I. Introduction to the Conference

The First MeSCo Meeting dealt with two major issues, one, the formation of the Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo), and two, the conference theme of the "Middle East Peace Process: the Mediterranean Dimension". This one and a half day conference was held at the Italian Office of the EC Commission. PASSIA is a founding member of MeSCo and with the Algerians, were the only group in attendance not asked to deliver or discuss a paper or chair a panel.

II. Sessions of the Conference Session one: Friday 25th February 1994 The Mediterranean Study Commission initiative:- goals/scope/rules of the Commission.

Introductory remarks by Roberto Aliboni, Istituto Affari Internazionali. Discussants were El-Sayed Yassin, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, and Alvaro Vasconcelos, Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internationais, Lisbon. [These three institutes form the troika of organizations rotating the responsibility for being the secretary of MeSCo for years 1994 - 1996.] The goal of this session was to discuss the founding, membership and goal of the MeSCo. Roberto Aliboni, who was the founder and holds the first secretariat of MeSCo, made a comprehensive summary of the issues facing MeSCo in this regard and turned to the conference participants for comments on the questions and recommendations he raised. He said that "the main trend in the Mediterranean today is fragmentation, because of the absence of unifying factors--be they internal or external - and because of the presence of trends working beyond the Mediterranean area proper (e.g. the new arc of crisis, unconventional proliferation, Islamism)." (p.3) He therefore expressed that the MeSCo should be "a club of Mediterraneans--open to contributions from other sides--which should organize an annual meeting on issues relevant to Mediterranean cooperation and security. The exercise should foster a Mediterranean consciousness and, most of all, understanding, rather than a Mediterranean identity." Aliboni added that two other important goals of the MeSCo should be mutual information exchange and institution-building. This discussion then led to a delineation of who constitutes the membership of the Mediterranean, and Aliboni explained that he had chosen the "simplistic geographic notion" and invited suitable institutions from "Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestinians, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal." Aliboni raised the question of inviting the states of former Yugoslavia. Finally, he submitted a list of questions to be dealt with at the 1st MeSCo meeting and responses suggested by the out-going Secretary (Aliboni). Among which were how should continuity be provided to MeSCo and should the newsletter, if any, be rotated along with the Secretariat. As regards all of these issues, recommendations of the participants and their comments were recorded to be discussed further and decided upon in the final session. El-Sayyid Yassin, the new MeSCo Secretary and from the institution responsible for hosting the 2nd MeSCo meeting, raised the issue of forming local and regional National Security Communities. He said that this concept which is well-known in the USA is also developed in other Mediterranean countries. He emphasized that there is a need to enlarge Arab strategic consciousness and for there to be an Arab reading of what is going on in the world. He mentioned that the third Arab Strategy Conference is being held in Amman about the perception of the Arab World in political consciousness. Alvaro Vasconcelos made comments on MeSCo and Aliboni's discussion. He proposed that there be a MeSCo presidential board in addition to the troika to offer guarantees for continuity and that the newsletter continue to be issued out of IRI (Rome).

Session two. The post-Cold War debate on security and security institutions in Europe and the Arab World: implications for the Middle East and the Mediterranean

Papers presented by Josef Janning, Forschungsgruppe Europa, University of Mainz and Jammaleddine Maazoun, Association des Etudes Inernationales, Tunis. Chairperson was Theodore Couloumbis, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens.

First Paper: Josef Janning, "European Security beyond the East-West Conflict. Implications for the Mediterranean."

Josef Janning said that "the static nature of European security has been replaced by a flux of risk perceptions, institutional changes, conceptual re-definitions and political manoeuvering." Now we are witnessing old-style diplomacy integrated with a new approach, but one which may work against integration. He said that weak institutions risk reinforcing public opinion in Western societies resulting in gradual disintegration and where a responsive system will become a system of fencing off. He maintained that development in the Mediterranean is inadequately dealt with by Europe. In terms of the balance of powers, Janning discussed changes in the positions of key states. The two zones in Europe are the European Union with an unidentified purpose, and Russia, with an identified purpose, but that they are unclear about how to realize it. He said that Germany can gain the most from an integrated policy whereas Russia has chosen to be a member with Europe and not in Europe. Ultimately, the balance of power creates problems for the margins, and the system will be organized around these two major players. There are problems over the distribution of resources and a lack of political leadership. Furthermore, it creates a basic level of mistrust and suspicion among the major players and returns to a position of rivalry about security and strategic issues. For example, the Russians questioned the German recognition of Croatia. As regards Central and Eastern Europe, there are clear ideas about how a security structure should be developed, but there is a lack of political leadership. In the Maastricht treaty the provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) are continued, and a "European Pillar", with the EU and NATO, make the basis for collective European defense with American participation. The inability to seriously decide on a course toward Central and Eastern Europe means that it absorbs more energy and resources than it should. He concluded saying that because of these issues, the Mediterranean ranks third and is outside the scope of European efforts and affairs.

Discussion In the discussion of Janning's paper, Hamdy Saleh (Egypt) raised the issue that the Arab world was absent from his presentation and that there is a very real conflict of perceptions, in particular about how the Arab world sees the US as a supporter of the status quo and not of democratization. He said that he feared that Europe would become part of that perception as well. Janning's comments discussed Russia's role in saving NATO from acting on threats to Bosnian Serbs and that the Russian role in the Mediterranean could be to put pressure for conflict resolution. In response to a comment that expanding the scope of security were codewords for inaction, Janning replied that while this is true, there is a need to recognize all dimensions and that security interests are economic interests and vice versa. He said at this time many things are happening, but it is an active inaction and that things will become worse if nothing changes or nothing is dealt with.

Second Paper: Jamaleddine Maazoun, "The post-cold War debate on security and security institutions in Europe and the Arab World: implications for the Middle East and the Mediterranean."

Jamaleddine Maazoun mentioned that the Mediterranean countries had not played the necessary role in political decision making and that rather the Northern countries are with NATO, W. Europe and the US. However, NATO and others now perceive the South as a possible source of threat. He listed the elements of the strategic debate, among which are, the relationship between Central and Eastern European countries, the strategy resulting from new situations with a possible role for NATO to manage crises, and pursuit of reducing armaments and European expenditures. He discussed a wider concept of security where the Eastern European countries are no longer a threat. What constitutes a threat, however, are ethnic differences, terrorism (both political and state), and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This concept of security has a wider role for dialogue, cooperation and defense. Crisis management is also at the center of the issue in terms of preventing conflicts. Threats are perceived from the Near East and North Africa in terms of lack of stability in the South Mediterranean and their arsenals. The Gulf War showed the precarious character of the community and the problem of profitability. Maazoun discussed the missions of the NATO armies that they should be to support crisis management, give new meaning to humanitarian missions and to provide defense. He maintained that nuclear deterrence as a strategy of means is a must and that conventional means, in terms of reduced forces (as in the Paris 1990 EC Agreement) where they are more modular, readily available, fast, mobile and with a system of reserves. He said that the future will probably bring a continuation of NATO strategy, increased security for NATO countries, and a lack of a global approach in the Mediterranean which will lead to problems. It is obvious that the S. Mediterranean countries problems are different than the NATO and European countries. In terms of S. Mediterranean weapons systems, the targets are within the S. Countries, and, with the exception of Israel, out of the 300 km range. NATO sees these weapons as a way of deterrence and therefore are important. This is not a plea to retain weapons, but rather underlines the obligations of the S. Countries to communicate among themselves because N. - S. relations in this context will be detrimental. The problems and concerns of expressed by the North do not take into account those of the South. There are excessive amounts of armaments in the Maghreb and Near East, and while the North reduces military expenditures, the South increases them. The European countries defense spending is around 3% of the GNP, while South countries reach as high as 7.5% in Egypt and 9.9% in Israel. He concluded by saying that the post-cold War debate on security will only be profitable if it takes into account the concerns of all partners in the area, and without security, cooperation is impossible.

Session three. The emerging European Union: past policies and future implications for the Middle East and the Mediterranean

Paper presented by Alvaro Vasconcelos, Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais, Lisbon, Portugal, and the discussant was Assia Ben Salah Alaoui, Centre d'Etudes Strategiques de Rabat. The session was chaired by Joseph Alpher, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. Before opening the session, Alpher discussed the massacre which had taken place in the morning in the mosque in Hebron and read Rabin's statement about the events.

First Paper: Alvaro Vasconcelos, "The emerging European Union: past policies and future implications for the Middle East and the Mediterranean." Alvaro Vasconcelos delivered a paper of the same title as the session (the paper is in English but in the conference he presented a summary in French). He asked the question of how the policies of the European Union will affect the Mediterranean, particularly in what concerns stability. He spoke of Europe before 1992 as experiencing a moment of optimism what with various intergovernmental conferences (IGC's) and a climate that lead to the drafting of the Treaty on European Unity (TEU) and outside Europe in terms of new Mediterranean policy - CSCM in the Western Mediterranean facilitated by the Arab Maghreb Union. In this time, there was the feeling that Islam could be integrated with Europe (the Balkans). It is obvious now that Europe is not able to face the problems of the South and the East, or the equilibrium of this area, or the recession. Europe of today is not a political power yet, but a civil power with political tools to carry out actions but without the power to decide about security, etc. It is faced with an internal crises - economic and social -, nationalism in Eastern Europe, and threats to the countries of the South from Islamic radicalism. Therefore, the Mediterranean initiatives of the EU were largely affected. One positive sign, however, is the Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. He said that Europe does not see the Mediterranean countries as a threat, although some think it may happen someday because of radical Islam or immigration. What is needed, he said, is a policy to prevent this threat. Vasconcelos then asked if we have the means to solve these problems given that there is no Marshall Plan for the Mediterranean and not funds or organization, on top of the fact that there is a gap between words and policies. He said that the means are not there. He then listed the action the EU should be expected to undertake to face the serious problems afflicting the different Mediterranean regions in diverse ways. First, he said that the EU accepts that the problems facing North African countries are of a "predominantly social and economic nature and that political problems such as domestic instability are generated principally on that basis. The same is not generally felt in relation to the Middle East, where existing problems were viewed until quite recently from an almost exclusively strategic angle." (p. 4) Therefore, European policy must be an economic policy which renews Mediterranean policy but with more means. In the past it has tended to privilege "good pupils" in implementing economic reforms, but this has not succeeded in Egypt and Algeria. Europe is not ready to open its markets to countries from across the sea. Second, "conditionality" and "coherence" in terms of political objectives should preside over economic cooperation, i.e. the linkage of foreign economic and trade policies and development aid, as set out in the TEU. When speaking of democratization, "it is painfully clear from the Algerian experience that democratic transition means a lot more than seeing elections through, however free and fair." However, "conditionality" is certainly not intended as, and should not be made to look like, interference. Third, stability through integration will be a way to integrate these countries into Europe and stabilize emerging democracies. While "regional cooperation should indeed be encourage, even if the present picture of fragmentation in the Mediterranean and the fragility of the existing process tends to make bilateral agreements more feasible", integration will be difficult with the Souther Med. countries. "In particular, high expectations are placed in the role of regional cooperation in the reconciliation between Israelis, Palestinians and their neighbors. Jacques Delors has suggested this regional cooperation could follow the model, that has worked so well for Europe, of the European Steel and Coal Community." Vasconcelos adds that "the joint action towards the Middle East decided by the European Council (Brusseles, Dec. 1993) contemplates the establishment of a regional cooperation framework to deal with economic development, arms control and security among priority support areas. In discussing the role of European Union external action in the Mediterranean and its constraints, Vasconcelos said that it remains a provider of "soft security" acting chiefly through economic instruments. He said that this policy leads to subpolicies that are cynical as a result of powerlessness - that Yugoslavia, Algeria, Egypt will not affect Europe and are self-contained. However, "the Libyan problem, partly as a result of which the Five+Five process has been frozen, should count as an example of why a discussion of security issues such as proliferation of armaments should not be absent from the EU/Mediterranean debate, why issues such as confidence-building and transparency will have to be addressed if any cooperation process in the Mediterranean is to succeed." What is needed, therefore, is discussions about "hard security" and about economic dimensions with political functions, in essence a politically driven Europe that sees itself as an outward-looking, multi-cultural, multi-religious area and not a civilian one. A politically driven Europe can integrate the countries of North Africa, balance opening up to central and eastern Europe with a reinforcement of initiatives towards the South. While a political Europe will tend to privilege the Mediterranean, a "civilian" Europe will increasingly concentrate on an expanding European economic area, and the European Union could soon become a vast free-trade area and little else. "Should it remain essentially a big market, and lack a truly political dimension, the south of the Mediterranean, together with the Balkans and part of eastern Europe will increasingly tend to be regarded as sources of conflict which should be contained within their geographical space ... lest they be allowed to contaminate the EU equilibrium."

Discussion: Assia Ben Saleh Alaoui said that the acting capacity of Europe is restricted due to a lack of global policies about the South, and although there is analysis, it is without the adequate tools. She added that if we neglect the Mediterranean, it is because it reflects the balance of powers in the region and that they do not share the same approach. There is no clear cut political will. Partners and groups do not have bargaining power and there is a need for financial support. She said that the South is like a woman who desires her husband (the North) and he is just interested in his job and career. The chair, Alpher, discussed the concentration in the conference on the Western Mediterranean (N-S issues). He mentioned that in the Jaffee Center in Tel-Aviv they have been looking at the European Union's strategic approach to the Arab-Israeli area and could not find one. Hamdy Saleh said that the forum for debate seems to be about problems in the South and what Europe should do about them. It is not enough to say that the Arab world is fragmented but it must be seen that this type of transformation is leading somewhere. Radical Islam is one element of a large internal debate, that is not something new - Egypt has been in a continual dialectic process between modernity and Islam for 150 years. Therefore, it should not been seen as a threat, but a changing process towards which Europe and America should remain neutral. He stressed the need for integration and that Europe should see the Arab world as an ally for the future. To that end, it should engage political forces and not just regimes. Rachid Driss stated that there are many reasons to be pessimistic, but that Europe should not be silent and should work to integrate to have a vision of a better world. A Marshall plan saved Europe and a similar plan for the South could lead to democratic regimes. He said that it is not democracy which strengthens cooperation but the opposite. In this context, the Maghreb is not refusing dialogue with the North, but rather it is the North's silence on the issue of Libya. The Middle East peace process started with an agreement which must be implemented to reach a just peace. The awful events in Hebron today illustrate the need for that. Another participant commented that the forum should not be the Arab world versus Europe, but within a general framework of the Mediterranean at large and not global solutions. What is needed are effective programs in the Mediterranean where there are creation of structures for development and cooperation, like, for example, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone. Laura Guazzone added some methodological remarks and added that the analysis is in terms of what should be done by one group or another. Some South groups are complaining of what the North has not done (as a rational actor) and the North groups are being self-critical of what they should have done. She added that the comment by Saleh that Europe should be neutral to the Islamic question was impossible, since one cannot forbid attitudes from forming and affecting decisions. She said that his comment was a judgement of value rather than an analysis.

Session four. North-South relations in the Mediterranean area within the framework of the "new world order": the right of intervention and the role of the UN Paper presented by Naser Tahboub, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, chairperson was Seyfi Tashan, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, and the discussant was Bassma Kodmani Darwish, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Paris. First Paper: Naser Tahboub, "North-South relations in the Mediterranean area within the framework of the "new world order": the right of intervention and the role of the UN. Naser Tahboub gave a five minute non-theoretical summary of his paper which was the same title as the session, and then encouraged people to discuss the paper and he would elaborate more in the questions on various points in the paper. Unfortunately, the participants had only received the paper on that morning, and had had no chance to read it.

Discussion Bassma Kodmani Darwish said that she had had little time to read the paper. In her comments she said that Europe is relatively ineffective in solving problems of conflict as seen in their role, or lack thereof, in the Arab-Israeli solution. They are more effective to contributing positively to growth. The EC participation in Palestinian institution building, training, etc., is more than is being provided by Gulf countries. She said that many countries are not masters of their own choices and that there are no European rivals in the Maghreb. However, most will do what they want despite US desires there. Seyfi Tashan said that currently three countries, Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia, are embargoed under Chapter 7 of the UN, while countries in the area have little to say on it. He said that their presence and input must be felt. Another participant added that the UN role in conflict resolution has failed. The alternative to a collective security structure other than the UN does not exist. Hamdy Saleh discussed the emergence of a strategy of how to contain the divisive impact of the Gulf War in how to restructure countries, deal with neighbors and structure the relationship with the West. However, in the Arab World, the UN is seen to have a credibility problem, that it is manipulated and adheres to a double standard. Discussion moved to the UN, and it was mentioned the clause in Chapter 7 which provides that the Security Council follow the desires of the General Assembly, but in the case of lifting the boycott on Bosnia, this has not happened. Another participant suggested that we are envisioning a new world order characterized by a general disorder. That embargoes on countries are seen as "legal", there is an ideological disorder, and the question remains as to whether the Israeli-Palestinian agreements are limited or if there is a true chance to see a new era with impact on the world. The weak presentation of the Jordanian severely curtailed any meaningful discussion that may have come out on the Mashriq in this whole conference, as this was the only paper presented, with the exception of the Israeli paper, from the geographical area east of Italy and Tunis. It should be noted, however, that this limitation was the result of the arrangment of the panel topics because even the topic of the Jordanian's panel did not relate directly to the Mashriq. However, had the Jordanian's presentation been stronger, it would have at least allowed for a Mashriq point of view to presented in the conference.

DAY TWO: Saturday, 26 February 1994.

Session five. Arms control and limitation in the Middle East peace process. Paper presented by Shai Feldman, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. Discussants were Maurizio Cremasco, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome and Hamdy Saleh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo. The session was chaired by Yves Ghebali, InterParliamentary Union and Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva due to the absence of Miloud El-Mehadbi, Mediterranean Studies Centre, Tripoli, Libya.

First Paper: Shai Feldman "The Middle East Arms Control Agenda: 1994-1995" Shai Feldman focused on arms control treaties and the need for such measures in the Middle East. He said that "the real critical issue in the Middle East is not the Israeli-Palestinian agreements but the breakthrough in state to state relations." He discussed multilateral arms control talks and the activities of the multi-lateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) in the Middle East. He also discussed the regional implications of global efforts such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a convention "capping" the production of weapons-grade material, and Conventional Arms Transfers Register. He said that there is the need to impose an urgent timetable on the region. However, there is little chance for arms control. Maurizio Cremasco discussed that the arms control goal is to stabilize the arms race and to improve perceptions of security and not to address the causes of war. Peace is dependant on politics and not on arms limitations. Feldman gave a strong and confidant presentation, with many examples. Throughout his presentation he focused on the Israeli role and position, as was expected. His paper seems to be a chronological review of events and treaties rather than an analytical work.

Session six. The Mediterranean Study Commission initiative: The future work. This panel was chaired by Salvino Busuttil, Foundation for International Studies, Malta, and remarks were given by Roberto Aliboni (IRI) and El-Sayed Yassin (Al-Ahram Center). El-Sayed Yassin opened the panel by reading a statement on the massacre in Hebron prepared by the Egyptians and PASSIA in the name of the Arab participants in the conference Roberto Aliboni brought up a number of issues to be discussed. First, the issue of membership in MeSCo. Alpher brought up the issue of the states of the former Yugoslavia and the need to include them in MeSCo. It was decided that institutions should be invited and not countries. Aliboni suggested that "institutes which become MeSCo members should act as "national" representatives. The problem was never solved, however, as to who should be sent to MeSCo meetings because he also recommends that "they should not necessarily send their staff members to MeSCo meetings; rather they should send participants from their respective countries with expertise in the research subjects and themes dealt with by the Commission." It is obvious that this is a problem for member institutions because if they send someone from outside the organization, s/he may not be familiar with the workings of the MeSCo but will be experienced in the research subjects, and if they send someone from inside the organization, the opposite may occur. In addition, a country like Palestine faces a problem. Will MeSCo accept as a PASSIA participant a Palestinian living outside Palestine, someone like Ahmed Khalidi or Yezid Sayigh? Later, the discussion returned to this topic and Feldman suggested that MeSCo should include more than one institution from each country. Guazzone said that MeSCo should invite scholars and institutes to participate in the meetings (not as members) and that MeSCo be broadly defined to deal with the Mediterranean and not just security issues. Some said that it should be limited to one institution per country because there is a problem of asymmetry in capabilities and those countries with more than one institute would tip the balance. Salim Nasr suggested that MeSCo be opened to all, as a network of building civil society, but that MeSCo should decide if that is what they want to do and what sort of network MeSCo wants to build. A second issue discussed was if MeSCo members should do joint research projects. Alpher (for the second time in the conference) said that there was needed for the members to know about the other members and that many of them could not have direct links with each other (Israel and the Arab states). He said that before we can begin to think of doing joint research, we must have an idea of what others are doing, therefore the Secretariat should facilitate exchange for those who cannot have direct links. This successfully derailed the discussion to talk about the role of the Secretariat and choosing the theme of the next conference. It was eventually decided that the Secretariat should serve as a link and should also chose the theme of the next conference. For the next year's meeting in Cairo, there was enthusiasm for Driss' suggestion that the subject be the role of the UN to commemorate the UN's 50th anniversary. Driss also suggested that there be collective research on the subject. Yassin mentioned whatever the research topic, it should focus on a broad definition of security and that papers should be distributed beforehand. Busuttil suggested that a new UNESCO body in Vienna (?) is working on building networks among Mediterranean organizations and that MeSCo use that network rather than duplicating efforts, but his comments were not acknowledged.

III. General Impressions It was a very Euro-centric conference concentrating on North-South relations, meaning Europe-Maghrib relations, from a European point of view. The Mashriq and Turkey were never discussed in the detail and depth that characterized the discussion of Europe. This was perhaps because the panels did not deal with these issues, rather than lack of interest or lack of attempts to discuss them. The concentration on Europe in the panels may reflect the large role Europe plays in the affairs of the Northern and Southern Mediterranean, but it is essential, therefore, to examine the role of others, who may play a similar role in the Eastern Mediterranean. Countries like Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, to name a few, have a weighty presence on the policies of Mediterranean countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, particularly after the Gulf War.

Although the title of the conference was "The Middle East Peace Process: the Mediterranean Dimension", the peace process was not a subject of any of the panels. With the exception of Shai Feldman's (Jaffee Center, Tel-Aviv) paper the subject was hardly mentioned. This was strange, although it seemed to reflect the absence of the Mashriq from the discussions. Even the Israelis seemed perplexed by it and out of their element.

Palestine as a subject, security or otherwise, was completely absent from the panels. The only mention of it was expressing hopefulness for an Israeli-Palestinian peace or when Feldman dismissed them as unimportant in the security game.

The subject of Turkey, a very important economic and security concern in the Mashriq, was completely absent from all of the panels.

Common issues facing the MeSCo countries were never actually made clear although they were discussed in the first session. This meeting seemed to be a test balloon to see people's reflections on the idea of a Mediterranean commission will work and how it should be shaped. It ran into some problems, however, most notably in the representation of the Mashriq, the overemphasis on the North's and Europe's affairs. If the issue is security, then countries like Germany and Iraq should also be included. Including just the countries bordering the Mediterranean, because of their geography, seems artificial and not relevant to the political forces shaping the area.

The absence of certain countries from the conference was noticeable. An invitation to a Syrian university professor was answered by the Syrian embassy in Rome, which deterred the IRI from pursuing the subject, as MeSCo if for non-governmental organizations. The Libyans face great difficulties in leaving Libya because of the UN imposed boycott. An institution from Lebanon apologized for not being able to attend.

There was some confusion in discussions for the future about whether MeSCo is to deal only with security or also with other issues, as it is not clear from the name, nor from the research topics they proposed for the following meeting. Most want to keep MeSCo as loose and general as possible.

A very well-organized conference, in terms of logistics, arrangements, panels, meals, hotels, etc. The IRI should be commended about how smoothly it was run.

IV. Recommendations There is a serious need to ensure a stronger Palestinian presence in MeSCo meetings. The next meeting, if it happens, will be held in Cairo under the auspices of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and therefore, it would seem to be easier to make more of an Arab and Palestinian showing in the conference. The following year it will be held in Portugal at the Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internationais and it will be very important to insist on a more equal representation on the panels in that meeting. I see two different ways to ensure a stronger Palestinian presence in MeSCo. One, work with the Secretariat to ensure that a Palestinian scholar of these subjects (security, if the focus stays the same), such as A. Khalidi, Y. Sayigh, or K. Shiqaqi, is invited as a guest speaker on one of the panels. Two, send a Palestinian participant from PASSIA who participated in the PASSIA Seminar on Strategy and Security. This would allow for a PASSIA representative in attendance to maintain PASSIA participation as a founding member of MeSCo and to ensure a qualified participant. At the same time, PASSIA should work to further train and prepare Palestinians in this field to enable them to participate effectively and knowledgeably in conferences of this type.