Summarised below is the presentation given by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi.

Subject: The Transitional Phase

A. Introduction

Discussion among most political trends and schools of thought in the Occupied Territories concerning the current negotiations, starting with Madrid and including the bilateral and multilateral talks in Washington, Moscow and elsewhere, anticipates that they may be the beginning of a transitional phase. This phase may witness, in accordance with its timetable, an Israeli withdrawal on more than one front, and a retreat from more than one position. It might see develop instead a local Palestinian administration or authority.

It goes without saying that in this phase a new relationship will develop between Palestinians inside and outside, and that there will be new arrangements between Israel and the Occupied Territories in the fields of economy, industry, trade, borders, security and so on. This phase will give people an opportunity for social, economic and psychological respite, distancing themselves from Israeli military presence. At the same time, the people will go through internal political "labour pains" which will affect the negotiation process on all fronts. Similarly, this phase will also witness the emergence of a new relationship between Palestinians inside and the State of Jordan.

B. Substance of The Transitional Phase

Two documents were put forward in the negotiation process regarding the form and substance of the transitional period. The first carried the title of autonomy. It represented the official Israeli position. The second, put forward by the Palestinian negotiating team, bore the title Palestinian Interim Self Government Authority.

During the past year, the bilateral talks in Washington have sought a common denominator between the two documents. Both parties seek to explain their position, to convince the other side of their demands, and also to convey their message to Washington. One of the main points of disagreement between the parties was the question of elections: whether these were for a legislative council, the Palestinian demand, for an administrative council, the Israeli demand, or for an executive body, the third party's suggestion. The future of the negotiations is still open, and in the international arena, in political circles and the media, are intensive calls for the continuation of negotiations, in order to achieve agreement between the parties and to start implementation of the process and arrangements to move from a situation of occupation to a transitional phase.

C. Events on the Ground

Israel There are two schools of thought in the Israeli political establishment. The first calls for the continuation of the strategy and tactics of the previous Likud government. Thus there will be more Israeli obstacles which will hinder the current negotiations and maintain the status quo of occupation and the policies of annexation and transfer. In time, there will no longer be a Palestine question. Instruments used by this school include settlement policy, human rights violations and manipulation of the word "democracy". Some from this school posit a distinction between political and security settlements, and find "security" excuses for the demolition using missiles of houses in Gaza. They encourage the implementation of an "iron fist" policy and mass expulsion of Palestinians, by which they will pacify the Israeli right-wing and co-opt the opposition aiming at the continuation of the Labour party in government. On the question of democracy, this group is still undecided about whether to have administrative or Municipal elections now, along the lines of elections to Chambers of Commerce and professional bodies. At the same time, they want to use the question of elections in the media to bring confusion and embarrasment to the Palestinian negotiating team, deepening the divisions among Palestinians.

The second school of thought in the Israeli government calls for activating and institutionalising the relationship with the Palestinian negotiating team in its capacity as the official political address for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. They want thereby to put pressure on the Palestinian leadership in Tunis, to confuse and preoccupy them with a wave of meetings and dialogue, Israeli officials and semi-officials and Jewish-American leaders. They claim that this is a step on the road to official recognition of the PLO. In reality, it seeks to drown the PLO in a sea of marginal positions and ideas without any real change.

This grouping is not opposed to European relations with and funding of the Palestinian political address through the various channels: the negotiating team, the Technical and Consultative Committees, the specialised Higher Councils, universities, unions, other existing institutions and those in the process of being established. This position wants the new administration in Washington to continue its moral and financial support to Israel, to endorse Israeli plans for autonomy, and to implement it as a reality with marginal changes in faces and names in the process. Thus the negotiating team and the PLO will find themselves implementing this autonomy and the present negotiations will become a matter of recognition and acknowledgement of this fait accompli.

In short, Yitzhak Rabin's political school is committed to the major positions which Likud agreed upon at the beginning of the negotiations, including implementing mere autonomy.

Palestinians Inside

There are four political schools of thought among Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

The first calls for using the current peace negotiations as a political means to establish Palestinian national authority. They stress the link between the Palestinian negotiating team and the leadership in Tunis. They see their constituency through the specialised Higher Councils for education, housing, industry, and, in future, health, agriculture and other areas. These will be backed by the technical and consultative committees, and by training Palestinian cadres to run the administration and to become the basis of the national authority.

Today, political and financial support for this approach comes from the leadership in Tunis, with occaisional reluctance, and it has the blessing of Washington, financial support from Europe, and no direct Israeli official interference. This trend believes that within two or three years they will be able to use this infrastructure as the basis of the national transitional government, a fact imposing its presence, if not its legitimacy, upon the other parties in the Palestinian arena.

Confronted with this reality, Israel will have the option either to normalise its relations with it, like the Europeans, Americans and (perhaps) Arab states, or to challenge it, attempting to change its form or substance or personnel, or to place obstacles in its path to progress.

The second trend calls for withdrawal from the current negotiations. Its alternative is to stress international legitimacy, domestically and internationally. However, it lacks a plan that its leaders can agree upon or can put to the wider national movement for agreement. This trend, despite its genuine nationalist commitment, has neither a realistic programme nor the means available to other trends to develop the intifada or to face international political challenges. They observe with concern and anxiety developments among the major political trends, fearing that they will find themselves left outside the processes and structures for establishment of the transitional authority.

The third trend demands retaining the option of military confrontation with Israel, and calls for use of this to maintain the struggle against Israel. This will lead the Israeli leadership either to escalate the confrontation, in which Palestinians and Israelis suffer further bloodshed and loss, or to deepen the divisions in both Palestinian and Israeli camps, which might in turn bring about different positions and decisions and will surely abort the current talks.

From among these three Palestinian trends, a fourth is emerging, although it is still in the early stages of national discussion. It is an attempt at a new formula to unite the left and to recruit elements from other trends. It takes into consideration recent regional and international changes and the general weakness among various factions, and proposes for discussion the question of peace as a Palestinian strategy and the political negotiations as the way to reach the national goal of the independent State.

This fourth position calls for direct participation in the following: the negotiating delegation, the specialised Higher Councils, Technical and Consultative Committees, training of cadres, and dialogue with all parties including the Israelis. They want to use their public and official presence inside as a partner in shaping the national authority, satisfied with the option of public political work. This new trend sees these efforts as a national responsibility. It demands a democratisation process, in order not to allow one faction to dominate the transitional authority, and at the same time, to maintain the political harmony between all trends and to lessen the division and strife between them.

Aside from these four schools of thought there are three major social forces which are scattered, lacking mobilisation, and not putting their weight behind any of the above schools.

a. Palestinian women are disorganised, lacking administrative and professional cadres, in a state of struggle between older and younger generations, and receiving no assistance or substantial support from men political activists. The question of gender in the intifada is still on the table for discussion.

b. udents are involved in struggle within educational institutions, divided between political factions, with no united voice. They are still a target for Israeli represssion and brutality, but are absent as a force in the political "street".

c. Labour, represented in various unions and institutions, still lacks professional organisation. It is confronted with the temptation to be absorbed into the Israeli market in the absence of national development plans to create employment.

There is no objective information on the balance of political opinion among these groups. Nor is there any electoral process which would reveal the political preferences of the population as a whole.

D. Internal obstacles

1. The 415 Expelled Palestinians It was said in early January 1993 that one of Rabin's aims is to weaken the PLO in Tunis, to cripple the Palestinian delegation, and to uproot fundamentalists from the Occupied Palestinian Territories and make them the new threat to the peace negotiations and to the moderates. It could be said that Israel succeeded in two of its aims but failed in the third. Because there is a consensus that all trends and factions are part of one family, the expulsions reinforced the reality of the unity of the people, but the events gave the upper hand to the position of the expellees at the expense of that of the delegation. There have been several attempts to marginalise the issue of the expellees, with no success. It is still a major obstacle to continuing the talks in Washington. Regardless of the outcome, the events have raised the Islamic leadership to the position of a partner with the PLO in Palestinian society.

2. PLO Decisionmaking Since Madrid, with the development of relations between inside and outside, there has been a demand to institutionalise and to put in order Palestinian decision-making in the Occupied Territories and outside. Several factions have opted to create an independent leadership and demand that Tunis accept their position. It has been a nightmare for Tunis to see this happen. At the same time, that there is no united decision-making body in Tunis itself is still a matter for criticism and dismay for those inside and outside.

3. The Question of Jerusalem It has been a humiliating and painful condition of the peace talks to put the question of Jerusalem aside during the first stage. There has been no Palestinian agenda on that question. However, the current circumstances are as follows: a. Israel "allowing" Palestinian groups to handle education, health, insurance, services, and, perhaps, municipal affairs in the East of the city; b. No Palestinian mobilisation to create groups or national bodies to carry out the responsibilities, to face the Israeli challenges or to negotiate on proposals; c. Israeli policy towards the Jerusalem area, leading to the cutting off of Jerusalem and to the inability of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to function as a unit, with Jerusalem as its capital. d. Issues of internationalisation, an open city or partition are far from the current reality of a quickening trend towards a unified Jewish city.

4. Finance Until recently, the Occupied Territories depended on outside financial support, from Palestinians in the Gulf and other Arab states, which was cut after the Gulf crisis. This severely affected the PLO, and, obviously, Palestinians inside. New sources of finance are Europe and the US. In both cases, funds require institutions to implement the proposals. This strengthens some political trends at the expense of others, encourages individuals and groups to set up new institutions leading to wasting of resources, and permits the interference of donors in the current political situation and the future, during and after the transitional phase.

E. External Obstacles

1. The Syrian Position Since the early days of Madrid, the Palestinian fear is to see normalisation between Israel and Arab states before progress on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiating agenda. There has been a building of public opinion in the Israeli and Syrian media towards reaching an agreement, and "reliable rumours" in Europe about such a probable agreement. During recent events, Damascus's position has been ambiguous: should they back fully the Palestinian demands vis-a-vis Israel, or continue on the two tracks regardless of progress or retreat on the Palestinian track. Damascus's position considers seriously the new global balance of power and the new administration in Washington, the weak and divided Arab world, and its historically unstable relations with the PLO.

2. The Jordanian Position It has been said clearly in Amman that the future relationship of confederation between Jordan and Palestinians is either too late or too early, meaning that they are not keen to go ahead with plans in that direction.

Following the influx of Palestinians from the Gulf to Jordan, the strengthening of fundamentalist trends, the weakening of the PLO after the Gulf crisis, and the emergence of a recognised moderate leadership in the Occupied Territories, Amman has become more clear in this position. Recently, Jordan supported and published widely a research study supporting it: it found that over 56% of those interviewed did not favour a confederation with the Palestinians. An element of crisis can be seen in the continuing delay in putting forward for discussion issues both of future Jordanian-Palestinian relationship and of practical steps for the transitional phase.

3. The New Administration in Washington It has been said formally that the US Democrats favour the Israeli Labour party. They have already had talks, approaching an understanding on the Middle East conflict, thus: a. Washington and Tel Aviv reach a deal on the expellees; b. no change in Washington's financial support to Israel; c. Washington encourages an agreement with Syria regardless of the consequences for Palestinians; d. no change in Washington's position on the PLO, but it encourages the emergence of moderates as the political address for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories; e. US guarantees, through its veto power, that Israel will not face harsh censure from the UN Security Council.

F. A Proposed Palestinian Agenda

1. Israeli military withdrawal is essential before the transitional phase; 2. A process of democratization within Palestinian society including elections to a legislative body and legitimisation of its national authority; 3. Institutionalisation of the relationship between inside and outside in terms of PLO institutions; one body with members inside and outside; 4. Legislative and administrative functions for the Occupied Territories must be based in Jerusalem; 5. Efforts to link interim and final phases of negotiations, on both bilateral and multilateral tracks, in terms of the relationship between the Palestinians and Jordan.

G. Specific Steps Required of Third Parties

1. Enforce a freeze on Israeli settlement housing and highway construction and land confiscation in all of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, particularly the greater Jerusalem area; 2. In the light of worsening human rights violations, implement international protection for Palestinians under occupation, including stronger UN, US and European intervention; 3. Upgrade the political status of the Palestinians through: a. resumption of dialogue between Washington and the PLO in Tunis; b. dealing with the Palestinian negotiating team based in Jerusalem on an equal basis to other negotiating parties; 4. Increase support for Palestinian socio-economic development to a level in proportion to that given to Israel, and with particular attention to the problems of the Gaza Strip; 5. Include the question of Jerusalem and Jerusalem Palestinians in the coming rounds of bilateral and multilateral talks; 6. Include the Palestinian negotiating team in multilateral talks on Disarmament and Security; 7. Ensure support and protection for the Palestinian electoral process for a national legislative council, as a step towards legitimation of the national authority in the transitional phase.