to Holst, committed Israel to preserving the Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem, to not hampering their activity and to encouraging their work.
Yet, all the activities of the Labour coalition government since the signing of the letter have been a negation of the spirit and text of these commitments. The Israeli government tried to change the facts on the ground and to create new faits accomplis in the city. It imposed a siege on the city. separating if from the rest of the Occupied Territories by barring Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from entering or passing through Jerusalem. Israel continued expropriation of Palestinian land and property in the city, whether of private ownership or owned by Muslim or Christian religious endowment (Waqf) establishments. Israel has built housing complexes for Israelis in the city and financed and encouraged the establishment and the expansion of settlements there. Israel continues to subdue the Christian and Islamic holy places and to change the Arab character of the city.
The Israeli government chose two areas, one local and the other international, to show that it is determined to maintain exclusive control of the city of Jerusalem, not withstanding the stipulations of the DOP that call on both sides to refrain from unilateral actions in Jerusalem affecting its final status. On the local level, the target of attack was Orient House. On the international level, the meeting in Paris on 9-10 September 1994 of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) and the Consultative Group of the donor countries and the World Bank was Israel's target.
3.1 The Attack on Orient House and other Palestinian Institutions
Orient House - object of right-wing Israelis defamation campaigns and attacks - has become a symbol of Palestinian presence and vitality in Jerusalem. Internationally it has become well known for its activities, integrity and as the meeting place for Palestinian local leadership and foreign visitors. Orient House was described by Filastin al-Thawra, the official weekly magazine of the PLO, as "the Palestinian Government House in Jerusalem".2 As described by its owner and director Faisal Husseini, Orient House started out as "the main office" of the Palestinian delegation to the peace process.3
In order to be effective and efficient in executing this mandate, specific departments were created or attached to Orient House, such as the Arab Studies Society, founded by Faisal Husseini in 1979 as a documentation centre, and the Palestinian Human Rights Information Centre (PHRIC). Orient House itself includes political desks and employs political officers responsible for various areas such as Arab. European, African, Asian and American affairs, in addition to other departments that serve the interests of the Palestinian inhabitants of the city. Orient House provided logistical support to the Palestinian negotiating team in terms of communication facilities (telephones and fax machines), meeting or conference rooms, typing and printing. It also houses the Technical Committees that prepare the groundwork and drafts for the Palestinian negotiation teams on the appropriate issues to be dealt with by the various committees in the negotiations.
Faisal Husseini, the founder and director of Orient House, is the leading Palestinian figure in the Territories. As an activist in the struggle for the Palestinian cause and as a member of the Palestinian leadership he has been imprisoned or put under house arrest by Israel on numerous occasions since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in June 1967. Husseini led the Palestinian team that met with former U.S. Secretaries of State George Shultz and James Banker. He was appointed by the PLO leadership as coordinator general of the Palestinian negotiating team in the peace process, and following Israel's recognition of the PLO in September 1993, was assigned head of the Palestinian delegation. Husseini took the Jerusalem portfolio in the Council of the PNA. In addition, Husseini was the 'undeclared' leading personality in the Fatah movement in the Territories until 1993 when it was made public that he was a member of the Fatah Central Committee, the highest body of the movement. As a leading personality in the Territories, he received foreign visitors, such as foreign ministers, officials of international organisations and other visiting dignitaries at Orient House. Husseini was also the interlocutor of Israeli officials on issues affecting he Palestinian population in the Territories, including Jerusalem. He was also assigned by Chairman Arafat, following his first meeting with Rabin in Cairo on 10 October 1993, as the headed of the Palestinian side of the joint Israeli-Palestinian committee on the issue of Jerusalem.
Following the return of Chairman Arafat to Gaza on 1 July 1994, the political significance of Orient House decreased. This development is only natural, since Chairman Arafat made his headquarters in Gaza, and the various ministers of the PNA are functioning either from there, Jericho or Ramallah. Consequently, the point of reference for local and foreign activities in all fields shifted from Orient House to Gaza.
Because of this development. Orient House was appropriately redirected to serving the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem. According to the DOP, Jerusalem will be first discussed at a later stage of the negotiations and as yet the PNA has no authority over the affairs of the city. Assigning this role to Orient House was an acknowledgement of the limitations imposed by the DOP on the PNA. Husseini, who is a minister of the PNA was given responsibility for Jerusalem but no declared portfolio.
In this capacity, therefore, Orient House is not part of the PNA. This was confirmed by Husseini who said that "we will not be part of the Authority in Gaza and Jericho and the autonomy agreement".4 He did not exclude, however, the possibility that once the negotiations on the final status of Jerusalem are successfully concluded, Orient House "may serve as a PNA office"5 in Jerusalem.
The reorientation of Orient House has been an important development for the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem. Since the PNA has no offices in the city yet, and since the Palestinian populatiohas no other Palestinian reference point there, Orient House is viewed as a "kind of government office that represents their interests"6 vis-a-vis the Israeli authorities, be they the Government or the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem which in the words of Jan Abu Shakra from the PHRIC, "has been ignoring the problems of the Palestinian population"7 and consequently is not viewed by them "to represent their interests".8
As a result, the functions of Orient House extend over a wide range of issues. These include political activity in the peace process, monitoring Israeli measures and practices in East Jerusalem, taking care of economic and religious affairs monitoring human rights abuses by Israeli authorities in the city as well as in the other Occupied Palestinian Territories, carrying out research, providing assistance and giving advice to Palestinian individuals and institutions who are threatened or feel threatened by the Israeli government and the Israeli municipality, and providing legal assistance.
3.2 Israeli Accusations against Orient House
The Israeli Government tries to hamper and obstruct the work of Orient House by all means possible. It uses a policy of intimidation accompanied by legal measures to achieve its goal of forbidding Orient House from either executing political functions on behalf of the PNA9 or becoming a "shadow municipality"10 for Palestinian Jerusalemites.
The Israeli accusations against Palestinian institutions, and in particular against Orient House, in Jerusalem were of political, diplomatic and security natures.
I. The political dimension:
The Israeli authorities want to make it clear to the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, and to the PNA in particular, that they will not accept any sharing of sovereignty or functional responsibility for the city. This will remain exclusively in Israeli hands, and Israel will not tolerate the establishment of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem that serve the PNA in the rest of the West Bank or Gaza, or that will be considered as affiliates of the PNA. Police Minister Shahal said in the Knesset that the government will not tolerate "any Palestinian national activity"11 or for that matter that of any other Palestinian institution. The Israeli government thus blocked the establishment of the Palestine Bureau of Statistics and the opening of a PECDAR office in the city.
Israel interprets "national activity" as activities serving or linked to the PNA. Accordingly, such institutions have to move out of Jerusalem and relocate in the Territories. There is unanimity on this position in the Israeli political, military and security apparatuses. According to sources at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs "all institutions connected with Gaza and Jericho have to go to Jericho and Gaza".12 An Israeli security source also said that the criterion for asking a Palestinian institution to move out of Jerusalem is "whether the primary target of the function of that or this institution is Gaza or Jericho or outside."13
To bolster this position, a series of administrative and legal measures were made by the Israeli Government to criminals institutions which do not conform to the Israeli position in order to bring them before the Israeli courts. The object is to thwart what they view to be attempts to consolidate the Palestinian foothold in East Jerusalem.
For example, administrative measures were applied immediately by Bezeq, the Israeli telecommunications company. The company refused to install telephone lines to the PECDAR office in Dahiyat al-Barid, a suburb north of Jerusalem, which administratively falls outside the municipal boundaries. Instead, the company told PECDAR officials that it was prepared to install as many as seven lines if PECDAR moved to Jericho.14 PECDAR rejected this offer, Bezeq did not install telephone lines for the office, and PECDAR staff used mobile telephones instead.
The Jerusalem Post reported that Prime Minister Rabin convened an "inter-ministerial committee on Jerusalem, and called for limiting Palestinian institutions in the city"15 in May 1994, and that his office told the paper that "Palestinians will require Israeli authorisation to create any future institutions"16 in East Jerusalem. Rabin declare that he had asked the Israeli Attorney-General. Michael Ben-Ya'ir, to look into taking legal measures against the Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem and to punish with imprisonment those who are found a violate them.17 For his part, the Attorney-General declared that these measures would be based on the
"principle of the sovereignty of the State of Israel on all Jerusalem, including East Jerusalem, in such a way that no organisation or foreign country can have activities without getting prior authorisation from the Israeli authorities."18
Israel's Justice Minister, David Liba'i, developed the concept of "foreigners" to include the Palestinians, whether of East Jerusalem or of the PNA. Liba'i said that "it is customary that foreigners do not engage in activity in another country's territory without the permission of the host country." Therefore, he went on to say that
"political activity that is undertaken on behalf of the Palestinian Authority or the PLO, and I emphasise this, will not happen without permission."19
These statements clearly show that Israel is trying to preempt any Palestinian demands on East Jerusalem. Libai's statement adds insult to injury to the Palestinians because he considers them "foreigners" in their own country. Hanan Ashrawi, then director of the Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights, a Palestinian human rights organisation, criticised the Israeli legislation saying it "could create hostility and harm the peace proces".20 Commenting on earlier statements, such as those of Ben-Yair and Liba'i. Samir Abdallah of PECDAR said "it is illogical" that institutions of the PNA will ask the Israeli authorities for authorisation to work in Jerusalem.21 These measures were codified into law by the Israeli government in November 1994, following the visit of Tansu Ciller, Prime Minister of Turkey, to Orient House during the first official visit made by a Turkish Prime Minister to Israel. The Israeli government was outraged by Ciller's visit to Orient House and tabled a bill at the Knesset to outlaw any activity by Orient House or other Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem, and to forbid any foreign dignitary or visitor from visiting Orient House or other Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem, and to forbid any foreign dignitary or visitor from visiting Orient House without prior consultation and arrangements with the Israeli authorities. The bill was passed by the Knesset on 7 November 1994 in its first reading.22 Also important in this regard was the fact that Prime Minister Rabin raised the issue at his meeting with Chairman Arafat on 8 November 1994 at the Erez checkpoint between the Gaza Strip and Israel. In a move unprecedented since the signing of the DOP, Rabin informed Arafat of the legal measures that his government intended to undertake in this regard.23
ii. The diplomatic dimension:
Orient House has functioned as the seat of the Palestinian negotiating team. Faisal Husseini received foreign visitors such as the foreign ministers of the USA, Russia, the European Union, Japan and Egypt. In November 1994, Husseini received Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, French Minister of Social Affairs, Simone Veil,24 and other foreign dignitaries, such as representatives of the United Nations and other international organisations. Discussions on the peace process and on bilateral relations, especially technical assistance to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, were typically conducted during these meetings.
These visits added to the prestige of Orient House on the international level and gave it a measure of diplomatic immunity vis-a-vis the Israeli authorities. However the Israeli government lost no time in underling that Orient House does not enjoy any diplomatic immunity. Following the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister, Shimon Peres declared that "the Palestinians do not enjoy any diplomatic immuninside Orient House".25 Nevertheless because of this acquired prestige, Orient House was able to use some national symbols without the Israeli authorities taking action. Orient House was able to hoist the Palestinian flag immediately upon signing the DOP in Washington on 13 September 1993. It also had its own security apparatus, although this functioned only inside its premises. The security officials have barred Israeli security officials from entering the premises of Orient House on more than one occasion, such as during the visits of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Turkey. In fact, the scuffle between the Palestinian security officials of Orient House and their Israeli counterparts accompanying the Turkish Prime Minister raised a huge furore in Israel. The press called it a "scandal"26, and many Israeli officials condemned the Palestinian action, among them Prime Minister Rabin, Foreign Minister Peres and Police Minister Moshe Shahal, in addition to Ehud Olmert, the Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem and Moshe Peled, Knesset member from the extreme right Tzomet party.27
Israel never objected to such activities or meetings at Orient House before signing the DOP in September 1993. They were hoping that the Palestinian leaders in the Territories who were members of the negotiating team would develop and mature into an alternative leadership to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Indeed, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised or helped to organise such meetings for visiting foreign delegations at Orient House with Husseini or other members of the Palestinian team. Responding to criticism in Israel of the visit of the Canadian Housing Minister David Dingwall to Orient House on Monday 18 July 1994, the Canadian Ambassador to Israel, Norman Spector, said that the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs "set up recently" meetings for a Canadian parliamentary delegation at Orient House when it visited Israel and the Territories.28
The change of Israel's position by the authorities came only after the start of the implementation of the DOP, namely the vacating of the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, in which the PNA started establishing itself. The change gained momentum following Chairman Arafat's return to Gaza on 1 July 1994. Cries from Israeli officials about the illegal nature of such meetings at Orient House or at any other Palestinian institution in East Jerusalem were made on a daily basis. They started what Israeli Telecommunications Minister Shulamit Aloni termed "a hysterical campaign" against the diplomatic activities of Orient House.29
According to the Israeli government, activities on behalf of the PNA, or aimed at serving Gaza and Jericho, should be moved out to these two places or should stop immediately. Shimon Peres told reporters "that foreign dignitaries could visit Orient House, but it must be clear that the business discussed is unrelated to Palestinian self-rule."30 Hence, he said, "all measures at our disposal, including legal ones" would be taken by the Israeli government to prevent Palestinians from "turning East Jerusalem into a base for their self-rule government for the Gaza Strip and Jericho." He thus instructed Joel Singer, the Foreign Ministry's legal adviser to study the legal aspects of such meetings and to fashion "a guide" on how to deal with the new PNA, "ranging from jurisdictional issues to diplomatic etiquette".31
The Americans were quick to bow to the Israeli change of policy. According to reports, some US Congressmen expressed their apprehension that if USAID set up its headquarters in East Jerusalem this would encourage Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem. Therefore, Brian Attwood, the Director of USAID, assured these congressmen that this would not be the case.32 Secretary of State Christopher also assured members of Congress that the US Administration would not discuss with the PLO in Jerusalem economic assistance destined for the self-rule areas. The meetings, he said, would take place in Gaza and Jericho.33
However, President Clinton's decision not to visit East Jerusalem while in Israel following the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty was welcomed by the PNA and regretted by the Israeli Government. This decision was in line with the position adopted by the US that Jerusalem still is a disputed issue. Had President Clinton visited East Jerusalem, accompanied by the Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem, this would have been a de facto recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the city. If he did not go with the mayor, as the Palestinian side was asking, that would have been interpreted by the Israeli and their friends in the USA as giving in the PLO demands on Jerusalem. Neither was acceptable to the President. So even the private visit of Mrs. Clinton to the Old City was canceled at the last moment.34
iii. The Security Dimension
Accusations were made by various Israeli officials, which were reported widely in the Israeli press, that Palestinians in East Jerusalem were engaged in security-and police- related activities. The target, once again, was Orient House. Three major accusations were made by the Israelis: First, that there was an attempt to form a Palestinian "police framework" in East Jerusalem; second, that arms were being carried by guards at Orient House, the implication being that they jeopardise Israel's security and terrorise the population, while the Israeli authorities are there legitimately to protect the population; third, that Palestinian security officials prevented Israeli security officials from carrying out their duties in and around Orient House, and that Israel would not permit this to happen in the future.
The first accusation was made after the Israeli police detained a Palestinian bodyguard who worked at Orient House and five other assistants for allegedly attempting to establish a police force in East Jerusalem. The Palestinians were accused of "mistreating" Palestinians, detaining and interrogating others who were suspected, among other things, of robbery and illicit drug possession. They were also accused of blackmailing people in the city.35
The second accusation was more specific in nature, dealing with the carrying of arms by bodyguards at Orient House. Police Minister Moshe Shahal threatened that any Palestinian guard or security man found to be carrying arms at Orient House would be detained and put on trial.36 He declared at a hearing in the Knesset that he "will not tolerate Palestinian police operations in Jerusalem".37
Third, based on these accusations and in view of the scuffle that took place between Israeli and Palestinian security men during the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister, the Israeli Government decided to limit the semi-independent activities of the Palestinian security apparatus at Orient House. Their aim was to make it clear to the PNA that no territory or property which Israel considers to be inside Israel will be closed to Israeli security officials and that no one can prevent them from executing their functions. The second aim was to make it clear to Palestinian officials that no one would be able to visit Orient House without prior Israeli coordination and approval. Rabin, Peres and Shahal made this clear in their statements.38 Shahal declared that the Israeli police and security forces would increase their presence around Orient House.39
Palestinian officials at Orient House rejected the accusations. First, they said the case of the Palestinian bodyguard was an individual case which neither they nor the PNA supported.40 Second, guards at Orient House do not carry arms and "we do not have armed guards and have never requested them."41 Third, security guards at Orient House are known to the Israeli officials, and were allowed at Orient House to protect members of the Palestinian peace team when death threats were issued by those opposed to the peace process.42 Fourth, officials at Orient House denied that any interrogation activity had taken place at Orient House. What the Israeli officials described as interrogation was the conciliation procedure caout by Palestinian officials at Orient House who process and follow up complaints from East Jerusalem citizens and try to solve hem either directly or through conciliation committees depending on the severity and seriousness of the complaint.43
3.3 The Palestinian Response
The Palestinian response to the Israeli campaign of accusations and defamation against the work and activities of Orient House and other Palestinian institutions was steadfast, reasonable and courageous.
At a news conference held at Orient House in May 1994. Faisal Husseini made the following points:
3.4 The Paris Meeting
Israel pursued its policy of attempting to deny any sort of Palestinian claim to Jerusalem on the international level as well. Israel blocked the meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee and the Consultative Group of the donor countries and the World Bank that took place in Paris from 7-9 September 1994. The Israeli delegation objected vehemently to the inclusion of development projects for Jerusalem in the assistance programme presented to the World Bank and the donor countries by the Palestinian delegation.
The Palestinian delegation presented requests for economic and construction development projects in East Jerusalem and investment in the areas of education and health.
Because of the impasse between the two positions, the World Bank decided to postpone the Paris meeting for a date to be fixed after resolving the differences between the Palestinian and Israeli sides.
At the meeting, the Israeli side objected to the Palestinian projects and declared in a press statement that "many pages" of the programme on Jerusalem "are unacceptable to us" and that "anything that includes Jerusalem will not be dealt with in this meeting."55 One Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman said "we do not object to the principle of foreign investment in Jerusalem"56. Consequently, what the Israelis reject is the involvement of the PNA in such assistance destined for Palestinian institutions or institution-building in East Jerusalem.
This Israeli position caused a shock in the Palestinian arena because it indicated unequivocally the plans and positions Israel harbours for Jerusalem, which will make it willing to adopt any measure to thwart Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem. On the Israeli rejection of the projects for East Jerusalem, Nabil Sha'ath said that he would understand the Israeli position if the Palestinians "were putting barracks or police stations in Jerusalem", but the projects were intended to repair schools and hospitals and hence the "minimum request is that Israel cannot practice a veto on that".57
The dismay on the Palestinian side was caused by the perception that Israel's position was premeditated, and that it created this problem in the AHLC-CG meeting because it wanted to put an end to what it interpreted as international support, directly or indirectly, for the Palestinian position on East Jerusalem. Amin Haddad, director of the PECDAR Department of Assistance, and member of the Palestinian delegation to the Paris meeting, confirmed58 that the Israeli delegation, as all other delegations to the Consultative Group meeting knew of the Palestinian position and received a copy of the Palestinian proposals before the meeting took place. He charged that the Israelis had not informed the Palestinian team in Jerusalem of any problems they had with the Palestinian proposals. Haddad accused the Israelis of acting "with bad intentions" vis-a-vis the building of the Palestinian economy.
Observations from Palestinians behind the scenes of the AHLC-CG meeting show clearly that the Israeli position demonstrates the real attitude of Israel to the peace process, to Palestinian institution-building efforts, and to the work and assistance the donor countries are providing in that regard.
Farouq Qaddoumi, Acting Chairman of the Board of Governors of PECDAR, headed the first ever Palestinian delegation to the meeting in Paris, although he did not attend the meeting because he is also the head of the Political Department (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) of the PLO, whose functions and post are not recognised in the DOP. Qaddoumi used the occasion to meet with French officials to discuss the peace process and bilateral Palestinian-French relations. In a statement on the collapse of the Paris meeting, he accused Israel of putting obstacles on the road of the peace process and of intimidating the donor countries not to deal with PECDAR. Thus he warned that the peace process "will stumble and even might be destroyed" if the donor countries do not give assistance to the PNA.59
Another high-ranking PLO official, Salim Zanoun, Acting Speaker of the Palestine National Council (PNC) - the Palestinian parliament in exile - put the responsibility on Israel for the failure of the Paris meeting, charging that Israel knew that the PLO had been financing the institutions in East Jerusalem in coordination with Jordan through the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Commission. Now Israel, he said, is putting obstacles before the PNA.60
Amin Haddad charged Israel of not wanting to have the Paris meeting of the Consultative Group in the first place, and that this was the reason why they raised the issue of international assistance to Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem. If the Israelis wanted to iron out the differences on this issue they could have discussed them with PECDAR officials in Jerusalem before the meeting in order to settle the problem.61 Hence, he said, the aim of Israel is "to undermine the mechanism of work of the donor countries". He asked whether the Israelis wanted "to starve the Palestinian people and cause the failure of the Palestinian Authority and the peace process?"62
The Consultative Group decided to athe meeting for a later date because of the "political differences" between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, as Caio Koch-Weser, Vice President of the World Bank with responsibility for the Middle East and North Africa, declared when adjourning the meeting.63
Rumours of putting aside political differences on bilateral issues, including Jerusalem, circulated as the issue was being debated behind closed doors in Paris. At least one report64 claimed that Koch-Weser had declared that the heads of the Palestinian and Israeli teams agreed to "put aside the Jerusalem projects." But the differences continued and the meeting was adjourned.
Norway, which heads the AHLC, was ready to help. It organised a special ceremony for 13 September 1994 to commemorate the first anniversary of the signing of the DOP in Washington. The guests of honour were PLO Chairman Arafat and Israel's Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. The host was the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Bjorn Tor Godal. The three signed yet another agreement for the implementation of the DOP which they called the Oslo Declaration.
Article 4b of that Declaration reads as follows:
Both sides accept the request by the AHLC chairman that they shall not bring before the donor community (the AHLC or the Consultative Group) those political issues that are of disagreement between them. They will deal with such issues between them. They will deal with such issues between themselves, based on the Declaration of Principles and subsequent agreements.
This declaration could have not been arrived at without the Palestinian side backing down from the issue of Jerusalem. The declaration calls on both parties to avoid bringing up political issues before the donor community, but in this case the political issue of disagreement was Jerusalem and it was brought up by the Palestinian side.
Criticism of Chairman Arafat for signing the Oslo Declaration was made on the Palestinian and Arab fronts for various reasons. Hamas, for example, described the declaration as "a testimony to Arafat's capitulationist policies and approach of succumbing to the Zionist policies"65. An editorial in the Lebanese daily al-Hayat, written by its editor-in-chief Jihad al-Khazen, charged "ineptitude in leadership"66 on the Palestinian side because the status of Jerusalem had been left to the final status negotiations in the DOP. Consequently, raising this issue at this stage had played into Israeli hands in enabling Israel to increase pressure on the PNA.
High-ranking officials in the PLO and the PNA expressed similar views. some press reports claimed that the Minister of Economy in the PNA. Ahmad Qrei'a (Abu Ala'), had tendered his resignation to Chairman Arafat because of the placing of Jerusalem on the agenda of the Paris meeting.67 There is no evidence to support these claims, but the fact that they were mentioned shows that there was difference on this subject in the leadership. Faisal Husseini criticised the Palestinian position on this issue. In an interview with the Qatari paper al-Sharq in Cairo on 15 September 1994. Husseini said
"the PLO tried to change an existing situation, but in fact Jerusalem is not included in the area of self-rule. The projects financed by the donor countries are targeted for these areas only."68
Despite these criticisms, and in view of the continuous Israeli attempts to claim Jerusalem for itself, the Palestinian position is basically sound in bringing up the question of Jerusalem in all fora. This undercuts the Israeli claims and remains a constant reminder to the Israeli and the international community that Jerusalem is an unresolved issue that Israel is trying to decide through force before the negotiations on the final status of the city commence.