

PASSIA SEMINAR 1992

*DIPLOMACY
AND PROTOCOL*

PASSIA

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

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PASSIA's Academic Committee

December 1992

INTRODUCTION

The increasing prominence of Palestinians on the international political scene, in the peace negotiations and in exchanges with diplomatic corps and visiting government officials in the Occupied Territories, has highlighted the need for Palestinians to be well trained in the art and practice of diplomacy.

Owing to the historical and political circumstances of the Palestinians, formal education, training, and practical experience in these areas have never been sufficiently developed. This risks impeding the Palestinians in their relations with the international community.

PASSIA, in an attempt to begin to meet this need, initiated a three-part seminar programme, during the 1992/3 academic year, to train and educate active and promising young Palestinian graduates. This report includes the proceedings and evaluation of the first part of the programme, a course on Diplomacy and Protocol held at PASSIA between September and December 1992. The second course, on Strategic Studies and Security, will take place in April 1993; the third, to be held in September 1993, will be on The European Community.

We have presented here what we hope is an honest account of the first course, reflecting not only PASSIA's introduction to and evaluation of the course, but the assessment of the participants and the judgement of the Swedish lecturers. The summaries of the lectures presented in the report are based on minutes taken by the Palestinian participants. Due to lack of time they have not been revised by the lecturers themselves. The recording of the proceedings was considered in itself an important training component of the seminar. Similarly, the report contains the essays completed by all the participants, regardless of PASSIA's assessment of them. We feel that this is more useful (and honest) than selecting the few we rate most highly.

We hope that this report highlights the achievements and shortcomings of the seminar, from which PASSIA and others may learn.

PREPARATION PERIOD

Since its establishment in 1987, PASSIA has promoted and been involved in academic and experiential dialogue and exchange between Palestinians and with visitors from the US, Europe, Israel and elsewhere. Having hosted, for six years, regular roundtable discussions involving leading Palestinian academics and activists, PASSIA's Academic Committee decided that it was time to widen, beyond established figures, the base of competence among Palestinians in international affairs.

In early August 1992, PASSIA's Academic Committee held several meetings to arrange the implementation of a year-long, three-part seminar programme to meet this need. PASSIA approached the Ford Foundation for support for all three seminar courses: Diplomacy and Protocol; Strategic Studies and Security; and the European Community.

PASSIA's history of joint projects and of sharing resources with other Palestinian institutions prompted it to approach the Arab Studies Society, and its Director, Mr. Faisal Hussein, with which it shared in the selection of candidates for the course on Diplomacy and Protocol, in promoting the project before the diplomatic community, and participating in the opening sessions of the first course.

PASSIA's Academic Committee chose to approach the Swedish Consulate General in Jerusalem regarding arrangements for the course on Diplomacy and Protocol, not only because of its committed role in the community, but also because it represents a country recognised for its diplomatic skills but which does play a part in the current peace process.

The end result is a three-stage in-country seminar for young Palestinian graduates, the first part of which consisted of a series of lectures and workshops on Diplomacy and Protocol. During September 1992, PASSIA and the Arab Studies Society interviewed 24 applicants, half of whom were women, from all over the West Bank and Gaza and selected 16 participants. Those chosen were thoroughly briefed on the seminar and provided with reading material to study in advance.

LECTURES BY PALESTINIANS

Opening Remarks

Speaker: Mr. Faisal Hussein *President, Arab Studies Society*

Establishing a state does not depend only on the results of negotiations but also on our actions. Jerusalem is our capital not merely as a result of slogans but through our practice and actions in the city. We must establish and build institutions, in order to make Jerusalem a visible and recognisable capital three years from now.

Israel rejects our right to deal with foreign affairs, but in practice foreign affairs are already in our hands. Therefore, we should train cadres to the required standard and to be able to work as a team. A state is inevitable, and we should reassure the Israelis that we are able to bear the responsibility that comes with it. There is a declared strategy for and various constraints on the political agenda, and we should consider the regional and global balance of power and understand our geopolitical position.

A politician is supposed never to declare his or her strategic negotiating maxima nor request the opposing side to lower its maximum demands. Today's priorities are to freeze all settlement activity and to create better political circumstances for the younger generation and to make a home for them. Our political task is to lay enough cornerstones in order to build a future state and not to accept autonomy. Diplomatic work is conducted 24 hours a day. It is not easy. A diplomat does not represent him or herself in social meetings but his or her people.

The US letter of assurances and the invitation to negotiations were very clear regarding our right to choose our delegation from Palestinians inside and outside. According to the letter of assurances Jerusalem is part of the Occupied Territories. Israeli annexation is illegal and the future of both East and West Jerusalem is to be determined by negotiation. Israeli settlement in Jerusalem is an act which negatively affects the negotiations and their outcome and will continue to be a major obstacle in the negotiating process.

Welcoming Address and Introductory Comments
Speaker: Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, *President of PASSIA*

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you all to PASSIA and to get this seminar programme underway. My talk to you today will focus on three items: an introduction to PASSIA's work; the background to and details of this seminar; and an analysis of the current Palestinian political situation.

I trust that most of you have some knowledge of PASSIA's activities. Its uniqueness as an academic society in Palestine results from its being independent, unaffiliated to any political party or organisation. Its work is open and based on strictly academic principles. PASSIA concentrates on three areas as they affect the Palestine Question: research, dialogue and publication. PASSIA is now entering its seventh year and continues to gain recognition and credibility among friends and enemies alike. Following its experience over the years of hosting visiting and resident diplomats and academics, PASSIA decided to initiate a seminar programme as a first step towards wider training of young Palestinian graduates in international affairs. This course is the first of three we have planned, the other two being on Strategic Studies and Security and the European Community.

PASSIA, in co-ordination with the Arab Studies Society, approached the Swedish Consulate General in Jerusalem to seek assistance in the implementation of this, the first course, on Diplomacy and Protocol. PASSIA is proud of its healthy and productive relations with the diplomatic corps in the region. We are especially grateful to H.E. Mikael Dahl, the Swedish Consul General, for his hard work in helping to make this course possible. He arranged the participation of the Swedish experts who will lecture you over the coming two weeks and to whom we are much indebted.

Staff of both PASSIA and the Swedish Consulate will attend all sessions and I hope that following the completion of the course each will present an assessment of it. You have all the details of the programme, which I hope will meet your expectations. PASSIA premises will be open to you throughout the course for any help you require. We hope that we can all learn from this experience and that this first course will lay the foundation for future seminars.

Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. This divided the Arab homeland into states, with each its own territory, people, government, interests and relations. These were all to become obstacles to the Arab aspirations of making Arab unity a reality. At the same time, the lines on the 1916 map were to bring about the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the heart of the Arab world. Nearly 80 years later, the region is prepared politically and geographically for the redrawing of the map of the Middle East. The new lines may further deepen the divisions in the Arab world, and at the same time are designed to accommodate and absorb the State of Israel as a recognised and legitimised state in the region. This recognition will come not only from the political powers in Arab capitals but will extend to the Arab general public.

The importance of this new agenda is that it coincides with an historic period characterised by the following: the retreat and absence of the traditional pan-Arabist and Baathist schools of thought; conflicts of interests between the people of the region; the strong possibility of the passing of current regional political leaders, the alternatives to whom are technocrats and businessmen whose decisions are shaped by personal interest; the new map, not opposed by Europe, implies the emergence of politically pragmatic groups who accept this new reality.

The Transitional Arrangement

Arabs, Palestinians, Israelis and other parties are already engaged in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. From the first reading of the negotiation process the consensus is for an interim arrangement. Disagreement centres on concepts, meanings, limits and the linkage between the interim and final arrangements. This phase of negotiation, in spite of its uncertainties, is a process of normalisation of Arab-Israeli political and economic relations and a clear attempt to oust the PLO from the regional political scene. Another process is evident, namely to replace the PLO with local instruments acceptable to the US, the Europeans, Israel and the Arab regimes.

The Current Avenue

1. The current US Presidential elections mean the suspension of any strong movements in decision-making for or against the Palestinians. The arrival of the Democrats in the White House would lead to one of two situations: the acceleration of the Israeli scenario of implementing autonomy unilaterally; or the easing of political and economic conditions in Israel, possibly leading to reduced

urgency to solve the Palestinian problem, and at the same time bringing to the fore the Syrian question.

2. A divided Europe preoccupied with its own economic problems will remain reluctant to assert a position independent from that of Washington.

3. There is temporary flexibility in the Israeli Labour Party concerning relations between the PLO and inside, that is public contacts, meetings, political and financial co-ordination, and PLO presence in the multilaterals. This policy will be short-lived in the event of a change of political leadership in Washington. Rabin's policy is to drown the Palestinian negotiators in a sea of detail and to open direct contact with more than one Palestinian grouping for the purpose of normalisation of relations and weakening of the central Palestinian legitimate decision-making powers.

4. Damascus is emerging from the dark tunnel of bilateral negotiations and is about to adopt a political-military-economic businesslike arrangement under the US umbrella. Recent Israeli-Syrian statements show that the parties are reading from the same script.

5. Amman is approaching a crossroads at which it may have long wait before any of the following occurs: internal re-arrangement in Jordanian affairs; the killing off of any possibility of the emergent religious leadership competing with the regime in an emergency situation; the beginning of normalisation in Arab-Israeli relations and the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli settlement; implementation of the interim arrangement for the Occupied Territories; or the rise of autonomous Palestinian institutions funded by Europe, recognised by the US, and free from Israeli interference, combined with PLO acceptance of the new reality.

6. Cairo may be drowned in a sea of domestic problems - economic, religious trends, elections and political parties. At the same time, Cairo may become preoccupied with relations with Iran, Sudan, Libya, the Gulf and the Saudis. It is concerned with security as well as with development and investment. The outcome will be Egypt's reduced interest in the Palestinian issue. Cairo considers a Syrian-Israeli arrangement easier and therefore preferable.

7. A possible struggle for power among Saudi princes in Riyadh may lead to a divided country in the form of three small emirates: Najd, Asir and Hijaz.

international affairs, to consider, and which I hope can act as guidelines in your analysis of the Palestinian political situation. Ask yourselves and discuss among yourselves how you think the Palestinian position has been or is affected by the following:

1. Five years of the Intifada and its possible future direction;
2. The interaction of various Palestinian political agendas, bearing in mind the inside (the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jerusalem; refugee camps; and Palestinians inside the Green Line) and the outside (Tunis, and the two schools of thought there; Palestinian refugee camps in the region; the diaspora; and Palestinians returning from the Gulf to Jordan);
3. The plethora of Palestinian institutions inside and outside;
4. The negotiating team, factional leaderships and the Unified Leadership of the Uprising;
5. The establishment of specialised higher councils in the Occupied Territories as a base for exercising national authority "on the ground".

LECTURES BY DIPLOMATS

Introduction to International Relations

Lecturer: H. E. Mikael Dahl, Swedish Consul General

Introduction

The mechanisms of international relations have many elements in common. The Swedish experience is therefore relevant to the Middle East. We see this seminar as an academic exercise in how the international system works and how to work within it. Diplomacy is the lubricant of the international system. It is a skill designed *inter alia* to facilitate communication between politicians. It is the art of "getting along with" others. Diplomatic relations are relations between two countries conducted by consent after recognition of each other.

General Concepts

1. Change

The notion of change is central to international relations. Change has been rapid and has altered the art of diplomacy with both strangers and neighbours, states and individuals. The origins of diplomacy are to be found in relations between ancient city states. Relations between states used to involve professional corps of diplomats who saw the field as their own. Change has been rapid. The revolution in communications has led to direct contact which replaces messengers or go-betweens. NGOs have become much more important as there has been an expansion of contact and of common interests. Summit and "shuttle" diplomacy, which used to be restricted to matters of war and peace, are increasingly commonplace. Now diplomacy covers everything from the price of butter, to the survival of humanity, to endangered species. This challenges the value of diplomats: are they necessary or replaceable?

2. The Formal Nature of International Relations

Within nations laws regulate relations, whereas there are certain "rules" governing relations between nations. International law is largely a set of norms and practices by which nations are asked to abide. It is respected voluntarily and there are few remedies for violation of it. Diplomats must deal with the increased importance of economic and commercial relations which are used in the political field. The European Community's common market is a political entity controlled by economic means.

3. Interests of States

The self-interest of states is the *raison d'être* of foreign policy. Interests may include peace, power, riches, glory or survival, with the latter often used as an alibi for the pursuit of other objectives.

4. International Cooperation

This is a basic requirement for survival, especially for small countries, and involves give and take. Getting along with ones neighbours is particularly important for a small country next to a powerful one. Sweden has for centuries sought to balance the power of Russia through alliances and neutrality. Sweden is now re-defining its position towards a more European dimension. Are international relations a game for major powers only, or do small countries have a role? Major powers act in their own widely defined national interests, often against those of small countries. This contributes to international cooperation being more important to small than to large countries.

Sweden cooperates closely with its Nordic neighbours and has implemented many laws in common with them. Sweden is now in EFTA and is a candidate for the EC. The UN has always been central to Swedish foreign policy and the country tries to place its global cooperation within the UN framework. Such an approach to international cooperation is in Sweden's interests.

A Brief History of Diplomacy

Lecturer: Mathias Mossberg

According to the now over-specific definitions in Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice, diplomacy is "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between governments of independent states", or "the conduct of business between states by peaceful means". The word diplomacy comes from the Greek *diploma* which literally means a folded, official paper which may have many purposes, such as a passport.

Although its origins go back much further, the diplomatic system has developed only over the last two centuries. It claims to be the oldest profession, older even than the history of the world. In the sixteenth century the first diplomats were considered to be angels carrying messages between heaven and earth. In prehistoric times, with little societal organisation, warring groups needed to stop fighting and send emissaries to negotiate. It would have been impractical for these people to be killed along with their messages, hence the beginnings of diplomatic immunity and privileges.

There has always been something of a taboo against foreigners, who were often considered dangerous and impure. In fourteenth-century Venice sleeping with a foreigner was punishable by death. Early emissaries were subject to "purification". Byzantine emissaries to Mongolia had literally to pass through fire. The early Greek states assigned special privileges to emissaries although they were sent by the Hermes, god of travellers, merchants and thieves.

The diplomatic conference also had its origins in ancient Greece. In 432 BC there was a conference in Sparta to decide whether Athens had violated treaties; if so, it faced war. The conference consisted of representatives of the Peloponnesian League, minus Athens. However, a delegation from Athens in Sparta was allowed to remain there after the vote against it, until it had finished its business and despite the declaration of war against it. Many of the Greek customs were transferred to western Europe, Egypt and elsewhere. The Romans continued the Greek traditions but did not make a substantial contribution except in administration where they were expert. As the dominant power, they used the typical tactics of imposing time limits on negotiations, and periods of immunity. The most important Roman contribution was in international law. They laid the

foundations for many legal systems of today. Very importantly, they used trained archivists. In the later stages of the Roman Empire, when brute force was no longer enough, the archives show the increasing role of negotiation. The Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium) used three main methods: "divide and rule"; buying friendship; and converting the heathen to Christianity. These methods demanded new qualities in representation. The diplomat had to have trained powers of observation and sound judgement: the seeds of the character of the diplomat today. During the fifteenth century, interest shifted to the Italian peninsula with its mini-states and shifting alliances. Diplomacy as a profession was by now generally recognised. In 1446, the first permanent mission represented the Duke of Milan in Florence. Duplicitous Machiavellianism was the order of the day. The impression of sovereigns' power was emphasised, at the expense of the envoy who was seen as little better than a spy. This went so far as having a throne quietly raised while the envoy was bowing before it. Diplomacy was a middle-class rather than aristocratic profession. Louis XI used his barber as an envoy and warned him, "If they lie to you, see to it that you lie to them even more."

The reputation of the diplomat improved, but gradually. A seventeenth-century English ambassador said, "An ambassador is an honest man sent abroad to lie in the interests of his country."

The Italian school gave way to the French which became dominant from the early seventeenth century. Louis XIV and Cardinal Richelieu pioneered a greater interest in long-lasting, stable relationships. Richelieu initiated the first Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus giving direction in foreign policy and the need to speak with one voice. Versailles became the model for other European courts and remained so until the early nineteenth century. The Congress of Vienna of 1815 tackled the important question of precedence: who was to be introduced when, and how, where to stand in line, and so on. The lack of a fixed order of precedence had been a major problem leading to serious incidents. In 1504 Pope Julius II had decided on an order of precedence in which countries appeared according to age. This would have worked if respected, but Spain, say, would never accept its coming after France. The drawbacks of such a system was exemplified in 1661 when the new Swedish envoy to London arrived at the Tower where there was a royal coach to meet him. However, France and Spain had sent their own coaches. When the Spanish tried to edge their coach in front of the French there was a collision and, with each having a 100-strong armed escort, the subsequent fighting led to several deaths, and to France declaring war. The

Congress of Vienna defined four classes of diplomat: Ambassador; Minister Plenipotentiary; Resident Minister; and Chargé d’Affaires. Within each class, rank was decided by the host country’s order of notification, the handing over of credentials. Now only two classes are used: Ambassador and Chargé d’Affaires.

Since 1815, the focus has shifted from the court to the cabinet. Diplomatic life is dependent on the political culture in which it exists. Three factors in particular have changed diplomacy: the growing sense of a community of nations; increased importance of public opinion with increased democracy, especially in Europe; and the rapid improvement in communications and the tendency towards summit and shuttle diplomacy. Summit diplomacy is not liked by diplomats who thus lose knowledge of events. World War One ended with the Treaty of Versailles wherein the dominant President Wilson advocated open, democratic diplomacy (despite the exclusive participation of Wilson himself and the British and French premiers). Treaties must be ratified by the home parliament.

International Law

Lecturers: Ove Bring and Mathias Mossberg

There are 90 people employed in the legal department of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, half of whom are lawyers. The department has four sections: International Organisations, covering the UN and human rights as they relate to the European scene; Individual Cases such as someone abroad getting married or extradited; Protection of Swedish Citizens Abroad, for example the three now in Iraq; Human Rights beyond Europe and Internal Treaty Processing.

On human rights, we need lawyers trained to defend the government in Europe and the UN, especially as Sweden tries to push human rights issues globally. The head of the legal department is an experienced lawyer from the Ministry of Justice. Such a choice is increasingly preferred over a career diplomat as the head must be able to organise the four sections.

Undergraduate law students tend to read international law for just a few weeks. One wishing to specialise must go on to a doctorate. A legal adviser must act for the four sections, being available to each of them and the political department which often gives more work than the legal department. Legal

this is not always true.

Sweden does not pursue policies which have tested my political commitment although had I been working in the US during the invasions of Granada or Panama I would probably have resigned. These were instances of the political overriding the legal department in order to legitimise a political decision which had already been taken. This often happens in the US.

International law is a reflexion of social phenomena. It is said that international law is not real law: it has no courts or police and is not dependent on sanctions in the way national law is. But a system of law is a social phenomenon. State practice establishes patterns which lead to laws. Thus international law is a reflection of reality not of a national system. International law is divided into private and public. Private international law is concerned with individuals and countries with contracts over borders. Public international law covers UN matters, laws of the sea, laws of space, etc.

Public international law is made up of legal obligations from: customary law and from treaties. This dichotomy is basic. Treaty-making is a kind of summation of custom.

Elements of Customary Law

1. Usage: i.e. what states practise. States objectively respect certain rules regarding matters such as foreign ships, basic rules of warfare, ICRC personnel.
2. Subjective : states express their *opinio juris* that they want to make into law the customs they follow.

Customary law is independent of treaties. A state that is not party to a treaty cannot excuse itself from respecting customary international law. When the US was before the international court accused of military intervention including the mining of ports and harbours in Nicaragua in contravention of the UN charter, the US said it did not necessarily respect the Hague Conventions. The court, however, agreed that the US is bound by customary law and was specifically contravening Article 38 of the Charter of the League of Nations. General principles of intra-state law and the rule of law can be easily transferred to international law, but international law suffers from the problem of being

general and vague. This may create difficulties when customary law tries to deal with specifics but it does leave leeway for progressive development and for pressing for particular interpretations.

There is an interaction between customary law and laws of treaty. It is possible, however, to go from nothing almost straight to customary law. The outer space treaty, for example, is already considered customary law. Treaty is a quick method of international obligation which has an impact on the development of customary law.

Actors in the International Legal System

Subjects of international law are those actors directly affected by and who must apply international law. Objects of international law are individuals or national or international organisations protected under international law but who have no right to act under it, although they may complain.

The number of subjects of international law is increasing and includes almost any actor in international relations. Such actors used to be restricted to states and important international organisations such as the UN. It now also includes the following :

1. Liberation Movements such as the PLO and ANC. The purpose of a liberation movement is usually linked with statehood and the right to self-determination and thus to implementing international law;
2. Political Entities which are not recognised as states but which do exist as territorial entities and can thus be the subject of aggression, free trade, etc. Taiwan, although not recognised as a state, is a political and territorial entity which is a subject of international law. Establishing relations with Taiwan does not mean recognising it as a state;
3. Nations without a state or a liberation movement. Kurdistan qualifies as such a nation while Palestine and the PLO are subjects of international law on two counts.

Subjects of international law, even if not states, do have rights under international law, for example against non-intervention and aggression.

If international law lacks sanctions is it still a legal order? I believe so, and that we should defend it. We would not gain by losing it, but should strengthen it to ensure protection. States have much to gain from international law which offers security in trade, airlines and so on. Always there are international regulations in force which are only highlighted when they do not work. International law works in routine matters but sometimes has to deal with political wills which are not the responsibility of the law.

The UN Charter and the UN are often criticised, but for the people meant to implement it there is the problem of international law being not legally but politically dominated. Some states do not like specific rules. The US do not like the idea of non-intervention in other states. Big political powers disregard non-intervention and there are many instances of this since 1945. It would not be good to make it less forceful in the face of violations.

Another problem is that the system of international law seems passive. National law is an active process and so too could be international law. Political will existed concerning Kuwait but does not concerning Palestine. The debate concerning double standards should not be used to criticise the UN and its policy against Iraq but to seek consistency: the UN now has the power to make decisions. However, many less-developed countries see the UN and international law as organs of the North. They want more representation in the Security Council, perhaps through India, Brazil or Pakistan. Should they now have a veto? Should there be less power of veto?

There are factors which show that international law works. Norms and reciprocity are needed by states which in turn risk sanctions for violation. UN sanctions formed part of the development of Zimbabwe and have contributed to change in South Africa. When Argentina invaded the Malvinas, the EC imposed sanctions and the UN branded Argentina a violator of international law. It is easy to see the validity of the policy of "no reward for aggression" if the territory concerned has never been part of the aggressor's territory. In the case of Argentina this was not so easy. They held the Malvinas until 1833; to them it was not an invasion. But the UN also says that any (including territorial) dispute should be solved by peaceful means, regardless of the legitimacy of a claim. I feel that sanctions should be used, as they demand respect for international law.

Different Schools of Legal Thought

1. Natural Law may be seen as a process of divine law descending on states. At the time of the Nuremberg trials there was no previous legislation on war crimes. Human rights law in 1946 was not part of the legal order. Decisions were made on the grounds of "reasonableness" or natural law, and led in turn to the 1948 Geneva Conventions.

2. Positivism still forms the eighteenth century basis of today's legal thinking, whereby only laws which are established through state political practice rise to international law. The problem with positivism is its overemphasis on governments and states and the subsequent loss of the values of internationalism. A 1966 case against apartheid gave positivism a bad name when the judges decided the plaintiffs were not affected by it.

3. Functionalism was born in reaction to the drawbacks of positivism and is based on the idea of relating norms to social needs and changing situations.

4. The Newhaven School begun in the 1950s is value and policy oriented, towards national interests and national security. The school was spearheaded by Myer S. McDougal, a very influential figure in the US State Department, and most in the State Department today are either disciples of McDougal or considered rebels. McDougal advocated increased emphasis on the politicisation of international law, including the values of democracy, welfare and human dignity, in terms of national security. He also saw law as a social process between claims and responses, not as formalistically as positivism. The notion of law as a social process is widely accepted but other elements (policy and values) create problems, because it becomes easy to manipulate the law to serve national interests. The law thus lacks predictability. This is all right for the major powers which change the norms but not for minor powers which rely on predictability. There is nothing to stop a strong country using force if it can relate it to national interests. In this way the US justified its invasions of Granada and Panama. Judge Sofaer said that all arguments on the Hague Charter are irrelevant until combined with national interest. Thus political policy can be justified after implementation.

5. The Non-Occidental Trend is a reaction to the fact that international law is based on western concepts and that new states were and are born into an international society where this law, to which they have not contributed, is clearly

...continued. As many new states were established in the 1960s and 1970s they began to press for their own interpretations of the law and for their values to be incorporated in it. General Assembly debates clearly reflect this. There was and is a particular problem on human rights, with western states maintaining the right to criticise. Third World countries responded with accusations of interventionism. They would accept principles of human rights but not examination.

6. The Idealistic School, begun in the 1950s, is a constitutional approach advocating world government and peace through world law. It was largely lost during the Cold War but is now back. It is not of major influence and is mainly associated with NGOs which, although increasingly important, sometimes isolate themselves through idealism.

Sweden and International Law

Lecturer: Per Holmstrom

Swedish Policy in the Middle East

Swedish interest and policy in the Middle East stem from the following:

1. The world is getting smaller and countries are both politically and economically increasingly dependent on each other;
2. Sweden has traditionally played a role in peace-keeping in the Middle East;
3. Swedes have sometimes played the role of mediators in the Middle East;
4. Sweden, especially as a small country, has an interest in respect for international law and human rights.

Sweden's Position on Palestine

In 1948, because of the assassination of Count Bernadotte, Sweden did not recognise the State of Israel *de jure* but only *de facto*.

Sweden believes that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 form the lasting solution even if there is nothing in them about the right to self-determination. It believes that the conflict in the Middle East should be solved through the practice of self-determination leading to a two-state solution. It believes that the "land for peace" concept follows from resolutions 242 and 338.

Sweden supports the principle of peaceful dispute resolution and hopes that the present peace negotiations will be fruitful. This principle is valid for states and any entity subject to international law. Sweden believes that since Palestine is subject to international law, Palestine cannot take up armed struggle to solve the conflict.

The Gulf War confirmed that aggression is illegal under international law. There are two exceptions to the principle of peaceful resolution:

1. Article 51 of the U.N. charter which gives a country the right to self-defence in case of aggression against it.
2. Articles 6 and 7: the Security Council has the right to use force.

The Security Council could act against Israel because of the 1967 occupation. But the Security Council is also a political body and has not done so. This has led to accusations of double standards. The concept of no reward for aggression holds that if force is used in any way (as in 1967) there is no good reason to recognise any resulting territorial gain. The land occupied in 1967 should therefore not be recognised as part of Israel.

The Fourth Geneva Convention

The Geneva Conventions form the basis of international law. Sweden has stated repeatedly in the U.N. General Assembly that it believes that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the Occupied Territories.

The first rules of international law on armed conflict prohibited the use of certain types of weapons. International terrorism was prohibited. Civilians were said to have to be protected during war, and prisoners and internees were guaranteed rights. In 1907 the Hague Regulations were developed. Now they form customary law and are thus binding. Sweden takes up in the U.N. issues of violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention by initiating argument and raising discussions about them. It does similarly in the EC. The Fourth Geneva Convention gives the occupier the right to issue military regulations in occupied territory on the condition that these military orders respect public life in accordance with the security of the state. Sweden works to act jointly with other states and with the EC to ensure respect for the Fourth Geneva Convention. This is partly done by supporting human rights groups in the Occupied Territories and in Israel.

There is a debate in Sweden as to whether the head of the Press and Information Service should be a diplomat or a journalist. Dominant opinion favours a diplomat on the ground that it is easier to learn the workings of the press than of the foreign service. There is now a clearly recognised need for thinking through relations with the media. Media play a very different role now. Television sets the pace, which is often very rapid. During World War Two the Swedish Prime Minister was on the radio six times. During three months in 1990 he appeared on television 165 times.

Organisation of the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Press and Information Service

Although this presentation concentrates on the Swedish experience there are elements of common interest. The Swedish Press Service was established in 1907. Following the break of the union with Norway in 1905, Norway was winning the ensuing propaganda war. The Press Service first consisted of one person with a wallet who paid journalists to write favourably. Funds available to the Press and Information Service have been very low, notably after the two world wars.

A constant characteristic is the desire to create a balance between the short-term (press) and the long-term (information). Though the two are separate they are linked. Generally speaking, the propaganda element in information has decreased. There is more questioning of the presentation of facts. Some in Sweden still believe it possible to influence the image of Sweden abroad through propaganda. The general belief, however, is that the image of the country is determined less by words than deeds. The desire to be absolutely objective has become a goal in itself. Spokespersons are the result of American practice adopted by many countries. It is the spokesperson's responsibility to ensure accuracy. This is in the interests of the Ministry and of the general public which has a constitutional right to know.

PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
OF THE SWEDISH MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Foreign Minister

Permanent Under
Secretary of State

Head of Department

Press Room

- Service to Foreign Correspondents in Stockholm.
- Information to and Programs for visiting Journalists and Foreign Media.
- Invitations of Foreign Journalists residing abroad.
- Press Services and practical press arrangements at in-and out-going state visits.

Bureau for Press Affairs

- Provides press services and media advice to the Foreign Minister.
- Provides information on Foreign policy matter to Swedish and Foreign media.
- Covers and analyzes Swedish and Foreign Press for Ministry use.
- Keeps Swedish Embassies abroad informed about Swedish Press and Media events.
- Overall responsibility for Press Counsellors/Attaches at Swedish Embassies abroad.

Bureau for Information

- Policy and Budgetary responsibility for information activities about Sweden abroad.
- Information about Swedish Foreign Policy in Sweden.
- Planning of cultural exchange programs through

The Swedish Institute (executive agency) Information, cultural exchange, research, Swedish language, scholarships.

All official documents, except those of a personal nature or those relating to national security, must be made available on request. Any journalist can ask for any document, and the decision to release it must be made within 24 hours. This gives unique guarantees for the journalist whose sources are also protected by law. The ministry is prohibited from seeking journalists' sources. If a journalist's request for material is rejected s/he can appeal and a decision on the appeal must be reached within 48 hours.

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still, of course, doing its best to manage the media. Information cannot be free of political overtones. Everyone tries to influence the media one way or another. They say that 50% of people would kill to be in the media and 50% would do the same to keep out. The Foreign Ministry is in both camps.

The head of the Press Department must have access to the Minister to know what is going on or else run the risk of losing credibility with journalists. The Press Service must have both offensive and defensive media strategies. It must decide who, when, how and what it would like to appear in the media and at the same time protect the Ministry's right to remain silent. The timing and composition of a press release need not be more important than the techniques to avoid attention: "No comment," "This is a matter to which we have given considerable thought," "We'll call back, nothing yet," etc. It is amazing how often a promise to call back gets you off the hook. Whatever happens, the Press Service must not lie. It may not tell all of the truth but outright lies are always discovered. Finance Ministers are the only people allowed to lie (about devaluation).

Much information given to the media is used attributively or off-record. This is very much based on trust. When tricky questions are expected the Ministry is asked to make a rule of speech whereby exact answers are constructed to predicted questions. These answers are then distributed in an effort to ensure that no one says more or less than is written. The rule of speech is an attempt to guarantee that the department speaks with one voice and so maintains credibility.

Confidence building between journalists and ministries is very important. Informal meetings may be arranged between journalists and officials. The meetings also have a strong educational aspect. The better a journalist understands how a Ministry functions the better the journalist (and the less likely to be critical).

Relations with the foreign press are very different. In Sweden absolutely nothing is done to influence what they write beyond trying to ensure as wide an access as possible. This is a principle which has served us well. There is little point in trying to hide things. We used to go out of our way to influence but no longer do. We very rarely enter into discussion with a foreign newspaper. It's not worth it. We might try and correct complete inaccuracies but raising an issue is counter-productive.

The Bureau of Information

The Bureau of Information does not actually produce material. That function is executed by the Swedish Institute which is a separate, independent body. This is a result of the effort to divorce government from the dissemination of information and so avoid propagandist overtones. The Bureau of Information has both public and private funding.

The mainstay of information distribution are "fact sheets" on various topics (economy, agriculture, etc). These are meant to be objective although such a policy is not uncontested. There are some who say they should be more propagandist. The Ministry does no more than provide money and general guidance.

The Organisation and Role of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Swedish Example

Lecturers: Matthias Mossberg and Gun-Britt Anderson

Ministry of Foreign Affairs are:

- a. executing and formulating foreign policy;
- b. administering international relations abroad (although this is not exclusive to the Ministry);
- c. advising government, formulating proposals and preparing decisions. This is mainly the domain of the MFA's political department;
- d. projecting a convincing image of policy both at home and abroad. The press department has a major role at home, while the projection abroad

- e. explaining and gaining support for policies through contacts with other governments and the public;
- f. conducting negotiations in the political, economic and trade fields. These can be bilateral or multilateral, at home or abroad;
- g. furthering trade and commercial interests. This may be carried out by a special ministry but in most countries is an important function of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- h. looking after the interests of nationals who are working and/or living abroad;
- i. managing missions abroad (this is an administrative role but also involves giving instructions to ministries);
- j. keeping and following up on relations with embassies in the capital of the country.

Principles of how the Ministry Works

1. The Ministry should be regarded as a whole and not divided between the economic and the political. Thus diplomats tend to be generalists, although sometimes different people have to be experts on certain different subjects.
2. Relations between external and home affairs are organic. The Ministry must be in touch with other ministries and consult with them.

Basic Structure

The structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs differs from one country to another depending on the tradition and size of the country. There are two general ways of organising the Ministry.

1. dividing the operative departments geographically with each one dealing with a different region;
2. dividing according to function (economic, political, cooperation, etc.)

A combination of both is possible. Most Ministries of Foreign Affairs have a legal department as well as archive and communications sections. The MFA administers a number of missions abroad. Sweden has approximately 120 such missions.

In some ministries, there is a research and/or policy planning department. This is not the case in Sweden, but is common in big countries. In Sweden, they use instead a number of external consultants as an alternative method of research in addition to encouraging people to think creatively and come with proposals for policy planning.

Foreign affairs tend to change less than home affairs with the change of government and depend much on national consensus. Human rights issues are dealt with by several departments. In Sweden these are the political, legal, and cooperation departments of the Ministry. In Sweden, the heads of department in the Ministry meet three times a week. In each department, there is a meeting at least once a week. In some departments, such as the political department, they meet twice a week with the heads of sections.

Countries differ about the relation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and intelligence department. This depends *inter alia* on the size of the intelligence department. In Sweden, intelligence is connected to the police and relations between them and the missions abroad are very limited.

No minister in Sweden except the Foreign Minister can make major decisions without a cabinet decision. Ministers meet informally once a day and formally once a week when decisions are made. In Sweden ministries are responsible for formulation of policies which are implemented by agencies that are guided by but independent of the ministries. There is a special crisis unit in the Ministry formed of representatives from the different departments.

Management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sweden

In Sweden there are three Foreign Affairs ministers in the Cabinet. There is a very good administrative system in the Ministry. This is because there is a long history of administration and a clear line of authority.

The roles and interests of the MFA are: regional and global security; peace-keeping and peace-building; economic cooperation through direct promotion of multilateral negotiations; immigration; global governance and common security and responsibility; development. The finance and personnel of the Ministry are limited and mainly unchanging, so, despite changing political development in the world, priorities have to be changed and managed within fixed resources.

reviewed by a special committee that comments and, if necessary, changes them before giving them back to missions. There is constant evaluation of the efficiency of the system and of the type and form of information sent by the missions. So the Ministry has to think about objectives and how to manage them within the resources available. The duty of the head of a mission is to follow up instructions, while s/he is expected and encouraged to give opinion. A good Ambassador formulates proposals for his/her government. If a matter is within her/his sphere of authority, then s/he has the right to act. But an Ambassador should not act too independently from the government and should refer to government regularly.

The government submits a consolidated plan to Parliament and cannot act unless Parliament approves the plan. The responsibility of execution is in the hands of the government while legislative power is in the hands of Parliament.

Sweden has a system of open access to information and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a press department to deal with its dissemination. The Ministry makes sure that all the relevant ministries are given the relevant information. The research department exists because others may not have the time to look ahead.

**The Role of a Diplomatic Mission, International
Organisations and International Civil Service**
Lecturers: Matthias Mossberg and Mikael Dahl

Embassies

It is clear that different Embassies have different tasks. They may have development cooperation work in, say, Africa but have wholly other functions in Europe. A "standard" Embassy, however, has the overriding function of conducting bilateral relations. Embassies primarily represent the sending country ("flying the flag") but do also, to an extent, represent the host country at home, especially if the host does not have a mission there. Presenting and promoting the home country's policies normally includes promoting business interests. Roughly

25% to 30% of the time of an Embassy is spent on protocol functions such as ceremonies or contacts with diplomatic corps.

The Embassy must report to the Foreign Ministry to give it information from all available sources for analysis. It is said that this function has become less important with the growth of the media. This is arguable. We need our own sources. We cannot compete with the media in terms of speed but when acting on information we need to be sure of it and so might need a different type of information with more analysis. What we need and when must be our decision and not dependent on the media. Also we may be given information that is not given to the press. Sources should know they can rely on us, so we keep the information confidential.

Embassies have the additional function of taking care of nationals abroad and, finally, administration, which takes much time and effort.

Consulates

A Consulate is subordinate to an Embassy. The most common reason for a Consulate is if the host is a large country making secondary representation desirable. They are normally called Consulates general or Consulates. The Ambassador is also the head of the Consulate. If the reason for a Consulate is the large size of a country, it is there to get a regional outlook. Los Angeles may be very different from New York.

Normally a Consulate will not carry out political duties. Its functions are otherwise largely the same. They tend to concentrate more on culture, trade and service to nationals. This leads to two career routes within the diplomatic service, with some concentrating more on the functions of the traditional Embassy and others more on the Consular.

Consulates in Jerusalem

The nine "*Corpus Separatum*" Consulates in Jerusalem are very different from others for two main reasons:

1. The existence of Consulates in Jerusalem is the result of international law and UN Resolutions, specifically the 1947 Partition Law. Jerusalem was

with representation in Jerusalem in 1947 decided to keep it, despite their recognition of Israel, to make the point that Jerusalem is not part of Israel or any other country. It is not Israeli or Palestinian but an international entity.

2. Consulates in Jerusalem serve as representation to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The Swedish Consulate has dealings with the Palestinians along the following lines:

- a. Political contacts with Palestinian groups and institutions;
- b. International witness of Human Rights Aspects in particular, of the occupation. This may consist of a physical presence through official visits or at political trials etc.;
- c. Administration of bilateral development programmes (the EC development programmes are separately represented through Brussels);
- d. Basic service to Swedish and other citizens in consular matters.

Consulates General in Jerusalem are not accredited with the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is a point of disagreement but "we agree to disagree." The arrangement is that no credentials are presented but protection is afforded. The Israeli position is that a country may only have one Embassy in Israel and that the Jerusalem Consulates are therefore subordinate. But this is not so. The Consulates are not in Israel and report directly to their respective home countries, not to Tel Aviv. Likewise, embassies in Tel Aviv deal with Israeli authorities on issues related to Israel proper not the Occupied Territories. Consulates in Jerusalem are those of the UK, France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece, Sweden, Turkey and the USA.

Delegations to Organisations

Representation is made to accredited international organisations such as the UN in New York, Geneva and other places and to regional and local organisations such as the EC. Ambassadors to these organisations are afforded similar protection to Embassy Ambassadors. Unlike Ambassadors to countries, Ambassadors to organisations are accredited not to the host country but to the organisation itself. The host country must, however, be notified.

The diplomatic mission of the sending country is expected to give support to delegations to organisations and should act as a liaison between the conference (say) and the home base. The delegation itself is also expected to maintain contact with the secretariat of the host organisation.

Requirements and Qualifications Needed in a Diplomat

Lecturers: Mathias Mossberg and Per Holmstrom

Historically, a loud voice and retentive memory plus good oratory have been the qualities of the good diplomat. Nowadays diplomat also needs powers of observation, clear judgement, and experience. Additional requirements include: precision; moral and intellectual accuracy; calmness, patience and detachment; national loyalty; honesty (important because dishonesty will out sooner or later, and credibility thus damaged).

When a diplomat is reporting s/he should not get carried away; s/he must be cautious, but at the same time be able to form an opinion. Modesty about one's role is important. Personal vanity has always been negative and is sometimes destructive. Knowledge, charm, industry, tact and courage are all taken for granted. Modern management techniques are now considered important.

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs recruits between ten and fifteen diplomats annually. The Ministry has a small department which examines the applications and considers the following: education; work and travel experience; language skills; experience in associations, trades unions etc. Following this applicants take a written test which lasts for one day and which is divided into: 100 general knowledge questions, e.g. about the U.N.; two essays in Swedish on issues such as Swedish politics, international relations, economics, elections, etc.; and one essay in English. After the tests are graded, applicants are interviewed. Each has nine interviews by the board members who come from different sectors of society (parliament, trades unions, academia).

Applicants sought are usually about 25 years old with a background in economics, political science, history, law or journalism. The ministry tries to keep an approximate ratio of 50-50 between the sexes.

Education after Recruitment

The newly recruited have a month and a half of introductory training before each works in a department for one year. Recruits then follow a course of three to four months theoretical training on Swedish foreign policy including role plays and writing political reports. The training also includes seminars on the media, negotiations and administrative matters. Recruits are then sent for 8-9 months to different departments in the Foreign Ministry. After two years they are sent on their first mission. Before leaving for a specific country there are intensive discussions with superiors about the local situation. Promotion and assignments are made regardless of political affiliation. The diplomat can refuse to go to a specific country, but is advised not to.

Protocol, Ceremonial Aspects, Diplomatic Immunity and Privileges

Lecturer: Klas Stenstrom

The rules of protocol are generally practical and are designed to simplify intercourse between people and countries. Rules of protocol should be strict and equally valid for all.

The first list of precedent (the order in which the representative of each country is placed when received by the Head of State of the host country) was set up by Pope Julius II in 1504. This put the Holy Roman Emperor first followed by the Kings of France and Spain and was more or less agreed. Diplomatic postings of the time were usually quite temporary, lasting perhaps from two months to a year. The practice of setting up legations is European, with permanent missions first being established after the Thirty Years War in 1648. These were few and restricted to the larger capitals of London, Paris and Rome.

In 1815, after the Napoleonic Wars, the increased need for regulation led to the Vienna Congress which agreed on various levels of representation [see "A Brief History of Diplomacy" above]. The language between diplomats used to be Latin and after the Thirty Years War became French and remained so until World War Two, since when it has increasingly been English. When Sweden and

Norway separated in 1905 the language of the agreement between them was French even though Swedish and Norwegian are very similar.

The 1961 Vienna Convention codified practice already pursued in relations between diplomats and was the first time that rules of behaviour were put on paper. These rules are very practical and important, especially when there are now 179 UN members.

Official and Working Visits

Official visits may be state visits (i.e. of the Head of State) which, in Sweden, are usually planned two to three years in advance. If a Head of State wants to visit at shorter notice s/he may come on a working visit (which is still official). A Prime Ministerial or Head of Government visit is easier. The visitor will still receive full honours and may come on a less formal working visit. The same division between official and working visits applies to Foreign Ministers.

Planning for visits is thorough in order to avoid disappointment. The most important task in any visit is to show the guest of honour all possible courtesy, to ensure that s/he feels safe and happy, and that the visit is fulfilling expectations. It is said to be a good visit if relations remain the same as before. The smallest thing can lead to disappointment.

Normally both official and working visits require a written invitation and reply. For a state visit, the host country pays for fifty members of the delegation of the visiting country. For a Prime Ministerial visit it pays for five and for a ministerial visit, three. If the visit is requested then it is at the requester's own expense.

Each country establishes in advance formalities for visits. The visitor's state always sends, prior to the visit, a representative to go through such details as the menu, the agenda, security of personnel and the probability of exchanging gifts, although the latter is less frequently practised.

A Head of State is met at the airport with a separate landing stage and red carpet. The host delegation is lined up with, in Sweden's case, a representative of the royal family along with the Prime Minister. The chief of protocol goes up the aircraft stairs, guides the visiting Head of State down and introduces the

anthems are played, the visitor's first, and flags flown, before the rest of the host delegation is introduced. A monarch does not meet a Head of State at the airport. A state visit normally lasts three or four days and usually includes an excursion into the country. Flags are flown outside the Foreign Office, the Prime Minister's office and on the bridge to the royal palace, where the guest and visiting delegation are housed in Sweden.

The guests usually meets the Speaker of parliament, the head of government and as many government officials as possible. They usually also visit industries, hospitals or other important institutions.

Journalists often accompany the visit of a Head of State, but must pay their own expenses. A visiting Head of State is surrounded by both his/her own and local bodyguards in equal number. The number of bodyguards and types of weapons must be announced in advance. Police escort, which is usually kept to a minimum, has its size and nature decided by the police themselves, except on the trip from the airport. Usually a state visit is announced publicly, with the text of the announcement having already been agreed on. The more concern there is over the security of the visitor the less notice will tend to be given.

Following luncheon with the King and dinner with the government, speeches of thanks are made by the host and visitor, each lasting five to ten minutes. Interpretation is provided throughout by the host state for an official visit but by the visiting state for a working visit. Priority in the flying of flags goes to the right. On a car the guest's flag is flown on the right. If there are four or more in line, first priority is to the right and second to the left. If there are three, priority is in the middle. For official functions, dress is white tie, although in the US it is black tie.

If there is much protest against a particular visit it may be postponed.

Diplomatic History of the Middle East

Lecturer: Mats Bergquist

The Ottoman Empire started to decline long before its later dissolution. The Middle East then came under the colonial control of the British and the French. Between 1920 and 1922 various Mandates assumed control of different countries in the Middle East, with the map of the area drawn by the colonial powers to suit their interests.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

What mechanisms have been used to try to amend the situation between Israel and Arabs over the last 45 years?

1. Bilateral negotiations

It remains an Israeli priority to have bilateral negotiations without a third party because bilaterals would mean that Israel would be recognised by the Arab country or countries concerned. In the past 45 years there have been three sets of such negotiations:

- a. 1949-1951 Israeli/Jordanian negotiations to reach a formal peace agreement between the two countries. They failed because King Abdullah did not feel strong enough to deliver or implement what was agreed and was concerned about his relations with other Arab countries;
- b. 1979-1982 Israeli/Egyptian negotiations over autonomy for the Palestinians;
- c. 1982-1983 Israeli/Lebanese peace treaty which was reached but not signed.

2. International Conferences

- a. The 1949 Wisan Conference with France, U.S.A. and Turkey failed because issues like refugees were discussed too early;
- b. The 1973 Geneva Conference served a very important political purpose and was set for negotiations over Sinai and other issues but failed to reconvene as planned;

the 1991 Madrid Conference is essentially following the same format as the Geneva conference.

Conferences serve as an umbrella for countries who do not recognise each other but would like to meet and discuss issues.

3. Third Party Intervention

There are mediators who participate in negotiations between two parties to a conflict and there are those who only transmit messages between the parties. At Camp David, President Carter forced Israel and Egypt to sign an agreement. Between 1989 and 1991, Baker got both parties to agree to hold a peace conference. He and President Bush have been able to force compromise out of both parties since, like Carter, they represent a major power with a strong influence on both parties.

The success of third party intervention depends largely on the following: the power of the country they represent; the personality of the third party; commitment to the issue; and genuine belief in the aim. Several third party interventions have failed in the Middle East because of the political situation during the time of intervention. Baker, it appears, is committed to achieving some success in the future through negotiations in the peace process.

Seven out of ten occupations in the Middle East have ended. The remaining three are the Turkish occupation in Cyprus; Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights; Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara. Most of the seven occupations ended at the negotiating table.

International Development Cooperation: North-South Issues

Lecturers: Gun-Britt Andersson and Mikael Dahl

Long-term peace and stability can only come from more equal development and a lack of poverty. This would be good for the world economy.

Sweden is a peripheral country in the rich world which has not been a colonial power outside Europe. As a small nation, Sweden feels the need for the protection offered by a world body and so has always been a strong supporter of the UN. Sweden's overseas development cooperation policy unfolded during the 1960s, marked by the following:

1962: A bill setting out basic principles of Swedish development policy (strongly supported by NGOs, trades unions and churches);

1965: The establishment of Sweden's first independent development agency (all policy is executed by independent agencies);

1968: A bill setting out the commitment to achieve development aid of 1% of GNP by mid-70s. In fact this was achieved by the early 70s and has been maintained more or less ever since. However, present economic problems have led to a reduction to the OECD target of 0.7%.

The overall objective of Swedish development cooperation is to raise the standard of living of poor people, especially through economic growth; economic and social equality; economic and political independence; democratic development; sustainable use of natural resources and protection of the environment. These priorities are agreed by all Swedish political parties.

Priority (half of the total budget) is given to the poorest countries. Development programmes include agricultural, economic, biological and industrial cooperation in Tanzania and India and humanitarian assistance in South Africa. Both the ANC and SWAPO have been recipients of Swedish aid. "Soft" loans are given only if the receiving country is creditworthy. Nordic countries and Holland are very strongly represented in international organisations (including UNRWA and UNDP) and often contribute more than the US.

Sweden has had a formal relationship with the Occupied Territories only since 1991. Now there is direct cooperation very similar to the bilateral relations between nation-states.

Different Swedish NGOs have been active here since before the occupation. Early involvement was mostly through churches but grew during the 1960s, mainly in health and social welfare projects. Finance came through adoption by a Swedish counterpart, a health centre or whatever, and, once contact was established, they would seek government support. The NGO would pay 20% and the government the rest. Throughout the 1960s and '70s there was no

concrete with the *intifada*. High level Swedish government contacts were then established with Tunis and with the West Bank and Gaza.

Stern Andersson's visit to the Occupied Territories in early 1988 affected him deeply and he decided at Maqassed that Sweden would help. By the time he returned to Sweden this was already fact. Cooperation was worked out with a Swedish NGO and emphasis placed on physical rehabilitation following *intifada* injuries and on mental rehabilitation.

The decision to start direct cooperation was made in 1991. Sweden then decided to upgrade its representation in Jerusalem to a diplomatic mission. Direct cooperation has four goals:

1. To alleviate the situation of the Palestinian people and to reduce their dependence on Israel through health and welfare measures;
2. To help create the basis of a future democratic society liberated from occupation;
3. To stimulate economic activity, to create employment and improve welfare;
4. To contribute to the amelioration of human rights conditions.

Components of cooperation

These are:

1. Continued assistance, especially in health and social welfare, through NGOs;
2. Support for UN activities in the Occupied Territories;
3. Direct cooperation between the Swedish government and Palestinian organisations and institutions;
4. Emergency assistance, especially following the Gulf Crisis;
5. Cooperation via Swedish organisations other than SIDA.

Swedish aid to the Occupied Territories is distributed as follows:

NGOs - \$4 million

UNRWA - \$25 million

Direct to Palestinian organisations - \$2 million

Emergency aid - none this year (\$2.7m last year)

Other organisations - very little.

The US Consul General in Jerusalem

Lecturer: H.E. Molly Williamson

Her Excellency Molly Williamson gave a personal account of her time in Jerusalem and of her commitment to the region. She said that unlike the usual US (and other countries') practice of sending diplomats to different regions for relatively short periods (usually two or three years), her own tenure, at her request, had been a long one. She said that her reason for working as a diplomat was not to travel the world and thus gain various angles on international affairs but rather to specialise in this region to which she feels attached.

On US policy in the region, she stressed what she said was a genuine commitment to peace and security in the region, the chances of achieving which were at least tangible as a result of the current peace process. Mrs. Williamson criticised those who oppose talking to representatives of the US government.

[Due to unforeseen circumstances, Her Excellency, who kindly agreed to address the seminar at short notice, could give only a short presentation and invited seminar participants to continue discussion with her at a future date.]



PALESTINIAN ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION

Six Palestinian academics - Riad Malki, Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Sa'id Zeedani, Mohammad Jadallah, Tamer Essawi and Zahira Kamal - reflecting various schools of thought on the peace process and international relations, were invited to address participants. There follows a summary of their presentations. [A two hour discussion ensued, the details of which are not presented here.]

I. The crisis as I see it in the current political situation, domestically, regionally and internationally is not necessarily only in the negotiations. I fear for what will happen in the transitional period, which may be based on Israeli conditions. If there is an agreement between Israel and Arab countries it means ending the state of war, cancelling the boycott, and starting normalisation mechanisms. Serious attention should be paid to seeing that the Arab position backs the final phase and never forgets that we are only in a transitional period.

If there is to be an agreement with the Palestinians, the Israelis will demand an end to the *intifada*. At the same time, the West will start a wave of financial investment and economic development in the region. This might mean that the transitional period will be continuous in an atmosphere of an open market and capital gains. My fear is for the final phase. If it is true that our maximum aspirations are not changed, what are the theory and practicalities behind refusing autonomy?

II. There is a consensus among all parties concerned that the negotiations are to bring us from occupation to a transitional phase which we have to struggle to make workable in the context of our aspirations. We have to put on the agenda three major issues.

1. We must maintain and strengthen the role of our political leadership and to defuse all theories and plans not only to cripple but to dismantle it. The enemy theory of the 1990s is that there will be no more PLO. It is our responsibility to

make the PLO as visible in the Occupied Territories as it is outside. I am talking about PLO institutions, not personalities.

2. Palestinian-Arab relations should be strengthened. There should be no advance on the Arab track of negotiations at the expense of the Palestinian track. Palestinians' interest is not only in the shape and content of an interim arrangement inside but also in the Palestinian refugees and diaspora. We should never close our eyes to the half a million forgotten Palestinians in Lebanon or those who have just been deported from the Gulf.

3. There should be centralised political decisions based on national consensus and our commitment to it inside and outside. We should not deal with the Israelis as factions, face the world as two separate entities or deal with an interim arrangement for the inside without political and economic compensation throughout the interim arrangement for those outside and without making sure of the linkage between the interim and final arrangements.

III. There is no escaping the interim arrangement. There is international, including Arab and Palestinian, consensus. This interim arrangement comes in the format of Camp David. We have two trends in the Palestinian camp. The first is saying it is not necessary to go into details; it sees this phase as just passing time. The second sees this phase as a base for building infrastructure and developing institutions and organisations in order to guarantee that when we enter the final stage we are going to have a state.

Concerning the practices of the opposition inside the PLO, unlike Hamas, they will commit themselves to the final resolution of the negotiations. Their opposition is based on the conditions under which we entered the negotiations.

IV. In the past few days, we have been confronted by a new wave of hard-line Israeli statements and positions. Rabin is saying, "I will crush the *intifada*," his Chief of Staff, Barak, is saying, "We will deal with the *intifada* in the Israeli way," and one of the fanatical rabbis is saying, "Palestinian rule in these territories is against Jewish religious law." On the other hand, the Palestinians began their struggle for freedom and independence as part of the Arab world. Today they are struggling as an independent entity. I ask about the depth of our pan-Arabism and how to maintain it, if not for the current negotiations then for our future.

negotiation itself. The problem here is not only that we submit proposals and scenarios but that we are not allowed to implement them, while Israel is in a position to implement what it proposes. Concerning the question of opposition, there is the opposition within the PLO (PFLP and DFLP) and the opposition outside the PLO (Hamas and Islamic trends). The new problem emerged with the statement of the ten factions from inside and outside the PLO, including Hamas, which might be considered as a new impetus to create a substitute for the PLO. This is the danger. There is still room for national dialogue and for achieving national consensus for a national charter.

VI. I would like to address the role of women, not only in the *intifada* but also for the interim arrangement. The PLO strategy is to build a state, and the agenda of the interim arrangement, as has been mentioned in previous sessions at PASSIA, is to exercise national authority towards establishing a state as the final arrangement. I say we must focus on establishing institutions which will play a major role in bringing the state to reality.

The role of women should be considered as part of the process of institution-building. They should have a role in the whole infrastructure. From my personal experience, I tell you that the way to emphasise women's roles is only through collective work and responsibility and should not under any circumstances be based on individuals.

The other point I would like to raise is the question of religion and women. I am not talking about side issues such as the *hijab* and *jilbab* (veil and women's Islamic dress). I am talking about the role of women in Islamic society: their rights and duties, and the need for improvement in gender relations to build a better society. I am not asking men, be they religious or not, intellectual or ignorant, to recognise this. Rather, I am asking women to continue struggling collectively for their equal role in building institutions and the future state.

SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

Social activity was an important element of the course programme. Not only were participants encouraged to mix and exchange ideas during breaks during the seminar, but both PASSIA and the Swedish Consulate arranged receptions wherein the participants had the opportunity to meet various leading Palestinian academics and activists and diplomats from Consulates General in Jerusalem.

Participants proved keen discussants during the seminar breaks, for which refreshments were provided by PASSIA. Interaction among themselves and with the visiting lectures was vigorous and friendly. PASSIA encouraged discussion between candidates not only in the context of the course topics but also because this was a rare opportunity for young graduates from all over the Occupied Territories to meet and establish contacts. These are the leaders of tomorrow, and it is vital that they both exploit educational and training opportunities such as those offered by PASSIA's Seminar Programme, and make links for future consultation and coordination among themselves.

To further this end, PASSIA invited all participants to a luncheon at the Philadelphia Restaurant in East Jerusalem and to a buffet at PASSIA with some of the Swedish lecturers and occasional Palestinian participants.

H.E. Mikael Dahl very kindly arranged two receptions courtesy of the Swedish Consulate, the first at the Consulate General itself and the second at the Consul General's official residence. It was stressed that PASSIA's Swedish counterparts were not only making a generous gesture to PASSIA and the Palestinian participants, but that they considered the receptions as valuable training in the art of protocol and diplomacy. Apart from the (Swedish) food and drink offered, the receptions provided the first experience for most of the participants of seeing the inside of a Consulate and a Consul General's residence. The Consul General himself gave a guided tour of the Consulate and explained the functions of each section.

Finally, PASSIA arranged a reception at the National Palace Hotel to which all Swedish and Palestinian participants were invited, along with representatives of the diplomatic corps based in Jerusalem and several Palestinian academics and heads of Palestinian institutions. Participants were thus able to meet Consuls General in an informal setting and to learn something of and establish links with different Palestinian academic organizations.

WRITING ASSIGNMENT

During November 1992, each Palestinian participants was required to write two papers (one in English and one in Arabic) on various topics related to the lectures and workshops mentioned above. The papers written in English are presented below.

The Effect of the Media

Marina D. Barham

The media plays a major role in communicating ideas and opinions of people, governments and nations. The different media channels make it possible to communicate information and ideas to different types of audience. For people who can read and write, the most effective channel for them to absorb such information and ideas is through newspapers, articles, journals and books. T.V. and radio are the most successful ways of communicating news to those people who do not read and write and for those who spend hours and hours listening to the radio or watching T.V.

Channels of media are part of the necessities of life among individuals, groups and nations. The media play a very important role between people. Media channels represent the position of the different sides of any issue. They also represent public opinion about a certain case or the official position of a government towards an issue, if such a channel is controlled by an official authority as is the case of some newspapers or magazines, radio or T.V.

Through this essay I am going to discuss the effects of the media on several issues and give examples. The media plays an important role between sides of a conflict through the following :

1. Using a certain language which serves the national issue.
2. Distorting facts, contradicting the news and responding to the news

- delivered by the other side of the conflict.
3. Showing and concentrating on internal differences of the other side of the issue by making them facts in order to win the political battles among both parties of a conflict.
 4. Using the media as a propaganda channel and as a tool to be used for psychological war.
 5. Imitating the role of journalists and media people without respect for the profession or the freedom of expression.

In general there are several other objectives and aims for the media which makes all media channels controlled by the authority in power.

The Media as an authority

All over the world the media are considered the fourth powerful authority that exists. We can notice that very clearly in the Arab world, where the media people occupy the most powerful status in their country, and they do gain that status from their governments which could be looked at as a bribe.

A clear example of this has been taking place in Egypt since the Egyptian revolution in 1956. Since that time the media in Egypt have been praising the then Egyptian President, Jamal Abdul Nasser, and continued to do so with all presidents until Husni Mubarak. If we recall the political developments which took place in Egypt between all presidents, we can clearly see that the Egyptian media, which are considered the most powerful in the Arab World, have always been praising the persons in leadership no matter who they are or what their names are.

The authority in control is always using and directing the media to serve that authority through hiding the opposition point of view. Not covering the internal conflicts or showing the mistakes of the authority in charge and the human rights violations in a certain country prove that the media here are serving the authority. This is similar to what takes place in the Gulf countries in general and in Saudi Arabia specifically. The Gulf War in 1990 through Western media channels revealed several serious issues which were never raised before by the local media.

The media are one of the most important channels of communication of

the Gulf War, during which the residents of the Occupied Territories depended only on the Israeli media for information, since there was a belief that other media were not giving clear information about the situation in the Gulf area. The Palestinian people were totally dependent on either the Israeli media or on the CNN reports which made it possible to put psychological pressure on the Palestinians and even made some of them disbelieve or change their political positions and principles. Through T.V. and radio which were the only possible channels of information during the war, Palestinian individuals were not given time to think, instead they were directed into believing what the media wanted them to believe.

This is what usually happens in most of the countries of the Third World, where people follow the points of view of the authority only. People negatively follow the authority in power and this is clearly seen whenever a coup in countries of the Third World takes place. The same people who praise the leader in power are those who praise the leader of the coup. This proves that the media follow the authority and so people follow indirectly the authority by following the media. The above rarely takes place in developed countries because there is freedom of expression.

Trust of the Public in the Media

The truth of the media comes from the public themselves, since the public believes in the different media channels and is convinced by whatever it read or hears. Through believing and trusting the media and its information, the public supports the media, which are usually directed by the authorities, directing the public's attention to issues which serve the authority and its being in control.

Using the media could be clearly seen when the American forces attacked Nicaragua to remove General Ortega, who was accused of trading with drugs, from his position as a President. This was a political action, because General Ortega was well known for his anti-American policy. The American authority used the media to publicise that Ortega is a drug dealer, and not an army general, which made the American public opinion bless the attack and give it an official status.

The above example proves that the public trust whatever the media says, that is why media channels are always sought to be controlled by the authority.

The Media and the Opposition

In most of the Third World countries, the opposition lacks coverage by the media each in his country. The opposition in such countries usually uses illegal channels to spread its ideas, beliefs and messages through to the public. Those channels are not guaranteed to be widely spread to the public.

The South African example is a good one, where the media was totally controlled by the white authorities. The opposition which formed the majority depended on typed leaflets, which were distributed by hand or through national songs for getting their message through to the public. The international community started paying attention to the South African problem after years of suffering and suppression only after the international and the European media in particular started covering the problem of the South African blacks. Some European and American states started boycotting South African products causing financial loss to the South African government and so forced the government to give the black people some of their rights. We can see clearly the effect and the important role that the media played in changing the whole situation of a nation.

In countries of the area, we always notice that the opposition is always suppressed. We confirm here that journalism and media represent power and authority in suppressing weak nations. For example, what was occurring in Jordan before the *intifada* of the south. No freedom of expression existed in Jordan before it, but after that some kind of freedom was achieved but with some limitations. A new law which prohibits any attack on the royal family, on religious beliefs and anything that endangers the state security, was issued after some calls for democracy in Jordan.


The above also applied to the media in Kuwait before 1986, but when Sheikh Jabber Al-Ahmad al-Sabbah, took over authority, he restricted the media and used media channels for the benefit of one authority only, his authority.

Even developed countries use the media for their own purposes, through making life easy for people who own the different media channels, in order to weaken the points of view of those who oppose the government. Developed countries also use the media through legal gaps, on the pretext that they are defending the right of the citizen or the individual. Another example on this is the British government, which influences the media channels, and makes them support the authority or the party in power.

















In Third World countries, and especially in the Arab world, in every newspaper we find an employee called the censor. This employee is usually appointed by the government, and has the role of omitting and cancelling certain articles and items which might not please the authority or the government. So most of the persons in charge of those newspapers or magazines always claim that they did not include a certain article, because the censor did not approve such item or an article, because as we mentioned before that even owners of media channels are controlled by the authority.

Based on the above the opposition always tends to use manual media channels, similar to what is happening in the Occupied Territories. Such leaflets are published once and are usually issued through a society or a university magazine or typed leaflets.

In the media in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and especially since the Gulf War, no attention is paid to the writers who have different beliefs from those who are in the leadership, "opposition writers", and this creates a gap among the Palestinian people. Not giving the opposition the needed coverage in a homeland under occupation, to show differences between brothers, will cause the breaking of national unity. That misuse of the media inside and outside the Occupied Territories and the Israeli media, in particular, the chance to show the Palestinian people as people who are not committed to their beliefs and who are quarreling together.

The Media and Minorities

The press and the media always try to neglect minorities and their rights, despite the fact that international law protects the right of minorities. These minorities most of the time have their own media and press. Wrong news are usually spread, especially when a problem arises. Such events which might affect the authority, similar to what took place in San Francisco. The government wanted to distract the public attention from the results of the Gulf war, by concentrating all media channels on the incidents of the black minority in San Francisco.

On the other hand, the authorities most of the time direct the media channels to concentrate on internal differences of the minority, as the Israeli

media does by showing the religious differences among the Christian community.

The Effect of the Media on the Policy of the States

The media's attention has been always concentrating on one area of the Middle East, that is Israel. The main objective was to influence international public opinion so as to support the State of Israel. In 1987 the *intifada* of the Palestinian people started, and this was an extraordinary event which made the media, especially the international media, interested to cover, showing the Palestinians for the first time as a nation suppressed, under occupation. The international media was obliged to clarify the idea that there are two nations in one country. All this had affected international public opinion which started to sympathise with the Palestinian people. The international community started to financially support the Palestinian people.

Even the position of those who supported Israel because of their strategic interests in the area have also changed because of the international media. All this pressure caused a change in the policies of several governments towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. During the visit of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was seen on T.V. screens in Nablus in a serious argument with Israeli soldiers. This news item made the British people re-study their political position towards Israel.

We have also seen several international officials, after their visits to the Occupied Territories and after seeing the sufferings of the residents of Occupied Territories, their statements which were on the spur of the moment, reflected a certain change in the position of their governments, which sometimes contradicts their government's announced policy towards the Palestinian issue.

The strong effect of the media on the public opinion can be clearly seen all over the world. We can confirm that the media are considered the fourth authority in the developed countries, not only for people in power, but also in the reach of the public opinion, towards a certain event, and all is based on the trust of the public of the media channels.

The media are also used to direct the public attention from a hot area to another, as happened in the case of South Africa, when the *intifada* started. The press was concentrating on the events of South Africa, until all that attention was transferred to the *intifada* incidents. Many countries started sympathising with the

international people. It was clearly shown in the recognition of the Palestinian state by 140 states of the world. Public opinion was ready to accept such a state, since they were sympathetic towards the Palestinian people, which was achieved through the media coverage of *intifada* incidents.

The international media also directed public opinion towards finding a peace solution in the Middle East area, and even made the Israeli voter think seriously before voting.

The Local Media

The local media lack several issues which are considered to be the basis of the media. In general, the local media lack the following:

1. Political analysts who are capable of analyzing the news in an objective way and not through personal beliefs. This causes the different media channels to be contradicting to one another in their analysis of the daily news.
2. Economical and agricultural analysts who are also needed to analyze the economical and agricultural situation. The lack of such specialists makes farmers and people of commerce avoid following the media, since such media are not interested in them or their work.
3. If we also look closely at local journalism, we would find it lacking professional journalism and specialized media personnel. Most of those working in the media earned their position either through experience or through short term causes. Reading news produced by unprofessional people negatively affects the audience.

The above means that economical, commercial and agricultural reporting are missing from the local media. The lack and shortages of such reporting in the local media are a result of not having the necessary authority which would take upon itself to provide news and information in a better form and with a better content. Lacking all of the above makes us depend on western and Israeli media channels which are different in their traditions and habits from our culture and our people. Depending on such channels causes a mental and political contradiction to the community through publishing and spreading mixed news

which ultimately weaken the local political writer who does not have a clear place in the local media.

Another important point which weakens the local media is being slow in getting the event or the news. Lacking proper developed methods of communication channels makes it difficult and almost impossible for the local media to cover an international event or even a local one by their own sources, due to the fact that we are under occupation, and all media channels are controlled by the authority. Local media depend for their sources on Israeli radio and T.V. or other written material which is translated from the Hebrew press. This translated material affects the mentality of the Palestinian individual who depends totally for his/her information on the local media channels. The language used in such translated news serves one side only and that is the Israeli side, and henceforth affects the Palestinians way of thinking since not everybody is aware of such points. All the above is caused because we do not have specialized people who can foresee such dangers.

The local media also suffer from Israeli military procedures which are taken against Palestinian newspapers and journalists who are not free to express their opinions and points of view without being threatened with punishment by the Israeli authorities.

The Palestinian press has been put under strict military censorship and being continuously closed by the authorities, since journalism is looked at as a political activity. According to al-Haq's information, censorship in the Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip takes many forms, which include the following:

1. Excessive resort to military closure, often with the apparent aim of preventing external monitoring of events, particularly by the press;
2. Physically assaulting members of the press corps;
3. Detention of journalists by the authorities, the impersonation of journalists (usually in order to arrest Palestinians) and the confiscation of film from journalists in order to identify particular individuals, with the result that journalists are regarded with suspicion by Palestinians.
4. Restricting journalistic access to Palestinian sources of information

through the closure of Palestinian press offices and the confiscation of materials from journalists' mail boxes in the Beit Agron Government Press Office.

In this essay I tried to show how great is the effect of the media and the press channels on public opinion and ultimately on changing policies or positions of individuals, groups, institutions and governments towards issues and events that concern the public opinion.

The coverage of the Palestinian issue was one of most important issues which had a great impact on some governments and nations. The whole look on the Palestinian people was changed through the media and their coverage of events in the Occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Palestinians need to concentrate more on the media aspect, not on the local level only but also on the international level. Local journalism and media need professionalism in order to work independently from all other sources and achieve the needed level of accuracy for the sake of the people. National institutions should give more attention to the media and people working in the press since through such channels some of rights of the Palestinian people might be achieved. Further studies in this field need to be conducted.

Why is it Considered Important to Have a Fairly Rigid Structure of Rules of Protocol?

Raja Hikmat Abughazaleh

Protocol has been part of life for thousands of years. Scenes painted in Egyptian tombs and the writings of early times tell of the strict rules that applied to various phases of life and death. The sculptured reliefs on the ruined walls of Persepolis show the order of procession imposed upon the tribute bearers at the court of Cyrus the Great 2,500 years ago. As times change, so do the manners of the people, and protocol must change and develop with developing official life.

The term "protocol" is derived from the Greek word protokollen. "Protos" means the first, and "kollo" means glue. This refers to a sheet of paper glued to the front of a notarial document giving it authenticity. For many years the word

was used to signify the forms observed in the official correspondence of the government department in charge of foreign relations and in drafting diplomatic documents, now it has taken on a much wider meaning. Also it is the glue that holds official life in our society together, whether on the local, state, national, or international level.

One of the cardinal rules in protocol is the observance of the order of precedence at all functions where officials of a government or its representatives are present. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the nations laid down the rules of precedence based on diplomatic titles. Envoys of equal title were ranked according to the date and hour they presented their letters of credentials rather than the size or influence of the nation the envoy represented. That procedure is still practised today. All heads of missions are received by the Head of State, the chief of protocol will escort the Ambassador through the diplomatic reception room. Within the ambassadors and ministers categories, heads of mission rank according to the date of the presentation of their credentials. The Chargé d’Affaires *ad interim* rank according to the latest date on which they began substituting for the Chiefs of Missions. For diplomatic officers other than Chiefs of Missions, precedence is governed by the length of time an individual served in the embassy in a specific grade. At ceremonies where the diplomatic corps is invited as a body, it should precede all other groups. Wives of diplomats enjoy the same privileges and immunities as their husbands and are entitled to the same precedence. The consular corps always rank after the diplomatic corps. All formal communications between a diplomatic mission and the foreign government in whose capital it is situated are made by or on behalf of the head of mission and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, except where special permission has been for dealing with another department.

Heads of Mission are entitled to fly their national flag on their residence and the premises of their mission at all times in order to mark their own national occasions, and to those of the state in which they are situated. On occasions when national mourning is officially prescribed, whether in the sending state or in the host state, flags are flown at half mast. They are normally flown in this manner only on the day of the funeral; but in the event of the death until the day of the funeral except on the date of the proclamation of the accession of the new Sovereign. When a number of flags of different countries are flown from individual flagstuffs the place of honour should be assigned to the national flag, the others being arranged alternatively to the right and left of this central point in the alphabetical order of the countries represented.

equivalent to an insult to his position and the country he represents. The history of diplomacy is interspersed with incidents of strained relations, and sometimes open hostility has arisen because of failure to give proper recognition to the rank or order of precedence of an official of a government. Courteous people, regardless of nationality or rank, are concerned with addressing each other properly. "The Honorable" is the prepared title used in addressing most high ranking officials, in office or retired. It is never used by the person who holds the office in issuing or answering invitations or on personal stationery or calling cards. "His Excellency" applies to a foreign Head of State, head of government, foreign cabinet officer, foreign Ambassador, or foreign high official. "Esquire" may be used in addressing a lawyer, the clerk of the supreme court, officers of other courts. When it is used the individual personal title (Mr., Dr.) is omitted.

Rules of protocol require that the first calls are made by the newly arrived, this is common in military and diplomatic circles and to a lesser extent in official government. For many years official calling followed a rigid set of rules. One rule was that all officials were expected to express respect to those of a higher rank than their own by leaving cards at the homes of those superior in rank. Such action is no longer obligatory. Calling upon the official, however, may be just the leaving of cards with no attempt being made to see those upon whom the call is made. The most convenient times for social calls are between eleven and twelve o'clock in the morning, and between three and five o'clock in the afternoon. At those hours the hostess is not expected to offer anything to eat or drink during the calls unless she wishes to do so. A formal call should last between ten to fifteen minutes. Conversation during the call may be light and general rather than brilliant or philosophical. If the caller does not wish to be received but simply wishes to express respect, it may be done by leaving cards with whoever answers the door. Where calling is the custom in the community, the following practice is followed. A man should leave a card for another man and one for the wife. An additional card is left for other ladies over eighteen years of age in the same household. A woman leaves a card for each lady of the house over eighteen years, but never for a man. Brief messages are often written on calling cards. The cards are never handed to the person on whom one is calling, cards are never placed in an envelope except when mailed, or when left at the reception desk of an apartment or hotel.

Another rule of protocol is the rule of invitation and replies. Formal invitations to official luncheons, reception or dinners may be completely engraved, semi-engraved, or hand written, but are always worded in the third person. Formal invitations may also be extended by telephone or telegraph. Formal invitations are always engraved with black ink on a plain white card. Invitations to formal dances and wedding receptions are engraved on the first page of fine-quality plain folded sheets. The date and hour of the invitation are always spelled out on the engraved invitation, only the day and month are capitalized. Envelopes of all invitations should be hand written in a black ink and addressed in the full name of the husband and wife unless the guest is single. Invitation for formal function should be sent two or three weeks in advance of the date of the event. Invitations should not be requested for oneself to any function. A diplomat may, when a colleague or high official of his own country passes through the post to which he is accredited, ask his other colleagues in the diplomatic corps to include the visitor in official and diplomatic functions where the invitation list is not limited. Sometimes it is impossible to send an invitation in advance to a formal function, so it is possible to make it by phone and as soon as acceptance is received, it should be followed by a hand written, or engraved reminder card. For informal invitations, a visiting card, single note card, or informal with the words "To Remind" written in the upper left corner. Also invitations may be sent by telegram and in case of formal events, the wording is in the third person and follows the engraved form. In informal events the form is simple but complete one similar to a personal note invitation. Personal notes are not correct for official functions regardless of the number of guests.

Personal contacts and friendly exchanges are very important because they cut across problems and conflicts. The basic purpose of official entertaining is to help achieve one's state's policy objectives, domestic, and foreign. Official luncheons and dinners are given in honour of a Chief of State, Head of Government, or other distinguished foreign visitors. Certain rules should be followed to avoid tension and chaos. When a state luncheon or dinner is reported in the press, few people realize the amount of planning and long hours of work that are needed to make such functions a success. Usually a dinner for a hundred guests involves a minimum of expenditure of 250 man-hours by the office of the Chief of Protocol alone. When selecting the date of the official function the guest of honour is given a choice of several dates. Official dinners are held at 8:00 p.m, and luncheons at 12:30 p.m. The number of guests to be asked will depend on the persons concerned and on the degree to which the principal guest is to be

official functions: Host, Guest of Honour, Hostess, Wife of guest of Honour.

One should not go through a receiving line holding a drink or cigarette, also it is considered extremely rude to bring ones cigarette to the table, or to smoke through the meal. Usually the first to leave the table are the ones who sat at the right of the host and hostess, whether they are the actual guests of honour or not. Table seating for formal official luncheons and dinners is a necessary procedure when entertaining government officials, foreign dignitaries, and other distinguished persons in international social life. At mixed official luncheons and dinners, the place of honour for male guests is to the right of the hostess. The man next in rank sits on the left of the hostess. The next lady, on the left of the host, the host and hostess may sit either at opposite ends of the table or across from each other at the middle of table. Women are seated at dinner according to the rank of their husbands, unless they hold official position themselves, in which case they are placed where their official position dictates. It is desirable that the total number of persons at the table not be number divisible by four in order to alternate men and women between the host and hostess. It is desirable, if at all possible, to avoid placing two men or two women next to each other. Engaged couples are always seated together, while one should avoid seating a man and his wife together. When selecting the menu for an official event, it is wise to remember that some foreign people have dietary restrictions. Menus should always be tested in advance so that changes can be made if necessary. The standard size of a menu card is 4" x 6" although some departments prefer slightly larger cards to include the name and title of the honoured guest in addition to a department name and date of the event. A toast is the verbal greeting and tribute to the guest of honour and tendered to him by the departmental official who may be host at dinner or luncheon honouring the distinguished foreign visitor. The toast is proposed towards the end of the dessert course. If the guest is being honoured at a formal dinner, champagne will be served and enough of this should be left in one's glass to drink the toast or toasts proposed at this time. Refusals are more considerate to the host than leaving filled glasses untouched. Where there are strained relations with a country, the basic concept in toasting is to mention friendship between the two peoples, improved relations, and toast all those who are present - and hope they enjoyed their visit. If the guest is a member of a foreign government, the toast is always drunk to the Chief of State or Head of Government. The person who extends the invitations should send the guest of honour a copy of the speech or toast he intends to propose in order to

enable the guest to prepare a reply. When it is an important political meeting, the reply is also communicated in advance. The national language of the guest of honour should be used on the occasion of the toast. When this language cannot be used, another language known to both speakers is chosen or interpreters can be used. In replying to a toast, the guidelines below should be followed: thanks for the Welcome; an expression of the considerations that motivated the meeting and the affirmation of the sentiments manifested; the good wishes of the Chief of State for the prosperity of the country and the people he is visiting.

The practice of "turning the table", i.e. all guests simultaneously following the lead of the hostess in shifting conversation from the right to the left - is now outdated. It is acceptable to talk with immediate dinner companions to the right and left and also across the table if it reasonably narrow. At the end of a meal the hostess, if it is a mixed party, gives the signal to leave the table. The ladies leave first, senior guests preceding, then the men in the same order, unless the men are staying in the dining room for coffee and liqueurs. The most frequent and usual form of after-dinner entertainment is conversation. Usually seating arrangements in drawing rooms and sitting rooms allow for small groups to converse. Usually, those who sat at the right of the host and hostess during dinner, whether they are the actual guests of honour or or not, are the first to leave. At the end of a professional performance, or about one hour after the end of dinner, they rise to say goodbye. It is courteous for guests to write and thank the hostess after dinner or luncheon. Such a note should be written within three or four days. The wife writes on behalf of her husband and herself. If there is no hostess, the husband thanks the host on behalf of his wife and himself.

With the advent of increasing institutionalisation of basic protocol activities in such areas as official visits, exchange of credences, treaty-making, reception, as well as state funerals, there arose the necessity for an office within the department of state to be responsible for the continuing administration of these activities in consistent and uniformly acceptable pattern. Here is a description of some of the duties of the office of the Chief of Protocol.

It meets a Chief of State, head of government, and scores of VIPs. It worries over the protection of embassies, accredits foreign diplomatic and consular representatives as well as official representatives and employees of international organisations. It settles complicated questions involving taxation and civil and criminal jurisdiction for state authorities. It is a real estate office dealing

plans and arranges for all official functions in the department's diplomatic reception rooms. It conducts official and ceremonial functions, and co-ordinates Protocol matters for presidential and vice-presidential trips abroad. Gifts and decoration from foreign governments come under Protocol purview. Also in consultation and co-ordination with the country directors, Protocol drafts messages of congratulation to heads of foreign government on national days. Keeping track of diplomatic employees, and other members of foreign government residing and working in the state. Maintenance of these records is still another major function of the office of Protocol. The Protocol office obtains diplomatic (DPL) Licence Plates and publishes the book, known as the official Diplomatic List of foreign consular officers.

Between communities, or within them, the absence of any commonly expected structure of relationships will give rise to an interaction regulated by vagiary and violence. In the relations of states, as in those of individuals, there is often a need merely for standardised forms, set procedures on which each party is able to rely. And any organization or society must, if it is to thrive, operate under certain rules if for no other reason than to prevent chaos. The same applies to relations between governments.

It is necessary that contacts between nations be according to universally accepted rules and customs and forms of planned organisation, that is protocol. Rigid rules of protocol also are vital in assuring that relations between the officials of organisations and governments are conducted with minimum friction and maximum efficiency.

Why is it Considered Important to Have a Fairly Rigid Structure of Rules of Protocol?

Nesrin. R. Hanbali

The main objective of any state in its relations with other states is to direct and influence these relations for its own maximum advantage; but at the same time, and if only in self-interest, it has the responsibility of formulating its policies towards other states and managing its relations in the interests of world harmony, thus helping to prevent wars and the waste of wealth. The formulation of foreign

policy is the task of the politician, while the management of international relations and reconciliation of diverse foreign policy priorities is the task of the diplomat.

The basis of diplomacy is communication, of thoughts and ideas, between the governments of states, and to an increasing extent with international organisations, and this can be effected directly between heads of government or indirectly through the intermediary of written correspondence or of an ambassador, but diplomatic relations in general can only be conducted indirectly, and centuries of experience have shown that the person of an Ambassador rarely works on his own; he is the head of a diplomatic mission which, working together as a team, acts as a link between government and government or between government and international organisation.

Diplomacy is an art and a science. It is the science of the international relations and the art of communicating with others. For a long time, countries have insisted on relations among them adopting methods held on principles that have become the rules that these countries follow to strengthen their relations and to serve their public interests. Exchange of diplomatic relationships between two countries is the first sign of friendly relations between them. So diplomatic activity has had a great role, to keep on these relations and to develop them.

Many international conventions, agreements and alliances have declared principles to be conducted among independent countries and the involved countries have been eager to respect the obligations that were clearly stated to serve their public interests and to create peace around the world. Accordingly, diplomacy was considered to be a wide knowledge of these conventions, agreements and alliances or in other words, a knowledge of the rights and duties of one country towards another and the rights and duties of one country towards the whole international society.

The international customs and traditions have confessed permanent or fixed principles that should be followed by a diplomatic representative to succeed in his formal work. Therefore, he should have great knowledge of them, in other words, he should be familiar with all these principles. Some of these principles were well-known and regimented but most of them depend on the diplomat's behaviour and his reactions to surroundings and towards certain circumstances. Since "man" is of great importance in the field of diplomacy, because of that, he should be of certain qualifications and virtues (which are not applied in other fields), so as to be a well-qualified diplomat. The first of these virtues is called

all the aspects of his behaviour and character, besides being voluptuary to all the aspects of social life so as to help him achieve satisfaction and influence on others.

Secondly, the objective virtues, which includes his "mental virtue", that means that a diplomat should not live in his ivory tower, he should be objective, of simple way of thinking, besides being flexible with all different trends and opinions. The objective virtues also include the cultural virtue, that is a diplomat should be a good reader and a pioneer of knowledge to the developments of all international problems and events taking place in this world.

What about the second section of diplomacy, which is practical application or diplomacy as an art of dealing with others. This is guided by a collection of principles either registered ones or those applied according to customs and traditions. All these rules and habits are called Protocol.

There are other principles that are guided by sense; that means the diplomat behaves in certain conditions using his sixth sense according to what is applied. And this can be gained by practice. These principles or rules are called "etiquette". So protocol is the limits that control the diplomat, according to the rules which are familiar in his formal work, while etiquette is the rules of behaviour or conduct that a diplomat must follow in dealing with others.

The rules and principles of protocol in the past were more conservative than today as they are getting simpler, even though the basic ones are still fixed. The principles and rules of etiquette are getting simpler but its fundamental or basic principles are still fixed, so long as the motive is good treatment and behaviour and raising the cultural human relations to high standard.

Diplomatic protocol is an essential means for a diplomat to represent his government's attitudes politely and accurately. Some aspects of diplomatic protocol are summarized in the following.

1. Orders of precedence: a diplomatic agent is concerned with four orders of precedence. They are precedence between Heads of Diplomatic Missions; individual precedence within a mission; individual precedence of diplomats at formal or diplomatic functions; precedence of heads of missions within the national order of precedence.

2. Correspondence and communication between a diplomatic mission and the host government: all formal communications between a diplomatic mission and the foreign government in whose capital it is situated are made by or on behalf of the head of mission and to the ministry of foreign affairs or its equivalent.
3. Demonstrations: a diplomatic mission may find itself approached by a group of people asking for an interview with the Ambassador or a member of his staff. An embassy thus approached has various options. The most commonly adopted are: to keep the door shut; to accept the petition without comment; to invite the spokespersons of the group in and explain the home government's position. If the demonstration appears to be getting out of hand the chief of Protocol (or, better still, the police diplomatic protection unit, if such exists) should be advised without delay. "The receiving state is under a special duty to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity" - 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 22, paragraph 2).
4. Flags: Heads of Missions are entitled to fly their national flag on their residence and premises of their missions at all times, and it is the practice to do so to mark their own national occasions and those of the state in which they are situated.
5. Dress: the rules regarding dress for diplomats vary considerably between countries, and depend largely on tradition, custom and climate, the increasing trend being towards informality.
6. State ceremonies: it usually falls to the chief of the Department of Protocol to plan and execute arrangements for state ceremonies and these are most commonly inaugurations, visits, anniversaries of national significance and funerals.
7. Official mourning: observance of official mourning may be declared by a head of mission's own government, or by the host government in which case it applies to the diplomatic corps as a whole.

About the privileges and immunities of a diplomat, we have to assure that the privileged position of diplomats in a society is traditional. But it is not for this

carry out their diplomatic functions satisfactorily. They should be utterly free from pressures, whether legal, physical or moral, that the state in which they are serving may be able to impose on them. Privileges and immunities accorded to the diplomatic mission and their functions are also applicable to the United Nations and its functions under the 1946 convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, though the application of the Convention varies in different states.

Here is a summary of the principles contained in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations which has been accepted by an overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations as representing an internationally agreed codification of modern diplomatic law.

1. Privileges and immunities in respect of the mission. Its functions are:

Inviolability and immunity of premises and property; inviolability of records, documents, correspondence and archives; freedom and inviolability of communications; the diplomatic bag, pouch or valise. A2 diplomatic bag usually falls into one of two categories depending on the importance of its contents, accompanied or unaccompanied. The diplomatic bag is inviolable: it may not be opened or detained, and every facility must be given for its swift despatch. It may be carried by a diplomatic courier who is entitled to the protection of the state which he is visiting or in which he is serving in the performance of his functions, and he enjoys personal inviolability; exemption from taxation; and rights to import and exemption from customs duties.

2. Personal privileges and immunities are divided into full diplomatic privileges and immunities and limited diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The first are applicable to diplomatic agents and members of their families forming part of their household, provided they are not national or permanent residents of the state in which the diplomatic agent is serving. They have the following immunities: personal inviolability and protection; immunity from criminal jurisdiction; immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction; inviolability of correspondence; exemption from liability for public service; exemption from liability to serve as a witness; exemption from national and local taxation; exemption from customs duties; exemption from social security

provisions; exemption from inspection of personal luggage; freedom of travel.

Those with limited privileges and immunities are entitled to the full immunities given to a diplomatic agent except that immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction does not extend to acts performed outside the course of their duty; and to full diplomatic privileges except that they are not exempt from the inspection of their luggage and exemption from customs duties is limited. Limited privileges and immunities are afforded to three categories of the staff of a mission, those who are nationals or permanent resident of the state in which they are serving, members of the administrative and technical staff, and private servants of members of the mission. The immunity granted to a diplomat and members of his family by the host state does not exempt them from the jurisdiction of their own state.

As has been mentioned, diplomatic privileges and immunities are important to be strengthened and assured for common peacefulness that helps diplomats in their tasks to show respect and to keep on good relations with other countries. Mistreatment of envoys means maltreatment to the other country and that might lead to tension in relations which might cause a declaration of war between these countries.

So protocol is proved to be of great importance as it has the task of organizing relations between countries and relations between a diplomatic mission and the host state so as to simplify the contacts among them. This needs a complete and more accurate explanation than mentioned in this essay, but according to what has been mentioned previously, it is essential to get a powerful and a fair-minded system of protocol to govern the relations conducted between countries in certain principles and rules, to be more comprehensive and to avoid misunderstanding which leads to tension in relations or even to a terminating of relations and withdrawal of diplomatic status and, accordingly, outbreak of war.

It is worth mentioning that besides familiar principles and rules of protocol the diplomat should be creative, acting cleverly and skilfully for developing friendships, being trusted and investing his mental abilities and his experience in his country's interest and good reputation and its protection. So a diplomat has got privileges that are not available for high rank officials, and the host country guarantees him immunities which are not available in other careers. Also he is

this idealism contradicts with his own individual freedom.

Common Interest Between a/the Palestinian State and Small to Medium-sized States in the Field of International Relations

Sawsan Huleileh

Palestine is expected to have a population of 2.5-3.5 million by the end of this decade, on an area that does not exceed 6,000 square kilometers. These basic facts make Palestine one of the smallest and most densely populated countries in the world. In the context of the Middle East (excluding the small Gulf states), Palestine will be a very tiny state when compared to most of the Arab countries. It will be similar only to its neighbours Lebanon, Jordan and Israel.

The expected GNP of Palestine in the next few years will be around \$4 billion, that is a little less than that of Jordan and Lebanon, a quarter of that of Tunisia and Syria, and less than one tenth of that of Israel.

The above mentioned indicators show that a future Palestinian state as far as geography, demography and productivity are concerned will be similar mainly to Jordan and Lebanon. What could be unique about the Palestinian state is the huge presence and influence of diaspora Palestinians in the region, and the world in general. This factor could bring more strength to the state economy and to its status in the region.

The international community, on the eve of 21st century, is trying to face economic difficulties by forming different kinds of blocs. While the world until recently has been divided at the economic and military levels into two separate blocs, the ex-socialist countries on one

side, and the western capitalist countries on the other, and while other kinds of world-wide groupings have emerged in the last few decades (like North-South relations, the non-aligned movement countries, and the Islamic countries) the new century is going to witness a new formation of international alliances. With the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and the weakness of the non-aligned countries, efforts are now geared towards

restructuring the power system at the international and regional levels. Unified Germany within the European Community, and Japan, will have a big role to play in the so-called "New World Order". Their international role will be reflected in their membership in the Security Council of the U.N. as well as other international fora.

On the regional level, the eighties witnessed different groupings in the Arab world: the Union of North African States, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Fertile Crescent, forming their own regional alliances. Previous attempts in the sixties and seventies failed to formulate a strong alliance within these countries. In the case of the Gulf countries, the attempts had better chances of success because of the similarities in the history and regimes of these states. In the nineties, Iraq tried to fill the power vacuum in the region which resulted from the weakness of the former Soviet Union, but failed to do so because it could not form a viable regional alliance, and had eventually to face the American-led coalition alone.

Within that context Palestine cannot assert its presence and effective role without forming strong regional coalitions. The peculiarity of the Palestinian case comes from at least two sources:

First, Palestine is being born out of decades of conflict and enmity wherein it had experienced war not only with Israel but also with the neighbouring Arab countries (Jordan in 1971, Syria in 1976 and '83, and Kuwait in 1991). This birth will force Palestine to protect its borders and people by different, primarily non-military, means. At the same time, it seems that the best guarantee of stability and security in the region is a tightly-knit multi-dimensional cooperation process. The mere fact that access from West Bank to Gaza goes through Israel, and the fact that tens of thousands of Palestinian workers are expected to continue to work in Israel at least for a few years, leads to the conclusion that special security arrangements have to be established between Palestine and some of its neighbouring countries.

Second, the economic aspect: Palestine with its meagre natural resources is most likely going to rely on tourism and export-oriented commodities. In order to catch up with the achievements of the neighbouring countries in the field of exports, a network of economic relations has to be established, strengthening the aspects of the local agreements with the neighbouring countries of Jordan, Egypt and Israel concerning transit trade.

The Palestinian people have experienced a long history of human rights violations both in the neighbouring autocratic countries in which they have been hosted and, above all, under the Israeli occupation. Being an optimist, I can feel that the Palestinians are very eager to enjoy democracy and are very sensitive to respect for human rights. With freedom of speech, division of powers, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, with periodic elections, Palestine is going to be a real democracy. Moreover, Palestine should be supportive of human rights in other countries, regardless of their location, although I believe that priority should go to the domestic and then the regional arenas.

Common Interest with Small and Medium-Sized States on the International Level

In addition to democracy and the regional cooperation between Palestine and its neighbouring countries, it is important to underscore the significance of establishing friendly relations at the international level. The Palestinians have learned the lesson of having international support at the governmental, non-governmental and inter-governmental levels. The existence and legitimacy of this state depends to a great extent on a complex network of international legality and international commitments that Palestine should respect. There is an increasing need for international cooperation and interest to seek security through alliances. The big powers tend to act from their own national interests that are defined very widely which causes problems for small countries, so international cooperation is thus more important to small countries than for big powers.

Being a small country, Palestine has to establish special relations with countries which have similar fears and worries, countries that are in need of allies and friends. Strength for small countries at international fora, without having the pre-requisites of either a strong economy or a large army, requires stable and tightly-knit relationships between small countries if they are to be able to withstand the threat of domination and control by big powers. It is wise for a small country to respect international law.

Small countries cannot defend themselves without justice and or without the protection of such an international body as the United Nations. Small countries should be committed to settlement of disputes by peaceful means. By

U.N. is not meant the current U.N. body. Substantial changes should be made to guarantee a powerful and active body not an impotent and weak U.N. as it has been throughout the years. I believe that concrete changes should be made to give the U.N. more power. By that I mean the veto system has to be abolished in order for the U.N. to be more independent from the political power of the big states. The U.N. in its current situation serves only the interests of the big powers and not international law. So if a small or medium-sized state faces a problem, neither world opinion nor U.N. resolutions can change anything but rather the interest of a powerful state can put an end to this dispute.

Palestine should take an active role in supporting international law, the Geneva Conventions and U.N. Resolutions. It should see to it that all of the above be implemented, because Palestine shares the common fear of small countries that a day will come when it will be in great need of these laws (despite the fact that we have paid a heavy price in the double standards of the implementation of international law through the years of Israeli occupation). Furthermore, Palestine as a new country whose people have experienced oppression by different regimes and authorities, will inherit a body of laws and regulations that have been enacted through the years by British, Jordanian and Israelis. A reform of the legal system is urgently needed. In addition, this young state has to adopt certain structures of government that serve the interests and well-being of the Palestinian people, their ideals and their long-term goals. So learning from the experiences of other states in a more or less similar situation is highly desirable. Palestinians will need to adopt a certain system for their elections and government structure, etc. The influence here will be from similarly-sized countries for practical reasons.

These reflections lead us to the conclusion that we need experience and know-how in state-building. The decision as whether to have a centralised or decentralised government could be a political decision, yet the size of a country like Palestine (Jordan, Tunisia, Lebanon) would be different from that of China, the U.S.A, or even France. Palestine cannot implement the structure of those governments, we need to look at similarly-sized countries and populations because it would be smoother and more appropriate to our state.

Issa Qasasiyah

Concepts like self-determination, human rights, democracy and free will are closely related to signify a civil society based entirely on the process of democratisation. In fact, such concepts are immediately identified with westernisation, liberalization and modernization which go side-by-side with the traditional Islamic Arab culture.

The Palestinian society has a unique experience if it is compared with that of the Arab society in general. Along its tumultuous history, the Palestinian society had to deal with political Zionism, an ideology that is basically colonial. This extra burden had transformed the Palestinian society from a partitioned and parochial society into a transitional society affected by the trends of secularism. This is why it becomes evident when the 1920s and 1930s Palestinian national movements are examined, that Muslims and Christians had formed their first political organization to represent the Palestinians during the British Mandate. This sense of cooperation is quite reflective of the tolerance and pluralism that characterize the Palestinian society. Unfortunately, throughout its modern history, Palestine has been subjected to different occupations starting with the Ottomans and ending with Israel. As a result, self-determination had evolved to become a basic principle for the Palestinians to achieve in their national struggle. As a matter of fact, the historic evolution of Palestinian nationalism since the early 1920s has incorporated self-determination as a prime objective to be accomplished. It is worth noting that the concept of self-determination, drafted by President Wilson in 1914, has become the driving force for all national liberation movements, and the Jewish nation, dispersed and persecuted, had also struggled to realize it after three thousand years of dispersion. This was fulfilled in 1948 when the State of Israel was officially declared and recognized *de jure* by the international community. It is for the same principle that the Palestinians are struggling; however, and ironically, it has been deprived of it. One may ask here how a society can transform itself through the process of institution-building to a civil society based on social justice, parity and equity, when this cornerstone of democracy is denied. One wonders how a society that suffers from a lack of structural and functional substructure could build a free-willed society when its socio-economic infrastructure is utterly shattered. It is justifiable therefore for the

Palestinians' frustrations to accumulate and terminate in an extreme portrayal of national expression.

Through the years students of Palestine who took part in national liberation movements could monitor the dramatic transformation in Palestinian politics, particularly during the past several years, when an explicit shift from total liberation to political accommodation and two-state solutions have become the current policy of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). This would not have been realized without the *intifada* which shook the sacrosanct status quo and transformed the Palestinian *modus vivendi* into one of defiance and outright disobedience. This change in the attitudes, perceptions, cognition and beliefs of the Palestinians have altered their thinking and *modus operandi* from one of submission to one of self-reliance and pragmatism. Therefore, the pursuit of self-determination from an exclusive Palestinian interest was inadequate in its fulfilment. However, with the emergence of the Unified Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), Palestinian politics became more focused and foreign relations through NGOs and foreign organizations have built a certain level of accountability and legitimacy. Surely, direct contacts and relations with the international community, through their respective governments and their programmes of aid in an attempt to ameliorate the Palestinian socio-economic conditions and act as a catalyst to enhance the right of the Palestinians for self-determination and self-rule, could be more expedited when Palestinians are in direct contact with the western world, since the latter's mode of thinking is rationalized along the same principle of political participation by the masses and the credibility of the elected elites and decision-makers.

The trends of modernization and the socio-political development by the Palestinians could be concretely enhanced when they directly deal with western polities. As a result, the wave of the new world order has targetted and greatly affected the Palestinians. However, to complete the building of a civil society, an independent economic infrastructure should develop, in order to promote the institution-building process and what it entails in terms of democratization, pluralism and laissez-fair market economy. It should be noted here that the transformation of the Palestinian society into a democratic one could encounter a defiance by the trends of Islamic resurgence and fundamentalism. The simple fact of the matter is that the frustrations suffered by the Palestinians under occupation allow for factionalism among the Palestinians, a fact which impedes the process of consensus-building. Islam's ideological position is antithetical to

can hardly be compatible with Islam. In fact, the ongoing peace process has split Palestinian society in terms of strategy and tactics regarding the resolution of conflict. Regardless of those who are in opposition to the mainstream, the concept of self-determination lies at the core of Palestinian objectives during the interim period and the final settlement. It is this principle which acts as a mobilizing force among Palestinians and tries to ameliorate their schisms. Undoubtedly, the Palestinian mode of thinking has changed retrospectively and developed to be open and pragmatic in realizing that the nature of world politics has been changing radically to adjust to the various trends of development whether political, social or economic. Nevertheless this is not adequate for the Palestinians to achieve because occupation has constituted an unsurmountable impediment that is difficult to break through without the direct involvement of the world community and the rising of the level of the US administration's participation in the peace process. In fact, the internal challenges faced by the Palestinians in various realms are directly connected with the outcomes of the peace process, and if it fails the repercussions would be detrimental to the national ethos and state of being a member of the Palestinian community. Self-determination, then, lies at the heart of this conflict and without it there is no resolution to the conflict.

How can Direct Palestinian-Foreign Relations Contribute to Political Self-Determination for Palestinians?

Mervat Rishmawi

A people's right to self-determination is guaranteed by international law. For example, this right is recognized by Article 1, common to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which states that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development." Moreover, Article 1 (2) of chapter 1 of the Charter of the United Nations states that among the purposes and principles of the U.N. is "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ..." (emphasis added). This paper aims to discuss the support and recognition of the Palestinian right to self determination, and the effect of Palestinian-international relations on the realization of that right.

The paper does not intend to discuss the different types of Palestinian-international relations. Neither does the paper aim at detailing the different ways the international community demonstrated its support. The paper gives examples that reflect the effect of such relations on Palestinian self-determination.

The right of the Palestinian people to political self-determination is recognized in theory by the international community of states. This has been demonstrated in several U.N. General Assembly Resolutions. For example, Resolution number 3236, adopted on 22 November 1974, states that the General Assembly recognizes that "... the Palestinian People is entitled to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." In fact, the right to political self-determination, a fundamental right often taken for granted by peoples who have sovereignty, has been denied the Palestinian people. This fact is evidenced by the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory.

Realization of self-determination happens in two steps. The Palestinian case is an example of this. The first step involves recognition of the right by states and other peoples. The second involves the realization of that right. A liberation movement, mainly intent on the second step, realizing the right to self-determination, can harness international law and the international community in its struggle only to the extent that it concentrates first on building recognition of the right, i.e. the first step. International relations are important for two main purposes in this context. First, through such relations a people can achieve more support and understanding of its existence as a people and its efforts to realization of self-rule. Second, until the time comes when this people enjoys complete independence, international relations can help the people begin the building of its independent infrastructure and promote local development. Self-determination is not just a change of status that can take place in one instant. Rather, it is a process that might take place through a long period of time. A major part of this process is development of economic, social and cultural aspects as emphasized in Article 1 common to the International Covenants mentioned above. Therefore, relations with the international community on political, economic, academic, and cultural levels are essential.

It is common that independent states, which are the parties of international treaties and conventions, and are the members of inter-governmental bodies like the U.N and the E.C., are the usual subjects of international law. The Palestinian Liberation Movement has also become a subject of international law. This is a

liberation movement, enjoying the status of a state. This happened because, among other factors, the Palestinian political leadership succeeded in convincing the international community that Palestinians were a people and thus have right to self-determination. Therefore, it became clear that the on one hand the international community recognized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and on the other hand regarded the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory as an act of aggression that violates international law and thus should not be rewarded. This position conforms with the spirit of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter concerning action with respect to threats to the peace and acts of aggression. This position is evidenced by the numerous times the international community has called on Israel to withdraw from all the territory it occupied in the 1967 war, including East Jerusalem, annexed later by Israel.

Recognition of the right to self-determination has taken a long time. Since the beginning of this century, the Palestinian people has been seeking to have its own rule and control over its own land. However, the political leadership of the Palestinian people was not recognized to be the legitimate leadership. With the development of Palestinian-international relations on the political level, which went hand-in-hand with the military actions of the liberation movement, the Palestinian cause started to become more understood and supported. This is so although these relations were on an unofficial level. This in turn led to more support for the justness of that cause. In fact, the same Palestinians accused of being terrorists in earlier stages began to become more accepted as legitimate leaders in later stages. This developed extensively after 1967. This change in the political map towards recognition of Palestinian political self-determination and the political leadership was reflected in the following examples.

After the declaration of the Palestinian independent state in exile on 15 November 1988, approximately eighty countries of the world immediately recognized the state. Today, more than two-thirds of the countries of the world recognize the Palestinian state. In these countries, Palestine has fully accredited diplomatic representation with all immunities and privileges granted to diplomatic missions. Further, the president of the declared Palestinian state is received in these states in a complete official way as any head of state. In many of the countries that did not recognize its independence, Palestine is represented through what is known as the PLO information offices. This is the case, for example, in most of the European countries. These offices do not enjoy diplomatic

immunities, but they have some protection.

Palestine enjoys now the status of an observer in the U.N. Through this status, Palestine has access to a very important forum where it can be heard.

The Palestinian political leadership is the unofficially recognized representative of the Palestinian people in the current peace negotiations. This is the case despite Israel's stubborn stand to refuse to negotiate with the political leadership of the Palestinians. Even the political opposition to the negotiations is received by most of the international community as a democratic opposition, and its representatives are invited to speak with many diplomats and official representatives of different states of the world to explain the position of the opposition. Further, co-ordination between the Palestinian negotiating team and the PLO leadership has become taken for granted and a known fact.

The above examples, reflecting the evolution of the status of the Palestinian political leadership from unrecognized to recognized show the development that occurred in the process of realizing the right to self-determination. However, without the international community taking practical ways of enforcing its theoretical position concerning Palestinian self-determination and the Israeli aggression, self-determination will not be realized speedily. In fact, the history of precedents in the U.N. can provide us with different examples of the various ways the international community adapted to support self-determination. In the case of South Africa, active measures were adopted by the international community. The right of the native South African people was recognized, and the apartheid policy was condemned. This support was taken steps further. South Africa was dismissed from the U.N. and its different agencies. Further, the Security Council called upon the member states in the U.N. to implement economic sanctions on and sever diplomatic relations with the government of South Africa. In the case of Palestine, on the other hand, the Palestinian right to self-determination was recognized, and Israeli aggression was condemned. However, no further steps were taken to help achieve that right and stop the aggression. This does not mean that any political change that took place in South Africa, or might take place in Palestine, depends only on the position of the international community. However, the position of the international community gives support and wider avenues for people to realize their self-determination.

connect signing bilateral trade treaties with Israel with the deteriorating human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. These continuing and escalating violations of human rights by Israel were clearly documented and reflected by a host of documents and reports produced by several Palestinian and international human rights organizations and by the media. These continued violations showed that Israel is not willing to allow Palestinian self-determination to be realized. Further, many of these violations severely hinder the development of the Palestinian economy and the infrastructure. Therefore, realization of independence becomes difficult without developed resources like the economy and infrastructure. Contrary to the South African case, no economic sanctions or any other sanctions were ever implemented in the Palestinian case. This is even when Israel is committing grave breaches of international conventions, like the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War of 1949. The Fourth Geneva Convention is considered by the international community to be applicable to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territory. However, Israel refuses to accept the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, despite several U.N. Security Council Resolutions calling on Israel to respect the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions tantamount to war crimes.

In conclusion, it is clear that there are different ways of enforcement that can help in realizing self-determination. According to the UN Charter, the international community has a legal obligation to address aggression. Methods of enforcement of international law, and forcing aggressors to abide with the international will, are clearly available in the UN Charter and many other international conventions including the Fourth Geneva Convention. The right to self-determination cannot completely be realized unless supported by the international community. Therefore, unless the international community takes steps according to its obligations in international law to support the Palestinian right to self-determination, this right may not be realized quickly.

How Far Does Policy React to the Media or Vice Versa?

George Sahhar

Policy reacts to the media as much as the other way round, because democratic governments are particularly sensitive as to what the media say about them, this while the media act as the voice and reflection of the people. This is interesting because parliaments were supposed to play the role of the watch-dog, but there gradually emerged the media as a watch-dog over the parliaments themselves.

The relationship between policy makers and the media is a love-hate relationship. Politicians need the media in order to have a message transmitted to the people. For example, during the 1992 presidential elections in the United States both Bush and Clinton seem more than eager to have the media transmit their message to the American people, yet both seem uncomfortable to discuss issues like abortion rights or certain questions about their private lives. Both candidates like the media as long as they further their message, but they also seem more than willing to lash out at "false reports". The media here enjoys a tremendous power in determining the agenda, since the media can focus on certain issues which they view as important, and thus forcing the candidates to discuss the issue and state their policy positions. On the other hand, the media also seem to be experiencing the same love-hate relationship with both Clinton and Bush. Media people express their desire to talk about a certain issue when they ask a related question, yet the media do not show much tolerance when a candidate refuses to talk about that issue. The candidate is then immediately accused of having something to hide. The media do not respect the fact that if Bush talks about the arms for hostages deal or if Clinton talks about resisting the draft during the Vietnam War, each candidate would run the risk of losing the elections.

The Middle East negotiations are another example on the interaction between policymakers and the media. Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are expressing increased frustration as to the attitude presented by Israel. As the public support amongst Palestinians may be eroding because their hopes are dashed by Israeli intransigence, Palestinian negotiations are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain their current policies. In the absence of a direct media channel between the Palestinian leadership and people, the leadership stands

support.

The fact that Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are caught between Israeli and Jordanian media is a factor which Palestinian negotiators have to live with. The Israeli television constantly transmits views from the Israeli point of view, but when the Palestinians watch that, they see it through Palestinian eyes. Even when a Palestinian official responds to the view presented by Israeli television, Palestinians have no access to such a response which does not get reported on Israeli television. Israeli media have the power to influence the Palestinian policy makers through pressure on the people, this while Palestinian policy makers stand helpless. The same kind of difficulty is encountered by Palestinian policy makers in regard to the news presented by Jordanian television. While Jordan presents views which are rather similar to the Palestinians, Jordan still has its own national agenda which is not identical to that of the Palestinians. Palestinian viewers may be very receptive of the Jordanian message because it is not dissimilar from the Palestinian one. Palestinian policymakers are thus faced with the difficulty of responding to a Palestinian population which may be unknowingly defending the Jordanian agenda at the expense of the national one.

The recent wave of famine in Somalia is a case where the media managed to attract enough people all over the world, and the policymakers had to respond and send shipments of food and medicine. No country in the developed world had any strategic interests in assisting the hungry people in Somalia. However, the media focused on the miserable situation in that poor country, and well-to-do people in the wealthy countries were daily presented with reports about death and hunger, and with pictures of little boys with protruding bones. Since a picture speaks louder than a thousand words, people in rich countries responded to the pictures of hungry children. Governments in Western Europe, Japan, and the U.S. responded due to the pressures created by the media and the people. This is an example where the media adopt a cause which then becomes the cause of the people and the government. Again, the strength in the interaction between the media and the government can only occur in democratic societies, since autocracies do not respond to the media, but rather to the contrary, where the media spreads propaganda which serves the regime's interests.

Contrary to the model presented about Somalia, there has been no similar pressures from the people in the developed countries to end the massacres against

Moslems in what used to be Yugoslavia, this because the media tell us that such massacres are occurring, but we have seen no pictures. While the world has a more significant interest to do something about Yugoslavia much more than it had about Somalia, very little is being done. That is caused by the lack of graphic and cruel pictures coming out of Yugoslavia the same way such pictures were transmitted from Somalia.

In comparison, the war in the Persian Gulf was an example of total harmony between the media and the policymakers. Some might argue that unlike the Vietnam war, the Gulf War was popular because the media liked it. During the Gulf War, the whole world was sensitized by the image of the little girl who spoke with tears about how children were pulled out of incubators. The story was repeated daily on all sorts of international media. The little girl who was crying as she testified in front of Congress became a rallying cry for all who supported the war. Nobody knew at that time that the girl was a liar, and that all the media attention for her story was mere hype. In this case, the media broadcasted a message supportive of the war, this before verifying whether the message was true or not. World media also fell into the trap of transmitting war images that were nice and clear, with no blood, and no casualties. We all saw pictures of a video-game rather than what was actually going on on the battlefield. This is another reason why that war was supported by so many; they could go to war, but they can at the same time avoid seeing the images of death and destruction. The media has failed in its mission of actually telling the public what was actually going on. People thought that they could have their cake and eat it too, by going to the war and yet not seeing any deaths or blood. Policy-makers undoubtedly enjoyed more manoeuvring space in front of their people because of the way the media reported from the Gulf.

Hardly any nation has been misrepresented by the media as much as the Palestinian people have. For many years, audiences and readers were bombarded by a single image of the Palestinian as a terrorist. The Palestinian as a human being was never presented. Palestinian culture, folk-tale, suffering, and aspirations were all overshadowed by an unfair and purposefully distorted image. As public sentiment worldwide was running against the Palestinians because of such an image, policymakers found it easy to exceed limits and adopt stances that are anti-Palestinian. Finally came the *intifada* and the media liked it. One of the successes of the *intifada* was the transformation of the Palestinian from the image of a terrorist to one of a freedom-fighter. The world suddenly started seeing

easily argue that because of such new positive impressions, the United States found it easier to start a dialogue with the P.L.O. One of the reasons why Palestinians were presented as a people since December 1987 is that western media liked the *intifada*. Suddenly the Palestinian issue became a priority, while a few days before the *intifada* Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev did not even discuss the Middle East in their summit meeting.

Finally, one needs to keep in mind that the dynamics which control the relationship between governments and the media are determined by the level of democracy which a certain society has achieved. In the love-hate relationships between governments and the media, in the tension between them, both sides have equal power in imposing their agenda on the other side.

Diplomacy and Self-Determination

Ahmed Ghandour

We are not here doing research about the right of self-determination for the Palestinians, but to answer a question of how to direct Palestinian foreign relations in order to develop this right. We think that to answer this question there is no way but to write a short introduction to define this political right which is one of the basic principles of the human rights domains. Then, we can move to the historical stages in which the above-mentioned right developed during the period of the British occupation and the British Mandate over Palestine through the League of Nations and the United Nations which passed the Partition Resolution, this resolution divided Palestine into two parts, one for the Israelis and the other for the Palestinians.

As this subject deals with diplomatic relations, we have to bear in mind the main kinds of diplomatic relations which were adopted by many nations all over the world from the beginning of the war between Israel and the Arab countries up to the direct and secret negotiations and the parliamentary diplomacy. Also, we have to take into consideration the relations among each country in this world and the peaceful process which is taking place now to find a framework for this diplomatic relation which will develop the right of self-determination for the Palestinians.

What is self-determination?

The right of self-determination is the right of a people living in a territory to determine the political and legal status of that territory. This political right which we consider one of the most ultimate rights of the human being is one which international law considers to be one of the fundamental rights with other human rights.

Despite the fact that this right is not frankly announced in international agreement, the two international areas which deal with the social and economic rights and the political and civil rights, announcements which were issued on 1966 in the United Nations have the right of self-determination, in which people can decide the shape of the political economic and social structure for their state. All the announcements which were issued from the General Assembly of the United Nations regard this right, like article 1514 in which the United Nations granted self-determination for the Occupied Territories and article 1803 related to the permanent sovereignty over natural resources and others. Also, the United Nations Charter in item 2 article 1 mentioned that right, so this right is a political and human right, on which depends human destiny.

What is the date of this right with the Palestinian people?

The Arab world during Ottoman rule which continued for four centuries felt the importance of the right to self-determination, so they asked for independence from Ottoman rule. Nationalist movements increased, then the great Arab revolution blew up. After the First World War, the Arab world was occupied by Britain through deception, and Palestine was a part of the Arab world. On the 10th of December 1917 Jerusalem was taken by Lord Allenby from the Ottoman empire nearly a month after the Balfour Declaration. This was the beginning of retraction of the right of self-determination from the Palestinian people. In April 1920, during the peace conference in San Remo, the British occupation changed to British mandate, as the League of Nations decided.

Mandate means qualifying the people to practise their right of self-determination for a certain period of time, but that was ended by the end of the League of Nations. The United Nations took the Palestinian issue from the League of Nations but, when the Palestinian issue transferred to the United Nations, the United Nations issued its resolution which adopted the partition of Palestine (Resolution 181) on 29th November 1947. The United Nations did not respect the clear desire of the Palestinians to establish independent state after the

Palestinian people increased and the recognition of the Jewish state became fact.

This encouraged Israel to continue in its policy of conquering the Palestinian lands, and the Palestinian question changed into a refugee problem: they have to choose to return home or to have compensation, thus this matter continued till the beginning of fifties. At that time, the small socialist states began their struggle against imperialist states to achieve the principle of self-determination. Resolution 1514 on 14th December 1960 was to give independence for the people and the Occupied Territories. The Palestinian Question remained as it is in the United Nations halls, until Israel occupied all the Palestinian lands, then the UN issued many resolutions in this respect, especially Resolution 242 which is the basis of peaceful negotiation.

The October War in 1973, and the determination of the Palestinian people to continued the struggle against the occupation under the leadership of PLO encouraged the General Assembly of UN to issue its Resolution 3246 which is considered the beginning of hope to correct the abuse of the Palestinian people. This led to the recognition by the General Assembly of the PLO as the legal representative of the Palestinian people on 26th November, 1974. That resolution established committees to protect Palestinian rights, but the U.N. in the same session (29) on the Namibia problem recognised SWAPO and established the United Nations council for Namibia and other organizations which were very helpful in supporting the Namibian independence. This did not happen to the Palestinian issue. After this period the Palestinian problem transmitted from the open diplomacy of the United Nations to direct negotiation diplomacy, and this was what Israel had searched for all along. There were many peaceful initiatives, American, Russian, European, Arab, etc. until the Camp David treatment in September 1978 and self-determination changed to administrative autonomy for the Palestinians which is refused by the people. The aggression increased on the Palestinian people everywhere, until December 1987 when the Palestinian Uprising began to return the Palestinian issue to international interest and the world began to search for solutions to the Palestinian issue. At the Madrid peace conference in 1991 the Palestinian delegation struggled to gain the Palestinian right of self-determination and independence after the announcement of the Palestinian state in 1988.

We have mentioned above the different stages of the Palestinian self-determination. States practise many kinds of diplomatic relations in their foreign

affairs policies. Maybe these policies directly or not affected the right of self-determination in which the Palestinians and the Arabs practised part of it.

Now we can wonder about the different kinds of diplomatic relation in the different historical periods which we mentioned above. Perhaps it is better to talk in this field about the period before international organization, the period which came before the establishment of the international organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations. So as not to talk about far history we will talk about the period of the First World War. At that time there was a kind of diplomatic relations called secret diplomacy and the best example of this kind of diplomacy was the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 which is a model of the secret agreement to apply European imperialism in policy. At that time Britain, France and Russia partitioned the wealth of the sick man Turkey. At the same time there were negotiations between El Sherif Hussein and Lord McMahon to enable the Arabs to gain their self-determination and their independence. At that specific time Britain and France were drawing the borders in the area to divide the area between them. Moreover, after a few months of these negotiations with El Sherif Hussein, Britain gave the Jews Balfour's promise which was the first stab to the Arabic nation and to the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, by establishing a national home for the Jews in Palestine.

But the years 1917-1918 had a great place in the history of diplomacy. In 1917 there was the Russian revolution which was the biggest revolution in history which established the Socialist Soviet State. This state cancelled secret diplomacy and began to talk about the open diplomacy that was the suggestion of Lenin in the second Soviet conference, in the declaration which was directed to governments and people. In this, called the peace declaration, secret diplomacy and its styles were cancelled. Also, all negotiations must be clear before the people and the agreements' charters must be published for the public, with absolute rejection of the items of secret treaties.

So the basic target for foreign affairs policy for this revolutionary government was cancelling all the imperialism systems, and the equality of rights between different nations and the recognition of peoples' rights, and first of these rights the right of self-determination. Also in the year 1918 the war against secret diplomacy was continued to open the way for the open diplomacy; in America there was the declaration of President Wilson with its fourteen famous items which sought a quick end to secret diplomacy and enable all the people to achieve

commitment, also to establish general organizations to deal with the nations according to certain charters. What is of concern for us is Article 12 which mentions that all nationalities under the Turkish Empire had the right to their complete independence.

This kind of open diplomacy declared the fact of Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine. At that time, several committees visited Palestine to solve the problem; a peace conference was held in Versailles in 1919. The Palestinians demanded an independent state and self-determination and to cancel Sykes-Picot agreement with all its results. After that, many committees and proposals were offered; but with no success. At that time also, after the announcement of the American President Wilson to establish an international organization, the world began to insist on establishing these kinds of organizations.

On February 18th 1919 at the conference at Versailles, for the first time the world knew this new order by establishing the League of Nations. A new diplomacy was discovered which is known as international organization diplomacy which is a kind of the open diplomacy which was created by the new states. The League of Nation's goal was to establish peace and security among different states and to prevent war; also, to respect justice and to respect states' agreements. The League of Nations searched for an end to imperialism by creating the mandate order. In 1920, as was mentioned, the British occupation was replaced by the British Mandate to prepare the area for independence. Palestine at that time was the first of all in preparing for independence although the members of the League of Nations prejudiced the parliamentary diplomacy and practised the old secret fashion of diplomacy which caused the failure of the League.

After the Second World War, states felt the importance of the new international organization to be strong enough to protect international peace and security and to develop good relations among people on the basis of respect and equality among the nations and to offer self-determination for people. Also, to increase cooperation among states to solve their problems. All that was found by establishing the United Nations in 1945 at the San Francisco conference.

Once again, parliamentary diplomacy was practised, inside the U.N. It was mentioned before what happened to the right of self-determination for Palestinians, positively or negatively according to the different policies practised by the states inside the U.N. through the Cold War between the two giants (the

USA and USSR) or the policy of non-alignment which many countries believed in after the Bandung conference. These two policies affected much the right of self-determination of the Palestinians.

Now, after what was mentioned about the historical political linkage to the right of self-determination, now is the time to think of creating a new form of diplomacy to increase the awareness of nations of this right and to help the Palestinians to gain self-determination and independence. In this period, is very clear the new order which is known as the new international order - the disappearance of the Cold War, even the disappearance of one of the two giants, the USSR. Also what happened to socialist states. Now we can see inside the U.N.'s new policies, forced by what is happening in the Arab world, of weakness and growing apart, and the disappearance of non-aligned states. For all this, the Palestinian people, leaders and the strong Palestine state need to practise a new kind of diplomacy to enable the Palestinian people to gain the right of self-determination.

What is the means?

In this period we think there is no way to practise the kind of diplomacy which came before the international organization period. So Palestinian diplomacy must practise the new open diplomacy in the direct relations with other states or through international organizations like the UN, or local organizations like the Arab League or the Islamic conference and the conference of non-aligned states. We must keep these very good relations, especially the good relations which came after the announcement of the Palestine state which are increasing day by day.

This kind of diplomacy which believes in law and international customs believes in practising the principles of human rights, working only through the principles of the U.N. charter to protect international peace and security.

The disappearance of the Cold War between the two camps demands the states to work effectively through the U.N. to find some kind of an international balance which is able to give all nations their rights. So, the PLO through this kind of open diplomacy with Arab, Islamic and other states, also the new states which were created after the end of the USSR, must work together to develop the status of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of all Palestinians through the U.N., which is seeking the development of the right of self-determination for the Palestinians. Also we will find through the U.N. special

committees to prepare the Palestinians, the same happened to Namibia. The Palestinian people and Palestinian diplomacy need to reread and discuss all the U.N. Resolutions before we decide to take or leave these resolutions because through these we are able to develop the right of self-determination and the basic rights of the Palestinian people. We can notice that some of those resolutions imposed some kind of control on Israeli behaviour; that has influence to develop that right of self-determination, for example the Security Council decision about the Al-Aqsa massacre which asked the General Secretary of the UN to prepare reports on the circumstances in the Occupied Territories. This happened once or twice, after that everything stopped and no one asked why, maybe after many years we will discover the importance of that decision to us. I think that in the new international circumstances the U.N. with its important role must be. In these days we can see that the U.N. in an occupation case is strong enough to use all kinds of sanctions even material sanctions against the occupying power. There is no use in crying because this policy is used in two measures.

Palestinian relations with the Security Council members must be good and us always working to develop it. Also, Palestinian relations will be better by conducting these relations carefully with the Arab world, to be away from the interfering of their international policy, and working with the others on equal standards for the mutual benefit of all.

I think that the current peace negotiations are not enough to solve the Palestinian problem, there is a great need to deal with the diplomacy of the U.N. and Israel in its beginning, also in the first days of the Arab-Israeli conflict it worked to deal directly in negotiation with the Arab states. In spite of that the Egyptian negotiator who had good results through the direct negotiation with Israel knows the importance of the open parliamentary diplomacy through the U.N. besides this negotiation to make the best results.

Lastly we cannot forget the Palestinian people's role in their uprising in consolidating the Palestinian diplomacy. I think it is not a legal mistake or some kind of violence or even a call to use it, it is just appliance of the UN Charter and Articles on the right of individual or collective self-defence against armed attack or occupation. The Palestinian people and Palestinian diplomacy must not forget that right of self-defence to attain the right of self-determination. We must say that Palestinian diplomacy must believe in the Palestinians's right to freedom and their struggle for self-determination as it is mentioned in the UN Charter.

Also to be very subjective through the policy of open diplomacy, equal to all in the world, working hard to develop her relations with others, also with USA, but without any interfering in the internal policy of any state, with a good understanding of all the UN resolutions especially with the Palestinian problem, working effectively through parliamentary diplomacy in the U.N., the regional organizations and the non-governmental organizations to enable the Palestinian people to practise their right of self-determination, however long the peace negotiations take or become more difficult.

Why is it Considered Important to Have a Fairly Rigid Structure of Rules of Protocol?

Ahmad Sa'id Younis

Protocol may be defined as rules of etiquette and order in diplomatic or military ceremonies; or as the ceremonial system of fixed rules and accepted behaviour that governs the means of talking and acting between rulers or representatives of governments of different countries and between people on official occasions.

During the past, and in many countries, the structure of rules of protocol were considered rigid and very formal. But nowadays, within the practice of modern diplomacy, the structure of rules of protocol and the strict formalities in many countries have been reduced.

In relation to the above there arise questions, "Shall we use a strictly rigid structure of rules of protocol?" or "Shall we use a simple structure of rules of protocol?" or "Shall we use a fairly rigid structure of rules of protocol?"

In my opinion, using a fairly rigid structure of rules of protocol will make the best choice among the given, for it will act as a mid-way between the other given choices, and when practising protocol in real life it will provide the best results, and the performance of the rules within it would be feasible to implement. And when carried out it will avoid misunderstanding between the concerned parties within countries, diplomatic missions and the host state's ministry or among different diplomatic missions. Moreover, within a fairly rigid structure of rules of protocol the diplomatic mission will guarantee maintained relations with the host state and other diplomatic missions that are accredited to that same receiving state.

of rules of protocol and the level of formality it follows, would make the diplomatic missions' tasks easier to cope with and build good friendly relations with the host state and other diplomatic missions. Moreover, following a fairly rigid structure of rules of protocol will provide a full understanding of each member of the diplomatic mission of his duties and responsibilities, and the liberties and rights he can practise, and the limitations and the red lines he/she cannot go beyond. Furthermore, a member in the diplomatic mission that follows a fairly rigid structure of rules of protocol will always be alert and responsible in all acts he performs whether official or personal. For example, regarding the protocol rules concerning dress, he/she will always be neat in his dress and aware of the kind of dress he/she is to wear, depending on the occasions and the level of formality, and if there are certain rules of protocol of dress for that ceremony that are adopted by the host country.

Furthermore, a good and well-defined structure of rules of a protocol that is considered fairly rigid should be flexible and inclusive in order for it to contain certain rules of protocol that deal with, organize, regulate and are related to all ways of life, and that takes into consideration various areas, whether political, military or even social, no matters if they are committing their official duties or not. For example, within the fairly rigid structure of rules of protocol, Orders of Precedence must be fully recognized by a diplomatic agent, and these orders of precedence consist of four orders: (1) precedence between heads of diplomatic missions; (2) individual precedence within a mission; (3) individual precedence *inter se* of diplomats at formal or diplomatic functions; and (4) precedence of heads of mission within the national orders of precedence. Members of a diplomatic mission must be aware of these rules of precedence, for following them would prevent getting into trouble and misunderstanding, also it will provide respect among the heads of missions and among members of the same diplomatic mission. For example following the rules of precedence between heads of diplomatic missions would help in preventing misunderstanding and discrimination or getting into priorities that are not based on stated rules or standards, which in turn create trouble and conflict. Moreover, members of the individual diplomatic mission must realize the individual precedence among them at formal or diplomatic functions, and that it is based on rank.

In addition, an important rule of protocol that ought to be recognized is related to correspondence and communication between diplomatic missions and

the host government. For example, it must be well-known that formal communication between a diplomatic mission and the host government must be on behalf of or by the head of mission and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, except in some cases where there will be some special permission given for dealing with another department, or in the case of specialist attaches. Moreover, in relation to personal interviews, according to the rules of protocol, the heads of missions will arrange and make the appointment by telephone to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. And it should be known that an appropriate member of the diplomatic mission, of the diplomatic staff, will arrange to see an appropriate member of the Ministry staff, usually equal in rank.

Also, a member of the diplomatic staff should understand that one rule of protocol states that he/she, during a formal appointment with a member of the ministry staff, should be brief and to the point, and should take leave when there is no further business to conduct. And following this rule of protocol is considered of importance because the ministry officials are normally very busy, so the guest diplomat must not waste his/her and their time when he/she finishes what he/she came for. Also, this makes that diplomat more accurate, doing work only during work time, and saving time for performing other duties.

Furthermore, there are certain structures of rules of protocol that are related to written correspondence, some of them deal with the note verbal, others deal with the official letters in the first person and other with rejection of a note or letter. For example, the "official note" is considered the customary method of correspondence between a diplomatic mission and a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and is also the standard form of communication between diplomatic missions. This official note would be typed using a recognized international language on official paper that is headed with the national crest and address.

Moreover, a member in the diplomatic mission must be aware of the language and phraseology he is using, which depends largely on the Ambassador's relationship with the Minister. For if this relation is a friendly one and there is no need to use formal phraseology, he might begin, "My dear Minister," and end with the words "Yours Sincerely". In this case, by using such words the Ambassador would be expressing a friendly attitude towards the minister, and would feel more free and less formal. But if the relationship between the Minister and the Ambassador is a formal one then he must use "Your Excellency" and he ought strictly to continue in the same way e.g. "My

using the same phraseology the Minister would consider it to be an act of neglect and impairment of his dignity and respect, and this may create misunderstanding. In regard to this issue the Ambassador must choose the appropriate word he is going to use and must bear in mind that phraseology as "Your Excellency" may become tedious and that the judicious and occasional use of the second person (you, your), which is considered permissible, avoids pomposity. In addition to that, a member of the diplomatic mission must comprehend and use the general rule of correspondence between officials, that they must begin "My dear (name of addressee)," and end "Yours sincerely (name of sender)."

Moreover, the heads of missions are frequently instructed by their governments to "make representations" to the Ministry of the country they are accredited to, or ask for clarification on a certain issue. On this occasion they need to make a personal visit during which the diplomat "states his or her case", so in this situation the diplomat must leave behind a summary of his or her remarks in order for him or her to leave no room for doubt as to the purpose of his or her visit, and to be clear and well understood.

Taking into account the case of rejecting a note or letter, where the minister will refuse to accept it even though he or she had taken delivery of it and studied it. In this case, according to the rules of protocol, he or she would summon the appropriate head of mission and hand back to him or her the document - whether letter or note - concerned informing him or her at the same time that it was unacceptable to his government. By this act he or she would be simply reflecting the government's viewpoint concerning that certain issue mentioned in the document, and their refusal of it in a civilized way.

In the case of following the pre-mentioned rules of protocol regarding communication and correspondence by a member of a diplomatic mission with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the host state and with other diplomatic missions, he or she would be following the known and recognized techniques for this purpose, and would be expressing respect and recognition to the other part, and avoiding misunderstanding and creating conflicts.

Also, there are certain given rules of protocol for the diplomatic missions to follow when dealing with a demonstration. In this case, the embassy has several options to follow, such as keeping the door shut, accepting the petition

without comment, inviting the spokesman/men of the group in and explaining the home government's position, or the Chief of Protocol or the Police Diplomatic Protection Unit will contact the receiving state to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or the impairment of its dignity. In my opinion, in the case of having a mission that is adopting a fairly rigid structure of rules of protocol it is best to follow the option to invite the spokesman/men of the group in and explain the home governments position. And in the case when the Chief of Protocol in the diplomatic mission thinks that the demonstration appears to be getting out of hand, he would contact the receiving state to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity, and by following there rules of protocol on such occasions, it will avoid impairing the dignity of the diplomatic mission, and would also prevent confrontation of any type between the mission and the receiving state's citizens.

In regard to the protocol rules that deal with flying the national flags, It has traditionally been followed that flags are raised first thing in the morning at 8 a.m., and lowered at sunset. Also, its commonly known and followed that heads of missions are entitled to fly their national flag on their residence and the premises of their mission at all times, as an act of marking their own occasions and the occasions of the state in which they are situated. Moreover, they are entitled to fly this national flag on their official car, although many would prefer to do so on formal occasions or in dangerous situations. Also, the heads of consular posts commonly fly their national flag on their official car when making official visits to the local authorities or when they are invited to take part in ceremonies. Moreover, regarding consular officers who include a post within their consular area, they are normally permitted to - and actually do - fly their national flag on a boat when on official duty, and this depends on whether there is any existing convention and on local custom. Also, on the occasion of official prescription of national mourning whether in the sending or the host state, the flags are to be flown at half mast and normally only on the day of the funeral. But in the event of the death of a sovereign it is customary to fly the flag at half mast from the day of death until and including the day of funeral except on the day of the proclamation of the accession of the new sovereign. By doing so, the diplomatic missions show an act of solidarity and respect following official techniques that are related to this case in regard to flying the flag. Also on the occasion of the visit of a distinguished foreign guest, an important rule of protocol that must be understood by diplomatic staff in regard to flags, is that the national flag of the visitor's state and the flag of the host state are often flown at

appreciation to the visitor's state, by putting the two flags of the two states at the same level. Also, they must know that when a number of flags of different countries are flown from individual flagstaffs the place of honour should be assigned to the national flag, with the other flags being arranged alternately to the right and left of the central point looking outward in alphabetical order of the countries they represent. And by following such arrangement of the flags according to alphabetical order will help in avoiding misunderstanding and discrimination of one country to another and bias, and would provide equal respect from the host state to the other countries represented.

Taking into account the rules of protocol regarding dress, it is clearly seen that dress for diplomats varies considerably between countries and depends largely on tradition, custom and the climate of the concerned country. In general there is an increasing trend - in regard of the dress of diplomats - towards informality, but still there are certain standard forms of dress that diplomats must be aware of as the diplomatic uniform or national dress that diplomats of certain states wear or other kinds of dress that are more for special occasions, normally indicated when invitation cards are sent. For example, male diplomats are to wear morning coats for daytime ceremonies, especially in the open. And they are restricted to wear tail coats (white tie or full evening dress) to formal evening functions such as dinners or receptions and occasionally for more formal indoor ceremonies during the day. Also the dinner jacket (black tie or smoking) is even for informal evening functions, and in the case where there is a greater degree of informality of the evening, the greater the liberty with regard to dress. So knowing and taking into account these rules of protocol regarding dress by a diplomat is considered of importance, for a diplomatic must know and wear what he is to wear depending on the ceremony and the degree of formality.

In relation to state ceremonies, there are certain rules of protocol that are to be followed depending on the occasion and that are to be known by diplomats. It is worth knowing that usually it falls to the Chief of Department of Protocol to plan and execute arrangements for state ceremonies such as inauguration, visits, independence day, anniversaries of national significance and funerals. And for all the pre-mentioned occasions except for funerals, there take place detailed plans and preparations several weeks or even months in advance. For example, in the case of the visit of a foreign Head of State or member of the government or other distinguished guest, the head of the diplomatic mission of the concerned

state is invited to all the official functions and entertainments which the visitor attends. Also it is essential to know that according to the rules of protocol a formal diplomatic visit begins when the visitor arrives in the diplomatic capital of the state, where the visitor is to be met by a member of the local authority and an official representative who accompanies him to the capital if his arrival is not directly into the capital. A general rule of protocol in this regard that is to be followed is seating of a state visitor in a carriage or a car, where they are placed in the vehicles in descending order of precedence with the senior person in each vehicle seated on the right hand side facing the way the vehicle is travelling. Also it is important for a diplomat to recognize that the host of a state visitor should be invited to return the visit to the other's state within a reasonable time. So depending on the above mentioned, regarding the rules of protocol that are related to state ceremonies, it is obvious to see the importance of recognizing and implementing such rules in details in real life when a diplomat is performing his or her duty on such occasions, relying on the importance that is conveyed by performed acts that express respect, dignity and friendly attitudes that will help in strengthening the relation and creating mutual respect between the two countries.

Also, it is considered of great importance and value for a diplomat to be aware of the rules of protocol regarding official mourning whether it is declared by the host state or the home state. In both cases the diplomat must follow the required techniques and practices accurately. For example, in the case where official mourning is declared by the diplomat's home government, a head of mission would receive instructions from his ministry concerning the period of official mourning, they would fly the flag at half mast, and the male members of the diplomatic staff would wear black ties or their equivalent, while the ladies would be appropriately dressed. They would refrain from giving or attending social engagements, and they may justifiably cancel previously arranged official commitments, but they have to attend state functions. Also they must provide a condolences book at the Embassy for receiving the signatures of persons wishing to express sympathy. Also they must provide a tray of cards and in certain instances a photograph of the deceased is displayed and surrounded by black ribbon. But in the case of official mourning being declared by the host state, here the diplomatic mission would receive its guidance through their *doyen* who would be in close touch with the Chief of the Department of Protocol. And the missions would fly their flag at half mast for a given period, and would cancel all but the most informal gatherings, and they would attend official ceremonies, and the head

Affairs, and all members of the diplomatic staff of a mission are to leave their cards marked together with a condolence book.

It is considered very important for a diplomat to follow a fairly rigid structure of rules of protocol, that is well-defined, flexible, inclusive and able to contain various rules of protocol that regulate, organise, deal with and relate to all ways of life, and take into account the political, military and social areas.

A member of a diplomatic mission must be aware of the rules of protocol that are related to order of precedence, correspondence and communication, dress, flying the national flag, state ceremonies and official mourning, etc. For following such rules of protocol will create good and friendly relations between the concerned parties, and will avoid misunderstanding that will lead to creating conflicts, and will guarantee maintained relations with the host state and other diplomatic missions that are accredited to that same receiving state. Also, following the rules of protocol will make tasks easier for the diplomatic missions and its members in regard of each understanding his/her duties and responsibilities and the liberties and rights he/she can practice and the limitations he/she cannot go beyond. Moreover, following such rules will help in making the diplomatic alert and responsible all the time and in acts he/she performs, and would help in preserving respect and avoiding the impairment of the dignity of the home state, the host state and other diplomatic missions.

In my opinion, and depending on the pre-mentioned, I think that it is better for us as Palestinians to follow a fairly rigid structure of rules of protocol in our desired state, a structure of rules that will contain the the rules that are found, recognized and followed by other states, and that will provide respect, order, friendly relations, and would avoid misunderstanding and impairment of dignity of all parties concerned.

What Common Interests may the Palestinian State Share with Small to Medium-Sized States in the Field of International Relations?

Rami Ihsan Tahboub

Introduction

At present, the international relations existing between states or countries are based on common interest. Such interest may be political, economic, cultural or the like. The progress and development of countries cannot be achieved through the isolation of individual countries, since such a country is liable to lose all potential elements of its existence. It is also inevitable that international relations are variant in size since the size of the different states, which determines such relations, is itself divided into three: large, small and medium.

By "large" here, not the geographic size is meant but the political, democratic, economic and military power. These large states succeed by means of such power in exerting pressure and establishing influence over the international community at large. Middle-sized countries are those countries which possess the above mentioned qualities, though at a more limited scale, especially on the military level. This is especially true since military power has become the decisive factor in this century. Small states, however, are those states whose power on the various levels hinders them from possessing any remarkable influence on the international community. Consequently, such countries are forced to establish and strengthen ties and relations with countries from the other groups, in order to be able to find itself a place in the international arena.

It is only natural that the future Palestinian State should be considered among the small countries, on which it therefore must be dependent for relations and common interests, in order to achieve progress on the international scale.

In this essay I shall account for a few measures that could lead the future Palestinian State towards the eventual establishment of reciprocal trust and common interest between the Palestinian State and other similarly small states.

Palestine and International Politics

The Palestinian problem has achieved significantly important recognition on the international level. Palestine and its problem has become an unseparable part of the international community, hence Palestine represented by the P.L.O has

organizations. It has also obtained membership in organizations outside the framework of the United Nations, such as the non-aligned movement, the Islamic Conference, and the Arab League. Palestine played and is still playing its part in these organizations.

A quick review of the past would reveal that Palestine represented by the P.L.O. has played an important part in determining Arab politics, especially as far as the political solution projects of the Arab-Israeli conflict are concerned, that were proposed by the superpowers.

The Palestinian problem has been imposed on the international community through the international recognition of the legitimacy of this problem, through the different Security Council decisions. And even if such decisions were not carried out, the Security Council is incapable of closing the Palestinian file. The P.L.O. was capable of winning wide international support when present Arafat declared the establishment of the Palestinian State in November 1988. Around a hundred states acknowledged then the legitimacy of the Palestinian State, among which were states of significant weight in international politics. Arafat's decision, however, was not haphazard, he was aware of the fact that the Palestinian people possess the ability to arrive to the standard of other states that may possibly enjoy remarkable relations with the Palestinian State, whose potential enables it to easily take a place in the international community, enabling it to establish relations of common interest with its neighbours.

The Palestinian State is small in size and limited in its economic, political and military power, due to the long decades of occupation to which it has been subjected. For a Palestinian State to seek itself a place in the international community, it must begin to establish relations with other states, beginning of course with its neighbours. It is important to note here that such relations are normally of a reciprocal nature. It is impossible, for example, for Palestine to be isolated from Jordan since the latter constitutes Palestine's eastern outlet to the Arab orient. Hence this fact presupposes the necessity of the establishment of strong ties with Jordan, if Palestine wished to secure for example its interests in the Gulf. Strong reciprocal ties, furthermore, reinforce the position of both states on both the international and the Arab scale. Common teams must therefore be formed to follow up relations and interests shared by the two countries. Palestine, however, is also considered Jordan's outlet to Europe, through the Mediterranean, a fact which would help Jordan save much money trying to get to Europe.

Palestine's position, moreover, as an attraction for tourists secures Jordan with a stable income since it will function as a stopping point for visitors on their way to Palestine. This is also true for other countries in the region. Stable regional alliances are thus required for the attainment of international weight. This would lead to the creation of strong negotiating power capable of exerting international pressure and finding a place in the new international system.

On the economic scale, the future common market: such a project must be based on internal balance and homogeneity of the participant states, enabling them to attain remarkable international economic weight or position. The foundation of such a council must be carefully planned to guarantee its steadfastness and avoid its collapse at confronting difficulties. Relations between council states must thus be based on reciprocal equanimity. This economic step could be commenced on the regional and not necessarily on the international level. For example, an economic collaboration or union between states like Palestine and Saudi Arabia would be obviously more fruitful than one between Palestine and Somalia. Bilateral agreements dealing with import and export relations must also be arrived at in order to guarantee economic balance, which in turn would lead to the creation of a strong economic power capable of possessing significant economic weight on the international level.

On the Military Scale

The humble and limited military capacity of small states prevents such states from actual participation in the making and imposing of international decisions. For the Palestinian State to avoid such a situation, and to have a share in international power, and keep its place in the international community, it must seek alliance with other states of a limited military power. This would provide the participating states with internal as well as external security. The success of such a military alliance would thus have a double function. On the one hand it would lead to the creation of a strong military power for the participant states, and would attain that through the combined financial effort of the states in which the financial burden is shared, on the other hand.

The money economised through such an alliance, could also be used for the property and advancement of other areas of life in the allied states. NATO, for example, is the first and only world power and it protects states participating in it from any external threat. We do not call for an alliance similar to NATO all the way through, but to an alliance which would reinforce the role of the region

must also achieve agreements with middle-sized states to provide each other with protection against external exploitation.

On the Political Scale

International politics is no longer confined to a certain state, but has become more comprehensive depending on this or that state's position in the international community. The Palestinian State constitutes an inseparable part of this universal organization, a part which would be able to form an influential political power only through a confederal union with most of its neighbouring countries. This union must take as its example the European Union, which came to existence as a result of growing American power. It is therefore specifically aimed at controlling and limiting this growing power. The only guarantee for a reasonable power for the Palestinian State can be attained through political treaties and alliances with other states, especially those possessing significant political power.

Moreover, if a Palestinian State aimed at attaining a respectable position within the international community, it should be based on a political system that advocates as its first priority the principle of respect for human rights. Its alliance must be with states whose political systems are in agreement with the new world order. Alliances must also be based on mutual reciprocal respect. Any alliance must also be based on moderate external policy guaranteeing the international community respect for the alliance.

Advantages of Constructing Reciprocal Relations Based on Common Interests

Small states benefit largely, especially economically from bilateral and common alliances and treaties, that lead to the economic development of small states. This in turn would encourage rich developed countries to seek relations based on mutual respect with those small states to secure their interests in the area. This is right, especially for the superpowers whose relations with other states are based on their own specific interests.

Alliances therefore protect small countries against the exploitation of the superpowers and prevent their intervention in the internal affairs of smaller states. The new world order, furthermore, does not allow the isolation of individual states because it is based on the principle of open relationships among various states. What happened in Iraq is only an example of how the United States feared the growing power of that country following the war with Iran, and persisted in

planning for the destruction of that country until it was successful following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, an invasion planned for by the United States in destroying Iraq and its infrastructure in the Gulf War of 1991.

If Iraq was at the time in a state of alliance even with Syria alone, the United States would have failed to strike Iraq in the Gulf War. Palestine, in my opinion, must seek alliance even if it were with small European countries in order to protect itself against becoming a prey for some large power which achieves control over it through the tempting trap of economic support. The common European market's support cannot possibly spring from European love for the Palestinian people, but from its interest in securing a place for its future existence in the area following any peace agreements. The United States is silently providing the occupied areas with economic support so as to eventually guarantee its lot of the lion's share. The Palestinian State must therefore attain economic and political relations with small states to guarantee its protection against such traps.

Common Comparative Ground Between the Palestinian State and Other States

Relations of common interest between Palestine and other small countries spring from the fact that all these small states share the same common problems and difficulties, among which the most urgent is economic. Complementary economic relations between two small states may lead to the creation of a strong economic construction for both. Similarly, a military alliance between two militarily small nations may bring about a strong military construction for both at a much lower cost and in a way which reinforces the two states' positions at both the regional and international levels. Being such a type of small country, Palestine would have to arrive at strategic defence alliance with strong neighbouring countries to secure its permanent future protection, in return the other stronger neighbour would have to be given a chance to also attain some of its interests.

The Super Powers and the Small Alliances

Any alliance arrived at by the small nation is closely observed and studied by the superpowers in an attempt on behalf of these powers to guarantee that such alliances would not even in the future challenge its or their interests in the area as the case may be. If, however, the superpower fears or suspects such a challenge it would commence any action that would hinder progress or even lead to destruction of it.

since the United States would not tolerate any threat to its interests in the area. If such a threat is caused by the Palestinian State, the United States would not hesitate to strike back at any cost. The United States, thus, would not allow the establishment of any alliance that may challenge its interests in the area.

Provoked and made anxious by the German Union, the United States has created for Germany the new Nazi war challenges and exerted pressure on the United Kingdom to hinder the final comprehensive European unity and the Maastricht treaty. The United States has preserved its presence through keeping military bases on the Japanese islands to safeguard its interests in Japan.

The United Nations

Jilan Wahba

Introduction

In reaction to the human and material costs of World War Two, scholars and statesmen, in each instance, strove to establish instruments for maintaining international peace and stability when fighting ceased, especially when the League of Nations failed to achieve its role in that time.

Dozens of peace-keeping organizations were working hard until antedated the first official plans made public in the form of Dumbarton Oaks proposal in the fall of 1944. The State Department recognized the widespread public interest in the D.O. proposal and responded to a request from the Americans united for world organization and the commission to study the organization of peace for a briefing session for representatives of interested international organizations. Arrangements were made for delegates from nearly 100 organizations to participate in a briefing and discussion of the proposal on October 16, 1944. This high degree of interest of concerned cities acting through private organizations, was strained through the period of drafting the UN Charter in San Francisco and continued into the initial years of the new organization.

In 1945, the UN came to focus as a body representing the balance of forces of both conservation and change, maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations, achieving international

cooperation (economically, socially, etc.) and through its main six organs the UN could direct its mission.

The organs of the UN are: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, Secretariat, and International Court of Justice.

The General Assembly: Political and Legislative Body

It consists of all members of the UN, who meet on regular sessions and discuss an agenda encompassing the general and specific international issues. On the other hand the General Assembly exercises co-ordinatory and supervising functions for all other agencies within the UN orbit and thus brings to a focus in its debates the most complete scope of the UN activities.

The most comprehensive and important function of the G.A. is its power to discuss and recommend, but there are two significant limitations restricting an otherwise indeterminate list of matters that may be of concern to the G.A. The first is the provision, in Article 12 of the Charter, that specifies that the General Assembly may discuss but may make no recommendation on any "dispute or situation" that is concurrently under consideration by Security Council. The second limitation is since the states are reluctant to surrender sovereign power to international agencies, the G.A.'s authority is limited to recommendations that are not binding on member states.

The second function is the supervision and review of all activities of the UN. The third one is deciding financial matters and approving the budget.

The Security Council

Considered as the big power of the UN, providing a mechanism to aid in maintaining international peace and security. When the most powerful states saw that without cooperation among them maintaining peace and security is not possible, they decided to have positions of authority on S.C. by being permanent members of it. The US, UK, USSR, China and France are the five big powers and the permanent members of the S.C. In addition, ten "non permanent" members were elected for two years by the G.A. These are the whole membership of the S.C. nowadays.

The primary function of the S.C. is to maintain international peace and security. In carrying out this function the S.C. may place on its agenda for

aggression. In that case, accepting charter, all members agree to carry out any council decision, this means in theory that S.C. decisions are binding, but compliance is difficult to enforce. Secondary function is its participation with the G.A. to recommend the admission of a state to be a new member of the UN.

The Economic and Social Council

The forty-five members who are elected by the G.A. for a three-year term with one third of the terms expiring each year is the system of the ECOSOC. Continuous membership is not entitled, but as a practical matter "to assure adequate support of programs" all the permanent member of the S.C. are regularly re-elected except China, the other seats are rotated on a regional basis.

The majority of the ECOSOC are the smaller and underdeveloped states which could pass resolutions favorable to their own interest, since all measures are adopted by simple majority vote, but because financial support by the prosperous states is necessary to give effect to most economic and social programs, it shows that the majority also does not help in the council. The functions are divided into three general categories:

1. Research and reports

ECOSOC performs an indispensable job in calling a wide variety of research studies and reports on subjects within the range of its authority.

2. Co-ordination among the special agencies and programs

The task of coordination is of signal importance and difficulty among the functions of the ECOSOC, because of the diversity of programs and numerous agencies involved in international economic/social work.

3. Deliberation and recommendation, which include matters related to human rights, refugees, economic and social development, culture, education, health, food supply, etc.).

The Trusteeship Council

It is considered as a supervisor of the administration of strategic territories, but as the S.C. theoretically replaces the G.A. as the final review agency this function is never exercised.

The significant aim of the T.C. is:

1. strengthening the international peace and security;

2. working in promoting, developing these territories under trusteeship in many ways (politically, socially, economically, etc.) until reached to be independent or

self-governing;

3. encouraging respect for human rights and freedom for all states.

The role of the T.C. is to provide, on behalf of the international community, supervision of those non-self-governing territories that are designated as trusts. The administration of each territory is carried out by a specialized state, but certain supervising is performed by the G.A. through the agency of the Trusteeship Council.

The Secretariat

The UN Secretariat is the body of international civil servants headed by the Secretary General. The Secretary General is appointed by G.A., acting by a two-thirds majority vote, upon the recommendation of the S.C. The major functions of the S.G. are to: act as the chief administrative officer of the UN; perform functions assigned to him by the G.A. and the other countries; make an annual report to the G.A.; appoint the secretariat staff under regulations established by the G.A.; has the authority to bring to attention of the S.C. any matter that threatens international peace and security.

International Court of Justice

The I.C.J. is situated at the Hague and is the principle judicial organ of the UN, to where all members of UN automatically subscribe. The court is composed of fifteen suitably qualified judges elected by concurrent vote of G.A. and S.C, and no two judges may be of the same nationality. They serve nine-year terms with the term of five judges expiring every third year. There is no limit for re-election and the court as a whole should represent the principal legal system of the world. The function of the Court is to give judgement on all countries' cases; give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by any branch of the UN or its agencies. Cases in the court are decided by majority vote of the participating judges, nine judges constitute a quorum. In case of a tie the President of the court has the casting vote.

Reform

Under the pressure of the present time's challenges (poverty, refugees, environmental, overpopulation, drugs, etc.) which affect the nature of international relations, especially after the end of the cold war and north-south rapprochement, the necessity for radical changes increased in international policy. The United Nations, according to its authorities and abilities, must suit itself as international organizations with these challenges to continue its role towards the

normative role, but it was not always equipped to deal with these matters effectively, especially when the aspects of everyday life have an international dimension, and to catch up with the present circumstance issues for the UN referring to what have been mentioned in the functional parts of the organs which clears some of the weak points from my point of view.

The General Assembly

The regular session must be out of routine, no speeches, discuss only the important issues which should be studied before through the specialized committees. The decisions must be binding without returning to the S.C. to be recommended, and the S.C. should execute these decisions. Strengthening the system of collecting and disseminating information and the G.A. should be the main centre.

The Security Council

The new world map should force the S.C. to change its policy towards the present situation. As the S.C. give the veto right to one permanent member to refuse the decision, on opposite side it gives the resolutions its legality by the agreement of the nine members including all the five permanent member, which is unfair; so I suggest that the agreement and refusal votes must be in equal levels. Resolution should need five to be cancelled, the same as approval. The S.C. resolutions must be binding with punishment in refusal cases.

The Economic and Social Council

There should be a clearer division of responsibilities between the General Assembly and the ECOSOC. The ECOSOC should be responsible for the development issues and its resolution should be binding after recommended from the G.A. The ECOSOC should have the full authority to respond to the special agencies and programmes related to the UN. In that case the ECOSOC should operate as a focal point for all efforts in this area, and should set up priorities, allocate projects and eliminate duplication of effort and conflict of interest among agencies. It should create a special fund committee for development in the third world.

I tried through the previous suggestion to give a small example for the UN which was set up as a universal inter-government organization, and has evoked strong feelings of hope of better, hoping it will affect the UN to continue it's normative role.

ASSESSMENTS OF THE SEMINAR

Palestinian Participants' Assessment

Palestinian participants were asked to rate the lectures from 1-5 (very low to very high) on the general interest, and present and potential professional usefulness of each topic. The average ratings were as follows.

International law

General interest	4.5
Usefulness in present work	3.0
Usefulness for future work	4.1

Diplomacy and Mass Media

General interest	4.7
Usefulness in present work	3.6
Usefulness for future work	4.0

Organisation of MFA and Diplomatic Mission

General interest	4.5
Usefulness in present work	2.8
Usefulness for future work	4.3

International Negotiations

General interest	4.6
Usefulness in present work	4.1
Usefulness for future work	4.2

Protocol

General interest	4.7
Usefulness in present work	3.4
Usefulness for future work	4.5

General interest	4.6
Usefulness in present work	3.2
Usefulness for future work	3.9

Feltham Diplomatic Handbook

General interest	4.4
Usefulness in present work	3.4
Usefulness for future work	4.3

Other Course Literature

General interest	4.5
Usefulness in present work	3.6
Usefulness for future work	4.4

The most immediately obvious feature here is that the ratings are remarkably high. This may be because of the consistently high quality of the lectures but the possibility should not be discounted (despite the anonymity of the evaluations) of participants wishing to be polite and thus giving exceptionally high ratings. It may be more useful therefore to examine relative scores. Most topics are rated highest in terms of their general interest (an overall average of 4.6), followed by usefulness for future work (4.2) and usefulness in present work (3.6). Although with such a small sample averages are easily influenced by one or two inconsistent figures, differences here are large enough to justify drawing conclusions.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the lowest overall ratings were those concerning relevance to present employment. Despite the considerable qualifications of the Palestinian participants and their obvious interest in the topics covered by the seminar, few have so far been able to find work consistent with their abilities and interests.

This is symptomatic of Palestinian society in general, with its high levels of under- and unemployment. The high level of general interest speaks for itself, reflecting the excellence of the lectures and the concerns and commitments of the participants. Most of the seminar concentrated on diplomacy and protocol between nation states, and participants often expressed particular interest in topics concerning state-building. Perhaps the high assessments in terms of future work underline not only the ambition and calibre of the participants but optimism concerning a future Palestinian state.

Swedish Assessment of Palestinian Participants
(Numbering corresponds to that in list of Palestinian participants below).

Participant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Overall Evaluation	V.G.	Good.	O.K.	O.K.	Exc.	V.G.	O.K.	Exc.	Good.	O.K.	V.G.	---	V.G.	Good.	O.K.
Language	O.K.	?	?	?	O.K.	O.K.	?	O.K.	O.K.	?	O.K.	---	O.K.	?	?
Level of Activity	Active	Active	not very Active	Active	very Active	Active	Active	very Active	very Active	Active minus	Active minus	---	very Active	Active	very Active
Level of Responsibility	Resp.	-----	-----	-----	Resp.	-----	-----	V.Resp	-----	-----	-----	---	Resp.	Resp.	-----

LEGEND OF ASSESSMENT :

Overall Evaluation: Excellent; Very Good; Good; Ok.
 Language: Ok; ?
 Level of Activity: Very Active; Active; Active minus; Not very Active.
 Level of Responsibility: Very Responsible; Responsible (This has only been applied to a few)-in terms of contributing to group dynamics; note taking etc.

PASSIA's Academic Committee is delighted with the seminar overall. We feel that our aim of assembling young graduates with genuine interest and potential has proved successful beyond our expectations and has taught us a good deal from which to learn for future seminars. Palestinian participants displayed vigorous commitment throughout and we are confident that several have the potential to excel in the field.

Assessment of Preparation Period

The seminar, as has already been noted, was arranged in co-ordination and cooperation with the Arab Studies Society and the Swedish Consulate General in Jerusalem. PASSIA is especially honoured by the efforts of the Swedish Consulate, and the Consul General, His Excellency Mikael Dahl, in particular. Relations between PASSIA and the Swedish Consulate were professional, efficient and cordial, with the Consulate displaying genuine endeavour for which PASSIA and the Palestinian participants are extremely grateful.

Selection of participants was made through formal application to PASSIA, either independently or upon the recommendation of Palestinian national institutions. Each of the 23 applicants was interviewed and assessed by PASSIA. PASSIA hopes and is confident that the success of the seminar will encourage greater numbers to apply for future seminars. There is already evidence that this will be the case, given that several applications have already been received for PASSIA's Strategic Studies and Security seminar which begins in April 1993. The expected increase in applications will necessitate improved organisational capacity on the part of PASSIA. Palestinian participants were well briefed on reading requirements and were generally fairly well prepared. The Swedish Consulate provided reading material which Palestinian participants found useful.

Assessment of Lecture Programme

The calibre of lectures was consistently high. Almost all lecturers were effective teachers able to combine a professional detachment with a relaxed and friendly approachability which was facilitated by the spirit of cooperation established during the preparatory period. As is clear from the lecture programme set out above, topics covered ranged well beyond what may be considered the usual

confines of diplomacy and protocol placing them in the context of concrete international relations, with frequent reference to the Middle East.

For most of the Palestinian participants this was the first experience of such a seminar. Sometimes this showed in a lack of discipline. Overly zealous participants tended, especially early in the seminar, to ask questions out of turn. Lecturers did not usually mind this, but there were complaints from other participants who felt either that the thread of the lecture became more difficult to follow or became impatient with others not waiting for more formal question and answer sessions at the end of each session. PASSIA found it difficult to lay down a standardised system for questions because some lecturers specifically said they did not mind being interrupted. PASSIA must decide whether to try in future to establish a stricter, uniform regime of questioning or to impress further upon Palestinians participants that different standards apply only to individual sessions as announced.

PASSIA's Assessment of Palestinian Papers

The consistently high level of commitment of the Palestinian participants was also evident in their writing assignments. They worked hard, often under difficult conditions and despite other priorities, to ensure the completion and timely submission of their papers. However, the overall standard of essays was disappointing. Generally they lacked material analysis, several attempting little more than description and assertion of opinion. Yet the participants were graduates who had just taken part in an otherwise successful two-week lecture and discussion programme. Clearly this begs the question as to why so many essays failed critically. It may be that some participants have suffered from an education system which demands few such assignments, is slow to encourage critical thought and has, besides, suffered frequent and often prolonged closure by the Israeli occupying authorities since 1967, especially since 1987. However, not all participants undertook their further education in Palestine, and there was no reflection of this in the standard of essays. Although PASSIA encouraged participants to use its library and consult with its staff, very few of the participants did either. Many were hampered by repeated and lengthy curfews and other Israeli-imposed movement restrictions in the Occupied Territories. PASSIA itself, meanwhile, was not as well-equipped to help as it should be. More time to advise and a larger and improved library, would no doubt have helped participants. This is reflected in the fact that one or two of those closer to

result. Some essays were indeed encouraging, as they bore evidence of considerable thought on the part of their authors. Unfortunately, these were exceptions.

PASSIA presents here the essays in English of eleven participants. Clearly the standard of English varies, but we decided not to edit the essays and to present them here as they were originally presented to us. Only spelling and punctuation have been corrected. In judging the essays, we were not so much assessing the writers' abilities in English as what we saw as their qualities of analysis.

LECTURE PROGRAMME

Day 1 **Monday 5/10/92**

- 8:30-9:00** Registration and group photographs
- 9:00-10:00** *Opening remarks* Mr. Faisal Husseini, *President, the Arab Studies Society*
- 10:00-11:00** *Palestinians and the Post Cold War Era*
Lecturer: Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, *President, PASSIA*
- 11:00-12:00** Organizational meeting, Swedish Consulate General
Mr. Mathias Mossberg, *Ambassador, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Director of the Seminar)*
Mr. Mikael Dahl, *Swedish Consul General in Jerusalem*
Mr. Per Holmstrom, *Consul, Consulate General of Sweden in Jerusalem*
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, *President, PASSIA*
- 12:00-15:00** Lunch (invitation by PASSIA)
- 15:00-16:30** *Introduction to International Relations*
Lecturer: Mr. Mikael Dahl, *Swedish Consul General in Jerusalem*
- 16:30-17:00** Coffee break
- 17:00-18:15** *The Role of a Small Country in International Relations. A Brief History of Diplomacy.*
Lecturer: Mr. Mathias Mossberg, *Ambassador, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden*
- 18.30** Reception at the Swedish Consulate General (Sheikh Jarrah)

- 9:00-10:30** *International Law*
Lecturer: Mr. Ove Bring
- 10:30-11:00** Coffee break
- 11:00-12:00** *International Law*
Lecturer: *Mathias Mossberg*
- 12:00-15:00** Lunch break
- 15:00-16:30** *International Law*
Lecturer: Mr. Per Holmstrom
- 16:30-17:00** Coffee break
- 17:00-18:00** *International Law* [continued]

Day 3 **Wednesday 7/10/92**

- 9:00-10:30** *Diplomacy and Mass Media*
Lecturer: Mr. Krister Kumlin
- 10:30-11:00** Coffee break
- 11:00-12:00** *Diplomacy and Mass Media*
Lecturer: Mr. Mathias Mossberg
- 12:00-15:00** Lunch break
- 15:00-16:30** *Diplomacy and Mass Media*
Lecturer: Mrs. Cordelia Edvardson
- 16:30-17:00** Coffee break
- 17:00 -18:00** *Diplomacy and Mass Media* [continued]
- 19:00-20:00** Buffet at PASSIA

Day 4 **Thursday 8/10/92**

- 9:00 -10:30** *Organization and Role of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Swedish Example*
Lecturers: *Mr. Mathias Mossberg* and *Mrs. Gun-Britt Andersson*
- 10:30 -11:00** Coffee break
- 11:00 -12:00** *Organization...*[continued]
- 12:00-15:00** Lunch break
- 15:00 -16:30** *The Role of a Diplomatic Mission, International Organizations and International Civil Service*
Lecturers: *Mr. Mathias Mossberg* and *Mr. Mikael Dahl*
- 16:30-17:00** Coffee break
- 17:00-18:00** *Diplomatic Missions...*[continued]
- 19:30-21:00** Buffet at the Swedish Consulate General, Residence, Greek Colony)

Day 5 **Friday 9/10/92**

- 9:00-10:30** *Requirements and Qualifications Demanded of a Diplomat*
Lecturers: *Mr. Mathias Mossberg* and *Mr. Mikael Dahl*
- 10:30-11:00** Coffee break
- 11:00-12:00** *Requirements...*[continued]

All participants will enjoy a long weekend and lectures will resume on the morning of October 12, 1992. Reading assignments for Palestinian participants will be distributed before the weekend.

- 9:00-10:30** *Protocol, Ceremonial Aspects, Diplomatic Immunity and Privileges*
Lecturer: Mr. Klas Stenstrom
- 10:30-11:00** Coffee break
- 11:00-12:00** *Protocol...*[continued]
- 12:00-15:00** Lunch break
- 15:00-16:30** *Protocol...*[continued]
- 16:30-17:00** Coffee break
- 17:00-18:00** *Protocol...*[continued]
- 19.00** **PASSIA Reception at the National Palace Hotel [Swedish and
Palestinian Participants and Diplomatic Corps based in Jerusalem]**

Day 7 **Tuesday 13/10/92**

- 9:00-10:30** *Protocol...*[continued].
Lecturer: Mr. Klas Stenstrom
- 10:30-11:00** Coffee break
- 11:00-12:00** *Diplomatic History of the Middle East*
Lecturer: Mr. Mats Bergquist
- 12:00-15:00** Lunch break
- 15:00-16:30** *International Development Cooperation*
North-South Issues
Lecturers: Mrs. Gun-Britt Andersson and Mr. Mikael Dahl
- 16:30-17:00** Coffee break
- 17:00-18:00** *Development...*[continued]

Day 8 **Wednesday 14/10/92**

- 9:00-10:30** Final discussion and course evaluation: Mr. Mikael Dahl
- 10:30-11:00** Coffee break
- 11:00-12:00** Discussion...[continued]
- 12:00-15:00** Lunch break (invitation by PASSIA)
- 15:00-18:00** Reading and consultation

Day 9 **Thursday 15/10/92**

- 9:00-10:00** Reading and consultation
- 10:00-10:30** Coffee break
- 10:30-11:30** Meeting with Molly Williamson, *U.S. Consul General*
- 11:30-16:00** Lunch break
- 16:00-18:00** Palestinian Academic Roundtable

Day 10 **Friday 16/10/92**

- 9:00-10:30** Consultation between the Academic Committee and participants and the formal end of the Lecture Programme

SWEDISH PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Mathias MOSSBERG, Ambassador, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
(Director of the Seminar)

Mr. Ove BRING, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Legal Department,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Krister KUMLIN, Ambassador, Head of Press and Information
Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mrs. Cordelia EDVARDSON, Foreign Correspondent of Swedish Daily
Svenska Dagbladet

Mrs Gun-Britt ANDERSSON, former Deputy Under-Secretary of State,
Department for International Development Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs

Mr. Klas STENSTROM, Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Protocol, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs

Mr Mats BERGQUIST, Ambassador, Tel Aviv/Helsinki

Mr. Mikael DAHL, Consul General, Consulate General of Sweden, Jerusalem

Mr. Per HOLMSTROM, Consul, Consulate General of Sweden, Jerusalem

PALESTINIAN PARTICIPANTS

1. Marina Barham

Age: 29 Residence: Beit Jala, West Bank.

Education: M.A. in Teaching English as a Foreign Language, Britain. B.A. in English and Diploma in Education and Translation, Bethlehem University.

Now the assistant Public Information Officer for UNRWA, she prepares and co-ordinates visits of diplomats, journalists and other visitors, gives briefings on the current situation, especially in refugee camps, prepares and organises press conferences and meetings, translates from Arabic to English and vice-versa, and writes and conducts surveys on UNRWA-related issues.

2. Ahmed Ghandour

Age: 31 Residence: Khan Younis, Gaza.

Education: LL.B., Ain Shams University.

An advocate and legal adviser and Executive Director of Palestinian Lawyers for Human Rights, he has compiled reports on children's rights and the right to worship, and participated in the Strasbourg conference on human rights.

3. Raja' Abu Ghazaleh

Age: 30 Residence: Nablus, West Bank.

Education: B.Sc. in Business Management, American University of Beirut.

Five computer studies and typing courses.

After three years in business management she took up secretarial work for Palestinian delegations to the Peace Conference.

Age: 26 Residence: Nablus, West Bank.

Education: M.A. in Biomedical Engineering, Leningrad/St. Petersburg.
Currently unemployed.

5. Sawsan Huleileh

Age: 33 Residence: Al-Bireh, West Bank.

Education: M.A. in Sociology, American University of Beirut. B.A. in Middle Eastern Studies and Sociology, Bir Zeit University.

After three years work as a field officer at the Quaker Legal Aid Centre she spent four years with the International Committee of the Red Cross, first as a field officer covering human rights violations and later as liaison officer assisting the head of the Palestinian sub-delegation in Jerusalem.

6. Issa Qassisieh

Age: 28 Residence: Beit Hanina, West Bank.

Education: B.A. in English and Political Science, Bethlehem University.

Now working as a political officer in the Turkish Embassy, he is the author of various articles in *Al-Quds* daily and *Al-Buyani al-Sayasi* and has undertaken research projects under the supervision of Dr Manuel Hassasian.

7. Nahla Qourah

Age: 43 Residence: Ramallah, West Bank.

Education: B.A. in History and Education, Jacksonville University, Florida.

Having worked as a translator and librarian at the Palestine Research Centre in Beirut she worked in the Arab League in Tunis before moving to her current job as librarian of the Ramallah Public Library. She also works in the Foreign Relations Committee of the Association of Women's Committees for Social Work and so receives many foreign delegations.

Age: 30 Residence: Ramallah, West Bank.

Education: B.A. in English Literature and the History of the Islamic World, Hebrew University.

Currently director of advisory and technical committees of the Palestinian team to the Peace Conference, she has much contact with foreign missions and other official representatives and organisations.

13. Rami Tahboub

Age: 26 Residence: Beit Hanina.

Education: B.A. in History and Political Science, Yarmouk University.

He now works both as a reporter for WTN to the Gulf countries and as advertising representative for *Al-Quds* newspaper.

14. Jilan Wahba

Age: 23 Residence: Al-Remal, Gaza.

Education: Diploma in Computer Programming, American University in Cairo.

Currently working as a secretary for the Arab Consultants Group (Public Relations), as a member of the Children of War Project, she has been involved in organising the Japanese Summit in 1988 and in conferences with UNICEF in the US.

15. Kamel Hussein

Age: 26 Residence: Jerusalem.

Education: M.B.A. in International Business, American University, Washington D.C. B.A. in International Affairs and Finance, American University, Washington D.C.

Currently working as Assistant in Diplomatic and International Affairs with the Arab Studies Society, he has considerable academic and work experience concerning diplomacy and international financial affairs.

Reserve places

1. Hamdi Shagqura

Age: 30 Residence: Jabalia Camp, Gaza.

Education: M.Sc. in Political Science, Illinois State University. B.A. in Middle East Studies, Bir Zeit University.

Now working as a researcher at the Panorama Centre for the Dissemination of Alternative Information, and as a part-time lecturer in political science at Bir Zeit University, he is the author of several articles on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2. Rizik Yacoub

Age: 25 Residence: Nablus, West Bank.

Education: B.A. in English and Translation, Bethlehem University. Currently unemployed.

Occasional Participants

Mr. Faisal Hussein, Ms. Zahira Kamal, Dr. Riad Maliki, Dr. Tamer Issawi, Dr. Mohammad Jadallah, Mr. Samir Huleileh, Mr. Hanna Siniora.

Mrs. Rita Karkashian, the Swedish Consulate, Jerusalem.

Mrs. Nina Dakwar, UNRWA, Jerusalem.

PASSIA ACADEMIC COMMITTEE

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi President and founder of PASSIA; Ph.D. Bradford University, U.K. [thesis: *Roots of Jordanian-Palestinian Relations 1900-1951*]; B.A. in Law, Damascus University, Syria; Editor of Al-Fajr, 1972; General Secretary for the Council for Higher Education in the West Bank, 1977-1980; founder of the Arab Thought Forum; fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, 1984-1985; and at Salzburg International Seminar, 1987; Special Adviser to the Ministry of Occupied Land Affairs, Amman, 1985-1986; author of several publications on the Palestine Question; born in Nablus, 1944; living in East Jerusalem, married with two daughters.

Dr. Bernard Sabella Director of the Academic Committee; Associate Professor of Sociology at Bethlehem University; B.A. in Sociology, Franklin and Marshall College; M.A. in Sociology, University of Virginia; Ph.D. in Sociology, University of Virginia; author of *Introduction to Sociology* (in Arabic), *The West Bank and Gaza Strip*, and articles on Palestinian demography; Palestinian, born in Jerusalem, 1945; married with three children, living in East Jerusalem.

Dr. Sa'id Zeedani Director of the Projects Committee; Professor of Philosophy at Bir Zeit University; formerly Director of Al-Haq, Ramallah, the West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists; author of several studies and articles.

Mrs. Kainat Dweik Director of the Administrative Committee; B.A. in Social Work, the American University of Beirut; family social worker for ten years; rehabilitation officer in the Occupied Territories for six years; born and living in Jerusalem; married with two children.

Mr. James Leith Co-ordinator of Academic Committee; B.A. in Development Economics, University of East Anglia; former researcher and political lobbyist for the World Development Movement, London and adviser to Youth for Development and Cooperation, Amsterdam; freelance development report writer; born in London, 1962, and living in Jerusalem.

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

Hereby Certifies that

AHMAD TAHA GANDOUR

Has successfully completed a training programme in

DIPLOMACY & PROTOCOL

September - December 1992

In witness whereof we have hereunto affixed our signatures and the seal of PASSIA

Mahdi Abdul Hadi
President of PASSIA

Faisal Hussein
President of Arab Studies Society

Mikael Dahl
Swedish Consul General - Jerusalem