

**PASSIA**



***ANNUAL REPORT***

**1992**

**PASSIA**

*Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs*

The logo consists of a central map of Palestine. A horizontal line of small human figures is drawn across the map, with the word "PASSIA" written in bold, black, sans-serif capital letters to the left of the figures. The figures are arranged in a slightly curved line, following the shape of the map.

**PASSIA**

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

This report summarises the activities of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, PASSIA, during 1992. Distribution of previous annual reviews was confined to PASSIA members and consultants. The decision to "go public" was prompted by the increasing local and international interest in PASSIA and by the recognition that PASSIA is now entering its seventh year and has, in a sense, "come of age".

Here we summarise PASSIA's projects of 1992, beginning with a review of the publications released under PASSIA's research studies programme. This is followed by a brief outline of the proceedings of the forty PASSIA Meetings in 1992. We then give an outline of the lectures and discussions which form the basis of two further PASSIA projects. The first concerns the interim arrangement for the transitional phase of the peace process in the Occupied Territories; the second, the city of Jerusalem, its past, present and future.

A major event in PASSIA's calendar for 1992 was a training seminar for Palestinians on the subject of Diplomacy and Protocol. It is the subject of a special publication; we present here an introduction to the aim of the seminar and a summary of the lectures given.

Finally, we mention other central aspects of PASSIA's work: its renowned Desk Diary, and the many conferences and the working visit to Europe in which PASSIA participated during the year. At the end of this report, readers will find additional information on PASSIA's Board of Trustees and Academic Committee, a full list of all PASSIA publications, and details of periodicals available in PASSIA's library.

We hope that this review of PASSIA's 1992 activities will provide the reader with a deeper understanding of PASSIA's activities and objectives, and of its wider role in Palestinian society.

PASSIA was established following a series of meetings of Palestinian political scientists, historians, political economists, philosophers and geographers, who decided that a Palestinian academic society should be formed to promote research and debate on international relations as they affect the Question of Palestine.

PASSIA remains "a Palestinian house" for research and discussion, open to Palestinians from all backgrounds; it is independent, non-profit-making and without affiliation to any political party, government or other organisation.

Since its inception, PASSIA has become the principal forum in the Occupied Territories for dialogue and academic exchange on international affairs. It hosts lectures and discussions with Palestinian, European and American experts on a regular basis. Through this free and open debate, and through research and publication, PASSIA attempts to present aspects of the Palestine Question in its national, Arab and international contexts.

In addition, PASSIA organises and hosts academic programmes to train Palestinians in theoretical and practical aspects of political science and international affairs. In its endeavour to ensure a wider understanding of Palestinian issues, PASSIA consults and coordinates with other Palestinian institutions, both inside and outside the Occupied Territories.

PASSIA strives constantly to increase its effectiveness in establishing a source and reservoir of knowledge in the field of international affairs, and hopes that others may learn from its experience.



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## 2. RESEARCH PAPERS

*Each year since 1987, PASSIA has commissioned a small number of academics to conduct research on issues related to PASSIA's areas of concern. In the past six years, we have published over 50 studies, as listed in the appendix to this report. In 1992, PASSIA's research programme consisted of six papers, the contents of which are summarised below.*

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### *Emerging Trends in Palestinian Strategic Thinking and Practice*

#### **DR. ZIAD ABU AMR**

Focusing on recent changes in political thinking and practice in the Occupied Territories, Abu Amr discerns seven principal trends: from ideological purity to pragmatism; from violent to non-violent forms of struggle; the growing prominence of Islam among political forces; the diminishing status of the PLO; the relative empowerment of the local political leadership; a revival of Jordan's political role; and a retreat from broader social change.

The author concludes that these tendencies are precipitated largely by changing objective conditions at the local, regional and international levels: the shift away from a bipolar international order of power, the isolation of Palestinians after the 1991 Gulf War, the decline of the *intifada*, and the disadvantaged negotiating position of the Palestinians in the Middle East peace talks. In future, the outcome of the peace process will be decisive, as will any attempt by Israel or the PLO to influence future internal political dynamics. Nevertheless, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories still have the capacity to change the course of events, and re-orient, even reverse, at least some of these trends.

Despite its cloak of rhetoric, Palestinian nationalist thinking has tended always to pragmatism. In the late 1950s, the nationalist movement could contemplate limiting its aspirations to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip only. This resignation increased especially after the 1973 war and the Camp David agreement exposed the military weakness of the Palestinians and of Arab states, and deepened further following the PLO's expulsion from Beirut in 1982. This strengthened support in the Occupied Territories for the two-state and bi-national state options, and led to the PLO's 1985

agreement with Jordan on a possible Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. This lowering of aspirations culminated in 1988 with the PLO's recognition of the State of Israel, prompted by calls from Palestinians "inside" for greater realism on the part of the PLO outside when it became apparent that the *intifada* could not force Israel to capitulate on Palestinian national rights nor spur Arab states into action.

Turning to more recent events, Abu Amr explains how these have not only reinforced this pragmatism, but left it as the only option. With the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, increasing U.S. influence and, by implication, support for Israel, the Palestinian leadership is forced to join the scramble for position in the new order. At the same time, consider the repercussions in the Occupied Territories of the Gulf War: the loss of vital remittances from Kuwait and Gulf states' financial support to institutions, and the blow to a collective morale based on hopes of restored Arab potency. Facing the Middle East peace talks from a position of weakness and isolation, the Palestinians participated on Israel's and the U.S.' terms rather than risk being excluded altogether.

This path from idealism to pragmatism has led, Abu Amr argues, to deep confusion in collective thinking. Each step has required a redrawing of the national agenda, a lowering of national sights. Liberation of all Palestine and establishment there of a democratic secular state is a long way from the current possibility of five years of self-rule (excluding East Jerusalem), with only the dim prospect of a state in confederation with Jordan. Autonomy without a guarantee of independence, however, was until recently considered a betrayal. This is one present contradiction. Another is that "we no longer know who our friends are" - the absurdity of activists dying at the hands of the same enemy with whom their colleagues sit at the negotiating table. There is still no consensus on key issues such as renouncing claims to "1948 land" and on continued participation in the peace process. After presenting both sides of the latter debate, Abu Amr cautions Palestinians who reverse previous assumptions to proclaim the U.S. "neutral".

Since the demise of the armed struggle in the 1970s, and particularly since the *intifada*, the use of violent means has been insignificant in comparison to non-violence. Non-violent resistance has flourished in the shape of more open political organisation, national institutions, social services, professional bodies, trades unions and the like. However, as popular participation in the *intifada* has declined as a result of Israeli suppression, failing resources and morale, tactics have become more violent. This counter-trend is fostered by disillusionment with the peace process, and Israeli policy which leaves "wanted" activists with nothing to lose.

Building on their well-developed social and political infrastructure, groups advocating an Islamic solution filled the ideological vacuum created by the nationalists' shift to political pragmatism. With what Abu Amr terms a "liberation theology" of *jihad*, they also attracted those who continued to support the use of violence after the nationalists renounced it. While distinguishing the situation in the Occupied Territories from that in Jordan and in Algeria, Abu Amr acknowledges that the Islamic movement is gaining ground, reflecting the regional trend. He points to the observance of strikes called by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the increasing use of Islamic references in nationalist statements, and the rising tension between nationalist and Islamic groupings. However, despite much speculation, the actual level of popular support for the Islamic movement cannot be determined without free general elections. The future balance of

power depends on the performance of each side relative to public expectations. How far will the public look for fulfillment of the stated Islamic goals, short-term (ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza) or long-term (an Islamic state in all Palestine), given that regional Islamic forces will provide no more than moral and financial support?

Both material and ideological factors have led to the PLO's losing its hallowed status. First, there is its inability to realise the goals of the nationalist programme, even as these became less ambitious. The PLO also failed adequately to address the problems of the majority of the population under occupation, and, in the face of growing poverty, could not maintain the level of financial support to the Occupied Territories after the Gulf war. Already bearing a tarnished public image as (at best) decadent, the PLO leadership could not fill the vacuum of authority left by popular rejection of Israel, and, latterly, acceptance of unjust terms in the peace talks led to a lack of faith in its political wisdom. Furthermore, in a period of general uncertainty, the public reacted against the lack of consensus among PLO factions. Intolerance and conflict grew, majority groups ignored criticism and failed adequately to tackle factionalism and the killing of alleged collaborators, and party interests were seen to take precedence over those of the national struggle. Public confidence was reduced further by party splits and internal disarray, purely pragmatic alliances, and the sudden abandonment of ideologies. There were increasing differences between leaders and supporters and between "inside" and "outside" over basic issues. Meanwhile, the Islamic movement emerged as a credible alternative with a coherent ideology and programme. Apart from any merits of its own, being the opposition, it gained by default from the perceived failures of the nationalists. Abu Amr concludes that in order to restore their support, the PLO and its constituent factions may have to undergo structural change.

Not only has the Palestinian leadership in exile undergone a process of "demystification", but increasingly it has sought the opinion of leaders in the Occupied Territories in order to legitimise its decisions. The empowerment of the "inside" vis-a-vis the "outside" began with the loss of Beirut, which left no base for struggle in the states surrounding Israel. As the Occupied Territories took over as the principal locus of struggle, their mobilisation in creating national institutions brought the population of the Occupied Territories to centre stage, eclipsing exiled combatants and politicians. In directing the *intifada*, the "inside" took the initiative. Most recently, the exclusion of the PLO and diaspora Palestinians from direct participation in the peace talks reinforced the role of the leadership "inside", and ironically, the proposed autonomy may satisfy their frustrated political ambitions.

Reconciling themselves to the substantial role for Jordan demanded by the terms of the peace process, Palestinians are now attempting to fashion this into the most acceptable form. Thus we see a rapprochement between the Jordanian leadership and the PLO and each PLO faction (with official visits, public statements and so on), the re-emergence of pro-Jordanian political figures, and a general public warming towards closer ties to Jordan.

Changes to the traditional Palestinian social order, prompted in the 1960s and '70s by the national struggle, accelerated significantly during the *intifada*. Even then, due to the general instability and the lack of an overall strategy for social development, social change remained a by-product of nationalist struggle, and has regressed with the faltering of the latter. Due both to their own failings and to Israeli repression, PLO



groupings have not become competent civil authorities; thus people preserve patriarchal relations and clan loyalties. Women have played a marginal role in creating social change, due to the nationalist priorities of women's organisations.

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### *Progress and Retrogression in Arab Democratisation*

#### **LARBI SADIKI**

"If one is to equate elections with democratisation, then the Arab world is indeed on the right track," begins Sadiki in his exploration of the reality behind the rising chorus of democratisation, pluralism and legitimacy in the Arab world. Defining "democratisation" as a higher order of substantive reform, Sadiki prefers instead the term "liberalisation" for the increase in recent years of elections, legalisation of political parties and constitutional reform.

In the 1980s, other Arab countries followed Egypt's lead, dating from Sadat's liberalisation initiatives of the 1970s. In economic terms, liberalisation takes the form of incentives to the local and foreign private sectors, at the expense of public investment. Elections are the process's political cornerstone. However, aside from questions of their fairness, they have failed to strike at centralised power and the traditional routes to positions of authority which preclude genuine popular political participation. Despite this, the long list of elections in Arab countries since the mid-1980s, combined with the growing incidence of constitutional reform and legalisation of political parties, gives hope for widespread democratisation in the not too distant future.

After reviewing these positive developments, Sadiki discusses in detail the negative, retrogressive aspects of these changes, illustrating each point with examples from throughout the Arab world. Algeria and Sudan have recently terminated their democratic experiments, as did Libya and Egypt in the past. In Morocco, liberalisation, always subject to rulers' whims, is now obstructed by the postponement of elections. Tunisia and Egypt, despite good appearances, hold poor records on human rights, election irregularities, and democratic separation of powers. Kuwait's leadership is stalling on political freedom. Saudi Arabia appears to be trying to prevent democratisation in Yemen. Any change in Iraq and Syria is cosmetic. Jordan is the one example of incipient democracy, and, if far from perfect, is at least a good compromise with tradition.

Sadiki uses two models to analyse retrogression in the democratisation process. The *reversal* model is most applicable to the situation where the overthrow of a regime halts elections and returns a country to direct rule. Libya, for example, witnessed electoral democracy from 1952 until 1969; the experiences of Sudan and Algeria also fit this model. In other cases, one can apply a *zig-zag* model, of alternate trends in democratic progress and regress. Between 1963 and 1992, Kuwait had elections on average every five years, but between these, three prolonged periods of direct rule. Morocco had several elections between 1963 and 1984, but with intermittent suppression of electoral activity and dissolution of the legislature.

Depending on its level of confidence, in retreat from reform a regime may

employ various mechanisms. Without the liberal state's separation of legislative, executive, judicial and military powers, these retrogressive tendencies are exacerbated. Sadiki identifies five main techniques. *Scapegoating* discredits domestic opposition through propaganda, blames neighbouring regimes for supporting subversion and treachery, and, at the international level, joins in the growing anti-Islam hysteria or alleges Western interference in domestic affairs.

Arab regimes use *tokenism*, its gestures and gimmicks, to win time on the promise of further concessions. *Co-optation*, commonly effected by giving opposition politicians ministerial posts or making "new deals", divides opposition movements and assists legitimation. Regimes employ *disinformation* to justify clamping down on their foes, win support and alienate supporters of their opponents (for example, the Tunisian government's exaggerated description of an attempted Islamic coup both diverted public attention from the dire economic situation and helped discredit the Islamic opposition).

*Repression* comes in degrees. Arab authoritarian regimes differ only in the scale of brutality, in their tolerance of certain formal freedoms, and in their preferred targets, in terms of class, gender, religion, ideology, ethnicity, and so on. Where the pace of democratic reform is controlled by a repressive regime, we should not be optimistic, argues Sadiki, after a survey of the evidence of coercion and human rights violations, particularly in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. The "soft" face of repression is the rejection of political pluralism. Of particular concern is the escalating violence resulting from intolerance of Islamic groups. Although they use the separation of religion and politics as justification for excluding Islamists from the political process, Arab regimes simultaneously cultivate "establishment Islam" to their own advantage. Ruling elites also use the weapon of exclusion against women and ethnic and religious minorities who seek political recognition.

Liberalisation, Sadiki concludes, has not brought an end to repression or harassment of opposition, nor installed the rule of law, nor ended the monopoly of ruling elites who steer the "democratic" process to keep in check threats to their hegemony and ensure that elections preserve the status quo. This "lack of depth or permanence" of democratic gains suggests that retrogression is inherent in these liberalisation initiatives.

Nevertheless, Sadiki is optimistic that the struggle for democracy in the Arab world will continue.

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### *Half the People: Women, History and the Palestinian Intifada*

**MARIA HOLT**

How have women's participation in the *intifada* and other influences, internal and external to Palestinian society, affected their position? Drawing on, and thus making available to the reader, a wide range of academic and mass media sources, Holt sets out to answer a series of pertinent questions about the progress, real and perceived, that women in Palestine have made. Throughout, she stresses the individuality and various opinions of women, seeking to present the diversity of aspirations and to locate them

in the context of the nationalist, feminist and Islamic perspectives, reminding us that only a minority have the luxury of choice between these.

There is a need to make sense of two opposing assertions. According to some Palestinian women, their position continues to improve, and what is shameful is determined today not by traditional social norms but by nationalist standards. Others maintain that it is deteriorating: notions of women's "natural" role have altered among only a minority; in the absence of other civil authority, people still turn to traditional figures who neither educate women about their rights under religious law nor dispel their fear of exercising them; and women are increasingly inhibited by lack of success, the priority of mere survival, and fundamentalist intimidation.

Women's tasks in the national struggle, in Palestine and the diaspora, although varying according to class, education, and urban/rural location, have differed consistently from those of men. Recent research has investigated historical changes in education, work and activism among women, and the social and charitable societies which were the main vehicle for collective activity. During the Mandate, intensified Zionist colonisation spurred women to enter the public political domain. Significant events include the founding of the Palestine Women's Union, the first Palestine Arab Women's Congress, and the 1936-39 revolt against British rule and Zionist entrenchment. Although tradition forced women to limit their activism in order to preserve regional and class solidarity, the greater politicisation which accompanied the revolt helped prepare the way for later activism.

It is a matter of debate to what extent the nature of women's organising changed between 1948 and 1967. After 1948, women augmented their charitable work, effectively fulfilling the role of state services, but nationalism attracted a few into new areas: opposition politics in frontline states, even armed struggle. Still, only a minority joined any formal organisation. Even the formation in the mid-60s of the nationalist General Union of Palestinian Women failed to challenge the primacy of traditional and charitable work which not only reinforced gender roles but also class divisions between women.

Holt highlights several themes which connect past and present; first, public versus private domains (it was and is permissible for women to stand up to attackers who cross into private space). Second, traditional beliefs about women's "honour" still determine the potentially conflicting duties of a woman to family, community and nation (many families fled in 1948 apparently in order to protect women's "honour"; today, despite rhetoric to the contrary, it is doubtful how far national honour does prevail over the patriarchal seclusion of women which ensures familial honour).

Looking to the present and beyond the Palestinian context to countries such as Algeria and Iran, we observe that liberation struggles by no means guarantee women's rights, and may relegate women to traditional roles as soon as victory is achieved. Are Palestinian women sufficiently aware of the dangers? These are particularly acute because in the Occupied Territories most women, while active, are not *organised*.

After 1967, the Israeli occupation provoked a sudden increase in women's activism and consciousness. However, in the *intifada*'s second phase of reduced popular mobilisation, it declined. Causes can be identified in the limitations of the popular women's committees formed in the 1980s. Among other sources, of particular interest here are the proceedings of two conferences held in Jerusalem in 1990 and 1992, where women discussed their role in the *intifada* and the democratic contribution of women's

organisations. Holt identifies two central issues. First, how undemocratic working has prevented the articulation of a national women's agenda. Activists have channelled spontaneous revolt into formal organisation, which tends to exclude all but a minority of women. Being distinguished by their distinct approaches to national rather than gender questions, committees give priority to party interests and exclude the politically independent.

Second, committees' activities, based as they are on traditional occupations, while successful in bringing women out of the home, still do not challenge the gender-based division of labour. Together, factionalism, and the lack of an overall social programme, have combined in a failure to tackle patriarchal family structures and the lack of participation in political decision-making. Thus the tension remains unresolved between nationalist objectives and those of social change.

However, responsibility lies also with external factors: the overall decline of democratic activity, the rise of religious groups, and increased hardship and violence under which conditions a separate women's agenda is seen as divisive.

Work is one area where opinions differ on women's achievements. Much depends on how we define "progress" and the importance we attach to statistics showing rising levels of education and employment. Recent research suggests that the pre-eminence of the national question during the uprising has served further to obscure the scale of women's domestic work and to reinforce traditional gender roles.

After reviewing the reasons advanced for the increased popularity of political Islamic groups in the Occupied Territories, Holt examines the links between the Islamic-nationalist antagonism and women's oppression. For many, Islam offers an alternative vision to secular nationalism which, among its other failings, precipitated social "disintegration" by raising women's expectations. Islamic groups promote a clear version of modesty for women and measure their support by adherence to dress codes. For some observers, the proliferation of Islamic dress is indicative of the failure of nationalists to confront women's oppression.

If Palestinian society is "disintegrating", others contend, this is a consequence not of secularism, but of Israel's manipulation of Palestinian patriarchal values. Like the Islamic movement, Israel uses familial "honour" ideology to control women and undermine nationalist allegiances. Recent research exposes Israeli treatment of Palestinian women detainees, which includes sexual blackmail. Women's experience of Israeli occupation in their homes and streets is also notably gender-specific - their anxiety at the threat of intruding soldiers violating private domestic space; their typical strategies of confrontation: protecting others, non-violent protest, alternative economic activity and services - although women are not excepted from Israeli violence, imposed individually or through collective punishments.

Israeli women working for justice for Palestinians are the other side of Palestinian women's experience of Israelis. Their path to mutual understanding has been uneven, but is encouraging, as are other developments such as recent portrayals of Palestinian women in Israeli films. Palestinian women have combined their struggle for equality and an openness to the attractions of modernity with developing authentically Palestinian creative expression. This takes both traditional and modern forms (embroidery and political poetry are good examples) besides the informal manifestations which fall outside a rigid definition of culture as art.

Paradoxes and contradictions are everywhere evident: the nationalist movement

has increased women's participation in political life but passed them the responsibility for the essential cultural task of preserving national identity. Men determine the nature and extent of women's involvement in the national movement by defining what is socially acceptable. While they may support women's participation, ultimately they will seek to preserve male privilege; hence the absence of support for women's rights in the nationalist leadership.

Women are doubly bound: caught between resisting subordination and preserving cultural values which include their subordination; caught between the full participation of women which the revolt against occupation requires and attempting to keep within the bounds of social acceptability.

The author concludes that although it improved in the early stages of the *intifada*, the position of women in the Occupied Territories is now under threat. Nevertheless, Palestinian women have struggled too hard for too long to give up what they have gained.

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### *Ein Beit Elma Refugee Camp: A Sociological Study*

**DR. MAHMOUD AQEL**

The words "refugee", "dispossessed", "stateless" and "refugee camp" have been closely associated with the Palestine Question for nearly half a century. One of the 63 Palestinian refugee camps throughout the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, Ein Beit Elma is situated on the western edge of the West Bank city of Nablus. The study begins with a discussion of the phenomena of forced migration. Factors which lead to forced migration include ethnic, religious and political persecution and discrimination. A recent U.N. report refers to 14 million refugees worldwide, who are denied basic human rights and who represent a global tragedy and a test of international ethics.

From this introduction, the study proceeds to discuss the causes and consequences of the uprooting of Palestinians from their land and homes. Among the consequences is that a large proportion of the population have become adjusted to the abnormal situation of life in camps. Their primary source of income was the land, which now has been lost. Families and *hamoula* (clans) are scattered, the social order destroyed, political identity absent. Palestinian refugees live in an unstable socio-economic and political situation unique in human experience. They have become outcasts, psychologically and socially, as a result of the 1948 Catastrophe.

Because of its isolated location in the northern West Bank, Ein Beit Elma, unlike other camps, lacks financial and social stability and its inhabitants feel great insecurity for the immediate and long-term future.

After a detailed examination of conditions in Ein Beit Elma in terms of health, economy, education and social indicators, the study turns to the more direct effects of occupation. Throughout the *intifada*, the Israeli authorities have practised killings, imprisonment, deportations, curfews, house demolitions and other measures among the residents of this as of other camps.

Finally, the author discusses the development of Palestinian identity and the

meaning of "belonging" in the camp. Both the concept of being an outsider, and the struggle for realisation of the right to return, combine in the Palestinian mind to produce a particular sense of belonging. This concept of belonging is not an extremist political ideology, nor a peculiar Palestinian vanity. Rather, it is a means by which Palestinians resist attempts to demolish their national identity.

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### *The Palestinian Islamic Movement and the New World Order*

#### **DR. IYAD BARGHOUTI**

This study commences with a review of the history of political Islamic groups in Palestine, from the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940s, the Islamic Liberation Party and Islamic Jihad, to Hamas. It examines the objectives, ideology, methods and political development of each between 1948 and 1967 and since 1967, including relations with the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes and with secular groups.

Significantly, the advent of Hamas signalled a qualitative change in the ideology and outlook of the Muslim Brotherhood as regards nationalist issues.

Turning to today's Palestinian Islamic movement, the study notes the increasing prominence of the Islamic movement since the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Increased politicisation has led to intensified nationalist activities by the Islamic movement. Relations between the Islamic and nationalist movements are discussed in the context of the New World Order, as are those of each group with the PLO, and specifically with Fatah. In particular, the entry of the Muslim Brotherhood into the nationalist arena through the establishment of Hamas intensified competition with Fatah. Although the nationalists always invited the Brotherhood to take part in nationalist activities, they then found themselves faced with strong competition.

Results of elections in various institutions in the Occupied Territories in the last year are examined as representative of the respective power of the Islamists and nationalists. However, the trend is not unidirectional: Islamists made progress in the West Bank, while nationalists gained in the Gaza Strip.

How is the "new world order" viewed by Islamic groups? Their usual reaction is critical, based on the general impression that the primary aim of the new order is to defeat Islam, although some seek not so much the demise or reversal of the new order as its reform.

Towards the Gulf War, the Iraqi regime and the invasion of Kuwait, each group's attitude depends on its own circumstances and ideology. Hamas's position is influenced by that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and by links, especially financial, between religious institutions in the Occupied Territories and the Gulf States. The Islamic Liberation Party supports Islamic unity from an ideological point of view; to that extent, it supported the invasion of Kuwait, although it is against Saddam Hussein because he is not an Islamic *khalifa*. Islamic Jihad opposes Saddam and opposed the occupation of Kuwait as a diversion from the central issue of the Palestine problem; it is oriented to Iran, which it considers the base of Islamic revolution.

The author proceeds to discuss the new Arab political order, the positions of

Palesinian Islamists in relation to the experience of Arab states such as Sudan, Algeria, and Tunisia, and changes in the wider Islamic world, especially the expectations of the new Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union and the problems of Bosnia and Afghanistan. Finally, the study explores the attitudes of Islamists to the current peace process and how relations between Islamists and the mainstream and left-wing groups have developed against the background of Madrid.

In conclusion, the study maintains that the future of the Palestinian Islamic movement depends to a large extent of progress in relation to the national question. If the current peace talks bring results, the Islamic movement will wane; if not, it will prosper.

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### *Dialogue of Three Writers*

One of PASSIA's initiatives in its endeavour to promote and develop public dialogue among Palestinians from different ideological and political backgrounds, was a series of stimulating articles in the local press.

During January and February 1992, Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi of PASSIA, Dr. Mohammad Jadallah, Chair of the Union of Health Care Committees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Dr. Riad Malki, of the Panorama Centre for the Dissemination of Alternative Information, contributed weekly articles to *Al Fajr* newspaper. Each wrote a separate piece on an agreed common topic, with the three contributions printed alongside each other. The six topics covered were:

- *Between the Bilaterals in Washington and the Multilaterals in Moscow;*
- *Moscow: What Next?;*
- *Municipal Councils and Elections;*
- *Whither Development?;*
- *Palestinians and Democracy;* and
- *The Fourth Round of Washington Talks.*

In March 1992, PASSIA reproduced the collected articles as a 200-page joint PASSIA-Panorama publication, *Palestinian Reflections and Opinions*, of which over 1,000 copies were distributed.

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### 3. PASSIA MEETINGS

#### INTRODUCTION

The year 1992 witnessed eight rounds of bilateral Middle East peace talks, and multilateral talks on refugees, held in Canada. Israeli negotiators proved extremely stubborn on the subject of U.N. Resolution 242 and the status of Jerusalem. Palestinians anticipated the results of Israeli and U.S. elections with a mixture of hope and despair. Many believed that a change in the Israeli government would mean a greater chance for peace, but, as the year progressed, it became apparent that Prime Minister Rabin's Labour government would conduct business no differently than did Likud. Few Palestinians expected any change in U.S. foreign policy, even with a new President. For Palestinians, Bill Clinton fits the same mould as George Bush.

The year ended with Israel's ruthless expulsion of 413 Palestinians, alleged supporters of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, an act which affected nearly 5,000 dependents, put a halt to the peace negotiations, and absorbed the attention of the Palestinian people, who realised the significance of Israeli and international decisions regarding the deportees for their collective future.

While most Palestinians here and abroad focused on the negotiations, PASSIA also increased its attention to the peace process. During the year, we held over 40 lectures and round-table discussions, many of which were concerned with various aspects of the peace process.

We present here a summary of the proceedings of the majority of PASSIA's meetings during 1992, prefaced by a comment on participation.

During the coming year, 1993, we shall proceed with discussions on the fate of the peace process and its various aspects. We hope our efforts will continue to reflect diverse Palestinian opinions on this and other issues in a responsible and thoughtful manner.

We will also expand our round-table academic and political discussions to a wider variety of topics, of interest to all those concerned with the question of Palestine.



## PARTICIPANTS

Speakers and participants from a wide variety of academic and professional backgrounds attended PASSIA meetings in 1992; from officials of the American Consulate in East Jerusalem, to the National Leadership of the Socialist International in Paris, to Israeli and American Jews who contributed to the depth and interest of the discussions with their insights and perspectives. A number of PASSIA's international guests who had visited previously returned to continue dialogue on a number of topics in the framework of the Palestinian question.

From the Palestinian side, we attempted, as usual, to include among the regular seminar participants staff of the major Palestinian universities, Bir Zeit, a-Najah, Bethlehem and Hebron. Due to the continued travel restrictions, it was impossible to include academics from the Gaza Strip on a regular basis. Apart from this limitation, and although there were military area closures and curfews in the Occupied Territories throughout the year, the situation was far less problematic than during and immediately after the Gulf War and meetings could be held with minimal trouble.

Also contributing to our intellectual enrichment were people from research centres, human rights centres, cultural institutes, and the media. PASSIA recognises that it must make an increased effort to include more women in order to share their expertise and knowledge.

As has always been our practice, we have continued our contact with a number of institutions abroad. This year we were happy to welcome again representatives of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Brookings Institute. In these particular sessions, the focus was on the peace process in general and the roles of the European Community and the United States in particular, with the guests providing all those who participated with particularly crucial insights.

Several representatives of the Canadian government visited PASSIA during 1992. Since Ottawa hosted the multilateral talks on refugees, there has been increased interest on the part of the Canadians in the questions of refugees and the peace process. Canadian foreign policy was also of great interest to our local participants.

We also held several meetings with visitors from a number of well-known institutions, such as the International Labour Organisation, the University of Paris, the Lutheran World Federation, and the Washington Institute, and with groups including parliamentarians from Sweden, Germany and other countries. These visits reflected growing international interest in the Palestinian question since the start of the peace process in Madrid, particularly since the sixth round of negotiations and the U.S. elections.

Once again, we hosted round-table discussions with Israelis from the Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University. Our first meeting of the year was with U.S.-based academics specialising in Africa who visited PASSIA under the auspices of the Institute. Meetings were also held with Peace Now, Mapam, individual Israeli peace activists and academics, and with visitors to the Anti-Defamation League in Jerusalem concerning the peace process; not surprisingly, opinions offered at the meetings were sometimes conflicting.

In general, our meetings have proceeded smoothly with an open and candid

exchange of ideas. Inevitably, a few have been somewhat tense due to the diverse perspectives of our participants. Nevertheless, we are proud that we have been able to arrange these meetings and are confident that they were productive and informative.

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## SUMMARY OF MEETINGS

One of the first meetings of the year was with representatives of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung of Germany, with which PASSIA maintains close relations. Dr. Wolfgang Lutherbach and Dr. Peter Hunsler discussed the peace process with local Palestinians from various ideological and professional backgrounds. In the discussion, Palestinians in attendance explained the continuing harsh effects of occupation, and stressed the need for international protection and pressure on Israel. They also stressed the need to develop cooperation with Europe. Dr. Lutherbach observed that although Germany's primary concern is with its unification and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, nonetheless, its interest in the Middle East had not diminished. Dr. Riad Malki and Dr. Mohammad Jadallah expressed their skepticism regarding the peace process. Dr. Jadallah maintained that the Palestinians are not dealt with as a unity with basic national rights, and are offered only a vague notion of autonomy for people, not for the land. In conclusion, Dr. Abdul Hadi said that the new world order is still being shaped and that the Palestinians have a role to play in influencing the balance of power.

A more general discussion was held on the same topic with members of the Lutheran World Federation. In this meeting, Dr. Abdul Hadi presented the guests with a summary of the Palestinian situation with reference to the peace process and the *intifada*. He pointed out that the first 20 years of struggle against Israeli occupation had not succeeded in changing the status quo, and that Palestinians who were born under occupation often feel that they have no future. Thus the *intifada* represents an attempt to change the status quo by those who feel they have nothing to lose. He went on to explain that the peace process is testament to the Palestinian commitment to the struggle for realisation of their rights, and to the spirit of peace and cooperation with which they have pursued this.

Later in the spring, PASSIA hosted a delegation from the Canadian government, composed of deputy Ministers of several provinces. Dr. Abdul Hadi and Mr. Hanna Siniora presented the Palestinian perspective. They explained that, having agreed to a two-state solution, Palestinians are still restricted in choosing their own representatives. Furthermore, Israel has continued with confiscation of land, colonisation of the Occupied Territories and collective punishments. Despite this, the Palestinians have entered the negotiations with a commitment to peace and justice such as has not been displayed by Israel.

Students from the United States studying at Tel Aviv University also participated in a meeting concerning the peace process and the *intifada*. In a general presentation, Dr. Abdul Hadi outlined the roots of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the background to the *intifada*, and the Palestinian position on a solution based on two states living in peace and security, with Jerusalem as capital for both Palestinians and Israelis.

A more in-depth discussion was on the *intifada* and the peace process was held with a delegation including representatives Mssrs. Linden and Schroder of the German

Foreign Ministry. In this discussion, Dr. Abdul Hadi emphasised the necessity of detaching the Palestinian economy from the Israeli economy and promoting self-reliance. Regarding the peace talks, the German guests brought up the question of timing: the longer the talks take, they noted, the more the Palestinians lose in terms of land confiscation, settlement construction and Arab consensus.

In an unprecedented move, the Anti-Defamation League of Jerusalem asked PASSIA to meet with a visiting American-Jewish group from New Jersey. On behalf of PASSIA, Dr. Abdul Hadi and Dr. Bernard Sabella met the delegation and discussed issues such as the Palestinian-Israeli talks in Madrid, Washington and Moscow, and reactions to Mr. Baker's visit to the region in the context of the peace process.

One of the most interesting meetings on the subject of the peace process was an introductory meeting at which Dr. Camille Mansour of the University of Paris presented his views on conflict resolution. Dr. Mansour made the point that, "There should be a clear distinction between solving a problem and solving the conflict." There is always the question of balance of power. In conflict resolution, one seeks to accommodate peoples' concerns, such as identity and security. In this situation, the first of these lies with the Palestinians and the second with the Israelis. Discussion focused on the experience of the Palestinian negotiators during the peace talks.

Soon after his first presentation, Dr. Mansour addressed another meeting at PASSIA, in which he dealt with the United States' concern for a settlement and for stability in the Middle East. Among the issues raised was that of the Israel-Syria talks, which Dr. Mansour believed Israel would use to put pressure on the Palestinians, while Syria too might place obstacles in the way of progress on the Palestinian question. Dr. Mansour observed that the Palestinians entered negotiations without any certainty as to whether they would bring results. Israel agreeing to a transitional self-governing authority is itself an achievement, although it has its price in the concessions Palestinians have to make.

A related discussion was that following a presentation by Dr. Kristen Urban of the University of Tennessee, author of our publication *Conflict Resolution: Assumptions Behind the Approach*. In her talk, Dr. Urban covered a wide range of points, including the observation that, in the past, the Palestinians have not known how to "play the game" and considered only the message, not the messenger. With the appearance of Hanan Ashrawi, people began to listen. Dr. Urban also pointed out that the Israelis are trying to discredit and divide the Palestinians, to show the world that they are not capable of running their own affairs, similar to the strategy used in South Africa. The *intifada* forced the media to focus on the issue of Palestine, but it was not a war against Israel, rather it was a rebellion by the younger generation against old values and the status quo, maintained Dr. Urban. Now the demands of the middle class must be addressed.

Changes in the global balance of power, the shift towards the priority of economic competition and the regionalisation of security considerations were major themes of the presentation by Dr. Anoushiravan Ehteshami of Exeter University. Participants discussed European and U.S. interests and the possibilities for Israeli regional integration. Regional security and the peace process were also addressed by Ambassador Richard Fairbanks and Dr. Robert Hunter of Washington in a later meeting.

A stimulating presentation made by Larbi Sadiqi, a doctoral candidate at Sydney

University, concerning democracy and its challenges and prospects provoked strong responses from participants. His presentation concentrated on Algeria, Tunisia (his native country) and the Gulf Crisis, arguing that poor political and economic development in the Arab world is largely due to a lack of democracy. Dr. Abdul Hadi responded with the suggestion that "guided democracy", such as that used by Jordan, may be necessary for the Palestinians in order to avoid chaos as they build their own democracy. Moreover, Palestinians should not reject Western models and mechanisms of democracy. During the discussion, Dr. Ziad Abdeen asked what are the necessary ingredients for democratic change in the Arab world, and what is the role of Islam. Dr. Adel Samara strongly condemned what he saw as flimsy charades of democracy: Neither the Palestine National Council (PNC) nor the Jordanian regime could be considered democratic. Another participant, Martin Plaut, pointed out that in the case of South Africa, the return of the outside leadership has been difficult, and asked how Palestinians define democracy, and how they are constructing it. Democracy begins with active opposition, he noted.

Earlier in the year, PASSIA held a seminar on Algeria's crisis of democracy. In attendance were members of the Academic Committee, members of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks and other activists. Comparisons were made between Algeria and Jordan and between the Algerian Peoples Liberation Front and the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Democracy, its nature and its relevance in the Palestinian context was addressed by Dr. Riad Malki at a discussion later in the year.

In 1992, the Israeli elections were anticipated as an opportunity for significant change. In May, PASSIA hosted a meeting on the Israeli elections with Israeli representatives from the Truman Research Institute. Dr. Bernard Sabella of PASSIA argued that in the end, even with a change of government, there would be no major difference in what is offered in terms of autonomy and interim arrangements. On a more optimistic note, Dr. Sabella stated that Europe and the world in general are strong enough eventually to modify Israel's position in the peace negotiations and on final arrangements. Dr. Sa'id Zeedani presented, in a detailed manner, the ideological commitments and points of departure of both the Labour and Likud parties. Only since Labour won the elections have Palestinians been able to see that the two parties are more alike than they previously thought. Dr. Zeedani agreed with opponents of the peace negotiations in that under present circumstances, establishment of an independent Palestinian state is unlikely. Some Israeli participants challenged the Palestinian participants' perception of the static nature of Israeli politics. Professor Naomi Chazan of the Truman Institute stated that indeed there was a great desire for change in Israel.

Another very informative meeting was held after the Israeli elections, with many Palestinian scholars and members of the Palestinian delegation participating. At the outset, Dr. Abdul Hadi presented what he believed to be the three schools of Palestinian thought concerning the results of the Israeli elections: Labour's success already means Palestinian freedom and independence; the Palestinians will face external pressure to conform to Rabin's agenda; there is no essential difference between Labour and Likud. Participants proceeded to a comprehensive discussion of the prospects for the peace process and the interim arrangement. Points raised included the need for the Palestinians to reassess their position and reformulate their strategy; the importance of Palestinian unity; public opinion on the peace process and the possibility of a

referendum; the lack of coordination between Palestinian groups inside and outside; the absence of change in the Israeli position on future Palestinian autonomy after the elections; Labour policy and Palestinians readiness to negotiate with Labour. One suggestion was that the Palestinian document on Confidence Building Measures be submitted to the new government.

Just after the U.S. presidential elections, PASSIA was host to Dr. William Quandt of The Brookings Institute in Washington D.C., who spoke on the presidential elections and his own interpretation of Bill Clinton's character, ambitions and statements in light of the nature of the U.S. presidency. Dr. Quandt looked in detail at what Clinton's attitude may be towards the Middle East. He was optimistic that as a "hands-on" president, Clinton may want to find a solution to the Palestine question. Quandt also stressed that although Clinton received 83 percent of the Jewish vote, AIPAC does not have the power it once did. Palestinians should "strike while the iron is hot", choose an issue and lobby for it; they should work out a clear agenda and be ready to present it.

Reports on the multilateral talks in Ottawa, Canada were overshadowed in the local press by the impending Israeli elections and anticipation as to the outcome of the U.S. elections. In June, however, Mr. M. J. Molloy, Adviser to the Middle East Refugee Working Group Coordinating Body, informed local participants at a PASSIA meeting of the results of the multilateral talks. Most importantly, he remarked, there was consensus that the process must continue, but with the inclusion of important parties such as Syria, Lebanon and Israel.

Following this briefing, two workshops were held on the question of Palestinian refugees. In the first, participants traced the history of the refugees in detail and debated the definition of a refugee. On whether the solution of the refugee issue is tied to the solution of the Palestine question in general, a number of opinions were given but no consensus reached. Dr. Salim Tamari of Bir Zeit University opened the second meeting with a summary of the proceedings of the Ottawa talks. During the talks, the central issue was to prevent any delegation from dealing with the refugees as a humanitarian question rather than a political one. There was a consensus to use U.N. Resolution 194 as a political basis. Many participants felt, however, that it would have been more appropriate to deal with the issue of refugees in the bilateral talks rather than in the multilaterals, and this became the topic of much discussion and of disagreement.

Canada's role in the peace process, including the talks on refugees, and its policies towards the Palestinians were the main themes of the meeting held in September addressed by H.E. Norman Spector, the Canadian Ambassador.

Not to be forgotten when speaking of the Palestinians is the issue of human rights. It was the theme of a meeting held with a delegation of visiting Members of Parliament from Sweden accompanied by the Swedish Consul General in Jerusalem, H.E. Mikael Dahl. The meeting was attended by a number of Palestinian activists and human rights workers, both Israeli and Arab. Dr. Jan Abu Shakra of the Palestinian Human Rights Information Centre explained that all types of human rights abuses still continue in the Occupied Territories despite the peace process. To compound the problem, her organisation's field workers are obstructed in collecting the necessary documentation, making it very difficult to demonstrate the need for international protection. Regarding abuses inside the Green Line, there were considerable differences of opinion. Israelis from the human rights groups B'Tselem and the Hotline for Defence



of the Individual, argued that Israeli law provides as well for Palestinians inside Israel as it does for Israeli Jews. This was contested by other participants, indicative of the different perspectives from which Palestinian and Israeli groups work.

One of the more controversial PASSIA meetings was held at the request of the Truman Research Institute. One of the two Israeli presenters, Ifrah Zilberman, speaking on the history of radical Islam, sought to link it to the Palestinian national movement, both of the the 1930's and of the present. Palestinian participants responded critically to some of Zilberman's ideas. Shaul Cohen gave the second presentation, a critical view of Israeli planning in the context of the "demographic war". Palestinian participants observed that the policies outlined by Cohen amount to "internal transfer".

When representatives of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) visited PASSIA, discussion covered the factors affecting labour conditions in the Occupied Territories. The ILO came with a specific agenda which included the effects of settlement and the immigration of Soviet Jews. To start the meeting, Dr. Abdul Hadi described the effects of the Gulf War on Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and in the diaspora, and the various positions on the peace process. Jobs and labour were no longer at the top of the Palestinian agenda, he said, although only 19 percent of Arab workers were now employed in Israel. Regarding the effects of Soviet immigration, Dr. Abdul Hadi stressed that Palestinians in Israel were also losing jobs. He repeated the concern of Palestinians, raised in several meetings during the year, as to what form self-government will take. He explained the causes of the weakening of the United National Leadership of the Uprising, including discord within the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the arrest of hundreds of alleged members of the Popular Front. Israel has also created problems for Islamic groups such as Hamas, despite not interfering with these groups in the past. Discussion then turned to E.C. policy on assistance to the Occupied Territories.

Although the European Community has long contributed to various small development projects in the Occupied Territories, 1992 was the first year that it made a sizeable contribution. In March, another meeting was held with guests from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (F.E.S.). Professor Hermann Buenz, responsible for liason between the F.E.S. and the E.C., outlined E.C. policy on the Occupied Territories and presented the F.E.S.'s plan for a Palestinian-Israeli workshop on regional policy. There was some discussion among the participants on the subject of sending delegates to go to Brussels to learn more about the E.C. Dr. Peter Hunsler explained that the E.C. wanted a greater role in the peace process, as the Palestinians had requested, and informed the meeting that the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung would be willing to facilitate contact between Palestinians and the E.C. Mr. Buenz also addressed a meeting later in the year on the subject of the E.C. and the Maastricht Treaty.

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#### 4. DISCUSSIONS ON THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT

*Each year, PASSIA establishes an eight-member committee to conduct a three to six-month programme of discussion on a topic of immediate concern to Palestinians. In 1991, academics and activists met regularly to discuss Palestinian perspectives on the Gulf War. Each committee member presented a paper on a different aspect of the subject, and PASSIA has since published the collected papers in Arabic and English.*

*In 1992, PASSIA's discussion programme focussed on the interim arrangement, facilitating dialogue on the subject between all factions, regardless of their attitude to the peace process. This exchange served as a constant point of reference for Palestinian representatives in the peace process, several of whom were regular participants. In addition to the regular core participants, others were invited to particular sessions, representing different factions and including members of and advisors to the Palestinian delegation.*

*Below we summarise the presentations made at each of the ten sessions on the interim arrangement held between January and June 1992.*

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14 January 1992

*Autonomy and the Road to Independence*

Speaker: **Mohammad Nayrab**

There are various possible definitions of autonomy, embracing, in particular, the distinction between personal and territorial autonomy. With reference to the Occupied Territories, we have witnessed two approaches. Egypt proposes territorial autonomy, excluding, in the interim period, control over external security and foreign relations. Israel's approach is that of Begin's 1977 plan which speaks only of personal autonomy. One can compose a scheme of the similarities and differences between the two approaches, in terms of elections, administrative and legislative bodies, personal versus territorial autonomy, powers of legislation and security arrangements. Information about various examples of and aspects of autonomy should be made available for public discussion.



21 January 1992  
*The Camp David Accords*  
**Open Discussion**

The Camp David accords on autonomy were formulated and agreed upon without Palestinian input. Moreover, today's situation in terms of political thinking concerning the region differs from that of 1978. Palestinian aspirations remain the national goal of freedom and independence, which the concepts "self-rule" and "autonomy" do not satisfy: to equate autonomy with national authority is deceptive. Although the PLO's position in 1978 on the Camp David agreement represented, at the time, a consensus of Palestinian opinion, there are today new interpretations of the Accords, and there is no longer a consensus.

During the seminar the following reference materials were distributed:  
Sobel, Lester A. (ed.) *Peacemaking in the Middle East*; Joseph Weiler *Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State*; Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler *Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada*; Mayer Gabay *Legal Aspects of the Camp David Framework for Peace in Relation to the Autonomy Proposals*; Yoram Dinstein (ed.) *Models of Autonomy*; Ruth Lapidot *The Camp David Process and the New U.S. Plan for the Middle East: A Legal Analysis*; Moshe Drori *Autonomy in Judea, Samaria and Gaza: Legal Aspects of Its Implementation*; Daniel J. Elazar *Autonomy, Some Considerations*.

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28 January 1992  
*Follow-up to Sessions One and Two*  
**Open Discussion**

There is both optimism and pessimism regarding future scenarios under the interim arrangement and alternatives to it. There are two ways of presenting the issues, either focusing on the Occupied Territories and the development and future of the *intifada*, or on the relations between Palestinians inside and outside and regional and global developments.

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11 February 1992  
*Negotiations: Where To?*  
Speaker: **Ali Jirbawi**

The impetus behind entering negotiations governs the subsequent process and outcome of negotiations. Three circumstances face us: the U.S. agenda as revealed after the Gulf War; the as yet uncrystallised new global order following the break-up of the Soviet Union; and the domination of one superpower and its effect on international relations. During the war, the linkage demanded by Saddam Hussein, that the Palestine question is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and demands a solution, was achieved, if paradoxically. In the early days of the war, the Palestinians were placed in the position

of the accused, opposed to the coalition's position in all respects. We faced, from the U.S., Europe, and Arab states, attempts to place the PLO and the Palestinian people under siege. From within our own ranks, voices called on us to acknowledge our weakness and to do penance for our wrongs. This perception of our impotence on the part of some was reflected in a newspaper article written by a member of the delegation in February, which stated that the Palestinian decision to join the negotiations was based on a weighing of the disadvantages of going against those of not going. This acknowledgement of weakness affected our work both strategically and organisationally. In terms of strategy, we are powerless. We cannot impose our solution; the basis of the negotiations is Israel's terms, not ours, and we depend on the U.S. agenda to assist us. Our conditions for negotiations, such as a halt to settlement activity, became the substance of negotiations: as if the decrease in the number of settlement housing units built were a victory.

I maintain that the negotiations are leading us towards autonomy on Israeli terms. We are caught in a cycle of self-deception. The situation is this: James Baker tamed both Palestinians and Arab states. Coordination between us and Arab states is non-existent. We failed to involve the population in the peace process. Our delegation says that its strength or weakness comes from Tunis; for example, although it advised Tunis against attending the Moscow round, when Tunis ordered us to go, we went.

*Comment by Ghassan al-Khatib*

Our achievements were ones of form not substance. We brought ourselves out of isolation, lifted popular morale, and succeeded in improving the image of Palestinians in the media. We avoided the potential losses of non-participation. Clearly, the Israelis are deliberately wasting time to prevent any substantial progress while creating new facts by continuing settlement. They put ever-increasing pressure on Palestinian society and question the credibility of the delegation and the PLO leadership. Moreover, the Israelis are trying to promote contacts through municipal councils, personalities in the education and health fields, and economists and businessmen (who have met collectively with Moshe Arens). I see Israel's interest in encouraging and reinforcing the importance of the multilaterals. In this phase our tasks are as follows: to continue participation as a matter of principle; to develop tactics to overcome Israeli delays, for example an agreement with the sponsors on timetables for discussion; to make it a condition for proceeding that Israel stop settlement activity and that continuation of multilateral talks be dependent on progress in bilaterals; to close all contacts with the occupying power, which undermine the role of the delegation; and to initiate national debate between those who participate in and endorse the peace process and those who oppose it. The negotiating programme should form a base of national unity and we should develop a national charter. The question is how to address the above in a situation of crisis in Palestinian decision-making where there are no political decision-making bodies and vital meetings go unrecorded.

18 February

*Negotiations: Where To?*

Speaker: **Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi**

In order objectively to analyse to where the negotiations are leading, we should evaluate our progress through this "dark tunnel" on the following levels.

*Phase of negotiations*

Negotiations started immediately after the Gulf War and continue with no clear time limit. The agenda was clear from James Baker's first meetings in Jerusalem. It is important to review the written and oral memoranda of that time, the various opinions in Jerusalem and Tunis and the impact of forming the delegation and going to Madrid. We were considered the vanquished party in a state of siege and the consensus was to escape from that state. We should recall who influenced the decision to attend and who opposed it, and their respective impact on the community.

*Negotiators*

Other parties to the negotiations formed delegations of technical experts and consultants. Employed by their governments, they were expected to carry out instructions, with no significant gap between their capitals' decisions and judgement and understanding at their end. In our case, we require negotiators from three categories: representatives of a national movement, representatives of a political leadership (the PLO), and employees or supporters. The gap between these groups, their priorities, interests and visions, and between inside and outside, has become steadily wider. However, we have started a painful process of self-criticism, not only on the question of the delegation, its composition and duties, but on our political agenda.

*Substance of negotiations*

In the beginning, Baker's statements and Bush's speech to Congress of 6 March 1991 constituted the U.S. formula: land for peace and implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338. Israel's agenda was based on the old autonomy plan of Begin, plus normalisation of relations with the Arab world. Our terms centred on an independent Palestinian state. Without an agenda for a transitional period, we faced the "two tracks" equipped with tactics but no strategy.

*Influences on negotiations*

Currently, we are confronted by the Israeli "iron fist" policy, and their attempts to drown us in a sea of daily preoccupations, on top of the incessant difficulties facing our people during the *intifada*. Add to this our present position in the Arab world, and I believe we face a real crisis. One further problem is the Palestinian disease of "the chief". We see this title attached to most members of our delegation and its spokespersons: the "head" of the delegation, of the advisors, the "chief" of the technical committees, of the coordinating body, and so on.

*Issues on the Palestinian agenda*

Previously, our position was based on a two-state solution. We are talking now about a transitional period wherein we move from a state of occupation to an "interim arrangement". Israel terms it personal autonomy under Israeli sovereignty. The U.S. calls it "self-rule" with a division of territory and sovereignty. The Arab scenario is dual citizenship (Jordanian-Palestinian) as a step towards a confederation. We in the Occupied Territories see the transitional period as a temporary phase during which we exercise national authority to lead us to freedom and independence in the future state. The problem is to find common elements in these scenarios and to convince Palestinians that a transitional phase will not jeopardise our principles or national aspirations.

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17 March 1992

*Changes in the Formation of the Local Palestinian Leadership*

Speaker: **Samir Huleileh**

We must consider the factors affecting the local Palestinian leadership, and the leadership's relation to the people; from these we can assess the overall role of the local leadership.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was fundamental to the weakening of the mainstream Fatah, its military role and its presence in Lebanon and elsewhere; in addition, the split led by Abu Mousa in 1983 weakened Fatah, its internal and external relations. Other organisations, particularly the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) suffered as a result of the invasion of Lebanon and the absence of effective military response. The main beneficiary was the Communist Party, the leadership of which was based in the Occupied Territories, close to the people. In the early 1980s, the Islamic movement, notably Hamas, began to organise in the Occupied Territories, particularly in institutions of higher education, but not, apart from a limited role in Jordan, in the diaspora. Its emerging presence in the community weakened other groups, especially Fatah.

Another destructive influence was the split within the DFLP during the *intifada*. Its internal strife, Israel's arrest of many members, and the divided groups' lack of direction have reduced their weight and credibility within the leadership, with detrimental consequences for leadership itself. A major blow to the Communist Party was the decline of the left and Communist parties worldwide, especially the fall of the Soviet bloc. The Communists were the first Palestinian left-wing group to face the crisis, having addressed the problem in a conference four years ago, and froze mass organising while preoccupied with internal matters and ideological differences. This brought them to the same crippled state as the DFLP. Although affected by the crisis, the PFLP did not witness the same degree of conflict in its leadership and remained relatively coherent. However, Israel's arrest of PFLP activists damaged its standing on the streets. Certainly, the ideological crisis which has engulfed others on the left will reach the PFLP sooner or later, but with less effect.

Organisational structure varies between factions, and the factors affecting inside-outside relations vary accordingly. Concerning the relationship between factions in

decisionmaking within the PLO, before 1982-83 there was an agreed fixed quota arrangement which assigned the majority of votes to Fatah, with the rest distributed between other factions and independents. In some places, such as Kuwait, a faction with only four or five members would still receive its set quota. Change to this quota formula came with the formation of the Unified National Leadership, an innovation which succeeded simply because of peoples' zeal and unity in facing occupation and entering a new chapter of struggle, the *intifada*.

Nevertheless, the new model, which gave each faction equal representation and financial support, faced difficulties. Was it fair for each faction to have equal financial backing, regardless of its weight in the community? Fatah, the faction most affected, opposed equal representation and demanded a return to the old quota system. Another difficulty arose on the question of consensus: some said that the new system was undemocratic. A third problem was the geographic centralisation of the local leadership. Although at the beginning of the *intifada*, the young leadership were spread throughout the West Bank and Gaza, in 1988-89 Israel deported and arrested many of this network of activists. In addition, resistance to occupation took a new form, with less concentration on the grassroots and more on Jerusalem-based diplomacy and media activity and the work of independent groups of professionals.

Independents outside the Jerusalem area became active and influential partly in response to this centralisation. Evidence of this was the result of the Ramallah Chamber of Commerce elections. A general state of disillusionment reinforced the position of independents and of Hamas, while weakening that of the leadership.

The coming period will witness rivalry between factions and dissatisfaction among members, especially in Fatah, of the way their respective leaderships take decisions. Faisal Husseini's role in this phase is similar to that of Yasser Arafat: simultaneously leading a revolution, and a PLO institution, and Fatah. We should also note the issue of relations between inside and outside, and their differences on the question of leadership.

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24 March 1992

*The Intifada Today*

Speaker: **Salim Tamari**

Writings on the *intifada* are one thing, and the reality something else. Most publications today portray the positive aspects of the *intifada*; virtual advertisements, they fail to deal with the problematic issues. Social upheaval has affected all classes in society, although it has been exaggerated by comparisons to the Cuban and Chinese revolutions. Now the tide of popular revolution has ebbed, leaving the government of the uprising's routine agenda, such as general strikes.

My concern here is to focus on the role of youth in society. By staying away from home and school for prolonged periods in order to exercise new positions of authority in the street, young people have weakened their relationships with families and teachers and loosened their moral ties. We see a lack of discipline in the education system. Students have lost interest in reading, discussing and understanding. Self-discipline at school, at work and in the street is lost. Such youthful tendencies to independence from the family are not only a result of the uprising. Other factors include working outwith

the family farm or business; emigration; the liberalisation of education in the early 1960s and the entry of all social classes to university; greater recognition of young people's right to independence; and changing marriage customs.

There have been changes in the numbers and type of young people involved in the *intifada*. More youth were involved and thereby gained greater independence in the early years. It became acceptable for young people to stay away from home and school in order to challenge the occupying forces. Another realm conquered by youth was family marriage arrangements. Families, in order to prevent them from being arrested, began to marry girls off as early as possible; thus the average age of marriage for girls dropped in 1988-89. At the same time appeared new phenomena, the cancelling of marriage celebrations, and an increase in birth rates across classes.

Thus the youth rebellion has posed, first, a challenge to the traditional values of the education system and, second, a challenge to discipline which has shaken the very foundations of the family. Parents and teachers were the first to be affected by the upheaval. They could not provide better alternatives, especially in the state of siege after the Gulf war. The interest on the part of some in directing this rebellion towards a political programme based on the peace initiative led to a breakdown of the post-1988 consensus. Consensus based on a programme of challenging occupation could not endure factional divisions and the uncontrolled rebellion in most areas of life. In addition, Islamic groups mobilised the population, providing a more reassuring vision based on the religious notions which form part of people's subconscious.

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March 31, 1992

*Israeli and Palestinian Perspectives on Interim and Final Political Arrangements*

Speaker: Sa'id Zeedani

The transition period has become part of any Israeli, Palestinian or Arab vision of the final resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Since the start of the negotiations, perhaps since Camp David, there has been no possibility to bypass the transitional stage. Apart from that of the Palestinians, most perspectives on the final outcome are tending towards what can be called a Palestinian "semi-state" under Jordanian auspices (the banner of confederation), under Israeli auspices, or under both.

We must understand the relationship between Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories and those in the diaspora against the background of their different interests and their disparate visions of the transition period and final position. I believe that the main losers in the transition period will be the diaspora leadership and people. Under any leadership, Israel is interested in reaching an agreement on the transition period, despite the diverse ideas about its form and its relation to a final resolution. Palestinians who object to the peace process are justified in the opinion that because of the conditions on which it is based, it is unlikely to lead to an independent Palestinian state. However, they are unable to provide an alternative or to interpret the hidden agenda of geopolitical considerations in the short, medium and long-term.

#### *Labour's position*

Stripped of the frills of its left wing, the Israeli Labour party maintains a consensus on

the following: the continuation of military occupation is too costly, morally unacceptable, and internationally embarrassing; an independent Palestinian state west of the River Jordan threatens Israeli security; annexation of the Occupied Territories is a threat to Israel's democracy and Jewish majority. A final arrangement entails more than autonomy, but less than a sovereign state (that is, a semi-independent state). It cannot happen without Jordan's participation, nor without territorial compromise, which might lead to conflict within Israeli society, even to civil war led by extremist settlers.

Therefore, if it wins the election, it is highly unlikely that Labour will act according to the wishes of its left wing. On the question of Palestinian representation, the Labour party is less sensitive than Likud. This is clear from public statements regarding participation in the talks by Jerusalem Palestinians, deportees and PLO members. Labour is more flexible in its definition of the transition period, accepting a wider authority for Palestinians, similar perhaps to Egypt's vision of autonomy. If Labour comes to power, it may, if the current negotiations falter, implement autonomy unilaterally, probably starting in Gaza.

#### *Likud's position*

Likud's mainstream agrees on the following: sovereignty over the "Land of Israel" west of the river is exclusive to Israel; foreign sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza is a denial of the historical rights of the Israeli people; Jordan is practically a Palestinian state, and there need be no other west of the river; the continued occupation is embarrassing internationally but constitutes a domestic dispute; interim and final solutions are identical, the final one being personal autonomy under Israeli sovereignty, but with political rights in Jordan.

U.S. diplomacy (and we should not be fooled into believing that it is a position of empathy with the Palestinians) seeks to shift Likud towards the Labour viewpoint on the transitional and final solutions. The strength of the U.S. stance lies in its interference in domestic Israeli debate, not by imposing a position from outside but by supporting stances already developed within Israel.

#### *The Israeli Left and Right*

Better termed a peace camp than a "left", because it has little connection with left-wing ideology, this coalition supports the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, even if that means an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. However, this support comes with the following conditions: agreement on Jerusalem's status as a unified city; meeting the demands of Israeli security; assuring peace with Arab neighbours; a Palestinian compromise on the right to return; and finding an acceptable arrangement for settlements and settlers.

Extreme right-wing parties demand sovereignty over the "Land of Israel" as an exclusive right of the Israeli people; formal annexation of the Occupied Territories; Palestinian residents may have religious and civil rights only, with no share in sovereignty over the land, and must accept Israeli rule and sovereignty without Jordanian participation. Those who do not accept this must leave.

#### *The Palestinian position*

In short, the Palestinian position insists on establishment of an independent state in co-existence with Israel (some accept a confederation with Jordan either prior to or after

independence); no separation between agreeing on a transitional stage and consideration of the final resolution; and the PLO remaining an active partner in both interim and final arrangements.

We must ask, in all honesty and objectivity, what interest the PLO and diaspora Palestinians have in the transition period. Clearly, both leadership and people "inside" have an interest in the transition stage and find it attractive, under certain conditions, despite their awareness of the dangers it presents for broader national objectives. Of course, there is considerable external encouragement from the U.S., Europe, Arab states and, to an extent, Israel. On the other hand, Palestinians and their leadership in the diaspora are suspicious of the transition proposals, have no interest in them, and fear that events will proceed out of their control as soon as implementation begins. Although the leadership inside cannot proceed to the transition stage without the legitimation of PLO blessing and guidance, nor can the diaspora obstruct the process, because the consequences might be devastating for the already besieged PLO. Although the U.S. has no interest in severing the ties between inside and outside, autonomy may give the inside leadership an independent legitimacy. Unless restructured, the relationship with the diaspora leadership may enter a crisis; the PLO will require an assurance that its key role will continue, through cooperation with Jordan or a return to an effective role in Arab politics.

In conclusion, there is widespread Israeli, Arab and international agreement to concentrate on the transition period. From this phase there can now be no escape, regardless of when and whether talks succeed. Apart from Likud's objections, there is consensus that the transition period will involve an end to military occupation. Jordan, Europe, the U.S., some Arab countries, and Israel all understand that a "semi-state", something less than an independent state but more than autonomy, will be effected. A sovereign state is absent from view when one looks forward through the period of negotiations and transition. Success or failure in the national project to establish an independent state on national land depends, not on the continuation of the *intifada*, but on the unpredictable events to come in the Arab/Islamic world. Those who believe that regional developments give cause for optimism ought therefore to oppose the current process, which makes no promise of an independent state.

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7 April 1992

*The 1992 Israeli Elections and the Future of the Peace Process*

Speaker: **Bernard Sabella**

Regarding the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the transition period, the basic positions of Labour and Likud are as follows. Likud recognizes no sovereignty but Israeli sovereignty. All aspects of the temporary and final solutions are to be identical. Since Likud separates people from land, and denies the exercise of Palestinian political rights, it is willing to normalise relations with Jordan to allow Palestinians limited involvement in Jordanian political affairs. Since the West Bank and Gaza Strip are to be under Israeli sovereignty, fundamentals of communal life, notably planning, security and natural resources, are to be controlled directly by the Israeli government.

Although not seeking Israeli sovereignty over the Occupied Territories, Labour is



concerned that the land of Israel should not house a binational state, and will not give up Israeli supervision of what it terms "security" nor Israeli control of natural resources. It is more sensitive to Palestinian political demands, in reciprocal measure to Palestinian sensitivity to Israeli interests regarding security and resources. Accordingly, the transitional period will be an experiment: will the two parties prove reciprocally responsive?

Labour does not want Israel to be inhabited by an additional two million Palestinians, nor does it want a Palestinian state. It regards autonomy, with administrative arrangements between Israel and Jordan, as a framework which will not contradict Labour's vision for Israel. Autonomy, as an interim arrangement, should incorporate all the elements and mechanisms of the final arrangement.

According to Labour, the prospect for Palestinians is control over all aspects of life, independent of Israel, but coordinating with Israel on matters of security, natural resources and borders. It includes the possibilities of an official political link with Jordan in order to develop Palestinian political institutions under a Jordanian umbrella, and of economic relations with Israel.

Labour thus proposes an option which it hopes will end the political conflict while guaranteeing a continuing dominant role for Israel.

What can we read into the possible results of the election? Israel's negotiating position will not change fundamentally, whoever wins. In the event of a Likud victory, emphasis will be on what has already been presented in Washington regarding how Palestinians are to administer their daily lives, with no possibility of the communal institutions required to exercise their political rights. If Labour win, we should not expect dramatic changes in the negotiations. Rabin will present the same obstacles as Shamir, if not worse. However, he will not sabotage the negotiations. His vision is of an interim agreement wherein he can guarantee Israeli interests at the same time as offloading the burden of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. If a coalition forms including both main parties, the Likud vision will dominate. The Israeli proposals will not change much in substance. Neither party will accept officially the PLO as a negotiating partner. At different stages, each would be ready to see the PLO participate indirectly, and there is the possibility of Labour meeting the PLO.

We have no interest in backing Labour or Likud, but should set our priorities according to how we see the results of the elections in Israel and the U.S.. We should be prepared for whoever is elected, and must be open to the Arab world and develop mechanisms to help put the Palestinian house in order. We must translate words into action for unity.

5 May 1992

*Israel, the U.S., the Palestinians and the Dead End Option*

Speaker: George Giacaman

The peace process will create a particular political situation, regardless of the Palestinian conception of a solution. Palestinian proposals for PISGA, whether accepted in full or part, will be the basis for the interim arrangement. The final arrangement will lead to three things: normalisation of Arab-Israeli relations; legitimisation of the Jewish state on the land of Palestine; and continuation of the Israeli position as a strategic ally of the U.S. with its interests linked to U.S. interests in the region.

In my opinion, the questions of normalisation and legitimation are the only cards left in the hands of the Arab and Palestinian negotiators.

There is a school of thought, thus: "If Arab-Israeli normalisation is achieved inside and outside and Israel is legitimised through officially recognized dealings with the Palestinians, the West will consider the conflict over, leave it aside and turn to domestic and other international matters." Another states that Likud might offer the Palestinians a very attractive deal, which will be difficult to refuse or bargain over; Likud will continue to present itself to Israeli electorate as the party capable of retaining the whole "Land of Israel" without giving anything away in return for peace. Likud will

continue to improve its chances in the 1996 election, by which time this generation of leaders will have passed.

These two schools represent a path to the "dead end" option. Palestinians are aware of these ideas, therefore the multilaterals will not lead to normalisation of relations with Israel before the gaining of minimum Palestinian rights in both bilateral and multilateral talks. In a divided Arab world, can we achieve this? Some Arab states talk of revenge against the Palestinians. Others consider the PLO an enemy. If we close the door on the current process, we might succeed if not in freezing, then in delaying the normalisation of relations with, and legitimisation of, Israel.



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## 5. THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM

*That over the status of Jerusalem is often cited as the most sensitive and emotive of the regional conflicts. While discussion in the current peace process as to the Holy City's future is denied at Israel's insistence, Palestinians in the illegally-annexed city continue to suffer the daily abuse of occupation. Besides the emotional significance of the city to its inhabitants and to millions of others, Jerusalem is of geographic, strategic and economic importance by virtue of its position at the heart of the Occupied Palestinian Territories.*

*Since its establishment, PASSIA has regularly hosted workshops and discussions on the Question of Jerusalem, and since 1990 has published four research studies on the subject. Early in 1992, PASSIA initiated a programme of roundtable sessions to which academics and members of institutions were invited in their personal capacity to give presentations and stimulate discussion on various aspects of the question of Jerusalem.*

*Behind the programme was the aim to exchange information, to identify interests and needs in the city, and to encourage academic endeavours to develop possible future scenarios. Each presentation made is summarized below. Topics for future discussion in the programme include the Old City of Jerusalem, infrastructure, demography, "absentee property", settlements, human rights, Israeli institutions, and future scenarios for the status of the city.*

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### *The Political Geography of Jerusalem: Demographic-Territorial Aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*

**Shaul Cohen**

16 June 1992

Since 1967, Israeli emphasis has been on maintaining a clear demographic majority in the city. In fact, the issue of numerical dominance dates from last century, at least in Zionist polemic.

Not only is a Jewish majority deemed essential, but so too is a population balance of approximately 75% Jews to 25% Palestinians, intended by Israel to quash notions of a redivision of the city. During the years of occupation since 1967, Israeli construction of housing for Jews in East Jerusalem has had territorial and strategic

considerations at heart. These dictated the location of the new Municipal boundary, which aimed to include strategic sites and room for growth, while excluding concentrations of Arab population wherever possible. Within the newly acquired area, two immediate goals motivating construction for Jews were the creation of a physical link between West Jerusalem and Mount Scopus and preventing the redivision of the city by eliminating the sectoral segregation that had existed between 1948 and 1967.

The 1968 Masterplan for Jerusalem envisioned expansion in three phases. The first was construction to tie the city across the former no-man's-land and eliminate the physical barriers which had divided the city. The second was to encircle the immediate periphery of the city. Finally, a belt of outlying settlements would provide greater control over the wider Jerusalem region.

To facilitate Jewish population of East Jerusalem, orders for land expropriation in 1967-68 allowed for construction to forge a link from the older Jewish neighbourhoods to Mount Scopus and, further out, in the area of Neve Ya'acov. A larger expropriation came in 1970, increasing the size of Neve Ya'acov and providing land for the satellite settlements of Gilo, East Talpiot, and Ramot, each of which had a particular territorial function. Largely completed by the mid-1980s, these comprise the bulk of the secondary belt around the city's core. They house over 100,000 people and allow a much broader distribution of the city's population. While these serve as pillars of a ring around the city centre, there is much to be done to fill the gaps between them. Part of this is underway, notably in the settlement of Pisgat Ze'ev, which links Neve Ya'acov in the north to French Hill, and where the Municipality and Housing Ministry have invested most of their effort in recent years.

Although construction is the most common method of preventing expansion by an adversary, or at least ensuring one's own control of land, it can be employed only up to a point if spatial separation is to be maintained. Thus there is commonly open space between Arab and Jewish neighbourhoods. Green areas are essential in new or expanding settlements. While bordering Jewish areas, these also border Arab areas. They limit the growth of the community, whether Arab or Jewish, but are more often used to check Arab growth; there are several examples.

Throughout the Municipal area, the Israeli goal, official or unofficial, is to check Arab expansion, whether by settlements, forests, roads, industrial areas or simply by restrictive zoning.

Despite this, it seems that the Arab sector is matching or even exceeding the pace of Jewish population growth. However, in absolute terms, Jewish growth has outpaced Arab growth in the last decade, while the gap between birth rates has decreased. Despite its declining birth rate, the Arab population of Jerusalem has increased by over 200% since 1967. If there is a housing crisis, how can the Arab population continue to grow? The question is highly politicised. It is often suggested that housing shortage or no, Palestinian residents of the West Bank are flocking into Jerusalem. Most Arab building, in contrast to Jewish construction, is not planned in a formal sense, nor sponsored by government. Research indicates that Arabs too employ building as a tactic to block the expansion of their adversary; dwellings are constructed in advance of need in order to prevent Israeli encroachment.

Illegal Arab construction has become sufficiently controversial to attract much media attention. In 1990, the Municipality noted an increase of 300% in illegal building in the Arab sector, linked to the delay in providing new housing in a supervised and

approved manner. The outline plan for the Shufat/Beit Hanina area was originally to have allowed the construction of 18,000 units; this was cut to 11,000 then to 7,500 in its current form by the Interior Ministry and other national bodies who feared an erosion in the Jewish demographic superiority and increased illegal Palestinian immigration to the city. Palestinians claim that 50,000 Jerusalem residents have had to leave the city because of a lack of housing, while Israel estimates vary from 10,000 to over 50,000 Palestinians residing illegally within the municipal area. Whatever the balance, the plan has come too late and is too small to seriously affect the issue of illegal construction.

Since 1967, the prohibition on in-migration from the West Bank has contributed to the rapid growth of Palestinian towns surrounding the Municipal boundary. With the simultaneous growth of Israeli settlements around Jerusalem, land which had seemed unimportant took on increasing significance. Israel prevents Palestinian land use in a wide variety of circumstances, such as through "special outline plans" for villages. These create a "blue line": within which permits will be granted, but none will be granted outside the line. Many villagers have land only outside the development zone. No provision is made for public purposes. Blue lines are drawn in accordance with "regional considerations", that is, Israeli interests.

Palestinians report an acute housing shortage in villages. As a result, villagers are compelled to leave, adding to pressure on the rental markets in Ramallah, Bethlehem and other areas. A portion of those who cannot build in the village go abroad, and a common Palestinian perception is that this is the intended goal of planning policy. During the *intifada*, the administration has made it even harder to obtain building permits, there has been an increase in illegal construction, and in demolition of illegal buildings.

Afforestation as a tactic for control of land has been employed by Zionists for 80 years. Since 1982, over 30 square kilometers have been planted in and around East Jerusalem.

Except for small plots, all land around Jerusalem is "tied up" in one way or another. This only means more fierce competition for what remains. Barring political developments against such a course, the third belt of Jewish housing both in and outside the Municipal boundary will soon be completed. It is on the remaining open land within that area that the struggle for control of Jerusalem continues to be waged. Clearly, Israel has the advantage.

Consequences will include the radical alteration of the Jerusalem landscape, problems of urban sprawl, the destruction of village character and traditional Palestinian residential patterns, and social problems of slum conditions in both Arab and Jewish sectors. Government policies, driven by demographic considerations based to a significant degree on an area much wider than the city and its immediate surroundings, are ensuring a Jewish majority.

*Planning and the Boundaries of Jerusalem*  
**Khalil Tufakji**, Arab Studies Society  
18 June 1992

There have been several attempts to develop municipal plans for the city. Here I will focus on the current phase of planning under Israeli occupation. The first official plan drawn up by Israel dates from 1968, one year after the occupation, partially ammended in 1976. The objective of plan AM9 is to reduce Arab presence in the city. The first of the settlement belts around the city extends from Ramot Eshkol and French Hill to the Hebrew University. The second is made up of Neve Ya'acov, Pisgat Ze'ev and Pisgat Omer on the land of Anata village. Currently, a new settlement is being built, Rekhesh Shufat, on land confiscated in 1976 and designated a "green" area. We must realise that the use of "green" space is a strategy for future settlement, to link existing settlements to each other. Examples of Israeli road projects include the Road 9, which encircles the city; Road 21, which links Pisgat Ze'ev and Pisgat Omer, while dividing Shufat and Beit Hanina; and Road 4, which links settlements in the Ramallah area with the centre of Jerusalem and crosses the land of Beit Safafa, dividing it in two; Road 1 will connect East and West Jerusalem, obliterating the Green (armistice) Line of 1967.

The Israeli authorities attempt to erase the Green Line and to confiscate Arab villages' land. By this, they are forming the first "canton" in the Ramallah area as part of a policy to divide the West Bank into "cantons".

Another method of land confiscation is the imposition of high property taxes. A house owner is not granted a permit to build on their land, but taxes continue to rise, and the owner is forced to sell the land in order to pay the tax.

Islamic *waqf* land in Sheikh Jarrah has not escaped confiscation. The *waqf* of Hijazi, Abed Rabbo and Abu Jibneh, the *kerem al-mufti* and the Kamal family land have been confiscated.

On 15 June 1992, a new planning map was published; it shows that Wadi Joz will suffer a similar fate to Sheikh Jarrah, affecting the properties of several families living there.

*Discussion focused on the mechanisms by which Palestinians can prevent the implementation of such plans. Attention was paid to the question of whether there are Palestinian plans to challenge Israel policy and practice, and to the accuracy of available information and the community's access to it.*

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## *Jerusalem as the Capital of Palestine: Initial Ideas*

**Rashid Khalidi**

25 June 1992

Our basic objectives regarding Jerusalem are sovereignty over the Arab part of the city as capital of Palestine, and local control over all Arab neighbourhoods of the city, and equity in municipal affairs. The main obstacles to these are Israel's annexation of the city and its absolute control over municipal affairs; settlement of some 140-150,000 Israelis in Arab East Jerusalem; the U.S. position that Jerusalem must not be divided; and international public opinion, misled for 25 years by the Israeli myth of a "unified" Jerusalem.

Our main assets are the principle of self-determination; the presence of 150,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem; Arab ownership of most land in East Jerusalem (and 40% of that in West); international consensus rejecting Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem; British, French and Vatican commitment to the city as a *corpus separatum* under U.N. Resolution 181; and international support for Resolution 194 (compensation or repatriation) as applied to Jerusalem.

Our problem is how to use our limited assets to overcome major obstacles and achieve, as far as possible, our objectives. We must align ourselves with international consensus as much as we can, to maximise our assets.

Thus, although we reject Israeli "unification" of Jerusalem, because international consensus calls for an undivided city, we must try to achieve the objectives of sovereignty and local Arab control within the context of an undivided city. This would also enable us to undermine Israeli propaganda about a "unified" city. We might propose divided sovereignty, a unified Municipality with equal representation for Arabs; Arab and Jewish neighbourhood councils with control over zoning, land use, and so on.

While our position on Palestinian sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem, although difficult to implement, must remain firm. We have an important weapon in that Israeli sovereignty has not been recognised internationally over any part of Jerusalem.

One of our objectives should be to utilise the international position as support for us, and as an incentive for Israel to recognise Palestinian sovereignty. That is, we should centre our diplomacy regarding Jerusalem on the demand that Israeli sovereignty not be recognised unless Palestinian sovereignty is also.

Similarly, Arab land ownership can be a potent weapon, given that Israeli seizures of Arab property in East Jerusalem are illegal under international law, while Arab property in West Jerusalem seized by Israel is still subject to the provisions of 194 regarding compensation.

We must demand the right to compensation for property, including public property, in West Jerusalem, and, after compensation, offer acceptance of Israeli ownership of this property. At the same time we must demand annulment of Israeli takeovers of private and public property in areas of East Jerusalem with an Arab majority (the Old City, Sheikh Jarrah) in return for accepting compensation for property, including leases, in areas which today have a Jewish majority (Gilo, French Hill, the Jewish Quarter and others).

Assets like Resolutions 181 and 194, and the principle of self-determination

should be understood not as hard and fast international resolutions which can be imposed on Israel (as U.N. resolutions on Kuwait were imposed on Iraq) but rather as bargaining counters of limited value, which may be used to achieve some of our objectives if we are able to maximise our employment of them and of our other assets.

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*The Question of Municipal Taxation in Jerusalem*

Yaqoub Marraghwa, Taxation Department, Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem  
2 August 1992

Each Municipality has certain obligations towards the community, for which there are rules and regulations governing the relationship between the two. The Ministry of the Interior authorises the Municipality to make regulations regarding the level of and collection of municipal tax (*arnona*) which makes up 45% of municipal income.

Here I will concentrate on Part Four of the Municipal bylaws, the rules on municipal taxation. The person liable to pay municipal tax is either the owner or the tenant of the property; they are liable for a fine and/or interest charges if payment is overdue. According to the law, the Municipality has no right to collect tax nor to change the rate of tax more than once a year. If the Municipality does not announce the time of collection or the rate, these are to be as in the previous year.

Properties fall into different categories, according to the area (ground floor coverage) of the building or land. Category A includes stone buildings of at least 119 square meters; category B includes cement buildings of at least 119 square meters; there are further categories for buildings made of wood, those considered uninhabited or unsafe and those which have more than one use (residential and business). Balconies, gardens, stairways and garages are not included in the calculation of area.

The Mayor has the authority to reduce or waive municipal tax. Reduction of tax in line with area is a right of which most inhabitants are ignorant. Village households can obtain reductions of up to 50%, and some business properties reductions of up to 30%.

A-Zahra and Salah ed-Din streets are considered Zone A. Banks and hotels in Zone A, for example, pay NIS 421 per square meter, and parking lots NIS 20.90 per meter (while in Zone B they pay NIS 13.97 and in Zone C, NIS 10.90).

On the West side, the police give 24 hours notice and try to arrange a settlement through the parties' lawyers. In the East (Arab) part of the city, there has been opposition to the racist methods of collection of municipal tax, including raids, confiscation of property, imprisonment, beatings, and humiliation.

Around 50-55% of Arab inhabitants in the city are behind with payments. Services in East are not comparable with those in the West. Nor are benefits: in the West, a young married couple is given a 100% reduction if the house does not exceed 100 square meters and the breadwinner's income does not exceed 150% of the national average. People in the East, unlike in those in the West, rarely go to court to challenge municipal tax levels.

Despite frequent attempts to make one, there should be no link between the question of tax and its collection and the question of sovereignty and the exercise of political authority in the city.



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*The Question of Sovereignty in the Arab Municipality of Jerusalem*

**Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi**

12 September 1992

After the occupation of Jerusalem, the Jewish state proceeded to annex the eastern part and to dismantle Arab institutions, among which was the Arab Municipality. We witnessed the deportation of Jerusalemites, the closing down of institutions, the takeover by the Israeli municipal authority, the establishment of Israeli presence (Ministries of Interior and Police, Histadrut, Kupat Holim and social insurance institutions), and efforts to surround the city with settlements and so to cut it off from the rest of the Occupied Territories.

International political positions vis-a-vis the city are very clear: no recognition of annexation; Israeli practices in the city are illegal; resolutions state that Israel cannot change the status of the city and has no right to sovereignty over it. However, this has not stopped Israeli policy and practices in the city.

There are international governmental and non-governmental bodies in the city working with the Palestinian community and receptive to its position and rights. There is also an Israeli position in the city, represented by Teddy Kollek and his Municipality, which attracts tourism, economic and political support, and seriously threatens Arab presence in the city.

Palestinians and national institutions active in the city work separately according to their interests and have little room for movement and contact, these being limited to that afforded by the Israeli authorities. There is an absence of national coordination among Palestinians in the city, and Moslem/Christian Arab positions and actions are seen as reactive rather than proactive.

Current circumstances are as follows: postponement of the Jerusalem question in the current negotiations; Israeli political parties struggling for seats in the Israeli Municipality, especially since Teddy Kollek's announcement that he will not stand for re-election; contradictory Arab positions on interest in the city and its Islamic and Christian institutions; and national dialogue in the city on the issues of sovereignty and national authority and linking the question of Jerusalem with the rest of the Occupied Territories. When the Israeli delegation to the Washington talks proposed elections for Municipalities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, there was no Palestinian position stating that the Arab Municipality of Jerusalem should be included.

Our recommendations therefore are: to build public opinion in the city towards re-establishing the Arab Municipality; to use the media as a tool to link the affairs of the city with the rest of the Occupied Territories; to establish a Palestinian base for coordination in the city; and to form an *ad hoc* committee in Jerusalem to work on the above.

*The Restorations of the Dome of the Rock and their Political Significance 1560-1992*

**Dr. Beatrice St. Laurent,**

N.E.H. Fellow, W.F. Albright Institute of Archaeological Research, Jerusalem

5 November and 12 November 1992

The Dome of the Rock, on the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, is the earliest surviving Islamic monument in Jerusalem. Throughout its history, the monument has been politically and religiously significant: to its early Umayyad patrons, its later Abbasid, Fatimid, Ayyubid, Mamluk, Ottoman, British and Palestinian protectors, and presently to the Haram officials of Jerusalem, who, in conjunction with the Jordanian government, are responsible for the Dome's supervision.

An examination of the building's history demonstrates that there have been many challenges to the Muslim supremacy of the site. The macrocosm of Jerusalem's history and political position are reflected in microcosm in the history of the Dome of the Rock.

"When Jerusalem was in the possession of the Circassian Mamlukes, all the *ulema* and pious men went out to meet Selim Shah in 922/1156. They handed him the keys to the Mosque of al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock of Allah. Selim prostrated himself and exclaimed: 'Thanks be to Allah! I am now the possessor of the first *qiblah*'". According to St. H. Stephan, that was how Evliya Çelebi described the Ottoman takeover of Jerusalem by Sultan Selim I. Selim's claim to possession of the "first *qiblah*" signals Ottoman awareness of the significance of Jerusalem and its place in early Islam and the importance of that legacy to Ottoman claims of religio-political hegemony over the Holy Land and the Hijaz.

Like the Abbasid, Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk rulers before him, Sultan Selim I embellished the city in small ways by restoring and adding to its edifices. It was in the reign of his son and successor Sultan Suleyman Kanuni, however, that the Holy City underwent renovations on a major scale. Suleyman's symbolic appropriation of Jerusalem, by redecorating its most famous Islamic shrines in the Ottoman manner and enclosing it within massively rebuilt walls, is the best known (some say the only) Ottoman contribution to the built form of the third holy city of Islam. This is in line with historiography that presents the last three centuries of Islamic rule in Jerusalem as an unbroken slide into neglect, broken only by the benign intervention of Europeans in the nineteenth century.

This paper, part of a wider research undertaking, puts forward an alternative view of active Ottoman, British and Arab engagement with Jerusalem and its monuments throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These later restorations of the Haram al-Sharif and the city are posited as part of a continuum that began with Ottoman claims over the territory of early Islam. Two main reasons emerge for the restorations in the city of Jerusalem. Restorations to architectural monuments were and are politically motivated, initiated as part of larger projects to assert or reassert central government control in the region. Secondly, they result from competition with other religious groups and foreign powers for primacy within the city.

Here, the following restorations are dealt with: those of the early eighteenth century and the end of the nineteenth century; that of 1928 during the British Military/Mandate period by the Supreme Muslim Council; that of 1960 by the

Egyptians; and the current project to restore the dome of the Dome of the Rock. These should be seen, according to the author, in the context of other extant religious monuments, such as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and to plans to rebuild the Temple; the Dome should also be viewed in terms of its use as a symbol in the Islamic world.

Throughout the building's history, despite continuous Muslim maintenance from 692 on, there have been attempts to demolish this earliest Islamic monument, challenges, which continue to the present day, to the Islamic hegemony of the Haram.

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*Towards a Palestinian Political Authority in Jerusalem*

**Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi**

19 November 1992

Participants in the discussion first reviewed Israeli policies and practices for Judaisation of the city of Jerusalem. Israeli and Zionist institutions have occupied more premises and expanded their possession of properties in the Old City. Israel's monopoly of institutions like the Histadrut (labour union) and social services influences the interests of Palestinians in the city, making them increasingly dependent on Israeli services and normalising Israeli authority in the city. Under Teddy Kollek, the Israeli Municipality has succeeded in becoming the principal Israeli actor in the city.

Major Zionist organisations in Europe and the U.S. are mobilising their constituencies to raise millions of dollars with the aim of "reconstructing" the Temple of Solomon on the site of Al-Aqsa mosque. Arab/Islamic symbols in the city, notably the Dome of the Rock, have been used as Israeli symbols for tourism. Israeli political parties are entering a new phase of competition for the position of Mayor, especially after Kollek's announcement that he will not stand again.

Palestinian attention has focused on side issues such as the reduction of taxation instead of fundamental demands such as no taxation without representation, and establishment of a Palestinian Municipality. Palestinian institutions lack the cooperation and commitment needed to strengthen their presence and become, as they should be, the centre for the Occupied Territories.

There is already rivalry among Arab and Islamic states (Amman, Riyadh, Cairo, Tehran) to have a say in the city. In the current peace process, with the focus on the interim arrangement and Israeli insistence on excluding Jerusalem, there is no Palestinian agenda for Jerusalem.

Participants concluded that there is a need for the following: to mobilise Jerusalemites towards "flying the flag" of Arab Jerusalem on all possible occasions; to build public opinion towards rehabilitation of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem, and establishing alternative institutions to those of Israel (social welfare, unions, a Municipality) as vehicles to maintain and develop Arab presence in the city; to establish a Palestinian official base in the city and to link all affairs of the Occupied Territories to it (this need not be the Arab Municipality nor the delegation headquarters); and to develop a procedure to form a Palestinian assembly with 150 members as the foundation of the base in Jerusalem.

*Living Together Separately: Arabs and Jews in Contemporary Jerusalem*  
**Michael Romann**

*Note: Due to unforeseen circumstances--the events at a-Najah University and the subsequent general strike called in the Occupied Territories--the presentation by Michael Romann had to be postponed and is to be rescheduled.*

Much has been written about the religious and political conflicts of contemporary Jerusalem, and about the realities of the *intifada*. This paper looks at how residents of the "reunified" city conduct their daily lives despite the violence, examining daily interactions and the complex networks of relations developed by Arabs and Jews since the occupation and annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967.

After a historical review of Jerusalem as an Arab and Jewish city, the paper addresses questions about the city from the perspectives of urban geography and social anthropology. These include, how the use of space and urban systems reflect both segregation and integration, how communal identity affects interaction in adjoining neighbourhoods, workplaces and other public institutions, and the rules of conduct in Arab-Jewish business, consumer and political contacts.

The authors proceed to compare Jerusalem to other divided cities, and to assess the impact of the *intifada*.



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## 6. DIPLOMACY AND PROTOCOL SEMINAR

### INTRODUCTION

*The increasing prominence of Palestinians on the international political scene, in the peace negotiations and in exchanges with diplomatic corps and visiting government officials in the Occupied Territories, has highlighted the need for Palestinians to be skilled in the art and practice of diplomacy. Owing to the historical and political circumstances of the Palestinians, formal education and practical experience in these areas have never been sufficiently developed. This risks impeding the Palestinians in their relations with the international community.*

*PASSIA, in an attempt to begin to meet this need, initiated a three-part seminar programme to train and educate active and promising young Palestinian graduates. The first part of the programme, a course on Diplomacy and Protocol, was held at PASSIA between September and December 1992. The second course, on Strategic Studies and Security, will take place in April 1993; the subject of the third, to be held in September 1993, will be the European Community.*

*PASSIA's history of joint projects with other Palestinian institutions prompted it to approach the Arab Studies Society, and its Director, Mr. Faisal Hussein, with which it shared in the selection of candidates for the course on Diplomacy and Protocol, in promoting the project before the diplomatic community, and participating in the opening sessions.*

*Regarding arrangements for the course on Diplomacy and Protocol, PASSIA's Academic Committee chose to approach the Swedish Consulate General in Jerusalem, not only because of its committed role in the community, but also because it represents a neutral country, recognised for its diplomatic skills but not taking an active part in the current peace process. The Swedish Consul General, H.E. Mikael Dahl, was very responsive to PASSIA's idea and made every effort to arrange for lecturers from Sweden to address the course.*

*Below we present a summary of the seminar's opening addresses and lectures.*

*Opening Remarks*

**Mr. Faisal Husseini,**

*Director, the Arab Studies Society*

Establishment of a state does not depend only on the results of negotiations but also on our actions. Jerusalem is our capital not merely as a result of slogans but through our practice and actions in the city. We must establish and build institutions, in order to make Jerusalem a visible and recognisable capital three years from now.

Israel rejects our right to deal with foreign affairs, but in practice foreign affairs are already in our hands. Therefore, we should train cadres to the required standard and to be able to work as a team. A state is inevitable, and we should reassure the Israelis that we are able to bear the responsibility that comes with it. There is a declared strategy for and various constraints on the political agenda, and we should consider the regional and global balance of power and understand our geopolitical position.

A politician is supposed never to declare his or her strategic negotiating maxima nor request the opposing side to lower its maximum demands. Today's priorities are to freeze all settlement activity and to create better political circumstances for the younger generation and to make a home for them. Our political task is to lay cornerstones in order to build a future state, and not to accept autonomy alone. Diplomatic work is conducted 24 hours a day. It is not easy. A diplomat does not represent him or herself in meetings but his or her people.

The U.S. letter of assurances and the invitation to negotiations were very clear regarding our right to choose our delegation from Palestinians inside and outside. According to the letter of assurances, Jerusalem is part of the Occupied Territories. Israeli annexation is illegal and the future of both East and West Jerusalem is to be determined by negotiation. Israeli settlement in Jerusalem is an act which negatively affects the negotiations and their outcome and will continue to be a major obstacle in the negotiating process.

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*Welcome and Introductory Comments*

**Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, President, PASSIA**

Dr. Abdul Hadi began by welcoming guests and participants to the seminar. In particular, he acknowledged the invaluable assistance of H.E. Mikael Dahl, the Swedish Consul General, and of the guest speakers from Sweden. He proceeded to give an introduction to PASSIA's work and to explain the background to and details of the seminar. Dr. Abdul Hadi then offered an analysis of the current Palestinian political situation, stressing regional developments such as the retreat of Pan-Arab thought and the rise of pragmatic and technocratic leaderships, the normalisation of Arab-Israeli relations, U.S.-Syrian rapprochement and Egyptian passivity on the Palestine question. He assessed the impact of international ousting of the PLO in favour of the local leadership, and that of the U.S. and Israeli election results. Finally, Dr. Abdul Hadi asked Palestinian participants to consider the Palestinian political position after five years of uprising, particularly the positions of inside and outside, Palestinian

institutions, the negotiating team, factional leaderships and the Unified Leadership of the Uprising, and the higher councils in the Occupied Territories.

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### *Introduction to International Relations*

**Mathias Mossberg**

The speakers began by explaining that because mechanisms of international relations have everywhere many elements in common, the Swedish experience is relevant to the Middle East. Defining diplomacy as a skill designed to facilitate communication between politicians, the art of "getting along with" others, they proceeded to outline the basic concepts in international relations.

Change has been rapid and has altered fundamentally the art of diplomacy, the origins of which lie in relations between ancient city states. The revolution in communications has led to direct contact which replaces messengers. NGOs have become much more important. Summit and "shuttle" diplomacy, previously restricted to matters of war and peace, are increasingly common.

International law is a set of norms and practices by which nations are asked to abide. It is respected voluntarily and there are few remedies for violation of it. Diplomats must deal with the increased importance of economic and commercial relations in the political field. Self-interest of states is the *raison d'être* of foreign policy. International cooperation is therefore a basic requirement for survival, especially for small countries. Major powers act in their own widely defined national interests, often against those of small countries. Giving examples of Swedish practice, the speaker concluded that Sweden serves as a good example of international cooperation by a small state.

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### *A Brief History of Diplomacy*

**Mathias Mossberg**

After considering various definitions of diplomacy, the speaker gave a fascinating and colourful history of diplomacy from earliest times. Many of the Greek customs, he noted, were transferred to western Europe, Egypt and elsewhere. International law, the foundations of many legal systems of today, and use of trained archivists were the most important Roman contributions. During the fifteenth century, interest shifted to the mini-states of the Italian peninsula. Diplomacy as a profession was by then generally recognised, but was a middle-class rather than aristocratic profession, and its status improved only gradually. From the early seventeenth century, French influence became dominant. Versailles became the model for other European courts and remained so until the early nineteenth century. The Congress of Vienna of 1815 tackled the important question of precedence and defined classes of diplomat.

Since 1815, the focus has shifted from the court to the cabinet. Diplomatic life is dependent on the political culture in which it exists. Three factors in particular have changed diplomacy: the growing sense of a community of nations; increased importance of public opinion with increased democracy, especially in Europe; and the rapid

improvement in communications and the tendency towards summit and shuttle diplomacy.

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*International Law*

**Ove Bring and Mathias Mossberg**

After describing the structure and functions of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the speakers began their discussion of international law and its basic concepts. International law they described as a reflection of social phenomena: thus state practice establishes patterns which become laws.

Private international law is concerned with individuals and countries with contracts over borders. Public international law covers U.N. matters, laws of the sea, laws of space, etc. and consists of obligations from custom and from treaties. Customary law is independent of treaties, therefore a state that is not party to a treaty cannot excuse itself from respecting customary international law. Because international law tends to be vague, difficulties may arise when customary law tries to deal with specifics but, the speakers noted, this leaves leeway for progressive development and for parties to press for particular interpretations. In this context, the speakers outlined the main tenets of the main schools of legal thought, the Natural Law school, Positivism, Functionalism, the Newhaven School, Idealism, and the Non-Occidental School.

There are an increasing number of subjects of international law; they include almost any actor in international relations: liberation movements, political and territorial entities which are not recognised as states, and nations without a state or a liberation movement. Even if not states, subjects of international law do have rights under international law, for example against non-intervention and aggression.

Despite its lack of sanctions, the speakers argued that international law should be promoted and upheld, and gave examples of its "successes". They then turned to the U.N., its limitations and advantages, concluding that sanctions can be effective and should be used to demand respect for international law.

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*Sweden and International Law*

**Per Holmstrom**

Swedish interest and policy in the Middle East is based on several considerations, the speaker explained. As the world grows smaller, countries are politically and economically increasingly dependent on each other; Sweden has traditionally played a role in peace-keeping in the Middle East; Swedes have sometimes played the role of mediator in the Middle East; and Sweden, especially as a small country, has an interest in respect for international law and human rights. He proceeded to summarise Swedish policy on the Palestine question. Sweden believes that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 form the basis of a lasting solution; that the conflict in the Middle East should be solved through self-determination leading to a two-state solution; and that "land for peace" follows from resolutions 242 and 338. Sweden believes that since Palestine is



subject to international law, Palestinians may not take up arms to solve the conflict. It also regards the Fourth Geneva Convention as applicable to the Occupied Territories.

There are, the speaker noted, two exceptions to the principle of peaceful resolution: the U.N. charter gives a country the right to self-defence in case of aggression against it and gives the Security Council the right to use force. Although it could act against Israel because of the 1967 occupation, the Security Council is also a political body and has not done so. However, land occupied in 1967 is not considered internationally part of Israel. He concluded by describing how Sweden takes up in the U.N. and E.C. issues of violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and supports human rights groups in the Occupied Territories and in Israel.

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*Diplomacy and Mass Media*

**Krister Kumlin, Mathias Mossburg and Cordelia Edvardson**

In the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the need to consider carefully relations with the media is now recognised. There is a general belief is that the image of the country is determined less by words than by deeds. After outlining the history and role of the Ministry's Press and Information Service, the speakers discussed the importance in this context of the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act.

Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still doing its best to manage the media, they asserted, thus its Press Service has both offensive and defensive media strategies and considers confidence building between itself and journalists important. However, in Sweden nothing is done to influence what the foreign press writes, beyond trying to ensure as wide an access as possible.

As a result of the effort to divorce government from the dissemination of information and so avoid propagandist overtones, the Ministry's Bureau of Information does not actually produce material; the lecture concluded with an explanation of the workings of this Bureau.

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*The Organisation and Role of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Swedish Example*  
**Mathias Mossberg and Gun-Britt Anderson**

The functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are: executing and formulating foreign policy; administering international relations abroad; advising government, formulating proposals and preparing decisions; projecting a convincing image of policy at home and abroad; explaining and gaining support for policies through contacts with other governments and the public; conducting negotiations in the political, economic and trade fields; furthering trade and commercial interests; looking after the interests of nationals who are working and/or living abroad; managing missions abroad; and maintaining relations with foreign Embassies.

Following a description of its functions, the speakers turned to the structure of the Ministry. Other issues considered included relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and intelligence services; its relationship to its missions abroad; the Ministry's administrative system, and its interests and concerns. The latter include

regional and global security; peace-keeping and peace-building; economic cooperation through direct promotion of multilateral negotiations; immigration; global governance and common security and responsibility; and development.

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*The Role of a Diplomatic Mission,  
International Organisations and International Civil Service*  
**Mathias Mossberg and Mikael Dahl**

Different Embassies have different tasks. A "standard" Embassy, however, has the principal task of conducting bilateral relations. An Embassy, the speakers explained, must give its Foreign Ministry information from all available sources for analysis, takes care of nationals abroad and carries out other administrative duties. Representation is made to accredited international organisations such as the U.N., and to regional and local organisations such as the E.C.

A Consulate is subordinate to an Embassy and tends to concentrate more on culture, trade and service to nationals. Looking specifically at the eight Consulates in Jerusalem, the speakers noted that they are very different from others: their existence is the result of international law and U.N. Resolutions, specifically the 1947 Partition Resolution; they are not in Israel and report directly to their respective home countries, not to Tel Aviv. Functions of the Swedish Consulate include political contacts with Palestinian groups and institutions; international witness and peaceful opposition to the occupation; administration of bilateral development programmes; and service to Swedish citizens and Palestinians in consular matters.

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*Requirements and Qualifications for a Diplomat*  
**Mathias Mossberg and Per Holmstrom**

Historically, a loud voice and retentive memory plus good oratory have been the qualities of the good diplomat. Today, according to the speakers, a diplomat also needs powers of observation, clear judgement, and experience. Additional requirements include precision, moral and intellectual accuracy, calmness, patience and detachment, national loyalty, and honesty. When a diplomat is reporting s/he must be cautious, but at the same time be able to form an opinion. Modesty about one's role is important. Personal vanity has always been frowned upon. Knowledge, charm, industry, tact and courage are all taken for granted. Modern management techniques are now considered important.

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*Protocol, Ceremonial Aspects, Diplomatic Immunity and Privileges*  
**Klas Stenstrom**

Rules of protocol are generally practical in nature, and are designed to simplify contacts between people and countries; they should, maintained the speaker, be strict and applied equally to all. After reviewing the development of rules of protocol, the speaker

discussed in detail the procedures for state visits by Heads of State, including working and official visits, and visits by Heads of Government or Foreign Ministers.

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*Diplomatic History of the Middle East*  
**Mats Bergquist**

Starting with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the colonial control of the British and the French has determined the political shape of the Middle East. After a historical introduction, the speaker explored the three mechanisms used to try to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict over the last 45 years: bilateral negotiations, international conferences and third-party intervention. He considered the importance of the 1949-1951 Israeli-Jordanian negotiations, the 1979-1982 Israeli-Egyptian negotiations over autonomy for the Palestinians, and the 1982-1983 Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty; the 1949 Wisan Conference, the 1973 Geneva Conference, and the 1991 Madrid Conference; the role of President Carter, Baker and Bush. The success of third party intervention depends largely on the power of the country they represent, the personality of the third party, commitment to the issue, and genuine belief in the aim. Several third party interventions have failed in the Middle East because of the political situation at the time of intervention. Baker, the speaker suggested, appears to be committed to achieving success through negotiations. Moreover, he noted, many previous occupations in the Middle East have ended at the negotiating table.

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*International Development Cooperation: North-South Issues*  
**Gun-Britt Andersson and Mikael Dahl**

Starting from the assumption that long-term peace and stability can only come with more equal development and an end to poverty, the lecturers described in detail the history of Sweden's overseas development cooperation policy. Its overall objective is to raise the standard of living of poor people, especially through economic growth, economic and social equality, economic and political independence, democratic development, sustainable use of natural resources and protection of the environment. Priority is given to the poorest countries. Nordic countries, as the speakers pointed out, are strongly represented in international organisations and often contribute more than the U.S.

Turning to the Occupied Territories, the speakers explained that although Swedish NGOs have been active here since before the occupation, Sweden has had a formal relationship with the Occupied Territories only since 1991. Now there is direct cooperation very similar to the bilateral relations between nation-states. Ideas for cooperation were implemented after the *intifada*, when government contacts were established with Tunis and with the West Bank and Gaza. Direct cooperation has four goals: to alleviate the situation of the Palestinian people and to reduce their dependence on Israel through health and welfare measures, to help create the basis of a future democratic society liberated from occupation, to stimulate economic activity, create employment and improve welfare, and to improve the human rights situation. It takes

the form of assistance, especially in health and social welfare, through NGOs; support for U.N. activities in the Occupied Territories; direct cooperation between the Swedish government and Palestinian organisations; and emergency assistance.

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*The U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem*

**H.E. Molly Williamson**

Her Excellency Molly Williamson kindly agreed to address the seminar at short notice, but due to lack of time could give only a short presentation, inviting participants to continue the discussion at a future date. She gave a personal account of her time in Jerusalem and of her commitment to the region. On U.S. policy in the region, she stressed what she said was a genuine commitment to peace and security in the region, the chances of achieving which were at least tangible as a result of the current peace process.

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*PALESTINIAN ROUNDTABLE*

Six Palestinian academics - Riad Malki, Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Sa'id Zeedani, Mohammad Jadallah, Tamer Essawi and Zahira Kamal - reflecting various schools of thought on the peace process and international relations, addressed participants on relevant topics.

## **EVALUATION OF THE SEMINAR**

PASSIA's Academic Committee was very satisfied with the seminar, feeling that its aim of assembling young graduates with genuine interest and potential had been fulfilled beyond all expectations. Palestinian participants displayed vigorous commitment throughout; the calibre of lectures was consistently high; the energy of the Palestinian participants was also evident in their attention to the seminar's writing assignment, although the overall standard of essays was disappointing. Palestinian participants assessed the content of the lecture programme in terms of the general interest and professional usefulness of each topic. On the whole, their evaluation was extremely positive. Evaluation by the Swedish lecturers was of each participant on an individual basis, in terms of level and quality of participation.



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## 8. CONFERENCES

*PASSIA participated in the following conferences during 1992.*

International Institute  
for Strategic Studies, London  
1992 Regional Security Conference:  
*The Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli  
Conflict and Middle East Security*  
Istanbul, 7-10 June 1992

The Foreign and Commonwealth  
Office, London  
*U.K. Presidency of  
the European Community*  
London, 7 September 1992

The Royal Institute for  
International Affairs  
*The Intifada and the Peace Process*  
R.I.I.A., Chatham House, London,  
8 September 1992

The Royal Services Institute for  
Defence Studies  
*Security Issues at Stake  
in the Plans for Palestinian Autonomy*  
Royal Services Institute for Defence  
Studies, London, 9 September 1992

The Islamic Council of the U.K.  
*Required Strategies for Muslims  
in the New World Order*  
The Commonwealth Institute, London,  
29 November 1992

The Joint Committee for Palestine  
*The Palestinian Struggle for  
Independence and the Peace Process*  
House of Commons, London,  
1 December 1992

*PASSIA was invited to but unable to  
attend the following:*

The Washington Institute  
*Islam and the U.S.:  
Challenges for the Nineties*  
Washington, D.C., 27 April 1992

The Hellenic Foundation  
for Defence and Foreign Policy  
*Cooperation and Security in Europe:  
the Mediterranean and the Balkans*  
Halki, Greece, 14 September 1992

Centre for Political and International  
Development Studies, Cairo  
*Democratic Challenge  
in the Arab World*  
Cairo, 24-27 September 1992

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## 9. WORKING VISIT

Host: **The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung**  
Brussels and Bonn,  
28 November to 18 December 1992

The purpose of the visit was to gain greater insight into European perspectives on the Palestine Question and into European policy and practice vis-a-vis the peace process and economic assistance to the Palestinians.

In recent months, the European Community has established a special department, with an office and representative in Brussels, concerned with economic assistance to the Palestinian people. There has been a series of consultations between the E.C. and the U.S., Arab states, the PLO in Tunis, and Palestinian institutions and individuals in the Occupied Territories, and between the E.C. and the Israeli government and military establishment. E.C. positions on the matter have been declared in Venice in 1980, Brussels in 1987, Madrid in 1988 and 1989 and in its resolutions of 1990.

Clearly, future stability and security in the Middle East requires recognition and realisation of the political rights of all parties concerned. Such normalisation needs a comprehensive plan for regional cooperation, including socio-economic development for the Palestinian people. This cannot be achieved without genuine commitment from the E.C.

Against this background, Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi of PASSIA visited Brussels and Bonn to work with various E.C. officials and Middle East specialists. These included the directors of Middle East Divisions in the Foreign Ministries of Belgium, Britain and Germany, and Mr. Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski, head of the Middle East Committee of the Socialist International. During his visit, Dr. Abdul Hadi addressed various topics including:

- the current political situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories;
- the *intifada*'s fifth year and the building of national authority through Palestinian national institutions;
- training of young Palestinians inside and outside the Occupied Territories, and the necessity of links between them;
- current and future direct E.C. assistance to Palestinians inside and outside;
- Europe and the peace process;
- Euro-Israeli relations and E.C. assistance to Israel;
- specialised E.C. workshops on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict;
- PASSIA's forthcoming 1993 seminar on Europe.

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## 10. APPENDICES

### *PASSIA BOARD OF TRUSTEES*

**Kamal Abdul Fattah**

Professor of Geography at Bir Zeit University; author of various publications on the geography of Palestine.

**Nayyef Abu Khalef**

Professor of Political Science at a-Najah University; member of the Higher Council for Education in the Occupied Territories.

**Mahdi Abdul Hadi**

Political analyst, academic, columnist and author; founder and member of the Arab Thought Forum in Jerusalem; President and founder of PASSIA.

**Freih Abu Meddian**

Lawyer, specialising in Human Rights; Chairman of the Gaza Bar Association.

**Riad Al-Agha**

Professor of Political Science and Dean of College of Science and Technology, Khan Younis, Gaza Strip.

**Kainat Dweik**

Sociologist and social worker; member of various women's organisations in the Occupied Territories.

**Ahmad Harb**

Professor of English Literature at Bir Zeit University; Director of the Centre for Applied Research in Education.

**Adnan Musallam**

Professor of History at Bethlehem University; founding member of al-Liqa Centre, Bethlehem.

**Mohammad Neirab**

Professor of Political Science at the al-Azhar Islamic University in Gaza.

**Sari Nusseibeh**

Professor of Philosophy, political analyst, author and columnist; Director of *Maqdes*, the Jerusalem Centre for Strategic Studies.

**Bernard Sabella**

Sociologist and demographer; Professor at Bethlehem University; columnist and author.



## PASSIA ACADEMIC COMMITTEE

### **Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi**

President and founder of PASSIA; Ph.D. Bradford University, U.K. [thesis: *Roots of Jordanian-Palestinian Relations 1900-1951*]; B.A. in Law, Damascus University, Syria; Editor of Al-Fajr, 1972; General Secretary for the Council for Higher Education in the West Bank, 1977-1980; founder of the Arab Thought Forum; fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, 1984-1985; and at Salzburg International Seminar, 1987; Special Adviser to the Ministry of Occupied Land Affairs, Amman, 1985-1986; author of several publications on the Palestine Question; born in Nablus, 1944; living in East Jerusalem, married with two daughters.

### **Dr. Bernard Sabella**

Director of the Academic Committee; Associate Professor of Sociology at Bethlehem University; B.A. in Sociology, Franklin and Marshall College; M.A. in Sociology, University of Virginia; Ph.D. in Sociology, University of Virginia; author of *Introduction to Sociology* (in Arabic), *The West Bank and Gaza Strip*, and articles on Palestinian demography; Palestinian, born in Jerusalem, 1945; married with three children, living in East Jerusalem.

### **Dr. Sa'id Zeedani**

Director of the Projects Committee; Professor of Philosophy at Bir Zeit University; formerly Director of Al-Haq, Ramallah, the West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists; author of several studies and articles.

### **Mrs. Kainat Dweik**

Director of the Administrative Committee; B.A. in Social Work, the American University of Beirut; family social worker for ten years; rehabilitation officer in the Occupied Territories for six years; born and living in Jerusalem; married with two children.

### **Mr. James Leith**

Co-ordinator of the Academic Committee; B.A. in Development Economics, University of East Anglia; former researcher and political lobbyist for the World Development Movement, London and adviser to Youth for Development and Cooperation, Amsterdam; freelance writer on development issues; born in London, 1962, and living in Jerusalem.

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## FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR PASSIA PROJECTS

*Each year, PASSIA's Academic Committee prepares proposals for its projects, based on the policy guidelines of the Board of Trustees. Below we list the 1992 PASSIA projects and the financial support given towards each. PASSIA takes this opportunity to acknowledge with gratitude the contributions of the organisations and institutions mentioned.*

- a. **Research Studies Programme:** supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn.
- b. **PASSIA Meetings:** supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn.
- c. **Special Programme on the Interim Arrangement:**  
supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn.
- d. **Three-Part Seminar on Diplomacy and International Affairs 1992-93:**  
supported by the Ford Foundation, Cairo.  
  
**Part One - Diplomacy and Protocol:** supported by the Ford Foundation,  
the Swedish Consulate, Jerusalem and the Arab Studies Society, Jerusalem.
- e. **Jerusalem Seminar:** supported by the Arab Programme.
- f. **PASSIA Diary 1993:** self-financing.
- g. **Specialist periodicals:** financed by outstanding loans from PASSIA members.

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PASSIA PUBLICATIONS  
MARCH 1987-JANUARY 1993

1. *Notes on Palestinian-Israeli Meetings in the Occupied Territories* (Arabic and English)  
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, PASSIA, Jerusalem; June 1987.
2. *Notes on Palestinian-German Seminar* (Arabic and English)  
PASSIA, Jerusalem, October 1987.
3. *The Federal Republic of Germany, the Palestinians and the Middle East* (Arabic and English)  
Dr. Helga Baumgarten, Free University of Berlin, Germany; October 1988.
4. *Modern Arabic Literature Translated into German* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Stephan Wield, Bonn University, Germany; March 1988.
5. *Swedish Foreign Policy and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict* (Arabic and English)  
Beatrice Zeidler Blomberg, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs; April 1988.
6. *Closure of the Palestinian Information Office in Washington, D. C.* (in Arabic)  
Maha Issa Shahadeh and Basam Suleiman Samman, Bir Zeit University; June 1988.
7. *The Jordanian Disengagement: Causes and Effects* (Arabic and English)  
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, PASSIA, Jerusalem; September 1988.
8. *Economic Aspects of the Intifada* (Arabic and English)  
Dr. Andrew Rigby, Bradford University, U.K.; September 1988.
9. *The Historic Evolution of the Armenian Question and the Conflict Over Nagorno Karabagh Arstakh* (Arabic and English)  
Dr. Manuel Hassassian, Bethlehem University; December 1988.
10. *PASSIA Diary 1989* (in English) December 1988.
11. *Notes on the Palestinian Declaration of Independence* (Arabic and English)  
Dr. Jerome Segal, Maryland University, U.S.A.; February 1989.
12. *The Nation and Homeland in Islamic and Christian Thought in the Middle Ages* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Ulrich Haarmann, Friburg University, Germany; April 1989.
13. *Towards a Viable Islamic Economy : Conceptual Approaches in the Eighties in Retrospect*  
(in Arabic)  
Dr. Dieter Weiss, Free University of Berlin, Germany; May 1989.
14. *The European Community and The International Conference for Peace in Middle East*  
(Arabic and English)  
Dr. Nayef Abu-Khalaf, a-Najah University, Nablus; May 1989.
15. *Economic and Social Conditions During the Intifada* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Hazem Shunnar, Nablus; May 1989.

16. *Israeli Planning and House Demolishing Policy in the West Bank* (Arabic and English)  
Rasem Muhyiddin Khameyseh, Ramallah; May 1989.
17. *Nahaleen* (in Arabic)  
Ziad Abu Saleh, Hebron, May 1989.
18. *The Intifada: Causes and Factors of Continuity* (Arabic and English)  
Dr. Ziad Abu Amr, Bir Zeit University, Bir Zeit; August 1989.
19. *The Intifada: the Struggle Over Education* (Arabic and English)  
Dr. Andrew Rigby, Bradford University, U.K.; July 1989.
20. *Reflections on American Palestinian Dialogue* (Arabic and English)  
Dr. William Quandt, The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C.; August 1989.
21. *The Intifada and the Local Press* (in Arabic)  
Mr. Ali Khalili, *Al-Fajr* Newspaper, Jerusalem; September 1989.
22. *Creating the Palestinian State - a Strategy for Peace* (translation to Arabic)  
Dr. Jerome Segal, Maryland University, U.S.A.; September 1989.
23. *Palestinian-Saudi Relations (1936-1939)* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Taysir Jabara, a-Najah University, Nablus; October 1989.
24. *Islam in the Federal Republic of Germany* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Rutrand Fieland, University of Ramberg, Germany; November 1989.
25. *PASSIA Diary 1990* (Arabic and English); November 1989.
26. *Studies in the Arabic Library* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Mohammad El Nuri and Ali Khalil Hamad, a-Najah University; January 1990.
27. *Palestinian Factionalism in the National Movement (1919-1939)* (in English)  
Dr. Manuel Hassassian, Bethlehem University; February 1990.
28. *On the French Revolution* (in Arabic)  
Karim Dabbah, a-Najah University, Nablus; February 1990.
29. *Sayyid Qutub: The Emergence of the Islamicist 1939-1950* (in English)  
Dr. Adnan Musallam, Bethlehem University; April 1990.
30. *Najati Sidqi: Life and Works 1905-1979* (in Arabic)  
Ibrahim Abu Hashhash, Hebron; May 1990.
31. *Transfer of Soviet Jews during Perestroika* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Azmi Bishara, Bir Zeit University; June 1990.
32. *Palestinians in Israel and the Intifada* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Muhsen Yousef, Bir Zeit University; August 1990.

33. *The Palestinian Component In Jordan's 1989 Parliamentary Elections* (Arabic and English)  
Shirin H. Fathi, Germany; August 1990.
34. *Graffiti of the Intifada* (Arabic and English)  
Paul Steinberg and A.M. Oliver, U.S.A.; July 1990.
35. *Jerusalem: Effects of Israel's annexation of Jerusalem on the Rights and Position of its Arab Population* (in Arabic)  
Usamah Halabi, Jerusalem; September 1990.
36. *Ghassan Kanafani* (novel and short story) (in Arabic)  
Fayha Abdul Hadi, Nablus; September 1990.
37. *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (in Arabic)  
George Orwell; translated by Rashda Masri; September 1990.
38. *PASSIA Diary 1991* (in English); November 1990.
39. *Germany: Information Paper* (Arabic and English)  
PASSIA, Jerusalem; November 1990.
40. *West Bank and Gaza: Information Paper* (Arabic and English)  
PASSIA, Jerusalem; December 1990.
41. *The Conflict Over Jerusalem: Some Palestinian Responses to Concepts of Dispute Resolution* (Arabic and English)  
Cecilia Albin, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.; December 1990.
42. *German Unification and European Unity* (Arabic and English)  
Prof. Wolf D. Gruner, University of Hamburg, Germany; January 1991.
43. *Palestinian Assessments of the Gulf War and its Aftermath* (Arabic and English)  
PASSIA, Jerusalem; April 1991.
44. *Introduction to Criminology: A Sociological Study* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Mahmoud Aqel, a-Najah University, Nablus; August 1991.
45. *The Intifada: Struggle between Israeli Occupation and the Palestinians from the Perspective of Criminology* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Suhail Hassanen, Jerusalem; September 1991.
46. *The Eighteenth of August: Boris "Bonaparte"* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Azmi Bishara, Bir Zeit University; 1991.
47. *Jerusalem and US Foreign Policy* (in Arabic)  
PASSIA, Jerusalem; December 1991.
48. *Jerusalem and United Nations Resolutions* (in Arabic)  
PASSIA, Jerusalem; December 1991.

49. *Ibrahim in the Torah, the Bible and the Qur'an* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Abed el-Satar Kassim, a-Najah University, Nablus; December 1991.
50. *Israel on the Eve of Election Year* (in English)  
Dr. Naomi Chazan, Truman Research Institute, Hebrew University, Jerusalem;  
December 1991.
51. *PASSIA Diary 1992* (in English); December 1991.
52. *Conflict Resolutions: Assumptions Behind the Approach* (in English)  
J. Kristen Urban, University of Tennessee, U.S.A.; October 1992.
53. *The Islamic Movement in Palestine and the New World Order* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Iyad Barghouti, a-Najah University, Nablus; December 1992.
54. *PASSIA Diary 1993* (in English); December 1992.
55. *Ein Beit Elma Palestinian Refugee Camp* (in Arabic)  
Dr. Mohammad Aqel, a-Najah University; December 1992.
56. *Emerging Trends in Palestinian Strategic Political Thinking and Practice* (Arabic and English)  
Dr. Ziad Abu Amr, Bir Zeit University; December 1992.
57. *Progress and Retrogression in Arab Democratization* (in English)  
Larbi Sadiki; December 1992.
58. *Half The People: Women, History and the Palestinian Intifada* (in English)  
Maria Holt, CAABU, London; December 1992.
59. *Diplomacy and Protocol: PASSIA Seminar 1992* (in English); December 1992
60. *PASSIA Annual Report 1992*; January 1993.



## PERIODICALS IN THE PASSIA LIBRARY

PASSIA's library specialises in books and periodicals in the fields of political science and international relations, Palestinian society and politics.

In an effort to enrich its library, PASSIA regularly renews and increases its many subscriptions to magazines, journals, newspapers and other publications of academic institutions. PASSIA also receives material from local and international non-governmental organisations, and U.N. agencies, including UNRWA, working in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. PASSIA's library is open on request to students, researchers and any interested persons.

During the coming year, as part of our policy to broaden the base of knowledge in Palestine on international affairs, we plan further to improve and expand the information resources available.

Listed and described below are the periodicals to which PASSIA subscribed in 1992, classified according to place of publication, as follows: 1. Occupied Palestinian Territories; 2. Arab and other regional states; 3. Europe; 4. United States; 5. Israel.

### **Palestinian Periodicals from the Occupied Territories**

*Al-Malaf Al-Usbu Al-Siyasi* (Weekly Political Report, in Arabic) a weekly report consisting of articles, news items, research studies and transcripts of speeches from the Occupied Territories and the Arab world; the Arab Studies Society, P.O. Box 20479, Jerusalem.

*Al-Malaf Al-Shahri* (Monthly Report, in Arabic) includes major articles and analytical studies related to the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflicts; the Arab Studies Society, P.O. Box 20479, Jerusalem.

**Al-Haq** is a Palestinian institution based in Ramallah specialising in documentation of human rights violations, legal advice, and legal and human rights education and campaigning. It publishes regular publications and special reports; Al-Haq, P.O. Box 1413, Ramallah.

**JMCC**, the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre provides daily and weekly summaries of the main events concerning the Occupied Territories; it produces regular publications and special reports; JMCC, P.O. Box 25047, Jerusalem.

*Nashra Al-Istratigiyah* (Bulletin of Strategic Studies, in Arabic); an monthly journal on strategic studies and issues related to the future of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; *Maqdes*, the Jerusalem Centre for Strategic Studies, Salah Eddin St., East Jerusalem.

**PHRIC**, the Palestine Human Rights Information Center, documents human rights violations under Israeli occupation and conducts human rights education; it publishes monthly bulletins and special reports; PHRIC, P.O. Box 20479, Jerusalem.

*Afaq Filastiniyah* (Palestinian Horizons, in Arabic and English, edited by Dr. Salim Tamari); this bi-annual journal concentrates on Palestinian society and the Arab-Israeli conflict; Bir Zeit University Research Review, Bir Zeit.

**Shu'un Tanmawiyah** (Development Affairs), concerned with studies and research on development issues; the Arab Thought Forum (*Al-Multaqa*) P.O. Box 19012, Jerusalem.

### Arab and Regional Periodicals

*Al-Muntada* a monthly journal on development in the Third World, Arab nationalism, international relations and domestic matters; the Arab Thought Forum, P.O. Box 925418, Amman (chairman, H.R.H. Crown Prince Hassan).

*Al-Siyasi Al-Duwaliyah* a quarterly journal, its chief editor from 1965 to 1991 was Dr. Boutros Ghali. It covers issues of arms control, world economic development, North-South relations, and strategic and diplomatic relations; the Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (*Al-Ahram*), Jala St., Cairo, tel. 755500.

*Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyah* quarterly, in Arabic, dealing with the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict, including studies, reports, documentation on the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the Institute for Palestine Studies, Anis Nsouli St., P.O. Box 117164, Beirut and P.O. Box 5658, Nicosia, Cyprus.

*Shu'un Filastiniyah* an Arabic monthly focusing on the Palestine Question, events in the Occupied Territories, and political and socio-economic affairs; the P.L.O. Research Centre, 92 Gregoris Afxentious St., Nicosia.

### European Periodicals

*European Affairs* a quarterly magazine on European affairs published by Elseviers. Prominent Europeans and non-Europeans voice their opinions regarding Europe and its impact on political and business relations (ceased publication during 1992).

*Mideast Mirror* a daily digest of major political news and views in the Arabic, Hebrew, Turkish and Persian press; Old Chelsea Mews, 18 Danvers St., London SW3 5AT, or Box 3516 Annapolis, MD 21403-0516, USA.

*Middle East International* covers political and economic affairs and contains regular updates on events in the Middle East; published in London and printed simultaneously in New York, 25 issues yearly; 10 Chelsea Wharf, 15 Lots Road, London SW10 9AF.

*Voice* an intelligence report aiming to bridge the information gap between the Arab World and the West; restricted circulation; Morris International Associates, 15a Lowndest St., London SW1.

*Journal of Contemporary History* academic quarterly combining research in social sciences, urban studies, culture and political sciences; Sage Publications, 6 Bonhill Street, London EC2A 4PU.

*Arab Affairs* informs on issues of the Arab World, including book reviews, documentation of meetings of the Arab League, analysis from the American and British press on issues concerning Arab states; published quarterly by the League of Arab States, 52 Green Street, London W1Y 3RH.

*Survival* quarterly specialising in strategic and international studies and security policy; published by International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock St., London WC2E 7NQ.



*Sourakia* a weekly magazine in Arabic published by Sourakia House, Laters Court, Millharbour, London E14 9TD.

*J.A.D.E.* Jewish Arab Dialogue in Europe (monthly, editors Saida Nusseibeh and Benjamin Cohen). *J.A.D.E.* provides information on contacts and activities for European peace groups, circulates their information via the newsletter, includes book reviews and a diary of events. *J.A.D.E.*, 43 Ponsonby Place, London SW1P 4PS.

#### American Periodicals

*Middle East Insight* aims to provide objective information on the Middle East, concentrating on political, social, economic and historical issues, in an effort to promote better understanding between the US and the Middle East; International Insight Inc., 1715 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Washington D.C.

*Current History* published nine times a year; examines issues of particular countries and regions and offers a monthly chronology of world news; 4225 Main St., Philadelphia, PA 19127-9989.

*The Washington Papers* of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.; covers major developments in world affairs; published eight times a year in Hanover, Box 465, PA 17331.

*Foreign Affairs* published five times a year by the Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th St., New York 10021; covers topics on international relations, politics, the United States and its foreign policy, and reviews recent books on international relations.

*Foreign Policy* published quarterly by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2400 N. St. N.W., Washington D.C.; concentrates on foreign policy, arms control, strategic studies and international relations.

*Journal of Palestine Studies* a quarterly on Palestinian affairs and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Includes special reports on the Palestinian Question, recent books, a chronology of events and bibliography; published by the University of California Press for the Institute for Palestine Studies.

*The Middle East Journal* published quarterly by the Middle East Institute, 1761 N. St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; specializes in the Arab-Israeli conflict, economy and government policy, gives a chronology of events and review recent publications.

*Journal of Modern History* published quarterly by the University of Chicago Press, 5720 S. Woodlawn, Chicago, in cooperation with the American Historical Association. It specializes in modern history and reviews relevant articles and books.

*American Arab Affairs* published quarterly by the American-Arab Affairs Council 1730 M. St. N.W., Suite 512, Washington D.C. It provides a forum for viewpoints on recent developments that affect U.S.- Arab relations, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and other regional affairs. Contains book reviews and documentation.

*Time International* weekly news magazine; Rockefeller Center, New York 10020-1393.

*Journal of Democracy* published quarterly by the National Endowment for Democracy and the John Hopkins University Press, 701 W. 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore MD 21211-2190. Includes articles on democracy in relation to ideology, government policies and international politics, and reviews latest publications related to the subject of democracy.

**The Washington Institute** is an American-Jewish private foundation that publishes research and information on U.S. interests in the Near East; 50 F. St. N.W., Suite 8800, Washington D.C. 20001.

*Palestine Perspectives* a bimonthly magazine on Palestinian affairs edited by Dr. Mohammad Hallaj; 9522A Lee Highway, Fairfax, VA 22031.

*The Return* an international Palestinian monthly magazine covering matters related to the Palestinian issue. Published by the Jerusalem Press Service, 865 National Press Building, Washington D.C. 20045.

*The New York Review of Books* P.O. Box 420384, Palm Coast, FL 32142-0384.

#### **Israeli Periodicals**

**B'tselem** The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 18 Keren Hayesod St., P.O. Box 92149, Jerusalem; documents human rights abuses in the Occupied Territories to bring them to the attention of policy makers and the general public; regular publications.

*I. & P. Israel and Palestine Political Report*, 5 Rue Cardinal Mercier, 75009 Paris, and Bamerkhav, P.O. Box 4461, Jerusalem; specialises in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, human rights, the Israeli government and politics.

*The Other Israel* newsletter of the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, P.O. Box 956, Tel Aviv; promotes peaceful dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis to end the Israeli occupation.

*The Other Front and News from Within* newsletters published by the Alternative Information Center, P.O. Box 31417, Jerusalem; addresses the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and a peaceful settlement.

