

# German Unification & the European Unity

Professor Wolf D. Gruner,  
University of Hamburg, Germany



**PASSIA**

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

# German Unification & the European Unity

Professor Wolf D. Gruner,  
University of Hamburg, Germany



## PASSIA

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

PASSIA is an independent, non-profit Palestinian institution, unaffiliated with any government, political party, or organization, which undertakes studies and research on the Question of Palestine and its relationship to international affairs. PASSIA encourages the publication of various research studies which reflects the plurality of perspectives and methodology within a context of academic freedom.

This paper represents the free expression of its author and does not necessarily represent the judgement or opinions of PASSIA. Professor Dr. Wolf D. Gruner, from the University of Hamburg in Germany, presented this paper at PASSIA in November 14, 1990.

c Copyright PASSIA  
First Edition - January 1991

PASSIA Publication  
P.O.Box 19545  
Tel: (02)894426 Fax: (02)282819  
East Jerusalem

## I. Preliminary Considerations

A few weeks ago, on October 3, 1990, Germany was reunited. It has been a day of joy and happiness for Germany being reunited after 45 years of separation. October 3, however, has also been a day of sober reflection after the breathtaking, dramatic and highly emotional changes since November 9, 1989 when the wall came down. David Lawday in his report for U.S. News and World Report of October 15, 1990 labeled his report "One Germany : Time to kiss and make up" (1). He grasped the whole situation on October 3, 1990 rightly in writing : "While most German symbols still make us ponder, the vibes they emit do not capture the mood of modern Germans. In general, the people chancellor Kohl governs welcome unity in muted, decidedly un-Prussian spirit : Nothing nationalistic, nothing overbearing, but a decided anxiety over whether they're up to the task" (2).

On October 3, 1990 the German Unity Treaty was enacted. On October 3, 1990 the Treaty on the international aspects and conditions of German unification, which was signed on September 12, 1990 in Moscow as a result of the "Four-Plus-Two" Conferences, came into force, restoring full sovereignty to Germany. Both events show the indissoluble connection of the German national and the European-international dimension of the German Question. A year ago nobody would have believed that Germany would be one single nation again today.

George Kennan, the longtime ambassador and political adviser, in a lecture to the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies stated, that the unification of Germany was no option (3). He repeated this view in an article for the "Guardian" four days after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 13, 1989 that "the euphoria of the past few days should not mask the fact that German reunification remains an unrealistic option" (4).

Kennan was discussing the security implications of such a step, which he was listing. He referred to the historical depth of the German problem. Kennan raised a point, concerning the German question which is still on Germany's neighbours' minds, especially after German unification on October 3, 1990 : "The principle by which most of us were guided when we found ourselves faced, 40 years ago, with the problem of Germany's future was this : that there must not again be a united Germany, and particularly a militarised one, standing alone in Europe. and not firmly embraced in some wider international structure - a structure that would absorb its energies and give reassurance to its neighbours. But if Germany is embraced in some wider structure ... then there arises the question : should Germany enter this larger structure as a united entity? Or would it not be better and even more reassuring to others if the two parts of that country while culturally and economically united, were to enter it as separate political entities as they are today? It is precisely these questions, the answers to which will depend on the nature of the wider security arrangements for Europe, that will have to be worked out ; and the one process must not precede the other" (5).

Kennan concluded that "this therefore is not the time to raise the subject" (6). As we know today, Kennan was wrong. The issues he was discussing, however, are still on Germany's neighbours' minds.

How will a united Germany fit into a European framework?

Will it be too large for the European system?

How can the new Germany be contained into a European security structure?

What about a political and economic European framework?

What does a united Germany mean for "Europe 1992", i.e. the creation of a Single European Market among the member states of the EC?

On January 1, 1993 the Single European Market will be established. Will 1992, the "annus mirabilis of the European Community", as a commentator aptly put it recently, be Europe's last chance to stay in business politically and economically?

What will be the impact of the peaceful revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe on the process of integration in the EC?

Will the unification of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the German Democratic Republic mean a "complete German takeover of all Europe" (7) and a subjugation to "Deutschmark" imperialism?

Why is 1992 important for World Trade, for the whole of Europe and not just for Western Europe?

Why are 1992 and its implications important for Germany as a whole?

Let me briefly give you some basic facts (8):

1. On January 1, 1993 the mass of (West) European legislation which has to be passed on an EC-level and on a national level for the completion of the Common Single Market will come into force.
2. Economically and politically speaking the magic year 1992 means some 300 regulations and directives which have to be enacted. This project is so far the "most sustained attempt towards the further economic integration" (Arthur Hanhardt) of Western Europe.
3. It is also the intention of the Internal European Market to reap the benefits of scale afforded by a market of 320 million people. Besides this vast market - then the biggest single one in the world - will provide the framework for Western Europe to become a giant, single industrial world power, setting the standards on a global level.
4. Aimed for, or not, the Single European Market - it is called European, but in reality it only includes the member states of the EC - will further the political, monetary, fiscal and social integration of the West European democracies and will at some point definitely bring about a European Political Union, thus fulfilling the dream of generations since the 15th century.

I shall not be able to deal with all these aspects. Thus I would like to concentrate my considerations on the "problem of Germany", Europe and the Single European Market 1992. What are the implications of the process of European integration for Germany as a whole? They are manifold. I believe that we can understand the impact of West-European integration and the process towards further integration only if we analyse the historical role and

function of Germany in Europe. This will also have to include the motives for European integration in the early 1950s and today as a means of containing the German nation-state. Much will, of course, depend on the further framework for a future European Union or, perhaps, for United States of Europe.

Will a United Europe be based on states, on nations, on regions or on traditional nation-states?

How will a united and democratic Germany fit into a European constitutional federal system?

Will such a solution then settle the German problem as a historical, political and psychological issue once and for all?

If we look at these matters there are lots of problems and unsettled issues involved. Despite the fact that the democratic Germany of 1990 is totally different from Imperial or Nazi Germany there still prevails fear among Germany's neighbours that she might once again aim at European hegemony. Take for example Nicholas Ridley's "verbal gatling-gun assault" on European Union and Germany: "It is all a German racket, designed to take over the whole of Europe. It has to be thwarted. This rushed take over by the Germans, on the worst possible basis, with the French behaving like poodles, is absolutely intolerable" (9). Whenever the role of a new and united Germany in a new Europe is being discussed the historical dimension of the German problem, especially the negative image of Germany still prevailing in many parts of the ruling elites, comes back to the surface. Thus it will be appropriate first to discuss the historical dimensions of the German question, as the Germans call it, or of the German problem as it is termed by their neighbours.

Many pamphlets were published during World War II dealing with the "Problem of Germany" (10). But there are only a few authors who discuss the question of how to overcome the "historical German peril" in terms of considering international collaboration of a new Germany "which has banished the Junker spirit in her internal affairs" and which approaches the issues involved from a balanced point of view (11). It was argued in most contributions that it was "true that the Germans have been saddled by a divine Providence with a double nose of original sin" (12). Among the most influential publications was a pamphlet, entitled "Black Record. Germans Past and Present" (13), which combined seven broadcasts by Sir Robert Vansittart. Besides numerous public speeches and booklets on Germany and the character of the Germans, there are extensive departmental and special committee elaborations and memoranda dealing with the alternative "Division or Unity" of Germany in a post-war settlement. Since 1945 the "Problem of Germany" over and over again received governmental attention (14).

Why had Germany become a problem?

What do the neighbours of the Germans associate with the German Problem?

What do the Germans mean when they are talking about the German Question?

These Questions show that the German question must be a rather complex and difficult topic. What people associate with the German Question seems to be a matter of perspective and approach, differing largely according to the national point of view. Thus it seems to be almost impossible to find a definition acceptable for Germans and their neighbours which would bring to an end the uncertainties as to the meaning of the German question (15). My considerations thus far will have shown that the German question cannot be regarded as a phenomenon which in 1945 was suddenly brought on the stage of international politics. It was not just the result of national socialist policy since 1933 nor an immediate consequence of the "policy of Yalta". The German Question implies more than the division of Germany after the war. Seen from a historical perspective it turns out to be a structural problem of European history.

The German Question past and present and its solution cannot be understood unless we keep in mind the historical and European dimensions of the German Question. We have to discuss its historical conditions and put it into a historical framework. From this perspective we may get some insight into German historical traditions and types of statehood in Central Europe.

In discussing the historical dimension of the German Question and its impact today I would like to emphasize four aspects briefly which, I believe, are essential for understanding the problem of Germany :

1. What do we understand by "German Question" or "German Problem" from a political perspective, what does it mean historically?
2. Has the foundation of the kleindeutsch German Empire in 1870/71 been the only and inevitable solution of the German national question in the 19th century?
3. What were the aims and ideas of the National Socialists concerning the German Question and the unification of Europe under German rule, how did the allies react and what were their plans for Germany and the reconstruction of Europe after the War?. Did they expect to solve the German Problem once and for all?
4. What was the impact of the German problem on the process of European integration since the 1950s and what would have happened to the GDR if the "silent revolution" of November 1989 had not occurred?

My concluding remarks will deal with the more recent debate on the question of Germany and the conditions of its solution against the background of German and European history and the necessary concepts for establishing a European Germany in a United Europe.

## II. The political and historical meaning of German Question

Does the term "German Question" necessarily imply that it was a German Question? The majority of the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the new GDR ("We are one Volk") certainly believe that this was the case. They associate with "German Question" the problem of how to overcome the division of their country which took place after the war without their consent. Thus the German Question has become a political term in the history of post-war Germany. Reunification of Germany became a political goal in both Germanys. The Federal Republic of Germany as well as the German Democratic Republic, established in 1948/49, claimed to be the legitimate agent for the whole German people. Whereas the Federal Republic was aiming at German reunification in peace and freedom on the basis of a democratic and federated political system, the GDR of 1948/49 considered a socialist system based on democratic centralism as the best means for the whole of Germany and its people. The political dimension of the German Question, however, covers one aspect only of a rather complex problem. We cannot understand the genesis and the reality of two states in Germany without keeping in mind its historical quality and setting. What do we mean by the German Question as a political term, what do we associate with its historical dimension? As a political concept the German Question brings together all problems concerning Germany since 1945. Notwithstanding existing interdependencies we have to make distinction between the national German level and the European-international level (16). From a German perspective it means between 1945 and 1948/49 the maintenance of the political, legal, territorial and economic unity of Germany. Since the foundation of two states in Germany in 1949 it implies the problem of how to overcome the division of Germany by reunification or by a new union of the German people. Especially the Federal Republic of Germany over and over again stressed the fact that the continuance of the division of Germany must be regarded as a threat to European peace in the long run. Thus the German question with all its security implications was and still is, as the "Four-Plus-Two" - Talks and the intention to call a special meeting of the CDCE in November 1990, considered as an important element of international politics.

From the perspective of international politics the German question means many problems and questions the victors had to face after the unconditional surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945. To the same extent they remain unsettled up to the present. To give some examples of this : The reintegration of Germany into the European and global system after the war; Germany/the Germanys and European security interests; Europe's reconstruction and the role of Germany; the decision on the political, social and economic order of Germany after the war; a treaty of peace with Germany determining the future international boundaries of an all-German state or the successor states of the German Reich; German-German relations; the geopolitical and geostrategic position of Germany in Central Europe; the political, military and economic integration of both Germanies into the



Eastern and the Western alliance system. Thus it seems to be appropriate to talk about the German question as manifested in single issues which are, at the same time, indissolubly interrelated.

Analysed from a historical perspective the German Question means a lot more than the division of Germany after World War II and the right for self-determination for the German people. The impact of World War II and its results gave a new quality to the "historical German problem". This is true if we approach the problem from a national perspective or from a European-international viewpoint. Alfred Grosser has reminded us with reason that "a purely contemporaneous approach gives a misleading, two-dimensional impression" (17). On the other hand, there are dangers if we over-emphasize historical continuities and historical traditions to throw light on the present, or if the historical approach is used as a vehicle to back up political and/or ideological objectives. It is the task of the professional historian to show a sense of responsibility in dealing with problems and phenomena of the past. He has to teach the public at large to understand its past, for a people repressing its history might stumble in the present (18). It cannot be the task of the historian to provide blueprints for the future. He has to draw conclusions from his findings, knowing however that historical phenomena and historical situations might give some insight into structures and options of the past which should not be transferred to the present time. At best, such an option, model or historical structure could give some impulse in dealing with considerations of how to solve a problem satisfactorily.

Concerning the historical dimension of the German Question we have to notice that the German Question has become a major issue of the European states system and the European Peace Order long before World War II. It has been a European and international problem at least since the turn of the 18th century, when the idea of the nation, as a result of the French Revolution of 1789, obtained a political dimension initiating the epoch of the nation state. From the view point of the national state the German Question becomes a primary problem of the European states system and its development. The entry of the USA into World War I in 1917, and its impact on the peace-negotiations of 1919 showed that the German question had become a global issue. The Germans and other nations should remember this fact, i.e. the German Question is not just a German issue. Thus the Germans cannot solve this on their own. A historical approach only provides the insight that the political and social system of the German nation today, and in the past, has always been a European-international issue. For any option it has to consider the European and international background. Thus we perceive through observation of German history that, in order to realize German political goals, we must secure European support (19).

There are varying interpretations of the German Problem/German Question depending on the differing national perspective. A German, French, British, American, Australian, Dutch, Soviet, Polish and Italian point of view will

provide a different understanding of the problem and conflicting ideas. One of the main reasons for this might be, as Theodor Schieder has pointed out, that "there is a German question so to speak in a subjective and an objective sense, namely as a question, which the Germans have to ask themselves concerning their own identity and their understanding of the past. On the other hand it means a question which the others have to put to the Germans"(20). Two differing definitions of the term "German Question" will prove this point. The German Question has always been, as Lothar Gall put it in 1971, "a social, a constitutional, a foreign policy and also economic and culture-political problem ... these problems have been interrelated in every changeable and overlapping appearances" (21).

For the British historian A.J.P. Taylor the "German Problem has two sides. How can the people of Europe be secured against repeated bouts of German aggression? And, how can the Germans discover a settled, peaceful form of political existence? The first problem revolves around the behaviour of others, not of the Germans; and is capable of solution" (22). To solve the second problem the Europeans must stick to the "old device of a divided Germany which saved Europe trouble over many centuries. It is not a good solution, and it is unlikely to be permanent; but it is better than none at all"(23). Taylor blames the "partitioning powers" for professing to regret Germany's division, for officially claiming to work for the reunification of Germany and officially deploring "any suggestion that precautions against a new German aggression are necessary, or ever will be" (24).

From this point of view the Germans should be happy to be divided, for "only a divided Germany can be a free Germany. A reunited Germany would cease to be free : either it would become a militaristic state in order to resume the march towards European domination, or its powers would be compulsorily reduced by foreign interference, if the former allies had the sense to come together again in time ... . The flourishing state of Germany at present (i.e. 1961) ... is evidence that disunion does not bring decay; on the contrary, disunion is the cause of Germany's prosperity" (25).

For Taylor the historical roots for the "German peril" can be found in the German national character. Thus he stated in 1945 : "The history of the Germans is a history of extremes. It contains everything except moderation, and in the course of a thousand years the Germans have experienced everything except normality. They have dominated Europe and they have been the helpless victims of the domination of others; they have enjoyed liberties unparalleled in Europe and they have fallen victim to despotism equally without parallel; they have produced the most transcendental philosophers, the most spiritual musicians, and the most ruthless politicians. 'German' has meant at one moment a being so sentimental, so trusting, so pious, as to be too good for this world; and at another a being so brutal, so unprincipled, so degraded, as to be not fit to live ... Geographically the people of the centre, the Germans, have never found a middle way of life, either in their thought or least of all in their politics. There is no determined geographic point for German expansion, equally none for German

contraction; and in the course of a thousand years geographic Germany has gone out and in like a concertina. At times Germany has been confined within the Rhine and the Elbe; at others it has blown itself out to the Pyrenees and to the Caucasus. Every German frontier is artificial, therefore impermanent; that is the permanence of German geography"(26).

A more balanced point of view if taken by John K. Sowden. As far as the German Question is concerned, he states, opinions "diverge considerably, but two main trends can be distinguished. The historical approach sees it principally in the constitutional, territorial and geopolitical context over the centuries. The (political) post-1945 view point considers it to be intrinsically the present-day set of questions relating to division and reunification, stressing not only the national factor but also its significance in European and even in World politics" (27). Sowden's definition emphasizes that the German Question has always been an international, European and security issue. Therefore it would be misleading to confine that rather complex problem of Germany to the post-World War II period only.

As we have learned from Taylor's perception of the Germany Problem, he believes that there is a negative German national character, which is the result of the central geographical position of the German people. Like others, Taylor tries to prove that there was a negative continuity of German history over a thousand years. Over and over, the political power aspect of the German Problem since the French Revolution of 1789 is stressed. Despite his biased view of German history and of the German character there are some elements in his definition of the German Problem, which, freed from a partisan position, give some axioms for the historical analysis of the German Question. We have to consider the following interrelated factors as being essential :

1. The image of Germany, i.e. the problem, how the Germans see themselves and how their neighbours perceive them. As a result of the German self-assessment, the German image abroad gradually has turned negative since the mid-1850s. After the miscarried Revolutions of 1848 many pamphlets and books on German heritage were published and the need for a national state of the Germans. Over and over, irrespective of a kleindeutsch or großdeutsch viewpoint, one finds phrases like : The Germans "are the most civilized race on earth" (28); "The Germans are the leading nation" (29); "The nature of the state is power, power, and power again" (30). The mostly positive view of Germany was replaced. The ambivalent image of Prussia, its militarism and efficiency developed since the late 18th century, became a substitute for "German" after the foundation of the Prussian-German Empire. "Prussian Militarism" and its 'synonym' "Nazism" played a major role in allied considerations on Germany in World War II (31).

2. The Geography of Germany: In contrast to Italy or Britain, there are no natural boundaries in Central Europe. There are lowlands extending from northern France to western Russia. Being the heartland of Europe means that major lines of European communication necessarily pass through Germany. Thus, from a geopolitical and geostrategical viewpoint,

"Mitteleuropa" (Central Europe) obtains a keystone position for any European order (32). This may be one of the reasons that the German syndrome of encirclement ("Einkreisungssyndrom") can be found in Germany's geographical position ever since the end of the 18th century, leading to attempts to provide secure boundaries for Germany through territorial expansion.

3. The nature of German statehood: The conceptions of German statehood oscillate between centralized unity and union in diversity; between fragmentation and cohesion; between central and federal forms of government. The constitutional order of Germany, however, is of major importance for the functioning of the European state system. Thus the neighbours of the Germans have a vital interest that any constitutional bond for the German nation agreed on will not destabilize the European system. From this perception the process of German unification will be watched carefully by the states bordering Germany. The "Four-Plus-Two" talks also served to find a solution acceptable for the Germans and their neighbours in Europe.

After World War II the French poet Paul Claudel focused the problem in writing : "Germany does not exist to divide nations, but to gather them around herself. Her role is to create agreement, to make the different nations surrounding her feel that they cannot live without one another" (33). A centralized German nation state might most probably aim at European hegemony, whereas a solution along federal lines would show a stronger tendency for European cooperation. The political system of the new Germany will be democratic and federal being integral part of a European architecture. The majority of the Germans are not aiming at a German dominated Europe. Their preference would be a European Germany as part of a united Europe.

4. The Demographic Factor (Population Potential): According to population figures the Germans are the dominant nation in the heartland of Europe. They have borders with almost every European nation. Germany's neighbours feel uneasy about her demographic potential. This feeling does not emerge from security considerations alone.

5. The Economic Potential: Germany (34) being in possession of insignificant natural resources like coal, iron-ore and potash only, increasingly became dependent on international trade and the state of world economy. It had to sell its goods on the world market, competing with other industrial nations. The raw materials had to be purchased at international price. Taking into account these prerequisites, Germany's position in international economy and in world trade at the same time implied strength and weakness. The knowledge of the ambivalent economic situations of Germany over and over again furthered efforts for German self-sufficiency.

From the historian's point of view these five determinants, indissolubly interrelated, have to be regarded as decisive components of the German Question. They should be remembered in the present debate.

### III. The Foundation of the "kleindeutsch" Empire and the solution of the German Question in the 19th Century.

In 1981, James J. Sheehan provocatively posed the question : "What is German history?" His analysis drew attention to the fact that German history in the 19th century is usually reduced to the foundation of the kleindeutsch Empire and how Prussia lived up to her "German mission", fulfilling the "national" dream of the German nation. Sheehan called upon the students of German history to rethink a "remarkably powerful and persistent historiographical tradition" established by Heinrich von Treitschke. "If we remove the kleindeutsch Reich from its unique and privileged position as the subject of German history and put in its place the persistent struggle between cohesion and fragmentation, we gain not only a new view of the German past, but also a different perspective from which to examine the German present. From this perspective we can see that 1945 did not mark 'the end of German history', as some have mournfully proclaimed ... It is time to acknowledge that the present period has a historical legitimacy of its own, a legitimacy which comes not from its relationship to the old Reich, but from its place within a broader and deeper historical tradition. The German present is not a postscript to the imperial past; it is a new chapter in a much older story" (35).

The Austrian historian Fritz Fellner is arguing alike when he complains about the shift of the kleindeutsch imperial idea from Berlin to Bonn, Prussia versus Prussia. From his perspective there should be a "federalization" of German history (36). The late Karl Dietrich Erdmann stated in a recent lecture "Three states - two nations - one people": "Bismarck's kleindeutsch unification of Germany was also the first division of Germany, The German Confederation was dismembered. Austria was excluded from the Central European confederate system. Today we have to reconsider the often debated question whether Bismarck's road to unity was the only practical solution, or if there might have been realistic alternatives"(37).

In my research on the German Confederation and on the German Question in the 19th and 20th centuries, I have discussed in detail the problems concerning alternatives to the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 (38). Some considerations will be discussed briefly in the following. I have pointed out that the German Question has been a major issue in European history ever since the idea of the nation obtained a political significance. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars the German historian Heeren was discussing the nature of the international order and the role of Germany within the European framework. He stated that "States, in forming a free political system, must mutually respect each other's independence and must be prepared to maintain this independence. There is no alternative to a European system based on a balance of power besides the hegemonial, universal monarchy of a dominating state, and "Germany, the central state of

Europe", cannot be transformed into one state - which would have been the grave of German improvement and European freedom" (39).

When the German Question was discussed inside and outside of Germany during the Italian War of 1859, a pamphlet, anonymously published in Hamburg, emphasized that a "centralized state in Germany is impossible. The individual states have their established rights. That applies equally to small and great states" (40).

Heeren and the anonymous writer quoted have pointed out major problems of German and European history which were on the minds of the allies in World War II and which are still alive - at least to some extent - today.

The end of the Old German Empire in 1806; the end of the Confederation of the Rhine and the defeat of Napoleon, demanded the political and territorial reorganisation of Central Europe after the Wars. There were various solutions to the German Question under discussion. One of them was an associative structure of either a 'confederate' (staatenbundisch) or 'federal' (bundesstaallich) type. For the purpose of a functioning international system of satisfying European interests in general, and taking into account the varying degree of modernization in Germany, a confederate solution to the constitutional and national problem seemed to be the best possible at the time. The outcome was the German Confederation of 1815. Established at the Congress of Vienna it could fulfil its German and European functions because:-

1. The Confederation as a national bond of the German nation linked together all states descended from the Old Empire. By its organisation it could provide protection and security for them against incursions by German and European powers. The sovereign rights of the member states were only curtailed through their obligations under the Federal Act. A multi-state system became the norm for Central Europe.

2. The existence and structure of the German Confederation in the Centre of Europe could guarantee the stability necessary for the entire European system. The German Confederation was to become the "keystone" of the European states order and the largely eurocentric international system. The constitutional framework assigned to the German small and middle states a constitutive role for a stable and functioning 'German' and 'European' balance.

3. By its constitution and political structure the German Confederation could fulfil a central function in the European security system. Its military institutions provided the means for the incorporation of geostrategically vulnerable states like Denmark or the Netherlands into its system of defence. In addition this defensive function, guaranteed by a federal system, could be maintained, i.e. Germany would not be a security risk for her European neighbours.

The German Confederation preserved the unity of the German nation. It was able to overcome Austro-Prussian antagonism (or at least neutralize it), and it offered the best chances for an evolutionary, peaceful development

and an effective, associative union of Central Europe. The German Confederation of 1815 was the only practicable solution of the German Question after the Napoleonic Wars. A centralized German nation state, which was demanded by a small but noisy national movement, could have been founded only in opposition to the European and German great powers and the German middle states! The European conditions of the foundation of the German Confederation, the perspectives on and alternatives to German constitutional development have not yet been accepted in German historiography, since a necessary 'federalization' of German history, away from a Prussian-kleindeutsch oriented view has not yet taken place. To some extent this was due to the consideration that from a law of nations' viewpoint the German Reich did not vanish on May 8, 1945 but still existed legally, i.e. the German Reich was unable to act as a body politic in absence of a treaty of peace. Thus German 'successor states' could only conclude treaties for themselves, but not for Germany as a whole. If they did, they would infringe on established rights of the wartime allies. Therefore along with the process of uniting the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic the "Four-Plus-Two" - Talks between the two German states, the USSR, the USA, Britain and France had taken place. On the other hand the West German government for many reasons no longer insisted on a treaty of peace, but was sounding other means.

The reasons for the disintegration of the German Confederation in 1866 are rather complex. In the long run, however, an effective reform of the institutions of the Confederation after its restoration in 1851 could have safeguarded the 'stabilizing' existence of the German small and middle states of the Central European associative multistate system. The German Confederation could thus have played its European peace-keeping role effectively. The chances for a functioning associative Central European system were gambled away. The abortive federal execution of 1866 against Prussia led to the dissolution of the German Confederation. Prussia had fulfilled her 'German mission' and became the champion of German history. The disappearance of the South German middle states (Baden, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt) in 1871 as independent international political units had, as we realize today, a lasting impact on the confederate structure of Germany. Constitutional reality in Germany turned out to be 'make-believe' federalism. The impact on the European system was equally important. After 1871 the German middle states were missing as regional and international stabilizers. This should have a major effect on the European consequences of German unification. This fact must be taken into consideration in any analysis of the process of transformation of the European states system during the second half of the 19th century as well as on Germany's neighbours' perception of the German past (41). In search of alternatives to the Prussian-kleindeutsch solution of the German Question after World War II and as a sensible model for the union of European states the German Confederation served as a historical example (42). One of the reasons for the failure of a Central European political body along confederate lines had been Prussia's belief in her 'German mission'. In 1815

as a result of European security considerations concerning France, Prussia gained the then most advanced German industrial areas, situated at the European cross-roads. Whereas Austria withdrew territorially from Germany and sought compensation in Italy, Prussia in 1815 expanded into Germany. She received resources which did have a considerable effect on her economic, strategic, military and political roles in Europe. Prussia had the ability to destabilize the Central European associative system if she did not accept the role assigned to her. As we know she did not. Thus the problem of hegemony in Central Europe returned through the backdoor after the miscarried revolutions of 1848/9, and was settled through military, unlawful means in Prussia's favour. Prussia's aggressive and militaristic role in German and European history - exaggerated in a phrase of the English republican Frederic Harrison that politically "Prussia is a camp, and the Prussian is a conscript" (43) - was to become a primary issue in allied war-planning concerning Germany and the undisputed joint goal to erase Prussian Militarism and Nazism. As a result the four powers, responsible for Germany as a whole, in February 1947 formally brought to an end Prussia's existence as a German state which had already been questioned in considerations of the British Government during the War (44).

#### IV. The German Problem, the Impact of National Socialism and Allied Views as to how to solve this Problem for ever (1933-1945).

With the coming of Hitler and the National Socialists, the German Question achieved new domestic and international dimensions. In order to understand this it is important to know that one of the characteristics of National Socialism was its ambiguity, i.e. National Socialism combined both traditional and revolutionary elements in its ideology which had a decisive impact on its domestic and foreign policy. When the National Socialists were talking about Germany's just demands for great power status as well as political and military equality, they appeared concerned for the interests of the German nation. To all appearances they were pursuing traditional German foreign policy goals. Open support for these traditional/revisionist aims had a twofold function, for the Nazis realized that :

1. these aims were popular with the German nation and could rally the Germans behind the Fuhrer, who seemed capable of bringing Bismarck's policy to fruition,
2. the state of rearmament during the early stages after the National Socialist take-over demanded a policy which was seemingly headed for a peaceful revision of the Treaty of Versailles.

The racist-ideological goals of National Socialism, that is, its "biological nationalism" (Thomas Nipperdey), could be realised only if the "Government of national revolution" (as the Nazis liked to call themselves) could succeed in activating the material and human resources of Germany. Its "biological



nationalism" and its policy of race and Lebensraum necessarily pointed to a policy of expansion and aggression. The results of this policy provided the political framework for postwar developments.

In analysing the foreign policy of Nazi Germany and comparing it with traditional German foreign policy (which was, until Munich, represented to some extent by the bureaucratic elite of the Auswärtiges Amt or Foreign Office), we shall find a qualitative difference in approach to both the theory and practice of foreign affairs. Despite the fact that economic and also, in the beginning, military and security determinants influenced the foreign policy of Hitler's Germany, there are some good reasons to believe that Hitler the "unprincipled, opportunistic Machiavellian" (Andreas Hillgruber) held to some extent a basic programmatic conception of National Socialist policy. Indeed, the global aims of the National Socialists, with their strong interdependency of domestic, ideological, and foreign policy factors, could only be attained through military force. While publicly maintaining a revisionist and even peaceful stance, the National Socialists in reality were aiming at an expansionist and aggressive realisation of their schemes. Thus, in a speech delivered to the Reichstag on May 17, 1933 - the so-called "peace-speech" - Hitler underlined the peaceful intentions and aims of the "new Germany". He demanded a revision of the Treaty of Versailles as a prerequisite for Germany's "equality" and her return to great power status(45).

In a talk to the generals of the Reichswehr only a few days after he had been nominated Reichschancellor, however, Hitler told his exclusive audience that Germany must be prepared for war by 1940 and that it was his intention to "Germanize" Europe (46). These expansionist aims of National Socialism, based on the idea of the "master race", precipitated the build-up of a war industry in peacetime in order to provide for the war material that would be required. The immediate consequences of these aggressive plans were the concentration of German industrial output on armaments production and the militarisation of German society. When war came in 1939 the German military concept of "Blitzkrieg" was initiated with astounding success: within the first year of the war, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, and - the biggest prize of all - France, fell to the victorious Wehrmacht. These countries were placed either entirely under German military administration or were left with reduced sovereignty over parts of their territories. Britain also seemed to be doomed. At Dunkirk it could save 25,000 troops who literally escaped at the very last moment and who were forced to leave behind most of their equipment. What would Hitler, now master of the greater part of the Continental Europe, do? As the foreign office weekly intelligence summary of July 9, 1940 put it, Hitler was faced with "the most fateful decisions of his career". He could crush Great Britain by invasion, starve her into surrender by blockade, or convince her of the necessity for peace on German terms by the impossibility of final victory. In these circumstances he would be forced to produce some outstanding success either by striking at the heart of his opponent or by extending the area of his conquests where the resistance is

weakest. Whatever Hitler will do, his purpose will be to secure peace on his terms (47).

Hitler's blandishments and threats produced no effect. The attempted invasion of Britain (Operation Sea Lion) failed. This was the first major set-back for Germany's war machine. In early summer 1941 German forces were turned against the Soviet Union and a quick defeat of this eastern state expected by most German and non-German statesmen. By mid-1942 Hitler's European empire had reached its zenith stretching from the North Cape to North Africa, and from the Atlantic to the Caucasus. It was at his point that German propaganda about a new European order under German leadership got under way.

In the summer of 1942 Germany seemed to have achieved a safe hegemonial position in Europe and a German peace for the continent seemed to be only a matter of time (48). It was not accidental that just in this period (1940-1942) major studies by historians and economists appeared dealing with the problems of European reconstruction, allocation of natural resources, and the theme of the "Reich als Ordnungsmach" (49). The Hamburg historian Westphal contributed a pro-National Socialist study entitled "Das Reich" (50). Other studies during this period struck a similar note. Since mid-1940 German propaganda had taken up the issue of "Plans for the Reorganisation of Europe". Over and again it was pointed out that it would be essential for the new Europe to be autarkic (51). After the war, continental Europe would be "economically organised by Germany" (Goebbels). In its initial phase the idea of a "new European order" was essentially unused for propaganda purposes. In 1942 German plans for a new Europe on the basis of a "greater Germanic Reich" became more concrete. In a lecture given at the University of Heidelberg, the governor general and Reichsminister Dr. Frank discussed the idea of the Reich and the reorganisation of Europe (52). He told his audience that Europe had reached the stage for launching a new order. This order would be based on the comradeship of the European peoples, on their community of interests, and on the idea that the general community would take care of the interests of the individual members. This useful balance of interests was put forward as a prerequisite for a free, self-sufficient development of Europe. Moreover, Europe would be freed from its dependence on the irrational and whimsical dominance and tutelage of the Anglo-Saxon world powers. The establishment of a new order in Europe would not aim at denationalisation, or would its purpose be to terrorize or to force a special regime on the peoples of Europe. Rather, its goal would be a European "Volksgemeinschaft". In the same speech, however, Frank also pointed to the fact that the "German people stands before the greatest territorial, political, and volkish achievement of its history" (53).

In September 1943, despite Germany's deteriorating military position, the Auswärtiges Amt formulated principal guidelines concerning the inevitable unification of Europe (54). There were only a few ideological overtones to these guidelines. Rather, European unification was perceived as a necessity

in the fact of rapid technological change, improvement of communications, and the production of highly sophisticated weaponry. Without unification, the German Foreign Office maintained, the European continent would be unable to maintain its global role. Thus the peoples of Europe were tied together in a community of fate (Schicksalsgemeinschaft). Germany's war against England must be perceived as Europe's war of unification against an old enemy of the continent. Moreover, although the European union should be created on a confederate basis, the Axis powers, due to their geographic and political position, would become the natural leaders of Europe. When these ideas were discussed in the European committee of the German Foreign Office, however, the tide of war had already turned against Germany. The challenge for European hegemony had failed, burying all hopes for a thousand-year greater German Reich.

What were the consequences of the National Socialist policy on the question of Germany?

1. The National Socialists had succeeded in mobilizing German resources to a level hitherto unknown. For a short period they had conquered Europe from North Africa to the Arctic Ocean, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Caspian Sea. From a political and security point of view, therefore, the defeat of the greater German Reich would have major territorial, political, and economic consequences for European postwar reconstruction.
2. National Socialist nationality policies ("Volkstumspolitik") and the German policy of exploitation in eastern and south-eastern Europe brought to an end all prospects of a policy safeguarding German minority rights in these areas. The experience of the war terminated the existence of centuries-old German settlements in eastern Europe (55).
3. National Socialist Germany's policy of subjugation and exploitation, and its claims for European (or even global) hegemony destroyed all chances for a European settlement based on a balance of power system. It gambled away all perspectives of reviving the great German (großdeutsch) idea. Even the further existence of the Prussian "kleindeutsch" national state of 1871 was questionable.

When, in the pressing circumstances of summer 1939, the British government elected to achieve military security even at the cost of economic security, it was convinced that the only way to safeguard the continued existence of the British empire and to shore up Britain's dwindling status as a great power was through declaring war on Hitler's Germany. This did not preclude, however, the danger of being degraded to the status of a second rate power in a qualitatively different postwar system. The political elite was convinced, however, that the British nation would close its ranks again and win "a victory for right". Defeating Hitlerism had thus become the only remaining hope for establishing a new European order on British terms. At first, Britain's struggle for a military victory against Hitler held few prospects for a quick and successful termination of the war. After the crushing defeats of her continental allies she had to bear the brunt of the war alone, especially throughout 1940 and early 1941. The military and material situation was

improved however, when the United States "expressed open support of the cause of democracy against aggressive dictatorship", providing the necessary laws for supporting Britain financially and materially in her struggle against Nazism.

German-American relations had dramatically deteriorated since mid-1940. Hitler accused Roosevelt and the Americans of "moral aggression". On Navy Day 1941 President Roosevelt "gave even more severe expression" to the already forthright tone which he had used in his message to the annual Forum of the American Foreign Policy Association (56).

In his speech Roosevelt also referred to detailed plans for German world domination, which the government had "in its possession". In his most outspoken address delivered six weeks before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor - which brought the United States officially into the war - the President made clear that the United States had long since abandoned the role of a disinterested power. Within a few months after the entry of the United States into the war the anti-Hitler alliance had been forged. The mutual aim of this "unholy alliance" was the complete defeat of Nazi Germany and the overthrow of Hitler and his bloodhounds. Both camps waged a grim and total war that increasingly took on ideological overtones.

Within the political and bureaucratic elites of the United States and Britain there were different solutions of the German problem under discussion. This discussion, however, concerned not only destroying German militarism and Nazism, but also reconstruction of postwar Europe. Moreover, the lessons from the Treaty of Versailles as well as perceptions of the German character and of German history also achieved major importance in these discussions. To avoid a new "stab in the back" legend being created in postwar Germany the Allies agreed to terminate hostilities only after Germany's unconditional surrender and the complete occupation of Germany (57). In addition, planning staffs considered military, economic, and political solutions to prevent future German aggression. While the general public discussed various options as to the treatment of postwar Germany and the prerequisites for a lasting peace most often within a Carthaginian framework (see for example the partition plans of Henry Morgenthau Jr. and Sumner Welles) (58), various committees of experts in Washington and London discussed the pros and cons of German partition or unity. In general, these committees approached their task soberly and thoughtfully, and therefore less vindictively than the extremists (59). The arguments put forward for or against the "desirability of a partition of Germany" ordinarily focused on economic and security questions. Whereas Robert Vansittart, the political advisor of the British government, was strongly in favour of a partition of Germany for economic reasons in order to avoid a sixth German war against Europe (60), John Maynard Keynes as early as 1940 warned against partition. Keynes stressed the necessity of "creating and preserving economic health" in every European country after the war. The "same principle must apply to the German people themselves". He was convinced that "Germany under new

auspices will be allowed to resume that measure of economic leadership in Central Europe which flows naturally from her qualifications and geographical position. I cannot see how the rest of Europe can expect effective economic reconstruction if Germany is excluded from it and remains a festering mass in their midst" (61).

All memoranda discussing the future of Germany and her role in postwar Europe make it quite clear, however, that there would have to be certain international controls of Germany. Either divided or preserved as a body politic, it was the intention of the planning staffs that Germany should contribute to the economic recovery of Europe without threatening their security. One argument against the partition of Germany recurs again and again in the files I have seen, namely, that a division of Germany would make "no contribution to security". On the contrary, it would constitute a permanent danger to future world order. British and American experts, therefore, in their considerations on solutions to the German problem, repeatedly expressed the view that it would be more appropriate to further the political and economic decentralization of Germany that "might arise from the living tradition of federalism in Germany and from a reaction to Nazi centralization" (62). Thus, to overcome the dilemma of "partition or unity" the British Foreign Office in the autumn of 1944 proposed the dismemberment of Prussia instead of Germany (63). This would further European interests and at the same time provide the best means for a positive development of postwar Germany. Prussia, not Germany, it was argued, constituted a grave security risk for Europe and for the world. A dismemberment of Prussia would be beneficial because it would provide a better territorial balance among the German states as well as an effective federal constitutional framework for Germany. The realization of these conditions would open up the best prospects for a stable and democratic system in Germany. Thus conditions could be created "out of which a new Germany can arise and a new Europe be rebuilt" (64). Another aspect is important in this respect. The memorandum stressed the psychological impact of the dismemberment of Prussia: "Prussia has undeniably been the focus of German militarism since the days of Frederick the Great. The elimination of Prussia would be a strong and symbolic action, clear to all; and the Nazis have shown that it is unwise to underestimate the power of symbolism, particularly in Germany" (65). Thus decentralizing Germany and eliminating Prussian militarism would be tantamount to minimizing the historical "German peril".

As far as the future of Europe was concerned the western Allies, and Britain in particular, were primarily interested in bringing about economic recovery in Europe (66). Britain especially was afraid of "economic turmoil" and "chaos" which would only further the communist cause throughout Europe. This becomes clear from a statement of Anthony Eden, who maintained that he was "personally inclined to think that out of chaos evil is more likely to emerge than good. It must not be forgotten that the great depression was one of the main factors in the growth of the Nazi party and we do not wish to destroy the Nazis only to put something equally evil in their place" (67). The

fear that Germany or, even worse, all Europe, might go communist, was not only on the minds of conservative politicians and officials (68). In stressing the economic importance of Germany for European recovery (which would be undermined in the event of German partition) Keynes argued that German economic leadership would be inescapable "unless it is our intention to hand the job over to Russia" (69).

Unlike at the end of the Napoleonic wars or the First World War, there existed in 1945 no allied principles or agreements as to the future of Germany and Europe in the post-war world. The Allies had only reached agreement, in 1944, concerning the zones/sectors of occupation and the control machinery for Germany.

At the Four-Power Conference of the Foreign Ministers in Moscow the Allies (Great Britain, U.S.A., U.S.S.R and China) also agreed on the restitution of Austria as a sovereign state (70). Nevertheless despite the existence in London of a European Advisory Commission (EAC), created in Teheran, the general lack of mutual agreement regarding the foundations of the post-war order was to prove fatal in the face of rapidly deteriorating relations among the wartime allies. There were arguments about the British proposal for the zones of occupation. The soviet handling of the Control Commission on the Balkans led to complaints and distrust. The documents dealing with the Conferences at Dumbarton Oaks (concerning the establishment of a World Organization) and Bretton Woods (International Monetary Fund) (71), show a difference of opinion as to the questions of security, international cooperation, world economy and the meaning of an international organization. Additional problems were posed by the Soviet demand for reparations at the Conferences at Yalta and Postdam (72). A disparity of views over and again originated from different perspectives and approaches. Thus Britain often totally disagreed with American views. For example the british delegation at Potsdam suggested to the Americans "the desirability of concluding early Treaties of Peace with the four satellites (i.e Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Romania WDG.) as both desirable in itself and the only means of securing an early evacuation of their territory by the Soviet army" (73). The United States did not support this solution, despite mounting conflicts concerning the operation of the "armistice regimes" on a genuine tripartite basis. Whereas Britain was interested in an early and stable settlement of the European question, acting as "representative of European culture" at Potsdam, the United States was mainly concerned about an early entry of the U.S.S.R. into the Pacific War. Regarding the procedures for reaching a peace settlement for Germany the Foreign Office took up an idea which had been discussed over and again in the British Government and Post-War planning committees, e.g. the Armistice and Post War Committee (AWP). Should there be a German Central Government or should Germany - in the "absence of potential democratic leaders after ten years of Nazi-repression" (74) - be governed like a protectorate (75)? As a result of the signing of the terms of unconditional surrender by the German High Command and the take-over of the administration of Germany by the

four Commanders-in-Chief governing the four Allied zones, there was "no German Government" and the central German Government had disappeared. Since it would be "impossible to put through a treaty of the Versailles type in any foreseeable future, even if this were desirable", the Foreign Office proposed to use the supreme authority over Germany, conferred to the Allies by the Declaration of June 5, 1945, to "impose the Allied peace terms upon Germany by Allied 'Declaration' (76). This procedure would be preferable, because the Allies would not have to wait for an indefinite period until there was a suitable government in Germany which could sign a "formal treaty of peace". The Foreign Office Officials gave good reasons for adopting the course of peace-making by declaration (77).

In face of the growing friction among the Allies the decision to divide Germany into four Zones of Occupation and the postponement of settlements for the "most pressing" issues turned out to be fatal. It took the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs almost two years to draw up treaties of peace for Italy, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary and Finland. The growing tensions between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union prevented a peace treaty for Germany and Austria.

The basic American memorandum dealing with the postwar policy toward Germany, agreed on in July 1944, spoke up strongly against the creation of Zones of Occupation in Germany, which would equal a de facto division of Germany. The State Department Officials predicted that these zones would fall under the control of the three great powers, which would "find themselves bidding for Germany's support by promising to work for the reunification of Germany" (78). Thus Secretary of State Cordell Hull suggested to the President in September 1944 that "no decision should be taken on the possible partition of Germany until we see what the internal situation is and what is the attitude of our principal Allies on this question" (79).

The deteriorating relations between the United States, Britain and France on one hand and the USSR on the other hand and tensions and disagreement among the Western allies precipitated a chain of reaction of measures and countermeasures based on misunderstanding, political, and security as well as economic interests, fears and suspicions on both sides, regarding the division of Germany and Europe. The partition of Germany along a military frontier was unnatural and moreover unhistoric (80).

## V. Germany and European Integration:

### Fears despite Containment

The foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in 1948/49 must be considered as being the result, not the motive for the development of a bipolar international system dominated

by the two superpowers which emerged from the war. The two states in Germany were integrated into the respective camp of their protecting power, i.e. the political, economic and military integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western alliance, accordingly the German Democratic Republic became integral part of the Eastern bloc (81).

As we have seen the image of Germany, discussed above, was a major issue in wartime planning and all considerations concerning Germany and her future European role after the Second World War. It has been an important aspect in all discussions as to how to integrate West Germany into the community of West European democracies in the 1950s and it still plays an important role in contemporary European politics and in the media, especially since the German question was put back on the political agenda of Europe since November 1989 from which the 'unfinished business of Germany' had disappeared since the atomic stalemate of the mid-1950s.

Of course the still negative overtones concerning the image of Germany or of the Germans are often used for diverting attention from domestic problems and issues. Nevertheless they should not be underrated. We should keep in mind Germany's neighbours' past historical experience since the late 19th century and during World War II including German plans for a new European order, for a European Economic Community - and United States of Europe at a later stage-under German leadership. Thus it has been in the interest of the other European nations to agree on checks and balances in order to make Germany's quest for domination (or even leadership), divided or reunited, impossible. In this respect integration becomes a key term. It stands for a strategy combining the image of Germany, the European security and economic aspects and the problem of the political bond for the German nation. Integration could either be approached as a positive or a negative strategy for containing Germany in Europe. Both spring from the same root.

The problem of European security besides the image of the German has been an essential determinant in all proposals and considerations on (West) Germany's European integration. Germany's European neighbours knew that a united Germany might come about at some stage of postwar developments, despite the fact they would prefer two Germanies in postwar Europe. The public debates in neighbouring countries when the remilitarisation of the two German states was being discussed serve as a good example. Fear prevailed then, to some extent as it did in the early 1980s and still does, that Germany might regain her military strength. Combined with her economic potential people in the "classe politique" thought it would pose a threat to any peaceful development in Europe. The discussions heated up, when after the beginning of the Korean War Winston Churchill in 1950 proposed a European Army and when the Western allies favoured a remilitarisation of the Federal Republic of Germany. There were several proposals like the Pleven-Plan and the plan to establish a European Defence Community (EDC). The treaty on



the foundation of the EDC was signed in 1952, but the French National Assembly in 1954 refused to ratify this treaty.

Like in other countries the prospects and implications of the EDC were discussed at national party conventions. In November 1951 the congress of the Belgian Socialist Party (PSB) discussed the consequences of a West German military contribution to West European defence. The party congress ruled: "The party is not against a European Army in principle but it thinks that in the case of German reunification the Western defence will not be sufficient. Besides the cadres of a German Army would have to come from the Wehrmacht. It is therefore against any German rearmament because this would constitute a threat to democracy in Germany and for the Peace of the World" (82).

In his speech to the party congress the Vice-president of the Belgian socialists pointed out that a remilitarised Germany posed a threat for Europe as a whole. He also was mentioning the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 1939, he referred to the treaties of Rapallo (1922) and Tauroggen (1813) concluding that the German military and German politicians had always been in favour of amiable relations with Russia. The experience of two German occupations in a lifetime and the fear that communism might take over in Europe come together. Other contributions at the congress spoke up against any "precipitate organization of European unity". Britain should be a party to any West-European integral body, like the ECSC and the EDC. Otherwise there would be the danger of German hegemony in a United Europe, i.e. there would have to be a counterbalance against Germany, because no democratic state could deny Germany's demand to be reunited. Paul Henri Spaack was one of the few Belgian socialists at the convention taking a positive stand concerning the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the community of West European democracies. Because of the German problem a European Federation was needed:

"Our policy towards Germany should be based on trust and confidence. We should not repeat the errors of the interwar period giving Hitler with an easy hand what we refused to concede to the friendly Weimar democracy. The only chance to solve the German problem will be to accept her as an equal partner within a European Federation" (83).

These positions, containment by negative integration versus positive integration, to some extent dominate the debate on Germany's present position in Europe and her future role in an European architecture to be created. The example of the Congress of the Belgian Socialist party thus seems to be symptomatic of the discussions on the problem of Germany from the early 1950s onwards (84). There still exists a strong belief concerning Germany, as a British memorandum in 1940 put it that "Germany has shown that if she is sufficiently strong, no treaties or undertakings will deter her from taking by force anything she might happen to want. Therefore security in Europe is only possible if Germany is not strong enough to act in this way" (85).

When the Federal Republic in 1950/51 negotiated the treaty for the European Coal and Steel Community and later on, the treaties of Rome 1956/57 establishing the European Economic Community and the EURATOM, the government had to keep in mind the provisions of the Basic Constitutional law concerning German unity and European integration. Any West German government has to work for the reestablishment of the unity of the German nation. In addition it has been the *raison d'état* of the Federal Republic that she will be representing all Germans as long as not all Germans are enabled freely to articulate their right of self-determination. The Western allies supported the FRG's legal point of view. Thus in the negotiations leading to the treaties of Rome the demand of the federal Republic that the "Soviet Zone of Occupation" was not considered as being a foreign country, was accepted (86). A protocol to the Treaty of Rome stated that the trade between the Federal Republic of Germany and the "Soviet Zone of Occupation" (i.e. GDR) was being considered as "internal German Trade". Thus from 1958 onwards the GDR seemed to be an "invisible memberstate" of the EEC. As long as the EC had not become a Single Market there were only minor problems arising from the special relationship between the FRG and the GDR. The approach of the planned establishment of the Internal European Market by 1992 would have to put the "inner-German" trade on a new basis. It had to be reconsidered since there no longer would be any border controls for trade within the European Community. If the dramatic changes in the states of Eastern Europe and the GDR, since the autumn of 1989 had not taken place, what would have happened to goods of GDR origin, entering the European Single Market? How would the partners of the FRG and the European Commission have handled this delicate aspect of the German question knowing that any West German government would have to veto any decision jeopardizing the reunification of Germany? This issue had always been on their minds, but nobody really liked to touch questions concerning the future status of the GDR in the European Single Market. Would W-Germany's partners in the EC grasp the opportunity to get rid of the Community's "n-th" member state? Would they be prepared to end a special treatment and a special relationship between the two states in Germany which has been considered by other member states as being a distortion of trade? On the other hand the member governments of the EC knew that the Federal Republic could not be prepared to give up her special economic ties with East Germany for political and legal reasons. What to do with the GDR after 1992 is no longer an issue. The unification of Germany is reality. Nevertheless it will be interesting to see, when the respective archival material of the EC and the member states will be open for research, if there were communications, memoranda and talks at the Commission and intergovernmental level dealing with the future relationship of the GDR, the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Single Market. Were there any blueprints for the final settlement of the problem of Germany?

## VI. A European Germany as Part of a United Federated Europe. The Solution to the German Question: A Perspective of Hope

Since the early 1980s the problem of Germany has reappeared on the agenda of international politics reviving all fears, hopes and prejudices constituting the historical framework for the German question.

For most contemporaries the German Question seemed to be settled. The topic was picked up dutifully in speeches on special occasions only. The President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Richard von Weizsacker, in an address delivered to the 1985 Convention of The Evangelical Church in Germany has drawn our attention to the point: "If we have a question to ask we want to be in a position to answer it and have it over with. And if it cannot be answered we would rather deny its existence. That is only human. But questions do not disappear simply because we cannot answer them. History has proved this time and again. While I was in Berlin someone put it very aptly: 'The German Question will remain unanswered as long as the Brandenburg Gate remains closed' (87).

Yet the debate on NATO's dual track decision and the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing Twos in West Germany has resulted in a notable upswing of public interest in the German Question in Germany, Europe and overseas. The Germans on both sides of the line of demarcation feared that Germany would become the battleground of a nuclear conflict of the superpowers. This had given a new dimension to the German problem.

Contrary to expectation the German Question was not a "dead issue" for Germany's "successor generation" in the East and in the West. The growing interest in the problem of Germany since the late 1970s, such as the demand of the new left and the new right forming an "unholy alliance" for reunification by neutralization of Central Europe, the often irresponsible talk about "missed opportunities" (88), the German peace movement, and the entry of the Green party in West German parliaments and the electoral successes of the Republicans in state elections were closely watched abroad. The media, public opinion and to some extent the official mind in foreign countries reacted with "seismographic sensitivity" (89) to any change in German politics. There was and still is talk about a resurging 'German nationalism and even revanchism', about the 'German peril', about the resurgence of a "Fourth Reich", about the bad features of the German character and about the irrational search for 'German identity'. The reliability of the Federal Republic of Germany often was questioned. The same applies to a united Germany today.

In his last speech to the Bundestag former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reminded his fellow countrymen of some important aspects of the German problem saying:

"As a consequence of the sufferings of partition there is a permanent danger that our existing propensity for emotinal exuberance dangerously breaks through. We Germans therefore are in urgent need of common sense, of political reasoning, providing the necessary compensation factor to balance our national anomalies"(90). The changes in Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany after more than 40 years of separation will certainly promote sensitivity and political reasoning. The developments since the 9th of November 1990 seem to prove this case. After some months, in order not to endanger the unification process, emotions were replaced by reasoning and communication with Germany's partners in West and East.

During the 1980s the only way out of the dilemma of neutralization and deployment of missiles seemed to be that both German states and their neighbours and Allies had to come to terms concerning a peaceful solution of the insolubly interrelated European and German problems which allow for a peaceful settlement of the German Question. Certainly there are no "ideal" solutions for the "unfinished business of Germany". It cannot be, and should not be, the task of the professional historian to present blueprints for this case. There are, however, some aspects, which I have dealt with, which could stimulate considerations and discussions on German statehood within the European framework. The German Problem has always been a primary European issue since the days of Napoleon, i.e. German options for national statehood can only be realized in conformity with European and international interests and never against them. European interests demand a settlement which does not threaten the stability of the European regional system and at the same time provides a solid basis to overcome the "historical German peril" for ever. An associative solution will open channels to finding the necessary compromise between the Europeans' need for security and stability and the legitimate claim of the Germans for self-determination and the re-establishment of national bond. In the "Four-Plus-Two" talks these issues were under discussion, one of the most debated ones being the future membership of a united Germany in Nato and the strength of a new German Army (91). The decision of the two German governments that a united Germany should be a federal state like the Federal Republic of Germany has to be considered as being the right option from a German and a European perspective. There are now 5 "Länder" of the former GDR, Saxony, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thuringen (92). They will adopt a political system similar to that of the Federal Republic. The first Landtagelections were held on October 14, 1990, putting the new states on a legitimate basis. The German question seemingly will be answered in the near future. Will the problem of Germany disappear from the political agenda for ever? This will happen if the new Germany will further the process of European political integration.

President von Weizsacker has reminded us in his speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II that it was Germany's aim "to seize the opportunity to draw a line under a long period of European history in which to every country peace seemed conceivable and safe only as a result of its own supremacy, and in which peace meant a period of preparation for the next war"(93).

Since the 1950s the democracies of Western Europe started on a process of economic and political integration. The E.C. is not a dream, it is real. Today the twelve states, forming the E.C., are highly integrated economically. The process of integration cannot be slowed down. The path to Europe is irreversible. Of course there are jealousies and tensions at times. The dynamics of German unification caught the E.C. by surprise. There was no agreed upon policy. The FRG's partners were hesitant for various reasons which have something to do with the historical and European dimension of the German problem. It can be followed throughout the history of European integration. German-French relations had deteriorated since Kohl's unexpected proposal to the Bundestag on the 28th of November 1989 for the process of German unification along confederate and federal lines(94). There had been no communication about his intentions between Chancellor Kohl and his colleagues in the EC, especially with his friend Francois Mitterand. Whereas President Bush at a very early stage favoured German unification unconditionally. France and Britain were not very enthusiastic about the perspective of German unification and its impact on the European system and the balance of power in Western Europe. Mrs. Thatcher made this quite clear in public and private statements. To counterbalance the speeding up of the German unification process President Mitterand proposed the creation of a "European Confederation" ("Confederation Europeenne"(95). In a leader of "Le Monde" on France and Germany, Michel Vauzelle, warned his countrymen to follow an outdated 19th balance of powers policy to contain the new Germany. A policy of mistrust against Germany does not provide a solid basis of "a serious European Policy" ("Ce ne pas sur la mefiance a l'egard de l'Allemagne que nous pouvons fonder une politique europeenne serieuse"). In the present period of rapid change it will be the wisest policy for France to cooperate with Germany (96). In an interview for "Time" Michel Rocard, the French Primeminister, stated that German unification was not a threat. If "we get on quickly in building the European Community, the German problem will be diluted in a greater political entity"(96). This was in line with a proposal of the President of the Commission of the EC, Jacques Delors, who proposed a Federal European Union before the end of the century. It was also Delors, who argued at an early stage that the GDR was a "special case" in Eastern Europe and would have a virtual right to membership in the EC. His proposition provoked opposition from the Dutch, the Belgians, the British and the French. Thus, as a commentator put it, the "German question could be his (i.e. Delors) litmus test" (98).

In a TV-interview on March 25, 1990, President Mitterand proposed the opening of talks on political union in the EC which should be formed at the same time as the completion of the European Single Market (99). The Kohl-Mitterand initiative for European Political Union at the Dublin summit of the EC-Council points into the right direction (100). There is no longer a question mark as far as the GDR's position towards the EC is concerned. Having entered the FRG, most probably after the conclusion of the Four-Plus-Two conferences, according to the provisions of article 23 of the Basic Constitutional Law, the GDR will no longer exist. The new Lander of the former GDR will form part of the new Germany. I have been talking about President Delors' federalist proposal and that the problem of Germany will be his litmus test. Let me quote Ian Davidson once more:

"Mr. Delors federalist vision may be premature, it may over be a touch naive. But the member states seem to be closing their eyes to the problem, either because they pretend it is a problem of the Germans, or because it may not happen soon. However, and whenever, it happens it cannot fail to have a colossal effect on the EC, and will raise once more the question of federalism" (101).

German unity was achieved on October 3, 1990. The new and democratic Germany will not pose a threat to Europe. It is different from the Wilhelminan Germany of the Kaiser or Hitler's Germany, which still dominate our neighbours' image of Germany. It wants to be European. If it is given a fair chance to work for fulfilling the European dream of unity, it will not drop out and lose interest. The question is, of course, how the new Germany will play her political and economic role in Europe. A leading American commentator put the central question, asking:-

"Will it act as Germania Rex, the haughty leading man who hogs the spotlight and steals the scenes? Or will it become more of an ensemble player, a willing partner of and respected spokesman for a more unified European Community?" (102).

The Germans have learned their lessons from history. Their attempts for European hegemony by creating a German Europe have failed. They know about the fears still prevailing among their neighbours that they might attempt a German Europe once again, may be this time by other means. Thus they will do their best to become good and reliable European Germans, working for the European ensemble. Only then the chapter on the German question, which has always been a European question, will be closed for ever. Today we have to rethink the German Question/Problem in a dual sense. Our neighbours and former wartime adversaries have to acknowledge that the Germans have learned their lessons from history. They will have to reconsider if German history as a whole has been a continuity of errors. The Germans have to rethink their national question in so far as they should accept that a settlement of the German Question could only be achieved within an international and European framework. In many speeches over the last few years the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Richard von Weizsacker, has reminded us of the European dimension of German

history and the German dimension of European history (103). He assured our neighbours that it was our aim "to seize the opportunity to draw a line under a long period of European history in which to every country peace seemed conceivable and safe only as a result of its own supremacy, and in which peace meant a period of preparation for the next war. The nations of Europe love their homeland. The Germans are no different. Who could trust in a nation's love of peace if it were capable of forgetting its homeland? No, love of peace manifests itself precisely in the fact that one does not forget one's homeland and is for that reason resolved to do everything in one's power to live together with others in lasting peace" (104). The majority of the Germans today are convinced that there should not be a return of the 19th century idea of the national state (105). Therefore "the restoration of a unified nation state" (106) cannot be the goal of the Germans.

In his last speech as a member of the Bundestag, former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt pointed out some important aspects of the German and European problem. He said: "As a consequence of the sufferings of partition there is a permanent danger that our existing propensity for emotional exuberance dangerously breaks through. We Germans therefore are in urgent need of common sense, of political reasoning, providing the necessary compensation factor to balance our national anomalies" (107). Schmidt's exhortations were not only directed to the Federal Government. On his mind were also the neutralist trends within his Social Democratic Party (SPD) and respective tendencies within the Green Party (108) and the West German Peace movement at large. A neutral, united Germany might be a challenging perspective for neonational, romantic, self-centred idealists, who wish to retreat into the German 'dream-world' of fool's paradise ("Wolkenkuckucksheim"). They seem to have repressed one fact that German history has for centuries been an integral part of the history of Europe. It can never be isolated. The Germans do not live on a lonely island in a faraway sea. Playing around with neutralist models for Germany and Europe shows a considerable lack of historical consciousness which is certainly deplorable. The Germans cannot afford to rely on emotions. They must be realistic. The Germans must base their policy and their options for the solution of the national question on historical and political facts. Otherwise our neighbour's image of the German as being a hopeless romantic dreamer and idealist will never be overcome, but will ever and again be revitalized. Thus real patriotic policy will have to discuss political options for the solution of the German Question within a historical framework. A neutral Germany will never be an acceptable answer for Germany's neighbours and all the nations involved. It would contradict all historical logic. Only recently Gustav Lang, foreign editor of the Swiss daily "Der Bund" and professional historian, has aptly characterized the German Question within the European-International framework when he stated: "There is no law of nature demanding the reunification of anything divided. There is no law, however, preventing this to happen. It is legitimate in the interest of Europe and the world to look for other forms of normality than the re-establishment

of a centralized German nation state. It is as well legitimate, however, to work for a stable system of peace in Europe which would enable a newly united Germany to find her place. Since both aims are legitimate, the German Question remains unanswered and the provisional state of Germany and Europe will continue" (109).





## Footnote

1. David Lawday, *One Germany: Time to kiss and make up*, in: *U.S. News & World Report*, October 15, 1990, p. 16f.
2. *Ibid.*, p.17.
3. George Kennan, *The German Question. A Personal View*. Washington, 1989.
4. George Kennan, "Reunification - not yet", in: *The Guardian*, London, November 13, 1989.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. Cf. "Speaking for England: Saying the Unsayable about the Germans, Dominic Lawson meets Nicholas Ridley" in: "The Spectator", July 14, 1990, p. 8-10.
8. Cf. Paolo Cecchini, *The European Challenge 1992*. Aldershot 1988. Victoria Curzon Price, 1992: *Europe's last Chance? From Common Market to Single Market*, London 1988. John Fells/Michael Newman, *The European Community and the Superpowers*, London 1989. Ernest Wistrich, *After 1992: The United States of Europe*. London 1989. Ralph Dahrendorf et al., *Whose Europe? Competing Visions for 1992*, London 1989. John Palmer, 1992 and Beyond, Luxembourg 1989. Werner Weidenfeld et al., *Binnenmarkt '92: Perspektiven aus deutscher Sicht*, Gutersloh 1988.
9. *Spectator*, *Saying the Unsayable*, p. 8 (July 14, 1990).
10. Robert Vansittart, *Black Record: Germans Past and Present* (London, 1941); Henry Morgenthau jr., *Germany is our Problem* (New York, 1945); Louis Nizer, *What to do with Germany* (Chicago, New York, 1944).
11. Cf. e.g. James Clerk Maxwell Granett, *A Lasting Peace with some chapters on the basis of German Co-operation by Hans F. Koeppler*. (London, New York, 1940). p. 279.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 224. Koeppler totally rejects this view arguing: "Such a charge is as monstrous as the Nazi claim to dominate the world because of the supposed superiority of the German race" (p. 224). He questions the charge against the aggressive German, for the increasing number of these writers have not yet provided convincing evidence. "No such evidence has been forthcoming. For what some clever people have produced recently is not satisfactory evidence but an insult to the intelligence of their readers ... Why do they always quote certain passages from Fichte or Hegel, and seldom Kant or Wilhelm von Humboldt? ... The truth is, of course, that thinkers of the same nation have throughout the ages held opposed theories. And a scientific method of computing which of these theories is more typical of a nation has yet to be invented. Until we find such a method it will not be possible to declare with conviction that Fichte's nationalism and Hegel's aggressiveness are more typically German than Kant's belief in a firm international order and Humboldt's belief in the State as the servant rather than the master of its citizens" (225). Koeppler in his considerations on "How to approach the German problem" over and over emphasizes that the "defeat of Nazism will not solve the German Problem" (p.274).
13. See above note 4. On the public reaction to Vansittart cf. *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, vol. 367 (17 December 1940), 1101f. Vansittart in a note for Winston Churchill (30 December 1940) proposed: "Get hold of the knife by the handle, and turn it against the Germans ... The 'revolution' mirage floats in the desert of wishful thinking that there are two Germanys, and that Hitler's stuff is antipathetic to some really considerable fraction of the nation. That is rubbish. He suits the great majority of them 'down to the ground'" (Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO) PREM 4/23/2). The Prime Minister at that time did not agree to the views of his first political adviser: "We must not let our vision be darkened by hatred or obscured by sentiment. If your policy means anything, it means the extermination of

40 or 50 million people. This is silly. A much more fruitful line is to try to separate the Prussians from the South Germans. I do not remember that you have used the word 'Prussia' lately. The expressions to which I attach importance and intend to give emphasis to are 'Nazi tyranny' and 'Prussian militarism'. I heard from many quarters that the line you took in your broadcast could not possibly be sustained by united public opinion here" (PRO PREM 4/23/2 January 7, 1940).

14. Cf. PRO F.O. 371/46864 "The German Character" (March 1945); PRO PREM 8/216 "Notes on the German situation" (1 May, 1946; PRO F.O. 1030/253 Memorandum of the Foreign Office "The Future of Germany: The Problem of Unity or Division of Germany" (April 19, 1950); PRO F.O. 371/103 666/C 1071/67 (June 1953); additional information on the "Problem of Germany" in the policy of the Western Allies will be provided by the more recent studies of Joseph Foschepoth (Ed.), *Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage* (Gottingen, Zurich, 1985); Adolf Birke, "Geschichtsauffassung und Deutschlandbild im Foreign Office Research Department" (Bernd-Jurgen Wendt (Ed.), *Das britische Deutschlandbild im Wandel des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Bochum, 1984), 181-197); idem, "Warum Deutschlands Demokratie versagte" (*Historisches Jahrbuch* 103/1983, 395-410); Joseph Foschepoth/Rolf Steininger (Ed.), *Britische Deutschland- und Besatzungspolitik 1945-1949*. (Paderborn, 1985); John H. Backer, *The Decision to Divide Germany* (Durham, 1978) Idem, *Winds of History. The Germany Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay* (New York, 1983).
15. For the problems of definition cf. Wolf D. Gruner, *Die deutsche Frage. Ein Problem der europäischen Geschichte seit 1800*. (Munchen, 1985), p. 15ff.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 15ff.
17. Alfred Grosser, *Germany in our Time. A Political History of the Post War Years* (New York, 1973), p. 1.
18. Cf. Richard von Weizsacker. *Die Deutschen und ihre Identität. Vortrag des Bundespräsidenten auf dem 21. Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchentag am 8.6.1985* (Press- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin Nr. 64/p. 537-544 (12. Juni 1985), p. 539.
19. Cf. Wolfgang Schauble, *Deutschlandpolitik im funften Jahrzehnt der Teilung. Vortrag am 15. Juni 1985 auf der Tagung des Politischen Clubs der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing* (Press- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin Nr. 70/p. 589-600, p. 596).
20. Theodor Schieder, *Die Deutsche Frage* (Meyer's Enzyklopäisches Lexikon vol. 6/1978, p. 521-527, p. 521).
21. Lothar Gall, "Die 'Deutsche Frage' im 19. Jahrhundert" (1871-Fragen and die deutsche Geschichte (1971), p. 19-52, p. 19 f.).
22. A.J.P. Taylor, *The Course of German History* (London, 1971/1945), p. 9 (preface to the 1961 edition).
23. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
27. John K. Sowden, *The German Question, 1945-1973. Continuity in Change*. (New York, 1975), p. 17; cf. also Robert F. Osgood's definition in his introduction to Charles R. Planck, *The Changing Status of German Reunification in Western Diplomacy, 1955-1966* (Baltimore, 1967); James B. Joll, "The Course of German History" (R.F. Hopwood (Ed.), *Germany: People and Politics, 1950-1945* (Edinburgh, London 1968), p. 27-41).
28. Anonymous, *Deutscher Kaiser* (Freiburg, 1862), p. 7.
29. Anonymous (A.B.), *Die Deutsche Frage* (Hamburg, 1859), p. 30.
30. Heinrich von Treitschke, "Bundesstaat und Einheitsstaat" (*Historische und Politische*

Aufsätze, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1886, p. 71-214, p. 152).

31. Cf. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (hereafter HoC Britain) vol. 392, 89ff: "Twice within our lifetime, and also three times in that of our fathers ... (the Germans) have plunged the world into their wars of expansion and aggression. They combine in the most deadly manner the qualities of the warrior and the slave. They do not value freedom themselves, and the spectacle of it in others is hateful to them. Whenever they become strong they seek their prey, and they will follow with an iron discipline anyone who will lead them to it. The core of Germany is Prussia. There is the source of the recurring pestilence. But we do not war with races as such. We war against tyranny, and we seek to preserve ourselves from destruction ... Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism are the two main elements in German life which must be absolutely destroyed. They must be absolutely rooted out if Europe and the world are to be spared a third and still more frightful conflict" (col. 90); PRO F.O. 371/46864 "The German Character"; PRO F.O. 371/22986/C 19495 "The Origins of Germany's fifth War" (R. Vansittart, 28 November, 1939); Roosevelt, Morgenthau and some of the top advisers in the Administration believed that Nazism was the most aggressive and cruelest form the German character and that militarism and nazi ideology had permanently tainted three generations of Germans. Roosevelt stated: "We have got to be tough with Germany and I mean the German people, not just the Nazis. You either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can't just go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past" (Memorandum by Morgenthau of conversation with Roosevelt August 19, 1944, printed in Warrner F. Kimball, *Sworcs or Ploughshares? The Morgenthauptan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946.* (Philadelphia, 1976), p. 95-97, p. 96); Idem (Ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt. *The Complete Correspondence.* 3 vols. (Princeton, 1984), III, p. 315-319); Rainer A Blasius (Compiler), *Donkumente zur Deutschlandpolitik. I. Reihe/Band 1: Britische Deutschlandpolitik, 3. September 1939 bis 31. Dezember 1941* (Frankfurt a. Main, 1984); Lothar Kettenacker, "Preußen-Deutschland also britisches Feindbild im Zweiten Weltkrieg" (Wendt, *Das britisches Deutschlandbild,* p. 145-168). Idem, *Krieg zur Friedenssicherung,* (Gottingen, 1989).
32. Like in the case of "Germany" there is no agreed on political and geographical definition of "Mitteleuropa" (Central Europe). Cf. Henry Cord Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815-1945* (The Hague, 1955), p. 1 ff., K. Sinnhuber, *Transactions of the Institute for British Geographers No. 20/1956,* 19, Fig. 2; the area indicated in the *Journal of Central European Affairs,* 1941 ff. and the articles printed; on the recent revival of the "Mitteleuropa" - idea see Timothy Garton Ash, *Does Central Europe exist?* (The New York Review of Books vol. XXXIII No. 15, October 9, 1986, p. 45-52) Garton-Ash was one of the experts invited by Mrs. Thatcher to the Chequers Meeting of March 25, 1990 (s. the published memo in the *Sunday Independent* of July 15, 1990); Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, "The Permanent Quest for Security" (*AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review,* vol. 4 (3,4): *Germany: Keystone to European Security. A Symposium* ed. by Joyce Lasky Shub (Washington, London, 1983), p. 35-39, p. 36ff.).
33. Quoted from Richard von Weizsacker, "The Germans and their Identity", speech at the 21st Convention of the Evangelical Church in Germany', Dusseldorf, June 8, 1985 (excerpt) (*Statements & Speeches, Federal Republic of Germany* vol. VII No. 20, June 25, 1985). I am very grateful to the German Information Center in New York for providing the English version of the advanced text.
34. By "Germany" in this context will be understood: The states of the German Confederation in the take-off stage of the Industrial Revolution, which began later compared to Germany's Western neighbours Britain, Belgium and France; since the break-up of the German

- Confederation the kleindeutsch Reich; after World War II the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR being major industrial countries and since July 1, 1990 the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR as one economic entity.
35. James J. Sheehan, "What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography" (*Journal of Modern History* 53/1 (1981), p. 1-23, p. 22ff.).
  36. Fritz Fellner/George E. Schmid, "Ende oder Epoche der deutschen Geschichte" (*Zeitgeschichte* 1977/78, p. 158-171); cf. also Fritz Fellner, "Das Problem der österreichischen Nation nach 1945" (*Die Rolle der Nation in der deutschen Geschichte und Geogenwart* ed. by Otto Busch and James J. Sheehan (Berlin, 1985), p. 193-220).
  37. Karl Dietrich Erdmann, *Drei Staaten - Zwei Nationen - Ein Volk* (University of Kiel, 1985), p. 5.
  38. Wolf D. Gruner, *Deutsche Frage*, p. 63ff.; idem, "Europa, Deutschland und die internationale Ordnung im 19. Jahrhundert" (*Politik und Kultur* 11/2 (1984), p. 24-35); idem, "Die deutschen Einzelstaaten und der Deutsche Bund" (*Land und Reich, Stamm und Nation. Probleme und Perspektiven bayerischer Geschichte. Festgabe für Max Spindler zum 90. Geburtstag*, ed. by Andreas Kraus (Munich, 1984) III, p. 19-35); idem, "Die Verfassungsordnung des Deutschen Bundes - Modell für die Wiedervereinigung?" (*Politik und Kultur* 13/4 (1986), p. 64-92); idem, "Die deutsche Politik Ludwigs I." (*Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte* 49/2/ (1986), p. 449-507); idem, "Die Rolle und Funktion von 'Kleinstaaten' im internationalen System 1815-1914: Die Bedeutung des Endes der deutschen Klein- und Mittelstaaten für die europäische Ordnung" (Hamburg, 1985); idem, "The Revolution of July and Southern Germany" (*The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, XIII Proceedings 1983* ed. by Clarence B. Davis (Athens/Georgia, 1985), p. 509-546); idem, "Bayern, Preußen und die süddeutschen Staaten 1866-1870" (*Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte* XXXVII/1974, p. 799-827). Idem, "Deutschland und das europäische Gleichgewicht seit dem 18. Jahrhundert", in: *Gleichgewicht in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. by Wolf D. Gruner, (Hamburg, 1989), p. 60-133. Idem, "Der Deutsche Bund und die europäische Friedensordnung", (*Deutscher Bund und deutsche Frage 1915-1966*, ed. by Helmut Rumpler, (Vienna 1990), p. 235-263); idem, *Der Deutsche Bund, die deutschen Verfassungsstaaten und die Rheinkrise von 1940. Überlegungen zur deutschen Dimension einer europäischen Krise*, (*Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte* 53/1 (1990), p. 51-78).
  39. Arnold Herman Ludwig Heeren, *A Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies* (Oxford, 1834, based on the 1809 second German edition), p. 10ff.; more detailed idem, *Der Deutsche Bund in seinen Verhältnissen zu dem europäischen Staatensystem, bey Eröffnung des Bundestages dargestellt* (Göttingen, 1916), p. 10-12. The essential passages quoted in Wolf D. Gruner, "Der Deutsche Bund als 'Centralstaat von Europa' und die Sicherung de Friedens. Aspekte britisch-deutscher Beziehungen in der Krise von 1819/20", in: *Großbritannien und Deutschland, Festschrift für Paul Kluge* ed. by Lothar Kettenacker, Manfred Schlenke, Hellmut Seier (Munich, 1981) p. 79-102.
  40. A.B., *Die Deutsche Frage*, p. 27.
  41. Cf. Gruner, *Deutsche Frage*, p. 82ff. Gruner, *Deutschland und das europäische Gleichgewicht*, p. 109ff. Paul W. Schroeder, "The Lost Intermediaries. The Impact of 1870 on the European System" (*The International History Review* VI/1 (1984), p. 1-27); Gruner, "Ende der deutschen Klein- und Mittelstaaten", p. 49ff.
  42. Cf. Wolf D. Gruner, *Deutscher Bund*, p. 23ff. Reginald Lang, "The Germanic Confederation and a Europaen Confederation today" (*The South Atlantic Quarterly* 45/1946, p. 434-442).

43. Frederic Harrison, "Bismarckism: or The Policy of Blood and Iron" (Fortnightly Review 14 (December 1870), p. 631-649, p. 641); cf. also Wolf D. Gruner, "Vom Deutschen Bund zum Deutschen Reich: Aspekte eines britischen Deutschlandbildes vor der Reichsgründung" and Thomas Kleinknecht, "Die Gründung des Deutschen Reiches 1870/71 aus der Sicht des britischen Gelehrtenliberalismus" (Das britische Deutschlandbild im Wandel des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. by Bernd Jürgen Wendt (Bochum, 1985), p. 55-78, p. 81-102).
44. Cf. Lothar Kettenacker, Krieg zur Friedenssicherung. Die Deutschlandplanungen der britischen Regierung während des Zweiten Weltkrieges, (Göttingen 1989), p. 486ff.
45. Printed in: The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, ed. by Norman H. Baynes (New York, 1969), vol. II, p. 1941-2058.
46. Thilo Vogelsang, "Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933" (Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2/1954, p. 397-436, p. 434ff).
47. Foreign Office, Weekly Reports June 1940.
48. Cf. the German press of the time and journals and yearbook like "Jahrbuch für Auswärtige Politik" and "Jahrbuch der Weltpolitik" and articles by Walter Frank in "Das neue Europa".
49. Karl Richard Ganzer, "Das Reich als europäische Ordnungsmacht" (Hamburg, 1941). There was also a pocket edition for the Wehrmacht. There were publications on Germany's historic boundaries (cf. e.g. Paul Kirn, Karl Griewank, Ernst Moritz Klingenberg and others).
50. Otto Westphal, Das Reich. Aufgang und Vollendung (Stuttgart, Berlin, 1941) vol.1: Germanentum und Kaisertum (all published).
51. Cf. Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, Serie E 1941-1945. vols. I-V (Göttingen, 1976 ff.) hereafter ADAP and especially Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Bonn (hereafter PAAA) Nachlaß Cecil von Renthe-Fink, vol. 13. In a note for the Foreign Secretary von Renthe stated in September 1939: "The present war is also a war for European unity and freedom". Terms like "economic solidarity", "close European economic cooperation", "fight for European economic freedom", "foundation of a European market and "European currency units" (Verrechnungseinheiten) over and over appear in the documents. Cf. also ADAP Series E vol. VI, note by Clodius, August 20, 1943 (p.419-421) and *ibid.*, vol. V, note Ribbentrop, March 21, 1943, "European Commonwealth", (p.437-441). Members of this commonwealth would be Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, Finland, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Spain, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Croatia and Serbia.
52. International Military Tribunal (hereafter IMT) vol. XXIX PS - 2233, Hans Frank, "Der Rechtsgedanke und die europäische Neuordnung" (Heidelberg, July 21, 1942), col. 534-538, col. 535; and IMT vol. XXIX PS 2233, cols. 522-529: "Das Recht und die europäische Erneuerung" (University of Vienna, July 1, 1942).
53. *Ibid.* IMT vol. XXIX PS - 2233, "Der Rechtsgedanke und die europäische Neuordnung" p.535.
54. Cf. PAAA Nachlaß v. Renthe vol. 11, "Drafts concerning the foundation of a European Commonwealth". The concept and the original for this memorandum will be found in this file and two annexes. The "Leitsätze" of the Committee on Europe of the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) printed in Hans-Alof Jacobsen, "Der Weg zur Teilung der Welt. Politik und Strategie 1939-1945 (Koblenz, Bonn, 1977), p. 272f. are referred to in the original file as "Guidelines for Propaganda" (September 9, 1943). The aims and purposes of the concept of a "European Commonwealth" were twofold: To give the nations of continental Europe an interesting perspective for a European order after the war and to fight allied plans for European reconstruction. Thus von Renthe-Fink in a note for Ribbentrop demanded "a constructive plan for the solution of the European problem" which would make clear

- Germany's intentions as to the constitutional framework of a "European Commonwealth" ("associative solution" and "voluntary union") and at the same time "mobilize all European resources for our victory". The Foreign Office officials deemed this to be very important in view of the critical military situation. The other nations of Europe had to be persuaded that Germany was the true protagonist for "a new and better order, which would provide for all European nations their legitimate position" (note September 9, 1943).
55. Cf. Blasius, "Britische Deutschlandpolitik I", p. 586ff., passim and idem, *Britische Deutschlandpolitik 1.1.1942-31.12.1942*, (Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik I. Bd.3 1.2.(Frankfurt a.Main 1989) passim).
  56. Samuel I. Rosenman (Compiler), *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York, 1950), vol. X,p. 438-445. On the early Germany policy of the United States cf. Marie Louise Goldbach (Compiler), *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik Series I. vol.2: "Amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik"* (August 11, 1941 to December 31, 1942), (Frankfurt a.M., 1986).
  57. Inter alia cf. Lothar Kettenacker (Ed), 'Andere Deutschland' im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Emigration und Widerstand in internationaler Perspektive (Stuttgart, 1977); Idem, *Krieg zur Friedenssicherung: Backer, Decision to divide Germany*; Detlef Junker (ed.), *Deutschland und die USA 1890/1985* (Heidelberg American Studies Background Papers No.2, 1985).
  58. Henry Morgenthau jr., *Germany is our Problem* (New York, 1945); Summer Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York, 1944).
  59. For sober and thoughtful approaches cf. e.g. Edward Halled Carry, *Conditions of Peace* (London, 1942); James Kerr Pollock, *What shall be done with Germany?* (Carlton College, Northfield, Minnesota, 1944); Kurt R. Grossmann/Hans Jacob, "The German Exiles and the 'German Problem'" (*Journal of Central European Affairs* 4 (1944/45), p.165-185), p.18f.: "It is essential for the economic future of Europe and the world that Germany's productive power be conserved. If it were destroyed, the economic conditions would become hopelessly depressed in all countries of Europe ... Germany's productive strength should be integrated in an international system of production and consumption.."
  60. PRO F.O. 371/22986 "The Origins of Germany's Fifth War" (Memo by Lord Vansittart, November 28, 1939); PRO F.O. 408/70 No. 84 "The Nature of the Beast" (Vansittart's Memo of March 14, 1940).
  61. PRO F.O. 371/28899 "Statement to counter the German 'New Order'" (Keynes, December 1, 1940), most passages printed in Blasius, "Britische Deutschlandpolitik" I. pp.243-246.
  62. Proposal of the Interdivisional Committee, September 23, 1943 (US Department of State, *Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945*, pp.558-560, p.560).
  63. PRO F.O. 371/39080/C 16550 "Confederation, Federation and the Decentralization of the German State and the Dismemberment of Prussia" (November 27, 1944). Lothar Kettenacker has first drawn attention to the 'Prussian' factor in British policy during World War II. cf. Lothar Kettenacker et al., "Großbritannien und Deutschland" pp.312-340; idem, "Die anglo-amerikanischen Planungen für die Kontrolle Deutschlands" (Foschepoth, *Kalter Krieg* pp. 66-87) and in his habilitation thesis, idem, *Krieg zur Friedenssicherung*.
  64. Pollock, *What shall do done?* p.6.
  65. PRO F.O. 371/39080/C 16550 "Confederation".
  66. Cf. the files of the British War Cabinet (Cabinet Conclusions and annexes PRO CAB 65/51, 52), the documents for "Argonaut" (code name for the Yalta Conference) PRO F.O. 371/50838 and "Termian" (code name for the Potsdam Conference) PRO F.O. 934/1 F.O. 934/1 F.O. 2, F.O. 4; PRO F.O. 934/4 (20) Economic Question Germany; PRO F.O. 934/6 and PRO F.O. 371/50864.

67. PRO CAB 87/67 (July 19, 1944).
68. Cf. the Memorandum "Will German go communist?" printed in Kettenacker, *Das 'Andere Deutschland'*, pp.212-217.
69. PRO F.O. 371/28899, Keynes, "Counter the 'New Order'" (December 1, 1940).
70. Cf. Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. VI (1943/44) (Boston, 1945), pp. 228ff. It is quite interesting to see how the German Foreign Office reacted to the Moscow Declaration cf. PAAA NachlaB v. Renthe-Fink vol. 11 note concerning considerations how to counteract a "Propaganda Initiative" of the Moscow Conference on European questions (October 13, 1943) and the reactions to the Moscow declaration *ibid.* Note for the foreign Secretary, November 16, 1943 and PAAA NachlaB v. Renthe-Fink vol. 12. Memorandum by v. Tippelskirch concerning the restitution of Austria in the Moscow Communiqué. Quite useful still Heinrich Sieglar, *Austria, Problems and Achievements since 1945* (Bonn, Wien, Zurich, 1969).
71. Department of State (Ed.), *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter FRUS) *Diplomatic Papers 1944*, vol. 1: General (Washington, 1967). pp.713ff. (*Dumbarton Oaks Conversations*), pp.614ff. (*Organization for Peace and Security*); *FRUS Diplomatic Papers 1944*, vol. II, General: Economic and social Matters (Washington, 1967), pp.106-135 (*Bretton Woods, International Monetary Fund*); PRO CAB 65/50, 51; *FRUS, Diplomatic Papers 1945*, vol. I, General: The United Nations, pp.108ff.
72. Cf. PRO F.O. 934/1-6 (Potsdam); PRO CAB 65/51, 52; PRO F.O. 371/50838-39 (Yalta); PRO CAB 119/11 (Yalta); PRO F.O. 371/50863-50867 (Potsdam); some of the British material on Potsdam has now been published by Rohan Butler/M.E. Pelly (Eds.), *Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series I vol. I: "The Conference at Potsdam, July-August 1945"* (London, 1984) including material on microfiche; still useful *FRUS, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945* (Washington, 1960) 2 vols.; *FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945* (Washington, 1955); *FRUS, Europe vol. IIIV* (Washington, 196ff); on the special issue of reparation cf. Otto Nubel, *Die amerikanische Reparationspolitik gegenüber Deutschland 1941-1945* (Frankfurt a.M., 1980); Josef Foschepoth, "Britische Deutschlandpolitik zwischen Jalta und Potsdam (*Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 30/1982, pp.675-714. *Alliierte Deutschland-und Reparationspolitik und die Anfänge der westdeutschen Außenwirtschaft* (Dusseldorf, 1978).
73. PRO F.O. 934/6 Note by the Foreign Office "Considerations affecting procedure for reaching a "peace settlement".
74. PRO F.O. 371/344460/C 11296. German translation of the Memorandum of September 27, 1943 dealing with the future of Germany printed in Jacobsen, *Weg zur Teilung der Welt*, pp.318-320/ Quoted also by Lothar Kettenacker, "Großbritannien und die zukünftige Kontrolle Deutschlands" (Foschepoth/Steininger, *Britische Deutschland - und Besatzungspolitik*), p. 39.
75. PRO F.O. 371/39116/C 9330 (Note of the F.O. July 15, 1944) printed in: Kettenacker, *Das andere Deutschland*, pp.203-210. See also Lothar Kettenacker, *Krieg zur Friedenssicherung*.
76. PRO F.O. 934/6 "Peace Settlement".
77. *Ibid.* Similar statement by Foreign Office officials can also be found over and over in the files.
78. Cit. in Backer, *Decision to divide Germany*, p. 26.
79. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1945), p. 1622.
80. An interesting view is taken by Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, an economic expert of the Foreign Office on February 14, 1941: "(Amery) does not solve the essential problem of how Germany can be the centre of European economy without becoming politically paramount and

therefore a danger to our own security. My own solution would be to divide Germany along the line of the Elbe and create a Western and Eastern European economic sphere; the one based on the coal and iron area of the Ruhr, Rhineland and Lorraine, and the other based on the coal and iron area of Silesia, South Poland and Czechoslovakia" (quoted from Blasius, *Britische Deutschlandpolitik* 1, p.212 n.8).

81. Cf. for these aspects the more recent studies by Dennis L. Bark / David R. Gress, *A History of West Germany*, 2 vols., (Oxford 1989), vol.1: From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963, vol.2: Democracy and its Discontents, 1963-1988; Wolfram Hanrieder, *Germany, American, Europe. Forty Years of German Foreign Policy*, (New Haven, 1989); Raymond Poidevin (Ed.), *Origins of the European Integration*, (Paris, 1989); Klaus Schwabe (Ed.), *The Beginnings of the Schuman-Plan*, (Baden-Baden, 1988); Enrico Serra (Ed.), *The Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome*, (Milano, 1990); Simon Bulmer / William Paterson, *The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community*, (London, 1987). For the GDR cf. David Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally*, (London, 1983); idem (Ed.), *Honecker's Germany*, (London, 1985); David Childs et al. (Eds.), *East Germany in Comparative Perspective*, (London, 1989); quite useful J.K.A. Thomaneck / J. Mellis (Ed.), *Politics, Society and Government in the German Democratic Republic*, (Oxford, New York, Munich, 1989).
82. Translated from the French text "La resolution sur la politique internationale" published in "Peuple" November 20, 1951. In addition cf. the reports from Brussels to the Auswärtige Amt (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn (PAAA) Abt.2/245).
83. Cf. PAAA Abt.2/245 Report of November,19,1951. For the problem of Germany and European integration also cf. Wolf D. Gruner, *Deutscher Nationalstaat und Europäische Integration*, (Deutschland und Europa nach dem 2. Weltkrieg. Entwicklungen, Verflechtungen, Konflikte, ed by Heiner Timmermann, (Saarbrücken, 1990), pp. 69-101).
84. Cf. e.g. Cf. e.g. the debates in the Danish Folketing in 1951 or in the Dutch Chambers.
85. Cf. PRO F.O. 371/24370/C 5155 "Post War Security" (12.3.1940).
86. Cf. Bundesrat und Europäische Gemeinschaften. Dokumente, ed. by the Sekretariat of the Bundesrat, (Bonn, 1988), p. 29ff.,pp. 105ff.
87. Richard von Weizsacker, *German Identity*, p.4.
88. Cf. Wolfgang Venohr, *Die deutsche Einheit kommt bestimmt* (Bergisch-Gladbach, 1982); Herbert Ammon, "Plädoyer für die deutsche Einheit durch Blockfreiheit" (*Deutschland Archiv* 8/1983, pp.820-833); Ulrich Albrecht, "European Security and the German Question" (*World Journal*, Spring 1984, 575-602); Herbert Ammon/Theodor Schweisfurth (Ed.), *Friedensvertrag-Deutsche Konföderation europäisches Sicherheitssystem* (Starnberg, 1985); from Steininger's more recent studies: Rolf Steininger, *Eine Chance zur Wiedervereinigung? Die Stalinnote vom 10. März 1952* (Bonn, 1985).
89. Dietrich Stobbe, "Germany - A Challenge to the Superpowers" (*West Germany. East Germany and the German Question. Five Lectures at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. German Issues I* (Washington, 1986), pp.13-22,p.13).
90. Printed in the "Süddeutsche Zeitung" No. 208, September 11, 1986.
91. Cf. the respective statements at the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs and of defence since the Brussels meetings of November 28-29,1989 (Nato Press Service, Press Communiqués); Survey of Current Affairs vol.20, no. 4, April 1990, p. 130f. "German Unification and East-West-Relations"; Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, Bulletin Nr. 74, June 13, 1990: "Meeting of Ministers of Nato at Turnbury", pp. 645-649; Bulletin Nr.90, July 10,1990: "London Declaration of the Nato Summit", p.777ff.
92. For the debate on the restructuring of the "Länder" (States) of the FRG and the creation of 3 länder instead of 5 on the former territory of the GDR cf. Karlheinz Blaschke, *Alte*



- Lander - Neue Lander. Zur territorialen Neugliederung der DDR, (Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 27/90, 29.6.1990, pp. 39-54) and the debate opened by the Hamburg senator for Federal Affairs Gobrecht, based on considerations and statements of the enquete commissions of the Bundestag, headed by Luther and Ernst since the early 1950s (cf. e.g. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Munchen (BHStAM), StK 110 096ff 'New Boundaries for the Lander').
93. English text of the speech commemorating the end of the war on May 8, 1985, provided by the Office of the Federal President.
  94. Cf. Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, Bulletin No. 134, November 29, 1989, pp. 1141-1148 and Suddeutsche Zeitung No. 274, November 29, 1989 p.3.
  95. Cf. "Le Figaro" 181.1.1990 "Apres les bouleversements a l'Est, quelle Europe? Quatre projets et des ombres. La 'confederation europeene' apres 'L'Europe de l'Atlantique a L'Oural'".
  96. Michel Vauzelle, "Paris, Berlin", "Le Monde" 7.3.1990, p.2 cf. also Jean Francois Deniau, "Misson Europe", idid.
  97. "A Vision of a New Europe". Michel Rocard interviewed by Henry Muller and Christopher Redman ("Time" April 2,1990) p. 24f.
  98. Cf. Ian Davidson, "Delors puts federalist mark at end of German Question" ("Financial Times", 25.1.1990).
  99. Cf. E.S.Browning / Mark M. Nelson, "Mitterand calls for EC pact on Political Union by 1993" (The Wallstreet Journal 26 March 1990).
  100. Cf. Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic, Bonn, Bulletin No. 84, 30.6.1990, "The European Council in Dublin", p. 717ff.
  101. Davidson, Delors federalist mark.
  102. Terence Roth / Mark M. Nelson, "Germany Prepares for a Leading Role" (The Wallstreet Journal, Europe, July 9, 1990).
  103. Cf. Weizsacker's speech commemorating the 8th of May 1945, his Address to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 23 October, 1985 and his speech to both Houses of Parliament, London, July 2, 1986 (The House Magazine July 4, 10-12). I am very grateful to President Weizsacker and his staff for providing English versions of the speeches over the last few years.
  104. Weozsacker, 8. Mai 1945, 9.
  105. Cf. Eberhard Schulz, Die deutsche Nation in Europa (Bonn, 1982); idem, "Unfinished business: the German National Question and the future of Europe (International Affairs 60/3 (Summer 1981) 391-402).
  106. Heinrich Windelen, Basic aspects of German reunification (Bonn, 1984), 13. Idem, "The New Policy Towards the East - Doubts and Fears" (United Europe faces the East ed. by Alfred Domes and Jerzy Hauptmann. East European Monographs 3. (Park College, Kansas City, Missouri, 1982), 81-92). Walter Scheel (Ed.), The Division of Germany and Europe. Background and prospects. (Bonn, 1984).
  107. Printed in Suddeutsche Zeitung No. 208, September 11, 1986.
  108. Cf. for example Dirk Schneider, "Gedanken zur Deutschlandpolitik der Grunen" (Zentralverband Mittel - und Ostdeutscher 1084 (3/4), 9-12, 21). Interview with Petra Kelly (German Studies Newsletter 7) March, 1986), Special Issue on Confrontation with the Past, 25ff.)
  109. Gustav Lang, "Geteiltes Deutschland im geteilten Europa in der geteilten Welt-Ist die Wiedervereinigung machbar und wunschbar? Part III (Der Bund), Bern, No. 57 March 10, 1986, 2).