


Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

# PASSIA ANNUAL REPORT 1994





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PASSIA

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs



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## PROLOGUE

1994 has been an eventful but frustrating year, the first major event of which was the signing of the Jordan-PLO economic accord in January. Attention was also focussed on the continuing negotiations which took place in Taba and elsewhere. Palestinian concerns however, were little reduced by these meetings as things remained very much the same in Gaza and the West Bank. Of particular concern was the fact that Israeli settlement continued unabated, mainly in Jerusalem, and that the settlers themselves were becoming increasingly volatile, the culmination of which came on February 25th 1994, when 29 Muslim worshippers at prayer in the Ibrahimī mosque in Hebron, were gunned down by Baruch Goldstein, a settler from nearby Kiryat Arba. This incident prompted the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 904, condemning the massacre and gave rise to the March agreement on a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) which stipulated that 160 European observers armed with pistols for self-defense were to be deployed in Hebron for 3 months although they did not begin this term until May. In addition to that, the mosque was closed for worshippers for 8 months.

Revenge attacks were soon carried out. In April, a car bomb exploded at a bus stop in Afula, killing 8 Israelis and wounding 44, followed by another bus bombing in Hadera, which killed 6 and wounded 28, including 18 IDF soldiers. Hamas announced in a leaflet that the bomb was the second in a series of 5 attacks in response to the Hebron Massacre.

Nevertheless, negotiations continued and at the end of April, the Palestinian-Israeli Protocol on Economic Relations was signed in Paris, followed, on May 4th, by the Gaza-Jericho Self-Rule or Cairo Agreement. Soon after that, the first Palestinian police forces entered the autonomous areas of Gaza and Jericho and began to set up a national, preventive, public, and presidential security system. On July 1st, Chairman Yasser Arafat returned home via the Rafah border after 25 years of exile. He swore in PNA ministers in Jericho and set up permanent residency in Gaza.

Since the deadline for Palestinian elections passed (July 13th), the next major event was the July signing of the Jordan-Israel "Washington Declaration" which formally ended the state of war between the two countries and was the forerunner for the coming peace treaty.

In August, the Early Empowerment Agreement on the transfer of five civilian authorities (education, health, social affairs, tourism and taxation) from the Israeli military/civil administration to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was signed.

In September, Jordan surrendered to the PNA the Waqf and religious courts in the West Bank, and the Gulf Cooperation Council ended its economic boycott of Israel.

Hamas kept themselves constantly in the news throughout October, firstly for a shooting incident in a pedestrian area in West Jerusalem, then for the abduction of Israeli soldier Nahshon Wachsman who was taken from inside Israel on October 9th and for whose safe return Hamas demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners. During an Israeli attempt to free the soldier by storming the hiding place in Bir Nabala, Wachsman, another Israeli soldier and three Hamas members were killed. This incident led to the suspension of the peace negotiations in Cairo and the Israeli closure of the Gaza Strip. The PNA reacted by launching a large-scale search and arresting hundreds of Hamas supporters. Thirdly, there was a Hamas suicide bus bombing in the heart of Tel Aviv on October 19th which claimed the lives of 22 people and injured many more.



The much publicised visit of US President Bill Clinton ran into diplomatic difficulties owing to a proposed tour of the Old City accompanied by Israeli Mayor Ehud Olmert. The visit was cancelled, but Mrs. Clinton and Mrs. Olmert did go to the Western Wall. Clinton's speeches in the Knesset as well as at other functions focused on terrorism and gave no cause for Palestinians to celebrate his presence.

Other diplomatic arguments occurred over plans for Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to pay an official visit to Yasser Arafat which ultimately had to be cancelled on Israel's insistence that she had not applied for permission through the proper Israeli channels. Later in the year, a visit to the Orient House by Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, provoked much discussion in the Israeli media as to the political status of Orient House and demands for its closure. As a consequence, Israeli soldiers were posted outside Orient House in November. Although it otherwise functioned as before, this created much tension.

More trouble occurred in the Gaza Strip in November following the assassination of an Islamic Jihad leader, Sheikh Hani A'bed. Laying the blame for his death on Israel, a revenge attack was carried out by an Islamic Jihad suicide bomber who rode a bicycle into a group of Israeli soldiers at the Netzarim junction killing three. Tension has been evident between the National Authority in Gaza and Islamic groups culminating on November 18th in a clash between Palestinian police and Hamas/Islamic Jihad activists which left 12 dead and hundreds injured. This issue is becoming of increasing concern to all moderate Palestinians and it is hoped that the new year will see dialogue and cooperation between the opposition groups in Gaza for the sake of achieving the wider aims of security and internal peace.

Although the DOP calls for the Jerusalem question to be discussed in the final phase and stipulates that nothing shall be done to change the status quo of the city in the meanwhile, Israel continuously confiscated land and expanded the settlements in East Jerusalem throughout the year. Further tension occurred, when, on December 26, the Knesset passed the final reading of the "Gaza-Jericho Agreement Implementation Law (Limiting of Activities)" which prohibits Palestinian political activities in East Jerusalem and contradicts the letter of assurances sent by Peres to the Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst confirming the "great importance" of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem saying "we will not hamper their activity." Finally, 1994 witnessed the second year in a row in which Jerusalem was cut off the rest of the OPT denying thousands of Palestinians access to the city, thus depriving them of their income, medical, educational and economic services as well as denying their right to the freedom of worship.

The year ended with demonstrations by residents of El-Khader near Bethlehem as attempts were made to expand the Israeli settlement of Efrat on land belonging to the villagers. Israeli peace groups came out in support of the villagers and the issue sparked debate in the Knesset leading to the construction site being moved elsewhere, although still on disputed land.

# 1

## INTRODUCTION

The PASSIA Annual Report 1994, begins with a brief review of the year's major events and an indication of where the Palestinian community finds itself as it prepares to enter 1995 (see prologue). The report then summarises the activities of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA). It is hoped that it will provide a comprehensive assessment of PASSIA's projects and undertakings throughout the year.

The first part contains a brief outline of each of the five studies published as part of the PASSIA Research Studies Programme 1994, covering a wide range of topics and addressing several key issues of Palestinian society.

The second section deals with PASSIA Meetings, the number of which has been steadily growing and reached almost 65 during 1994. A particular feature of this year's Meetings Programme was a series in which prominent Israeli and international scholars gave their perspectives on the peace process. PASSIA plans to publish a small booklet containing summaries of some of the presentations.

PASSIA completed its "Education for Democracy" programme which began in 1993. Five workshops, each addressing a different aspect of democratisation, were held throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Part four of this report provides a summary of these workshops out of which three publications were produced, dealing with administrative links between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, elections, and legal aspects of the DOP.

Another PASSIA project which began in 1993 was also completed. "A Review of Literature on Economic Co-operation and Integration in the Middle East" was published by the University of Toronto Press following the submission of bibliographical material from a Palestinian (PASSIA), an Israeli and a Jordanian team. The findings of this research were presented in a conference held in Cairo by the Canadian coordinator (see chapter 8), and the material gathered by PASSIA was expanded to produce a publication "The Palestinian Economy - A Bibliography" (see chapter 2).

A short project in 1994 followed a request for PASSIA to compile material on Palestinian history, politics and personalities, for use in the London based Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia. The information collected will appear in the Microsoft Encyclopedia for 1995/6.

Jerusalem has always been a topic of great concern to PASSIA and this year was certainly no exception, particularly given the urgent need to define a comprehensive Palestinian



controversial opinions towards it in depth (see chapter 5).

The series of PASSIA seminars "Education and Training in International Affairs" which began in 1992, continued, albeit in a slightly different form. In September 1994, PASSIA held a seminar on Strategic Studies which constituted the first part of a combined fellowship programme, in which the two most outstanding participants in the seminar were awarded fellowships for a one year Masters degree in War Studies at King's College, London.

Other items in the Annual Report include a review of the PASSIA Desk Diary, a list of conferences in which PASSIA participated or was invited with summaries of the most important conference proceedings. In the appendices are details of the Board of Trustees, PASSIA Administration and a full list of PASSIA publications since 1987.

# 2

## RESEARCH STUDIES

### Introduction

PASSIA is an independent, non-profit making Palestinian institution, unaffiliated with any government, political party or organisation, which undertakes studies and research on the question of Palestine and its relationship to international affairs. PASSIA encourages the publication of various research studies on the Palestine Question that together reflect a plurality of perspective within the context of academic freedom.

Each year since 1987, PASSIA Research Studies Programme has commissioned a small number of academics to conduct research on Palestinian issues. In the past seven years, PASSIA has published over 70 studies, as listed in the appendix to this report. In 1993 PASSIA received eight research proposals and, after review by the Academic Committee, the following five were approved as research studies and chosen for publication:

#### **The Palestinian Economy - A Bibliography.**

**PASSIA Research Staff. April 1994 (English, Pp. 220).**

The background of this study is a project started in 1993, when the Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada, consulted various institutions and professionals in the Occupied Territories in order to find a partner to compile part of a larger bibliography for "A Review of Literature on Economic Co-operation and Integration in the Middle East". PASSIA was recommended for its high academic standards and for the commitment it had shown in previous undertakings. It was subsequently chosen by the Centre to be one of the three mutually exclusive independent research teams from Palestine, Jordan and Israel, to contribute to the Canadian bibliography project over the period October 1993-February 1994. PASSIA formed a research team specifically for this project, consisting of Deniz Altayli, who did the bulk of the research work, Kainat Dweik and Valerie Grove, all under the supervision of Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi.

The final product was published by the Centre for International Studies in April 1994 and the overall findings of the three teams were presented in a conference on "Economic Cooperation in the Middle East", held May 14th-16th at Cairo University (for details of the PASSIA paper see p. 114). During the course of this research, the PASSIA research team found that there was a lot more information available on the Palestinian economy than would be used in the original project which was essentially limited to the subject of regional co-operation and integration. Since it had been contractually agreed that once "A Review of Literature on Economic Co-operation and Integration in the Middle East" had been completed, PASSIA was



"The Palestinian Economy - A Bibliography" is the result, containing more than 1,600 entries related to every aspect of Palestinian socio-economic affairs. It is an extensive collection of local and international books, journal articles, conference proceedings and working papers, published mainly in the last fifteen years. Just a few of the categories included are Economic Development; Agriculture; Industry and Industrialization; Construction and Housing; Finances and Banking; Trade, Economic Relations and Regional Cooperation; Settlement; Education, Training and Human Resources. The basic assumption made is that to achieve peace the right environment is needed for economic development, and that this will be dependent on private sector initiatives and free trade regulations. The importance of this work cannot be underestimated, given the necessity for the knowledge and understanding of the nature of the Palestinian economy in the context of recent developments in the region. Anyone interested in its local dimensions and its wider regional and international context will find this most comprehensive reference work currently available indispensable.

### **Palestinian Refugees.**

**Najeh Jarrar. May 1994 (Arabic, Pp. 128)**

Opening with a historical description of refugees in the 20th century and of United Nations efforts and institutions for their protection, this study places the Palestinian refugee situation in a world context. It then focuses on Palestinian refugees and the international and local causes of their particular crisis, detailing the viewpoints of Palestinians, Israelis and international law towards them. A case study of the living conditions of refugee camps, the ties of residents to their original homes, their economic situation, political orientation and its affect on the peace process, is addressed in some detail. The study concludes with an examination of various projects, both contemporary and historic, to solve the Palestinian refugee problem and provides a vision of the future for Palestinian refugees in light of recent political changes.

### **Dutch Development Policy Towards the Middle East.**

**Tom de Quaasteniet. May 1994 (English, Pp. 62 and Arabic, Pp. 65)**

Tom de Quaasteniet, of Middle East Research Associates in Amsterdam, gives a concise history and critique of Dutch governmental policy regarding development aid to the Middle East. He highlights discrepancies between official criteria for aid allocation and the actual practice of it and devotes a large proportion of the study to investigating the attitude of the Dutch government to the Occupied Territories. Dutch reluctance to become involved with the issue is shown to have slowly become more positive and the author expresses hope that this trend will continue in the future. The study makes good use of a variety of tables to support its findings and gives a good overall picture of the intricacies and contradictions of development policy and development aid.

### **From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: the Rise of Hamas in Palestinian Society.**

**Hisham H. Ahmed. May 1994 (English Pp. 172)**

This study provides a detailed investigation of the factors which led to the birth and growth of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. It was written by Hisham A. Ahmed, a young

Palestinian scholar from Dheisheh refugee camp near Bethlehem, who obtained a Ph.D. in International Relations and International Law from the University of Santa Barbara in 1988.

The study covers historical, social and economic components, and also takes into account the wider regional and global influences on the birth of the Hamas movement. Making extensive use of some fascinating interviews with a variety of Hamas members and activists and providing the reader with a good translation of the charter of Hamas, the author illustrates the political programme of the movement and its relationship to other forces within the Palestinian political arena as well as to Israel, Arab States and the international community. In conclusion, there is an investigation of recent events in the region and the subsequent reaction of Hamas leaders, which suggests possible directions that the Hamas movement may take in the future and the effect of this on Palestinian political life.

But the author also makes some unfounded and biased conclusions. For example, he dismisses the popularity of Hamas as being due to economic misery among the villagers, when in actual fact the highest proportion of Hamas supporters exists in the towns and cities, where the standard of living is relatively higher. He also neglects to mention that much of Hamas' popularity stems from disillusionment with the secular ideologies of the past forty years which have governed neighbouring countries and failed to achieve their goals of freedom and progress. He seems to rule out Hamas' feasibility as a governing force by his underlying assumption that the only legitimate form of government is a western style democracy. Another detrimental factor of this study is the author's claim that Hamas is funded in part by Iran, which the Israeli government would love us to believe but has never been proved.

However, it is a useful study providing a detailed history of Hamas since the intifada, as well as investigating its deeper historical roots in the Muslim Brotherhood. The interviews made provide some interesting insights, particularly that with Sheikh Hamed Bitawi, who was among the 400 deported in December 1992 to Marj a-Zuhour and is considered the second most respected Islamic figure in the Occupied Territories after the imprisoned Sheikh Ahmad Yassin.

## **Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Future State of Palestine: with a Case Study on Women's Rights.**

**Adrien K. Wing. July 1994 (English, Pp. 84)**

This study begins by expressing the hope of the Palestinians to establish "the first true democracy of the Middle East". It states the need to discuss the policies of the interim government and suggests some form of a constitution, the concept of which is then rather unnecessarily defined.

The study describes the four-member commission set up by PLO Chairman Arafat to produce several drafts of a proposed Basic Law to function as interim constitution. The purpose of the book is to inform "Palestinian decision makers and citizenry" of the factors which need to be considered when formulating this law. These factors are discussed in the following chapters. The final chapter is devoted to a case study of constitutional rights, focusing on women.

Among the factors affecting democracy, the following is discussed: Educational gaps caused by the low standards in refugee camps, a drop in the age of marriage, the general attitude of the intifada generation, and the problem of accommodating the high potential of manpower within the new regime, and the disillusionment that may ensue. Furthermore, issues such as political pluralization, factionalism, and the difficulties in the transition from underground politics to open democratic activities are addressed. The book is a highly readable and

investigated are the distrust in authority caused by the occupation and what this implies for the new self-government, and the difficulties with the multi-layered legal system which is made up of foreign, customary and religious laws, with no governing body and the problem of conciling secular law with religious law.

The author's advices however, are often obvious and general, e.g. "training will be needed for bureaucrats". Her statement that women "will have to have child care assistance to allow them to participate in activities outside the private sphere", makes her seem not aware of the reality on the ground.

The third part of the study focuses on the need for reform, suggesting the setting up of new institutions and the implementation and enforcement of new laws. Examples of other Arab states in their attempts to reform are cited and potential legal, executive and judicial models that should be considered when forming a new constitution are suggested. This chapter is concise and the examples quoted are very relevant to the issue at stake.

Part four raises the issue of human rights, focusing on women. Existing and planned human rights bodies are discussed, in particular regarding the need for equality in the private and public sectors. Conflicting attitudes of religion and custom and the difficulty of defining the limits of customary and religious law are examined as is the cultural and legal status of women and the link between the women's liberation movement and the national liberation movement.

The author then looks at what can be done to ameliorate the status of women within the new constitution, suggesting a re-interpretation of religious laws, and cites examples of the experiences of other predominantly Muslim countries that have attempted this. The case study is concluded by addressing the effects of the intifada on the status of women who had become deeply involved in the struggle for independence. Women's groups and resource centers have been opened for the benefit of women. The intifada, however, went hand in hand with the growth of fundamentalist attitudes (e.g. the Hijab or veil campaign) which was detrimental to women's freedom.

This study gives a good insight into the situation of the Palestinian woman, her hopes and fears, and links the issue with general human rights concerns. It is easy to read, and the amount of information is adequate for the area under discussion and well presented. It is a good portrayal of the problems that need to be addressed during the interim period but not of their solution.

# 3

## PASSIA MEETINGS

PASSIA traditionally invites local and international scholars to address meetings and provides a major forum for discussion and debate among representatives of all Palestinian political alignments. The number of PASSIA meetings has risen each year. This increased activity reflects intense political concern with the current status of the peace process, the implications of the DOP and how to progress towards democratisation and development. Palestinian community and political leaders talked to the visitors, answering their questions about the situation on the ground and discussing the dangers of continued settlement activity, particularly in Jerusalem, extremism on both sides and the necessity of maintaining Arafat's credibility throughout the transitional phase and future.

PASSIA received a number of political and economic delegations from Europe and the US, including ministers, members of parliaments, EU and US Congress representatives, and media groups. Additionally, a large number of Jewish delegations came to hear about Palestinian perspectives on the peace process, Palestinian-Israeli relationships and future prospects.

PASSIA also initiated a series of meetings in which Israeli and international academics with expertise in the region were invited to lecture on the current situation in particular countries and their attitudes to the peace process.

### 3.1 Academic Meetings

The 62 meetings held in 1994 are listed below, followed by summaries of major meetings.

#### January

- . 3rd - British Labour Party Home Affairs Spokesman, Mr. Tony Blair
- . 6th - British Conservative Friends of Israel
- . 9th - US International Jewish Delegation
- . 9th - Democratic State Chairs Mission
- . 13th - United Jewish Appeal (UJA), "*Perspectives on the Declaration of Principles*"
- . 15th - Intra-Palestinian, "*The PLO-Jordan Economic Accords*"
- . 18th - US Congressional Delegation
- . 25th - Romanian Diplomats, "*Romanian/Palestinian Relations*"
- . 25th - International Republican Institute (IRI), Washington D.C., "*Democracy and the Future of Palestine*"

10. Authority for the Transitional Phase"
11. 9th - National Democratic Institute (NDI), regional and international representatives, "Prospects for Democracy"
12. 14th - European Union Commission on Elections in the OPT
13. 15th - Multi-Track Diplomacy
14. 28th - Presidents of major Jewish organizations

## March

15. 2nd - German Students - School of Social Work in Esslingen, Germany  
"Palestinian-Israeli Relations after the Hebron Massacre"
16. 6th - Intra-Palestinian, "Assessments on the Aftermath of the Hebron Massacre"
17. 8th - The American Jewish Committee's Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations
18. 19th - Intra-Palestinian, "UN Security Resolutions and the Hebron Massacre"
19. 30th - Ford Foundation delegation

## April

20. 4th - Ontario Conservative Party
21. 5th - Spanish Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and Spanish economic delegation
22. 9th - International Labour Office, Geneva
23. 14th - Dr. Awad Mukhtar Haluda, former head of Egyptian Statistics Department, Consultant for the UN, "Statistics: Information for Development"
24. 14th - French Socialist Party
25. 26th - American Academy of Arts and Sciences
26. 27th - Canadian Centre for Management Development
27. 28th - Meeting with Italian-Jewish Delegation
28. 30th - Dr. Hisham H. Ahmad, "From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas in Palestinian Society"

## May

29. 9th - University of Leiden, the Netherlands, "NGOs and the Peace Process"
30. 24th - Intra-Palestinian, Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, "Palestinian Perspectives on Relations with Jordan during the Transitional Phase"
31. 26th - Meeting with American Council of Young Political Leaders
32. 28th - American Media Group

## June

33. 2nd - National Democratic Institute (NDI)
34. 3rd - Dr. Yezid Sayigh, "Palestinian Security Arrangements: the Transitional Phase and Beyond"
35. 8th - Professor Fred Halliday, "Yemen: the Present Situation and Future Ramification"
36. 24th - International Research Development Centre
37. 28th - West Point Delegation
38. 30th - Italian Economic/Business Delegation



## July

- 39. 11th - Long Island American Jewish Committee Educators Tour
- 40. 15th - Brian Atwood, USAID administrator
- 41. 23rd - Intra-Palestinian dialogue (general issues)

## August

- 42. 8th - Asher Susser, *"Jordan, Palestine & Israel: the Transitional Phase and Future Directions"*
- 43. 11th - Dr. Moshe Ma'oz, *"Syria, Palestine & Israel: the Peace Process and the Different Agendas"*
- 44. 13th - Hanna Freij, *"Iran and the Regional Conflicts"*
- 45. 16th - Dr. Jennifer Claire Olmstead, *"Family Investment in Human Capital: Education and Migration among Bethlehem area Palestinians"*

## September

- 46. 1st - World Union of Jewish Students: Student Leaders from Britain
- 47. 20th - Andrew Rigby, *"Non-Violent Intervention in Regional Conflicts: Examples from the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict"*
- 48. 22nd - Annika Jagander, secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Swedish parliament
- 49. 22nd - Douglas Wilson, *"U.S. Foreign Policy under the Clinton Administration"*
- 50. 27th - Lutheran World Federation

## October

- 51. 5th - David Hunt, British Member of Parliament
- 52. 23rd - Med-Campus Haifa Seminar, Jewish-Arab Centre for Peace
- 53. 25th - Delegation of EU Troika
- 54. 25th - US Interreligious Committee for Peace in the Middle East
- 55. 28th - Former Foreign Minister of Sweden and Swedish delegation

## November

- 56. 14th - Tom O'Melia, National Democratic Institute

## December

- 57. 12th - Assistant Director of United States Information Agency
- 58. 13th - Lutheran World Federation, *"Between Occupation and Peace"*
- 59. 14th - Jordanian Tourist Delegation
- 60. 19th - Delegation of British Members of Parliament
- 61. 21st - Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum, *"Saudi Arabia and the Peace Process"*
- 62. 22nd - Intra-Palestinian dialogue

## January

**(6)** Institutions and groups from throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) attended a meeting to discuss the implications of the "The PLO-Jordan Economic Accords" which had been through four revisions before being provisionally acceptable to all parties but still lacked consensus. The nature of the relationship dictated by this agreement, the respective interests it represents and the main problems arising from it were discussed, as well as contradictions between the Palestinian-Jordanian and the Palestinian-Israeli agreement, ie. discrepancies in the published texts, for example concerning the opening of banks. Furthermore, use of the Israeli currency and the absence of a Palestinian Central Bank during the transitional period and its implications were addressed.

Concerning the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship, it was discussed whether it would be similar to that between Palestine and Egypt or whether the Palestinian economy would be dominated by Jordan's economy as it is by Israel's. Reference in the text to "building a common future" was seen as replacing the concept of "confederation" and allowing for a Palestinian state. Banks opened pre-67 in the West Bank and Gaza and their role in the context of the agreement were mentioned and it was noted that Israel closed pre-67 banks although the Cairo-Amman Bank was allowed under a special military decision, contradictory to pre-67 Jordanian laws.

The agreement supplied a much needed general framework, but delays in establishing Palestinian law had implications for the possibility of making legal decisions about a Palestinian banking system. The Israeli-Palestinian agreement will dictate the operation of the banks and cancels the Cairo-Amman Bank agreement. Palestinian negotiators were united on creating a Palestinian bank and currency. Article 1 and 2 of the current agreement are only temporary, the ultimate status of banks and currency are not decided.

The Jordanian position was analysed in terms of the extent to which it is hostile or only defensive of Jordanian interests. Of prime importance was achieving a balanced relationship, as neither Jordan nor Palestine wanted confederation, of which the result would be a Jordanian take-over of the West Bank. Any gains the Palestinians made from Israel might be transferred to Jordan, rather than contributing to a move towards independence. It was recognized that complete Palestinian economic independence at this point would be difficult and that it was necessary to determine exactly what the Palestinians wanted economically from Jordan and Israel.

**(9)** Mr. Stuart Holliday and Mr. Lauren Ross of the International Republican Institute addressed a meeting on "Democracy and the Future of Palestine", attended by leading Palestinian political figures. It was said the aim of the IRI is to aid democratic development, by looking at long term development needs and institution building. The discussions reflected Palestinian frustrations in this area, the decades of neglect of their human and democratic rights. Mohammed Jadallah said that the Palestinians for years have called on others to help them have fair democratic elections in the municipalities and no one answered. Holliday said that the Palestinians were right to be frustrated and that history has seen people on the wrong side of issues in the past. The IRI is not for policy formation, but rather carries out training and technical assistance in the nuts and bolts of civil society.

The barriers to democratization under the DOP are:

- ) economic,
- ) the process of separation from Israel, both economically and nationally,
- ) weak infrastructure, particularly in communication and transport, and
- ) the difficulties of modernization within an Islamic society.

The increasing power of Islamic groups was discussed and the need to understand and avoid the mistakes of Algeria and Egypt, the importance of understanding the heritage and experience of Islam and of avoiding Western stereotypes and misconceptions. Failure of the DOP would make room for the Islamicists.

Holliday said that IRI is interested in developing Palestinian institutions by Palestinians or Palestinians, with no second agenda or ulterior motives, and in a non-partisan fashion to empower.

Finally, Western confusion between religion and the political uses to which religion can be put by political Islamicists in order to take over decision making were discussed.

## February

**10)** Sam'an Khoury, Journalist and Director of the Zeitoun Centre in Jerusalem, gave a presentation on the *Draft Constitution of the Palestinian National Authority for the Transitional Phase*. He discussed the Palestinian view of law saying that despite living under Israeli occupation and under laws made to fit the interests of the rulers, Palestinians respect the law and know its importance. He emphasized the need to begin discussing and drafting documents for the interim phase so that people know what is going on and so that there will be adequate public discussion before official documents are signed. The constitution provides a system to allow the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. It does not allow discrimination on the basis of sex, colour or religion. Contradictory articles about the death penalty in the first draft have been clarified in the second, and execution is permissible by presidential decree. Also, the process of appointing the chief judge will be electoral. Of particular significance in the draft is the attention paid to human rights and freedoms.

Issa Abu al-Hawa asked why it is called a constitution if it is really a basic system. A constitution cannot exist unless there is a people, a land, and a state. The Palestinians have only two of these and therefore using the word "constitution" is not correct. According to Article 6 of the draft]:

*"The president of the Executive Committee is the head of the Council of the National Authority and shall exercise the powers designated to him by the basic regulation of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the resolutions of the National [PNC] and Central Councils and the Executive Committee as well as other prerogatives determined by this Law".*

Issa Abu al-Hawa expressed concern that making the president follow the decisions of all of these bodies will be confusing and there may be contradictory decisions. He added that the legislative power is not with the people because they have no power to make laws about water, security, borders, immigration, etc., except in agreement with the Israelis. He pointed out that in his draft, the executive authority and the legislative authority are in the hands of the same person.

Tamer Essawi said that there must be a system governing relations between the authorities and the people. Article 15 gives the PLO Executive Committee the right to appoint

not democratic. There should be clear division between the leaders of the National Authority and those of the PLO.

Fou'ad Jabar expressed the concern that the way the constitution ties the executive and legislative authority to the PLO may lead to situations that are incompatible with democracy.

Hatem Husseini said that there are positive aspects such as 26 articles dealing with human rights and women, and a stipulation that the president ratifies the decisions of the legislature as is done in the PLO-PNC relationship. He stressed the need to preserve national unity and that although some say that Arafat does not represent the people, Husseini emphasized that the PLO itself does.

Manuel Hassassian said that setting up a constitution was a premature step which should not have been taken until after elections. Building civil society was more important at this stage as the Palestinians have neither control nor sovereignty. He expressed concern that the Palestinian Authority will be coming from outside with the police. He said that Palestinians are living in a time of tribalism/tradition, not an environment of many views and voices. Palestinians have always thought about liberation and now are thinking of their state, but in fact they remain under occupation. He said that it is not wrong to draw up a constitution, but how could it possibly be applied at this stage.

Dr. Abdul Hadi said it was necessary to mention a capital and the principle of Jerusalem being a capital. Palestinians should bring Jerusalem to the forefront and struggle for it. The challenges were not in interpreting the text of the articles, but in building confidence in the PLO leadership, to legitimize and strengthen the National Council for the transitional period.

## March

(17) The meeting of the American-Jewish Committee's Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations was to have discussed "*Israel Diaspora Relations and the Advent of Peace*" but focused instead on the recent Hebron massacre. Dr. Abdul Hadi asked the delegation to consider what the position would have been had this attack been carried out by Palestinians against Israelis. Possible consequences of such an event could have been either the resignation of Rabin or mass deportation of Palestinians. Collective punitive measures and suspension of the peace talks would have been likely. Instead, the Palestinian community had been subjected to the collective punishment of curfews and roadblocks for 10 days since the massacre, as if they had committed the crime. Victims of Baruch Goldstein are also victimised by Israeli policy since the massacre. In other Arab countries there are open demonstrations of condemnation and attempts to understand the massacre but Palestinians inside the OPT have been denied this right of expression.

Concerning the presence of the 42 Israeli settler families in Hebron, Dr. Abdul Hadi said they were a stumbling block to peace and should not continue to live there, both for their own safety and to lessen the chances of another atrocity. Until 1982, settlers were forbidden to carry arms outside their houses and cars, but they now carry arms on the street, a provocation which should not be allowed. There was a grave risk of retaliatory action particularly from Islamist groups. There was Palestinian public demand for the immediate evacuation of settlements, withdrawal of troops and punishment for those publicly lionising Baruch Goldstein. Despite calls for an end to the peace process and for the removal of Chairman Arafat, Palestinians in the C

were working together to maintain consensus on a political agenda, in order to maintain stability, security and normality. Actions such as to move the Hebron settlers and to control their carrying of weapons would help maintain the peace talks and the credibility of the Palestinian leadership, enabling a return to negotiations. Dr. Abdul Hadi summarised the present position as one of waiting for an adequate response from the Israeli government which would allow the peace process to continue although some believe that there would be a deadline until March 15th only, after which revenge attacks would be made. Rabin seemed to be postponing any decision until his trip to Washington but a delay would only worsen the situation.

**19)** In a meeting with representatives from the Ford Foundation (Cairo, New York), Dr. Abdul Hadi discussed different subjects including PASSIA's work in general, past, current and future projects. He said that PASSIA intends to dedicate its efforts to becoming the national institute for training and educating Palestinians in international relations, particularly diplomacy and protocol, strategic studies, and the European Union. PASSIA encouraged all aid donors to invest through Palestinian institutions and thereby assist evolution from intifada to a civil society. There should be confidence in governmental institutions because these institutions will be run by Palestinians from inside with the guidance of the outside leadership. There must be time to see what will happen between these two - either a marriage where they work together, or a conflict of interests which might lead to a power struggle.

**April**

**20)** Mr. Michael Harris, Leader of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, said that his party really wanted to understand Palestinian positions at this time and that he would convey his position on his return to Canada. He was interested in Canadian economic support.

Dr. Abdul Hadi said that the Palestinian political address was Orient House and that it could be maintained there. He described PASSIA's work, notably its programme on Democracy and listed all organisations involved in preparing for elections or democracy. He said it was fair that Palestinians were collectively punished by roadblocks, curfews etc. following the Hebron massacre, while settlers were still allowed the freedom to roam the streets fully armed. He acknowledged that the Temporary International Presence in Hebron had set a precedent, despite the fact that it fell short of what Palestinians really consider necessary. Dr. Abdul Hadi also discussed the likelihood of Rabin being unable to protect settlers and the unlikelihood of them leaving Palestinian areas of their own accord, which could lead to a very explosive situation.

He said that Palestinians in the OPT were concerned that Arafat would appoint his own people in newly opened PLO offices. The merging of those from inside and outside was a big challenge and it was not yet clear if this would be a conflict or a marriage. Economists, businessmen and academics were looking for an immediate marriage between the two groups which would ease their transition into place as leaders of industry and investment. Dr. Abdul Hadi said that there could be problems, particularly between those of the secular opposition inside and those outside, whose attitudes were very different. Those outside were out of touch with reality on the ground and it was essential that the secular opposition on the ground remain engaged, particularly as Syria's future moves were unsure. The secular opposition are not interested in autonomy elections but do want a part of grassroots power, are calling for elections on that



and are ready to ...  
Concerning the issue of Jerusalem he said that doors had already been opened between Palestinians and Israelis as well as with others such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Other points raised were the importance of the Palestinian Police presence, international support, and the refugee issues. Regarding the latter, dual citizenship for Palestinians living outside, the right of diaspora Palestinians to vote, the right to return, and compensation for land that would never be returned were discussed.

Steve Hibbard, Counsellor at the Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv, asked if settlers would remain on the land and Dr. Abdul Hadi said that this was a very difficult problem, as the relationship between Palestinians and settlers was very volatile, particularly in Hebron. Furthermore, there had been no action to moderate the relationship and to conceive co-existence was very difficult.

Mohammed Sawalha, Al-Najah University Professor and Director of the House of Friendship in Nablus, said he viewed the situation differently. After 25 years of occupation the Palestinian economy and infrastructure had collapsed - a situation that Israel had intended in order to disable Palestinians completely and make independence unachievable. The intifada led to negotiations and euphoria after each stage that seemed to have achieved concrete results. Consequently, the most recent hope will fade if there are no basic improvements. Israel has the power to enable this improvement and if it refrains from doing so it will undermine the credibility of the current leadership with disastrous results. He added that democracy was considered the solution by the Palestinians and it was vital that this be promoted. It was difficult to rebuild the infrastructure of society, while at the same time promoting rapid improvements which would ensure the credibility of the leadership. Israel was not helping at all by offering confidence building measures. Life goes on in the same way it did before. One more event like the Hebron massacre could lead to a total collapse.

Mr. Harris said that the sooner the final arrangement was made, the better for everyone concerned. Dr. Abdul Hadi agreed. The difficulties of transferring from an intifada-based to a civil society were huge and require all the help they could get in terms of joint projects, advice, and training. He suggested that Canada could expand the work they have already been doing on refugees as it was not enough to rely on the multilateral talks alone which were very slow moving.

The massacre remained a priority for discussion throughout the year, by foreign delegations and by many intra-Palestinian meetings. A statement released as a result of the meetings indicated that retaliation was a foregone conclusion once the period of mourning had passed. A call was officially made for disarming settlers and dismantling politically dangerous settlements. International military protection for Palestinians was requested and a call was made for the outlawing of the extremist groups Kach, Kahane Hai and others. The settler issue at a time bomb should be on the political agenda for negotiations at all levels. Warnings were constantly made during this period that the credibility of the Palestinian leadership was at stake and that the massacre might result in a new intifada which could lead to the emergence of a new leadership. Suspension of the talks was necessary in order to signal the leadership's attitude after the massacre. Ultimately, meeting Palestinian demands after the massacre was seen as a minimum that Israel should do, but the Israeli attitude was that any changes in policy were "concessions" rather than practical and necessary acts to save life, help maintain the credibility of the Palestinian leadership and the peace process itself.

**23)** Dr. Awad Mokhtar Halouda, UN consultant and former head of the Egyptian statistics department, gave a lecture on *Statistics and Information for Development*. He explained the practical and theoretical application of statistics and how they give insight into human activities, standards of living and economic fluctuations. He described the use of statistics in economic planning, the goal of which is to raise the level of national and individual income and maintain stability during times when inflation affects employment. There are many indicators for development, including the state of the labour force and the level of technology. Knowledge of these is important for the planning of future strategies and the realisation of principal national aims.

**25)** Continuing its long relationship with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, PASSIA was host to a meeting with Jeffrey Boutwell and Everett Mendelsohn of Harvard University.

Ahmad Khalidi, currently at Chatham House, London, described the problems caused by Palestinians having been remiss in developing their own notions of security. Consequently, Israel dominates all discussion on the subject. He contrasted the Palestinian and Israeli attitude to security saying that the former tried to set and maintain certain permanent parameters which can be defended while the latter always look at worst case scenarios and do not base their security needs on present realities. Differing notions of security exacerbate tensions in the interim phase. Israel perceives straightforward confidence building measures as concessions. Release of prisoners becomes a favour rather than a necessary and logical gesture. Israelis perceive the interim phase as experimental and reversible. Consequently, the principle is that only the Palestinians can fail and that Israel will be inherently correct in all action throughout the transition period. Another source of tension is the time scale; Israel wants results now - police today and security tomorrow - but this is only achievable through the kind of repression that Palestinians have lived under for years and they do not want to adopt the same methods as those practised by the occupation. The Palestinian leadership needs a broader vision of security based on prevention. Emphasis at this stage should be on improving the quality of life so that Palestinians can feel that their situation is getting better.

Everett Mendelsohn said that security involves Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and that the whole issue would look very different without the problem of settlers and settlements. Priority was to maintain law and order in the interim period and to begin state building and a security system. The movement of people, whether diaspora or Palestinian workers in Israel, had to be regulated. The security issues involving Jerusalem and Palestinian institutions based there needed clarifying. Khalil Shikaki said that the main problem was settlements which Palestinians see as a continuation of occupation and may well come into confrontation over them or with them. Citing Hebron, he said that the occurrence of a similar incident was possible and settlements policed by the IDF could make them a target which may then cause Israel to consider retaliatory re-occupation.

Nazmi al-Jubeh said implementing the DOP was problematic, especially the deployment of the IDF which, in effect, would spread in order to protect settlements and to control 50% of roads.

Hassan al-Qiq said that the Palestinian people had a right to freedom and to establish their independence. Sovereignty leads to the means for self-defence. He questioned the meaning of security when one side has all the power. Without any power over land or water and no return of land to those in the diaspora, there is little chance of success. He decried the emphasis

Maheer Daoudi said that the credibility of the incoming authority was essential. The issue of prisoner release was one undermining factor, as for every person released, another 10 are arrested.

Ahmed Khalidi said that there could be regional cooperation that negated the need for Israeli troops in certain areas, particularly the West Bank.

Nabil Qassis said that Palestinians resent imposition from outside and he believed that they should be demilitarized. Palestinians are not the aggressors and the idea of using military power to dominate is not something they want to live with. However, this could only really be decided at a later point and if Palestinians feel wronged by the results of the peace process then there could be a problem. Any delay in dealing with the settlement issue was completely shortsighted.

Maheer Doudi raised the concern that Israel could easily reoccupy a demilitarized Palestinian area as the Palestinians have nothing with which to bargain in any military or other treaty.

Mr. Mendelsohn asked what military forces Palestinians would want or be able to support. Ahmad Khalidi said that for Israel to argue for demilitarisation, was a way of maintaining that the Palestinians were guilty and the aggressors.

Dr. Abdul Hadi concluded by warning that the real problem could be in the West Bank in particular in Jerusalem, since Israel cannot govern the city without a strong military presence.

**(26)** In a meeting with a group from the Canadian Centre for Management Development, Bernard Sabella began by giving a brief demographic breakdown of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. He listed the problems of the high population density in Gaza, combined with an underdeveloped economy and competing with Israel. There was considerable potential, especially in the education sector, which would contribute to achieving a decent standard of living. He stressed that the DOP was only the beginning and that the task ahead was huge and needed a very strong government or administration to set the path for an economy and society that could come to terms with, and establish good relations with Israel. A liberal, democratic and secular society with a strong economic base was not only an ideal but a necessity.

Said Zeedani said that although negotiations on Jerusalem are to be postponed until the final stage it was a very hot issue, particularly given the continuation of Israeli building which Arab areas are neglected. He said that there was a lot of opposition to the DOP, especially due to the fact that there are no assurances on the final settlement. With more positive signs that transition would lead to statehood there would be more cohesion among Palestinians and more support for the agreement.

Dr. Abdul Hadi gave a brief historical review of the stages through which Palestinian society had passed concluding that the current desire was for a complete divorce from Israel. The problems were primarily the settlements and had become even more intense since the Hebron massacre. Many fear that it will be "Gaza-Jericho First and Last" with a weak PLO which will mean that the Palestinian people will become merely a prisoner of the regional agenda of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. They wanted freedom in every sense, not just re-deployment of Israeli forces but complete withdrawal. Concerning security, he said that Gaza was governed but the West Bank would be a problem, as there is no clear decision on dealing with security for settlements. A civil society had grown up out of the intifada and it was now time

legitimize Palestinian relations with the world. Israel should face up to the challenge of becoming a real citizen of the Middle East. The settlement issue remains acute and dangerous and human rights abuses also continue. Closures and restrictions on movement had a devastating effect on the livelihood of Palestinians. The closure of Jerusalem had caused particular hardship given the fact that it is the centre of the West Bank.

Glenda Simms asked if there were tensions between Israeli Arabs and Palestinians and how they envisaged their future relationship. Said Zeedani said that tension was vis-a-vis the agreement but no radical disagreement. Basically, it was a quite logical battle between optimists and pessimists.

Bernard Sabella noted that there was more happiness about the agreement in the international sphere than in Jerusalem and the OPT. People were still digesting the real implications and a lot of uncertainty remained, the tasks ahead are enormous and tension was natural under the circumstances.

Dr. Abdul Hadi said that within Fatah and the mainstream the DOP was supported but there were conflicts of interest between the different groups inside and outside. The secular opposition inside have no alternative agendas and a strong opposition for democracy to function was needed. The Islamic opposition want to be involved but in stages, they are more interested in maintaining their grassroots base but keeping dialogue with the mainstream open. Palestinians in Israel fall into three categories: those who have survived the Israeli system and want nothing to do with the DOP, those who consider themselves sold out, and those connected to the Islamic resistance.

Dr. Riad Malki berated Dr. Abdul Hadi for saying that the opposition was necessary simply to fit in with the mainstream's idea of a functioning democracy and said he should not consider the opposition as existing to meet the requirements of the mainstream. He said that Fatah does not have a majority to implement the DOP without the backing of Hamas and are, therefore, looking to keep Hamas involved. He asked if the mainstream would accept their minority status and back out if Hamas withdrew their support or if they would push ahead with their minority regardless. If a non-legitimate and non-representative government were installed there would be chaos. The mainstream must go down to the level of the people. It may have international support but lacks domestic support and cannot survive for very long on international support alone. He concluded that this was a serious issue that had existed for the last two decades and that elections were the only way to decide.

Bernard Sabella asked if Dr. Malki was willing to participate in the elections. He replied that he wanted elections that represented all Palestinians including those in the diaspora and he could participate in elections only if all 6 million Palestinians were given the right to vote.

Dr. Abdul Hadi said that there was an independent election committee formed to discuss the possibilities and that all groups in the Palestinian political arena should take the opportunity to make decisions without Israel. A civil society had been created and it must not be lost. He asked how voting rights could be extended in line with Dr. Malki's wishes suggesting a quota system.

Bernard Sabella said that he very much feared the non-involvement of the secular opposition in democratic elections. It was imperative that all groups take part, including Hamas and those 12-13% who were independents. The opposition's role was to ensure that elections take place.

Linda Blackwell asked if there was a possibility that the momentum of the process could carry everything along to a successful conclusion. Riad Malki said that there had already

Ahmad said that in all interviews with Hamas members there had been an outright dismissal of the possibility of civil war, but in his opinion it could still not be discounted completely.

Abdul Hadi asked about the attitude of Hamas to Christians.

Dr. Ahmad said that according to Hamas' covenant all minorities shall live in peace under Islam. However, this would exclude them from holding any positions of power and their status would probably be like that of Arabs living inside Israel. Ultimately, it would be a denial of their rights.

Jamil Hamami said that this was a fallacy and if the history of Islamic states was taken into consideration no evidence of hatred or suppression of minorities would be found. The accusation of minority repression under Islam was a typical example of western or Zionist manipulation of ideas.

Dr. Abdul Hadi concluded by saying that Hamas must be made an integral part of the whole Palestinian political spectrum as they are like any other faction operating within the society. As such they should be perceived and consequently, cooperation and coordination with them was vital.

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33) Mr. Ranjit Singh, representative of the National Democratic Institute, Jerusalem, described his work with the Commission for Elections, in response to a request from Saeb Erekat who also said he wished to promote a wider internal discussion involving the whole Palestinian community rather than responding to Fatah alone. Dr. Abdul Hadi recommended more contact with the political and economic department in Tunis. He emphasised the importance of approaching Palestinians in Jordan and that they should be considered in relation to all other work undertaken, be it with Tunis, the diaspora, or locally. There should be consultations with Khalil Husseini and work performed by various research centres in Jerusalem, Hebron, Ramallah and Gaza should be considered. A dialogue could be held with the opposition parties, who were affiliated with the democratization process, and the proceedings published. It was agreed that all efforts similar to those of NDI should be combined, such as the work of the EU, Palestinian institutions and international organisations.

Mr. Tom O'Melia stressed that NDI should avoid the impression of hostility to any particular group. The process preceding elections is vitally important as efforts to create legitimacy must begin well before actual elections take place. Throughout the year, regular meetings were held with the NDI to discuss progress in the democratization process.

35) Professor Fred Halliday of the International Relations Department at the London School of Economics, gave a lecture at PASSIA on the current conflict in Yemen. He began by giving the historical background of the country remarking that each side had very different colonial influences which contributed to the political characteristics each was to adopt in the post colonial period. He gave a precise catalogue of the differences and tensions that had existed between the two Yemens and discussed the events that led up to their unification in 1990. He cited the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as being the most decisive factor underpinning the circumstances which eventually led to the outbreak of the current civil war. The economic havoc brought by the Gulf conflict, including the expulsion of 800,000 Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia came at a time when regional stability was crucial for the successful unification of



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and its civil conflict. He concluded that the conflict was most likely the result of a purely internal dynamic and was not pressure or manipulation from external powers.

## August

**(42)** The first of the lectures given by Israeli academics with particular regional expertise was given by Dr. Asher Susser, Head of the Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, on *Jordan's relationship with the Palestinians and Israel*. Dr. Susser said that Jordan was not a regular player in the Arab-Israeli conflict as the Palestinian question was not an issue of foreign policy but a domestic issue to Jordan. The British Mandate, he said, had created three entities, the Israeli, the Palestinian and the Jordanian which are all related. Jordan is tied to the Palestinian question and over the last 25 years, the desire has grown to be Palestine's partner. Dr. Susser gave a basic historical assessment of Jordan's changing relationship with the Palestinians, Israel and other countries in the region saying that Jordan had wished to Jordanise the Palestinians from 1948-1967 but did not succeed, and sees the revival of the Palestinian entity as a potential threat. 1967 was a watershed for Jordan, beginning a new era in Palestinian-Jordanian association. The loss of the West Bank ended Jordanisation and manipulation *vis-a-vis* the Palestinian National Movement, and from this time Palestine emerged as an independent player in the conflict. Thus, the June war was not only a blow to Jordan, but to the pan-Arab movement as a whole. Jordan soon concluded that some sort of new partnership with the Palestinians was essential and the turning point came in 1972, when Hussein's Federation plan recognised a separate Palestinian entity for the first time. This paved the way for the disengagement, which, however, was not Jordan's departure from the Palestinian question, on the contrary, it was intended to create a basis of trust with the Palestinians to pave a way for a partnership. It was not at first a partnership of equals, but this signified that Jordan could henceforth be a partner only and not a substitute for Palestinian nationalism.

The initial idea of partnership between Palestinians and Jordanians was not devoid of their own complexities - the problem for Jordan was to decide if they should create the partnership with a Palestinian representation consisted of the PLO, the people in the OPT, and the Palestinians in Jordan. Jordan did try and create a distinction between the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people in the OPT and that of the PLO. In the 1980s they realized the difficulty of operating without the PLO, although they sought to subordinate it.

Dr. Susser then talked briefly on the Madrid conference before moving on to the subject of Oslo, which set in motion a process designed to culminate in a Palestinian state, contrary to Jordan's aims. Jordan feared being cut out of the Palestinian solution and was concerned about the change in Israel's policy. Jordanian-Israeli negotiations consequently entered a new phase culminating in the signing of the Washington Declaration in July 1994. Jordan wants economic and political understanding with the Palestinians but the PLO has used the negotiations with Israel to ensure their detachment or independence from Jordan.

In the following discussion, Dr. Abdul Hadi commented that Jordan was established in 1921 as buffer zone but no longer plays this role and thus seeks a new role. He also disagreed about the disengagement saying that it was the direct result of the intifada.

Dr. Susser replied that Jordan does remain a buffer, due to its geo-political location between Israel and Iraq. It does not necessarily look for a new role but tries to maintain the

stability of the East Bank. Dr. Susser agreed that Jordan did receive a strong message from the intifada and had accepted it. He added that many Israelis see an advantage in Palestinian-Jordanian coordination. Their relation cannot be formulated by Israel but can come only from the Jordanians and Palestinians themselves.

Riad Malki asked how Jordanian nationalism and the rift between the King and Arafat affect cooperation between Jordanians and Palestinians.

Dr. Susser said this would not have any detrimental effect on future cooperative ideas, as the main concern of Jordanian nationalism was to protect the East Bank and not to devour the West Bank. Although the King and Arafat neither like nor trust each other, they have no choice but to continue along the current path and keep their personal differences to a minimum.

Khalil Shikaki pointed out that the main fear of the Palestinians was that neither Israel nor Jordan had accepted the emergence of a Palestinian state. He asked what threat there was to Jordan from Palestinians when it was a domestic issue and said that Palestinians also think that there is, or will be, a division of labour between Israel and Jordan in the sense that Israel will be in charge of security issues and Jordan will have a controlling role in defining the Palestinian future.

Dr. Susser replied that Jordan would not cooperate with Israel in becoming the caretaker of the Palestinians. They rejected Camp David for their own purposes of legitimacy and it is long term legitimacy that is the basic driving force for Jordan. As things stand now and are likely to stand in the future, Israel is not capable of determining the Palestinian future.

Said Zeedani asked about the Jordanian economy and possibilities for conflicts with Israel.

Dr. Susser replied that Jordan cannot afford a conflict with Israel. It is not on the verge of economic collapse even though it had recently a very difficult economic period. Europe, the U.S. and even Japan would not allow a collapse to happen.

Dr. Abdul Hadi said the Washington Declaration left Palestinians and Jordanians with three possible outcomes - coordination, conflict of interests and loyalties or, a long wait for a solution.

Dr. Susser agreed that all three options were realistic. Confrontation, he said, was most worrying as it would have a very negative impact. Waiting to see was not a real option because it could lead to unilateral steps, by the Palestinians, the Jordanians or both, therefore, endangering the possibilities of their future cooperation. Although not much of an option yet, coordination is something that only Arafat and Hussein can agree upon, as the most productive avenue to pursue.

A further meeting on the subject of Jordan revealed Palestinian perspectives on relations with Jordan during the transitional phase. Dr. Abdul Hadi's presentation was followed by intense discussion among Palestinian intellectuals and activists of various ideas and strategies on how to deal with this issue in the coming period. Later in the year, a meeting was held with a Jordanian delegation in which the opportunities for cooperation in the sphere of tourism were explored (59).

**43)** In the second of PASSIA's series of meetings on the situation and attitudes of Arab States, Moshe Ma'oz, Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University and Director of the Harry S. Truman Institute, lectured about *Syria, Palestine & Israel: the Peace Process and the Different Agendas*. Prof. Ma'oz spoke of the recent Jordan-Israeli agreements saying that these two nations had always had common interests, despite several wars between

there has been recognition of the fact that an agreement with Syria holds the key to lasting peace in the area. The 1993 Oslo agreement and the 1994 Cairo agreement signed between Israel and the PLO, may be considered a great breakthrough but four issues will be problematic: what lies beyond the Gaza and Jericho accord? What of Jerusalem and the two-state solution? What will be done about refugees and what will be done about settlements?

These four issues pose enormous problems for both Israelis and Palestinians and there is no shortage of vocal opposition from groups on both sides. The crucial question was whether full reconciliation between the peoples is possible although Prof. Ma'oz said he believed that education and building of mutual economic and cultural ties could overcome these psychologically charged problems. He added that since the signing of the DOP, security had improved to the point where Israelis are visiting Gaza and Jericho. Many Palestinians as well as many other Arabs have realised that there is a move towards recognition of Israel and the possibility of living side by side in peace.

Professor Ma'oz emphasised the importance of bringing Syria into the process due to:

- i) Palestinian refugees in Syria and Lebanon;
- ii) Syrian control of the Hizbullah; and
- iii) Syria's embodiment of Arabism that would encourage others to follow suit should Syria make an agreement.

However, there are serious obstacles to reaching a settlement with Israel, such as the Golan Heights which have to go back to Syria in return for full peace and normalisation and worries on both sides about the role the US will play. Prof. Ma'oz also voiced the fear that any agreement would be made with Assad and not with the majority of the Syrian people and to achieve the latter, there must be economic cooperation and unbiased education on both sides.

**(44)** Hanna Freij, Professor of Political Science at Utah University, gave a presentation on Iran outlining that Iran's intervention in the Caucasus was for the purpose of stabilizing the region in order to reduce its threat to Iran and not in order to spread the message of Islam, as was generally believed. Dr. Freij said that Iran's authoritarian populism is based on symbolic manipulation, of which the late Ayatollah Khomeini was an expert. Khomeini considered Iran not as a nation but as an Islamic state and his successors, Rafsanjani and Khamaneh, do not have the same Islamic legitimacy. Therefore, to maintain their support they must provide other incentives which are partly economic. Iran's economy is problematic due to population growth and high unemployment since the Gulf war. By the year 2000, the population is estimated to stand at around 90 million. Iran's primary export is oil, the price of which is dropping. Attempts to privatize have led to massive inflation and the opening of its market to cheaper South East Asian goods has put some Iranians out of business. Iran also fell short on loan repayments thus losing its credit worthiness from external sources.

Additionally, Iran felt threatened by the presence of US forces in the Gulf and by the uncertainty about the stability of the Caucasus and the influence instability could have on its own minorities. The government does not want to see a powerful Azerbaijan. Attempts to redraw the regional map concern Iran which is apprehensive about a redrawing of territory along ethnic lines. Iran fears a US attack and wants advanced nuclear technology although there are conflicting reports as to the level of Iran's nuclear capabilities. Iran has been attempting to c

Americanise its own military hardware and is buying from Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union and China. The International Institute of Strategic Studies suggests that these attempts are not advanced and come up to the standards of 1980 only.

A question was raised about competition between the countries who had a religious input into the Caucasus, such as Turkey, and how successful Iran had been in exporting Islam. Hanna Freij said the problem with Iran was that it was Shi'ite whereas the Caucasus were often Sunni.

Asked if Iran was prolonging the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Hanna Freij said that Iran probably wanted an end to the conflict but that it would do nothing to influence the outcome.

**(45)** Dr. Jennifer Claire Olmstead, Economics lecturer at the University of Michigan, gave a presentation entitled *"An Economic Analysis of Palestinian Migration"*, focusing on the Bethlehem area. The meeting was attended by employees of PECDAR and representatives of international banks.

Dr. Olmstead began her presentation by saying that in 1992, she had visited 262 households to get information about socio-economic conditions, gender and migration patterns. She defined a pattern of migration which had push and pull factors and gave examples of pull factors being the lack of educational opportunities, causing people to go outside for educational purposes and the lack of employment opportunities, which pull people outside to look for better working and living conditions. Among the push factors were the political and economic situation. The largest percentage of male migrants went outside for work purposes and the largest percentage of women predominantly for family reasons, either for marriage purposes or to join relatives outside (60% of migrants already had a family member abroad). Dr. Olmstead said that she had found that Muslim and Christians migrated in the same proportions but that Muslims were more likely to return. She said that the Gulf war made a major impression on migration patterns, as the West and Jordan absorbed many of the returning workers from the Gulf and Israel prevented many others from returning.

Following graduation, young people have nothing to do and although the recent changes have strengthened political and social motivations for staying, the economic motive is at an all time low. To avoid the brain drain it is essential that new opportunities be created in the future for employment, better wages and the development of entrepreneurial channels in which educated people can use their skills. Palestinians live in a high risk environment, where their economy can be disabled very easily by Israel. A Palestinian strategy has to be formed to address these problems.

An intense discussion ensued on the prospects for the future Palestinian economy and how to discourage migration. Ma'moun Sbeih said that there should be an investment-oriented and labour intensive industry to encourage immigrants to return. Ms. Olmstead's analysis was not considered helpful in assessing the situation and finding a solution.

Replying to one participant who criticised the donor countries and the activities of PECDAR, Bernard Philippe of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development said that PECDAR had been doing a lot of work (funding, distribution and administration) and that it had made commendable achievements under the current difficult circumstances.



coming to lecture Palestinians and trying to impose their models or agendas caused resentment. The lack of appreciation shown by both unofficial and official third parties of the asymmetric nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was also cited as a block to understanding. Resented also was the insensitivity of some experts who offer advice and workshops to Palestinians while their prime concern was the promotion of their own careers or institutes. In situations of violent conflict, the most significant third party actors were other states, therefore, the prime concern of unofficial third parties should be to establish channels of communication to state-level decision-makers. In conclusion, the relationship between peace groups, public opinion and foreign policy decision-makers was discussed.

**(49)** Douglas Wilson, Director of the Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs Office of the United States Information Agency (USIA), gave a presentation on "*US Foreign Policy Under the Clinton Administration*". He said that the defining character of the Clintonian foreign policy was a "new internationalism", which was neither isolationism nor cold-war involvement in international affairs, but a transition between the end of the cold war and the yet to emerge new world order. Mr. Wilson defined new internationalism as having a primacy of economic interests or considerations involving local leaders (mayors and governors) in the search for business opportunities abroad and increased scrutiny by congressman and the public in general over any adventurism in foreign affairs.

## December

**(61)** Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum, Associate Professor at Tel Aviv University, lectured on "*Saudi Arabia and the Middle East Peace Process*" observing that the Saudi position on the Peace Process is not widely heard. Saudis project their society as one which perfectly balances tradition and modernity, is rich and has very few social problems. This is not the case, however. Saudi Arabia has been going through some serious changes, including a deficit since 1983 which has increased steadily and is predicted by the IMF to be around 60% of the GDP by the end of 1994. This was the result of short-sighted policy in the oil rich years, after which the population began to expect full government care in the sense that there was no taxation and cradle to grave welfare provisions. Another problem is that Saudi Arabia regards loans to Iraq as assets and is afraid to face the political consequences of any cutback even though it has needed loans itself since 1987. The Saudi Ambassador to the US actually said that it would not be possible to pay for defence contracts before a process of re-structuring the economy began, which would have to include taxation which the Saudis are keen to avoid. Unemployment is a relatively new problem, concerning now 25% of college graduates. According to UN statistics, Saudi Arabia has the third highest population growth rate in the world. There is no conscription, although the regime is committed to doubling the size of the army which ties them further to the US. This is very much resented by the growing ultra-conservative Islamic movement which was highly critical of western intervention during the Gulf War. In 1978, the Islamic charity "Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights" (CDLR) was set up, and its first action was a fax campaign and interviews with prominent critics of the Saudi regime. It gave unprecedented information, also to the western press first resulting in satellite dishes being outlawed. The regime was attacked

for corruption and for receiving commissions from large international deals and accused of behaving irresponsibly. CDLR is active on the Internet and well organised. In September 1994, the arrest of two preachers led to riots in the Qassam area. Such protests are very rare and the CDLR made sure it was reported in Egypt. Two Saudi diplomats recently defected were granted asylum by the US after Britain refused.

Until the 1970s, Saudi Arabia never initiated a policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict. They took a strong anti-Israeli position and the media generally remains anti-Jewish. The Camp David Accord broke the comfortable Arab consensus but the Fahd Plan implied recognition of all states to live in peace and tried to get it accepted as UN policy. Since the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia was indebted to the US and was present as an observer in Madrid on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. There were reports that Saudis were working behind the scenes to get Syria to attend and some studies that have claimed that there would be no peace process were it not for Saudi Arabia. Generally, the domestic situation is the Saudis' priority and not the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore they kept distance, although they have now pledged \$100million to Palestinian development. Moves on the peace process are usually made at the urging of the US but are little more than tokenistic.

In the discussion it was pointed out that the Saudis see themselves as the protectors of Islam, particularly regarding the annual Hajj which they portray purely as a religious responsibility. They were challenged in this respect by Iran who uses the Hajj as a political vehicle.

Said Zeedani asked how they could comply with the US push to support the peace process without this having a detrimental effect on the regime, particularly given the anti-American sentiments expressed by a large percentage of the population. Dr. Teitelbaum replied that the US understands this problems to the extent that it is very diplomatic in its dealings with the regime and does not actually push for significant changes.

Afif Safieh asked why, after years of ignoring human rights violations, the West was now interested in such internal Saudi matters. Dr. Teitelbaum said that the CDLR have generated a lot of publicity and are causing comment to be made internationally, however, at the government level, there was still no interest, not even when human rights violations involved JS citizens.

Regarding future developments, concern was voiced over the successor of King Fahd and the political trends likely to be dominant. Dr. Teitelbaum pointed out that Islam is currently the dominant trend and that liberal modernists have abandoned the field, in terms of being vocal at least.

Throughout the year, PASSIA received international representatives and diplomats from foreign Ministries, Consulates in Jerusalem and Embassies in Tel Aviv (listed below). The purpose of these meetings is to exchange information and ideas on political aspects of the situation and to give the Palestinian perspective on internal, regional and international issues. It is also a part of PASSIA's efforts to forge and maintain international diplomatic links for Palestinian institutions.

**Canada:**

H.E. Norman Spector, Ambassador; Steve Hibbard, Counsellor; Louis Simard, George Rioux, First Secretary, Consul; Kirsty Wright, Canada Fund Coordinator; Judy Gladstone, Dialogue Fund; Michael D.Harris, M.P.P. Leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario; Ferdinand Marcouy, Chief, Institutional Management Sector, Canadian International Development Agency; Alberto Palacios-Hardy, Programme Manager, Canadian International Development Agency.

**Egypt:**

Mustapha Mohammed, Consul.

**European Community:**

Mr. Thomas Dupla.

**France:**

Jean de Gliniasty, Consul; Gilles D. Della Guardia, Commercial Consul; Eric Rouleau, Paris, Basma Darwish Kodmani.

**Germany:**

Michael Bock, Counsellor, Amman Embassy; Andres Michaelis, First Secretary, Embassy Tel Aviv; Martin Kobler, Representative Office Jericho, Andrae Gaerber, Herman Bunz, Friedrich Ebert Foundation; H.E. Herbert Sahlman, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

**India:**

Virendra Gupta, Counsellor.

**Israel:**

Latif Dori, Head of Arab Desk, Mapam; Professor Dr. Joseph Ginat, Chairman, Committee for Relations with Arab and Muslim Countries, Israel Labour Party.

**Japan:**

Katsuo Shoji, Project Formulation Advisor, Embassy of Japan, Tel Aviv.

**The Netherlands:**

Daan Rosenberg Polak, Counsellor of Embassy, Suen B. Bjerregaard, Royal Dutch representative in Jericho.

**Romania:**

Dr. Radu Homescu, Ambassador Tel Aviv; Mircea Mironenco, Counsellor, Embassy; Julian Smaranda, First Secretary, Embassy; Nicolae Ropoteanu, Director, Cabinet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Spain:**

H.E. Andre Collado, Consul Gen.; Marcos Vega, Deputy Consul; H.E. Carlos Westendorp, Deputy Minister, Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State for the EU; Alberto Navarro, Dir. Gen., Legal and Institutional Co-ordination with EU; Alfredo Delgado, Deputy Dir. Gen., Agriculture and Fishing; Santiago Martinez Caro, Deputy Dir. Gen., Institutional Relations; Christina Pe'rez Canto, Chief, Press Office of the Deputy Minister.

**International Institutions:**

Lutheran World Federation; Dr. Brian W. Neldner, Director, Geneva; Darcy Christen, Head of Sub-delegation ICRC; Catherine Comtet, Fred Fluitman, ILO, Geneva.

**Sweden:**

Annika Jagander, Deputy Secretary, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee of the Swedish Parliament; B. G. Herrstrom, Deputy Assistant Undersecretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mikael Dahl, former Consul-General; Karin Roxman, Consul-General.

**Switzerland:**

William Simpson, Director, Industrial Relations and Labour Administration.

**Turkey:**

Muk Akim, Consul General.

**United Kingdom:**

Robert Hancock, Guy Warnton, Research Analysts, FCO; Richard Dalton, Consul General; Christopher Innes-Hopkins, Attache; Joanne Adamson, Consul; Yacoub Dahdal, Commerce, Information; Sir John and Mrs. Moberly, Chatham House; MAP UK; MPs Tony Blair, Menzies Campbell, Lord Holme of Cheltenham, Paul Tyler, Malcolm Bruce, Graham Watson, Ben Rich, David Hunt; William Jordan, First Secretary, Amman Embassy.

**United States:**

Edward Abington, Consul Gen.; Michele Dunne, Lori Kressey, Political Officers; Karen Learez, USA; Susan Ziadeh, Consul; Humphrey Davis, Ford Foundation; Shaha Aliriza, National Endowment for Democracy; John Peter Loiello, USA Associate Dir., Educational and Cultural Affairs; Robert L. Shiffer, Dir., USA Citizen Exchanges Office; Gary L. Garisson, Area Chief Middle East/South East Asia, Fulbright Scholar Programme, Council for International Exchange Scholars, Washington D.C.; Christopher D. Crowley, Deputy Dir., US Agency for International Development, Cairo; Benjamin L. Cardin, Congressman, Baltimore, Maryland; John Homan, Deputy Dir. USA.



# 4

## EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

The project entitled "Education for Democracy 1993-94" is an education programme designed to help reinforce democratic debate and to increase understanding of democratic ideas and processes within the OPT. The project had three stages with related activities, writing papers, workshops and publications. The first stage involved the commissioning of five papers from academics and professionals representing various schools of thought. A project team was formed consisting of authors, a co-ordinator and a secretary. For the second stage, this team organised workshops in community and education centers in Jerusalem, Beit Hanina, Gaza, Nablus and Hebron.

The papers were presented and discussed at these workshops prior to their publication. Participants in the workshops were political activists and professionals from educational institutions and community organizations, who will encourage practical use of the ideas raised in the local context. To conclude the programme, three of the research studies were published in book form while the other two are expected to be published at a later date.

### Project Objectives

Specific objectives of the project were:

- To provide a forum for open and free debate on ideas, issues and aspects of democracy in relation to Palestinians in the OPT.
- To encourage greater awareness of the value and importance of using the tool of open and fair elections in a period of transition.
- To help the development of democratic institutions in civil society (long term objective).

### Project Activities

The authors and subjects chosen for the papers were as follows:

**Raja Shehadeh** (Lawyer; Co-founder of Al-Haq, the West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva; member of legal advisory committee for the Palestinian negotiation in the Middle East Peace Process).

**Project:** *"The Declaration of Principles and the Legal System in the West Bank"*.

**Dr. Khalil Shikaki** (Assistant Professor, Political Science, An-Najah University, Nablus; Director, Center for Palestine Research and Studies, Nablus. Author of various studies on the Palestine Question)

**Project:** *"West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Future Political and Administrative Relations"*.

and columns.

**Subject:** *"Mechanisms for Palestinian Elections: The Laws, Candidates and the Electoral Parties, Funding and the Media."*

**4. Mahdi Abdul Hadi** (Academic; member, Palestinian delegation to the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees in the Middle East Peace Process; political analyst; author of various studies on the Palestine Question).

**Subject:** *"Democracy in Theory and Practice among Palestinian Factions in the Occupied Territories, including Islamic Political Trends."*

**5. Ruba Hussari** (Researcher; Jerusalem Media & Communications Centre; Journalist, Ramallah)

**Subject:** *"The Role of the Palestinian Media in a Future Democratic System."*

All five workshops took place throughout August and September 1994; details are as follows:

## Workshop One

**Ruba Hussari, "The Role of the Palestinian Media in a Future Democratic System."**

**Date:** Tuesday, 23rd August 1994.

**Place:** PASSIA, Jerusalem.

**Participants:** Representatives of all Palestinian factional and political alignments; academic professionals (particularly media related); political activists; PLO representative in London, Mr. Afif Safieh, who is planning to return to Jerusalem and establish a new Palestinian daily newspaper in English.

### Summary:

Points raised were:

1. The position of the media as defined by the articles of the Palestinian interim by-law.
2. National security needs of the society and the role of the media.
3. The right of the media to discuss and influence political decisions.
4. The social and political agenda of women in the transitional phase.

The case of An-Nahar was raised and it was agreed that it was a political message to Jordan from Arafat that had been sent to the wrong address. The reaction of NGOs and community leaders was very clear in its opposition to the move and questions were raised as to what guarantee there could be that this kind of "incident" wouldn't happen again.

The situation of the Lebanese press in the 60s and 70s was discussed and whether or not the Palestinians would allow the free operation of newspapers writing on behalf of other Arab states, or if the print media would be Palestinian only.

The role of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the Egyptian experience 1974/75 in establishing a higher council for media and drafting a code of ethics for journalists was considered. The by-laws allowed for press ownership of 49% by media organisations themselves with the remaining 51% government owned. It was asked if Palestinians would let the decision on media guidelines to the PNA, or if there was room for those working in media to draft or influence the guidelines under which they will work themselves.



On the issue of censorship, it was noted that Palestinians had been crippled by Israeli censorship laws for many years and that there was a general fear of the attitude of the PNA to the media organisations, ie. if they would introduce censorship or would accept the challenge and have enough confidence in the media to let it function normally and without interference.

The exposure to mass media with new technology and increased television and radio time should be devoted to truth, objectivity and the building of credibility and confidence, otherwise the Palestinian media will lose a large part of its audience.

The extent to which the media can help promote elections by reporting and having public radio and television debates and problems of the current media were discussed. It was noted that there was one major newspaper, two small bi-weeklies and one very poor quality English weekly paper. In the area of broadcast media, there was only a skeleton service operating from Jericho.

It was asked what forums were available for the mainstream and the opposition, through which they could challenge the status quo, and if these were not made available, would the opposition only be able to assert itself through the distribution of underground leaflets as had before.

The establishment of forums to address issues of concern about women such as cases of murder and abuse of women, as well as gross inequality of marital and divorce rights was suggested and it was mentioned that there is no media forum to address these problems.

The Islamic opposition pointed out that although they recognize "Palestinian" authority, they do not recognize it as "National" authority. To prove it is "National" elections are needed to give it legitimacy as a *National* Authority. They noted their disappointment at the lack of reaction to the Israeli closure of [the pro-Hamas newspaper] Al-Bayan but maintained that they had a continued interest in national dialogue to maintain harmony and understanding and to develop ideas.

Independent personalities said that more tools must be made available by the media, to ensure that the whole range of political views can be aired. There were often articles which would appear representing a different point of view each week. This had recently become less common and it was urged that this particular tool be adopted strongly by any current or future media concern.

The secular opposition groups criticized the way in which the PNA had dealt with the media issue so far, pointing out that there had been contradictory statements by ministers and that there was a complete absence of forums to publicly oppose the closure of An-Nahar. The main Palestinian daily Al-Quds, had not mentioned the episode and this meant that there was no "free press".

## Workshop Two

Ali Jarbawi, "Mechanisms for Palestinian Elections: The Laws, Candidates and the Electorate, Parties, Funding and the Media".

**Date:** Wednesday, 31st August 1994.

**Place:** Islamic Society for Culture and Science, Al-Ram, West Bank.

**Participants:** Islamic leaders; secular leaders; Christian leaders; members of the Palestinian Independent Group for Elections; academics; professionals; and political activists.

a democratic political system. People have suffered from being denied a say in their daily lives but are very aware that the PNA could become a military authority. Individuals and institutions need more time to fully come to terms with the marriage between the outside and the inside and it is hoped that elections will help to consummate this relationship.

From the PNA's point of view, elections would grant it legitimacy. The PNA went from military struggle by an established leadership, to leadership without struggle, to negotiation which it shared with new leaders inside. Elections can legitimize both the old and the new.

From the opposition's point of view, elections give the people the right to control the governing authority, maintain [the opposition's] political and social position and invalidate attempts to marginalize it.

It was noted that any election which takes place, be it municipal or legislative, is part of and within the control of the DOP. Whether this fact is approved of or not, any attempt to ignore it amounts to self delusion. Palestinian strategy should be to build consensus among all parties that the eventual objective is to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 territories, without jeopardizing the historic rights of the Palestinian people. The purpose of elections is to establish a representative body on the land and to establish an elected legislative council.

From the point of view of others (eg. Israel, the West, Arab States etc.), elections are an affirmation of the DOP, a dividing line between the inside and the outside and a mechanism whereby the current leadership can be changed. There is also a link between financial support and elections, whereby donors call for elections as a measure of credibility and worthiness.

The central question is how to use the principle of elections and to create Palestinian modalities agreed by all parties in order to establish a truly representative political body. Palestinian objectives should not jeopardize the union between inside and outside nor the aggregate rights. To establish a basis whereby Palestinians are capable of making and developing legislation on all aspects of life is of prime importance. It is proposed to create electoral by-laws for the transitional phase which will not jeopardize the rights expected in the final phase.

The electoral system should be temporary, used once only and should consider very carefully the societal conditions on which it must be based. Of particular relevance to this, the fact that the society is very much orientated to group loyalty and sensibility, be it familial, tribal, geographical, factional or religious. Moreover, the gap and differences between the land and the conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should also be considered with care.

There is a need for temporary by-laws (transitional phase) and an outline of a permanent legal system. All by-laws need to be unified by an independent legal committee; there is a problem envisaged with the PNA appointing such a committee. There is a need for a governing system or constitution which separates between various authorities and promotes balance among them.

Proposed election modalities are on three levels: central, regional and local. On the *central* level, based on an estimated six million Palestinians and on a ratio of one seat per 20,000 people there would be a total of 300 seats. These 300 elected members would form the Parliament. The Palestinian National Council (PNC) would be responsible for affairs inside and in the diaspora.

The *regional* council will consist of 100 seats for both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, all of whom will automatically become members of the PNC. Elections will not take place

should Arab Jerusalem citizens refuse to participate or are denied the right to participate. The local body shall consist of 20 members who will form the PNA and will be the caretaker government. This level shall be responsible for the two levels indicated above.

The Islamic groups raised the possibility of boycotting the elections. Sa'eb Erekat, head of the appointed commission for elections, had declared publicly on August 30th that five papers had been submitted to Israel for approval of general elections. The PNA had set December 15th for these to take place. As yet, there had been no response and Chairman Arafat has been criticizing Rabin for delaying the election process. It was made clear that the Islamic interest in elections and reaction to the issues raised, was for their own politically partisan interests and not for national interests. It was understood, however, that if the community agreed on an electoral system and demanded and pushed for use of the system they had chosen, rather than boycott that agreed upon by the PNA and Israel, then the door for elections would be open.

The secular opposition agreed on the need to continue the national dialogue and the need to create modalities of electoral planning based on maintaining unity between inside and outside and by not necessarily legitimizing the DOP. Elections to the PNC, therefore, are possible but not to the autonomy council. There was a heated debate on the possibility of a campaign by the Islamic and secular opposition to boycott the elections, but both are committed to continuing this kind of open discussion on the subject.

## **Workshop Three**

**Dr. Khalil Shikaki, "The West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Future Political and Administrative Relations".**

**Date:** Friday, 9th September 1994.

**Place:** Marna House Hotel, Gaza City.

**Participants:** Representatives of all Palestinian factional and political alignments; professionals; academics; representatives of women's movements and the media; political activists.

### Summary:

The speaker made introductory remarks emphasizing that the geographical separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has meant that there have been two different sets of experiences and has established de facto circumstances which have led to the further strengthening of the divide between the two regions creating many obstacles and distinctions between them. Despite the negative effect of Israeli occupation policies and practices for the past 17 years which exacerbated the distinctions between the two regions, it did actually link them together for the first time. Since the Madrid negotiations and the following Oslo/Cairo accords, the whole region is facing a new era. The new conditions can strengthen the current weak linkage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

What is needed now, is a Palestinian authority, a Palestinian political system and the solution of local, regional and external problem.

Responses to an academic questionnaire showed deep differences in awareness of the gap between the West Bank and Gaza. New conditions for the transitional phase are required which can close the gaps. The scenario of a developed autonomy over a semi-independent entity

Any scenario for an independent state necessitates the withdrawal of settlers, settlements, and the IDF and the establishment of one political entity with one market. The choice of options for the future must rest on a careful reading of Palestinian capability and interests taking into consideration the economic, social and domestic interests of three parties: Jordan, Israel and the PLO. There is a need to review the parties' interpretations of the current situation and how they view the future.

There is a Palestinian consensus that a political independent entity is being built but this is not the only option to unite the people and the land. Another viewpoint considers the transitional phase a special stage which will take the society from a revolutionary to a stable condition, from an unsystematic to a democratic society governed by a political and administrative regime. This, as well as the conditions to recruit and appoint people to the seats of authority, should be based on qualifications, scientific capabilities and loyalty to the homeland and not on factional political loyalty.

There are four options to unite the people and the land:

(1) Full assimilation, i.e. a central political administrative headquarters for the new Palestine.

(2) A non-centralized administrative system which will be semi-sovereign in the transitional phase.

(3) A federal relationship, not with central political and administrative headquarters, but two separate geographical and political entities overseen by a higher authority.

(4) A political central authority operating, at the same time, with a decentralized administration in which some elements of the previous options could be considered.

Whichever option or combination of options is finally decided, it is imperative that the state is aware and capable of dealing with the following factors:

1. Creation of geographic-political unity while moving from a revolutionary to a stable phase.

2. Closure of gaps, minimisation of current differences and finding solutions for the different problems in each region.

3. Maintenance of a balance between the two areas, despite their great proportional and strategic differences which also embraces the interests of other parties, i.e. Jordan and Israel.

4. Unification of the economic and other policies for both regions.

5. Ability to provide the necessary incentives and expenses to ensure that committed and suitable personnel are available to take charge of these two regions.

6. Awareness that political loyalty on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip could be directed outward. The effectiveness to prevent this shift of political loyalty should be considered and the option where this is least likely to happen should be taken.

7. Consideration of the cultural and social differences between the two regions affected by the life experience of the Gaza Strip under Egypt and the life experience of the West Bank under Jordan.

8. Paying attention to the fact that the demographic concentration in Gaza is 10 times that of the West Bank.

9. Establishment of a united educational system and body of law, a central authority for land and citizen registration and the fair distribution of these in the territories should be a priority.

The current political arrangements (since the DoP) govern the current relationship and leave all these options theoretical and hypothetical. Discussion on the two regions has revealed that their total assimilation is nationally and passionately favored and that a translation of this option to practicality, i.e. by unifying the laws, having one national anthem, a central government and public promotion of a united assimilation option is needed.

It is wrong to put Israel, Jordan and the PLO on the same level of consideration. For Palestinians, Palestine is a homeland, for others it is an independent entity with which they deal according to their financial and security interests. What is needed is a simple arrangement in harmony with the reality which will provide the people with legitimate government ready to use what is good in the DOP to meet their aspirations. By doing this, an assimilated relationship will be created. The obstacle to this goal is the DOP which completely governs the nature of the transitional phase.

#### Discussion:

**Participant 1:** The options in the transitional phase have their impact on the final phase. Plans for the interim phase should be based on an agreed national agenda for the nature of the final arrangement. We can begin with what is available in the DOP but plan as if the DOP doesn't exist and doesn't govern us. Our strategic goal should be that we work in one homeland and our plans should be concerned with how to develop this homeland which will then make redundant all other options.

**Participant 2:** The strategic Palestinian goal is to reach an agreement on how better conditions to bring people together can be created. Not only by closing the gap between the West Bank and Gaza but within each region. People are very sensitive in both regions and at present, people in the West Bank see the seat of authority as existing solely in Gaza and this has had a negative impact on them.

**Participant 3:** The daily life experience which reflects the differences and gaps can be seen with those in the diaspora as well. A political interest and awareness is created by the fact that we live in the West Bank or Gaza, or Jordan, the Gulf, Europe or wherever. We have different experiences under different systems while being denied our right for self-determination. We need to create a mechanism in this transitional phase to centralize attention on the notion of one common single homeland.

**Participant 4:** In Jordan, political decision makers are very much aware of the distinctions, gaps and differences among people in the two regions. They are expecting the PNA to face more difficulties and it seems that the Jordanian interest is to focus on these differences or gaps and let them to have an impact on the final arrangement. Should we deal with the transitional phase in accordance with the Israeli agenda and with total awareness of our differences and objectives or should we deal in accordance to our understanding of what is best for us without ignoring what the DOP is all about?

Palestinian entity if we start with this negative approach. However, if you really want to deal with differences, I invite you to deal with the question of refugee camps and not with the differences between cities, towns and villages. The factional headquarters abroad were the ones who started and maintained this emphasis on differences - this is a small homeland and there is no room to build it on differences. Talking of the differences will only provoke feelings that some are being discriminated against.

**Participant 6:** The *intifada* leadership was based in Gaza and Gazans felt uneasy when it moved from there to the West Bank, although there was no total consent on the West Bank. Today, the seat of the PNA is centralized in Gaza, the people of the West Bank feel isolated. PNA leaders living in the Gaza Strip are very much aware of their authority and power but when they come to the West Bank they notice that their importance is less and consequently feel that perhaps they overestimate their position and authority in the Gaza Strip. This is a problem and the only way to solve it, is to struggle to centralize our seat of government in our eternal capital of Jerusalem. I don't think refugee camps, cities or villages will disagree on centralizing our seat of government in Jerusalem. Meanwhile, until we can achieve this target, it is crucial that we centralize land and citizen registration and create one body of law to govern the one homeland. We cannot continue as things are run now.

**Participant 7:** Talking about differences and feelings of discrimination while searching for a political regime based on those differences, is wrong. We cannot put people face to face with these options as if they are equal options. We should present one national programme for one homeland to the people, exactly as the Zionists did. Our strategic choice should be to unite the people under one national identity. We should no longer talk about West Bankers, Gazans, Palestinians in Jordan etc. but as one Palestinian people. We should then refer to our people according to geographical areas which can be redefined into North, South, Central and Coastal regions and the diaspora.

**Participant 8:** I am for the option of one homeland governed by one political system. I agree with the point mentioned earlier about Gazans feeling angry at the time when *intifada* political decision making was moved to Jerusalem, however, the right thing to do now is to focus on Jerusalem. Jerusalem is our capital; it become the centre of our political life. This would solve many problems.

**Participant 9:** The central seat of authority for the coming two years is Gaza but transferring to Ramallah will bring negative reactions and maybe the Gaza phase will seem like it never happened.

**Participant 10:** The Gaza/Jericho phase is one station on the way to the establishment of the Authority and we should not focus on Ramallah as if we are creating a Palestinian Bonn. Germany's Bonn was a substitute for Berlin. Are we to forget Jerusalem for maybe 20 years the Germans forgot Berlin? Why not balance the seat of power between Gaza and the West Bank from now on and then transfer both halves to Jerusalem when the time comes. Focussing on Ramallah as an extension of the new Arab Jerusalem will weaken our negotiating position.

on Jerusalem. We need to re-emphasize and re-strengthen whatever we have in Jerusalem, and link it and expand it to the rest of the OPT.

**Participant 11:** The feeling of discrimination that has been noted here, is not my personal opinion but is the result of many polls and questionnaires. The question which still needs an answer is what mechanism exists to unite people in one homeland without ignoring these feelings and gaps. This could be answered by discussing the following: a) the performance of the current Palestinian authority; b) the relationship between the authority and the opposition and vice-versa; c) civil liberties, including freedom of the press and human rights; d) security; e) elections; f) external relationships, emphasizing the role of Jordan.

The conditions and restraints of the DOP are limiting the authority of the PNA, therefore, the PNA lacks the necessary strength and has its performance somewhat hampered. The PLO is exercising its leadership role through the PNA. The evidence is that the individual decision making headquarters are the same. There is no system and the by-laws are not clear. Arafat is not seeking to institutionalize the PNA bodies but is centralizing all the authority in his hands. With the exception of Islamic Jihad, the opposition refuse to participate in ministerial posts but they accept lower and less important seats in the government like Ministry Undersecretaries, General Directors of departments or advisors. However, all without exception are willing to participate in serving the society in the field of health, education, agriculture, municipalities etc. Though military occupation will not return to Gaza, there is a fear haunting the PNA that if conditions are to deteriorate beyond repair, then it will return.

**Participant 12:** There is no rationale in military action against Israel and my advice to the religious opposition is that it should not be the party responsible for the failure of the DOP before the world. Israel is the one who should be responsible.

**Participant 13:** The national and religious opposition are not in harmony because the former is not against the political peace process particularly the PPP (Palestine People's Party, formerly Palestine Communist Party, PCP) who have been a party to it. Our [PPP] opposition is directed at the particular results of the negotiations.

**Participant 14:** The Islamic Jihad refuses to participate in any post within the PNA.

**Participant 15:** The PNA lacks the means to deal with security issues for the following reasons:

- there is no integration between the seven various departments of security;
- there is no coordination between security institutions or officers; on the contrary there have been clashes and confrontations;
- various security forces and apparatus are functioning independently which will lead to competition developing which will worsen the situation;
- the position of the political authority today rests on a weak legitimacy (i.e. not elected), therefore, it is not going to oppose the idea of a divided security framework as this framework allows it to use each section which is less of a threat to its own position;
- opposition forces are aware that the political authority is not in a strong position to confront them;
- a clash among the various security bodies and Israeli interference are possibilities;



**Participant 16:** The PNA does not feel that it represents all the people and this makes it reluctant to take strong action against the opposition. The PNA is going through a continuous test phase but one major question is if the PNA intends to disarm factions and activists when election time comes. We will resist disarmament. The PNA has no right to disarm the people while the occupation still exists. Anyone who denies our right to resist occupation will be fought. We don't want to become another Arab regime. If the PNA is to disarm people, then there will be a confrontation, however, I don't expect there to be a total security collapse. There is no reason for this. The example of recent arrests [of opposition figures] has shown them to be a formalism as if there is an unwritten arrangement between the PNA and the opposition. Our objective from the point of view of military resistance, is to pressure the occupation to dismantle settlements. It is worthwhile noting that we take Rabin's public statements through the media as part of the negotiation game.

**Participant 17:** PNA objectives behind the recent arrests are to please Rabin and to give confidence to the Israeli public that they (the PNA) are in control. It is an indirect testing of the water in which the future relationship with Israel will be built and a test for the capabilities of the security apparatus. The intensification of military operations (by Hamas) against Israel is to keep up the pressure for the dismantlement of settlements. We need them out as soon as possible. Our opposition platform is a responsible opposition. It is not in our interests for security to collapse or for a Palestinian civil war to arise. We are in dialogue with the PNA and during the Amman talks, Hamas was offered seats in the PNA in excess of its requested numbers, but this offer was refused. We need now a reform of our military actions in accordance with this transitional phase. Hamas' military action has actually been military "reaction" against a massacre or an Israeli attack. For example, the Rafah operation was a reaction to the massacre at the Erez checkpoint. The Afula and Hadera bombings were reactions to the Hebron massacre. Gush Katif was a reaction to the killing of a Palestinian youth in Jerusalem. These operations are to meet people's aspirations and demands for justice and to seek their support. Regarding the reformation of our operations, we will no longer announce who is conducting them, no longer claim responsibility for them and no longer make public the reasons behind them.

#### Views on Election:

**Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP):** We support legislative elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but we do not believe that such elections will take place.

**Palestine People's Party (PPP):** We should take advantage of election and develop an assertive determined position in which the modalities and conditions under which we will accept to participate are made very clear. We can then strongly apply the pressure of this position to guarantee the quality and condition of elections.

**Hamas:** We are for legislative election to a parliament but the ceiling should not be the DO

**Islamic Jihad:** Participation in election under the umbrella of the DOP means that we will be giving legitimacy to the authority, therefore, we are most definitely not going to participate in legislative election. However, we will take part in election to unions and professional organisations.

#### What will happen in the event of Arafat's death?

**PPP:** The DOP will not fall apart and neither will the authority. The confusion people will face is simply because of their understanding of the DOP which is not actually ending occupation but re-arranging the occupying presence. The authority will manifest its powers in Gaza but it will fade on the West Bank. Israel does not seek geographic assimilation of the territory but rather its partition. For the time being the current authority has the character of just another Arab regime.

**Hammas:** There might be a chaotic situation if the head of the authority disappears for whatever reason. The struggle to succeed him among those who surround him might lead to confrontation what might be beneficial for the opposition. The security forces' are not loyal to Abu Amar but to other countries.

**Islamic Jihad:** The security forces will take over and there will be a struggle for power, not only between those within the current authority but the door will also be open to those who made sacrifices during the years of occupation. At the end of the day, whoever has control of military power will govern.

**PFLP:** In the absence of the head of the authority, the struggle will be among the PLO leadership close to Abu Amr and between a new political group from the OPT. We will hear voices vying for the right to call themselves rulers and will witness "military" Fatah against civilian Fatah. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, Fatah will continue exercising the authority and the departure of its head will not have a great deal of difference.

**PPP:** There are three factors here: a) The current scenario is autonomy. It will not be shaken as long as America and Israel are endorsing it; b) Abu Amr is responsible for the deterioration in the OPT, but it will not worsen when he departs; c) The army is not a suitable candidate for government but those who will be funding it will be able to hook it into a political framework which will then produce the decision makers.

## **Workshop Four**

**Laila Shehadeh, "The Declaration of Principles and the Legal System in the West Bank".**

**Date:** Saturday, 24th September 1994.

**Place:** Centre for Palestine Research and Studies, Nablus.

**Participants:** Lawyers, judges and other legal professionals; representatives of local Palestinian chambers of commerce; educationalists; academics; representatives of women's movements and the media; and political activists.

endorsement a year ago. It was a framework for the final arrangement and an arrangement for a self-rule government in the transitional phase which will present inherent complications in moving from the latter stage to the former. Since it is a framework agreed upon in 1993, it took the legal status quo of the time, as its basis which is an important element in Israeli strategy. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion that arises out of the study of the DOP, is that the interim arrangements take as their starting point and are based on the situation as it existed in the OPT when the negotiations began, both in terms of the state of the law and of public administration. That is to say, that the DOP comes to *consolidate* rather than replace the extensive legal and administrative changes which Israel put into place during its 27-year occupation of the OPT. However, Palestinians could attain some of their demands and aspirations during the negotiations after transition by relying on the Geneva Convention.

The DOP was signed on September 13th, 1993, the Cairo Agreement on May 4th, 1994 and early empowerment in the spheres of education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism began on August 29th 1994. The takeover of duties and responsibilities is however, only within the legal context of what already exists on the ground and this includes both Jordanian and British Mandate law as well as Israeli military orders.

The interim phase should lead to a final arrangement based on UN Resolution 242. However, Palestinians have no agenda on what they wish the final arrangement to entail. What was "legally" established and already enforced on the ground within the framework of the DOP, has to be identified and clarified in order to help Palestinians to think more strategically about their final goals.

The current legal framework in existence is Jordanian, based on previous laws, Ottoman, British and French. Added to this, are Israeli military orders which directed and amended previous laws. The military orders were enforced to achieve three basic objectives of control:

a) Separation between administrative and military affairs - the formation of the Israeli civil administration post-Camp David, was a tool to advance this.

b) Separation between Palestinian and Israeli affairs in the OPT, as in the case of South Africa. Palestinians would be governed by military orders while settlements would continue to enjoy the citizenship of the Israeli state under the Israeli legal system.

c) Separation of the Palestinian people from their land - previously the Jordanian administration followed a policy whereby settlement of disputes over land led to a system of registration for land in the West Bank.

From the Palestinian perspective, it is necessary at this point to start planning and forming an administrative system based on a Palestinian law, which will link peoples interests and land issues. In Israeli planning the question of land has been kept a very isolated issue and this has had a major impact on the position in which Palestinians found themselves at the beginning of negotiations. The Israeli negotiating strategy has been to transfer authority over civil affairs and services to Palestinians without transferring any power on major issues which are the question of land rights, settlers and settlements. Thus, the transfer of authorities will have no real effect on the current legal status.

The 4,110 military orders and four military proclamations have fostered the following:

a) The entry of the IDF to the area.

b) Transference of administrative and legislative authority to the Israeli military government thereby granting him ultimate power.

c) Formation of military courts which abided by the Fourth Geneva Convention until Article 35 of Proclamation no. 3 waived this requirement.

d) 10 days after the Cairo Agreement, the military governor issued Proclamation no. 4, in which he - according to the agreement - transferred some of his responsibilities to the PNA.

Proclamation no. 4 entitles the implementation of Gaza-Jericho including transference to Palestinians of civil administration. In Gaza, the Israeli civil administration is to be canceled out in Jericho, only some of its authority will be transferred. In both cases the administration of civil and military affairs concerning Israelis in the OPT will remain as it is. We must discover what Palestinian strategy, planning and thinking is. It became an all too common habit to explain and decide what the official political position was according to rumors and not facts and figures. An example of this is the way Palestinians dealt with the disengagement of Jordan. King Hussein announced on 31st July 1988 that the disengagement of Jordan's administrative and legal relations with the West Bank was "according to Palestinian wishes". This affected the Jordanian citizenship law of 1954. According to the King's speech, an administrative arrangement distinguishing between the East and the West Bank was implemented. However, in the case of a woman from Ramallah who went to the Higher Court in Jordan demanding her right to have her Jordanian passport and residency renewed, the court discussed the administrative arrangement but did not give a legal explanation, did not examine the legal power of the King's speech and did not interfere in the constitutional aspect of the disengagement. Eventually, it was left to the Interior Ministry to consider the case but constitutionally it was not tackled. The change was never confirmed by a change in the Jordanian law of citizenship.

Palestinians are now facing a transitional phase based on a framework which exists on the ground. They need a strategy to bring the full withdrawal of Israel and achieve self-determination. To realize one's own identity one must begin by realizing who governs his identity, how and from where.

#### Discussion:

**Participant 1:** We are against military orders. The Cairo Agreement obligated us to keep military orders for the duration of the transitional phase but seeing as the DOP does not specify a military presence, there should be no need for military orders. If we keep them, then we may have to face the possibility of the PNA adopting them, applying them in the transitional phase and becoming a "police" authority which derives its legitimacy from the military orders of its occupier.

**Participant 2:** Islam as read in the holy Quran addresses the case of property and I believe that this should be the basis for discussing the issue.

**Participant 3:** It is the duty of professionals in the community, especially lawyers and judges, to start drafting a Palestinian legal code which will unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under one legal system. There must be emphasis placed on new Palestinian land registration regulations in particular. Palestinian society is in a stage of transition and the door is open for creative thinking and planning for a legitimacy which comes from the people. In the case of the disengagement with Jordan, it is hypothetically true that the King's speech was not constitutional but political, hence Jordanian government negotiations with the PLO on issues like economy,

been between two people with two identities and two different territories. The question of citizenship is still to be agreed on through Palestinian-Jordanian negotiations. At present, there is a vacuum to be filled through joint agreements but their starting point is that Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine.

**Speaker:** As a civil society in the making, we need regulations, laws and a constitution. We still do not have a clear idea of how to get rid of the unjust laws and replace them with just ones. The connection between politics and law is the area we need to address without fear. We need to define clearly the methodology that we are going to use. Current Palestinian decisions have no legal base.

**Participant 4:** The PNA regulates and makes decisions for the time being and enforcement on the ground is based not on the DOP but on people consent. People are accepting that the PNA is the *de facto* authority, therefore legitimizing it by consent. What happened in Jericho is testament to this<sup>1</sup>.

**Participant 5:** What steps could be taken to protect the PNA from Israeli threats to torpedo the DOP? In the field of education early empowerment has been granted to the PNA and now it is up to the Palestinian Ministry of Education to decide on school fees, curriculum etc. The first step is to cancel the military orders which were imposed in the field of education, including those banning the use of hundreds of books. If the PNA can succeed in this without any Israeli influence then there really is an "authority" in the making.

**Speaker:** Other countries attempted to guarantee the DOP. It is actually registered as a UN document but there are no real guarantees. Talking about Israeli threats has no basis, these are empty threats. That most countries recognize the DOP is an adequate protection. The DOP is a framework and all Israel can do is to stall its implementation. Our communities succeeded in resisting Military Order 854 and others. The new Palestinian reality is what will create new facts on the ground.

**Participant 6:** It seems the disengagement was unconstitutional and Israeli military orders are unjust and the new reality is the DOP and the fledgling PNA. What if Jordan or even the majority of Palestinians in the OPT changed their minds?

**Speaker:** This requires a political answer, not a legal one and it is wishful thinking to be considering a return to the *status quo ante*.

**Participant 7:** What is the legal status of Jerusalem as there are already three parties directly involved?

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<sup>1</sup> The loser in a land and water dispute, which had been mediated by the mayor of Jericho complained to the PNA who then reversed the mayor's decision. Despite the fact that the mayor decision was generally thought to be correct in the particular circumstances of the dispute, few criticisms were made against the PNA.

**Speaker:** Jerusalem has a very special status which is totally different from the current administrative and legal position. Israeli annexation violates international law, nobody recognizes Israeli presence and practices in Jerusalem. The status of Jerusalem is based on UN Resolution 242 which stipulates that it is a *corpus separatum*. What Israel has done, is to create facts on the ground irrespective of the legal status. Labour follows the Likud in its policy on Jerusalem, creating facts on the ground. Jordanian power in Jerusalem has only been through Islamic Waqf and some education and health services under Jordanian law but there has been a siege on Jordanian administration. Israeli policy is to have a Jewish majority in Jerusalem and there is no Palestinian strategy to cope with the ongoing deterioration in Jerusalem. This is one of the things which we should be addressing.

**Participant 8:** I put the responsibility before the Palestinian bar. There should be a specialized and dedicated group focussing on the legal issues and presenting their recommendations to the leadership.

**Participant 9:** There is no such thing as a centralized Palestinian bar. We have three areas in which Palestinian lawyers function - the Jerusalem "bar" on the West Bank, the Arab Federation of Lawyers and the group which no longer exist as part of the Palestinian legal system since they gave up the general strike and went to work for the Israeli courts. No authority has been given to any group but we do still have a moral commitment. We are on the way to reforming a "national" Palestinian bar.

**Speaker:** Our society is a forgiving society and objections to some regulations and orders by the PNC is healthy. I fully support the call for a better and more advanced role for lawyers.

**Participant 10:** The DOP can be interpreted in different ways. Each party has its own definition and my primary concern is that Palestinians should work towards finding a consensus on what the DOP actually means. Our civil society needs by-laws and a whole new legal system but we cannot begin from a vacuum. What is available has to be used as a base and then amended according to the needs of the society. We have Ottoman, Mandatory, Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli laws as precedents.

**Speaker:** The first thing that the PNA should do is publish a monthly Palestinian official gazette which proposed laws, legislation, regulations, decisions made and any appointees to PNA or other relative positions should be reported. People should not be left in the dark as to what the government is doing as this will cause not only resentment but popular speculation, which can be even more damaging. People should know of all developments directly through a PNA monthly publication. It is the primary duty of the authority to issue an official gazette and not the responsibility of the public.

**Participant 11:** Last week there was a debate on the draft labor law. I did not hear any contribution, ideas or criticisms in the local media or other public fora from lawyers and other legal professionals. I believe that the legal professionals have a duty to begin serving the public immediately and that they should take the initiative to promote equality and governmental responsibility through legal means.

of lawyers and judges who can review the military orders, do you think the PNA will be receptive?

**Speaker:** The Technical Committees over the last few years conducted several studies on Israeli military orders. Whether or not military orders should be used is a political and not a legal decision. What we suggest is that issues are centralized and organized in a way that will assist the community in its move towards becoming a civil society.

**Participant 13:** The Cairo Agreement authorized the PNA to change the by-laws and the military orders but is there any possibility that they may begin doing so prior to elections taking place?

**Speaker:** The Cairo Agreement speaks about stages of Palestinian legislation, all of which should be sent to an Israeli review committee within three days. At the Oslo talks there was a joint committee to revise the by-laws. The problem is the ambiguity of the wording about how the Palestinians can actually go before facing the final Israeli veto. There is a great need to focus on the methodology on which the implementation of the DOP is to be based. My advice is to focus on the legal issues as a means to organize towards a primary objective of creating a fully functioning civil society.

## Workshop Five

**Mahdi Abdul Hadi, "Democracy in Theory and Practice among Palestinian Factions in the Occupied Territories, including Islamic Political Trends."**

**Date:** Thursday, 29th September 1994.

**Place:** Hebron University, Hebron.

**Participants:** Representatives of all Palestinian factional and political alignments; academic representatives of the Hebron municipal council and Chamber of Commerce; legal and educational professionals; business people; unions.

### Summary:

#### **a) *The Mainstream and its alliance***

The mainstream believe that the DOP and the implementation of the "Gaza-Jericho-Firya agreement will lead to an independent Palestinian state. It is hoped that the return of Yasir Arafat to Gaza and Jericho will close the gap between inside and outside and unite the Palestinian political agenda which is concerned predominantly with:

- 1) releasing the detainees, return of deportees and diaspora;
- 2) dismantlement of Israeli settlements in the autonomous areas;
- 3) development projects and investment with the joint effort and involvement of Palestinians inside and outside;
- 4) democratization, starting with national dialogue and working towards elections. Fa movement started a process of institutionalization in preparation for elections to a congress, central committee and a collective leadership within the movement;
- 5) establishing a national democratic political system on Palestinian soil, liberalizing media institutions.



This mainstream is faced with the challenges of:

1) Israeli settlements and settlers within the autonomous areas and no political mechanism or power to confront their presence, insist on their removal or even to freeze Israeli plans to expand and strengthen settlements in the OPT.

2) No power or influence to link the transitional phase with the issues of the final arrangement. Bilateral talks appear to be overshadowing multilateral talks raising fears among Palestinians that their position, interests and needs on the questions of Jerusalem, refugees, security and borders will be severely undermined prior to the final arrangement.

3) Being drawn into a sea of local, daily issues with no division of labour among members of the PNA and the beginning of a power struggle among them which is weakening their credibility, their future legitimacy and could result in the limitation of their future authority to Gaza only.

4) Close and continuous coordination with Egypt at the expense of any coordination with Jordan which has been clearly and generally negatively noted by many different and concerned parties.

5) The confusion and overlap of economic plans and agreements within the society itself and between the PNA and Israel and the PNA and Jordan.

The PLO remains the recognised leadership for Palestinians everywhere but its infrastructure and institutions are involved in a major process of being reshaped. This Palestinian authority in the making is going through a trial and error period as it adapts to its new circumstances and attempts to establish its legitimacy on the ground which will lead to its ability to provide effective government.

There are 3 categories of people within the Fatah movement who have returned from outside:

1) Well known names and faces who had been enjoying authority in Tunis, who returned immediately and moved to the seat of power as members of the PNA. They feel that they are the authority due to past experience, because of involvement in the Oslo Agreement and the conclusion that they are the ones who actually "delivered" to the Palestinian people. However, their problem is a lack of legitimacy. They need to be elected by the people before they are truly the leaders. The second problem they face is the relationship between them and the *de facto* leaders on the ground, often *intifada* leaders. In some cases there is a struggle for power but in others there has been assimilation and several cases of *intifada* "generals" becoming part of the PNA. There has been an ongoing dialogue between the two and various institutions and organisations have been formed, particularly the security apparatus, which have absorbed most of the young generation, ie. the *intifada* leadership. For example, the Preventive Security Force has seemingly become Fatah's military organisation for control throughout the transitional phase, while the Presidential and the General Security Force have absorbed those from outside. All are going through a certain degree of trial and error as they attempt to maintain law and order.

2) The second category contains businessmen, investors, intellectuals and grassroots leaders. Their common ground (whether they are from inside or outside) is that they need the transitional phase to work out the most effective way of working and linking their interests to create a common agenda which gives them economic power and a subsequent political input to their own constituency. They are not in a rush to govern and are very well aware that this is only the transitional phase, ie. that names and faces will disappear. They hope to strengthen

3) The unfortunates who came from outside, left their families and their often very successful lives, only to end up with living conditions that are mediocre at best, a serious cut in salary and with no serious attention paid to their well being. They are joined by those from inside who became affiliated with Fatah late and who have no official status. They are desperately seeking a connection with the new system to avoid losing out in the race for a future position.

Together, these three categories represent about 40% of the community. In spite of the differences, their verbal loyalty is to Arafat and their interest is to become the single party of the future government. Young Fatah members have succeeded in having Abu Amar (Arafat) endorse their agenda for reforms to institutionalize electoral processes to give the movement a stronger position and to avoid leaving the door open to speculation about the power, support and capabilities of the movement. They want to be visibly organized and elected. In the Silwan area for example, it was claimed that there were 200 Fatah members during the *intifada*. Since Arafat endorsed the preparation for local elections procedures, registration to the Fatah movement has risen to 800. The transition phase could be considered a Fatah reform phase because the factions are very much more positively interested in the work of Fatah and their actions throughout the episode could encourage the factions. The general message seems to be that what is most important is what is done on the ground inside and what is visible to the population.

The process of institutionalization has resulted in a recently formed 6-member Fatah Higher Committee in the OPT which is headed by Faisal Husseini and contains nine departments:

- |                           |                      |                                 |
|---------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Municipal and Villages | 2. National Affairs  | 3. Mobilization and Information |
| 4. General Affairs        | 5. Student and Youth | 6. General Institutions         |
| 7. Women's Department     | 8. Information       | 9. Intelligence                 |

Each of the departments will recruit its members according to professional background, skills, dedication etc. It was the first time ever that the formation of such a committee was publicly announced in the national press. This is widely considered an indication that the responsibility for organizational credibility is being taken seriously.

### ***b) The opposition***

The secular and religious opposition interpret the DOP as "Disaster of Palestine" and "Gaza-Jericho First" as "Gaza-Jericho First and Last", expecting the PNA to become no more than "collaborators" with limited authority over these two regions. They base their argument on the following assumptions: UN resolutions are becoming no more than archive documents; the world is accepting the idea that the Middle East crisis is over; Europe and the US consider the people of the Middle East to be negotiating and reshaping their relations; the role of the international community is to offer financial support only and not interfere in the deliberations and a divided Arab world is burying the Arab nationalist cause, focussing separately according to own interests - on economic and market issues.

The secular opposition state that there is no detailed, comprehensive Palestinian strategy able to unite the people, but that it is all based on words and slogans. Concerning Jerusalem

particularly, examples like "Palestinian flags will be flown from the walls of Jerusalem" or "We shall all pray together in Jerusalem" are criticized as no more than hollow rhetoric. They point out the reality that Jerusalem is isolated and in a political and security siege. Nothing moves in the OPT without Israeli permission and Israeli military forces are still present. Therefore, they claim that the PNA will be "collaborators" with limited authority for the duration of the transitional phase. There has however, been a serious drop in the influence of the opposition on the political process with many splits and divisions within the opposition ranks clearly evident.

Nayef Hawatmeh's DFLP, has already had a crisis situation in which one third of its Central Committee were dismissed for their "moderate statements" and for contacts with Fatah. The crisis goes beyond the institutional level, it is geographical, financial and ideological, too. At its recent annual congress, the leadership was also seen to be split and recent polls show that they do not hold more than 3-5% of factional support in the OPT. There is also little opportunity for their voices to be heard, not only because of the current absence of a free media but because they have been drawn into a battle of slogans among themselves which has precluded the issuing of a cohesive statement.

The other opposition faction, the PFLP, is witnessing a similar division but is trying to overcome it with the help of some of its leaders who have returned to Gaza and the West Bank. In one of their recent conferences, they invited members of the PNA to attend and to give keynote speeches as well as other factional representatives. They want to maintain their presence and are keeping a very close eye on Fatah plans to institutionalize its movement in preparation for an elected congress. They say that it is time for reform and that there is a need to join the electoral bandwagon.

The third party is Hamas. They are also having problems with division among the ranks with the clear exception of their position on elections. Statements from Hamas representatives in all areas indicate that they are interested in two kinds of elections:

- i) elections on the municipal, union and charitable organisation level to enable them to continue serving the community and to challenge Fatah at a grassroots level.
- ii) legislative elections - although stipulating that the ceiling of these should not be the DOP. Arafat, succeeded in having close and direct dialogue with Hamas in Gaza although in the West Bank they are divided and reluctant to join dialogue with the PNA despite the fact that they are in contact with other factions, including Fatah.

The opposition, both secular and religious, criticize the DOP and the PNA, its practices and its political agenda without offering a convincing and realistic alternative Palestinian national agenda. This tactic brings neither hope nor change to the current situation and could arguably lessen their popularity in a social climate where people are weary of negativism. They could fall into a trap of words and slogans without making any practical effort to mobilize the community or coordinate with other factions in challenging the occupiers as was done in the *intifada* phase. It is very likely that the opposition will accept to fully join in the game of "musical chairs" starting with the first notes struck by election. Their ultimate fear is of losing the position they do have and they cannot be sure that their "seats" are guaranteed if they are not in the game.

businessmen, intellectuals, and the silent majority. They think that "Gaza-Jericho" will not fail. Military occupation will not return to Gaza, and the current process, with or without the current members of the PNA, will lead to a Palestinian entity more advanced than autonomy but less than an independent state. They base their argument on the fact that the DOP was signed at the White House which was a indication of wide international recognition and support for its implementation. They say that Israel is entering an era of normalisation in the region and without a continuously developing process on the Palestinian track, it cannot reach the rest of the Arab world. The new era of international and regional relations is based on economic and security considerations and the DOP is one of the cornerstones on which businessmen, investors and governmental projects are to build the new Middle East. Any areas of future conflict such as finance and banking, labour and market, or access to water and natural resources, can only be resolved by negotiation and not on a military basis. This group is continually praying for the Palestinians to grasp the opportunities in the coming two years to rebuild their homeland with less conflict and more coordination with all internal and external parties. They see Arafat and Rabin as being in the same boat with the decision on whether this boat will sail or sink in the hands of the two peoples. This group believe that neither Palestinians or Israelis are interested in seeing the boat sink and that new definitions must be found for the relationship as they begin to use a joint vocabulary which can create new words and develop a common language for both of them. In particular, they consider that the word "sovereignty" could mean "sharing authority" and the words "open city" could mean "rotating responsibilities."

#### Issues facing the Palestinian National Authority

One question repeatedly raised, is whether or not the PNA can deal with the complex nature of Palestinian civil society which has always operated amid a plurality of political opinions. There are several immediate issues which it is necessary for the PNA to take a firm and acceptable stand on, to demonstrate its capability and to maintain its support. A primary issue is the question of Jerusalem, regarding which the PNA needs to rapidly establish a strong national consensus. They need to continue stressing that Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine and an inseparable part of the OPT. It must be included in all developments in the transitional phase and should begin with Israel freezing, if not reversing, the continued 'Judaization' of the city and rectifying the damage already done.

Another problem concerns PNA ability and qualification to govern and obtain the necessary funding for "early empowerment" in the spheres of education, health, tourism, social welfare and taxation. Recent reports on funding however, announced that donor country funds to the PNA would be channelled through the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to cover police salaries and related costs from July to October 1994 only. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has indicated that it will "bridge the funding gap" until the PNA tax system has developed to the point of covering salaries and recurrent policing costs. At present, the cost of police salaries is about \$7million per month while the tax revenue collected by the PNA is running at \$3million only.

There are currently 9000 Palestinian police in Gaza and Jericho as well as three intelligence agencies (Preventive, Presidential, and General Intelligence Security Force). There are doubts about the PNA's interest in uniting and centralizing these security organisations

become one national apparatus and about the fairness and integrity with which they maintain law and order in the OPT.

Other issues which the PNA must prove competent in dealing with include human rights, liberties and press freedom, formation of political parties, freedom of enterprise and investment and non-interference in the running of independent institutions. The PNA must face the problems associated with democracy building and running their own affairs through the mechanism of elections. This particular issue is crucial in order to legitimize the current leadership and open the door for the upcoming generation to share the responsibility of building the homeland. It will demonstrate respect for the agendas of the religious and secular opposition and maintain national dialogue and harmony with them. It is also the most speedy and effective manner of divorcing Israel.

### Discussion

**Participant 1:** We need to develop common ground between supporters and opponenets of the peace process. The opposition camp is concerned about the success of the PNA whose performance until now has indeed been unsatisfactory. It is very important that our voices are heard publicly, in order to direct and correct the path before the PNA. There should be a better mechanism to develop its functioning. This requires a plan based on democratic principles. We cannot afford to waste time and we cannot exercise democracy in the absence of law which protects our rights and liberties. Then, when the time comes for elections within the framework of the law, people will accept the results.

**Participant 2:** Though we don't differ much on what is happening in the transitional phase, we should be very much aware where it is leading us. We should now be determined to convince the Israelis that we are responsible and capable of running our own affairs. The Israelis thought that after Beirut in 1982, the Palestinian people were no more. The *intifada* in 1987 opened their eyes to the fact that we were still here and we now need to use this period to generate an unequivocal stand to convince them that in spite of our [internal] differences, we are ultimately one united people.

**Participant 3:** I believe the Oslo accord did not put an end to the conflict between us and the Israelis. It just put the conflict on a different level or track. Some would call it a conflict between civilizations, some would call it a conflict for existence and for deepening the roots of both our presence and theirs. Whatever the actual conflict may be, my point is that we are a very long way away from meeting the people's aspirations. The question of the right to return or compensation for refugees is still pending with other issues until the final arrangement. Therefore, opposition and supporters should work together towards the success of the transitional phase. This will not be achieved unless we manage to bring about a collective elected leadership. This should lay the cornerstone for the respect of human rights, dignities and liberties. Division of labour must be based on qualifications and not factional loyalty or good connections among the elite, which can only widen the gap between rich and poor. The PNA got off to a bad start, it did not manage to professionally diagnose the "patients'" concerns and symptoms. The formation of its departments and its methods of recruitment for personnel were not started from a clean slate and demonstrated clearly that loyalty comes first and not professionalism and suitability for the job.

Resolutions 181, 194 and all others which condemned Israel and supported Palestinian rights. Our position in Madrid would have been very different. James Baker's agenda was for less than a state and advocated only a limited autonomy and the position of the US as the sole superpower in the arena is confirmed beyond doubt after the fall of the Soviet Union. We should consider the new international balance of power and the support that Israel is gaining vis-a-vis Palestinian interests. The new reality is that we have an authority on a piece of land but it is not a progressive one, it did not institutionalize democracy. We have a people who are full of support for election to bring about a National Council with legislative powers to guarantee a democratic political system. What can be done to improve and to develop this authority to build a state where the only supreme rule is the rule of law? An individual cannot hold all the authority and be above the law at the same time.

**Participant 5:** The main factor in our current political-ideological conflict, is an underestimation of the people's will and of the gap between the leadership and the people. After the Hebron massacre, there was an important opportunity for change, political investment and rectification of the negotiations to achieve better conditions on the ground. Institutions, organisations and popular committees sent memos, reports and requests to the PLO in Tunis, explaining the new status quo in Hebron and demanding that negotiations be suspended until Israel was forced to evacuate fanatic settlers from this city. Peres and Rabin played a classical tactical game by putting the town under siege and closing down the mosque. Many people, who are opposing the current scenario of negotiations, were ready to reconsider their position, had the Palestinian negotiating team or the PLO leadership taken the new situation after the massacre as serious as it deserved. I understand that they have been under regional and international pressure but they ignored our repeated cries to invest politically in the Hebron events and to create a new negotiating stance and to achieve immediate changes on the ground. Unfortunately, our leadership yielded again to the external pressures ignoring its own people's voices.

**Participant 6:** I don't want to defend the actions of the PLO or the negotiating team but I can accept somebody in their position who misses 70% of attempts but scores professionally and successfully with the other 30%. [Audience interruption: it should be vice versa 70% of the goals should be reached]. Palestinian factions and their democratic slogans whether they are opposed or supportive are not doing much on the ground themselves. It is the PLO who is doing it and we should support them. Furthermore, criticism should remain within our own house and not be put out for media consumption or political gain.

**Participant 7:** The question of factions is not limited to their relationship in the OPT. It also reaches out to their leadership in Damascus, Amman or elsewhere. There was a feeling among them which tended towards linkage of their political agendas, inside and outside, with Jordan. Their criticisms of today are based on the PLO ignoring Jordan and Palestinians in Jordan. I will go further on this point and say that the Hamas and Islamic leadership in Jordan will promote the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation more than they will promote a PNA functionary for the transitional phase, in the hope of eventually having an independent state in the future.

**Participant 8:** In western democratic systems there are two or more political parties. In the holy Quran there are clear phrases about the prophet defeating the parties. Here in the 20th century, I don't see any prophets but I do see parties in the making. Are we going to live in a multi-party system with no prophets? The Jewish ideology is based on the Jewish people's claims to this land. Our ideology is based on our rights to this land. Their prophets and ours are dead but their message is very much alive. We should do as they have done and make political parties based on ideology and not political slogans. What if Hamas or Islamic Jihad or other Islamic groups formed political parties based on Islamic ideology. How would the PNA or Israel react to this?

**Participant 9:** Legislative election delivers representatives of the people and you should consider yourselves as the peoples' product and not the product of the Oslo Agreement. The ceiling of elected governmental bodies may be Oslo, which actually negates its democratic merit, but the legislative elected council should not abide by such a ceiling. Since the PLO leadership did not invest politically in the Hebron massacre, they have no right to interfere in the current splits or divisions in Hebron. We had opened more than a house for condolences. Each faction had its own house and I should remind people that in a recent gathering, similar to this, Nabil Sha'ath said that "the PLO received its return on investment in the Hebron massacre and that was the liberation of Gaza". We told him that the Israelis did not want Gaza in the first place, Rabin actually said that he didn't care if Gaza sank into the sea. The liberation of Gaza has no value for the Israelis, certainly no value for Hebronites and perhaps only has value for him.

**Participant 10:** I would agree that reading into factional contradictions and relations inside and outside is a complicated issue. However, were a non-partisan scholar and researcher to investigate this, his conclusions would always reveal more support than opposition to the current transitional phase. Can we demand a referendum by the people to make sure that his conclusions are what the people want? Legislative election we agree upon, but we are not interested in elections to the PNA.

**Participant 11:** On the international and regional levels, Palestinians lost politically, the conflict is considered over. The image of Arafat and Rabin shaking hands in Washington made people accept the principle that there was no longer a conflict in existence. Israelis and Palestinians don't have so much faith in this image. Occupation still exists but now we will come to see it as a new economic occupation with Japanese, German and US influence. We do not have our own national agenda.

**Participant 12:** The discussion of the factional relationships should be directed toward the common ground which is the question of Jerusalem, of refugees, of settlements, of security and what people are reluctant to speak about publicly at present) the future relationship with Jordan.

The following three studies were published as final part of the PASSIA "Education Democracy" programme. It is hoped that the remaining two studies will be published in due course.

### **1. The Declaration of Principles and the Legal System in the West Bank.**

Raja Shehadeh. *October 1994 (Arabic and English), pp. 77 and 72.*

Raja Shehadeh's paper addresses questions of legislation and the relationship between lawyers, judges, and their organizations in the current transitional phase. It examines how the Palestinian legal structure will look throughout this time, as well as the form it will take under the final arrangement. The study investigates particularly the manner in which the Palestinian judicial system is likely to evolve, considering the influences of preceding legislators such as the Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians, the Egyptians and the Israelis. Other legal issues are also discussed and related to the process of democratization in Palestinian society.

### **The West Bank and Gaza Strip: Future Political and Administrative Relations.**

Dr. Khalil Shikaki. *September 1994 (Arabic), pp. 161.*

This study looks at the different histories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the consequent divisions that this has caused between them. The study emphasizes the need for dealing with these divisions in the transitional phase and offers several options for the future linkage of the two areas. It addresses how a federal relationship in the OPT can ensure the integrity and safety as a single unit and how the two areas may be represented in national bodies. Considerable attention is also given to the limitations regarding the transitional phase which are inherent in the DOP and which will hinder attempts at securing cohesion between the two areas.

### **Elections and the Palestinian Political System.**

Ali Jirbawi. *September 1994 (Arabic), pp. 44.*

This Paper shows the importance of elections and the presence of the Palestinian Authority on part of the homeland. The author suggests how the Authority should develop its presence and its institutions towards the Palestinian objectives, the ultimate goal of which is a Palestinian state and discusses the difficulties that will arise from turning the transitional Authority into a permanent one. The different factions, both religious and secular, and their differing interests and reactions to the elections are then examined. The demographic reality of the Palestinian is addressed, a third being in the homeland and the rest in the diaspora and the different laws by which these Palestinians are governed. In the final chapter, the author puts forward his own ideas on a future political system and the elected councils which should govern it.



# 5

## THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM

**D**iscussion on Jerusalem has acquired more urgency from the Palestinian point of view, since the DOP stipulated that the question of Jerusalem is to remain unanswered until negotiations on the final arrangement begin in a few years. In general, the status of Jerusalem continues to be changed by construction of settlements and roads for the Israeli population. As a consequence, the demographic balance is becoming more assymetrical as building and residency restrictions continue to be imposed on Palestinians. At the end of the year, this issue came to a head, and demonstrations and arrests were seen in the village of Al-Khader, near Bethlehem.

Another major issue in 1994 was the role of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem. There have been threats to force the closure of certain institutions, most particularly Orient House. Following the outcry around the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, Israeli police were posted permanently at Orient House in November.

The following is a summary of meetings held at PASSIA throughout 1994 which addressed the subject of Jerusalem. Owing to limitations of space it is not possible to include the many meetings with local figures involved in Jerusalem which occurred regularly during the year. Other meetings were with visiting international representatives including groups from the Council of Churches for Middle East Peace, St. Andrews Presbyterian Church, the Rabbinical Cabinet of the United Jewish Appeal, the Council of Christians and Jews, the Christian Leadership of Chicago and the United States Inter-Religious Committee for Peace in the Middle East.

- Date:** Saturday, 26th March 1994.
- Topic:** Meeting with members of the Lutheran World Federation, Geneva and Jerusalem.
- Participants:** Dr. Brian W. Neldner - Director of Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Geneva; Rev. David L. Johnson - Administrator of LWF, Jerusalem; Charlie Haddad - Director LWF/SVS, Jerusalem; Dr. Ibrahim al-Lada'a - Physician (ENT), Jerusalem; Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi - Head of PASSIA.

### Summary

Mahdi Abdul Hadi gave a brief introduction to PASSIA's work, activities and projects. He then analysed the question of Jerusalem and the Palestinian initiative to establish a "Jerusalem National Council" or the "Jerusalem Arab Council", and described the Palestinian struggle to achieve freedom and independence over the past decades. In terms of recent events, he discussed the various tools used and paths taken which led to negotiations and the Oslo agreement, Israeli theses and interpretations of the Oslo agreement, and how these differ from

In the discussion, the visitors emphasized the importance of PASSIA's work and asked specific questions about what they can do in the transitional phase, with the knowledge that they have a partner in UNRWA (who provides health services with the Augusta Victoria/Lutheran Hospital) and budget cuts are affecting them. PASSIA responded by encouraging the visitors to double their efforts and strengthen their position and relations in terms of budget, personnel and projects. The philosophy behind this, is that if they become weak in the transition, the Palestinian recipients will be crippled. But if they are strong, they will help maintain the balance of power and assist in shaping a healthier civil society. Human rights and democracy cannot achieve much in a crippled and besieged society.

The visitors asked for an official Palestinian request. PASSIA referred to the outline for the establishment of the Jerusalem National Council and in one of the nine departments there is a major section under health. Augusta Victoria Hospital is invited and is needed to work with other Palestinian institutions to develop the health section in the society. The visitors replied that this is a satisfactory element and that they would make a report based on this. It is hoped that the Augusta Victoria hospital and services will continue to serve and assist the Palestinian community.

**Date:** Monday, 18th April 1994.  
**Topic:** "Jerusalem: Palestinian Dynamics of Resistance and Urban Change, 1967-1994"  
**Speaker:** Anne Latendresse.  
**Participants:** Atyeh Masarweh - Headmaster of St. Georges School, Jerusalem; Wahid Dajan - Physician at Makassed Hospital, Jerusalem; Mark Khano - Businessman with Guiding Star Ltd.; Elias Khoury - Lawyer, Jerusalem; Ibrahim Matar - Economist Jerusalem; Ellen Fleischmann - Historian, Georgetown University, USA; Terry Boullata - Research Assistant with UNRWA, Jerusalem; Said Zeedani - Assistant Professor at Bir Zeit University, Bir Zeit; Pierre Beaudet - CEAD, Montreal Canada; Diana Safieh - SVP President and manageress of travel agency Jerusalem; Samir Najdi - Dean of Students at al-Quds University, Jerusalem Usama Halabi - Lawyer, Jerusalem; Mohammed Jadallah - Physician, Jerusalem Mahdi Abdul Hadi - Head of PASSIA.

*[Anne Latendresse is preparing a thesis on "Palestinian Dynamics of Resistance and Urban Change Jerusalem, 1967-1994", towards a Ph.D. in Urban Studies at the University of Quebec in Montreal. Parallel to her studies, Latendresse has been working for the Arab Studies Center for Development (CEAD), Canadian NGO based in Montreal. Between 1988-1990, she was the coordinator of this organisation and she has since then been a member of the executive committee. She has written a number of articles on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly on the Palestinian women's movement and has active participated in the preparation of seminars and conferences on the Middle East. The most recent one, "The Middle East: The Role of the Women's Movement in the Democratization Process", was held in Montreal in October 1993. In order to carry out her dissertation research, she has been granted a scholarship from the IDRC (International Development Research Centre (Canada) and from FCAR (Fonds quebecois d'aide a la recherche) in Quebec. Bir Zeit University agreed to receive her as a fellow and she works under the supervision of Dr. Salim Tamari and Ms. Islah Jad.]*

## **Summary**

In the literature published by Palestinian researchers, the transformation of East Jerusalem since its illegal annexation in 1967 is often presented as a process which was only determined by the interventions of Israeli actions (national, municipal, civil, mainly settlers). This deterministic approach presented Palestinians as passive actors, victims of the Israelisation process and considered them as being almost absent from the development dynamics of East Jerusalem. Development is here taken in the sense of economic, social, cultural and spatial development of the city. Only too rarely do researchers mention the attempts of Palestinian actors to survive, adapt and resist Israelis interventions in the city, particularly in East Jerusalem. At the theoretical and empirical level, we must reverse the perspective, taking into account Palestinian actions and their impact on the city's development, and more particularly the space which they claim as the capital of the future Palestinian state.

One of the purposes of my research is to see to what extent the Palestinians, through their collective practices in the political, economic, social and cultural sectors (the latter includes religion), partake in the "destructuring" and "restructuring" process of East Jerusalem. This concept is defined as the result of the dialectical relationship which opposes the Israeli and Palestinian development dynamics, in terms of the territorial, economic and demographic structures of the city.

## **East Jerusalem: the Result of a Dialectical Process**

In geography, a socio-spatial formation refers to a unit composed of three elements: a territory, its population and the economy. These elements are tied together through a dialectical relationship and, depending on this relationship, the socio-spatial formation transforms itself through time and takes on a certain form. Such development takes place simultaneously both over a short and a long-term period. The use of this concept leads one to conclude that the development of a given territory and its population is in no way static or determined. Besides various internal elements, also external forces may influence the transformation of the unit. In East Jerusalem, given the process of Israelisation, Palestinian territorial, economic and demographic structures underwent a profound upheaval. These transformations are not solely the result of Israeli interventions, but rather of these and of the actions of the Palestinians, who through different means have attempted and still attempt to preserve their space and identity. On theoretical and empirical levels it is important to recognise the existence of this dialectical relationship since Israelis have not been able to integrate the Palestinians, as Mayor Teddy Kollek wished to do, nor to efface their presence in East Jerusalem. One of the aims of my research will be to shed light on the contribution of Palestinian actors, as a group under domination, in the process of destructuring-restructuring of East Jerusalem.

## **The Politico-Spatial Limits of East Jerusalem**

The several definitions of Jerusalem in the literature can create confusion. There is a Jerusalem which corresponds to Israeli municipal boundaries, modified several times. There is Metropolitan Jerusalem, which is currently being planned and which would represent a new Israeli territorial expansion. Speaking of East Jerusalem, there is the Old City and the business or residential areas which composed East Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967. Finally, since 1967, the Israeli authorities annexed several West Bank villages which have now become administratively a part of East Jerusalem. In my research, East Jerusalem includes the limits of Jerusalem under Jordan's

## **Strategies for the Preservation of East Jerusalem**

Through various individual and collective strategies and practices which varied throughout the different periods of the occupation, Palestinians refused to recognize the illegal annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967. Palestinians attempted to maintain their activities in the economic, social, cultural and religious sectors and to preserve their institutions. The first years of the annexation witnessed strikes and demonstrations led by the merchants of East Jerusalem, who refused to request Israeli permits, and by teachers and the families of students of Jerusalem schools, who refused to adopt the Israeli curriculum. The religious authorities re-established the Higher Islamic Council to protect Waqf lands and properties. The majority of the Palestinian inhabitants refused to adopt Israeli citizenship although they maintained their status as residents of Jerusalem.

One decade later, various organizations, the most important of which is probably the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee, not only understood the importance of reacting and protecting themselves against Israeli encroachments, but also of developing an offensive policy inciting Palestinians to remain on their lands. These institutions granted loans which made it possible for Jerusalemites possessing lands to build on them. Some religious organizations initiated some similar programmes. Finally, newspapers and two theatres were established in East Jerusalem, as well as a variety of organizations offering certain services such as health. These new organizations defined themselves as national, establishing themselves in East Jerusalem for tactical and political reasons. Since the beginning of the peace process in Madrid, some leaders in the national movement set up a technical committee on Jerusalem in order to establish a programme which would permit them to work on the municipal level. The analyses of the strategies from 1967 to 1994 show that in the absence of Palestinian national and municipal representatives and despite the limits and contradictions of their actions, Palestinians - through their economic, religious, and professional organizations - contributed to create a Palestinian dynamic of development for East Jerusalem.

## **Discussion**

Mahdi Abdul Hadi said that it should be kept in mind that this is a general presentation without specific details about all of the various issues. He added that when Ms. Latendresse raised the issue of resistance and the "destructuring" and "restructuring" of Jerusalem, he did not see it linked to the larger national issue of the West Bank and Gaza with Jerusalem as the capital. He stressed that a separation between local and national resistance does not exist and outlined the changes in authority after the occupation: pre-1967 authority was vested in the Jordanian government, the municipality, and grassroots organisations while post-67 authority is held by the Israeli government, ministries and other institutions. The role of the Palestinians within these systems has changed. He said Latendresse needs to include the role of the Waqf in her paper. Replying to the presenter's comments about Palestinians constructing housing units in Be Hanina as a means of resistance, he said that he did not see them as such because it was the good relations with the Israelis which allowed it to happen and that the Israelis will use it as one of their development schemes. Although the housing units help maintain a presence in the city they could also be construed as collaboration.

Ibrahim Matar said that the construction issue was both important and useful to the people of Jerusalem and is a major factor in ensuring an Arab presence. He emphasized the importance of the joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee which gave loans to anyone who had a permit to build. He raised the issue of land saying that the open space has allowed for the Judaisation, if there was no room, it couldn't have happened. There has not been enough resistance to land-grabbing and legalized theft has enabled the Israelis to steal at least 24,000 dunums of land. Land owners are not taking people to court and Palestinian organizations need to be involved. Generally, houses are easier to defend, as the example of people who stopped bulldozers has shown, than open property.

Matar and Dr. Abdul Hadi emphasized the issue of the Old City, the difficult living conditions there and the vast number of people who have left or been forced out.

Terry Boullata said that in examining the actors and actions over the last 27 years, it is important to look at different periods and to see the differences of resistance. She emphasized the new socio-economic lifestyle of Jerusalemites and sees in it a new strategy of resistance.

Elias Khoury said that the Palestinians had no strategy of resistance, but that it has taken place on the level of basic interests of the individual. This has allowed the Israelis to do what they wanted on the larger level. In looking back at the last 27 years, the Arabs have only reacted to Israeli policies. There has been no international action. Palestinians were not involved in the municipality or Israeli institutions which may have been one of the larger faults.

Dr. Abdul Hadi said that the question is whether they should struggle within the system or to divorce themselves from it. Khoury replied that the fight should be on all fronts. He questioned why there was not some sort of cooperation in order to gain some Palestinian goals.

Anne Latendresse said that this is a taboo among Palestinians. However, when she met with the Beit Hanina and Beit Safafa neighbourhood councils who had set up housing projects, she found that they wanted to resist but at the same to gain more for themselves as Palestinians.

Khoury said the Waqf and the Jordanian-Palestinian Committee have had no strategies or priority for Jerusalem. No license is needed for restoration in the Old City, so why didn't they work on this? Many houses have been emptied because they are dangerous to live in. He said at one time he gave a letter to Jordanian officials explaining this but there was no response.

Dr. Abdul Hadi said that it is not fair to compare participation in the municipality between Jerusalem and the West Bank. Jerusalem was annexed, and by participating Palestinians would recognize the legitimacy of this annexation.

Osamah Halabi said that there has been no Palestinian strategy about Jerusalem until now and that it is interesting to compare the West Bank and Jerusalem in terms of resistance and the intifada because of the different socio-economic structures. Two factors, Israeli control over Jerusalem and the absence of a Palestinian strategy, have led to the current situation. Much has been done to ensure the Israeli presence in the city, an example is the number living on National Insurance. The evacuation of the Maghrebi Quarter mirrors Israeli policies: some of those who were moved were part of a housing project in Izzariya, but by moving there they became West Bankers.

Dr. Abdul Hadi said that it is not fair to compare West Bank and Jerusalem resistance. A better comparison is Yaffa, where the residents are demolishing their own presence in the city.

Mark Khano said it is important to understand Israeli policy in order to react to it. He asked about the role of non-Jerusalemites in Jerusalem-based resistance and how the current closure of the West Bank will affect this resistance, the role of the actors in Jerusalem and the employment of non-Jerusalemites. He agreed with the general trend of the meeting, that there

Dr. Abdul Hadi asked if the lack of resistance was a result of the ignorance or their power.

Khoury countered that the Israeli Master Plan for the city of 1972, was known about by all, but that no one did anything about it or objected to it. It was out of negligence.

Said Zeedani said that the Palestinians have been both passive and active actors. Important is, how successful they have been. In examining resistance in Jerusalem, two things need to be taken into account. Firstly, comparative judgements are the most useful, in particular with Palestinians inside Israel. Jerusalemites are somewhere in between those and the ones in the rest of the OPT. They share things with both groups and the process must be seen in that light. They are not subjected to the human rights violations, restrictions, curfews, and have relatively more services. The fact that it was annexed changes it. Of the seven groups mentioned in the paper, some are in Jerusalem because of the annexation which has allowed for certain things. Secondly, things should be seen in context and in perspective. Israel has a problem in Jerusalem and tries to show how much they provide benefits, but they still keep to a policy of discrimination. The council of Beit Hanina is a bad example because the council members are representing the municipality and not the people.

Matar replied that the Israelis have imposed curfews on Jerusalem in certain areas during the intifada and the Gulf War. They have destroyed houses there and in fact, the first house destroyed after 1967 was the Nammari house in Jerusalem. Also, the emergency law for arresting people [administrative detention] is applicable in Jerusalem. Zeedani replied that it is on a different basis in the West Bank and Gaza and is also applicable inside Israel itself.

Wahid Dajani discussed the lack of knowledge of the history of the city among its residents, and - worse than this - the lack of interest. He stressed that the Palestinians must appreciate what Jerusalem is, the Jews certainly do. Their efforts at unifying the city did not succeed, not because of the unity of Palestinian efforts but because of the threats of children. Palestinians must attach themselves to the city. The schools are lacking in this regard.

Samir Najdi said that ignorance of the place you live in is something universal. What has happened has happened. More important is what are Palestinians going to do now for the future. The West Bank and Gaza will be under some sort of Palestinian government but what about Jerusalem? Ellen Fleischmann questioned the theoretical aspect of the presentation in which a complicit understanding of the definition of resistance was portrayed.

Pierre Beaudet was struck by the tone of the discussion that "the battle is over". Despite the Israeli fanfare about the demographic parity, it took them over 30 years and about \$300,000 per person because they were building an infrastructure which meant confronting a Palestinian reality. This parity is fragile and could change. Although Jerusalem is reputed to be the city of peace, there has been neither peace nor stability and that makes it different from the Tel-Aviv Yaffa example. Not all acts of resistance and actions, when put into a tight framework particularly spontaneous or semi-spontaneous ones, are perceivable. The intifada, was a bit of a surprise because of the slow molecular process of change that was disorganised and fragmented. These forms should not be underestimated and rather a strategy should be built on such fragmented forms of resistance.

Atiyeh Masarweh discussed education issues giving the example of how private schools in 1967 and until today have resisted the implementation of the Israeli curriculum. Most school teachers come from outside Jerusalem and despite the closure, the Israelis will never be able to

change this. When there is a closure, everyone has a crisis. At St. George's, 22 of 39 teachers are from outside Jerusalem. In East Jerusalem there are 61 private schools with approx. 25,000 students and 1,200 teachers. 60-70% of the teachers are from the West Bank and at least 10-15% of the students.

Mohammed Jadallah said that values change and people are better able to criticize what went on in the past. The Oslo Agreement contributed to this: it made Palestinians feel that this is the end of the road, a permanent situation, and that no further changes will be made. This allows them to be self-critical. However, this is not the end of the world, Jerusalem is still part of the OPT.

Diana Safieh said that the Hebronites should be thanked for keeping Jerusalem Arab. Given all of the exoduses, turn of the century, 1948, 1967, they are the ones who have stayed or moved in. The Waqf should be blamed for its role, or lack of it, in maintaining Jerusalem. She criticised the Palestinians from the Galilee who stayed on their land but kept nothing out of it. People's eyes should have been opened to Israeli plans after 1967. No one thought that they would still be here in 1994.

Matar commented that the Jews have not achieved anything to be proud of; rather what they have done is theft under a racist policy that is contrary to international law and the United Nations.

Khoury, a Palestinian from the Galilee, responded to Safieh saying that those from the Galilee were not-Palestinians, and for several years did not accept their saying that it is now a honeymoon, but soon it will be over. The lawyer Hanna Naqara pleaded for people to take their cases to court, but they did not listen.

Masarweh maintained that if Jerusalemites had taken part in the Israeli municipality, they would have reached the same place as the Oslo agreement, a legalization of the occupation.

Anne Latendresse thanked the participants saying that there was agreement about the lack of a Palestinian strategy, and the fragmentation of practices. The Palestinian context of resistance, the stages of resistance, and collective and individual acts are main points of her research. Responding to Zeedani, she said that it is not enough to explain transformations through economic factors.

Dr. Abdul Hadi concluded by discussing the two chapters of Palestinian resistance: 20 years of *sumud* ('steadfastness'), ie. of waiting and maintaining, and 5 years of intifada, ie. of working to change the status quo. It is not fair to compare the results of these two because of the time variable.

- date:** 10th May 1994.
- topic:** Jerusalem Arab Women during the British Mandate period in Palestine.
- speaker:** Ellen Fleischmann, Georgetown University, U.S.A.
- participants:** Fadwa Elshar - Arab Studies Society, Jerusalem; Mary Mussalam Qunieh - teacher, Bethlehem; Diana Safieh - SVP President, manageress of travel agency, Jerusalem; Samia Khoury - volunteer, Jerusalem; Anna Kennedy - Quaker Peace and Service; Makram Copty - Researcher, Jerusalem; Hania Aswad - Coordinator, Jerusalem; Sherry Lapp - Women's Study Centre, Jerusalem; Mark Khano - Travel Agent, Jerusalem; Nahla Assali - Bir Zeit University; Anne Latendresse - Researcher, Jerusalem; Ziad Abdeen - Researcher, Jerusalem; Bruce Stanley - Academic, Jerusalem; Adrienne Boyle - Bisan Centre, Jerusalem; Wahib Dajani - Physician, Jerusalem.

difficulty was that only little documentation on her particular subject was available and often unreliable. Newspapers only dealt with the activities of educated elite women of the time or those who were from notable families. In Jerusalem, during the Mandate, an active urban life began to flourish, and education played a very important role in opening up the world of work for women who began to participate in the political, economic and cultural life of the city. The event most often cited as the foundation of the Palestinian women's movement is the Palestinian Arab Women's conference held in Jerusalem, at the home of Tarab Abd al-Hadi on 26 October 1929. There had been a lot of political activity by women in Jerusalem which predated this conference, such as their active protests against British Government policy before 1929. Nevertheless, the conference attracted a lot of attention, consisting of 14 women from notable Jerusalem families. There was a great degree of sophistication about the organisation and convening of this conference which illustrated the dominance of the Jerusalem woman in this initial effort to organise Palestinian women at the national rather than the local level. After this date, many towns and villages formed women's groups, and the existing ones saw a major growth. Jerusalem women were highly politicised, possibly because Jerusalem was the seat of government and women were aware of what was happening politically. Since they were generally members of highly placed, important families, they had also more access to political information which they used in petitions against British policy. Their protests were usually written and prolific but this form of protest seemed to become less effective over time. Other groups developed more radical tactics such as the Haifa Arab Women's Union which actually bought land rather than merely protesting about its sale to the Jews. The 1930s experienced increased radicalisation of Palestinian society and the women's organisations were often in the vanguard, lauded by the press and held up as example to the nationalist organisations. They fired off frequent protests in the form of letters and petitions to the High Commission of Palestine and even the Prime Minister in London, sent delegations to the High Commissioner, or telegrams to international and local press, maintained close contact with Arab governments and met or attempted to meet, foreign consuls in Jerusalem to protest about the British government. They also organised relief and funds from outside during the strike and revolt, battled for prisoner rights and attended regional and international conferences. As a general rule, the women most actively involved were frequently unmarried, from well off and notable families, well educated and may have been in the teaching profession. Generally, they were fiercely nationalistic and it is this issue that is controversial, as it states that women's activism was the political activism of women in Mandate Palestine and was centred entirely on the nationalist issue. Women were not fighting for their rights in the sense of western feminism nor would they necessarily have supported women's suffrage; their "feminism" should not be defined by the western model. Women living under regimes that make nationalism the overriding cause, do not define themselves by gender. They use it to take action for the national good and not the good of their own sex.

The meeting concluded saying that the issues then and now, have remained very much the same. Gender issues are still relegated in the struggle for independence and several of the participants expressed concern that the advantage of the intifada years, which reaffirmed the role of women in the active political sphere would now reverse. The national struggle has always taken precedence and so the issue of the position of women in society has never truly been addressed in its own right. With the advent of a national settlement, it was feared that worr



would be expected to effectively "retire" from public life and that any gains made in their own independence and effectiveness, would be lost.

- Date:** 19th May 1994.
- Topic:** Housing and Community Development through Land Reclamation: a Proposal for Planning and Building New Communities in East Jerusalem.
- Speakers:** Sarah Kaminker, City Planner and former Jerusalem City Councilwoman, Jerusalem.  
Jan Abu Shakra, Palestine Human Rights Information Centre, (PHRIC) Jerusalem.
- Participants:** Beatrice St. Laurent - Albright Institute, Islamic Archives, Jerusalem; Susan Laws - Attorney, Jerusalem; Anne Kindrachuk - Researcher, PHRIC, Housing Rights, Jerusalem; Stephanie Koury - Attorney, Jerusalem; Judy Gladstone - Dialogue Fund, Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv; Mark Khano - Travel Agent, Jerusalem; Nabil Izhiman - Attorney, Jerusalem; Hasan Abu Asleh - City Planner, Jerusalem; Khalil Tufakji - Cartographer, Jerusalem; Dr. Marwan Abu Zalef - Editor, Al-Quds, Jerusalem.

**Summary**

Sarah Kaminker began by saying that when she was a councilwoman, she had been placed in charge of planning the East Jerusalem neighbourhoods. After four years of plans that had been rejected, she had realised that what she was actually being asked to do, was to plan for the confinement and not the development of Arab neighbourhoods. Consequently, the Arab neighbourhoods are going to have to do as much as they can themselves in order to develop. She gave the example of A-Tur, which had organised its own neighbourhood self management committee and thus far had been doing a very good job, despite the fact they had worked within the existing system with no authority and no sovereignty. Many other neighbourhoods could do the same thing.

She said that the transitional period will be very difficult, as Israelis were going to be going even more to establish facts in the ground and prevent the growth of Arab areas in Jerusalem. It was necessary for communities to make connections with other West Bank towns, early illustrating that Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Greater use of the land than the municipality allows must be made and plans must be produced that the Palestinian leadership will endorse. There is an urgent need for a vision of what Palestinians want in the future and each neighbourhood should initiate their own plans for Israeli zoned land that was within each community's immediate environs. These plans will have then to be submitted to the Israeli municipality and although the likelihood of being accepted is low, there are many good reasons for doing it. Not least of these, is the fact that an onslaught of Palestinian initiated housing plans which meet their legitimate needs, will be a big publicity tool and this will galvanise public opinion and mobilise grassroots organisations. Kaminker warned that there are currently Israeli plans under way which will be legally effected post-transition and it is imperative, therefore, that there be incessant Palestinian action during the transitional phase. Non-acceptance of Palestinian plans by the Israelis, she insisted will not be a loss as the preparation which will go into such action will always provide a base from which the communities can operate and provide a powerful blueprint for the emergence of Palestinian sovereign power in Jerusalem. Furthermore, if there are concrete proposals, then this will attract a lot of investment so the means to put the plans into action will also be forthcoming. If this is

northern part of the city where the population density compared badly to the number of houses available. The ultimate goals of her proposal are:

1. Reclaiming land owned by the Palestinians for use by the Palestinians.
2. Protecting vacant land from future expropriation.
3. Solving the unmet need for housing of Palestinian families.
4. Building strong grassroots communities that are backed by national Palestinian leadership.
5. Building a network of contacts with local figures who have leadership potential.
6. Providing a quasi-governmental housing and planning service for the Palestinians of East Jerusalem.
7. Encouraging citizen participation in civic affairs.
8. Starting a dual planning system that will be a functioning unit when acceptable accords are reached on the governance of Jerusalem.
9. Incubating and testing ideas about the kind of city Palestinians want to build in East Jerusalem.

Jan Abu Shakra began by saying that she had had many discussions in the past with Kaminker about how they could coordinate their projects and that there were many things in Kaminker's proposal of extreme interest. She said that with all due respect to the intifada, community organisation had not really taken root in Palestinian society. Many things were needed in the transitional phase but the organisational and professional fields that exist were inadequate to deal with the issues which had to be faced. Housing rights, homelessness and community building were very much talked about and there was also time to put the variety of ideas into action but nobody knows where to start. She called it the "sleeping beauty syndrome" from which everyone was wishing to awake to normality rather than become active and begin the process themselves which was the only way.

She pointed out that house demolitions were occurring only in Jerusalem and that there were extreme cases where the Palestine Human Rights Information Centre tried to help but there was generally no response from other institutions. She said that Jerusalem lacked a sense of community which could help in terms of both personal support and public action. There were plans which PHRIC had submitted to the Jerusalem National Council (JNC, the effective shadow municipality), but nothing had happened. She bemoaned the waste of talented people who had ideas and motivation but who could not get anything moving. The JNC was an important body but lacked any dynamism and any mechanism for grassroots input where ideas and needs could be presented, which the JNC could then decide how to deal with. There was a lack of political decisions on Jerusalem which, despite there being some people who had the political green light, meant that any serious planning did not get off the ground. There was not a professional resources staff and the actual citizens who need the benefit of "council" planning as soon as possible, were completely isolated from an essentially elitist political process. In few years there would no Palestinians be left in Jerusalem as the remaining land was swallowed up and further houses demolished. She asked if Sarah Kaminker proposals was the spark that could actually get things going. Concerning the proposal, she said that she was not sure if going through the Israeli municipality was the right way. She bemoaned the lack of decision and even discussion among Palestinians on particular cases, which need immediate attention and that the result of this on the street level was anger directed at the Palestinian political leadership. She said a well organised campaign is necessary but this was difficult, as most people still think

is better to remain quiet and make deals where possible. Aggravating was the lack of cohesiveness among villages and other parts of Jerusalem. Conflicts of interest between families, owners and tenants have made it impossible to find common threads and no effective mobilisation can occur until these disputes are neutralised. She said it was difficult to even mobilise people around the issue of rights, as nobody thought they had any rights in or on issues related to Jerusalem. She said that PHRIC was in the process of organising a mass registration at Orient House of people who had lost their homes, with the hope that this would put pressure on the Palestinian side to organise some decision making mechanisms, particularly regarding emergency housing.

- Date:** Monday, 20th June 1994.
- Topic:** Jerusalem: Palestinian Dynamics of Resistance and Urban Change, 1967-1994
- Speaker:** Anne Latendresse
- Participants:** Mark Khano - Travel Agent, Jerusalem; Ellen Fleischmann- Historian, Georgetown University; Terry Boullata - Researcher, UNRWA Jerusalem; Mahdi Abdul Hadi - Head, PASSIA; Adleh Raja Dana - PR, Bir Zeit University; Mohammed Nakhal - Assistant, Hebrew University; Makram Copty - Researcher, Jerusalem; Suzanne Zima - Journalist, The Jerusalem Times; Sharon Shapira - UCSB Student, Jerusalem; Leila Dabdoub - Editor, Jerusalem; Daan Rosenberg Polak - Netherlands Embassy, Tel Aviv; Maher Doudi - Society for Austro-Arab Relations, Jerusalem; Khalil Tufakji - Cartographer, Jerusalem; Dr. Ahmad Zuaier - Orthopaediatrician, Jerusalem; Dr. Arafat Hidmi - Chief, UNRWA Field Health Programme, Jerusalem.

### Summary

Anne Latendresse presented the second part of her research on "Palestinian Dynamics of Resistance and Urban Change, 1967-1994." She introduced her study as being a challenge to prior studies, not only in terms of the widely held belief of Israeli dominance in the city, but also in terms of Palestinian resistance, which was little documented. She said that her aim was to give a general picture of the resistance strategies in Jerusalem to demonstrate the very real action which had taken place. She gave a history of events in the city since 1967, citing the importance to Palestinians of Jerusalem's geographical, political, national, religious, cultural and symbolic significance. She said that by virtue of these things, resistance in Jerusalem assumed much more of a national than local dimension which effectively made Jerusalemites the elite of the national struggle, although they were still very much subject to control. She said that her study classified the characteristics of each decade, beginning with the period post-1948, classified as period of civil disobedience in which the population were basically hoping for help from outside. Following this, an organisational resistance against Israeli control of institutions took place, spearheaded by the Waqf and the Chamber of Commerce. Furthermore, the Maqassad Hospital and the Electric Company managed to keep a legal, if not practical independence.

Concerning education, the Jordanian curriculum was successfully maintained. Merchant and professional organisations also managed to continue their work. The fight against integration into Israel was actually much more successful than it is usually given credit for, although in some areas, such as the municipality, integration was inevitable. Land was much more difficult

The most important phase of resistance in Jerusalem was 1977-87, when an offensive strategy began to be developed. Financial support from Jordan and from Christian organisations helped to bolster the situation of Palestinians in Jerusalem and put them in a strong position, just as the intifada began. The fact that the intifada spread very quickly in Jerusalem clearly illustrated the failure of the Israeli unification of the city. The establishment of committees to deal with Palestinian rights was a precedent for further action and the non-participation in the municipal elections was a strong point in illustrating the non-acceptance and non-existence of unification.

In the final period, from Madrid until the present, the only major step has been the forming of the Jerusalem National Council and apart from the occasional demonstration organised by PHRIC and others there has been no action. However, Palestinians have managed to preserve the socio-economic base in Jerusalem by protecting their pre-67 institutions and establishing many new ones.

Dr. Abdul Hadi pointed out that the linkage between Jerusalem and the rest of the OPT was very close and the resistance is against occupation generally, thus it was difficult to isolate certain areas as being more important than others. He said that dividing the stages of resistance into decades was perhaps less effective than dividing it according to events and the reasons behind them. For example, the non-cooperation stage should be supported by reasons for this action. The evolution of international policy should also be investigated and be linked to resistance in Jerusalem accordingly. The search for a Palestinian strategy on Jerusalem could also be elaborated and he mentioned Sari Nusseibeh's work on demography. He stressed the need for a national political address in Jerusalem which could link the city and the rest of the OPT and hopefully open the door for a solution.

Dr. Ahmad Zuaiter said that many people had liked former Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek and that Palestinians who cooperated with him became beneficiaries rather than collaborators. As a consequence, he said that corruption had been encouraged. Their cases highlighted the inequalities existing in Jerusalem. There was no plan for East Jerusalem and any guidelines given on the height or size of buildings were useless, seeing as Palestinians were not given permission to build at all. Regarding benefits such as health insurance, Palestinians received bad treatment and were not entitled to the full benefits received by their Israeli counterparts. For Palestinians outside of Jerusalem, there were no benefits. Since the DOP, things had got more difficult. The Israeli municipality was requiring doctors who had been practicing for years to apply for a license. The licenses granted are only temporary, so acquiring one gives no sense of stability or ability to start developing the health sector.

Dr. Hidmi said that there had been a drive to make Palestinians dependent on Israel and no development had occurred in the Old City whatsoever. He warned of the dangers of the present period under the new mayor Ehud Olmert which have included professional harassment and political closure for "security" reasons, putting many Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem in danger of collapse. The international community needed to understand that Olmert's practices will swamp East Jerusalem and Palestinians will be overwhelmed by the changing demographic aspects in the city. A recent example was that Palestinian tour guides in the Haram al-Sharif were refused licenses to operate unless they agreed to refer to that area as the Temple Mount.

Dr. Abdul Hadi said that there were always two problems, permission and then money. In the case of the promised college on the Al-Haram Al-Sharif compound, permission had been granted but funds weren't available to actually start building, so the land remained a target for

ction by Jewish groups such as the Temple Mount Faithful who recently set up mobile homes at the site.

Makram Coptly asked why no institutions had been established to defend Jerusalem. Dr. Quaiter replied that nothing was built so as to avoid having to go through the Israeli channels as the Palestinian policy has been constantly one of non-cooperation and non-recognition of its authority. He said that the Old City was becoming increasingly ghettoised could pose a threat in various ways. There is already increased incidence of drug use and consequent rise in the amount of collaborators following the introduction of drugs into refugee camps by Israelis. This issue needed to be addressed and although the study of resistance in Jerusalem was worthwhile, we thought it should be made more contemporary and should suggest ways in which the contemporary problems can be tackled.

**Date:** 28th July 1994.  
**Topic:** A Personal Perspective: a Study on the Future of Jerusalem.  
**Speaker:** Assad Maluf, Palestinian lecturer, PhD.student, Political Science, Brussels University  
**Participants:** Ziad Abu Zayyad - Journalist/Editor, Israel-Palestine Journal; Dr. Abdallah Sabri - Physician, Jerusalem; Munir Lada'a - Student of Political Science, Hamburg; Dr. Ibrahim Lada'a - ENT doctor; Abed Abu Diab - Jerusalem Electricity Company; Sheikh Jamil Hamami - Jerusalem; Anis al-Qaq - Jerusalem.

### Summary

From whatever angle we consider the Arab-Israeli dispute, it is the city of Jerusalem which presents the most complex and sensitive problem on the road to peace, because of its spiritual, historical, political and cultural status. Jerusalem has occupied this position exclusively throughout history, in an ever-widening context. It has had a special impact on human destiny. Its geographical location at the cross-roads of three continents means that Jerusalem has played a vital role in the contact and mixing of cultures, past and present. Successive peoples entering the city have imposed their authority upon it, directly or indirectly. Jerusalem is the key to the region: whoever controls Jerusalem controls the entire region. Jerusalem has a special place in Arab-Muslim thinking, as it does in Christian and Jewish thinking and has also a symbolism which is not confined to religion but goes deep to the roots of politics and ideology. It is this which lies behind the policy of "de facto" occupation.

Israel annexed Jerusalem on 27 June 1967 and subsequently announced it to be her eternal capital, rushing to implement her settlement plans in an attempt to change entirely the demographic and geographical map of the city. Concerning the peace process, both Palestinians and Israeli differ on the question of what legal and administrative system should govern the city of Jerusalem. I shall try to explain briefly how to achieve a solution without going into lengthy details.

### **Objectives**

to find a solution to the problem of Jerusalem, satisfactory to both the Israeli and the Palestinian side

to build a capital for the state of Palestine in the eastern part of the city.

to resume building the Municipality of Arab Jerusalem.

- \* the number of settlements in the city of Jerusalem increases without pause.
- \* the Israeli government employs the de facto policy, with the support of the United States
- \* the European states stick to their position on the internationalization of Jerusalem.

## Proposals

1. To divide Jerusalem into three parts:
  - \* West Jerusalem to be considered the capital of Israel
  - \* East Jerusalem to be considered the capital of Palestine
  - \* the Walled City to be shared

2.
  - i) To set up a joint administrative committee for the Walled City which will consist of 7 members:
    - \* a member to represent the Arab inhabitants of the Walled City
    - \* a member to represent the Jewish inhabitants of the Walled City
    - \* three members, each representing one of the three religions;

In this respect, it is proposed to hold a conference of the Christian sects to agree on representation. One representative of the Palestinian municipality and one of the Israeli will be each chosen for **each** session according to the subject under discussion.

- ii) To appoint this committee by vote or by consensus-compromise; the committee to be responsible for law and order within the Walled City.
- iii) To achieve full coordination between the Israeli and Palestinian municipalities matters which come under the authority of this committee.
- iv) To put decisions to the vote or otherwise achieve unanimity.

### 3. The Executive Bureau

- i) The Administrative Committee to appoint members of the Executive Bureau with the agreement of both municipalities.
- ii) The Executive Bureau to be responsible for:
  - \* applying the decisions of the Joint Administrative Committee and enacting them.
  - \* making decisions on proposals and plans and costing them.
  - \* other matters to be decided by the committee.

### 4. The Fund

- i) The Administrative Committee shall appoint a secretary for the Fund and all the officials needed for the programme: accountants, administrators, programmers, etc.
- ii) Department of Taxation: It is suggested that both municipalities have authority for the collection of municipal taxes from those inhabitants who come under the administration and that such taxes be transferred from the inhabitants of the Walled City to the appropriate taxation department.

It is proposed that both municipalities contribute an agreed sum, to be transferred to the Administrative Committee for the implementation of its duties.

### Other Proposals

- i) Both languages, Arabic and Hebrew, to be used in official documents of the Joint Administrative Committee.
- ii) Moslem, Christian and Jewish holy places be supervised by a department of Religious Affairs, in coordination with the parties concerned or their representatives.

### The Arab Municipality of Jerusalem

Re-establish the Municipality of Arab Jerusalem in the eastern part of the city as follows:

#### i) The Mayor :

- \* to be elected from the inhabitants of the city using a voters list dedicated to that purpose.
- \* the Mayor to appoint his deputy from the elected members of the council.
- \* the Mayor to decide in some cases (to be defined later) without needing the consent of council members, but in all other decisions he shall involve the council members.

ii) *Elected members of the Municipal Council:* The election of the Municipal Council shall be by means of another voting list, and the number of members should be in proportion to the inhabitants of the municipality, for example 7 to 1,000; the members to represent all political parties in that area.

iii) *The Secretary General:* The Secretary General is to be appointed by the Mayor with the agreement of the members of the Council; he shall appoint the team of employees he needs with the approval of the Mayor; his office shall include such administrative departments as shall be necessary; he shall implement all resolutions taken at the highest administrative level; he shall keep the minutes of meetings and prepare the municipal budget and other administrative duties as they arise.

iv) *Municipal Departments:* The Jerusalem Municipality shall be divided into various departments. The Mayor and council members shall add or remove departments as needed. Such departments as:

- \* Department of Economics
- \* Department of Social Affairs and Education
- \* Department of Legal Affairs

It is proposed that the Mayor and members of the Administrative Council establish an Administrative Court to annul decisions of these departments. Appeal against these decisions may be made to the administrative or legal court.

- \* Department of Research

In the case of land expropriation on the grounds of the presence of archaeological remains or for reasons of public interest, citizens shall be compensated and every citizen shall have the right of appeal.

- \* Department of Social Welfare
- \* Department of Religious Affairs
- \* Department of Financial Affairs

\* Department responsible for coordinating with Arab Municipalities

After the transitional stage, relations between the Arab municipalities in all parts of the Palestinian state should continue. This department shall be responsible for holding conferences pursuing joint activities and conducting research with the aim of improving coordination and cooperation between the municipalities.

- Date:** 13th September 1994.
- Topic:** Jerusalem: Between the Past and the Future.
- Speaker:** Dr. Eqbal Ahmad, Professor of International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies at Hampshire College, Amherst, Massachusetts.
- Participants:** Raja Shehadeh - Lawyer, Al-Haq, Ramallah; Ziad Abu Zayyad - Lawyer; Michael Romann - Lecturer; Walid Salem - Researcher; Maha Jarrad - UPWA Director, Chicago; Uri Davis - University of Durham; Abed Abu Diab - Jerusalem; Mamdouh Aker - Urologist; Farhat J. Ziadeh - Professor; Susan Ziadeh - U.S. Vice-Consul, Jerusalem; M.A. Abu Gazala - Intermed-PAL, Gaza; Awad Mansour - Researcher, PHRIC; Hashem Abu Sido- Gaza; Rodolfo Ragoniery - Assistant Professor; Mahmoud Sbeih - Public Information PECDAR; Labibe1 Habash - EC Desk Officer, PECDAR; C. Woodcraft - Student; John West - Journalist; Said Zeedani - Bir Zeit University.

### Summary

**Dr. Eqbal Ahmad:** I'm first of all most deeply moved and I wish I could say I'm happy which I'm not, to be in this city with friends from Palestine and Israel. I've had a long commitment to the cause of the Palestinians but my commitment has been rather controversial, especially with the leadership of the Palestinian movement. But to Jerusalem: I really felt that it would be extremely presumptuous of me to talk about the history of the city, or its architecture, or its beauty, or its religious significance to the three great religions of the world. What I'm going to do, is to say a few things about how it looks to me and what I think what should be done with Jerusalem.

The city is holy to three religions and with a few, exceptional interregnums, it has remained fortunately a monument to ecumenism since at least the 14th century. In the age of multi-ethnicity and multi-culturalism, it should not be, and I hope that the world will not allow it to become, the messianic or nationalist monopoly of a single religious grouping. If that were to happen, perhaps peace would be kept for a while but it would sow the seeds of a millennial conflict in this region.

The second point I want to make, is that we all know that two national movements, an Arab and a Jewish one, have a stake to claim for this city as their capital, the capital of the existing or hopefully to be born state. God has developed deep emotional links with this city and I think it is not very helpful to argue which claim is more real or which claim is more imagined. All nations in our time at least, are more or less, to use the title of a well known book "Imagined Communities". The power of nationalism as an ideology lies perhaps in its quality of imagination. What follows from that is that the objective of the peace process in which the Palestinians and Israelis are engaged, (if the objective of this peace process is to bring real peace



between two people), is that an arrangement has to be found to link both nations organically to the city in a manner that is both equal and meaningful.

Thirdly, from what I've had read about cities, Berlin, Florence, even such cases as Amsterdam and Paris and from an environmental and architectural perspective, most ancient cities are regarded as indivisible and continuous space. Breaking up an ancient city, evidently breaks up its history, architectural and esthetic nature. This is perhaps more true about Jerusalem than of most ancient cities. Therefore, it would follow that whatever solution to Jerusalem is devised, it must be done within the framework of maintaining the unity and integrity of Jerusalem.

Fourthly, I think a liberal minded, decent, or peace caring person, or people, or communities, would by and large disagree that sectarian ideologies and claims whereby the rights and wishes of one people are held as being superior to those of another have produced World Wars and genocides in our time. Hitler's evil began only with the sin of claiming that the rights and privileges of an Aryan people were superior to those of Jews and gipsies. Hanna Arendt, in her brilliant study of Nazism, points out that from this banal beginning, a very great evil followed because no one stopped on the track to change what its consequences could be. The Serbs have made a similar turn against Bosnians. And we are seeing the facts, the products of that banality. We should appeal therefore, to all the people concerned, especially Jews and Arabs, to steer away from making monopolistic claims and seek instead a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural future for Jerusalem. This city of peace, ought to become a monument to world civilization, not a contested symbol to differing nationhood. I would make a very modest proposal but before the proposal a few demands:

1) both Palestinians and Israelis should renounce their intention to make Jerusalem a capital of a nation's state. Israelis will do very well to go back to Tel Aviv and stop being here and the Palestinians would do very well to build perhaps a capital, I don't know which one they would like, Ramallah, or El-Bireh or somewhere in Gaza. In our time, and in these special circumstances, I feel that this city will not be able to bear for very long, the burden of becoming the capital of two states.

2) the world community has made an unequivocal commitment to opposing sectarian claims and ideologies. It has therefore a moral and political responsibility to reject those claims on this city.

3) the state of Israel occupies this city in violation of the UN charter. Most governments, even the friendliest to Israel, the US, have so far refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Israel's conquest of the city and of turning it into its national capital. If Israel's claims to a peaceful revocation are to be taken seriously it has to withdraw from Jerusalem. Again I'm talking political reality not religious.

4) I would suggest that Jerusalem remains united and is governed by a small council made up of the representatives of the three religions which consider it holy. This would constitute an arrangement which could be made to guarantee the rights of all. Arrangements could also be made to turn it into an international city, de-politicised, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-cultural, for both people and three religions and as a whole, belonging to the whole world. Such should be the future of the city if we are serious about peace, lasting peace and people's peace. Now you may argue that this is romanticism but before we reject such an idea as romantic, let us recognize a few things. It is my conviction, that if we settle this problem on a sectarian basis, whether Muslim or Christian or Jewish sectarianism, it will blow up, in 5 years, 10 years, or 100 years. And it will blow up badly. That's one concern I have because the

attachment to Jerusalem as a holy place. And we are also underestimating the anxieties of non-Arabs over the fact that we find the pivotal center of Islam, i.e. the Arab world, soft, weak, and unwilling to make impossible compromises. It has produced a pimp for the Arab region but more importantly it has produced anxiety. Western scholarship does nobody any good by trying to look away from reality. A large, voluminous amount of literature that has emerged in the last 20 years on Islamic fundamentalism. There's no point in doubting the occupation of Jerusalem incidents as the destruction of the Babali Mosque in India by a Hindu mob, nor such realities as Western support for what looks to Muslims as a purely sectarian idea of the Jewish state. More importantly with the Islamic groupings is the idea that an ideology that is based on religion, that emphasises religious solidarity, is what we need to get powerful. Look at it, everyday see what it is, look at how the Israelis bargain. Until Israel makes those gestures that would be gestures that are non-sectarian on both sides and I'm not saying only Israel, I think the future of non-sectarian political life in the entire region and perhaps in all of the Muslim world, will become increasingly difficult. Somewhere in your literature, I read Jerusalem was described as the third holiest place of Islam. There is a difference in Muslim and Arab perception on this. In Indian and Bangladeshi Islam at least, it is seen as the second holiest place because we do not see the place where the prophet Mohammed is buried as the holiest place; that would be a very extraordinary *shirk* [idolatry; not appropriate to the concept of Muslim monotheism]. At the place from where he went up to heaven, the *Isra al Miraj*, is a different experience and because of the extraordinary Sufi influence on Indian Islam and on Iranian Islam we have always viewed it to be the second holiest place and the first qibla.

A massive problem is such crazy things as the PLO chairman, president of Palestine Yasser Arafat, making an effort to become guardian of the holy places here. King Hussein of the Hashemite dynasty wants to be guardian of the holy places, too. I fear that Jerusalem, under Israeli sovereignty and Jordanian, Palestinian or some Muslim guardianship, is a timebomb. For all of that, Muslim guardians here were pure symbolic security forces. Guarding the Haram al-Sharif is an open invitation to the Jewish fundamentalists for trying to take over the place, to blow it up and for the Israeli government to say "It was under your sovereignty, we've tried our best to keep an eye on you but it was something under your sovereignty and of course we are very sorry, we are deeply pained" etc. and the damn thing will go on. Imagine what that will do to the Muslim public. I'm personally opposed to the silly notion, I would rather these places remain under Israeli occupation because they will then be held responsible for the safety of al-Haram. I think that the only future for this city that would be viable and that would be lasting, would be to bring the two communities together in a joint enterprise to conserve it, preserve it, make it beautiful and a living monument to ecumenism. Thank you.

**Mahdi Abdul Hadi:** I agree with you totally in criticizing the weak Arab position and the continuous concessions they are making, especially the Palestinians. But I have a problem with your proposal asking Palestinians to withdraw their claims for Jerusalem to continue to be the centre and central city, their capital and their heart. You're inviting us to ignore 1400 years of history and to accept the 27 years of Israeli occupation of the city. What are these concessions you're asking the Palestinians to make? When we link the whole story of Jerusalem to religion, to history, to culture, to politics, to nationalism, to everything, how come you want us to ignore it, to deny, to put aside our heritage, our life of 1400 years in the city, simply because they have

...en occupying it for the past 27 years?! This is ridiculous, this is upsetting, this is not acceptable at all for Palestinians under any circumstances. We want to see Israeli withdrawal from the city and Israel to stop raping us in Jerusalem and the rest of the OPT, we want to see a phase to find some healing for our society and a real balance in the population and a real link between Jerusalem to the rest of the OPT. Jerusalem has been occupied, this has to be recognized by everybody, why should we now, simply because of the DOP, Declaration of Principles, or DOP, Disaster of Palestine, accept such concessions to those who are still our enemies despite the DOP, in spite of any agreement. We will become neighbours, we will become friends, we will co-exist together, once there will be no more Israeli occupation in our house. They continue to occupy us with these documents, their positions and "phases", we are dependent on their good will. I will never accept under any circumstances the forgetting of my history, my culture, my 400 years in the city, Islam and as you mentioned it, Christianity in the city, and accept concessions, simply because they have been occupying the city for 27 years. You did succeed in provoking me.

**Yusuf Ahmad:** I think I have detected a very serious flaw in the manner in which I have made this presentation. I have also clearly underestimated, no I haven't underestimated, I knew this would happen, I have clearly appreciated unexpectedly the extraordinary attachment that the Palestinian Arab people have to the city because of your commitment of a very emotive nature. I have said some things between the lines, which I shouldn't have assumed, but I assumed it deliberately. This may not make any difference to you but it seems to me that you did not take those into account. Dr. Mahdi, for example, is saying why do you ask us to renounce our heritage, culture, and life. The last thing I want is to ask the Arab people to renounce their culture, identity, or for that matter, their heritage or life. The situation is simply that this city is at the moment occupied by Israel. OK. This city has been divided, before the occupation, into East and West. OK. Palestinian politics suffered between 1948 and 1994 from not looking facts full in the face, and then, in response to those facts, developing a solution that would be possible with struggle, not without fighting. Palestinians, even with the most brilliant struggle they can wage, will not get both East and West Jerusalem back. This is inconceivable to me. Therefore, eventually, what we're talking about is dividing the city. At the very best what you get is East Jerusalem back. I propose an arrangement where East Jerusalem is under Arab sovereignty, this is a juridical question, West Jerusalem is under Israeli sovereignty, because those are what the ground realities are of 1967. Ground realities right now are very bad. The juridical reality is on your side, the post-47 UN resolutions and 242 both support an Arab claim to Jerusalem, not either of them support the Israeli claim to Jerusalem. This is politically probably the most practical way to wage a struggle to get Jerusalem, East Jerusalem under your sovereignty. Create in the city out of a hope for peace, a mechanism of ensuring some things, create by nationality. It has been a goal of your movement for a long time and one of the things that has attracted me to the Palestinian cause, was its commitment to secularism, to bi-nationalism, to multi-ethnicity. How about carrying out this commitment in Jerusalem? I think I was not clear in conveying to you that nothing of Arab culture disappears, in fact, a lot comes back. You are affirming your heritage by taking this choice. And as far as I know, nothing of our identity fades. I think it would be important for Palestinian identity to be identified with an idea, with a history and a culture, rather than with a state; because states are not half as important as these long, lasting connections that we have to embrace. You said the Jerusalem problem is not religious, it is political. I agree. As long as it is political, there's no solution. We

structure of what makes up politics, only morality is for everybody. It should be a contest of moral claims, of spiritual claims, a clash of ideas, clash between universal values and sectarian values. It is very possible that after 70 years of struggle with Zionism, Palestinian nationalism has lost some of its earlier commitments. Where is that notion of *kulhum kanu Araban*? You have to regulate things and you have to bring back more solutions. The city will be divided at the moment. It's de facto divided now, you either have to fight over the city in terms of keeping it divided and the occupiers withdrawing or making it united with the occupiers withdrawing, but you share the united city as a co-sovereign reality with the occupiers governed by conciliatory arrangements between three religions rooted in it.

**Said Zeedani:** Is this not contradicting? You want to depoliticise the problem by taking religion out of it but depoliticisation is not that. Sharing or dividing sovereignty is a political concept.

**Eqbal Ahmad:** Sovereignty is a juridical concept.

**Said Zeedani:** Not only, it has also political implications and the argument that it is a purely legal matter is misperceived.

**Eqbal Ahmad:** I am arguing on the question of Kashmir that the best thing to do is to give the people the facility for the full right of self-determination and since neither India or Pakistan are going to pull them out of there without getting something out of it, they will share sovereignty with the Kashmiris and that will be manifested in terms of the three having a common commitment to defending the borders of Kashmir. In modern times, when exclusionary claims are clashing very strongly, we have to devise some innovative formulas to move away from them.

**Hashim Abu Sido:** Our guest amended his proposal for dividing the city into two areas under separate jurisdiction but the whole proposition is a political statement. In order to keep the city unified as you propose, a full, political and juridical agreement is necessary between two sovereignties. What we need is mutual recognition of sovereignty which can then lead to negotiation between the two leaderships.

**Eqbal Ahmad:** I have offered a complete skeleton, East Jerusalem under Palestinian sovereignty and not jurisdiction, and West Jerusalem under an Israeli one, and then say that the two sovereignties negotiate a united future for the city. I am assuming further that whatever we are talking about in Jerusalem, is not in isolation from an overall settlement between Palestinians and Israel.

**Mahdi Abdul Hadi:** Both sides want the same Jerusalem but the problem with this is that we claim this is ours not theirs. The problem, starting with the British Mandate, is that the British court with a Jewish judge, an Arab judge, and a British judge decided that the Wailing Wall was an Islamic property. We accepted that you (Israelis) will start praying at the Wailing Wall, in your right, though it is Islamic property. What really happened with this rape of an occupation for the past 27 years? More than 350 houses in the Maghreb quarter were demolished to expand the Jewish neighbourhood over there, and claims were made for the whole city. This is the problem of Jerusalem. Is it ours or yours and who is to judge? We are not talking about a city on the moon, this is real for us. Look at the map, Jerusalem is the centre, the heart of Palestine, you cannot take it out of its context.

**Yusuf Ahmad:** I've been dealing with the Palestinian leadership for nearly 22 years now. I've been dealing with liberation movements for 35 years and in all this years I have not met a leadership more incompetent and more self-indulgent than the Palestinian one. As a result of its many failures, it finally reached the point which always comes for people who do not know how to deal with their lives: they had a nervous breakdown. What has happened cannot be explained in any other terms. Anyone who had the minutest understanding of the international scene in 1993-1994 would have judged that firstly, the Palestinian leaders knocked themselves into a corner and isolated themselves even within the Arab world. Secondly, they are incredibly lucky that in spite of all their difficulties and mistakes such as support for Saddam Hussein, they were ending themselves with a very strong bargaining chip. The bargaining chip consisted of this: since 1969 the concentration of US world strategy had been on consolidating its full hold of the Middle East. Not for its own sake but as a means to acquire in a changing world, new leverages with old allies and to maintain all leverages and clients because by 1969 it was clear to them that they were a declining power because they no longer had the strategic superiority they had enjoyed from 1946-1968, the year when the Soviets deployed the ICBMs and the Polaris submarine. They have lost economic as well as strategic leverage on Europe and Japan. In the absence of economic and strategic leverage on their main allies, they need new ones which happen to be those who are consuming 80% of their energy from the Middle East. All this is known, it has been written about it, but what are the implications for the future? They built a doctrine, as Vietnam put into question their will and capacity to fight limited wars, invisible, forgotten wars, they built a so-called Nixon doctrine to create a regional configuration of power. With Israel and Iran which they used to call their two eyes in the Middle East. When the Iranian revolution came they lost one eye. Anwar Sadat was the only Arab leader who fully grasped this strategy, but drew the wrong conclusion from it. He tried to join the US constellation of power at a certain cost, and missed it.

Saddam Hussein knew that a superpower had been knocking at the door which at that point had no genuine ally in the region, except Israel. He opened the door with the invasion of Kuwait, for what I had two conclusions which immediately were made public: that no force will stop the US from invasion; it will use this time to create a new coalition and then invade. And two: there's no way that Saddam Hussein will withstand more than one week. Later, Edward Said said I was wrong, because I was too optimistic: Saddam stood only one day. The Americans were building up Saddam Hussein as the third largest army in the world. One of the problems of Arab politics is triumphalism, the other side of which is demoralization. Those engaged in triumphalism, instill visions of great victories, which collapse very fast because there is no realistic view of things. After Saddam Hussein collapsed and I met Arafat, I understood the man had lost his will. During the Intifada he showed signs of focussing on questions, he asked questions, he did this and that. But once the Americans had won the Gulf War in 1991, it didn't matter so much what Arafat said anymore, this is the problem.

**Date:** Monday, 10th October 1994.

**Topic:** Jerusalem: the Transitional Phase and the Final Arrangement - an Israeli Perspective.

**Speaker:** Shimon Shamir, Prof. of Middle Eastern History, Tel Aviv University; Head, Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Research; former Ambassador to Egypt (1988-90)

**Participants:** Steve Hibbard - Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv; Awad Mansour - PHRIC, Jerusalem; As'ad Ghanem - Researcher, Haifa; Elias Khoury - Lawyer, Jerusalem;

### Summary

**Shimon Shamir:** I feel that it is very important to begin this kind of dialogue without which we cannot possibly think of solving the problems that lie ahead. It is regrettable that this meeting takes place in the shadow of the incident last night, in which one Israeli and one Arab were killed. Such incidents are always setbacks to the peace process but also highlight the necessity to progress in the process and tackle the difficulties in a peaceful way before it is tackled by those who prefer other means.

My subject is very sensitive and possibly the most difficult subject that can be discussed between Israelis and Palestinians. To choose this subject for such a meeting, one has to be either very adventurous or very unwise as it is almost impossible to discuss it without touching sensitivities. I hope that you will bear with me because I think that my point of view will differ very much from yours but this is the nature of dialogue.

Jerusalem is always considered to be the most difficult problem and the general position is that it should be left to the end as it is a very emotional question and neither of our societies are ready to deal with it at the moment. It is a matter of controversy and the emotional commitment that both sides have on this issue is not becoming less, on the contrary it is getting stronger and stronger. It has been like this throughout a history of political conflicts which bring in emotional, religious and historical aspects of attachment to this city which have led us to the situation today. We have two positions which will not do justice to either side but expose a few of the roots of the problem.

On the Palestinian side, Jerusalem is seen essentially as an Arab city; since Omar Ibn al-Khattab it has been Arabized and was predominantly Muslim. It is the third holiest place in Islam and it grew larger in Arab literature. That Muslims regarded the city in high esteem, is expressed in the many endowments and monumental structures in the city, on the Temple Mount, in the Haram a-Sharif and other places. Nowadays, one cannot separate the Palestinian identity from Jerusalem. Therefore, there is no possibility of a solution without recognising Palestinian rights in Jerusalem.

The general perception in the world is that Jerusalem is a city of Jews, Muslims and Christians but this does not reflect the Israeli perception. From the Jewish point of view, Islam and Christianity are historical extensions of Judaism, therefore, the city is important to those religions by virtue of the fact that it is important to Jews. Jerusalem, at the time it became the capital city of David, was what we would call nation building today. The formation of the Jewish nation and the establishment of the capital, the city of David, are one and the same. For Jews it is very important that Jerusalem has never been the capital of any political entity, excluding the Crusaders, other than a Jewish one. For Judaism, Jerusalem is not a holy city, in the sense that it is to other religions. It is a part of the religion itself. It occupies a central place in the theology, prayer books etc. in a way that is not evident in the texts of other holy books. The Israeli national movement came to be called Zionism because Zion means Jerusalem. Settlement and migration meant that Jews became the largest community by the middle of the 19th century and they are the majority today.

This is a wide gap that has to be somehow breached and where the Palestinians are perhaps in a more acceptable position to the international community because they are saying that Israelis can take part of it while they take part of it. They say that the city can be divided but the majority of Israelis feel that this concession contradicts their whole attitude to the city. What can be done about it? One possible answer is: nothing. Such is the wide gap that, however many things are attempted or channels opened, they are expected to break down. In a recent symposium on the subject one speaker said that if you have a solution for the question of Jerusalem then you do not understand the problem. This is a very stark way of putting it, but many think that the gap is so wide that eventually all things will break down. This would be a catastrophe because many of the other things which have been achieved in all other aspects of Israeli-Palestinian problems will also collapse if we do not find a solution for Jerusalem. In many discussions with Israeli decision makers, I have said that if you did not have any ideas about a solution for Jerusalem, then you should never have started the whole process. Now you are in this process, there is only one way out and that is through Jerusalem. Many Israelis cannot understand this at all and think that the Jerusalem question can remain open now that this much of a settlement with the Palestinians has been made, but this is impossible.

I sometimes believe that Jerusalem is not the most important problem when compared with the issue of the settlements. Settlements, at least in some aspects, are more serious and more difficult to solve than the issue of Jerusalem. What makes it more problematic is, firstly, that it will involve some drastic measures of depopulation as existing settlements must be dismantled. In Jerusalem the issue is control, who controls what, you don't have to move people, you don't have to do as many difficult things as in the case of the settlements. Secondly, the fact that we have reached a point where we can't go ahead with the West Bank unless we tackle the issue of the settlements is a problem that could block the whole process, whereas Jerusalem can be discussed in various channels over a period of time. It does not have such immediate implications as the settlements issue, assuming of course that the participation of Jerusalemites in West Bank elections does not present a problem.

Labour sees a solution if certain conditions are met during the interim period:

1) Emergence of a relationship between Israel and the Palestinian entity, which would be highly cooperative and the emergence of a demarcation line which would be a very "soft" border. If what really emerges between both of them is a solid line separating each of the two societies with little cooperation and with each society going in its own direction, there will be many difficulties in finding a solution if something does happen. If a solid line emerges between the two societies, then we will have to draw that line somewhere in Jerusalem. This will leave us with no common ground. On the other hand, if we have a full effort with open borders, cooperation, free flow of people, goods and services, then together we can develop a system for Jerusalem which can benefit both societies.

2) During the interim period, certain things must be achieved in order to prepare a better climate for negotiating and problem solving, i.e. more trust between the two societies, greater stability and both leaderships preparing their public for painful negotiations and painful solutions. Jerusalem has to be discussed in more practical terms and less mystical, emotional, theological or religious. Our input must be based on shifting symbolism to practicality in order to create a climate in which we can find more practical solutions. The interim period must come a preparatory stage to breach the gap.

3) Maintaining the status quo. To inspire confidence will be of no value if the interim period is used for changing the situation on the ground.

changes on the ground, with Israel continuing to take land and continuing destruction and with the Palestinian institution building in Jerusalem. Both of these actions go beyond what had been agreed. Given that the three conditions are satisfied and we have a better climate and starting point for dealing with the issue itself, then we are in the process of finding a solution. I am not proposing a solution but I think I can detect a number of directions in which we can go to develop a slow process of negotiation. Two elements seem to be promising and can indicate a certain direction to be followed: the "map" and the definition of sovereignty. These are vital issues for Israelis and Palestinians on the issue of Jerusalem. They are also grey, flexible, and even ambiguous in a way which could be a great advantage.

Firstly, the map of Jerusalem. What is Jerusalem? In the 9th century, this was a difficult question. Jerusalem was surrounded by a wall and anything outside was not considered part of the city. Now there is the old Jerusalem and the new Jerusalem. In the Mandate period Jerusalem did not include Silwan, A-Tur, Beit Safafa, Issariya or Shu'fat, they were considered suburbs or hinterland. The UN Partition Plan (1947) had a concept of Jerusalem which included Bethlehem and Beit Sahour but nothing north of Shu'fat. There are many different maps of the city. When we talk about the heritage, history and religion we find that there are different Christian, Jewish and Muslim maps defined in historical terms. The Jewish memory has to do with the City of David, Mt. Zion, the Mt. of Olives but not with Beit Hanina or Shu'fat. Muslims and Christians define particular areas according to Arab, Islamic and Christian memory and history.

There is also a social map and under social aspects this is a divided city, it has never been united. Even the Jewish side is divided, its religious and secular neighbourhoods are mutually separated from each other than Arab and Jewish Jerusalem. Religious neighbourhoods block roads and prevent secular traffic from entering on Shabbat. There is also a distinction between urban and rural Jerusalem with villages which seem very distinct from the rest of the city.

The economic map incorporates the industrial areas of both sides; even Ben Gurion/Kalandia/Atarot airport is part of Jerusalem and economically an important element.

On the municipal map of Jerusalem, you can consider such criteria as the water system, the sewage system and the spatial distribution of the city into residential and arable areas.

Thus, there is no established map which is accepted as a solid foundation for planning or negotiation on Jerusalem. On the other hand, this carries with it a potentiality for a solution in that the pluralistic development of Jerusalem holds within it a pluralistic solution to the problem. If you start thinking about a city designed for different purposes within different demarcation lines, then you can start to get over some of the controversies and main obstacles. A look at institutions in Jerusalem, for example, shows that the distance between the heart of the city (Haram a-Sharif, Temple Mount) and the Knesset is about the same as between the Temple Mount and Shu'fat. A Palestinian institution in Shu'fat cannot be said to be any further outside of Jerusalem than the Knesset. This illustrates that there is a flexibility: you can have establishments which will be seen by your side as being in the city, but which will be easier for Israelis to accept as being outside of Jerusalem as they define it.

Concerning Jerusalem at the present time it is often said that sovereignty is indivisible, it is either Palestinian or Israeli. This principle of the indivisibility of sovereignty is a myth, simply not correct. The term sovereignty emerged not from international relations but from a different context which was late medieval discussion on relationships within the state. It was considered who actually had sovereignty (whether the king, the people or a parliament).



representing the people). It centered on what was the source of law and lawmaking within the state and on who was the primary voice in the political structure of the state. It was associated with such things as natural or divine rights. So, there was an almost metaphysical principle which served as foundation for the discussion. However, in modern times, the question of sovereignty has been applied to relations between states and in this realm, sovereignty is absolutely divisible. We may argue for the indivisibility of sovereignty within the state, but certainly not in international relations. In the case of Europe, members of the European Union have conceded part of their sovereign rights to the larger body of the Union in general. There are many other examples where there is a whole network of connections between states in which part of their sovereign rights are yielded to larger framework.

Applying this to Jerusalem, it becomes a second direction in which it is possible to develop a solution. Breaking this concept of sovereignty into its components and dealing with each of them separately, may make headway. As long as the discussion focuses on who is the sovereign and who has sovereignty over what, we will not get very far in the next years. However, if we say we are not negotiating sovereignty but about its components, then the whole thing may look different. This will raise questions that could be answered by negotiation. For example, can religious authorities be established that will take under their control the religious places? Will it be possible to conceive a unified municipality in such a way that many areas that are the responsibility of the state, will become the responsibility of the municipality (eg. taxation, police). An agreement on a unified municipality can take care of many of the functions of the state. The problem for Palestinians is that elections for this municipality will always result in an Israeli majority but this can be taken care of. Having two houses will safeguard the rights of the smaller, Palestinian population. One house will be numerically representative, and the other will have 50/50 parity, Palestinians and Israelis, similar to the US system.

Is it possible to go in this direction or should be invested in a large number of local councils with power enough to enable them to take care of all the daily problems in their particular area. This direction will solve not only the problem of Israelis and Palestinians wishing to live under their own administration, but also within the Israeli and possibly Palestinian communities as well, as the various secular or religious communities could take care of their own needs.

Currently, people are subjected to laws according not to their personal status but according to the geography of their situation. Thus, Palestinians will vote for their own institutions, will stand for election to their own institutions and will be subject to Palestinian law, they will pay taxes to a Palestinian authority and all because they are Palestinians in terms of their personal status and not because they live in this or that part of the city or in the West Bank. Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem are possible in using the flexibility of the map of Jerusalem as I mentioned before.

These are all very complicated questions that need much more study. We need to get off the ideological and political tracks of discussion and deal with the practicalities of life in Jerusalem, guaranteeing dignity and political rights for everyone living in this city. We need creativity, open mindedness, a better climate and a cooperative relationship. We have to develop better channels of communication and I think that meetings of this kind are a step in the right direction.

**Participants:**

H. B. Patriarch Michel Sabbah - Latin Patriarch, Jerusalem; Sheikh Ekrima Sabri - Mufti of Jerusalem and Palestine; Bishop Samir Qafaiti - Arab Episcopalean Church; Sheikh Ibrahim Said Sabri - Member of the Council of Appeal Courts; Sheikh Adnan Hussein - Waqf Director, Jerusalem; Walid al-Assali - Lawyer Jerusalem; Dr. Abed Abu Diab - Jerusalem Electricity Company; Dr. Mohammed Jadallah - Physician; Hassan al-Qiq - Engineer, Jerusalem; Afi Safieh - PLO Representative in London; Sheikh Jamil Hamami - Jerusalem Ibrahim Qandalaft - Christian Affairs, Palestinian Patriarchal Authority; Fathe Adib Zomot - Latin Patriarch; Dr. Ibrahim Abu Lughod - Vice President, Bir Zeit University; Bishop Lutfi Laham - Roman Catholic Church; Dr. Riad Malki - Bir Zeit University; Dr. Bernard Sabella - Bethlehem University; Sheikh Mohammed Hussein - Al Aqsa Mosque; Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi - Head of PASSIA.

**Absent:**

Faisal Hussein; Sheikh Hassan Tahboub; Dr. Sari Nusseibeh; Ziad Abu Zayyad; Archimandrite Timothy (Orthodox Patriarchate); Raja Shehadeh.

**Rapporteurs:**

Khamis Ghosheh - Administrative assistant, PASSIA;  
Said Salah Zahika - Director, Faisal Hussein's office.

**Summary**

Mahdi Abdul Hadi began by thanking the attendants for their show of interest in the issue of Jerusalem and asked for opinions on the establishment of a national, religious and local authority in Jerusalem. He said the report of Christian institutions, published a few days earlier had ignored the issue of occupied Jerusalem, and stressed that meetings on the issue of Jerusalem should not just take place at PASSIA but throughout the community, to avoid Palestinians becoming a surrounded minority. He mentioned Faisal Hussein's call for the creation of a national organisation for Jerusalem to deal solely with its problems and he beseeched the attendants to do whatever they possibly could for Jerusalem. He asked what Christians and Muslims were doing to make churches and mosques active in the opposition to the siege around Jerusalem and Israeli policies.

Patriarch Michel Sabbah supported the idea of regular meetings and exchange of information. Bishop Qafaiti said that those concerned should not be sitting around waiting for a reaction but should be taking action now to avoid leaving Jerusalem to be plundered. He suggested to begin with an assessment of the treasury of Jerusalem in order to work out what could be achieved with the resources currently available. He said regular meetings needed the support of the community.

Sheikh Ekrima Sabri said that the Israeli settlement policies should be addressed, emphasising the urgency of this matter, given that a written agreement was still far away.

Sheikh Ibrahim Sabri stressed that Jerusalem must be saved from Judaization and that dialogue and coordination were very important.

Sheikh Mohammed Hussein said that Christian and Muslim voices are not heard and that a strategy is vital. He said the chances of implementation are strong as the Waqf lands belong to the Palestinian people and the siege on Jerusalem cannot last forever.

Mahdi Abdul Hadi said participants could benefit from cooperation citing the case of the European Troika committee and how it conveyed Israel's stand on Jerusalem to the Palestinians. Referring to a statement of Shimon Peres that the Jerusalem issue had three

dimensions, religious, political and civilian, and that religious authority must remain in Jewish hands, that Jerusalem was and would remain the political capital of Israel, and that the problem of civil services could be solved using the Israeli municipality and local councils for the Arab areas which are to be formed, Dr. Abdul Hadi said that for Palestinians the Jerusalem question cannot be divided into three separate issues, as this would allow Israeli to impose its hegemony, system and law. Jerusalem cannot be separated from its history, heritage, religion, politics or from its geographical position.

Sheikh Adnan Husseini said the issue had been too long ignored so that the Al-Aqsa mosque had already become an isolated enclave as Israel continued to annex the territory around it.

Walid Assali said that a body is needed to address the issues of Jerusalem. It would have two basic objectives: the protection of Arabism, Islam and Christianity in Jerusalem and to ensure that Palestinian voices expressing their feelings and ideas about the city, are heard throughout the world.

Mahdi Abdul Hadi referred to a meeting of nine councils at Orient House, which decided that Jerusalem should take priority over everything, quoting Faisal Husseini: "I sacrificed my life and my family for the PLO and I now say that I would sacrifice the PLO for Jerusalem". A foundation is needed which can gain aid and support. Such a forum must be multi-religious and cooperative.

Mr. Zahika said that if the international point of view would be ignored, Jerusalem will fall to the Jews and recommended to hold a conference on religion in Jerusalem, involving all churches.

Bernard Sabella said there is a need to know what is happening on grassroots level and cited the exodus of Jerusalem's Christians to Beit Jala and Ramallah. More demographic research is needed.

Riad Malki said that Israeli and Palestinian plans have to be compared and clarified. There was no particular barrier between Palestinians of different faiths and the debate has to be taken into the wider community to familiarise people with the meeting and its concepts. He agreed with the formation of a council, the importance of planning and trying to stay one jump ahead of Israeli plans.

Regarding the Judaization process, Mahdi Abdul Hadi cited a Tunisian at a conference (London, December 1994) who referred to the Haram a-Sharif compound as the "Temple Mount".

Ibrahim Abu Lughod said that the Jews didn't want to discuss Jerusalem. Palestinians need a research centre and a national agreement on Jerusalem. He mentioned the issue of the division of Palestine, the internationalisation of Jerusalem which was suspended, the need for economic success in protecting Jerusalem, and the importance of sticking together even in failure.

Jamil Hamami said that more than meetings is needed because something has to be done on the ground. Neglecting Jerusalem is a negligence of faith, as the city belongs to all Muslims not just Palestinians. The neglect of Jerusalem by the PLO has exacerbated the existing rift between Jordan and Arafat and this has given Israel further leeway to create new realities. Their continuous action has changed the face of Jerusalem and it is essential to ask how this can be halted effectively.

Bishop Laham said that Muslim and Christian participation was important on an international level. The council must find a common base, to start working from. The media

Sheikh Adnan Hussein said that many people think the conflict over Jerusalem is finished but 26% of West Jerusalem belongs to Christians and Muslims and if the situation stays the same, the Israelis could reduce this claim to nothing, as happened in the Moroccan quarter.

Bishop Qafaiti said that the conflict of Jerusalem had just begun and it was the responsibility of those who live there to cooperate on the future.

Sheikh Ekrima Sabri pointed out that there was a lack of popular support for meetings involving the three monotheistic faiths due to the exploitation of the situation by the Jews.

Ibrahim Qandalaft made the final comment that Jerusalem, like the rest of Palestine, remains occupied but other countries will not acknowledge its annexation. The refusal to see the situation as it really is, did not serve future Palestinian rights in the city.

### **Special Meetings - Summary**

Throughout the summer, PASSIA held a series of nine closed sessions attended by representatives and activists from the whole Palestinian political spectrum. In these meetings, various issues related to Jerusalem were addressed, such as international resolutions, international legality and the position of the US and the EU vis-a-vis the question of Jerusalem. Subjects discussed were also the proclamations of various Arab states, the likelihood of their future attitude to Jerusalem and their practical and political investment in the city. Religious aspects covered were the official and popular attitudes of the Arab/Islamic world, the Vatican and the churches. Regarding Jerusalem, Israeli government statements, the general perception among the Israeli population and differences between various Israeli groups were examined as well as their implications for future negotiations. Other topics were property and land confiscation and West Jerusalem municipality policy in general.

Concerning the Palestinian position, official statements, attitudes among Gazans, West Bankers and East Jerusalemites in particular, the role of the Waqf, and Islamic-Christian relations were investigated. The problems of daily life in the city were considered, including the closure policy, the issue of Palestinian institutions operating in the city and the problem of settlements. The implications of U.S. Secretary Warren Christopher's decision to by-pass meeting with Palestinians in the city was also raised and general political awareness among Palestinians on the question of Jerusalem were discussed, noting that normalisation is already taking place to a certain extent.

In conclusion, self-criticism was expressed because of the absence of a strong Palestinian position and strategy concerning Jerusalem and a lack of coordination on the issue which has led to separate, weak committees with no clear agenda and no continuous budget. Palestinians have always been too ready to sloganise on the issue but not prepared to actually take concrete action. Participants emphasized that Jerusalem is an occupied city and integral part of the rest of the OPT, to which UN Resolution 242 also apply. The participants agreed that a national body should be established to work exclusively on and in the city, confronting problems which contribute to Palestinian weakness there. The overall message of these meetings was that Palestinians of all political alignments needed to form an alliance on Jerusalem and work together to maintain Arab Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.

# 6

## EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

In 1994, PASSIA continued its programme on "Education and Training in International Affairs"

by holding its seminar on Strategic Studies which has been developed to include a fellowship opportunity, for one year's study in London for the most successful of the seminar participants.

The original course was started in 1993; the first Strategic Studies seminar was conducted from March-June 1993. 15 Palestinian graduates participated and five of them became a team at PASSIA, specialising in Strategic Studies. Most of last year's participants were recommended to take part in various workshops and seminars in Europe and the USA and fulfilled part of the continuous need for a Palestinian presence and contribution in the field.

The second Strategic Studies seminar in September 1994, was followed by a one year fellowship placement in London for the two most outstanding participants in the seminar.

The programme aims to train Palestinian graduates in the field of Strategic Studies and apply the concepts of this discipline to regional and international affairs. It's part of PASSIA's endeavour to meet the needs of the Palestinian community for formal education, training and practical experience in this area. The particular subject of Strategic Studies is one that is receiving increasing attention as Palestinians define and address their own security needs. PASSIA hopes that this seminar, held at this crucial period in our history, will enable Palestinians to continue the process of state-building and to enhance our relations and understanding with the international community.

### **Seminar Programme**

#### **Preparation**

In June, PASSIA began to consult with British and Palestinian scholars working in the field of Strategic Studies in order to plan and implement the seminar. PASSIA advertised the seminar in the local press, (*Al Quds, an-Nahar, The Jerusalem Times*) in July. Notification was also given to national institutions such as universities and research centres. PASSIA received 38 applications from all over the OPT.

#### **Participant Selection Procedure**

PASSIA formed a Committee specifically for the preparatory stage of the seminar. Its members were: Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Khalil Shikaki, Rosemary Hollis and Valerie Grove. Dr. Hollis came from England specifically in order to participate in the interviews which took place over the period 25th-30th July 1994 and were conducted in Jerusalem, Nablus and Gaza. Of the total of 38 applicants, 32 were interviewed, and the Committee selected 15 to participate in the seminar, plus four reserves.

respective lectures. Required reading material was distributed to participants at the beginning of August, in order that they could familiarise themselves with the concepts of the seminar beforehand. Each participant received 30 assorted articles amounting to approx. 600 pages. Additional reading material on the subject and material recommended by the lecturers was available at the PASSIA library.

### **Lecture Programme**

In the two weeks, 5th-18th September, three academic specialists visiting from Britain and two from the OPT gave a series of lectures and other educational exercises. They were Rosemary Hollis, Yezid Sayigh, Ahmad Khalidi, Khalil Shikaki and Mahdi Abdul Hadi. HE Richard Dalton, British Consul General in Jerusalem, was invited to give the introductory speech to formally open the seminar on the September 5, 1994, but had to drop out at the last minute due to illness.

### **Social Activities**

During the seminar beverages and luncheon for participants and lecturers was provided by PASSIA. At the end of the seminar, PASSIA hosted an evening reception for all involved in the seminar, representatives of local institutions, the diplomatic corps in Jerusalem, and friends of PASSIA. HE Richard Dalton was sufficiently recovered from his illness to host an informal reception at the British Consulate General in Jerusalem, for participants and lecturers which took place on September 12th.

### **Writing Assignments**

During October 1994, participants were required to write two essays, one in Arabic and one in English, on topics studied during the seminar. Seminar lecturers compiled a list of suggested titles for the essay papers and participants selected two of these for analysis in their papers.

### **Advanced Studies**

The PASSIA Committee nominated two of the participants to be considered for fellowships, to take the Masters degree course in War Studies at King's College, University of London, for the academic year 1994/95. It also nominated a further shortlist of candidates for fellowships in 1995/96, based on the results of their seminar participation. The fellowships for 1994/95 were granted to Hashim Abu Sido and Jumana Abu Zayyad. They left to begin their studies at the end of September and are currently in London, attending King's College. The European Coordinator of the project Dr. Rosemary Hollis, took care of all necessary arrangements for the fellows and maintains close contact with them.

### **Lecture Programme**

The seminar was held over a two week period and covered the following topics:

*Sovereignty, self determination, power, national security & the use of force.*

*Foreign and defence policy, military strategy and military doctrine.*

*Nuclear deterrence and balance of power.*

*Disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures.*  
*Strategy and game theory.*  
*Strategy and systems analysis: writing options papers.*  
*Regional security issues in the post Cold War era.*  
*Strategic theory and regional systems.*  
*The regional system and external actors (Middle East context).*  
*The regional system and local actors (Arab-Israeli context).*  
*Power balance and national security (Arab-Israeli context).*  
*Military doctrine and war fighting capabilities (Arab-Israeli context).*

**Monday, 5th September**

8:30-9:00 Registration, group photographs.  
9:00-10:30 Opening remarks. *Speaker: Mahdi Abdul Hadi.*  
11:00-13:00 Khalil Shikaki.  
15:00-18:00 Rosemary Hollis.

**Tuesday, 6th September**

9:00-13:00 Khalil Shikaki.  
15:00-18:00 Rosemary Hollis.

**Wednesday, 7th September**

9:00-13:00 Khalil Shikaki.  
15:00-18:00 Workshop - Examples and experiments (Khalil Shikaki).

**Thursday, 8th September**

9:00-13:00 Khalil Shikaki.  
15:00-18:00 Simulation (Rosemary Hollis)

**Friday, 9th September**

9:00-13:00 Rosemary Hollis.

**Saturday, 10th - Sunday, 11th September**

WEEKEND BREAK: PASSIA premises were open to participants during the weekend for access to reference materials, the library and for discussion of the first week's programme.

**Monday, 12th September**

9:00-13:00 Yezid Sayigh.  
15:00-18:00 Ahmad Khalidi.  
19:00-21:00 Reception (*hosted by HE Richard Dalton at the British Consulate General, Jerusalem*)

**Tuesday, 13th September**

9:00-13:00 Yezid Sayigh.  
15:00-18:00 Ahmad Khalidi.

15:00-18:00 Simulation (Rosemary Hollis).

#### Thursday, 15th September

9:00-13:00 Yezid Sayigh, *Security structures and CBMs (Arab-Israeli context)*

15:00-18:00 Rosemary Hollis, *Decision making and crisis management (Arab-Israeli context)*.

19:30-21:30 Reception (hosted by PASSIA at the Ambassador Hotel, Jerusalem).

#### Friday, 16th September

9:00-13:00 Yezid Sayigh and Ahmad Khalidi, *Palestinian security and the peace process*.

#### Saturday, 17th - Sunday, 18th September

WEEKEND BREAK: PASSIA premises were open to participants during the weekend for access to reference materials and the library and for discussion and follow up of the second week's programme.

## Visiting Lecturers and Seminar Committee

**DR. ROSEMARY HOLLIS:** Head of the Middle East Programme, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London, specialising in regional security issues. Previously, lecturer in Political Science at George Washington University, where she gained her doctorate. Her thesis, an analysis and case study of Britain's adaption to decline, examined the evolution of Britain's relations with selected Arab Gulf states from 1965-1985. She holds an M.A. in War Studies from King's College, London, and has conducted research in Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Palestine, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Her publications and presentations to military, academic and business audiences, have focused on Middle East security issues. Most recent publications include: "Israeli-European Relations in the 1990's", in Efraim Karsh and Gregory Mahler, eds. *Israel at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Peace* (London: British Academic Press, 1994); *The Soviets, Their Successors and the Middle East* (Macmillan 1993 (Editor)); "Whatever Happened to the Damascus Declaration? Evolving Security Structures in the Gulf." Dept. of International Politics, University College of Wales, 1993; "What Price Renewed Conflict in the Middle East?" *RUSI Journal*, (October 1992).

**DR. YEZID SAYIGH:** Assistant Director, Centre for International Studies at Cambridge University (from October 1994). Previously, MacArthur scholar and research fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford (1990-1994), working on international relations and security of developing countries. Acted as advisor to the Palestinian Delegation at the Bilateral Middle East Peace Talks (1991-1993), was member of the Palestinian Delegation on implementing the "Gaza Jericho Agreement" (Oct.1993-Jan.1994) and headed the Palestinian Delegation to the Multilateral Working Group for Arms Control and Regional Security (Jan.1992-Nov.1993). Currently working on issues of demilitarisation and its social, economic and political dimensions in Arab countries, and on issues of elites and class in Arab political systems. Most recent publications are *Arab Military Industry: Capability, Performance and Impact* (Brassey's, London: 1992); *Rejecting Defeat: The Beginnings of Armed Action in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1967* (Beirut: Institute



for Palestine Studies 1992; Arabic); and *Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990). He published various articles in: *International Affairs*, *Middle East Journal*, *Third World Quarterly*, *Survival*, *RUSI Journal*, *Maghreb-Mashreq*, *Politique Etrangere*, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, and *MERIP Reports*.

**DR. AHMAD KHALIDI:** From an old Jerusalemite family, grew up in Lebanon, and was educated at Oxford (B.A.) and London (Ph.D.) Universities. Has been active in Palestinian politics since the late 1960s. Formerly Co-editor of the London based Arabic language *Strategic Review*, and currently editor-in-chief of the *Journal for Palestine Studies* (Arabic edition). Has written and lectured widely on Middle Eastern political and strategic issues in both English and Arabic and is co-chairman of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences project on Middle East Security. Has served as advisor to the Palestinian Delegation to the Washington Peace Talks as well as on security issues to the Taba-Cairo PLO-Israeli negotiations. Currently research fellow at the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House), working on Syrian-Iranian relations and their impact on the peace process. Recent publications include: *Points of Tension in the New Israeli-Palestinian Nexus* (London: Royal United Services Institute Journal, June 1994); *Gaza/Jericho & the Uncertain Prospects for Peace* (London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs: London, April 1994); *Arab Security in the 90's: Arab-Israeli Peace and the Parity Principle* (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace, Forthcoming); *Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security* (Jerusalem: Harry S. Truman Institute, Hebrew University and Arab Studies Society, Forthcoming).

**DR. KHALIL SHIKAKI:** Associate Professor of Political Science, An-Najah National University, Nablus (since 1986); Director of the Centre for Palestine Research and Studies, Nablus. Previously, Research Fellow at the World and Islam Studies Enterprise in Tampa, Florida (1990-1992), Visiting Professor at the Universities of South Florida, Wisconsin and Milwaukee, and Visiting Scholar at Columbia University. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, New York, and M.A. in Political Science from the American University of Beirut. Specialising in International Relations, Security and Middle East Politics. Most recent publications include: *The Gaza Strip and the West Bank: Future Political and Administrative Links* (PASSIA, Sept. 1994); *Palestinian Opposition: Where To?* (Nablus: Centre for Palestine Research and Studies, June 1994); and *Israeli Security, Hegemony and the Peace Process (al-Siyasa al-Filastiniya)*, Nablus, 1(1) 1994).

**DR. MAHDI ABDUL HADI:** Head and Founder of PASSIA; Ph.D. Bradford University, B.A. in Law, Damascus University. Lecturer in Palestinian history at Saint George's College, Jerusalem. Member of various Palestinian bodies, including the Palestinian Committee on Jerusalem, the Independent Palestinian Group for Elections in the OPT, and the Palestinian delegation to the Middle East peace negotiations, multilateral working group on refugees. Closely involved with a variety of international institutions. Previously fellow of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (1985) and fellow of the Salzburg International Seminar (1986). Currently member of the Black Sea University Foundation, Bucharest. Formerly Editor of *Al Fajr*, General Secretary, Council for Higher Education in the West Bank, founder of the Arab Thought Forum, and special adviser to the Ministry of Occupied Land Affairs, Amman. Publications include *Post Gulf War Assessment: A Palestinian Perspective* (1991); *Jordanian Disengagement: Causes and*

**VALERIE GROVE:** BSc.Hons. in Sociology, Kingston University, London; formerly English language and literature teacher in Tokyo 1986-91; advisor/editor of publications translated from Japanese at the Japanese School in London 1992-93. Editor, researcher and executive secretary at PASSIA 1993-95.

## **Palestinian Participants**

**MOHAMMED ABED RUHMAN** (Age 31); Kalandia, Ramallah.

High Diploma, Physical Science, Ramallah Men's Training College; Diploma, Human Psychology, Margarita College; Assistant Refugee Affairs Officer and Radio/Telex operator UNRWA, Ramallah.

**MOHAMMED ABU GAZALA** (39), Gaza Strip.

BSc. Electrical Engineering and Communication, Alexandria University, Egypt. Office Manager Gaza branch of Intermed-Pal; previously involved in electrical engineering projects in Abu Dhabi and Gaza.

**HASHIM ABU SIDO** (37), Gaza City. Selected for fellowship

BA/Ed. English Language, Monoufia University, Egypt. Postgraduate EFL-Diploma, Linguistics University College of North Wales; Independent Consultant, freelance researcher and writer on political, social and economic development issues in the OPT; translator of literary works of local writers; spontaneous translator for visiting foreign missions; Former public information officer for UNRWA in Gaza, Jerusalem and Vienna; instructor of English, Bir Zeit University and Gaza.

**JUMANA ABU ZAYYAD** (24), Jerusalem. Selected for fellowship

BA, International Relations / English Language, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Public Information Officer, Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) Jerusalem; former Research Assistant; seminar paper on "Disarmament and Military Balance in the Middle East".

**SAMIR AWAD** (28), Anabta, Tulkarem.

BSc. Mathematics, Bir Zeit University; Research Assistant, Centre for Palestine Research and Studies; former assistant, Palestinian Society of Mathematical Sciences & Council for Higher Education.

**RANA EL-FARRAH** (24), Khan Younis, Gaza Strip.

BSc. Chemistry/Biology, American University, Cairo; Microbiology (2 years), Kuwait University; Research volunteer at the Environmental Protection and Research Institute.

**HANI HUSSEINI** (32), Jerusalem.

BA. Business Administration, Asc. Computer Science, Strayer College, USA; Assistant Director of Public Relations; Advisor to the General Director, Arab Studies Society, Jerusalem.

EDAL JAYOUSI (33), Ramallah.

BA English Language and Literature; MA Education, Yarmouk University; Head of English Department, Educational Sciences Faculty, UNRWA, Ramallah; Former English instructor at West Bank institutions.

ARK KHANO (31), Jerusalem.

B.A.Hons. Engineering, Economy and Business Management, Oxford University, England; Director of Guiding Star Travel Agency/Tour Company, Jerusalem.

WAD MANSOUR (27), Jerusalem.

B.A. History, St. Lawrence University USA; English Data Bank coordinator, researcher, and contributor to publications, Palestine Human Rights Information Center (PHRIC) Jerusalem.

AMAL NATSHEH (35), Jerusalem.

B.A. Middle Eastern Studies, Bir Zeit University; 3 years Islamic History (towards MA), Hebrew University; Journalist, coordinator and translator at al-Sada newspaper, Jerusalem; formerly editor-in-chief of al-Sada, editor and journalist with al-Mawkef newspaper.

R'AFAT NEJEM (29), El Nuseirat, Gaza Strip.

MSc.Chemistry, University of Santo Tomas; BSc. Science, Bethlehem University; Lecturer, Department of Chemistry, Faculty of Education; chairperson of Science Laboratories, el-Rimal, Gaza; former researcher; author of *Manillana Acta*.

SSA SAMANDER (39), Ramallah.

B.A Economics, Bir Zeit University; Purchasing, Store & Personnel Safety, Arab Industrial Company, Ramallah.

ZOUGHBI ZOUGHBI (31), Bethlehem.

MA Peace Studies, Notre Dame University, Illinois, USA; BA English, Bethlehem University; Public Relations officer; group/conference coordinator and press monitor for the Middle East Council of Churches, Jerusalem.

#### **Reserves:**

WAEEL ABU NEMEH (33), Jerusalem.

Study for BSc. Computer, Yarmouk University (3 years, unfinished due to imprisonment); member of the Palestinian team to the Middle East Peace Process; Systems operator; Computer specialist.

MUSTAFA ABU MEDDIAN (38), Gaza.

B.A. History, Ein Shams University, Egypt; Head, Personnel Dept., College of Science and Technology, Khan Younis, Gaza.

LABIBEH HABASH (26), Jerusalem.

BA Philosophy/Political Science, American College of Greece; Post-Graduate Diploma International relations, International Institute for Public Administration, Paris; Aid Coordination & Facilitation Dept. PECDAR.

MA'MOON SBEIH (25), Ramallah.

B.Eng. Electrical Computer Systems, Salford University, UK; Public Information Officer, PECDAR.

## **London Activities**

The Palestinian Coordinator for the project went to London from November 28th-December 4th 1994 to follow up on the activities of the two fellows and to assess their adjustment and performance in King's College. They were found to be well adjusted and very much committed to their studies and wider activities arranged by the European coordinator such as contacts with British and international institutions in London who are working in strategic studies or related fields.

The Palestinian coordinator also consulted with all lecturers involved in the seminar, in order to gain an overall assessment of the seminar and participants and to gather material for the seminar report, including an evaluation of participants, final copies of the lectures given by each speaker, their suggestions and opinions on the conduct and success of the seminar and fellowship programme.

# 7

## PASSIA DESK DIARY

The PASSIA Desk Diary is an attempt to develop understanding of international relations as they affect the Palestinian question. It presents relevant facts, figures, historical events and statistics in a widely accessible form. When PASSIA first conceived of its diary in 1988, it did not realise the extent of the vacuum it helped to fill. Now entering its eighth year, the PASSIA diary has become for many an invaluable source of information on Palestinian affairs, both here and abroad, and demand for it increases each year.

Throughout the year, PASSIA updates and adds new data, addresses and documentation as it becomes available, including statistical information on the OPT. The 1995 diary's 380 pages contain all the standard attributes of a diary: a day by day yearly planner, calendars for the previous and following years, address and note space and important international dates. The first 70 pages contain a directory of Palestinian and international institutions in the OPT which is unavailable anywhere else in such a concise and thorough form. Directory listings include Associations and Unions, Consulates and Embassies, foreign and local NGOs, Research Centres, Media, Educational and Health Institutions, Hotels, Human Rights Centers, and many more. As well as addresses telephone and fax numbers, a brief description of the activities of each institution is also provided. The 1995 directory includes a comprehensive list of all PNA Ministries and Administrative Offices, including key personnel in each department. All information is updated annually and applications from institutions wishing to be registered in the directory increase every year. Additionally, this section provides a list of Palestinian academics and their particular areas of expertise.

The first chapter contains factual information on Palestine and the Palestinians, compiled and listed under the following headings: history; occupation and intifada; geography; population; religion; nationalism; refugees; settlements; economy; education; health; land & water; culture & media; legal aspects; human rights; society; women; PNA; and security. Some sections contain sub-sections, the history section, for example, includes details on the PLO and on Palestinian factionalism, dated from the Ottoman Empire. Each sub-section is followed by a bibliography of further reading material.

Chapter two is devoted to the subject of Jerusalem. It contains facts and figures on the city, a comprehensive historical chronology up to the period of peace negotiations, and details of the most important events in Jerusalem since the signing of the DOP. It also contains a bibliography.

Chapter three provides the diary with a new section: biographies of important Palestinian figures, covering a period from the beginning of the century to the present.

Each gives a brief assessment of the socio-political impact of its subject and insight to political key groups in history.

McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915-1916 and end with the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty finally ratified in November 1994. Others include some previously unpublished documents which chart the history of the negotiations which led up to the September 1993 signing at the White House.

The final part of the diary contains a collection of maps illustrating the land of Palestine in various historical stages and showing the development of the city of Jerusalem.

The PASSIA diary continues to grow in order to include all the necessary information which will keep it as up to date as possible and PASSIA strives to continue improving on the content and the standard of the diary each year.



## PASSIA MEETINGS



Mahdi Abdul Hadi on *"Palestinian Perspectives on Relations with Jordan during the Transitional Phase"*, May 24, 1994.







Dr. Asher Susser, Head of the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, on "*Jordan, Palestine & Israel: the Transitional Phase*", August 1994 (see p. 26-27)



Moshe Ma'oz, Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Head of the Harry S. Truman Institute, on "*Syria, Palestine and Israel: the Peace Process and the Different Agendas*", August 11, 1994 (see p. 27-28)





(from left to right: Prof. Yosef Corni, Prof. Y. Harakabi, Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Prof. Leonard Binder, Dr. Yezid Sayigh)



PASSIA SEMINAR ON STRATEGIC STUDIES - September 5-18, 1994 (see p.87-94).





Eqbal Ahmad on *"Jerusalem: Between the Past and the Future"*, September 13, 1994 p. 74-79).







PALESTINIAN MEETINGS ON THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM



Intra-Palestinian Roundtable Discussion on the Topic of Jerusalem, December 17, 1994  
(see p. 84-86).



Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi on *"Current Profiles and Possible Scenarios: A Palestinian Perspective"*, at The Grand Committee Room, House of Commons, London, November 30, 1994 (see p. 140).



(from left to right: Maria Holt, CAABU, Afif Safieh, Head of the PLO Delegation to the UK; Lord Gilmour, former Minister of State; Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, PASSIA).







Intra-Palestinian Roundtable Discussion on the Topic of Jerusalem, December 17, 1994  
(see p. 84-86).

## CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS

### Introduction

PASSIA's network of communication has very much developed over the years and is now at a stage where it is notified about most conferences, seminars or workshops held worldwide, which address any subject relevant to the Palestinian situation and the Palestinian position in global concerns. In 1994, PASSIA was approached to participate as an institution or to commend academics to participate either on behalf of PASSIA or independently, in events held both nationally and internationally. What follows is a summary of all those conferences, seminars and events to which PASSIA was either invited or participated.

**Date:** 19th-20th December 1993.  
**Topic:** Second Conference for Palestinian Investment.  
**Place:** Seven Arches Hotel, Jerusalem.  
**Organised by:** Orient House.

### Summary

This two day conference featured an in depth discussion of future Palestinian investment possibilities. The three keynote speakers, Mr Faisal Hussaini, Mr Haidar Abdul Shafi and Mr. Ibrahim Mayassi, each addressed a different aspect of investment and gave an assessment of the advantages and pitfalls.

**Date:** 3rd - 7th January 1994.  
**Topic:** Arms Control and Security in the Middle East  
**Place:** Institute for International Relations, Panteion University, Delphi/Greece  
**Organised by:** Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California.

### Summary

This workshop brought together scholars and policy makers from Arab States, Israel, Europe and the USA to discuss regional security and peacemaking. PASSIA nominated Mr. Maher Doudi, graduate of PASSIA's Seminar on Strategic Studies and Security.



**Place:** Renaissance Hotel  
**Organised by:** The National Conference of Christians and Jews and  
Journal of Ecumenical Studies.

### Summary

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi's (PASSIA) speech addressed the concerns and problems concerning Jerusalem. Recently, Israeli Yeshiva students had moved 8 mobile homes onto the Mt. of Olives, an area that the Kollek administration had earmarked for an Arab school to compensate for granting of 15 dunums to the Mormons to build a religious college. The current municipality seemed to have altered the zoning regulations and violated all UN resolutions and the peace accords which leave Jerusalem to be expressly unchanged from now until the final negotiations start. Dr. Abdul Hadi said warned that Palestinians would not watch their capital being taken and that this could weaken the current stage of the peace process. The changing of zoning regulations was a further act to Judaize the city and the people of the world must realise that the city is Christian, Muslim and Jewish and should not be owned by any one of these groups. The continuation of Israeli policies will mean changing the structure of the city and it will lose much of its cultural and historical visual significance. No authority has changed the Mt. of Olives for many decades, keeping it as a place of particular heritage.

**4. Date:** 5th - 6th February 1994  
**Topic:** Challenges Facing Palestinian Society during the Transitional Period  
**Place:** Ambassador Hotel, Jerusalem.  
**Organised by:** The Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC)

### Summary

This conference was held to encourage practical and democratic discussions about the challenges facing Palestinian society during the transitional phase. The panel discussions were as follows:

- I) *Reading the Declaration of Principles: Political and Legal Dimensions of the DOP*
- II) *An Israeli Understanding of the DOP and the Transitional Phase.*
- III) *The Palestinian Authority in the Transitional Phase: Legal Plans for the National Authority; An Analytical Study of the Legal Plan for the Palestinian Authority in the Transitional Phase; An Understanding of Authority and Democracy.*
- IV) *Dealing with Issues not Mentioned in the Agreement but Important in Real Jerusalem, Settlements, Refugees of 1967.*
- V) *Economic Development Strategies in the Transitional Phase; Opportunities for Palestinian Investment in the Transitional Phase.*
- VI) *National Unity in the Framework of a Political and Ideological Plurality: Vision and the Future of the Relationship between the Islamic Movement and Transitional Authority; The Future of the PLO and its Role in the Transitional Phase; Elections as a Framework, Mechanism of Plurality, National Unity and Democracy.*

Two PASSIA researchers attended this conference. One of the main points raised was that an apparent lack of democratic practice was undermining Palestinian political and public life. The need for a basic law was emphasised as was the necessity that the future National Authority is based on democratic principles. There was also general concern about the limitations of the DOP. The proceedings of this conference have been published and are available at the JMCC in Jerusalem.

- i. **Date:** 13th February 1994.  
**Topic:** Family Reunification.  
**Place:** Bethlehem University.  
**Organised by:** Alternative Information Centre.

#### Summary

Kainat Dweik, PASSIA's administrative director, attended the workshop. Ahmad Rubery, a lawyer from Lea Zsemel's Law Office, was the speaker. The workshop dealt with issues of family reunification, focussing on Jerusalem Palestinian families who are scattered outside of Jerusalem as a result of Israeli laws and policies and ways to insist upon the rights return and reside in the town of their birth.

6. **Date:** February 25-26, 1994.  
**Topic:** Middle East Peace Process: the Mediterranean Dimension.  
**Place:** Italian Office of the European Community Commission, Rome.  
**Organised by:** The Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo).

#### Summary

**SESSION ONE:** Rochelle Davis of PASSIA attended the first MeSCo meeting (PASSIA is founding member of MeSCo). The two major issues were the formation, goals, and rules of the MeSCo initiative and the conference theme "Middle East Peace Process: the Mediterranean Dimension".

Roberto Aliboni, Istituto Affari Internazionali, made the introductory remarks. El-Sayed Yassin, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, and Alvaro Vasconcelos, Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais, Lisbon, were the discussants. These three institutes form the troika of organisations rotating the responsibility for being MeSCo's secretary for 1994-1996.

This session was to discuss the founding, membership and goal of MeSCo. Secretary Roberto Aliboni said that MeSCo should be "a club of Mediterraneans, open to contributions from other seas on issues relevant to Mediterranean cooperation and security" and that two other important goals of MeSCo were information exchange and institution-building. The discussion then led to a delineation of who constitutes membership of the Mediterranean. Aliboni said that he had chosen the "simplistic geographic notion" and invited institutions from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal.

El-Sayyid Yassin, the new MeSCo Secretary, raised the issue of forming local and regional Security Communities and emphasised that there is a need to enlarge Arab strategic consciousness.

... Europe and the Arab world and its implications for the Middle East and the Mediterranean. (Chairman: Theodore Couloubis, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens).

**First Paper:** Josef Janning, Forschungsgruppe Europa, University of Mainz: *"European Security beyond the East-West Conflict. Implications for the Mediterranean."*

Josef Janning said that the static nature of European security has been replaced by a flux of risk perceptions, institutional changes, conceptual re-definitions and political manoeuvring. Now we are witnessing old-style diplomacy integrated with a new approach, but one which may work against integration. He added that development in the Mediterranean is inadequately dealt with by Europe.

In terms of the balance of powers, Janning discussed changes in the positions of key states. The two zones in Europe are the EU with an unidentified purpose, and Russia with an identified purpose, but both unclear about how to realise it. Germany can gain the most from an integrated policy, whereas Russia has chosen to be a member with Europe and not in Europe. The balance of power creates problems for the margins, and the system will be organised around these two major players. There are problems over the distribution of resources and a lack of political leadership, creating mistrust and suspicion among the major players and rivalry about security and strategic issues. As regards Central and Eastern Europe, there are clear ideas about how a security structure should be developed but there is a lack of political leadership.

### **Discussion**

Hamdy Saleh (Egypt) raised the issue that the Arab world was absent from Jannings presentation as well as the the Arab world's perception of the US as a supporter of the status quo and not of democratisation and fear that Europe would become part of that perception as well. He discussed Russia's role in saving the NATO from acting on threats to Bosnian Serbs and in the Mediterranean where it could put pressure for conflict resolution. In response to a comment that expanding the scope of security were codewords for inaction, Janning replied that while this is true, there is a need to recognise all dimensions and that security interests are economic interests and vice versa.

**Second Paper:** Jamaledine Maazoun, Association des Etudes Internationales, Tunis: *"The Post-Cold War Debate on Security and Security Institutions in Europe and the Arab World: Implications for the Middle East and the Mediterranean."*

Jamaledine Maazoun said that Mediterranean countries had not played the necessary role in political decision making and that the Northern countries are rather with the NATO and the US. However, they now perceive the South as a source of threat. Strategic debates should include the relationship between Central and Eastern European countries, the strategy resulting from new situations with a possible role for NATO to manage crises, and reducing armaments and European expenditures. What constitutes a threat are ethnic differences, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Crisis management is needed in terms of preventing conflicts. Threats are perceived from the Near East and North Africa in terms of lack of stability in the South Mediterranean and their arsenals.

The Gulf War showed the precarious character of the EU and the problem of profitability. Maazoun discussed the missions of NATO armies, to provide crisis management, give new meaning to humanitarian missions and that nuclear deterrence as a strategy is a must. He said that the future will probably bring a continuation of NATO strategy, increased security for NATO countries, and a lack of a global approach in the Mediterranean which will lead to problems. He then discussed the problems of the Southern Mediterranean countries, their shorter range weapons (except Israel) and how NATO sees these weapons as an important deterrent. There are huge differences in military expenditures between European countries and those in the south. He concluded by saying that the security debate will only be profitable if it takes into account the concerns of all partners in the area.

**SESSION THREE:** The Emerging European Union: Past Policies and Future Implications for the Middle East and the Mediterranean. (Chairman: Joseph Alpher, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv)

**First Paper:** Alvaro Vasconcelos, Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais, Lisbon, Portugal: *"The Emerging EU: Past Policies and Future Implications for the Middle East and the Mediterranean."*

Vasconcelos asked how the policies of the EU will affect the Mediterranean, particularly its stability. He spoke of Europe before 1992, the drafting of the Treaty on European Unity (TEU) and a new Mediterranean policy - CSCM in the Western Mediterranean, facilitated by the Arab Maghreb Union.

He said that Islam could be integrated with Europe (the Balkans). Europe is not able now to tackle the problems of the South and the East, the equilibrium of this area, or the recession. Europe of today is not yet a political power but a civil power which cannot decide on security issues and has its own internal crises. One positive sign, however, is the Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. He said that Europe does not see the Mediterranean countries as a threat, although some think that radical Islam or immigration could cause a problem and that a policy is needed to prevent this.

Vasconcelos asked if we have the means to solve these problems. Firstly, the EU accepts that the problems facing North African countries are of a predominantly social and economic nature and that political problems such as domestic instability are generated principally on that basis. Concerning the Middle East, existing problems were viewed, until quite recently from an almost exclusively strategic angle. Europe is not ready to open its markets to countries from across the sea.

Second, "conditionality" and "coherence" in terms of political objectives should preside over economic cooperation, ie. the linkage of foreign economic and trade policies and development aid, as set out in the TEU. Concerning democratisation, he said that Algeria's experience showed clearly that democratic transition means a lot more than seeing elections.

Third, integration of these countries into Europe could lead to stability and support emerging democracies. Regional cooperation should be encouraged, but that integration will be difficult with the Southern Mediterranean countries. High expectations are placed in the role of regional cooperation in the reconciliation between Israelis, Palestinians and their neighbours. Jacques Delors has suggested that regional cooperation could follow the model of the European Steel and Coal Community. Vasconcelos said that the joint action towards the Middle East decided by the European Council (Brussels, Dec.1993) contemplates the establishment of a regional cooperation framework to deal with economic development, arms control and security

of vulnerability acting through economic instruments. This policy leads to sub-policies that are cynical as a result of powerlessness. Yugoslavia, Algeria and Egypt will not affect Europe as they are self-contained. However, Libya is an example why issues such as proliferation of armaments, should not be absent from the EU/Mediterranean debate.

### **Discussion**

Assia Ben Salah Alaoui, Centre d'Etudes Strategiques de Rabat, said that the acting capacity of Europe is restricted due to a lack of global policies about the South. There is no clear political will. Partners and groups do not have bargaining power and there is a need for financial support.

Hamdy Saleh said that the forum for debate seems to be about problems in the South and what Europe should do about them. He discussed how Islam had been battling with modernity 150 years and therefore, it should not be seen as a threat, but a changing process towards which Europe and America should remain neutral. He stressed the need for integration and that Europe should see the Arab world as an ally for the future and should engage political forces, not just regimes.

**SESSION FOUR:** North-South Relations in the Mediterranean Area Within the Framework of the New World Order: the Right of Intervention and the Role of the UN. (Chairman: Seyfi Tashan, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara).

**First Paper:** Naser Tahboub, Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan. *"North-South Relations in the Mediterranean Area Within the Framework of the New World Order: the Right of Intervention and the Role of the UN."*

Naser Tahboub gave a 5-minute non-theoretical summary of his paper. Unfortunately, the participants had only received the paper that morning, thus had not read it, which limited the discussion.

### **Discussion**

Bassma Kodmani Darwish, Institute Francais des Relations Internationales, Paris, said that Europe is relatively ineffective in solving conflicts particularly in the Arab-Israeli sphere and are more effective in participation in Palestinian institution building, training, etc.

Hamdy Saleh discussed the emergence of a strategy of how to contain the divisive impact of the Gulf War. However, in the Arab World, the UN is seen to have a credibility problem, that it is manipulated and adheres to a double standard. Another participant suggested that we are envisioning a new world order characterised by a general disorder. That embargoes on countries are considered legal, implies that there is an ideological disorder and the question remains as to whether the Israeli-Palestinian agreements are limited.

**SESSION FIVE:** Arms Control and Limitation in the Middle East peace process. (Chairperson: Yves Ghebali, Inter-Parliamentary Union & Institute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva)

**First Paper:** Shai Feldman, The Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University: "*The Middle East Arms Control Agenda: 1994-1995*".

Shai Feldman focused on the need for arms control treaties in the Middle East. He said that the real critical issue in the Middle East is not the Israeli-Palestinian agreements but the breakthrough in state to state relations. He discussed the talks and activities of the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) in the Middle East and the regional implications of efforts such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a convention "capping" the production of weapons-grade material, and Conventional Arms Transfers Register. He said an urgent timetable on the region is needed but there is little chance for arms control.

**SESSION SIX:** The MeSCo Initiative: Future Work. (Chairman: Salvino Busuttil, Foundation for International Studies, Malta).

Roberto Aliboni said the issue of membership in MeSCo has to be discussed. Alpher added the issue of the states of the former Yugoslavia and their inclusion in MeSCo. It was decided that institutions, not countries, should be invited to become members. Aliboni suggested that those institutes should then act as "national representatives." He also recommended that they should not necessarily send their staff members to MeSCo meetings but rather participants from their respective countries with expertise in the subjects and themes dealt with by the Commission. The problem with this is that if member institutions send someone from outside the organisation, she/he may not be familiar with the working of the MeSCo but will be experienced in the subject, and if they send someone from inside the organisation, the opposite may occur. In addition, a country like Palestine faces problems: Will MeSCo accept a diaspora Palestinian as PASSIA participant (eg. like Ahmed Khalidi or Yezid Sayigh)?

## GENERAL IMPRESSIONS

The conference was very Euro-centric: North-South relations meant Europe-Maghreb relations, from a European point of view. The Mashreq and Turkey were not discussed in detail, mainly because the panels did not deal with their issues, not because a lack of interest. The concentration on Europe may reflect the large role Europe plays in the affairs of the Northern and Southern Mediterranean, but it is essential, to examine the role of others, who may play a similar role in the Eastern Mediterranean. Countries like Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to name a few, have a weighty presence on the policies of Mediterranean countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, particularly after the Gulf War.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

There is a serious need to ensure a stronger Palestinian presence in MeSCo meetings. The next meeting, will be held in Cairo under the auspices of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. Therefore, it should be easier to make more of an Arab and Palestinian showing. The following year it will be held in Portugal and it should be insisted on a more equal representation. To ensure this, a Palestinian scholar of security (eg. Ahmad Khalidi, Yezid Sayigh, Khalil Shikaki) should be invited as a guest speaker or a participant of PASSIA's Seminar on Strategy and Security should be sent by PASSIA to maintain PASSIA's participation and ensure a qualified participant

**Topic:** Human rights, Democracy and Women in Palestine.  
**Place:** National Palace Hotel, Jerusalem.  
**Organised by:** The Swedish Palestinian Friendship Society in Sweden.

### Summary

This seminar was attended by Khamis Ghosheh, administrative assistant at PASSIA. Speaker: included Dr. Anis al Qaq and Mr. Evert Svensson, Chairmen of the Swedish Palestinian Friendship Society. A presentation of the current political situation was given by Faisal Hussein and the question of human rights was addressed by Dr. Hanan Ashrawi.

**8. Date:** February 28th, 1994.  
**Topic:** The Complexities of the Current Situation.  
**Place:** Ambassador Hotel, Jerusalem.  
**Organised by:** The Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organisations.

### Summary

This symposium was an open dialogue about the current situation. Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi and Dr. Hanan Ashrawi each gave a presentation, followed by in depth discussion with the participants. Issues addressed included the Declaration of Principles and its limitations from a Palestinian point of view and the major obstacles to the continuing peace process on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides.

**9. Date:** 17th- 18th April 1994.  
**Topic:** Rehabilitation of Ex-Political Prisoners.  
**Place:** Rashad El Shawa Cultural Centre, Gaza City.  
**Organised by:** Gaza Strip National Committee for Rehabilitation and Gaza Community Mental Health Programme (GCMHP).

### Summary

The speakers were Dr. Iyad el Sarraj, Director of the GCMHP and Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi, Head of the Gaza Strip National Committee for Rehabilitation. The latter said that the Palestinian community as a whole, not only ex-political prisoners, were in need of rehabilitation due to the trauma of 27 years of occupation. Mr. Ahed Besiso, Amideast-Gaza, said that rehabilitation is a long process which needs a lot of material and human effort. The four sessions of the conference were entitled *The Psycho-social Aspects of Torture; Rights and Law; Therapeutic Experience in Treatment of Victims of Torture; and Community Repression and Rehabilitation.*

**10. Date:** 27th April 1994.  
**Topic:** Political Aspects of Jerusalem.  
**Place:** National Palace Hotel, Jerusalem.  
**Organised by:** Panorama-Centre for the Dissemination of Alternative Information.

### Summary

The three panels at this conference were headed by Walid Assali, Izzat Abdul Hadi and Mohammad Jadallah. Dr. Riad Malki and Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi were speakers in the final session which debated the status and future of Jerusalem under the DOP.

- 11. Date:** 28th - 29th April 1994.  
**Topic:** Financial Markets and Investment in the Middle East  
**Place:** Chatham House, London.  
**Organised by:** Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the British Government.

### Summary

The conference was opened by MP Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd who pointed out the immense economic potential in the region and the work needed to establish a framework for inward investment and private sector growth. The governor of the Bank of England chaired the discussion on central banking. The Lord Mayor of London and the chairman of the London stock exchange, also attended. Speakers included the chairmen of the Amman, Cairo and Tel Aviv Stock exchanges; the Deputy Governors of the Central Banks in Israel, Jordan and Egypt; senior economists from the World Bank and the IMF; and a number of Palestinians closely involved in the setting up of new economic institutions in the OPT. As a follow up to the conference, the British Government agreed to fund a detailed consultancy on banking supervision in the OPT and to consider institutional and training assistance to the proposed Palestinian monetary authority.

- 12. Date:** 5th-7th May 1994.  
**Topic:** Workshop on the Future of Social Science Research in Palestine.  
**Place:** Semiramis Hotel, Cairo, Egypt.  
**Organised by:** The Ford Foundation.

### Summary

#### **Introductory Remarks**

Salim Nasr, Ford Foundation Program Officer of the Middle East and North Africa, Cairo, discussed the purpose of the workshop. Humphrey Davies, Ford Foundation Acting Representative for the Middle East and North Africa, Cairo Office, said that the Ford Foundation saw its role in this workshop as providing a forum and space for useful discussion and contacts.

#### **Session on the Presentation of the Centres and Institutions**

Participants from four centres presented their activities, current status and future programmes.

##### **1. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, PASSIA, Jerusalem.**

Dr. Abdul Hadi described his experience in founding organisations in the OPT and discussed the goals of PASSIA, its activities and future plans.

Discussion: Dr. Abdel Fattah Abu Shokor of An-Najah University, Nablus, praised PASSIA's work, suggested the possibility of holding PASSIA meetings in other locations in the



2. *Suad Amari, Riwaq - Centre for Architectural Conservation, Ramallah.*

Dr. Amari said that the issue of architectural conservation is intimately tied to development, and also to comprehensive planning, infrastructure, tourism, environment and heritage. She asked why money is distributed for new buildings, and not for the renovation of old buildings, such as those in the Old City of Jerusalem. Riwaq's work (including the "Friends of Riwaq") concentrates on registering buildings and areas, and making cultural/historic maps. It emphasizes the role of conservation and cooperates with technical committees.

Discussion: Stressing the importance of Riwaq's work, community initiated projects with the help of UNESCO, and learning from the experiences of Egypt, Beirut and Morocco in restoring and planning issues were suggested.

3. *Islah Jad, Shu'un al-Mar'a, Nablus, and Bir Zeit University Women's Studies Programme.*

Issues raised were the new Women's Studies Programme at Bir Zeit University and its goals to develop a feminist curriculum in studies of Palestinian society, train new generations, and raise the level of researchers by the use of conferences, research, publishing and training. The courses will deal with issues such as Arab women, women in Palestine, feminism and women and development. The programme also coordinates with the Arab World and the Third World and is currently involved in looking at the social perception of women in various magazines and how to develop and change it.

Discussion: Issues raised were the need to integrate women into research and studies and not place them on the side as "the role of women". It was asked if current research, agendas and theories were sufficient. The Women's Studies Centre's seminars for women participants only were criticised, as it was the men who needed educating. The response was that the seminars were important opportunities for women to discuss issues in a non-threatening environment.

4. *Mustapha Hamarneh, Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS), University of Jordan, Amman.*

Dr. Hamarneh said that the CSS is a special study centre at the University of Jordan. It focuses on social sciences and distances itself from political activism and statements. He described the history of the CSS and its position on economics, demography, democracy studies, women, and Jordanian-Palestinian relations. There are three units within the CSS: the Opinion Poll Unit, the Economic Policy Unit, and the Israeli Studies Unit; a fourth Unit for Social Policy is currently being planned.

Discussion: The discussion focused on the relationship between the CSS and the government. Hamarneh said the government or the university (except in appointing staff) did both interfere, and although self-censorship exists, the fear is from the press and not from the government intelligence. He stressed the need for joint Palestinian-Jordanian projects and studies to learn from each other and to look towards the future. He also stressed the importance of building relations and generating studies on this subject given that the dichotomy of Jordan (Palestinians/Jordanians) is the number one problem facing Jordan, economically and politically.

### **Session on the State of Social Science Research in Palestine - An Overview**

Dr. Salim Tamari from Bir Zeit University, discussed current problems of social science research inside Palestine under the following aspects: Institutional Set-up; the Problem of Palestinian Exceptionalism; Methodological Problems; Access to Data; Survey Research; Limitations of Quantitative Surveys; Commissioned and Packaged Research; New Challenges: State Formation and Future Research Tasks; Networking and Electronic Data Communication; Social Science Periodicals; and Bibliographies.

Discussion: Out of the presentation and discussions a number of issues emerged.

(1) the issue of "quality control" and of who determines the quality of research and the standards applied to scholars and educators, which should be internationalised.

(2) the issue of lack of coordination, funding, sufficiently trained staff and "teamwork".

(3) academic issues such as the applicability of paradigms, getting away from their mechanical usage and to using paradigms developed in the Third World. Palestinian exceptionalism has damaged its ability to use conceptual theories that would be of relevance to them.

(4) integration of Palestinians outside with the inside has caused fears of a political machine coming in from outside. What sort of restructuring and participation will attract all Palestinians to get involved?

(5) the need for many different kinds of studies - for example, sociological and psychological effects of peace and the peace process.

(6) issues of the low levels of training in the social sciences at local universities.

### **Session on Research on International Affairs and Security Issues**

Presentations were given by Mahdi Abdul Hadi, PASSIA; Yezid Sayigh, Oxford University; and Khalil Shikaki, Centre for Palestine Research and Studies.

Mahdi Abdul Hadi discussed the activities of PASSIA in these two fields, in particular the Seminar on Strategic Studies and Security. He stressed the lack of Palestinian scholars in this area and the need to work to build up the field and public opinion about it.

Yezid Sayigh stressed the difference between the Third and the Western world where there is a lot of interest and money to fund research, etc. In training programmes, such as the one at PASSIA, it is important to provide a lateral, multifaceted understanding, a self-critical learning process and a balance between Palestinian and international dimensions. The dissemination of information is very important and must be of a high level, conforming with certain standards of quality control.

Khalil Shikaki asked why are there no Palestinian studies about strategic and security issues and why should there be? He answered 1) Palestinians are in a constant state of flux combined with the lack of a vision and objectives, but this situation will change with the existence of a state. 2) Lack of serious training in the field requires the training of scholars in conceptual analysis and Palestinian strategic studies as without them there will be a complete absence of Palestinian security views and needs. The current discourse has excluded Palestinian security concerns and concentrates on Israel.

Discussion: The short discussion focused on two issues:

i) the need to provide training and funding to young scholars, so that they will commit to the subject and open the field up to the non-English speaking areas in order to build public opinion.

...assessments will not be allowed to have weapons for a long time. Food security should be addressed too.

### **Session on the Logistics of Social Science Research**

Presentations were given by Abdel Fattah Abu Shokor, Salim Tamari, Mr. Ashraf, Engineer (Egypt).

Abu Shokor discussed the lack of information (bibliographies, data banks, statistics) and of coordination and cooperation in research. He said that due to the lack of funding in this regard many rely on the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. The Palestine Bureau of Statistics has nothing published yet and is suffering from financial problems. In terms of documentation, there are some centres at the universities but the University of Jordan has the best collection.

Salim Tamari said that many of these issues are tied up with the process of state building. The FAFO research and study was one of the few comprehensive studies of Palestinian society.

Discussion: The following issues were discussed:

(1) universities and research: many institutions do not have the capabilities for research studies and professors are not given special time. There is also a lack of coordination between universities in library materials and research and publication needs to be ensured.

(2) the lack of women as a part of the research in the semi-governmental institutions such as PECNDAR and PBS; their involvement must be ensured (this was one of the successes of the FAFO study).

(3) Gaza: its complete absence from the larger picture also concerning cooperation efforts, and the need for investment in Gazan institutions.

(4) The need to create a complementariness between government, universities and centres to provide, coordinate and organise information (eg., a Geographic Information System of maps for planners which could be used by all.)

Mr. Ashraf, an Egyptian engineer, outlined his experience with al-Ahram Centre in Cairo in setting up an information document computer archive (so-called OCR -Optical Character Recognition) which reads both Latin and Arabic. A retrieval system must be established with indexes etc., and a network system set up so that people from all over can access the information from their computers.

Discussion: The participants expressed the need for a workshop to introduce this use of technology to institutions and individual researchers. Such a workshop for Egyptian institutions will be held by the Ford Foundation, in the second week of May 1994.

### **Summary on Research on Governance and State Building Issues**

Iyad al-Barghouthi discussed different kinds of researchers: those tied to a religious or political text and those tied to authority. A lack of freedom in research is caused by trying to preserve relations, and people either don't write or write in foreign languages. Independent critical researchers are rare.

He said that research tends to focus on socio-economic or development issues rather than specifically on institution building, and that independent institutions tend to be "dakakin" and

reset with internal problems, bureaucracy and authority. Now that Gaza-Jericho First has happened, there are many questions about what sort of system we are setting up and what sort of relations will exist. Only few institutions, PASSIA, CPRS, Muwatin, doing work on these issues. However, without democracy the study of governmental institutions and state building is impossible.

Suad al-Amari raised issues of state and institution building, and the transfer of the Civil Administration to the Palestinians. The new role of NGOs and the Technical Committees is still unclear and on the larger level, many questions exist about the PLO and how the outside structure will return to the inside and be integrated with it. What will its relationship then be to Palestinians outside? The private sector is another issue as the inside will be overwhelmed by the money and skills coming from the outside and what kind of upgrading will take place of the people inside.

Khalil Shikaki said CPRS had the two goals of political analysis and research. He outlined its administrative structure, independent status, and its four concentrations: strategic studies and security, economy, policy and authority, and Israeli policies and studies (the fourth is planned). The centre's work takes the shape of forums (briefings, public lectures and brainstorming sessions), publication (the journal *Palestine Policy*), and academic research. Current projects are the corridor, settlements, refugees, public opinion polls, and the elections monitoring committee which it set up.

Discussion: The following issues and questions emerged out of the discussion:

- i) Rehabilitation (e.g. the 11,400 prisoners) and retraining needs of large sections of the society and the leadership before civil society can develop and educate about democracy.
- ii) UNRWA: its creation of a dependency syndrome and its role in the future.
- iii) The role of academic research for its own sake and for political purposes, in terms of the relation of research to the authority. Questions were raised as to the re-orientation of research, funding and its relationship to research priorities, the relationship between the state and the independence of research/research institutions, and the role of the intelligentsia and the authority.

### **Session on Research on Economic Reconstruction and Development Issues**

Presentations by Abdel Fattah Abu Shokor; Mohammed Shtayyeh, Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR); Antoine Mansour, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA), Jordan.

Abu Shokor gave a historical review of economic and development issues, starting with the Israeli occupation in 1967, including important publications, the role of the Palestinian universities, changing settlement policies, the *sumud* strategy and the "building" of a state.

Mohammed Shtayyeh explained the administrative structure of PECDAR which will work to channel the aid and donations to building the infrastructure and to NGOs. It has various development models under consideration, but there is still need for research studies on the private sector, market needs, agriculture, energy, water, housing, etc. PECDAR has three main funds: the Holst Fund (\$19 million) for running costs for hospitals, universities, the PNA, municipalities and councils; a technical fund (\$35 million); and a project fund (\$393 million for 1994, \$379 million for 1995, \$428 million for 1996). There is a direct relation between PECDAR and the PLO. All projects outside of Gaza and Jericho must be approved by the Israelis, and PECDAR must be located in the self-rule areas.

are needed. An issue in the coming years will be how countries will operate in the free market situation. Israel will have a free market economy after 1996 which will have an effect on the OPT. The Palestinian Diaspora must know the financial resources, potential areas of investment and technical potentials.

Discussions: the following issues were discussed:

- i) the important role of the informal sectors of the economy, in particular during the intifada.
- ii) the need for a formal structure to provide research studies in reconstruction and socio-economic development, particularly in non-traditional policy areas, such as education, environment, recycling.
- iii) the lack of an Arab or Palestinian strategy for regional cooperation; whether it will be imposed upon the region if they do not come up with one; and if it will be composed of an Arab or a Middle Eastern bank which would include Israel. The Arab League should come up with a strategy. Many are against the idea of a Middle East market, but on ideological grounds, not out of a knowledgeable position. There must be real political developments before much change will take place. Restrictions which prevent trade today (and are out of the Palestinians hands) will continue.
- iv) Women tend to make up the informal sector of the economy and they need to be integrated formally into development of the economy.
- v) the need to make efforts - in discussions and in reality - to situate the problems of Palestine in the world experience and the need to be aware of failures, so that they are not repeated.

### **Session on Research on Social Change and Gender Issues**

Presentations by Suha Hindiyyeh, Women's Studies Centre, Jerusalem; Islah Jad; Iyad Sarraj, Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, Gaza; and Bernard Sabella, Bethlehem University.

Suha Hindiyyeh said the WSC was founded in 1989 with the goal of making the invisible visible through research and contributing to a feminist agenda. The activities include

- 1) surveys and research studies, eg. on street vendors; divorce rates in al-Bireh; development needs for women during the interim phase; women who do handwork at home (NOVIB); and school drop-outs (UNICEF). There is cooperation with independent researchers.
- 2) educational training and outreach (included a bibliography on women, a women's festival, and a course by Judith Tucker on trends in feminist theory.
- 3) a library with an indexing system and CDSIS computerisation.

Islah Jad said that the subject of Palestinian women in society is not clearly perceived, issues of training and education are not addressed, and the FAFO study showed that the more educated the woman, the lower were her chances of getting married. The Technical Committees, were formed without even a thought about including women.

Iyad Sarraj said the GCMHP (established in 1990) is an independent institution with a yearly budget of \$1 million. It targets two populations: children and victims of torture. In Gaza, there are 6,000 traumatised children and 90,000 adults who need psychiatric intervention due to prison, poverty, stress, intermarriage. Palestinian culture, and also doctors, are ignorant to the psycho-political problems and attach a stigma to them. There are no clinical psychiatrists or

mental health nurses. The GCMHP provides mental health care and professional training. The results of their research and evaluation is published in journals with a political message about the occupation's damaging effects. One study about the wives of prisoners, for example, showed the oppression and abuse they often face as a result of the husband's behaviour due to the trauma.

Bernard Sabella discussed social change issues including the following aspects: how will the authority participate in the building of civil society? What will be the result of the many young people in prisons in terms of family relations and violence? How will urban-rural relations change? How do the young perceive Palestinian culture? What social institutions are needed? How do refugees see themselves and the camps? What is the relation between the authority and the individual?

Discussion: The discussion raised the following issues:

- i) the lack of research on such issues as children, old age, laws, personal status, marriage, divorce, inheritance, and sexuality. *Shu'un al-Mar'a* and *Shu'un Tanmawiyya* journals deal with these subjects.
- ii) the importance of introducing women's studies and issues into research centres and research.
- iii) the need to be able to deal with drugs, gangs, guns and the rehabilitation of prisoners.

#### **Session on Building Research Institutions: Training, Equipment and Funding Needs.**

Salim Nasr said that the political and theoretical changes taking place will define research possibilities and fields and affect life. Research centres should work to attract and train a new generation, to concentrate on retraining and rehabilitation, and to benefit from the Diaspora community.

Salwa Isma'il discussed how to provide a general theoretical and political framework for social science research. Many of the issues raised here must be seen in the wider context of the developing world and social sciences. Concepts like "state building" must be examined and the limitations understood. Will it be a 1960's style centralised state or a decentralised state? What sort of institutions will be tied to the state? To what extent are old development theories being recycled? Palestine has its own specificity, but it is not in isolation. The 30 years of others' experience in the post-colonial state-building process should be taken into account. Before recommending a certain course of action, questions must be posed. Social science has normative concerns and values.

Discussion: A number of issues were raised in regard to Dr. Isma'il's presentation.

- i) should this be a discussion among researchers or institutions? This framework cannot be imposed upon researchers, and it is not reasonable for an institution to impose a theoretical framework on its researchers. There are too many paradigms, left, extreme left, conservative Islamic, moderate Islamic, liberal. If the institution imposes a theory for research, it can refuse work based on the fact that it does not like the paradigm or ideology used. Freedom of choice at the institutional level is very important.
- ii) the theoretical underpinnings of research should be clear and not be separated from the work itself.
- iii) the contours of the Palestinian state are going to be completely shaped by political agreements and are not free to decide which theory to use or not use.

Palestinians from the Arab world has caused problems and affected research on many different levels.

v) the intellectuals' role here is to work, not to watch, and to ensure that the people have a role in deciding their future.

vi) the large gap between theory and practical work exists, particularly in colonial and post-colonial societies because of lack of freedoms, etc.

### **Session on Toward a Social Science Community: Networking, Collaboration, and Policy Relevance**

*This panel consisted of ideas and recommendations for institution building, cooperation, and development of human resources in institutions.*

The participants first put forward their different ideas and recommendations, among which were:

1) establishing a Palestinian Social Science Research Council or an inter-university research forum to help in cooperation, information, funding, support, publishing, standards, etc.

2) publishing a set of reports (task groups, policy reviews, etc.)

3) establishing networks, such as *baraka* (E-mail), or book fairs with other institutions in Palestine and the Arab world, to set up possibilities for exchange of information, visiting scholars, funding, etc.

4) widening the role of university academics, so that they can work on studies and receive training.

5) setting up a research project or centre to investigate the private sector and possibilities there.

6) publishing bibliographies of recommended readings, eg. a bibliography of the social sciences.

7) undertaking studies on the final stage status to give information on such issues as refugees, settlements and Jerusalem.

8) undertaking market surveys of the Palestinian economy and possible relations with other economies of the area. What is needed (eg. investment) and how can the diaspora play a role.

9) researching the issue of land and what will be its status and who will control what.

10) dealing with the issues of culture and cultural studies and normalising it.

11) integrating women and gender issues in the development process in the interim period.

12) examining regional and comprehensive planning issues and to tie it to sectorial planning so that there is integration in the approach.

13) ending the academic and institutional isolation of the OPT with the rest of the Arab world.

14) involving the young in all aspects of life (most of the active people are over 40); the Islamic movement is very successful in this (social activities, summer/work camps, etc.).

15) rehabilitation of existing structures; retraining of leadership with a focus on democratisation (in actions and thinking).

16) educating/training new generations in relations and life (marriage, child raising, sexual relations).



17) building up a support system for institutions, including training employees, raising standards of researchers graduating from universities in the OPT, bringing in researchers from outside and funding.

18) coordinating funding but without centralisation and prioritisation. PECDAR is needed but should be very general and not a body of control.

19) encouraging institutions in places like Khalil, Nablus, Tulkarem, Jenin (not Ramallah); prioritising funding politically independent institutions.

20) Ford Foundation conference about Jordanian-Palestinian relations in a neutral place.

21) setting up a network for distribution of publications both within and outside of Palestine and establishing a national depository for everything that is published in two or three libraries.

22) holding such conferences inside Palestine and jointly with the Egyptians.

23) establishing a board of ethics to establish standards of research.

Discussion: Salim Nasr responded to the suggestions:

1) The Ford Foundation funds many conferences and he will try to get them to secure invitations for Palestinians from the OPT.

2) This conference has already had an effect as he received a proposal from George Giacaman to organise a workshop on social science research in Palestine.

3) Another workshop will be held in Cairo next year and will be more focused.

4) Ford Foundation is open to proposals particularly setting up a network organisation. He categorised the suggestions into three areas and asked for further comments on them:

A) *Suggestions for integration, communication, ending the isolation, newsletter and a book fair.*

Comments:

Yezid Sayigh emphasised the role of the Diaspora and the need to concertise their role. He suggested tours of Palestinian diaspora academics in social sciences, to visit universities and institutes and set up exchange programmes.

Iyad Sarraj suggested establishing contacts with Arab countries on all levels not just academic.

Bernard Sabella mentioned that the government may be coordinating and setting up some structures and frameworks and that coordination is needed before setting up new structures.

Islah Jad said that a newsletter is difficult to gather information for and must not be too large. A book fair does not have a critical audience, but would provide for better information exchange.

Mohammed Shtayyeh said that four book fairs do happen at Bir Zeit at least, but are fractional and small scale. Arab researchers should know about Palestine and for Palestinians should expand into the Arab world and internationalise distribution.

B) *Research on the final stage.*

Comments:

Suad al-Amari said there must be more preparation and a division of labour between the negotiator and the researcher who should have some flexibility and independence. Time is limited as in two years negotiations will begin about the final status.



... was ... Society has the best information on settlements as it has aerial photos of the areas and could serve as a basis for a geographic centre.

Bernard Sabella said that independent institutions do this sort of final status sta; research.

Khalil Shikaki said that CPRS has a section for this research and is concerned about leaving anyone out and therefore, there must be coordination.

Salim Nasr summarised the recommendations and said that there is urgent need for research on Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, borders, and Jordanian-Palestinian relations. He suggested setting up a small meeting of organisations concerned with these issues, CPR PASSIA, Arab Studies Society, Institute for Palestine Studies, CSS, which could do background studies with suggestions for a quasi-programme, papers of perhaps 30 pages that are policy alternatives papers.

*C) Larger issues, such as a larger framework or a social science research council.*

Comments:

Yezid Sayigh recommended to organise the academic community like a Palestinian Social Science Research Council or an inter-university council. This could help in:

- 1) creating and focusing a research agenda
- 2) coordination of funding, research subjects, etc.
- 3) pooling of resources.
- 4) creating lists (inventories) of people, periodicals, libraries, donors.
- 5) receive and send visiting scholars. 6) establishing a framework for outside/inside Palestinian academic relations.

Muhammed Shtayyeh asked if the Palestinian Sociological Association is anything similar, to which the answer was no, it is a syndicate for sociologists and anthropologists.

Salim Nasr asked Yezid Sayigh write up a working paper of his recommendation and send it to all participants so that they could give him feedback.

**Conclusion**

Salim Nasr said that any proposals for projects raised in the course of the discussions would be welcomed by the Ford Foundation which is very interested in the subject.

13.     **Date:**                                 **14th - 16th May 1994.**  
          **Topic:**                                 **Economic Cooperation in the Middle East.**  
          **Place:**                                 Cairo University.  
          **Organised by:**                     Economics Department, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University.

Summary

PASSIA was supposed to attend this conference to present the results of a joint project undertaken in 1993/94 with the Centre for International Studies/University of Toronto. The project was entitled "A Review of Literature and Economic Cooperation and Integration in the Middle East" and in its final form was a bibliography compiled by one Palestinian, one Jordanian and one Israeli team, containing available literature pertaining to economic integration and cooperation. Due to several logistical problems, political sensitivity and problems with the

papers produced by the other two teams, PASSIA did not attend. Dr. Andrew Watson of the Centre for International Studies, who finalised the project, attended the conference, where he presented the paper that was written by PASSIA and the overall results of the prospects for integration and cooperation in the Middle East.

The following is a summary of the text of the paper presented.

## **A Review of Literature on Economic Co-operation and Integration in the Middle East**

### The Research.

The research work for took place in university libraries and in the libraries of research institutions and other organisations in the OPT and involved compiling articles, books and other material which was relevant to the subject of the bibliography and was then transferred to the computer. The 1700 collected items were reviewed, edited and classified by subject to cover as broad a range of areas as possible. The final selection was approximately 500 items and work began on the annotation of certain inclusions that were either deemed significant or for which information was readily available.

Several difficulties were noted in the course of this research project: Firstly, since there is no national Palestinian library, information was widely spread, with the libraries often lacked full journal collections or indexing systems; the Israeli closure policy and strike days disrupted the opening of many institutions. Secondly, due to the nature of Palestinian life at the present time (in the transitional phase), there are an incredible amount of projects and new works occurring making Palestinian time scarce and many people who may have been able to advise us were too busy with their own work. Nevertheless many acknowledged the usefulness of the bibliography and stressed their commitment to future cooperation.

Financial support for Palestinian research is mainly dependent on grants or donations from outside. These are provided principally by non-governmental organisations, by governments as development aid, or by the specific organisation initiating the research project. Research is often required by a number of organisations involved in regional co-operation and development.

### Findings:

In the course of this project it was found that literature produced in the 1980's was very much influenced by the notion of *sumud* or 'steadfastness' the key element characterising Palestinian resistance to occupation during that time. Since the *intifada*, and particularly since the events of 1993, the literature has become much more concerned with future potentials and the possibilities of cooperation and development. Economic cooperation is wanted but first things have to improve and skepticism remains about the form that this co-operation could take.

In general it was found that the Palestinian economy has suffered more than twenty years of stagnation under anti-developmental administrative policies. Further declines occurred resulting from the *intifada* and the Gulf war, and, most recently, from the Israeli closure policy. The socio-economic situation within the OPT is near breakdown as closures deprive the Palestinians of their income due to their structural economic dependency created through the military occupation and civil restriction on self-development in the last 26 years.

The Palestinian economy can be seen as a low-performance, underdeveloped, dependent, subsistence economy, dominated in all spheres by Israel and with no significant progress either in terms of numbers employed or Gross Domestic Product.

almost completely devastated by Israeli policies which restricted it on paper, sabotaged it and confiscated huge amounts of land. Consequently there is no longer a strong Palestinian agricultural base from which economic recovery could have been built. Industry consists of primarily small-scale enterprises and since occupation, no significant change have been noticeable in productive output, number and size of establishments, contribution to the GDP, or the rate of employment. The industrial sector has suffered with the downturns in the Israeli economy but not benefitted when there have been upswings and expansion.

Trade is restricted from the Occupied Territories into Israel despite the fact that the territories currently provide a market for Israeli Products which is second only to the US.

Development in the OPT is restricted through the domination of its markets by subsidised Israeli products and the restriction of Palestinian trade. There is no infrastructure, adequate monetary system or investment. This created economic hardship that induced emigration and the exploitation of human and natural resources in the OPT. The consequence is that there can be no implementation of comprehensive development plans in which the growth of the industrial sector would be used to stimulate other sectors and promote stable development.

The OPT are particularly vulnerable to external economic shocks, mainly those originating in the Palestinian communities of neighbouring Arab countries who supported them.

Economic conditions and future economic development in the OPT will be determined by both economic and political factors. The Israeli side fears a Palestinian state and military attacks and the Palestinians are worried that the talks will lead to nothing but a modified form of occupation. Both sides are aware that a solution of the conflict will carry a high potential for future development.

The Palestinians wish to develop their infrastructure and economy independently as much as possible. Self reliance is given high priority and once a degree of this is established, the potential for development and cooperation on a regional base increases. The West Bank has more chance of independent success than Gaza which seems to remain highly dependent on Israel.

Owing to the fact that Palestinian society was traditionally an agriculturally based, studies available on this topic were found to predominate. Other fields in which most information is available include water, housing, and education.

In the sector of tourism there is and has been considerable cooperation and an interest in further research was expressed. It is one of the few areas in the Palestinian economy which has a quite strong base but which will need to be further developed and made more efficient.

Generally, there is a lot of work now being done on future economic prospects, development potential, regional cooperation potential, restructuring of the economy and the need for adequate planning. There should be an increase in economic workshops and negotiation. Studies need to be made and there should be a general assessment of prospects for economic co-operation.

In attempting to develop their backward economy, Palestinians face a number of special problems: the absorption of returning refugees; the lacks of experience in trade and even local cooperation; to ultimately find specialised economic niches and develop them to create a competitive economy and to play its role in future Middle East regional cooperation.

- 14. Date:** 15th May 1994.  
**Topic:** **Palestinian Society - where to?**  
**Place:** National Palace Hotel, Jerusalem; Bir Zeit University; Rashad El Shawa Cultural Centre, Gaza.  
**Organised by:** Bir Zeit University; Gaza Cultural Group and the Palestinian Centre for Political Studies, Washington D.C.

#### **Summary**

This joint international academic conference consisted of three events held simultaneously at the three venues listed above. Discussion in each was concerned with the future of Palestinian society following the Declaration of Principles.

- 15. Date:** 25th May 1994.  
**Topic:** **International Workers Aid Meeting on the Peace Process.**  
**Place:** Levinson College, Beit Berl.  
**Organised by:** Na'amat, Movement of Working Women and Volunteers.

#### **Summary**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi participated in this seminar as part of a panel consisting of himself, Dr. Ron Pundik and Dr. Yoram Peri. Each participant made individual observations on political developments, followed by a discussion which involved panel members and observers.

- 16. Date:** 29th-31st May 1994.  
**Topic:** **The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Settlement, 1964-1994.**  
**Place:** Handler Auditorium, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.  
**Organised by:** The Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace and Hebrew University.

#### **Summary**

Dr. Abdul Hadi gave a presentation in the concluding session of this three day conference, which was entitled "Israeli Palestinian Relations: Between Past and Future".

- 17. Date:** 10th June 1994.  
**Topic:** **The Position of Palestinian NGOs in the Light of the Declaration of Principles.**  
**Place:** Friend's Boys School, Ramallah.  
**Organised by:** Palestinian NGO Coordinating Committee.

#### **Summary**

Khamis Ghosheh, Deniz Altayli and Rochelle Davis of PASSIA attended this meeting which addressed the problems which were expected to be faced by NGOs in the future. The conference served as a background investigation for a larger conference held between June 17th -19th.(summarised below).

**Place:** National Palace Hotel, Jerusalem.  
**Organised by:** The Geneva Conference Working Group (GCWG).

### Summary

The conference, attended by Deniz Altayli and Valerie Grove of PASSIA, was organised by GCWG, which is composed of Palestinian and International NGO coordinators. Its purpose was to discuss the current situation, changes and challenges facing NGOs and define their future role in the process of Palestinian development and state-building. On the last day, the panels and workshops of the conference were reviewed, followed by the drafting of position papers, based on workshop decisions. These papers will be submitted to the Geneva conference for discussion in August.

### **Opening**

Professor Roger Heacock welcomed the participants and Anis Al Qaq of the Palestine Health Services Council summarised the ideas of the conference emphasising the role of NGOs at this crucial time, particularly in Jerusalem. He said that the PNA and the already existing NGO network must become close partners to ensure that their work is complementary and to avoid a conflict of interests or the duplication of services. He said that this will be difficult and cooperation and openness are necessary between the PNA and NGOs, as well as among the donor countries, training organisations and new advisory bureaux.

Tamer Essawi of the Centre for Peace and Democracy reminded the conference participants of the huge contribution that NGOs had made and still continue to make in the Palestinian Society. Unfortunately, he could see no clear path for the future of NGOs under the PNA. He referred to the shortcomings of the Oslo-Cairo agreements, saying that nothing had changed, Israel still controlled the majority of land in Gaza, Jerusalem was still isolated from the rest of the West Bank, and there had certainly been no encouraging evidence for the effectiveness of the future PNA. All that had occurred was a modification of the occupation. The agreements were open to interpretation and in did not allow for the development of an independent Palestinian state. He said that NGOs should continue their work as if Palestinian society remains under occupation. He said that Palestinians had developed a civil society despite occupation and this should be supported in very way.

The third introductory speaker was Samir Ayyad from the Prisoners Support Centre. He said that the Cairo agreement had been seen as a turning point but in fact nothing had really changed on the ground. Prisoners were still being used politically, the withdrawal of the IDF had proved to be little more than redeployment, and the issue of Jerusalem also remained a major problem. The Cairo Agreement is not capable of securing a just and durable peace since there is still occupation and the main priority is still liberation from settlers and the army. He stressed the importance of the role of the NGOs as part of civil society who must assume even greater responsibility.

Dr. Ibrahim Abu Lughod, Vice President of Bir Zeit University and the overall chair of the conference then opened the conference, explaining the intent, goals and procedures. He said that there was still a long struggle ahead and that Jerusalem must always be seen and thought of as the occupied capital of the Palestinians. Occupation had not finished with the agreement and the struggle for institutions in Jerusalem had only just begun. No institutions should move

ut, it was always a political decision that Jerusalem would be the institutional capital and branches would be spread from Jerusalem throughout the West Bank and Gaza. He said that having never had a central governing body before, the Palestinians did not have a shared vision, although they did know their ultimate goal. Consequently, the emphasis must remain on the fact that occupation still exists, and that there must be a continued emphasis on the struggle for independence. Positive interaction between national organisations and the people is crucial and there are many possibilities for cooperation in the current phase. Palestinians must adopt a constitution which protects the rights of the people against the possibility of dictatorship and would also ensure that local NGOs have a strong democratic base from which to operate. Although NGOs were non-governmental, they were national institutions and had preceded the PNA in many ways; they are a rich source of experience and advice for the incoming PNA. The international NGOs should continue to promote the Palestinian right to self-determination and to provide financial aid.

Fritz Froehlich gave a brief background of the conference saying that the preparatory work had consisted of five local meetings. He talked of the prospects for the Geneva conference to which position papers resulting from this conference would be forwarded. He stressed that European NGOs had always considered Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state and still do.

The final speaker at the introductory session was Chris Doyle, representative of the European Coordinating Committee for Palestine (ECCP). He briefly explained the work of the ECCP, which had been established to coordinate between European and Palestinian NGOs and which was pushing for the European Union to play a stronger and more active role in resolving the Palestinian question.

**Panel One: NGOs and Development Strategies**

**Chair:** Fathiya Nasru

**Panelists:** Mustapha Barghouthi; Izzat Abdul Hadi (Bisan); Mohammad al-Shadid (Housing Council)

After a brief introduction by chair Fathiya Nasru, various aspects of future development strategies were discussed. Barghouthi stated that NGOs in their function as mass, women, charitable, grassroots or specialised organisations are a part of the OPT's civil society. The DOP has caused new challenges and realities facing NGOs; some might become governmental and others may cease to exist. NGOs had played an important role during and despite the occupation, in providing services (e.g. up to 60% of the health sector is run by NGOs and almost 100% of pre-school education), initiating projects and in building a base for democracy. NGOs are not committed to the Cairo-Agreement. Their primary concern is helping the society and one of the main challenges will be the building of infrastructure. It is necessary, to set priorities, guarantee fair distribution of donations, create a democratic base and to differentiate between NGO and governmental tasks.

Izzat Abdul Hadi said that the setting up of a PNA had been important but the Oslo-Cairo agreements had placed serious restrictions on development. Democracy and nationalism are two separate ideas which should not be confused, as without democracy there would be no human rights. A solid working relationship between opposition strategy and development strategy should be fixed. The private sector would be playing the most important developmental role in building up trade and industry. Although the necessity and function of a 5-year plan had

and education and concerning the whole meaning of reconstruction, it could give the private sector the opportunity to take over. The public sector was ambiguous as there was no real idea of the direction that the PNA would take. Abdul Hadi raised the possibility that the PNA could adopt a developmental model, based on other Arab states, and expressed his concern that the PNA would effectively take over the work of the NGOs. A democratic development from the bottom to the top is needed which emphasised the importance of gender and human rights issues. He suggested that a complete review of the current NGO operational procedures needs to be made, in order to set a solid framework for dealing with the PNA.

The final panelist, Mohammed Shadid, discussed the role of NGOs in development. After a brief review of the original meaning of NGOs and their work in other countries, he turned to the Palestinian Development Plan, stressing the big demand for labour, the need to develop human resources, provide rehabilitation, encourage trade and tackle problems of funding. Regarding funding, he discussed international aid and compensation from Israel for losses caused by the occupation. The responsibility of NGOs in the coming development process was defined by the following: monitoring the PNA, implementing activities, promoting public consciousness, cooperating and coordinating for common development, reviewing past development strategies, working scientifically and objectively, and clarifying priorities for each sector. He stressed the importance of NGOs remaining on the grassroots level and that PNGOs and the PNA should not necessarily be in opposition. He concluded by giving the housing sector as an example and saying that, due to Israeli policies, there was a lack of at least 100,000 housing units and 15-20% of existing houses were not fit for human habitation. Some \$3 billion will be necessary to improve the situation. The PNA's tasks will include the protection of this sector and registering the whole problem for better coordination and information.

Discussion: The points raised included the predominance of the private sector and the need for an umbrella organisation under which the NGOs could operate. Izzat Abdul Hadi said that no one could compete with the private sector and due to the fact that there was no central union, the question of an umbrella was very problematic and needed to be addressed soon.

## **Panel Two: NGOs and Palestinian Civil Society**

Chair: Eileen Kuttab

Panelists: Fateh Azham (Al-Haq), Rawiya Shawwa (Al-Quds Newspaper), Jamil Hammami  
Lance Matteson (ANERA)

Fateh Azham began by saying that she was a strong advocate of democratic reform and multiplicity. She gave a review of all the benefits that a democratic system could have for the Palestinians as well as pointing out the suitability of the system for Palestinians. She said that the role of the NGOs should be as a complementary opposition and that democratic reform would provide a vital framework for competition between governmental and non-governmental bodies. She stressed the importance of coordination between NGOs and said that the whole question of individual human rights should be taken much further, to include the rights of different groups to survive, regardless of their political ideas. This was particularly pertinent with a lot of local NGOs who have political affiliations different from the incoming PNA but who, nevertheless, contribute a great amount to the society through their work and it is their action and achievements which should be seen as the estimates of their worth.

Rawiya Shawwa spoke about the future of NGOs in the OPT according to the new situation. To discuss the relationship between NGOs, the PNA and organisations in neighbouring countries, one should examine other liberation movements and promote the role of PNGOs in the transition phase and how they can help to create a national authority. Shawwa then discussed the history of NGOs in the Palestinian context, their role of building civil society, their situation during the intifada and the reasons for their overall survival, in spite of having no governmental protection. She concluded that NGOs enriched Palestinian society and have the experience and expertise which the new PNA lacks, the latter, therefore, have to learn from and cooperate with the NGOs.

Jamil Hammami talked about the legitimacy of organisations, be they governmental, non-governmental, charitable or in any other form, concluding that this depended on the amount of interaction that it had with the people, particularly on the grassroots level. He said that organisations working on the ground often provided basic services and were more likely to be truly representative. Concerning funding for NGOs, he said that problems of mismanagement and corruption already existed and were likely to increase with more funds being made available without a strict and efficient monitoring system to justify them. There needed to be a clear vision of the future role of NGOs and that given their rich experience in administering the affairs of the OPT for so many years, this role was indispensable. He stressed that there was a huge pool of ability and experience, enough to fulfill all the needs of Palestinian society in the future and he hoped that this would not be wasted.

The last panelist was Lance Matteson who began with defining civil society as a mirror of a pluralistic and democratic society, and NGOs as non-profit, formal, volunteer organisations, which are not strictly religious or political and not linked to governmental bodies. Palestinian NGOs lack protection, are continually under the suspicion of the Israeli authorities and this makes them forums of politicisation, adapted to providing services and generating political leaders. The regional meetings held throughout the OPT mirrored the existence of a Palestinian civil society very clearly despite the absence of a government: 430 NGOs and more than 700 NGO activists were involved. In the future, NGOs need legal protection and rights, made by civilians, not by the government, whose responsibility is to recognise and protect those rights.

**Panel Three: NGOs and Jerusalem**

Chair: Nora Kort

Panelists: Khalil Tufakji (Palestinian Geographic Research & Information Centre), Mustapha Abu Zahra (Chamber of Commerce), Nahla Al-Assali (Care Society), Fritz Froehlich (SAAR)

Khalil Tufakji showed a variety of slides illustrating the changes that had taken place in Jerusalem since 1967. A large amount of these showed the building and location of settlements and illustrated clearly their incredible proliferation, particularly over the last decade. Tufakji said that settlement building had not taken place randomly but had been planned strategically in order to change the geographic and demographic status of the city. Many settlements had been built in the Jerusalem area in order to divide Arab populated areas and to effectively cut off the city from the outlying West Bank villages and towns. A demographic breakdown of the Jewish and Arab populations depicted quite clearly the incredible growth of Israeli residents in the city. Not only were settlements a strategic issue but also the road networks linking settlements and outlying Israeli areas were very important as they created physical separation and effective



phenomenal while new Arab housing has hardly occurred.

Mustapha Abu Zahra started with the announcement that Jerusalem is "the heart of Palestine and its capital" and reiterated Tufakji's statement. He said that the duty of NGOs inside and outside of Jerusalem, in facing the Israeli practices were as follows: presence in the city; emphasizing that it is the occupied capital of Palestine and Arab in its nature; fighting for international legitimacy against closure and occupation; getting international support; developing socio-economic activities; returning offices/organisations to Jerusalem, the Old City in particular social activities such as kindergartens.

Recommendations for the Old City included the following: conducting own social and architectural surveys; restoration activities (with an estimated \$9 billion needed); producing maps according to Waqf registration (as was done 100 years ago); re-utilizing Old City streets and suqs; bringing tourists back in the Arab market (from the Jewish Cardo); demanding back confiscated land and the return of the St. John Hostel, presently occupied by settlers; publicising Waqf documents of ownership, sales, absentees land etc.; creating a documentation centre for research and information on Jerusalem's history; protecting religious, international and housing rights in the city; fighting settlement policy.

Nahla Assali began by saying that NGO presence in Jerusalem was very important, particularly those working on humanitarian issues and considered them to be the conscience of Jerusalem. She said that settlement activity, Israeli municipality zoning plans, and the separate identity cards were all planned to annex the city. She called for a strong, united stand from all Palestinians, saying there were over 200 organisations and that the character of the city was still very much Arab. She said that local NGOs should continue working with international NGOs and support the PNA. She raised four crucial points: Is there or will there be a mechanism for NGOs to coordinate with the PNA? How can factional complications be overcome? Can funding be guaranteed for PNGOs? How do we classify NGOs that will become part of the PNA and will solidarity among them be achieved?

Fritz Froehlich briefly reviewed the history of Jerusalem and concluded that UN Resolutions 181 and 194 (on the city's status) are still ignored, that the occupation continues despite the recent agreements, and that there will be no changes before it is completely removed. He reiterated Mustapha Abu Zahra's suggestions about how to fight for Jerusalem, and added that more seminars should be held on and in Jerusalem and cultural and sport activities in the city be increased.

Discussion: One point raised was the necessity to confront the continuation of settlement activity around Jerusalem and it was suggested that one of the recommendations from the Geneva conference should be on land confiscation, planning and construction. Another concern was about the sudden increase of Palestinians in Jerusalem applying for Israeli citizenship. They have not actually been granted Israeli citizenship yet and the importance of this issue will be in the result of their application. The basic conclusion was that NGO presence in the city must continue and new premises be found, particularly inside the Old City. More focus should be on restoration/renovation work in the Old City and there should be a considerable increase in the use of the media.

- Panel Four: NGO Relationships** (with other NGOs, PNA Bodies, Multilateral Organisations and Funders)
- Chair:** Jumana Oudeh
- Panelists:** Raja Shehadeh, Roger Heacock, Bernard Harborne (Gaza Centre for Rights and Law).

Raja Shehadeh began by specifying two areas of interest: legality and policy. He said that the negative aspects of PNA policy towards NGOs could effectively marginalise their role and that since the negotiations had begun this had already started, especially in Human Rights organisations such as al-Haq and many NGOs had actually stopped working. Their contribution to the negotiations was negligible and they should have been allowed to play a much larger role which was a bad indicator of the incoming authority's attitude. Their role in the past has been that of a government and therefore their relationship with the PNA has never been comfortable. There is a very large threat of PNA domination and the question is to which extent this could actually be taken as the existing legal framework was not enough to protect NGO needs. He briefly described the Cairo agreement and explained how legislation for charitable societies would still be subject to Israeli approval. He said that NGOs must re-organise their relations on all levels and that there was theoretically a possibility to change the existing legal system under which they operate. He concluded by saying that he believed the job of monitoring allocation and spending of funds to NGOs, should be performed by the government, although there was doubt that this could be done without interference.

Roger Heacock began by defining the difficult context of relationships in Palestinian society, given the existence of the Israeli authorities, the newly established PNA, PNGOs, donor countries, international and intra-governmental organisations, and international NGOs. A struggle of power between competing types of organisations creates tension. Power should be balanced according to interests and responsibilities but this is problematic as there is no state with rules, regulations and laws to direct and mediate. Israel has power and could use it to create an imbalance among the groups mentioned above, since the recent agreements do not say anything about NGOs and civil society. The PNA as a transitional authority will turn the PLO into a more governmentally structured organisation, especially following elections. It needs as much support from NGOs as possible since it is in a very weak position under the agreement. The PNGOs' main interest is to maximize their revenue (basically international aid) and as long as this financial need is met by the PNA, they will support the process of state-building. The interests of donor states are defined by "hidden agendas", personal priorities (such as private sector projects), and political concerns (respecting Israel regarding issues like Jerusalem). Through their financial channels, they could exercise control over the PNA. He then explained the difficulties international NGOs face, such as their increasing dependence on home-governments and the financial problems of NGOs established after the Gulf War. Heacock suggested that NGOs should sign a resolution to regulate their future relationships and interactions and publish a declaration of independence to overcome any conflicts between the groups.

Bernard Harborne read a statement by Raji Sourani, who was unable to travel from Gaza, saying that the agreement could be the cause of a dangerous liaison between the PNA and NGOs. The power to veto certain NGO activities could work very much to the disadvantage of the PNA, as NGOs can often do things without hindrance from the Israeli side, whereas the PNA may encounter problems. A liaison body is needed to be established to prevent the loss of certain institutions to the private sector. The paper gave strong advocacy of the need for NGO

go towards erasing much of the corruption widely seen in other states, particularly Arab states. Ultimately, the coming stage would see a lot of NGOs disappearing, particularly some of those that have mushroomed in recent years. This however, would not necessarily be a bad thing; it would make the whole NGO network more professional, streamlined and accountable. Effectively he said, a lot of "dead wood" would go.

### **Faisal Hussein's remarks**

Feisal Hussein said that NGOs should work towards approving rights to liberate the land and that the current battle of achieving self-determination during the interim period will lead to negotiation on the final solution, including the West Bank and Jerusalem, as stated in the Oslo and Cairo agreements. He emphasized the Jerusalem issue saying that the most important symbolic issue of the conference was the fact that it was held in Jerusalem, as Palestinian existence and presence in the city is a struggle. The Jerusalem issue is rather more historically than politically determined and Israel feels threatened by this. When Palestinians created a committee to protect Jerusalem and fight the Jewish dominance, it "shocked" those Israelis who thought the Jerusalem issue was solved and Palestinians would move out, but had to learn that the battle will not end before the liberation of Arab Jerusalem.

After this statement, Fritz Froehlich said that all segments involved in the conflict are aware of the rocky road on the way to find a solution for Jerusalem and that Israel should create the conditions for a just and lasting peace.

### **On behalf of PECDAR, Samir Huleileh's remarks**

In the past and since the Oslo agreement, there had been much discussion among NGOs on their role, nature and relationship with the emerging PNA. These discussions reflected political pluralism and fears of NGOs about the coming period. One of the main problems in the past was that popular and official support towards the OPT was intermixed through the presence of international funders alongside Palestinian groups, ie. receiving funds occurred on grassroots level as well as officially. Furthermore, financial assistance from abroad made up 80-100% of the NGO budgets. Concerning the future, the national struggle to end the occupation will continue, backed by the PLO. The internal struggle for state-building is task of the PNA but its relationship to the NGOs must be very good and they should both be responsible for the development tasks, the former as the main implementing body. International funding, whether on governmental or NGO level, needs to be coordinated and checked clearly. The PNA would not interfere, but international governmental aid (including support from the UN, EU and Arab organisations) should not support PNGOs without being coordinated by the PNA. Therefore PNGOs should participate in information sharing.

It is the PNA's duty and priority to work towards building the authority, the state and its organs for the Palestinian people. It should also facilitate the continuation of support for NGOs and organise relations with them through the following actions: registering NGOs for better coordination and cooperation; facilitating import of equipment etc.; and create a forum for discussing the future development and priorities between the PNA and NGOs, with recommended annual meetings. The NGOs should start a dialogue with the PNA on the new questions such as which of the agricultural cooperatives, hospitals, educational institutions etc

ould remain private and which should be under state control. NGO organisation should be efficient and not in conflict with the PNA. Registration would legitimise their work, provide a legal framework and lead to better cooperation. Information sharing is crucial since both sides need sufficient information to undergo global development efforts and guarantee proper funding. Democratic elections are to be held and all should commit to the concept of openness, good administration and effective monitoring. The PNA does not want to demolish NGOs and/or their work, but maybe will integrate some into the governmental apparatus. Hopefully NGOs will deal democratically and professionally with the new situation and there will be a good relationship with the PNA as their goals are the same.

Discussion: Responding to a required specification of the future relationship between NGOs, the PNA and their subordinated councils, Huleileh stressed the need for cooperation between them and said that the councils will have an advisory nature and might mediate between NGOs and ministries. Since the ministries have to do a lot of work to establish their structures etc., he said he expects that the situation of the NGOs will remain as it is now for a long time.

Another question referred to the World Bank promises and the potential conditions this implies. Huleileh said that the financial agreements ensure the PNA's independence and the bulk of money promised, as well as the technical assistance, is, therefore, unconditional. Problems will occur, concerning the bilateral agreements between the PNA and donor countries as they are expected to be bound to certain conditions regarding their own work and the stand of Israeli authorities.

- 19. Date:** 19th - 21st August 1994  
**Topic:** Muslim and Christian Heritage in the Holy Land.  
**Place:** Notre Dame Centre, Jerusalem.  
**Organised by:** The Centre for Religious & Heritage Studies in the Holy Land.

**Summary**

The purpose of this conference was for Christian and Muslim communities in Jerusalem to explore their own and each other's heritage and to strengthen links between the two communities by looking for common ground, particularly as regards the future of the city.

- 20. Date:** 24th August-2nd September 1994.  
**Topic:** Human Rights, Democracy, Development and Reconciliation: the Role of the Church in the Shaping of the Future Palestine.  
**Place:** Ambassador Hotel, Jerusalem.  
**Organised by:** The Lutheran World Federation.

**Summary**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi was invited to give the keynote address at this conference. His presentation was entitled "The Middle East Today" and gave a brief history of Palestinian society from the beginning of the occupation. He talked about the current Palestinian political trends and the impact that these could have on the peace process, as well as Israeli opposition and the influence of other countries in the region. He talked about the challenges to be faced by the

21. **Date:** 10th-12th September 1994.  
**Topic:** International Human Rights Colloquium - Protection Mechanism and Political Change.  
**Place:** Rashad El Shawa Cultural Centre, Gaza City.  
**Organised by:** Gaza Centre for Rights and Law.

**Summary**

This large international conference brought together human rights experts, political analysts and legal advisors from all over the world. The status and obligations under international law of both the emerging PNA and the remaining occupation forces were examined in detail. Legal anomalies concerning the status of Jerusalem, the status of settlements, the position of refugees and prisoners, and the current and future status of Israeli military orders were also considered. The key issue was how respect for human rights and the rule of law could be best promoted throughout the coming 5-year interim period and under a future Palestinian authority. Full details of the proceedings of this conference are available from the Gaza Centre for Rights and Law.

22. **Date:** 17th September-1st October 1994.  
**Topic:** The Mediterranean European Athens Seminar.  
**Place:** The Ionic Centre for Scientific, Cultural and Spiritual Study.  
**Organised by:** The Ionic Centre for Scientific, Cultural and Spiritual Study.

**Summary**

This conference was attended on behalf of PASSIA by Ms. Ahlam Abbasi. The seminar comprised of 18 delegates from Palestine, Tunisia, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Malta. The lectures dealt with subjects linked to the history of development of European-Middle East relations and suggested ways to develop methods of cooperation between the countries. Participants were left a short period for discussion at the end of each session. Main subjects were the EU and its future, European, Mediterranean, religious and political history, the multi media and democracy and theocracy.

23. **Date:** 3rd-4th October 1994.  
**Topic:** Palestinian-Israeli Workshop: Monitoring Change in Palestinian and Israeli Societies. "The Societies and Political Systems: Current Profiles and Possible Scenarios".  
**Place:** Tantur Ecumenical Centre, Bethlehem.  
**Organised by:** Friedrich Naumann Foundation and Political Science Department, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

**Summary**

At this conference prominent Israeli and Palestinian scholars presented their views on the current situation and possible future scenarios.

4. **Date:** 14th-24th October 1994.  
**Topic:** Mediterranean European Seminar.  
**Place:** Haifa/Givat Haviva.  
**Organised by:** Jewish Arab Centre for Peace/MED Campus.

**Summary**

This conference began in Haifa and took participants to various locations for lectures and study tours. On October 23rd, the participants came to Jerusalem for a tour of Orient House and attended a lecture and discussion on the Palestinian Question which was given by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi.

5. **Date:** 11th November 1994.  
**Topic:** 21st Annual Symposium on Politics and Ethics - The Middle East Peace Process and the Question of Jerusalem.  
**Place:** Church of the Reformation, Washington D.C.  
**Organised by:** Luther Institute and Lutheran Theological Seminary at Gettysburg.

**Summary**

Dr. Abdul Hadi attended this conference and gave a presentation in reply to other presentations made earlier in the conference. A synopsis of his remarks appears below.

Gershon Baskin, head of the Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information works on various issues on the question of Jerusalem. We live in the same city and work on the same subjects from different perspectives but we don't meet. It is ironic that I have to travel all the way from Jerusalem to Washington to meet the man and to discuss his paper at this forum. Maybe it is the fashion nowadays that we have to go to a third place in order to respond to each others positions.

Since the keynote speaker was Mrs. Holst, which reminds us of the Oslo chapter and the exchange of letters between the late Mr. Holst and Mr. Peres on Jerusalem, I think my starting point should be to place Oslo in the unfolding history of Palestine. The story goes back to the end of the First World War and the Versailles peace conference in 1919. Two leaders met, Chaim Weizmann, representing the Jews and the Zionist movement and Prince Faisal, representing the Arab people and the Arab Revolt. Their meeting took place with the assistance of a third party, Great Britain and T.E. Lawrence, who came to be known as Lawrence of Arabia. London was very much interested in the region and competing with France. These two leaders reached an agreement, based on regional economic cooperation as a starting point for regional security arrangements. Part of that agreement read: "We, the Jewish people are asking you, the Arab people to give us part of the land of Palestine on which the Jewish people can have autonomy and establish a homeland". The basic understanding for co-existence was economic cooperation and it was said that in return, Jews would give the Arabs the world economic markets. The agreement was never materialized, not because Washington was not involved, nor because the balance of power between Great Britain and France would not allow it, but because the people concerned did not agree on geo-political and economic issues and the Arabs were seeking independence from the Turks and struggling for unity and sovereignty. The Jews did not agree either, they were divided on the priorities of their political and demographic agenda.

Washington.

It does not differ much from the 1919 agreement. It is also based on regional economic cooperation, but this time we, the Palestinians, are asking the Israelis to return to us a part of our homeland, 22% - the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, on which to establish Palestinian autonomy towards Palestinian statehood. In return, we will give the Israelis the Arab economic markets. Immediately after the signing of the DOP we saw Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres arriving undisguised in Morocco. Then, we saw Mr. Beilin signing an accord with the Vatican and later, an Israeli delegation negotiating in the multilateral talks on refugees in Tunis. It was obvious that Israel had gone into the Arab world across the Palestinian bridge but without anything changing on the ground. Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem remains.

The questions to be addressed today are about the future of the DOP, especially if Mr. Arafat is going to sink in the Gazan Sea or if Mr. Rabin is going to lose the coming elections (1996) leaving no Labour party in government to continue the implementation of the DOP. I think the two peoples are still in the early stages of a peace process, still at the doorstep of recognition, acceptance and acknowledgment of each other. This does not mean that we have reached the stage of reconciliation. The image sold by the media of Arafat and Rabin shaking hands at the White House, as if the conflict was over, was very memorable, but is not the reality of the relationship. The problem is not solved.

The starting point for a real solution, is for people to see a change on the ground to promote acceptance of the idea of sharing land and living as independent neighbours. Can we reach that stage? Most importantly, can that scenario be applied to the question of Jerusalem?

Both the question of a Palestinian-Israeli divorce, or as Mr. Rabin refers to it, separation means ghettoisation of Palestinian cities and towns, confiscating Palestinian land and annexing it to Israel. Mr. Baskin asked why the divorce? We have never been married and I was very polite to use the term divorce. The truth is that we have been raped by the Israelis for the past 27 years. They confiscated our land. They demolished our houses. They deported our leaders. They killed our youth. We accepted, acknowledged and recognized Israel. We wanted to keep Israeli presence away from our homeland. Even today in Israel there are two groups, the military, who are enjoying what they are doing to us, and the politicians along with the economists, who dream of different scenarios but are unable to implement their vision. According to Mr. Baskin's presentation, there is an Israeli consensus that Jerusalem is the capital of the state and their concern covers only the question of security and the holy places. He said that there are ideas about establishing neighbourhood councils for both communities - Palestinians and Israelis. I say that the Palestinian position will see two capitals, two municipalities, two sovereignties and two peoples sharing the city. Security is of great concern to us too, but Mr. Ariel Sharon still occupies an Arab house in the middle of the city, guarded for 24 hours by soldiers who harass people and block the roads while Palestinians are still being evacuated from their houses, churches being closed down and people being deported from the Old City. What concept of security is that? Do they have a concept of security for Palestinian?

On the question of the holy places and if they should remain under Israeli control, I would like to remind you of some ideas raised by speakers this morning. It was said that from 1948 to 1967, Jews were denied the right to go to worship at the Western Wall. An Israeli request to allow Jewish worshippers to go to the Western Wall was never submitted. TH



discussion, agreement and action during these years was about arrangements and passage for medical support to the Hebrew University Hospital on Mt. Scopus, under Jordanian jurisdiction. The British Mandate and its courts decided in 1936 that the wall is the el-Burak wall and an Islamic property. There, Prophet Mohammed left his horse (Burak) and ascended to heaven in the 7th century. Muslims never prohibited access to any holy places for either the inhabitants of the city, pilgrims or tourists. In 1967, the first thing the Israeli occupiers did was to demolish over 350 Palestinian houses in the Maghrebi quarter in order to build the plaza in front of the Western Wall. It was under the Arab-Islamic rule of the city that its heritage, history and culture were preserved. The case of holding the keys to the Holy Sepulchre shows this. All Christian churches had agreed that the keys be kept with a Jerusalemite Muslim family and it was after the Israeli occupation that the Holy Sepulchre was robbed by two Israelis. An agreement on holy sites and their security cannot be reached if the concept of their maintenance is an entirely Israeli one. The city has been governed and controlled by Arab, Islamic and Christian heritage and politics for 1,400 years. Why accept the dictates of only 27 years of Israeli occupation and concede to them?

A third point, concerns the idea of an open city and the question of exactly what city we are talking about. A Jordanian scholar published an article (*Foreign Affairs*, 1992) suggesting that the walled city should be kept away from the arena of conflict and each party would be responsible for its own respective part. West Jerusalem would be for the Israelis and the East part for the Palestinians.

Palestinians are speaking about one open city. They own 26% of West Jerusalem property and they have their presence in East Jerusalem with 150,000 inhabitants and over 200 institutions. The concept of an open city should cover all parts of the city in spite of the evolution of the municipality borders from 1949 to 1967 to 1982 to the 1990s. It is one city without walls or barriers and access from the OPT is, or should be free. In fact, East Jerusalem is part of the OPT but the future of the whole city has been left open since the Partition Plan of 1947.

Item four concerns the issue that Jewish neighbourhoods in the Arab sector of East Jerusalem should remain under Jewish-Israeli sovereignty. If I claim my right to my neighbourhood in West Jerusalem, I would demand that that neighbourhood be under Palestinian sovereignty, if we are sharing the city. This takes us back to the question of partition which raises issues of citizenship and residency. If you, as an Israeli, would like to live in the Arab part of the city, you become a resident, but you are not a citizen of that area. Residency for all, if people will abide by the rules and laws of the respective countries. Citizenship raises the issue of sovereignty, authority and jurisdiction. Why should discussion head in that complex direction? The concept of sovereignty differs from nation to nation and for the time being, there is no consensus on it.

On the idea of establishing a charter and special court for Jerusalem, I think many other problematic issues will follow, such as who decides on citizenship and residency rights? Who will decide which courts are appropriate for which people? I think it is a long way before Palestinians and Israelis can reach a common agenda for such a charter. However, if you want to think and plan a political, social, cultural and demographic charter, your starting point must be a shared city, not a closed Jewish capital. Palestinians are receptive to ideas which could solve these problems.

The current, immediate problem is that East Jerusalem was occupied by Israel. Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank and anything that applies to the other OPTs should also apply in Jerusalem. If the discussion is to cover the whole city of Jerusalem, the fact before us



## Summary

Deniz Altayli and Valerie Grove promoted PASSIA's work, displayed its publications, and encouraged visitors to contact PASSIA for any further information on Palestinian life in the OPT. PASSIA was made better known and achieved wide range of new contacts. Participants came from Palestine, Israel, Greece, USA, Germany, Croatia, Nigeria, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, Zambia, Taiwan, France, Canada, South Africa, Switzerland and the U.K.

### **PASSIA was invited to the following conferences but was unable to attend.**

. 17th-19th January 1994.

*International Symposium 'Trans-Mediterranean Interdependence and Partnership  
Auletta dei Gruppi Parlamentari'* at the Italian Parliament, Rome.

North-South Centre, European Centre for Global Interdependence and Solidarity, Council of Europe.

. 14th-17th April 1994.

*Peaceful Management of Trans-boundary Resources.*

International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, England.

. 15th April 1994.

*The Impact of Israeli Occupation and Political Change on the Sociological and Psychological Wellbeing of Palestinian People and Society.*

Bethlehem University.

The League of Arab Workers in Mental Health in Israel; Bethlehem University.

. 29th April 1994.

*Democratic Elections and the Current Palestinian Status.*

Mashad El Shawa Cultural Centre, Gaza. Gaza Cultural Group.

. May 3rd 1994

*Collective Identities and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking: Past, Present, Future.*

Notre Dame Centre, Jerusalem.

Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI)

. 3rd-7th of May 1994.

*13th Wilton Park Conference:*

*Prospects for an Arab-Israeli Peace.*

Wilton House Conference Centre,

Weyning, UK.

Wilton Park - An executive agency of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

. 17th May 1994.

*Economic Directions for a Palestinian Future.*

Bir Zeit University.

Palestinian Bureau of Statistics; Bir Zeit Faculty of Economics and Commerce.

*Facing the Challenges of Democracy,*  
Doubletree Terrace Hotel, Washington.  
The Foundation on Democratization and Political Change in the Middle East.

9. 3rd-4th June 1994.

*Preservation of Architectural Heritage in Palestine.*  
Bir Zeit University.  
RIWAQ and the Technical Committees.

10. 3rd June 1994.

*Palestinian Police and Security.*  
Rashad Shawa Cultural Centre, Gaza. Gaza Cultural Group.

11. 7th-9th June 1994.

*Security Group of the Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East.*  
Institute of International Affairs,  
Stockholm.  
Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East, Search for Common Ground.

12. 24th-25th June 1994.

*Jerusalem - Best Second Choices.*  
Tantur Ecumenical Centre, Bethlehem.  
Israel-Palestine Centre for Research and Information, IPCRI, Jerusalem.

13. 29th-30th June 1994.

*The Middle Eastern Economy and the Prospects of Peace.*  
European Parliament, Strasbourg.  
The French Research Centre in Social Sciences, CEDEJ, Cairo.

14. 17th-18th August 1994.

*Elections During the Period of Palestinian Autonomy.*  
Forte Grand Hotel, Amman.  
Middle Eastern Studies Centre, Amman.

15. 16th-19th September 1994.

*Women, Justice and Law - Towards the Empowerment of Palestinian Women.*  
National Palace Hotel, Jerusalem.  
Al-Haq, Ramallah.

# 9

## WORKING VISITS

### WORKING VISIT ONE

**Date:** January 29th-31st 1994.  
**Place:** Central Europe-Middle East, Sinaia, Romania.  
**Organiser:** Association for International Law and International Relations at the Black Sea University, Bucharest; the Romanian Foreign Ministry; British Punchline, London.

#### Background

From the 6th-8th November 1993, a conference was held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on the subject of "Relations between Europe and the Middle East", organised by the Hebrew University, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the International Support Committee of the Institute for European Studies at the Hebrew University. The conference was attended by Israeli, Palestinian and European academics and sponsored by Punchline, a London based specialist consultancy service providing advice on political, business and commercial interests and facilitating contacts. At this conference Mr. Sergiu Celac, the Romanian Ambassador in the UK, approached former Prime Minister of Egypt, Mustapha Khalil, Israeli Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yossi Beilin and Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, head of PASSIA, suggesting the convening of a similar seminar to be held in Bucharest, Romania, on Central/Eastern European and Middle East Relations. He subsequently approached Chairman Arafat during his visit to London and after receiving a positive endorsement for the seminar preparation and consultation began. Financial support was given by the European Community and Punchline.

#### **Sinaia Seminar**

##### Participants

- Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi - Head of PASSIA, East Jerusalem.
- Senator Kamel Abu Jaber - Chairman of the World Affairs Council, Amman, Jordan.
- H.E. Sergiu Celac - Ambassador of Romania to Great Britain.
- Mr. Paul Clairet - EU Department of Planning and Analysis, Bruxelles, Belgium.
- Prof. Gyula Gazdik - University of Budapest, Romania.
- Mr. Florin Guy - Punchline/W. Nagel, London.
- Prof. Yair Hirschfeld - University of Haifa, Israel.
- Prof. Mohammad Machnouk - Director of "ECO BEIRUT" and "RADIO MAKASSED" radio stations, Lebanon.
- Acad. Mircea Malita - Secretary General of A.D.I.R.I., Black Sea University Bucharest, Romania.
- Prof. Petr Mares - Caroline University, Prague, Czechoslovakia.

Evaluation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, Egypt.

13. Prof. Jordan Peev - University of Sofia, Bulgaria.

14. Mr. Nicolae Ropotean - Director of the Middle East and North Africa Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest, Romania.

15. Mr. Zygmunt Shorzynski - Chairman of the Poland and Europe Foundation, Warsaw, Poland.

(The Syrian participant Dr. Aziz Shukri, Dean of the School of Law at Damascus University made last minute apologies for not being able to attend the seminar. The original Egyptian participant, Dr. Usama El Baz, had to attend the Davos, Switzerland, meetings which coincided with the proposed seminar. His place was taken by Ambassador Othman from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry).

### **Programme**

The seminar consisted of four sessions held over a three day period. The first session was chaired by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Palestine; the second by Kamel Abu Jaber, Jordan; the third by Professor Yair Hirschfeld, Israel, and the fourth by Mr. Paul Clairet, European Commissioner.

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi divided the first session into three parts: firstly, he called upon Ambassador Celac to brief the other participants on the background and preparation for the seminar, stressing that the intention was to explore the views of all parties in a non-political representational capacity. Secondly, he called upon Mircea Malita to provide a background on the Black Sea University which resulted from the Black Sea Association. Thirdly he requested all participants to speak candidly about their views on the following four points:

- a) Their countries current foreign policy and foreign relations.
- b) The idea of a dialogue between the 6 Middle eastern countries, (Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Israel) and the 6 Central/Eastern European Countries (Czechoslovakia, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria).
- c) The Palestine-Israel Peace Process.
- d) Relations between the EU and the 6 Central/Eastern European countries listed above.

The session lasted for four hours and all participants raised a variety of ideas which became the cornerstone of subsequent dialogue for the duration of the seminar.

### **Topics of the Four Session**

1. The Future of Relations of Central/Eastern Europe and the Middle East in the Perspective of the Middle East Peace Process.
2. Challenges to Peace in the Middle East in the view of Present Situations.
3. Economic Projects of Reconstruction and Development in the Middle East and the International Dimension.
4. Review and Evaluation of the Discussed Issues.

### **Framework of Dialogue**

1. The historic links between the 6 Central/Eastern European and 6 Middle Eastern countries and the Ottoman empire.
2. Security problems and the current position held by the 6 Central/Eastern European countries excluded from NATO and from trade and investment from the EU similar to the Middle Eastern countries who are also not members of a security pact and fail to form an economic bloc.
3. Both groups are looking for open dialogue on nationalism and religion and more understanding among themselves generally.
4. The importance of brainstorming sessions, in order to find solutions and build confidence.
5. Opportunities for dialogue among the 12 countries in a variety of combinations: multilateral (participation of all parties), or bi/tri-lateral (effective combinations such as Israel and Syria).

### **General Remarks**

One participant said that World War II began in Dansk and was only finished a few months ago with the signing of a Polish-German joint security and economic treaty. Others raised the issue of the weak relations between the 6 Central/Eastern European countries, saying that they are divided. Three see their future as part of the EU while the other three are divided between Russia, Turkey and Austria.

Internal and external security and the necessity for a global perspective was emphasised. Areas on which security talks needs to focus are the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Economic and cultural cooperation for Palestinians should address their needs to obtain a passport, a passport and a flag without the terms and means being dictated by others. Their relations with others must be agreed in the context of discussion with Jordan, Egypt and as at the current talks in Paris with Israel. The idea of a free economy was raised and the process of institution building. The PISGA agenda and the need to obtain national authority in the transitional phase were emphasised as was the centrality of Jerusalem and the need to recognise Palestinian rights regarding the city, which includes having a political/national address in an open city with two flags, two authorities and two municipalities. Pre-requisite to self-determination is the freedom to decide on own economic ideology, political security and refugees. The European countries expressed interest in being a part of the multilateral talks.

The question of Jerusalem which is not to be negotiated until the final stage does not necessarily mean postponing dialogue among the parties concerned. With the assistance of a mediator, a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue can take place as well as a Palestinian-Israeli-Jordanian.

The idea of a Black Sea Economic Co-operative was discussed and the possibilities for co-operation between Turkey and Romania but there was no appropriate model on which to base an alliance of this kind and no economic support such as in the EC.

The idea that a forum for education and joint projects between the participating countries received a lot of support, and it was suggested that the EC could serve as an interpolitical decision maker to fund and encourage such initiatives. Exchange of information and personnel from research centres and universities before conflicts were resolved, could provide vital groundwork, particularly on issues like water and energy. Multilateral talks on energy,



among the 6 Middle Eastern countries was raised.

The EC will further contribute to the progression of the Middle East Peace Process and any initiative which goes toward achieving this end. The EC is interested in planning and facilitating any efforts at cooperation or dialogue between the 12 countries, be it bilateral, trilateral or multilateral.

The 6 Central/Eastern European countries have no current agenda concerning economic or security issues and the continuously changing global scene makes it difficult to initiate one.

### **Joint Challenges**

- a) Israel to become a citizen of the Middle East.
- b) The Middle East to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement.
- c) Palestinians to exercise self-determination and build an independent state.
- d) Eastern European countries to participate in the peace process.
- e) To achieve a balance between national aspirations vs. regional cooperation and regional cooperation vs. diversity of economic agendas and internal problems of the countries in the region.
- f) To find a mediator who can promote dialogue among all parties.

### **Recommendations**

- a) *Meeting of the 6 Middle Eastern countries.*

This would lead to political exchange (political messages), show goodwill and delineate the possibilities for future action. The precedent of this conference should be followed even if topics are repeated. This also gives the opportunity for bi/trilateral contacts.

- b) *Meetings between the 6 Central/Eastern Europe and the 6 Middle Eastern countries.*

The Black Sea and the Middle Eastern community to become partners in peace, cooperation, construction and development. Strategic and security concerns to be addressed cover the Association of the Black Sea Countries to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

- c) *Meetings between the 12 countries and the European Community.*

The EC could provide a follow-up programme to ensure stability based on cultural and economic cooperation. An attempt should be made to consider the agenda of the USA in such a framework and if Central/Eastern European countries emerge as an association of complementary or equal partners or as a buffer between Western Europe and Russia.

- d) *Romanian initiative.*

To follow up a dialogue among the 6 Central/Eastern European countries, particularly searching for a strategic agenda, taking democracy, human rights, minority rights and the associated factors of religion, history and geography into consideration.

### **Political meetings**

The President of Romania received all parties at the Presidential Palace in Bucharest (31 January) thanking them for their efforts and confirming the Romanian interest in the topics of the seminar.

Issues raised were:

- i) Romanian involvement in the independent Palestinian future nation and assistance in construction plans for Jericho and Gaza.
- ii) Romanian interest in joining the Peace Process through the multilateral talks.
- iii) Romania's special relationship with Turkey.
- iv) The presence of 400,000 Romanians in Israel.

The Romanian President also received Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi at the Presidential Palace (31 January) for a meeting in which the following was discussed:

#### Eastern Europe

- 1) Romania continuing the initiative of the dialogue between the 12 countries.
- 2) Romania encouraging the 6 Central/Eastern European countries to invite ministers to work on changing the image of the Warsaw Pact in a changing world.
- 3) Romania gauging the reactions of London, Bruxelles, Washington and Moscow to this suggestion.
- 4) The Turkish-Romanian relationship should not decline at the expense of developing the future role of the 6 countries, therefore a seminar on Strategy and Security between the Black Sea Association and the 6 countries should be held also involving the 6 Middle Eastern countries. Iraq could join such a seminar in the future. Romania should be allowed to conduct construction projects in the area as an element of compensation for previous Romanian losses in Iraq in terms of equipment and material.

#### The Middle East.

- 1) The missed opportunity for dialogue among the 6 Middle Eastern countries due to the withdrawal of Syria should not affect the determination of any future dialogues; Syria will be continuously invited.
- 2) Romania has a continuous commitment to bring all parties of the Middle East to a better understanding and host more meetings among them. Specific issues such as security, borders, arms, exits, Jerusalem and refugees could be discussed as could joint economic ventures in the Dead Sea.
- 3) This could be achieved in stages, beginning with the 6 Middle Eastern countries, then perhaps Jordan/Israel/Palestine, and then bilaterally with Israel and Syria.

#### Bi-lateral Relations.

- 1) On Romanian-Palestinian relations, the Romanian President emphasised that he had made several invitations to Chairman Arafat and sent a special delegation to Oslo on the eve of the funeral of Jurgen Holst. An official visit has so far been postponed but will hopefully will occur before Ramadan
- 2) Romania has a strong interest in assisting Palestinians in building houses, roads, factories and making priority equipment and material available to the PNA for Gaza and Jericho.
- 3) Exchange programmes at all levels are encouraged with the political/financial support of the EC.
- 4) Romania showed its interest in joining the multilateral talks and would encourage Palestinians to invite Romania and others as participants in the talks on refugees. Programmes of rehabilitation/ training/education and re-housing in the whole region were also mentioned.

### **Meeting with the Foreign Minister**

At the invitation of the Romanian Foreign Minister, Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi met at the Foreign Ministry on 1 February 1994 in the presence of the Foreign Ministry's Undersecretary to follow up on topics discussed with the President on the previous day. Understanding on following points was confirmed:

1. Preparation for a second seminar for the 6 Central/Eastern European and 6 Middle Eastern countries with an emphasis on:
  - a.) Calibre of the participants should be considered and it is wise that they should be close to decision makers and their respective capitals.
  - b.) Romanian envoy to travel to Damascus, Amman, Tunis and Tel Aviv to convey the results of this seminar.
  - c.) Continuous coordination/contact with the Palestinian leadership on these matters.
  
- 2..
  - a.) Preparation for a special seminar on Strategy and Security among the 6 Middle Eastern and the Black Sea Association countries to be held in Romania in the future.
  - b.) Romania will continue to play the facilitator for dialogue among the 6 Middle Eastern countries in Bi/tri/multilateral format and provide all facilities for its success.
  - c.) The Foreign Ministry will delegate a Romanian Ambassador to follow up on contact.

### **WORKING VISIT TWO**

**Date:** November 28th-December 4th 1995.

**Place:** London, UK.

#### **Foreword**

On the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people (29 November 1994), Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA, received various invitations to go to London and to speak on that occasion and in public meetings during the period, November 28-December 4, 1994.

#### **First Day**

On arrival at Heathrow Airport, Dr. Abdul Hadi was received by the PLO mission, followed by a luncheon with the head of the mission, Afif Safieh, during which current developments in the OPT were reviewed. That afternoon, Dr. Abdul Hadi met with Chief Editor Abdul Bari Atwani and other journalists of Al-Quds, Arabic Daily newspaper office in London. Later on, he attended a meeting at the Royal Institute for International Affairs, Chatham House, where Dr. Esmat Akbar al-Mejid, Director General of the Arab League, gave a speech on "Integration in the Arab World and Europe".

In his speech, Dr. Abdel Mejid emphasised his official statement made at the Casablanca conference earlier in the month, in which he pointed out that normalisation with Israel should not proceed while the occupation of Palestine continued. The Arab League

endorses and encourages the peace process but cannot interfere in the policies of individual states on the question of freezing/lifting the boycott policy towards Israel.

Questions addressed to Dr. Abed al-Mejid reflected the audience's interest in:

- The fact that the Palestine question remains the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict;
- Future security in the region (the Gulf countries vis-a-vis the crisis in Yemen; the embargo on Iraq; regional economical cooperation as a base for stability and security);
- assisting the Iraqi people without serving the regime of Saddam Hussein;
- The Jordan-Israel peace treaty and its impact on the course of Syria-Lebanon-Israel relations;
- The divided Arab world and the limited role the Arab league can play.

## **Second Day**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi gave a presentation on "Palestinian Society in the Transitional Phase \* The Gaza/Jericho Experience" at the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU).

Major points raised were:

- a) The Gaza incident on the 18th November.
- b) The performance of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).
- c) Elections and the Israeli position.
- d) PECDAR, future economic development and the role of the donor countries.
- e) Democratisation and incidents of media censorship.

The meeting was followed by a buffet lunch in honour of Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, attended by diplomats and friends of CAABU.

In the afternoon, a meeting took place at the BBC TV studio. The BBC announced that the head of the PNA, Yasser Arafat, and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, will be holding another round of talks in Cairo next week to discuss details of implementation for the 2nd phase of the autonomy agreement. Arafat and Peres met yesterday in Brussels to discuss the issue and encourage donor countries, including the EU, to fulfill their promises for financial support for Palestinians. The BBC asked why the donor countries are reluctant to release the financial support for Palestinians.

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi answered by pointing out that when Ben Gurion formed the first Israeli transitional government in 1948, he was not subjected to the strict conditions and delays which Arafat is being subjected. Washington and Tel Aviv are putting pressure on the PNA to make more concessions during the transitional phase. Foremost among these is the desire that the Islamic Movement be crushed and that the PNA should be less demanding on the conditions for election. Long before the formation of the PNA, the EU would tell Palestinians that agreements could not be signed nor funds transferred since you don't have a government and Europe will deal only with governments. Today the Palestinians have a recognised transitional authority with ministries, and the door is open for negotiation, agreement and transference of financial support for governmental projects and plans. Last year, Palestinians lost \$1 billion of pledged aid simply because the donors claimed there was no address to which it could be sent, no transparency and no accountability for donated funds. The complicated bureaucracy among

Another point discussed by Dr. Abdul Hadi, was the issue of Israel sealing the houses of the families of the three Palestinians accused of kidnapping Israeli soldier Nahshon Wachsman. He pointed out that the Kiryat Arba house of Baruch Goldstein, perpetrator of the Hebron massacre, was untouched and two of the three kidnappers and Wachsman himself were killed as a result of Israeli troops storming the building in which Wachsman was being held.

### Third Day

A luncheon was given at the Four Seasons Hotel and attended by Arab and Palestinian businessmen, among whom were George S. Zakhem (Lebanon; Chairman of Zakhem International Construction Ltd.), Amar Khayyat (Iraq; member of the Arab Thought Forum, Amman), Mr. Shakshir (Palestinian; member of the Welfare Association, Geneva), Basel Adra (Palestinian member of Welfare Association). Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi gave a presentation on "The PNA and Electoral Negotiations". Major points raised concerned:

1. The new banking system in the OPT and attitudes to the Arab, Jordan and Cairo Amman banks. Regarding the PA, represented by the Ministries of Finance and Economy and PECDAR, it was asked if there existed or was likely to be a power struggle or a conflict of interests between them and the Ministry and Planning and International Co-operation.
2. Regarding Arafat's authority and the group assisting him, it was asked if the situation in Lebanon was reflected and if there was a successful adaptation to intifada society.
3. The Palestinian security apparatus, media censorship and human rights.
4. The future of Hebron and the settler issue.
5. The question of Jerusalem.
6. The business community, their activities and associations, how they can be developed, and if there was any possibility of the Lebanese model.

Later in the afternoon, a meeting took place at the Grand Committee Room of House of Commons. The speakers were Lord Gilmour, Mr. Afif Safieh and Dr. Abdul Hadi, who presented a paper entitled "Current Profiles and Possible Scenarios: A Palestinian Perspective".

Among the topics raised were the question of Jerusalem; the future of Palestinians in the state of Israel; the future of settlers and settlements in the OPT; Chairman Arafat's performance in comparison with the Grand Mufti of Palestine during the British Mandate period; the cry of *jihad* in the Arab world; and elections and democratic development.

The PLO office in London, headed by Mr. Afif Safieh, received several calls of support and encouragement after Dr. Abdul Hadi's speech at the House of Commons. The Arabic dailies *al-Hayat* and *al-Quds* wrote reports on his speech, and some quotations appeared in articles in British dailies.

In the evening, a reception was held at CAABU, attended by Arab diplomats.

#### **Fourth Day**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, in place of Ahmad Qreih (Abu A'la), Minister of Economy in the PNA, attended a conference on "Europe and the Arab World: Breaking the Barriers", held at the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre and sponsored jointly by the League of Arab States and CAABU in association with the European Commission. Under the topic "Regional Development in the Arab World: Change in the Levant".

In the afternoon, a meeting took place at the London School of Economics (LSE), hosted by Professor Fred Halliday and attended by students and academics from the LSE. Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi gave a lecture on "Institution Building and Democracy in Palestinian Society".

Later on, Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi addressed - following an invitation from the Student Union of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London - students and academics from SOAS.

#### **Fifth Day**

Dr. Abdul Hadi attended a meeting at the Royal Horse Guards Hotel on "Training and Education in International Affairs". Other participants were Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), Dr. Ahmad Khalidi, Chatham House, and the PASSIA fellows studying at King's College London, Ms. Jumana Abu Zayyad and Hashim Abu Sido.

Later on in the morning, Dr. Abdul Hadi was interviewed by the Chinese Television on the subject "President Arafat and the Nobel Peace Prize".





Since 1987, PASSIA has accepted the responsibility of acting as host to visiting research scholars in a similar way to universities, think tanks and other research organisations.

The first of PASSIA's visiting scholars, for the academic year 1993-94, was **Dr. Hisham H. Ahmad** who completed his year at PASSIA in April 1994. Dr. Ahmad gained his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Santa Barbara, in 1988. Since then he has been a lecturer in this field teaching a variety of courses, ranging from Middle East Politics to Foreign Policy Analysis. Dr. Ahmad was at PASSIA under the auspices of the Fulbright Programme and he spent a productive year doing research on the evolution of the Hamas movement. This study was completed and published by PASSIA, in May 1994.

The second of PASSIA's visiting scholars in 1994, was **Dr. Andrew Rigby**, senior lecturer in Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, West Yorkshire, England. He was actually a returning scholar, having spent time at PASSIA on more than one occasion in the past.

This year, Dr. Rigby stayed at PASSIA throughout September and performed intensive research on the current state of Palestinian education and its prospects for the future under the Palestinian Authority. This research, given the working title of "*Palestinian Education: The Future Challenge*" is currently being considered for inclusion in the PASSIA Research Studies Programme of 1995. Some of the background material contained in this study is taken from "*The Intifada: the Struggle over Education*", previously written by Dr. Rigby and published by PASSIA in July 1989. Another paper written by Dr. Rigby, entitled "*Economic Aspects of the Intifada*", was published by PASSIA in September 1988.

PASSIA hopes to continue providing an academic base in Jerusalem for visiting scholars and researchers. PASSIA also intends to develop exchange programmes whereby Palestinian scholars can have the opportunity to study in the Arab world, Europe or the United States. PASSIA is trying to ensure that this proceeds on a yearly basis.

**I. PASSIA Board of Trustees****Kamal Abdul Fattah**

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## **I. PASSIA Administration**

PASSIA employs all its staff on a contractual basis whether full or part time. The current team handles the execution of all PASSIA projects, with other researchers commissioned for specific duties related to those projects.

### **Mrs. Kainat Dweik Abdul Hadi - 1988-95**

Director of the Administrative Committee; B.A. in Social Work, the American University of Beirut; family social worker for ten years; rehabilitation officer in the Occupied Territories for six years; born and living in Jerusalem.

### **Mrs. Valerie Grove - 1993-95**

Executive Secretary and Editor; B.Sc.(Hons) Sociology, Kingston University, London; lived and worked in Japan from 1986-91; teaching and editorial work at The Japanese School in London before coming to Jerusalem.

### **Mrs. Deniz Altayli - 1993-95**

Researcher; M.A. Sociology (with Economics and Political Sciences), Heidelberg University, Germany; lived and worked in Jerusalem 1993-95; affiliated with PASSIA Research Studies on the Question of Jerusalem, Bibliography on the Palestinian Economy, Publications, Documentation and Library archives.

### **Mrs. Nada Awad - 1990-95**

Secretary, professional Arabic and English typist; tawjihi from Dar Al Fatah Al Laji'a School, Jerusalem 1988; YWCA Secretarial Diploma, Jerusalem, 1989; born in Jerusalem.

### **Mariam Ghosheh - 1992-95**

Administrative Assistant; tawjihi from Ibrahimiyah College, Jerusalem, 1963; B.A. Business Administration, Beirut University, 1968; General Manager of a Jerusalem Pharmacy; advertisement representative for medical companies; freelance advertiser for local and international companies; born and living in Jerusalem.

### **Muhammad Natsheh - 1987-95**

Accountant at PASSIA; registered with Palestinian Accountants Association; Diploma from Beirut University, 1970. Born and living in Jerusalem.

### **Michelle Davis - 1994**

Researcher at PASSIA from January-June 1994; B.A. Islamic Art History, University of California, Davis, 1990; M.A. Modern Arabic Literature, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 1993.

**PASSIA**  
*Palestinian Academic Society*  
*for the Study of International Law*  
*Jerusalem - 1994*

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## **II. Financial Support for PASSIA Projects**

*Each year, PASSIA's Academic Committee prepares proposals for its projects, based on the policy guidelines of the Board of Trustees. Below, we list the 1994 PASSIA projects and the financial support given towards each. PASSIA takes this opportunity to acknowledge with gratitude the contributions of the organisations and institutions mentioned.*

. **Research Studies Programme**

supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, Germany.

. **PASSIA Meetings Programme**

supported by the Canadian Embassy Dialogue Fund, Tel Aviv.

. **Seminar and Fellowship Programme on International Affairs 1994-95**

supported by the Ford Foundation, Cairo.

. **PASSIA Diary 1995**

supported by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, Germany, and the Royal Netherlands Embassy, Tel Aviv.

. **PASSIA Programme on Democracy**

supported by the National Endowment for Democracy via the Foundation for Democracy and Political Change in the Middle East, Washington D.C.

. **Programme on Jerusalem**

financed by income generated from sales of PASSIA publications.

. **Specialist periodicals and library archives**

financed by income generated from local sales of PASSIA publications.

1.	Notes on Palestinian-Israeli Meetings in the Occupied Territories	Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi PASSIA, Jerusalem	A/E	June 1987
2.	Notes on Palestinian German Seminar	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	A/E	Oct. 1987
3.	Federal Republic of Germany, the Palestinians and Middle East	Dr. Helga Baumgarten Free University Berlin, Germany	A/E	Oct. 1988
4.	Modern Arab Literature Translated to German Language	Dr. Stephan Wield Bonn University, Germany	A	Mar. 1988
5.	Swedish Foreign Policy & the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict	Beatrice Zeidler-Blomberg The Swedish Institute of International Affairs	A/E	April 1988
6.	Closing Down the Palestinian Information Office in Washington, D.C.	Maha Issa Shahdeh & Basma Suliman Samman, Bir Zeit Univ.	A	June 1988
7.	The Jordanian Disengagement: Causes and Effects	Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi PASSIA, Jerusalem	A/E	Sept. 1988
8.	Economic Aspects of the Intifada	Dr. Andrew Rigby Bradford University, U.K.	A/E	Sept. 1988
9.	The Historic Evolution of the Armenian Question and the Conflict Over "Nagomo Karabagh" Arstakh	Dr. Manuel Hassassian Bethlehem University	A/E	Dec. 1988
10.	PASSIA Diary 1989	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	E	Dec. 1988
11.	Notes on Palestinian Declaration of Independence	Dr. Jerome Segal Maryland University, USA.	A/E	Febr. 1989
12.	The Nation and the Homeland in the Islamic and Christian Thoughts in the Middle Ages	Dr. Ulrich Haarmann Freiburg University, Germany	A/E	April 1989
13.	Towards a Viable Islamic Economy : Conceptual Approaches in the Eighties in Retrospect	Dr. Dieter Weiss Free University Berlin, Germany	A/E	May 1989
14.	The European Community and the International Conference for Peace in Middle East	Dr. Nayef Abu-Khalaf An-Najah University, Nablus	A/E	May 1989
15.	Economic and Social Conditions During the Intifada	Dr. Hazem Shunnar Nablus	A	May 1989
16.	Israeli Planning and House Demolishing Policy in the West Bank	Rasem Muhyiddin Khameyseh Ramallah	A/E	May 1989

17.	Nahaleen (Information paper)	Ziad Abu Saleh, Hebron	A	May 1989
18.	The Intifada: Causes and Factors of Continuity	Dr. Ziad Abu Amr Bir Zeit University	A/E	Aug. 1989
19.	The Intifada the Struggle Over Education	Dr. Andrew Rigby Bradford University, U.K.	A/E	July 1989
20.	Reflections on American Palestinian Dialogue	Dr. William Quandt The Brooking Institute Washington, D.C., USA.	A/E	Aug. 1989
21.	The Intifada and the Local Press	Mr. Ali Khalili Al-Fajr Newspaper, Jerusalem	A	Sept. 1989
22.	Creating the Palestinian State - a Strategy for Peace ( <i>translated</i> )	Dr. Jerome Segal Maryland University, USA.	A	Sept. 1989
23.	Palestinian-Saudi Relations (1936-1939)	Dr. Taysir Jbara An-Najah University, Nablus	A	Oct. 1989
24.	Islam in the Federal Republic of Germany	Dr. Rotraud Wojtowysch- Wielandt, University of Bamberg, Germany	A	Nov. 1989
25.	PASSIA Diary 1990	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	A/E	Nov. 1989
26.	Studies in Arabic Library	Dr. Mohammad El Nuri & Ali Khalil Hamad, Najah University	A	Jan. 1990
27.	Palestine Factionalism in the National Movement (1919-1939)	Dr. Manuel Hassassian Bethlehem University	E	Febr. 1990
28.	About the French Revolution	Karim Dabbah An-Najah University, Nablus	A	Febr. 1990
29.	Sayyid Qutb: The Emergence of the Islamicist 1939-1950	Dr. Adnan Musallam Bethlehem University	E	April 1990
30.	Najati Sidqi Life and Works (1905-1979)	Ibrahim Abu Hashhash, Hebron	A	May 1990
31.	Transfer of Soviet Jews During "Perestroika"	Dr. Azmi Bishara Bir Zeit University	A	June 1990
32.	Palestinians in Israel and the Intifada	Dr. Muhsen Yousef Bir Zeit University	A	Aug. 1990
33.	The Palestinian Component in Jordan's 1989 Parliamentary Elections	Schirin H. Fathi Germany	A/E	Aug. 1990
34.	The Graffiti of the Intifada	Paul Steinberg & A.M. Oliver USA.	A/E	July 1990
35.	Jerusalem: Effects of Israel's Annexation of Jerusalem on the Rights and Position of it's Arab Population	Osama Halabi Jerusalem	A	Sept. 1990



38. PASSIA Diary 1991	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	A	Nov. 1990
39. Germany: Information Paper	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	A/E	Nov. 1990
40. West Bank & Gaza Information Paper	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	A/E	Dec. 1990
41. The Conflict over Jerusalem: Some Palestinian Responses to Concepts of Dispute Resolution	Cecilia Albin Johns Hopkins University Washington, D.C., USA	A/E	Dec. 1990
42. German Unification & European Unity	Prof. Wolf D. Gruner University of Hamburg, Germany	A/E	Jan. 1991
43. Palestinian Assessments of the Gulf War and its Aftermath	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	A/E	April 1991
44. Introduction to Criminology "A Sociological Study".	Dr. Mahmoud Aqel An-Najah University, Nablus	A	Aug. 1991
45. The Intifada : Struggle between Israeli Occupation and the Palestinians from the Perspectives of Criminology	Dr. Suhail Hassanen Al-Quds University, Jerusalem	A	Sept. 1991
46. The Eighteenth of August Boris "Bonaparte"	Dr. Azmi Bishara Bir Zeit University	A	Nov. 1991
47. Jerusalem & US Foreign Policy	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	A	Dec. 1991
48. Jerusalem & United Nations Resolutions	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	E	Dec. 1991
49. Ibrahim in the Torah, the Bible & the Qur'an	Dr. Abed el Satar Kassim An-Najah University, Nablus	A	Dec. 1991
50. Israel on the Eve of an Election Year	Dr. Naomi Ghazan Truman Research Institute Hebrew University, W. Jerusalem	E	Dec. 1991
51. PASSIA Diary 1992	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	E	Dec. 1991
52. Palestinian Reflections & Opinions	Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Dr. Riad Malki, Dr. Mohammad Jadallah	A	Mar. 1992
53. Conflict Resolutions: Assumptions behind the Approach	J. Kristen Urban University. of Tennessee, USA.	E	Oct. 1992

54. The Islamic Movement in Palestine and the New World Order	Dr. Iyad Barghouthi An-Najah University, Nablus	A	Dec. 1992
55. PASSIA Diary 1993	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	E	Dec. 1992
56. Ein Beit el-Ma' - Palestinian Refugee Camp	Dr. Mohammad Aqel An-Najah University, Nablus	A	Dec. 1992
57. Emerging Trends in Palestinian Strategic Political Thinking and Practice	Dr. Ziad Abu Amr Bir Zeit University	A/E	Dec. 1992
58. Progress & Retrogression in Arab Democratization	Larbi Sadiki Sydney University	E	Dec. 1992
59. Half The People: Women, History and the Palestinian Intifada	Maria Holt CAABU, London	E	Dec. 1992
60. Diplomacy & Protocol: PASSIA Seminar 1992	PASSIA Report Jerusalem	E	Dec. 1992
61. PASSIA Annual Report 1992	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	E	Dec. 1992
62. The Conservation of Jerusalem	Khaled A. Khatib, Jerusalem	E	June 1993
63. The Law of the Land: Settlement and Land Issues under Israeli Military Occupation	Raja Shehadeh Ramallah	E	June 1993
64. The Occupied Palestinian Territory	PASSIA Information Paper	E	July 1993
65. The Australian Press and Palestine	Dr. Henk Overberg Deakin University, Australia	E	July 1993
66. Strategic Studies and Security: PASSIA Seminar 1993.	PASSIA Report, Jerusalem	E	Aug. 1993
67. PASSIA Diary 1994	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	E	Dec 1993
68. The Jerusalem Arab Municipality	Osama Halabi, Jerusalem	A	
69. PASSIA Annual Report 1993	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	E	1994
70. The Palestinian Economy - A Bibliography.	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	A	April 1994
71. Palestinian Refugees.	Najeh Jarrar, Nablus	A	May 1994
72. Dutch Development Policy Towards the Middle East.	Tom de Quaasteniet MERA, Amsterdam	A	May 1994
73. From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: the Rise of Hamas in Palestinian Society.	Dr. Hisham H. Al Jerusalem	E	May 1994

75.	The Declaration of Principles and the Legal System in the West Bank.	Raja Shehadeh. Ramallah	A/E	Sept. 1994
76.	Elections and the Palestinian Political System	Dr. Ali Jarbawi	A	Sept. 1994
77.	The West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Future Political and Administrative Links.	Dr. Khalil Shikaki An-Najah University, Nablus	A	Oct. 1994
78.	Jerusalem: the Palestinian Dynamics of Resistance and Urban Change, 1967-94.	Anne Latendresse Montreal/Jerusalem	A/E	Dec. 1994
79.	PASSIA Diary 1995	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	E	Dec. 1994
80.	PASSIA Annual Report 1994	PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem	E	Mar. 1995

\* A/E = Arabic/English

