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Decentralization – Donors Perspectives
Date: February 25th, 2003 PASSIA, Jerusalem Speaker: Dr. Khalil Nakhleh, General Director, Accreditations and Quality Assurance Commission, Ministry of Education and Higher Education.	More Photos
:: Introduction :: Framework :: Further Points

	Participants:		Maha Abu Samra, Field Training Officer, UNRWA; Caroline Abu Sada, PhD Student; Benoît Challand, PhD Student; Safa' Abu Assab, Program Manager, Diakonia; Lois Nakhleh, Artist; Valker Bach, Assistant Director, Star Mountain; Michael Neuwrith, Miftah; Raya Al-Abbasi, Project Director, IRFAN Canada; Nick Kardahji, Hijazi An-Natsheh, Mahdi Abdul Hadi, PASSIA.

:: Introduction

At present Palestinians are facing a number of different crises:

Political/leadership – weak central government, no decentralization, lack of effective leadership.

 

Economic – widespread poverty and unemployment, collapse of the Palestinian economy.

 

Israeli actions – the construction of the “Apartheid Separation Wall”, the closure policy and checkpoints/roadblocks all of which severely restrict freedom of movement.

 

This is the context in which our present discussion takes place. Where are we as a society, as a culture? Serious questions about the future have not been addressed by the leadership.

 

The trend over the last 20 years has been a negative one. It precedes the arrival of the “outsiders” and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994. It is related to a lack of sovereignty and the lack of true power to make decisions about our lives. The context or framework of discussions about what to do, how to act has always been determined by outside forces. Since the start of the twentieth century Palestinians have not had control over their lives in a real sense. When the Z ionists arrived they began a project to dominate the lives of the Palestinians and this has continued since that time. The shape of governance has changed (PLO/Civil Administration/PA) but the lack of real power remains the same.

 

We must put the PA and the international donors in an international context.

 

The two sides:

Donors – Sources of funds. They are outside Palestine .

 

Recipients (“partners”) – beneficiaries, Palestinians inside Palestine or rather this “little piece of Palestine ” (i.e. West Bank , Gaza )

 

Some underlying assumptions:

• The donors who fund interventions in Palestine have a clear “perspective on what they are doing;

• Their perspective is more important, carries more weight, has more impact etc than that of the recipient;

• It is doubtful whether the recipients have or express a perspective and if they do it is inconsequential anyway, otherwise why the preoccupation with the donors perspective!

 

“I am not sure of any of this” – are the donors investing money for the sake of developing Palestine ? On the Palestinian side do we have a clear vision of where we are going? Palestinians claim they want a market economy – are we sure what that means? We are not taking any practical steps to implement such an economy.

 

Why do we talk about “donors” perspectives? Why not Palestinian perspectives? We are preoccupied with the formers point of view. The donor countries have a clear vision – this is our starting presumption but we are naïve to think this. Nevertheless this perspective has more weight than our own.

 

:: Framework

 

If we are to understand donor perspectives on any issue we need to look at three levels:

1. The “High Structure” – Formal policy/strategy. Strategy papers, plans for the region, speeches made to parliaments etc. Every donor has one form or another of this “grand document” outlining their vision (e.g. country strategy papers prepared by the EU). “Personally I am suspicious of these documents”. They don't give us much just what ought to be done.
   
    
2. Application on the ground of these documents (the “Low Structure”) – How do these strategy papers get applied to the real world? These documents always include lists of priorities, objectives. It is useful to compare these objectives in different countries, e.g. to compare the EU's success or failure in implementing its key priorities in India compared to Palestine . A comparative framework.
    
3. Intervening variables – The factors which affect the outcome of attempts to implement grand strategy. How do donors deal with this?

 

 

 

 

The above figure provides a diagrammatic representation of this framework.

 

A concrete example of this framework in action: The EU's top priorities are a viable Palestinian economy, hopefully leading to an independent economy eventually, and strengthening the rule of law and democratic governance. However day-to-day factors prevent these priorities from being realized, e.g. checkpoints, closures, curfews, the construction of the Apartheid Separation Wall and so on.

 

The question to ask is, why is it that the EU doesn't take serious action to eliminate these factors (or at least reduce their impact) which prevent implementation of the priorities set forth in their strategies. The Palestinian system of governance is undemocratic (to say the least) – there is no formal democracy, no local government, improper functioning of the PLC. Why is there no real action (that is beyond simply issuing statements) to deal with these problems?

 

If we consider that the Palestinian leadership is corrupt why do the donors continue to prop them up? Why do they concentrate on internal matters such as Palestinian textbooks/school curriculum, a matter for Palestinians themselves to debate, but not on other issues?

 

:: Further Points

 

For the sake of a transparent analysis, consider the following points:

• The litmus test of the honesty of a donor in claiming to want to achieve certain aims, the honesty that is of their formal strategy papers, is how they deal with the “intervening variables”. (Examples – effects of checkpoints and closures on economic development and the lack of serious action from the donors; propping up an inherently undemocratic system while claiming to want to strengthen the rule of law; not pushing for legislative and local elections).

• Examining the formal documents, strategies, speeches etc only provides you with indications. To understand them fully they must be placed in their regional context (e.g. the MEDA strategy for the EU, the MENA strategy for the World Bank, the Arab and Islamic countries for the US ). EU's strategy for Palestine is part of its strategy for the Mediterranean area as a whole. It should also be noted that the EU has a strategic relationship with Israel which is more important than its relationship with Palestine .

• Beyond the regional context we cannot ignore in our discussion the globalized context of foreign interventions that has shifted in the last half century (notwithstanding US military “adventures”) from sending armies and fleets, to sending transnational capital and goods, technocrats (“consultants”) to manage this capital and maximize returns for the donors, and localized technocratic agents (“I call them ‘brokers'”), who are recruited to increase the visibility and effectiveness – through their claims to knowledge of local culture – of transnational interventions.

• This discussion is not concerned with motives or emotive factors. At this level it is of no relevance whether a particular donor is nice or kind or sympathetic to the Palestinian cause (“of course I prefer it when they are not jerks!”). This discussion transcends local donor representatives and their personal perspective; in the regional/global context these factors are irrelevant.

 

Since 1993 when development was sanctioned as part of the Oslo process which was endorsed internationally, the aid process has become more overt and direct. The PA could apply for and receive funds as a quasi-state body. But the process began before this, and has existed in different forms since the 1970's, since Camp David I. Camp David can be viewed as a critical marker.

 

Another critical marker came with the establishment of the “Steadfastness Front”, i.e. those states that were opposed to the Camp David agreement. They developed a fund for Palestine with the aim of increasing the steadfastness of the people on their land, helped them to build homes and establish local government. Much of the funds promised by the Steadfastness Front states never materialized. The US also channeled funds via PVOs and in the context of the “Jordan Plan”. There was also medical relief in the late 70's.

 

Why was it that with the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987 all this money did not provide the population with basic food resources? There was no plan/strategy to develop Palestine to become independent/autonomous. The excuse of “corruption” is not enough of an explanation.

 

A longer-term perspective – cause for concern. Serious problems with the education system, environment, the value structure (emphasizing certain aspects of religion at the expense of others, same with secularism). The development process is not human-centered.

 

It is not important whether Arafat is here or not – it is more important to worry about our school system, our curriculum, are we producing knowledge (“we can do this regardless of the occupation”). We can determine whether villages run their own affairs. We have the resources to raise critical questions about the kind of society we want.

 

“Why focus on the donors to solve our problems? We have to focus on our internal creative talents.”