What we are here for, I think, is to explore and expose some elements of the issue - and as I see it we have two schools of thought on the process of negotiating. Some people say that we are already in the transitional period. Some people say that it is not yet here but will start immediately once there is agreement in principle, once we accept the timetable and the framework for the transfer of authority, and we start implementing it. I'm one of those who believe that we are already in the transition period, that it has existed since Madrid.

My reading of the situation is as follows: We have a delegation negotiating with a mandate from Tunis - from the legitimate historical leadership of the Palestinians. There is consensus that this delegation is negotiating on behalf of the Palestinian people to end the Israeli occupation, to bring the Palestinians to exercise national authority in the transitional phase on their own soil, national soil, leading to an independent Palestinian state.

In this context, we have been functioning smoothly in establishing higher councils in such fields as education, health, transport, and the economy. And these higher councils are functioning with the endorsement of the leadership. They are already signing contracts and receiving funds from the European Community and they are already implementing projects on the ground without any Israeli interference.

The only two things missing from these higher councils is firstly to establish a higher Palestinian council for public order and safety and then to recognise their independent authority. This does not yet exist for several reasons, but I don't think that Palestinian history lacks experience of plans or apparatus concerning security. This does exist. It has always been there. Our history does not begin with Camp David. It does not begin with the current peace process. There have been several plans and attempts to set up projects for this kind of thing. The basic difference between Palestinians and Israelis is not in the content of the security but on the approach to it. I don't see a Palestinian national body exercising its authority on a certain border without certain security, security not limited to the question of a police force but a complete security apparatus, beginning with intelligence, a national guard, a police force, municipal police - i.e. with everything, the whole apparatus. Are we going to ask for permission to establish this apparatus? Are we going to be seen as collaborators with our occupiers in order to establish our national security apparatus? I don't see that.

What I do see are some major obstacles in moving from this gap to the reality. If we accept that the Israelis are already negotiating with our leadership, with those who can deliver, they can put the question of security on the agenda, under the sun, in front of everybody. And it must be put there clearly. Can the Palestinians maintain law and order and safety for all during this transitional period, whether it is three years or five years? I think the Palestinians are willing to go through such testing if there is not interference from Israel, i.e. if the training and education of the Palestinians are not carried out in Israel. There have been attempts to accomplish this in Jordan and in Egypt, and perhaps there will be future attempts in France -- and there is already Force 17. In other words, there is already a Palestinian security system existing capable of governing and delivering. Why not bring it in to do the work in this transitional phase?

Everybody is for phasing. As far as I know, that phasing is based on the timetable and geographical areas. I think that these should be linked. Redeployment of the IDF is another must, as a step towards witdrawal. This should be carried out immediately, since we are already in the first or second year of the transitional phase. As to borders, if we agree in principle that the negotiations are leading to autonomy, say, from the Israeli perspective, self-rule from the American perspective and to self-government -- a national government exercising its authority in a process to establish an independent Palestinian state -- from the Palestinian perspective, there should be a recognised border accepted by both parties where this national body is going to exercise its authority. This authority has to be recognised here, on the ground, which means as I see it, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Of course some people say it is difficult to discuss the details of the problem of Jerusalem now ... but Jerusalem is the heart of the problem. It is our capital. It is part of the Occupied Territory. It is the problem, but we have to address it eventually and it has to be kept on the agenda no matter what. There has been a lot of attention paid in the Israeli media to a police force, and there have been several recent attempts by settlers and others to exploit the problem. The problem is not the police force as such. The problem is whether you are willing to withdraw, to accept us as independent next-door neighbours, whether, just as you will accept our running of our education, health, transport, commerce, and everything else, you are willing to see us maintaining internal and external security. For there is no doubt that external security, even when we try to begin dealing with it, means collective security for the whole region. This means including Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, and Palestinian Jerusalem in the collective security system.

In order to maintain the credibility of both the negotiators and the Palestinian people while ending the occupation, and establishing a recognised and accepted national Paleastinian authority, we must link the political and security processes. They cannot be separated. You cannot have an elected national legislative body without an executive branch to implement its decisions, without a security apparatus to link its executive decisions. You need both at the same time. I should not, perhaps, repeat myself in remarking that it is high time for our colleagues, the specialists, the experts and the professionals in the Israeli house to stop dictating what Palestinians should and should not do, what the priorities are and are not. But it is high time that the Israelis accept, acknowledge and recognise the Palestinian agenda. As far as I see it today, this agenda includes some sort of acknowledgement that we have been crushed, humiliated and governed by others for all these decades. It is time for us to breathe freedom and independence, to govern ourselves in our own way - and this must begin now.

One way to start is to close the gap between the Israeli leadership in Tel Aviv and the PLO leadership in Tunis. If you have already accepted PLO experts and specialists into the delegation, leading and governing the negotiations, why not accept talking directly to the PLO in Tunis? You recognise them as the specialists, the experts who will govern the future system of security for Palestinians. They are the people who can deliver. Local leadership in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is not in a position to deliver.

On the question of the settlers, I think there are three scenarios. One scenario says that the transitional phase will see them under Israeli control with Israeli security, and with absolutely no Palestinian security interference whatsoever. But you'll be fooling yourself if you think this will work. It is not your land to keep or govern... but we are not here today to talk about sovereignty or authority. In another scenario, the settlers will be dealt with as in the case of Palestinians and the Lebanese government. We have refugee camps in Lebanon, and there have been guns, weapons and everything in these refugee camps. The agreement between the PLO and the Lebanese government was not to use these guns or arms or whatever outside the borders of the refugee camps, and that neither the Lebanese government nor any Lebanese citizen would interfere with the security within these camps. This was between the Palestinians and the Lebanese government. If we now consider, hypothetically speaking, the settlers as residents or refugees in a future independent Palestinian state, the settlers could enjoy a similar arrangement in the transitional phase, which would give them time to consider whether or not they wish to continue living there.

The third scenario is one in which the settlements are accepted as Israeli military installations during the transitional phase and once occupation ends, they end with it.

There may even be additional scenarios, but in order to have any agreed-upon and acceptable scenario for this transitional phase, you must first accept that this is the land of the intifada. This is the land of future Palestine. Thus, whoever lives in this territory must abide by Palestinian law, as any Palestinian who would like to live in Israel must abide by Israeli law. As you treat my people, I treat your people. But we cannot apply Israeli law in Palestinian territory. Otherwise there would be no national authority and no Palestinian security apparatus. It would not exist. You don't want to see the Palestinians who have been resisting occupation still struggling to end it. After twenty-five years of steadfastness waiting for a solution to come from the outside, and trying for the past five years to change the status quo and build a new society under the banner of the intifada, you cannot expect the Palestinians to become new collaborators, to maintain the status quo because of your security, to feed your confidence because you need to be 100% sure that you will be safe during the transitional phase. You cannot expect them to be as your employees. This cannot and should not be.

On the question of opposition, I don't think the only opposition comes from the settlers. We have opposition too. It is not Hamas or the Islamic Jihad. There are Palestinian nationalists who also oppose the current negotiations. What we are talking about in these negotiations is 25% of all the land of Palestine. We are talking about another amendment in the borders. We are talking about more settlers. At the time of Camp David there were about 11,000 settlers. Now we have 110,000. We didn't accept them then. Why should we accept them now? So opposition does exist. But opposition cannot stop the process if there is a strong committed leadership who can control and deliver.

Look what is now going on in Gaza. There is a dispute between factions.Who governs Gaza? It is the PLO. There is no doubt of that. There must be confidence and assurance in a leadership that can deliver and govern, especially during the transitional phase when we are trying to build this national consensus. We are asking everybody inside and outside to commit themselves to peaceful settlement. Of course, you have the need for safety and security. There is the same need for the Palestinians. We need guarantees that once you withdraw you will not re-occupy us if there are clashes between the settlers and our security apparatus - whether it is intelligence, the police force or the National Guard. Guarantees during the transitional phase should be the presence of the UN force, especially along the borders, and a new redeployment of forces where there are clashes. And, again, I am one of those who is willing to continue raising this problem for one simple reason: we need more meetings and more talk about this question because we need to build confidence in people's hearts and minds that we are for co-existence. We are entering a new era. What we are talking about today, we didn't talk about at Camp David. We couldn't talk about it in the thirties, in the forties, in the fifties, or in the seventies. We are both different peoples. We are in an entirely different era. We are more accepting of each other. And if we want to build a settlement together, we have to begin co-operating. And we cannot co-operate without equal respect, acceptance and shared work - but not as collaborators. We are not yet partners and we are still resisting Israeli occupation. Military occupation must end now.