CONFERENCES & WORKSHOPS (2006)

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“After The Palestinian and Israeli Elections -

Domestic Developments and Future Relations”

 

Jerusalem, May 4, 2006

AMBASSADOR HOTEL

A EuroMeSCo “Crisis Management” Seminar

 

Organised by Roberto Aliboni, International Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome

in collaboration with the
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), Jerusalem

 

 

 

Agenda

 

10,00 am – Discussion on “What crisis has to be managed and to what purpose? ”

 

11,30 am – Coffee break

 

11,30 am – Discussion on “What are the challenges facing Israel’s  disengagement strategy?

 

12,45 pm – Discussion on “Which evolution is Hamas’s victory bound to stir up in Palestinian

 politics?”

 2,00 pm – Lunch

 

 3,00 pm – Discussion on “Which role for the European Union and its members?”

 

 4,15 pm – End of the seminar

 

 

Each session will be briefly introduced by Aliboni and/or Tocci. General discussion will unfold based on the guidelines.

 

 

List of Participants

  • Dr. Mahdi Abdel Hadi, Chairman, PASSIA, Jerusalem (EuroMeSCo)
  • Dr. Mustafa Abu Sway, Lecturer, Al-Quds University
  • Dr. Roberto Aliboni, Vicepresident, IAI, Rome (EuroMeSCo)
  • Dr. Yossi Alpher, Strategic Analyst and co-Editor of Bitterlemons, Tel Aviv 
  • Ms. Anat Kurz, Jaffee Center of Strategic Studies-JCSS, Tel Aviv University
  • Mrs. Amit Leshem, Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem
  • Dr. David Newman, Ben Gurion University
  • Prof. Joel Peters, Ben Gurion University
  • Dr. Jamil Rabah, Political Analyst,  Near East Consulting
  • Dr. Nathalie Tocci, Senior Researcher, IAI, Rome
  • Dimitri Diliani, Director, Palestine Consultancy Group
  • Knut Dethlefsen, Resident Representative of Fredrich-Ebert Foundation, Jerusalem
  • Awad Mansour, Palestinian Diaspora & Refugee Center (SHAML)
  • Jamal Zahalka, Memebr of Knesset, BALAD Party
  • Deniz Altayli, PASSIA, Jerusalem
  • Francesca Gilli, PASSIA, Jerusalem

 


Introductory Remarks for the Discussion

What crisis has to be managed and to what purpose?

With the 2001 talks in Taba, the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians has been abandoned. The Quartet-run process has been nothing more than a framework in which both Israelis and Palestinians have managed their respective relations with the international community, either to contain its pressure or to acquire some leverage on the other party.

Nonetheless, public opinion in Europe perceives Hamas’s electoral victory and its rise to Palestine’s government as a grave crisis in the peace process initiated by the Oslo accords and put again on track by the Quartet after the 2000 Camp David failure, a crisis that should be urgently managed.

As a consequence, European governments and the European Union (EU) feel the need to contribute to the management of the crisis stemming from Hamas’s electoral victory with the purpose of restoring the basic conditions for the peace process to be resumed.

  • Is there a crisis in the peace process? Is there a peace process to be put in crisis? What kind of crisis has Hamas’s electoral victory unleashed?
  • Has Israel’s disengagement strategy and more generally Israeli unilateralism triggered a crisis, and how (if at all) will this be affected by Hamas’s ascent to power?
  • Or is the crisis primarily a domestic Palestinian crisis, as the Hamas’s victory - formally impeccable from a democratic angle – represents more than rotation in power and may lead to a systemic change in Palestinian politics? More specifically:
    • Is there a crisis that could be triggered by the formation of parallel PA structures (controlled by Fatah and financed by the international community)?
    • What are the prospects for rising polarization and in-fighting within Palestine?
    • What are the prospects for an economic, and consequently political, collapse of the PA and what kind of crisis could this lead to?

 

  • Does it make sense to manage these eventual Israeli and Palestinian crises with the aim of making the restoration of a peace process conditions possible, in a more or less distant time?
  • Or existing crises have to be managed but only to the purpose of containing their destabilizing implications in the region and the international arena and limiting damages?

In the new conditions, what are the challenges facing Israel’s disengagement strategy?

The disengagement policy, worked out by prime minister Sharon and now fully owned by Mr. Olmert’s government, is based on a completely unilateral decision-making process. In a first stage, unilateralism was justified by terrorism and the lack of confidence with regard to president Arafat’s ability or willingness to suppress terrorism. President Abbas’ coming to power didn’t change Israeli perceptions substantially: Abbas is reputed personally more reliable, yet equally unable to assure the necessary level of security.

  • While Israeli unilateralism persists independently of Palestinian politics, is any change needed in this policy after Hamas’s victory? Or does it simply strengthen Israel’s commitment to unilateralism?
  • If the consequence of current Israeli and international policies is the collapse of PA structures, can Israeli persist in its approach towards disengagement?

A distinguished Israeli analyst has pointed out that Israel is since long facing a dilemma: on the one hand, the impossibility of interacting constructively with a Palestinian interlocutor is diminishing rather than increasing; on the other hand, the necessary hardness of the Israeli response to such evolution is limited by international pressure. As it cannot escape this dilemma, Israel will keep on managing the social crisis caused by its policies, yet this will not limit its coercion vis-à-vis the Hamas government.

  • Which are the consequences of this approach in the new context?
  • Will negative reactions from the international community increase or will the international community ultimately support or acquiesce in Israel’s unilateralism?
  • If the international community were to resist Israeli unilateralism, would this generate divisions within the Israeli body politic?
  • Under the reinforced disengagement policy (i.e., convergence) which may arise in the years ahead, while Israel’s legal occupation of the Palestinian territories would persist, in practice its social and humanitarian responsibilities towards Palestinians people would diminish. This would increase international costs. Is this development likely? How would the international community react? How can it react in view of its current stance towards the Hamas government?
  • Could Israeli coercion trigger a unifying trend in presently strongly divided Palestinian players? Would such development imply a cost for the Israeli policy?

Which evolution is Hamas’s victory bound to stir up in Palestinian politics?

Hamas’s victory has shed light on two basic trends in Palestinian politics: (a) its weak constitutional framework and uncertain legitimacy; (b) a systemic fault line between religious and secular tendencies, the latter being coupled by deep strategic divisions in its own body. The religious groups and the secular ones presently opposed to Fatah’s mainstream grouping are divided by their respective social, political and ideological perspectives (islamization vs. secular nationalism) but united in rejecting the Oslo legacy. The rejection of this legacy is also a factor putting in question the Palestinian constitutional framework.

  • Which are the main trends in the Palestinian political spectrum after Hamas’s victory? How can their perspectives be assessed?
  • Are there significant differences within Hamas? Is it possible that such differences come to emerge and affect Hamas’s strategic line? If so what are the adequate international strategies to affect political change within Hamas?
  • Is it likely that Hamas will change or smooth over its basic perspective towards Israel and the conflict? If so, what and how is Hamas likely to change?
  • How is Hamas linked to the Islamist movement and to its democratization perspectives? Its victory is an element of moderation or radicalization in this movement?
  • On which factors are the differences between Fatah and the other PLO factions based?
  • What are the prospects for Hamas’ entry in the PLO? And what are its likely consequences?
  • What are the prospects for national unity within the Palestinian movement in terms of strategic means and objectives? Has the rise to power of Hamas increased or reduced the prospects for such unity?

Which role for the European Union and its members?

At present, the EU and its members, unlike the United States, have failed to establish a firm policy towards the new developments in the Israeli-Palestinian frameworks. Prior to the elections, the EU High Representative Solana threatened to withhold EU monies in the event of a Hamas victory. Following the elections, the Union opted for caution, disbursing some EU funds and waiting to judge the conduct of the Hamas government. On 10 April the EU reversed this stance, deciding to withhold budgetary aid to the Palestinian government. The EU’s contradictory actions are based on several contrasting considerations. On the one hand, the EU and its member states remain convinced that a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a pivotal factor for the future of Western relations with the Arab-Muslim world and its security. To achieve this goal, in principle it believes that inducing Hamas to change through a balanced policy of sticks and carrots is preferable to a blunt policy of coercion intended to make the Hamas government collapse. On the other hand, the EU is determined to maintain good relations with Israel (particularly in view of their deterioration between 2000 and 2004) and it is reluctant to engage in policies which contradict American ones. The result so far has been one of pragmatism and absence of strategic direction.

While there is no doubt about the continuation of humanitarian aid (directly or indirectly), the continuation of “political” support is not that certain. While any policy to resume the peace process is out of sight in the short run, the EU and its members will try to set in motion a policy to manage the crisis. By this policy, while contributing to Hamas’s coercion, the EU will leave doors open to dialogue and change. Against this backdrop, there questions the EU is trying to respond to. In the following there are some of them:

  • Is there any real difference between humanitarian and budgetary aid, given that the latter is largely used to pay salaries and finance the PA services such as education and healthcare?
  • Is there the danger that by suspending assistance to the PA, EU governments will lose leverage and control over the use of the PA’s budget?
  • If the EU persists with a policy of negative conditionality, is it prepared to face the consequences of the PA government’s non-compliance?
  • What are the likely consequences of withdrawing EU assistance?
    • A strengthening or weakening of Hamas’ political support?
    • The collapse of the PA government?
    • The collapse of the PA?
  • To what extent can international organizations and non-Western donors surrogate Western aid so far provided to Palestine?
  • What is or should be the EU’s strategic thinking vis-à-vis these possible developments? How would the EU respond to them?
  • Given there is nothing preventing the EU from establishing contact with an organization named in its terrorist list (in so far as contact does not amount to political or economic support) can or should the EU establish diplomatic relations with Hamas, despite not sharing its view and abstaining from supporting it? How would this approach be viewed by other Palestinian actors, Israel and the US?

Mark A. Heller, “Hamas’s Victory and Israel’s Dilemma”, Strategic Assessment, Vol. 9, No. 1, April 2006.