His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal

 

Remarks to

 

The Euro Mediterranean Study Commission Working Group – Governance

on

Civil Society Initiatives in the Euro-Mediterranean Area

Amman, Jordan

 

15 December 2002

 

 

Excellencies;

Dear Friends:

 

First of all, thank you [Dr. Abdul Hadi] Mahdi, dear friend.  Let me thank you very much indeed for keeping the candle of Euro-Med cooperation lit. The governance I seek is of greater emphasis on the Greek presidency of Europe than ever before. I feel that the move to the Eastern Mediterranean is called for.  I am in the process of writing a letter to George Papandreou, which he will receive after the Copenhagen Summit.[1]  I do feel that the whole issue of the potential Greek-Turkish reconciliation – the possibility of Turkey’s involvement in a new Europe – is full of potential opportunities for us.  Let us imagine that the Cyprus issue is at rest in a sanitary manner.  One asks oneself: if one looks at the post-colonial era – that is to say, the post-British colonial era of Kashmir, Palestine and Cyprus – why does the Palestine issue remain extant in the manner that it does?  Of course, I do not need to tell PASSIA what is happening in the Occupied Territories today; but I would like to emphasise the theme of governance, because this is exactly what your group is attending to.  I believe in building from the bottom up. I feel that the patriarchal system, whether authoritarian, monarchical or totalitarian republic, has not reached the people. 

 

I need to remind you of course, and myself,  that the other four groups include:

 

(1)   Political and security dialogue in the EMP (Euro- Mediterranean Partnership): devising mechanisms to bring to life the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability.

 

As we know in the context of occupied Palestine and the context of Iraq, there is very little opportunity for political and security dialogue, simply because each situation is dealt with – forgive me, with all due respect to Madrid through Mitchell and beyond – I will not say in an ad-hoc manner, but in a manner that was invited on us by circumstances. The issues addressed are generally issues of current security and police-related security, rather than issues of basic security. I personally have called for many years for a code of conduct for the region – for a weapons inspections regime that includes Israel on the one side and India on the other – because I do not think we can speak of the West Asian/Middle Eastern region being a potential contributor to peace without our collectively living up to international norms. In particular, I would like to emphasise human rights and humanitarian law; that is to say, in the context of the culture of compliance – the paper, which is available to any of you if you should wish to read it, was presented by the Bureau of Humanitarian Issues (an off-shoot of the Humanitarian Commission) and by OCHR (the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs) to the General Assembly of the United Nations.  It calls for compliance with international law by both state actors and non-state actors.  So this issue of addressing how the Israeli government or Arab governments deal with their citizens, how groups organise or coalesce – particularly since the announcement of the ‘war on terror’ – is an issue that has to be analysed and understood. In that sense, as I was saying earlier, I am rather attracted to the study produced by Boaz Ganor [of the Hertzliya Institute] entitled No Prohibition without Definition – meaning terror.  What is understood by national resistance movements? What is understood by freedom movements?  And what is understood in terms of cultural relativism?  I personally abhor, as you all do, the suggestion that a particular ethnic identity or religious persuasion is prone to terror, as if this were a congenital given.

 

In terms of the second working group, I would like to remind you of the:

(2)   Interlinkages within EMP or the synergy between the three baskets of Barcelona; and

(3)   Implications of CFSP (Charter for Stability and Peace) and EDSP (European Defense and Security Policy) for EMP or the implications of Europe’s foreign, security and defence policies on the partnership process and the region as a whole.

 

You may feel that at this particular moment there is a resonance in Europe because of the fear of impending war, particularly with emphasis on Iraq.  I think there is a feeling of hopelessness that the inevitability of war will force new realities on us. In that context, as I said on the BBC this morning, the issue of Israel working actively to become a dominating minority in a region of minorities invites the implicit and explicit threat of the transfer of population. And as I have said many times, the solution to the Palestinian demographic issue is not to take Palestinians en-masse and move them from one country to the next.  The time has come to talk about regional stability based on partnership.  The partnership to which I refer is not a partnership between talking heads and governments; it is a partnership between citizens committed to a new charter for the region. 

 

I would like to suggest that the:

(4)   Sub-regional cooperation within the EMP is fraught with

potentials and at the same time with hindrances.

 

Your group, of course, looks at governance in terms of the commitment of the Barcelona Declaration to the protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy. Now I was a little bit surprised, and I raised the proverbial eyebrow at the statement by Secretary Powell yesterday, that a certain quantified sum had been put aside for the promotion of democracy in this part of the world.  In terms of the billions of dollars that are being invested in the preparation for war, one would have thought that the window of opportunity could be created for a more serious discussion on human security of the region.  In that context, I would like to suggest that the time is overdue for the creation of a regional benevolent fund. I think it is very clear that Muslim countries today stand accused of funding extremism.  That is to say, funding the parallel economy which in many countries is actually more effective than the state economy; of supporting extremist ideas and ideals (and in that sense there is a selective reading of Islam and Islamists – I personally refer to Islam as a religion and a faith system; I do not refer to the politicised Islamists as representing mainstream Islam).  But I do think that the third criticism – the absence of الغيْريّة  (altruism) in the Muslim world – is valid; there is a cultural emphasis on الاستحواذيّة (acquisitiveness) … .  The feeling that somehow countries are strong because they are populous, or they are wealthy or they are strident in their expression, seems to underline the weakness in the Arab and Muslim region in general in developing any form of an understanding  الاستقلال المتكافل(intra-independence).  I say this in the context of the Arab and Muslim world simply to emphasise the fact that we commit a certain double hypocrisy.  On the one side, we oppose normalisation – I am not one of those who opposes المثاقفة(acculturation) – but we oppose  التّطبيع(normalisation) with Israel; that is to say, we oppose the freedom of the present set of circumstances in a certain time and place.  But on the other hand, I think it is extremely important to bear in mind that we are not reaching out to each other in the Arab and Muslim context.  The result, of course [in terms of the Christian communities in the Occupied Territories when we speak of civil society and pluralism], is that the Christian communities under the traditional churches are being challenged by the new Christian movements – particularly in the United States – who effectively are playing a highly politicised role.  I recall in Zanzibar, for example, in a place of worship (I do not want to mention of which denomination) you would find two poor boxes: one with a cross on it, which is full of money, and the other with a crescent on it, which of course is empty.  I come to the conclusion that we are living, in a sense, a tribal religion of monopolies of the truth that have absolutely nothing to do with the common ground that we seek to develop in terms of sharing human values.

 

In that context, I would just like us to remind ourselves that it is now seven years since the founding document of the Barcelona Process was agreed upon by the Seven Partners in November 1995. Our common journey post-Oslo and after the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was towards constructing a zone of shared peace, prosperity and stability in the Euro-Med region.  In a sense, the Euro process was an off-shoot of regional achievements between regional partners in a regional context. It was not a dictat from beyond the region. What did the process suggest?

 

I would like to express my adherence to the process going back to Helsinki and beyond the post-war process in Europe, through what I call the alphabet soup: PFP (Partnership for Peace),  PFM (Partnership for the Mediterranean), OSC (Organisation for Security and Cooperation), and so on. I get the impression that this alphabet soup is heavily emphatic on style, a little bit emphatic on form; but certainly not emphatic on substance. I think it is – if I may use the American expression, although values change as the seasons change – but I think that a continuous value to which we have to pay some attention is the anthropocentric value, “We the People,” as enshrined in the Charter of the Declaration of Human Rights and in the American Constitution. When one speaks of political and security cooperation, it is extremely important to recognise that in terms of political activism, the idea is to do something positive – I mean, there is a lot of political activism to do negative things … .  But it strikes me often that the work of your B’tselems, for example – in the context of the Occupied Territories and Israel – the work of your IPCRIs (Israel-Palestine Centre for Research and Information), the work of Arab centres of thought is beginning to look at human beings in a more objective and comprehensive manner than ever before. Maybe this is the light at the end of the tunnel; I don’t know!

 

In terms of economic and financial cooperation, I think we are living in a region where the ‘super-rich’ are more influential than they have ever been.  With reference to the ‘super-rich’ and their projects, the emphasis is on ‘high-heeled’ – not, as the economists used to say, low-investment ‘high-heeled’ – but emphasis on the ‘quick-buck’ at the expense of the region, with the mushrooming of the internet and telephone-related services and with the reality of a dwindling middle class and increasing poverty in the region. 

 

When we turn to social, cultural and human cooperation, I would like to refer to V.A. Pai Panandiker’s description of Problems of Governance in South Asia.[2]  Some of them are not surprising to us, but they have certainly been carrying great similitude.  They include:

1. Population Growth
2. Poverty and Deprivation
3. Slow Economic Development
4. High Illiteracy
5. High Infant Mortality
6. Poor Health Care and Sanitation
7. Inadequacy of Democratic Processes
8. Poor Quality of Institutions of Governance
9. Failure of Political Parties
10. Politicisation of Armed Forces
11. Rise of Ethnic Conflict
12. Rise in Violence
13. owth of Urbanisation
14. egradation of the Environment
15. Corruption in Public Life

Now, that applies to South Asia, and much of that applies also to West Asia. The Human Development Report, initiated by my late friend Mahbub-ul-Haq in the 1990s, was analytical. It made news this year because it took the Arab humanitarian plight into consideration.  I ask myself: Why this year? Why is it that those of us who have been talking about human development since we worked in the early 1980s on the development of a new International Humanitarian Order – which I hope some of you will read in the Report of the Commission[3] – are not aware of that fact; I don’t know … .  Victor Hugo says that a good idea is that whose time has come – we can hardly wait for the time to come of these definitely good ideas.

 

If you recall, in 1981, when Alexandre Hay was the head of the International Commission of the Red Cross, we met here in Jordan with resistance fighters from different parts of the world. I made the observation that the world has a law of war and makes concessions for that law of war; but there is no such thing as a law of peace. We listened to the mothers of the plaza di mayo; we listened to the victims of torture; we listened to refugees, witnesses represented by many NGOs worldwide; man against man, man against nature, victims of Chernobyl, and so forth. When we turned to the NGOs they said, “We are the lobby for the powerless.”  I had to admit that we, 26 commissioners from all over the world, including Desmond Tutu from South Africa, were the powerless lobby for the powerless.

 

I would like to suggest that EuroMeSCo’s work falls within the first basket as an official confidence-building measure. In retrospect, the third basket of Barcelona – the cultural basket –should perhaps have been the first. Because, if you want to promote social and economic development, then you have to understand what makes people tick. The interconnectedness, or synergy, between the social, cultural and human dimensions with security was driven home recently in the Copenhagen EuroMeSCo Senior Officials Joint Meeting on 18 November, which dealt with building a comprehensive concept for security in the Euro-Med region.

 

May I suggest that the concept and the content, as well as the form and the format, of the Copenhagen Seminar are important. I think it is important to disseminate in the mind of the Arab breathing public, for those who say, “What are the Europeans doing?” . . . It is important to assure the Europeans, who sometimes say, “Well, what is our niche? What do you expect us to do?  We are powerless; the Americans are reigning supreme.”  In terms of people-to-people peace, the Copenhagen Seminar was designed to re-launch the Euro-Med debate through developing a common language – a security debate. Security for me is not hard security (police action and military action); it is soft security – human security.  In that context, the empowerment of civil society falls very well within the context of the Copenhagen statement.  There is recognition now that the early approval of the Charter for Peace and Stability, however, is very unlikely. The security debate will therefore be pursued in the face of the current difficulties through a wider framework that includes both governments and civil society.  So, in a sense, we have a problem of both addressing external partners and addressing our own governments.  As I said at the Arab Thought Forum (ATF) the other day, I would love to see an intellectual meeting between the ATF and the most affluent and intellectual association of Arab ministers, who are (surprise, surprise!) the Ministers of the Interior. Theirs is an association concerned with curative measures rather than preventative measures.  Not the association of Ministers of Education, Heath or even of Justice; but the Ministers of Interior, who draw the lines very clearly when it comes to issues of national priority and national security.

 

The security debate will be pursued; but the aim is to achieve common ground both within our cultures and beyond our cultures on a broadly-defined security concept.  This in itself can be regarded as a confidence-building measure.  People out there are looking for partners; in our street they are looking for hope. I would like to suggest the socio-economic approach, for example, in India, in Pakistan, in the Katchi-Abadi Authorities (the squatter settlements) … .  Where I travelled, from Karachi to Belluchistan, you had Pathans, Muhajirs, Punjabis and Sindhis; you had 1.2 million people (400,000 households) producing silk – men, women and children spinning and weaving: cottage industry – and exporting to the United States and Europe. The first result of 11 September was to stop the textile imports from Pakistan.  To those Americans I met I said, “By stopping the imports you are throwing hundreds of thousands of people into the lap of despair – into the lap of the parallel economy.”

 

I would like to emphasise the importance of civil society – in the context of Bangladesh, for example, the Grameen Bank (the women’s bank) recoups 96% of its loans.  It does not ask for collateral on a fifty dollar loan.  As a result, when the fundamentalists demonstrate in the streets, they find ten thousand women demonstrating in front of them, not because they are men or women, but because these people feel that they are stakeholders.

 

I understand that your group will be addressing issues under the rubric of security, migration and civil society.  I think the great acronym over the past few years was TIM: Territoriality, Identity and Migration.  I would like to suggest that this issue be scrutinised, particularly when it comes to the issue of identity and migration.  I want to remind you that in 1993, when I attended the Donors’ Conference for Palestinians, I made it very clear that in my understanding of the Oslo agreement, Oslo focused on displaced persons (DPs).  Public statements were made by a Palestinian official to the effect that 200,000 DPs are the capacity expected to return or be absorbed by the Territories.  Now, that leaves a very important issue for us all to consider, and that is the identity of refugees.  On this issue, I personally feel that the time has come to say to Arab countries that in terms of the economic and social integration, you cannot continue to shoulder the price; you are not doing anyone any favours.  I am not doing my citizens favours by shouldering the price of citizens – because they are citizens – but that is not the case; I am shouldering the price of UNRWA.

 

I would like to put the following thought: in terms of human beings, when you talk of refugees you are talking not of a barrage of slogans and individual agendas; you are talking about a security issue in the broadest possible sense.  If the scenario is: the strike on Iraq will result in Israel becoming the dominating minority in a region of minorities; if the price is ‘Jordan is Palestine’ – some of us might say that it already is Palestine, in not only de facto but also in romantic terminology; after all, the division between Jordan and Palestine was always north-south, not east-west;  if we think as Arab nationalists – as Arab patriots – we should not actually see the narrow divisions.  But, unfortunately, we do not think that way; we think less and less of the public realm and more and more of private agendas.

 

The point that has to be made is that, in terms of absorptive capacity, this region needs an aménagement de térritoires: a regional management of natural, economic and human resources.  We need to say, finally, “Towards 2030,” as we said in the early 1970s, “Towards 2000.”  The absorptive capacity of human beings in terms of their consumption of water, for example, is going to be x or y in the different sub-regions of this broad area that we sometimes describe as the Middle East.

 

I would like to suggest that over and above and in addition to security, the different sessions that you will be engaging in will deal with civil society initiatives in the Middle East and corruption, as well as migration, stability and cultural exchange. But please bear in mind the recent Copenhagen EuroMeSCo meeting, because its thematic structure strives to bridge the conceptual gap of a lack of a common language or security culture among the partners. Please bear in mind that it is groups like this that could possibly take the important role of theme setting. In the words of the seminar document: “Divergences over core concepts and in the usage of terms, and the use of differing security discourses for the consumption of different political constituencies and publics, are a cause of mutual suspicion and distorted perceptions.  Over the long term, confused concepts can end up structuring reality. To some extent this is already the case.” 

 

I am not using diplomatic language; they are using diplomatic language.  But for those of us who live in the region, we know very clearly the difference between a DP, between a full citizen, between a refugee, between a Palestinian Israeli and a Jewish Israeli, and for that matter between a Kurd or a Shi’a or a Sunni or a Christian in Iraq. The future is either one of pluralism, respect for the other, enhancing what is universal and respecting differences; or it is a future of ethnic and sectarian bloodbath – Balkan style.

 

In Copenhagen, the task was to clearly define concepts such as ‘asymmetrical violence,’ which have important bearing on policy options, especially on security, which is at the top of the post-11 September international agenda.  In the words of the organisers: “The absence of clearly formulated concepts can jeopardise open dialogues and further hinder cooperation.”

 

Any attempt to look beyond the current crises confronting the Euro-Med region will face a number of challenges.  This is particularly true when we consider the set of wars involved: the ‘war on terror,’ the Gulf War and the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Let me remind you that the Prime Minister of Israel condoled the President of Russia, and he equates Chechyns and Palestinians with terrorism. And post-Mombassa, of course, you find a self-styled mandate implicit in Israeli statements that we now have the right to hunt down these terrorists wherever they may be, which basically means that we go beyond the security confines of the Palestinian dimension.

 

I would like to suggest to you once again that the concept has to be clear.  Please read Boaz Ganor.  Please talk about the different definitions that have to emerge in our articulation of our views –whether procedurally, legally or juridicially.  We were talking earlier about crimes against humanity and the furore created by those international lawyers who regard suicide bombing as a crime against humanity. I think it is important to bear in mind that the case for human dignity has to be expressed and if we, the few who claim to know more than others, are unable to express ourselves in responsible and clear terms, how do you expect the chattering public and international media – who are so prone to sensation and so prone to financial inducements (I call them المؤلّفة جيوبُهُم) – how do you expect them to carry the message of integrity and focus?

 

“Any attempt that cannot really date the end of war in terms of how wars end,” – if I may quote Sydney Bailey of Quaker fame – “is impossible.  We cannot really date the end of war if we cannot date its beginning.”  In South Africa, for example, when I called on Walter Sisulu, he said, “I can forgive but I cannot forget.”  One of the civil-society building measures which might be focused is education by analogy: the Erasmus concept; the Socrates concept.  I studied French history from a British point of view: the subjected.  I think the time has come for us to say to the Israelis: “Stop objecting to the content of our curricula.  Let us try to develop a halfway convergent / halfway divergent understanding of historical facts.”  (I hope that ‘historical fact’ is not a contradiction in terms.)  If we cannot date precisely the beginning of the wars which currently face us, and consequently their end, what can be done to accelerate the transformation or the transition through the ‘grey zone’ that may confront us?  How can we best deal with this fallout?  I think this is the anguish that we all share at the moment, and I think it important that we all come to exercise our minds at this very difficult time.

 

In the present globalised era, terrorism has been regarded as the privatisation of war.  This is especially true for those groups that, for a variety of reasons, have failed to participate successfully in globalisation.  Members of the emerging Global Civil Society have a responsibility to search for alternatives.  If we are to provide value added, then we need to go beyond exploring ‘reasons’ to evolving ‘strategies,’ as well as specific ‘instruments.’  Your network of conflict avoidance and post-war reconstruction centres – including, for example, centres I visited recently in York, Belfast and elsewhere – should be called upon to work jointly in terms of the parallel examples that need to be brought to public attention and need to be brought to the policymaking level.  

 

I have tried in my own small way to undertake a new initiative, ‘Partners in Humanity,’ which we are launching in New York, hopefully in the beginning of the new year. The basic point of departure was that we often hear is of the American talking about the American image abroad.  Why can’t we talk about an interactive image?  Why can’t we talk about dialogue?  And in that context, can we not talk about networking academia? Those of you who cannot come from Bethlehem, for example, should at least be teleconferenced. Why can’t we talk about citizens conferencing?  You say you come here to breathe.  Well, that is not only in terms of a luxury hotel, but it is in the context of opening a conversation based on a culture of participation.

 

In Copenhagen last month, there was an attempt to elaborate a broad security concept that links the three baskets of Barcelona. Bolstering the role of civil society is a key instrument, and I shudder to think of the alternatives if we continue without an emphasis on the public realm. I think our society is becoming more tribal, more exclusionist, more committed.  Someone told me the other day that Hamas has more people who are ready to go out and blow themselves up and sacrifice their lives than they know how to handle. The young have their own agendas.  I am not being judgemental; that is a fact.  So how can we move the clock forward and not backward – towards collective responsibility?  In making the key issues understood: why is it that people are sacrificing their lives?  

 

In the Copenhagen Summit, we saw Europe at work in redefining itself: the 15 have become the 25.  I would like Arabs to begin to redefine themselves on the basis of extraterritorial priorities.  Despite everything that I have said, I have the impression that the qualifications of people that are under occupation – in that they are hard-fought achievements in centres of learning, academia and civil society – are far more worthy than the qualifications of Arabs in Arab countries.  Why?  Because of the dint of competition to be recognised.  I look at the different ethnic groupings that form the state of India, for example, and recognise the importance of sharing their public responsibility because they are there on merit.  I would like to think that this merit-based approach is truly a part of the future civil society of Palestine and, consequently, can carry a message of political emancipation – ironic for me to say it – for the region, inasmuch as we hope that the outcome of whatever develops in Iraq leads to a restructuring from the bottom up: a restructuring of society.  

 

I think that it is important to bear in mind that all of these wishes and aspirations cannot be born in a vacuum.  I would just like to say that I came here not only to speak; I am a good listener.  I am a member of many international organisations.  If you have proposals or thoughts which I can help you market yourselves – to put you in the pilot seat – I would be very happy to assist in any way possible. In Mainz, Germany, only a few months ago, we had the greatest meeting ever of two thousand participants from four Middle East study networks. And what I thought was attractive about that meeting – 60 Israelis participated, but the majority were actually from this region – was that there was a degree of sanity in the discussion because, believe it or not, there was a shared concern for regional cultural identity (which maybe you develop when you go to Mainz!).  I think there was a definite recognition of the fact that globalisation is not Americanisation, and that modernisation is not at the expense of a deeply-held appreciation of our cultural contribution today and tomorrow.

 

So with that I would like to thank you very much.  And forgive me for going on too long, possibly.