The conference began with attempts to define the concept of 'intractable conflicts', followed by brief introductions to the Israeli-Palestinian and South African conflicts. The next focus was on what considerations had brought the respective sides from both conflicts to negotiations. The following sessions focused on the two negotiation processes and negotiation methodology and typology. The final day concentrated on the implementation of the agreements from the various points of view, and the importance of issues such as (continued) violence, and political prisoners. The concluding roundtable discussed the lessons of the two cases for conflict resolution elsewhere in the world.

The South African and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts have often been compared and the conference provided a welcome opportunity to examine this comparison in a more academic context. On the theoretical level, Louis Kriesberg of New York University, defined 'intractable conflicts' as those lasting for more than a generation, where the protagonists regarded their goals as irreconcilable, liable to recourse to violence and where significant numbers of both groups have a vested interest in a continuation of the conflict. Conflict between groups based on ethnicity, language, religion or territory are particularly liable to become intractable, especially where these factors coincide. Intractable conflicts, however, begin as tractable, and will revert to this stage as a result of changing conditions such as ideology, economic conditions or a sense of the failure of existing strategies.

Dr. Hermann Giliomee of the University of Cape Town explained the NP's decision to open negotiations with the ANC as due to the acceptance of the inevitability of some form of democratisation, with the NP choosing to negotiate sooner rather than later in order to direct the process as much as possible. It would seem that the Israeli government pursued a similar logic in opening the Oslo channel with the PLO, but has been consistently more successful in shaping the outcome of negotiations. Giliomee made further points about the South African situation which could be applied to Palestine, pointing out that the shift from an authoritarian system to democracy needs to be accompanied by broad based economic development; and the prevalence in Africa of populations "...rallying behind a single mass party which would soon proceed to stifle democracy."

David Welsh of the University of Cape Town pointed out some of the differences between the two conflicts and their envisaged solutions, with the South Africans embarking on an uncertain process of common institution and nation building, in contrast to the process of institutional separation under way in Palestine.

Responding to Ya'ir Evron's paper on the Process of Getting to the Negotiating Table, PASSIA's Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi described the pre-negotiation phase between Palestinians and Israelis as serving to mold public opinion in both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. The intifada, meanwhile, had served to strengthen the idea of a two state solution in Arab and Palestinian thinking. Both sides experienced divisions between military and politically oriented leaderships, while the Palestinian leadership on the outside was apprehensive of the emergence of a local leadership from the inside engaging in substantive negotiations with the Israelis. It was the local leadership, led by Faisal Husseini, which persuaded Tunis to accept the humiliating conditions for attending the Madrid conference, in order to attempt to build and change the situation. The Palestinian negotiating position was weakened by this division of responsibility and the lack of a central body directing the negotiations. The negotiators in Washington were not authorised to agree to anything, having to carry out instructions from Tunis.

The negotiations in Washington which produced the Israeli document on autonomy and the Palestinian proposal for an Interim Self-Government Authority (PISGA), provided the starting point for the secret negotiations in Oslo. The exclusion of the PLO and the fact that the local leadership was not legitimated by the organisation led to the emergence and eventual success of the third group, the academics and professionals, through the Oslo channel.

Speaking about the Israelis, Dr. Abdul Hadi pointed to the lack of a clear concept of a final settlement from the Israeli government or officials. The Palestinians, meanwhile, have a clear vision: a two state solution. As for the future, there are three options: Israel's integration into the Middle East; separation, as advocated by Rabin, which would fail due to demographic pressures, with the likelihood of increased armed struggle; or finally economic cooperation, namely a Palestinian- Jordanian federation.