

Helena Lindholm Schulz

*One Year Into
Self-Government*

**Perceptions of the
Palestinian Political Elite**

PASSIA

**Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of
International Affairs**

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PREFACE

This study forms part of research being carried out for my doctoral dissertation. Data collection in the form of qualitative interviews was carried out during the academic year 1994/1995.

I wish to express my deep gratitude to all the people that I have interviewed and whose names appear in this text for being so generous with their time and their thoughts. The research would not have been possible had it not been for their patience and generosity.

My gratitude also goes to Birzeit University where I had the opportunity to be affiliated as a guest researcher during the academic year 1994/1995, as well as to the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where I had similar arrangements.

Needless to say, I bear the full responsibility for any misquotation or misinterpretation.

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Jerusalem, May 1995

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INTRODUCTION

Palestinian nationalism finds itself in a new era with the implementation of the agreements on self-government, following the Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed in Washington on September 13, 1993. It is being transformed from a revolutionary resistance movement into a state-building nationalism. This process is bound to unleash internal conflicts and dilemmas. Whether the current process will lead to a Palestinian state or not is for the future to tell. The establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the new activities of governance, authority, legitimacy, in addition to Palestinian state-building aspirations are underlining today's debate. The establishment of state institutions is often turbulent and provides the potential for the emergence of previously latent conflicts. For the last century, Palestinians have found themselves in a complicated and uneven process of nation-building, and for the past 30 years in an equally difficult state-building process (cf. Brand, 1988). Until 1994, the most important aspects of statehood were lacking, namely internationally recognized control over territory and population.

This paper deals with the *effect of the self-rule agreements on Palestinian nationalism* through an analysis of *political discourse* as revealed in a number of interviews with representatives of the PNA as well as of political factions, i.e. the political

elite, which defines nationalism in the West Bank and Gaza.¹ The underlying question is: *how have the self-rule arrangements effected Palestinian nationalism?* How is self-rule perceived as a step towards a solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Palestinian statehood? How is the other side perceived, i.e. the Israelis? How is the PNA perceived and how are internal relations affected by the agreements?

Three major political trends are discernable : 1) mainstream nationalism represented by the PNA, Fateh and FIDA, which can in turn be divided into official and popular, 2) oppositional nationalism, which consists of a) leftist/Marxist opposition, and b) Islamic opposition, and 3) reformism, consisting of the PPP, independents, and individuals from Fateh and FIDA. These political streams are seen as variants of Palestinian nationalism since the priority of all is related to the territorial unit of Palestine, the national struggle, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Islamic movements are seen as a form of nationalism, as they seek cultural authenticity and preservation.

¹ The study is based on qualitative interviews with representatives of Palestinian political factions and the PNA as well as political figures with no clear factional affiliation. The basic idea is to let the respondents 'speak', in order to contribute to the Palestinian national narrative at an important juncture in Palestinian history, in order to answer the question: how are those agreements perceived today, i.e. in contemporary history among Palestinian political elite? My intention is not only to collect and present the different modes of discourse and narrative, but also to critically examine them.

It is difficult to estimate the actual support for the various factions in the Palestinian society. According to a poll conducted by the Nablus-based Center for Palestine Research and Studies (poll #16, March 1995), 67% of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza supported continued negotiations with Israel, while 21% opposed. Divided on a factional basis, 84% of Fateh supporters, 37.6% of Hamas supporters, 54.8% of Islamic Jihad, 66.7% of DFLP and 45.1% of PFLP sympathizers supported continued negotiations.² There was a rise in support during the first months of 1995 after a decline during Autumn of 1994. Fateh has enjoyed increased support at the expense of the opposition since early 1995. In fact, the only factions to be considered as political contenders are Fateh and Hamas, although the gap between them is large. The PFLP has lost support since 1993, and the remaining factions have negligible support (according to the Palestine Research and Studies Center, Nablus). An opinion poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center found 37.7% support for Fateh and 15.3% for Hamas (*Palestine Report*, May 28, 1995).

²

There is a debate within Palestinian society whether these figures are correct or whether they are being amended as a result of both Israeli and PNA-pressure. It is not for me to determine the correctness of the figures, suffice it to say that the Center for Palestine Research and Studies is one of the few institutes continuously conducting opinion polls. A more relevant criticism is related to the reliability of the methods used. In its early phase, polls were conducted on the 'street', raising serious problems with reliability and validity. Since no population registers exist, the sample still provides a problem. Therefore, the figures should basically be considered as indicators.

1. FROM INTIFADA TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

The *Intifada*³, one of the most important phenomena in Palestinian political history, represented popular nationalism⁴, undirected as it was by both the Tunis-based PLO and the prominent personalities in the inside. As Rosemary Sayigh put it:

One of the most striking characteristics of the Palestinian national struggle has been the spontaneity of its uprisings, and the problematic relationship between these and the national leadership (Sayigh, 1994, p. 5).

Soon, however, it became under the control of both power structures (e.g. Jarbawi, 1990), which also accounts for the deterioration of the Intifada.⁵ *Intifada* in the inside replaced *sumud*, steadfastness, based on attachment to the land and refusal to leave (which was a more passive form of resistance than the active-oriented revolution with its focus in the outside, although revolution, liberation and armed struggle entered also the interior).

³ There is a vast literature on the *Intifada* in its early phase: Lockman & Beinun (1989); McDowall (1989); Nasser & Heacock (1990); Peretz (1990); Schiff & Ya'ari (1990); Hunter (1993). Few writers seem to have been willing to account for the negative aspects of the uprising. After 'Oslo', Palestinians are in a process of reconsidering and reexamining the *Intifada*.

⁴ For an historical view of Palestinian nationalism as well as PLO-ideology and discourse see: Porath (1974); Lesch (1979); Johnson (1982); Cobban (1984); Muslih (1988); Khalaf (1991); Kimmmerling & Migdal (1993); Lindholm (1994).

⁵ Naturally, external factors played an equally important role with harsh Israeli repressive counter-measures, international pressure and the Gulf War.

With the Intifada, Islamic politics⁶ gained in influence and began to both compete with secular Palestinian nationalism and inform Palestinianism with a new meaning. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the popular resistance nationalism of the Intifada, was replaced by the official negotiating nationalism of the Madrid conference and the Washington process. This continued with the secret Oslo channel, leading to the DOP and the subsequent Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Cairo Agreement). The decline of the Intifada, the decrease of international and Arab support in the wake of the Gulf War, and reduced economic resources led the Palestinian leadership to change strategy and opt for real-politics, diplomacy and compromise. Official discourse replaced popular, and the competition between the exterior and the interior became more visible.

The period following the signing of the DOP and the Gaza Jericho agreement is described in the DOP as a *transitional* phase, i.e. a period of transformation with as yet unclear guiding principles. It is also a period of confusion and insecurity. What has happened is *not the end* of the occupation, but there is *less* of it. A Palestinian state has not been established, but there is *more* Palestinian (self-)rule. Both territorially and functionally Palestinian rule has expanded and Israeli rule and presence has diminished, although it is equally true that both

⁶ For good accounts of the Islamic movements in English see Abu-Amr (1994); Legrain (1990, 1991, 1994).

territorially and functionally, Palestinian rule is severely limited. Despite all criticism raised against the agreements and their implementation, it should be emphasized that *official Palestinian nationalism is now territorially based*.

No firm or clear structure has come out of this, but a process leading in a new direction has started. Needless to say, this course of events will not *necessarily* lead to Palestinian statehood. Negotiations on the West Bank continue, and it is still unclear what kind of structures will be established. It also remains unclear whether the current Israeli government would be willing to relinquish the West Bank or whether limited autonomy will occur, along with a ghettoization of the West Bank. What is most important regarding these agreements is the *change in direction* of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The PNA held its first cabinet meeting in Gaza City on 26th June 1994. Its members were appointed by Yasir Arafat, balancing out not only the inside and the outside, but also family loyalties, regional affiliations, and factional (Fateh) interests. The *Intifada*-generation has basically been bypassed, however, with most of the PNA-appointees being rather old revolutionaries and prominent personalities than activists of the Intifada. This gave rise to resentment among young cadres of the uprising as well as prisoners from the period of

armed struggle in the 1970s.⁷ The current coalition consists mainly of Fateh veterans (or parts of Fateh) and the old land-holding elite.

The return of Yasir Arafat on July 1st, 1994, together with soldiers and officers now making up the Palestinian police and security apparatus was an important symbol of the Palestinian right of return. Although the refugee issue remains unresolved under the current agreements and belongs to the questions which are to be dealt with in the final status negotiations, the return of thousands of Palestinians to the West Bank and Gaza was a sign that it is *possible* to return to the homeland. With the establishment of the PNA, symbols of statehood emerged, such as the flag, a cabinet and ministers, radio and television⁸ stations, stamps, a Palestinian identity card, car registration plates, and Palestinian banks. All of these are instrumental in *representing* a nationalism from above. The most potent (and perhaps also the most debated) symbol of statehood is, however, the Palestinian police. This police force, recognized by Israel and the international community, represent a body with sole legitimate use of violence - a term which is one of Weber's most well-established criteria for statehood.

⁷ Conversation with former Fateh-activists in the 'armed struggle' and the *Intifada*.

⁸ A struggle has emerged in the media, with several newspapers being established in the wake of the coming of the Authority, but with some of them being closed for certain periods for publishing material critical of the Authority.

According to Giddens (1981), the concept of nation-state or state contains an inherent tendency towards violence. In Autumn of 1994 and Spring of 1995 respectively, the PNA resorted to violence to resolve conflicts with the Islamic opposition. It resorted to the use of repressive measures, such as mass arrests, curbs on press freedom, and restriction on the freedom of movement and assembly.⁹ For the PNA, the situation is particularly delicate being *not yet* a state, with pressure internally (i.e. by the opposition and by high expectations on part of the population) and externally (i.e. Israeli security-related pressure and the donor countries' demand for transparency and accountability).

The following is an examination on how these new structures are perceived and assessed by the Palestinian political elite.

⁹

Palestinian, Israeli as well as international human rights organizations and individuals have criticized the establishment of military courts, random arrests, torture and the death in custody.

2. MAINSTREAM NATIONALISM: STATE-BUILDING

Mainstream nationalists are those who generally support the current peace negotiations (albeit sometimes with severe criticism) and the agreements signed with Israel. Such nationalists are to be found obviously within the PNA and the Fateh and FIDA factions. In turn, this could be divided into official and popular with the PNA representing official nationalism, while, for example, Fateh activists represent a popular version. Fateh is seriously divided on the issue of the agreements, with one part strongly rejecting the signed accords - on basically the same terms as the leftist opposition. The other side of opposition is represented by the part of the PLO/Fateh remaining in exile, such as Farouq Qaddoumi, Hani al-Hassan and others. Fateh, having been the leading force in Palestinian nationalism, is today suffering from its attempt to be an all-embracing movement with no clear socio-economic or ideological programme. Fateh is a micro-cosm of Palestinian society and the divisions in wider society are reflected within the Fateh movement as it has entered a problematic and turbulent period of transformation into something as yet unknown. It is very likely that the Fateh movement will split as a result of the new situation.

The Agreements

The PNA and its supporters stress the transitional character of the current period and underline that the Gaza Jericho first arrangements should be seen as the first step in a longer process, the goal of which is to establish an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. The process of establishing the Palestinian state is perceived as *irreversible*. In the Autumn of 1994, the position was optimistic, although problems were not denied.

In 1989, I was saying that within 5 years time, we will have a passport. This year we have a passport. In the celebrations of the year 2000, the celebrations in Jerusalem will be [] between Israel and a Palestinian state.

(Interview with Faisal Husseini, Fateh, Minister without Portfolio, PNA, October 12, 1994)

Before April 1996, there will be real peace in the region. And the Palestinians will be the bigger winners. Nobody could stop the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. It's coming. But it's wrong to say it's coming the next year or the year after. It's coming. There's no doubt about that. The peace process is absolutely irreversible. [...] At least we started. I don't say that we gained all that we want. But politics is usually the art of the possible, not the impossible or the slogans []. Before Arafat made this courageous step, we made many political mistakes, we missed many golden opportunities. But at least we started.

(Interview with Elias Freij, Mayor of Bethlehem, Minister of Tourism and Antiquities, PNA, November 2, 1994)

The agreements signed with Israel are perceived as a first step from which the Palestinians can negotiate further towards a better deal. What has been achieved is seen as the best possible option under the current circumstances. A common assessment of the agreements is that despite its vagueness, the DOP was a satisfactory agreement. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement signed subsequently in Cairo, however, with its much more detailed articles, was not the preferred outcome of the DOP.

In the statements, there is a pattern of realism or *real-politics*. The agreements constitute facts and must be used as the frame of reference for Palestinian politics from now on. The PNA sees its position as realistic and pragmatic; Palestinian politics have to change towards politics of realism. The PNA is arguing for the normalization of politics .

I liked [the DOP], I really liked it. And to be honest with you, on the personal level, I felt relief. I had doubts that we could reach an agreement with Israel. When it was agreed, I was happy and I noticed the loopholes in the agreement, but I felt that we can build on it, and I supported it 100 %. [But] I think in the Cairo Agreement, there are things that should not be there, according to the Oslo. And I think it was really pushed faster than it should have been. [] It's not agreeing or disagreeing. Politics is to deal with reality. [] Israel evacuated Jericho, and Hajj Ismail¹⁰ entered, and of course as Palestinians we cannot just continue what we have done perfectly well for the last 20 years, say no and yes, good and bad. We're going to have

¹⁰

Head of the Palestinian Police in Jericho.

to say something in the middle and how can we work on it, build up something, fill the loopholes and see the changes and just play politics.

(Interview with Sa'eb Erakat, Fateh, Minister of Municipal and Local Affairs, February 3, 1995)

From the perspective of the PNA the problems following the signing of the agreements have more to do with *implementation* than with the articles of the agreements. Most of the problems are perceived as being caused by Israeli foot-dragging in the continued negotiations, as well as by the continuing occupation in the remaining parts of the West Bank, but there is also an acknowledgment of internal problems. Most PNA and Fateh figures divide the problems into two categories: those created by Israelis, and those caused by the PNA.

I can say that things are unfortunately going very slowly, and with leaving obstacles without moving them, [] there is a long way to go []. The biggest part is of course Israeli [obstacles] []. The other part is concerning us; changing from a revolutionary thinking and administration to a state, and the [fact] that we are coming to a completely destroyed infrastructure.

(Interview with Faisal Husseini, Fateh, Minister without Portfolio, PNA, October 12, 1994)

Faisal Husseini refers to the main problem, which is *how to redirect a revolutionary structure into an administrative apparatus?*

The transformation of revolutionary movements always witnesses problems. The unique characteristics of the Palestinian movement, with so

much power and control in the hands of Arafat, create specific problems in transformation. The Palestinian movement heads in two directions with the old elite trying to remain in control, while others interpret the new situation in terms of internal political change.

PNA officials often find it difficult to see the agreements as either bad or good. The agreements are the best of the worst according to Shtayyeh (see below). But the agreements still do not meet Palestinian aspirations. The occupation has not yet ended, and there is a lack of tangible benefits for the majority of the people. Furthermore, since there is now a Palestinian authority, all the problems and difficulties can no longer be blamed on Israel. It is a fact that the PNA has inherited a skewed structure, disrupted by 27 years of Israeli occupation but matters are complicated as the Palestinian cause changes. No longer is the struggle only about liberation and/or independence, but *also* about what *kind* of internal structures are to be established. Democracy, political pluralism, human rights, legal institution-building and the rule of law are being debated, as the increasingly complicated situation of less occupation and more Palestinian rule' creates confusion and frustrates expectations. The most important thing about the agreements is, however, the Israeli recognition of the PLO, representing the formal recognition of the Palestinians as a people.

The most important thing about the Cairo agreement [] and about the Oslo agreement is that

it was done not with us, i.e. the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks in Madrid/Washington, but that it was conducted by the PLO. [] Israel recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and Israel conducted this agreement with the PLO. [] the agreement is the best of the worse, but the interpretation and the implementation of the agreement has only been on the Israeli side. This is due to our internal, organizational problems, we have to be given a chance to put organizations together.

(Interview with Muhammad Shtayyeh, Fateh, PECDAR, September 14, 1994)

The Oslo Agreement is seen as a historical document acknowledging Palestinian claims for land and a national home as the Balfour Declaration did for the Jews. Although problems which seem difficult to overcome persist, both Israelis and Palestinians have reached the point where nationhood are clearly and mutually recognized.

It is the first document [in which] the Israeli government recognized the Palestinian people and its representative. [] It's like [the] Balfour Declaration. It's the Oslo Declaration for the Palestinians [to have a] homeland. And I think Oslo [] has frozen the occupation. This is the text of the Oslo. But the soul of the Oslo is to end the occupation.

(Interview with Marwan Barghouti, Fateh, October 23, 1994)

The occupation has been frozen, i.e. it has not ended yet, but it does no longer expand territorially or functionally.

The essence in the agreement and the mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel, was that the Israelis [were] saying, they exist, they have rights, they have national rights, and this openly stood [in the agreement], [it was as though] someone said: We lied for the past 70 years, we cannot longer lie. They are there.

(Interview with Sa'eb Erakat, Fateh, Minister of Municipal and Local Affairs, February 2, 1995)

Highlighted in Shtayyeh's as well as Barghouti's and Erakat's replies is the fact that the revolutionary PLO has now been elevated to the salons of international politics. Recognition is an achievement in itself. The Palestinians now constitute an entity in the eyes of others. This is a powerful image and symbol.

There was increasing pessimism and frustration in early 1995, as the negotiation process was seriously delayed and the deadline for the implementation of the second stage of the DOP drew near with no obvious progress being made. The climate worsened in the Spring of 1995: as more land in East Jerusalem¹¹ was expropriated in order to expand Israeli settlements causing doubts about Israel's true intentions regarding the peace process. Both Oslo and Cairo¹² are seen as a result of external

¹¹ With the declared Israeli land expropriation in East Jerusalem and in villages around Bethlehem. The decision was reversed in a spectacular political move orchestrated - as widely believed - by pressure from the Arab Democratic Party and Hadash in the Knesset. These Arab parties demonstrated influence and achieved what international Arab and PLO/PNA pressure had failed to.

¹² In the discourse on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 'Oslo' represents the DOP, while 'Cairo' represents the Gaza-Jericho arrangements.

pressure and international politics. PNA representatives often defend themselves by saying that there was a lack of alternative and options: there was no option but to sign.

The Oslo Agreement is not our dream, it is according to the new order after the Gulf War, and we accepted this agreement from a weak position. And this is the only alternative, this is the only option for our future, but this is not our dream, and this is not a fair agreement.

Cairo, when you read it, [] you feel that you need a miracle to achieve something in implementation on the ground. [...] Actually, the time for the peace process has reached a point of no return, but it doesn't mean that the peace is going in the right direction. I don't feel that we are in the right direction.

(Interview with Freih Abu Middein, PNA Minister of Justice, March 30, 1995)

On the one hand, Abu Middein admits that the peace process might collapse, and on the other hand he believes it has reached a point of no return. This ambiguity regarding the perception of the agreements is widespread. The problem, however, is seemingly rather caused by the *implementation* and Israeli procrastination than by the agreements themselves.

The Oslo agreement is the minimum of the minimum that the Palestinians want, and the minimum of the Palestinian rights. [] The agreement is not what the Palestinians want, but what the world wants. [] But if we cannot get the Palestinians together to develop this agreement [or] if we cannot solve the problems, I believe that we can return back.

(Interview with Sufiyan Abu Zayde, Fateh, December 4, 1994)

To accept Oslo and Cairo is a minimalist strategy, which, in turn, is considered as being more realistic. If this should not work, however, many argue that return to previous strategies of armed struggle or Intifada is possible, even though very difficult .

The alternative is difficult. It is not impossible, it is difficult. For us and I believe also for the Israeli people []. They will never be able to achieve peace with the Arabs without the Palestinians, and we will not be able to achieve peace except by the way of negotiations. [] It is difficult, but I am optimistic that it will succeed.

(Interview with Ahmed Qrei'a, Fateh, Minister of Trade and Economy, PNA, February 21, 1995)

Perception of Israelis And Israeli Intentions

Another main question is how the PNA and Palestinians supporting the peace process perceive their counterparts in the negotiations process. Many are suspicious of Israeli intentions, and believe that Israel does not intend to go beyond limited self-rule for the West Bank and Gaza, and is finally implementing the autonomy plan of the Camp David Accords, reorganizing the occupation with Palestinian hands. According to this view, the DOP is a Zionist conspiracy. While this view is widespread among the opposition, it can also be found among supporters of the agreements. However, the perception among the supporters is more complex. Israelis are not to be fully trusted, yet the objective circumstances will create better mutual understanding and cooperation. Also among political representatives and figures interacting with Israelis in

negotiations and discussions, there is a great deal of suspicion and distrust. Formal recognition on official level has not yet overcome hostile feelings created by years of occupation, violence and repression:

The Israelis are still seeking this kind of peace equation where they can continue settlements, continue [to be occupiers] and at the same time have peace. And that's the irony in Israeli thinking. In peace-making, you must picture a win-win situation. That's the essence in any agreement. The Israelis are still thinking a lose-win situation, in the mentality of occupiers, and not in the mentality of those who signed an agreement. The Israelis are thinking in terms of who is the source of power []. So unless the Israelis [stop] this way of thinking, I don't think that we [will] ever reach a peace treaty. *(Interview with Sa'eb Erakat, Fateh, Minister for Municipal and Local Affairs, PNA, February 2, 1995)*

To many, the basic problem regarding the negotiations is derailed as the arrogant Israeli way of thinking. Palestinian respondents are not sure about the Israeli intentions. In contrast, the clear goal of the Palestinians is a Palestinian state. Uncertainty in terms of Israeli goals creates insecurity and suspicion on the Palestinian side. The Israeli unwillingness to clearly define its intentions with the current process might indicate that there is a hidden agenda. The existing Palestinian inferiority complex leads to the interpretation that Israeli motives and intentions must be contrary to Palestinian aspirations. Many argue that Israelis are not really to be trusted and will try to sabotage the course of events *(Interview with Muhammad Shtayyeh, Fateh, PECDAR, September 14, 1994)*, but since the process is somehow

irreversible, Israel would eventually have to accept the fact of a Palestinian state. The mainstream discourse is characterised by a mixture of pessimism in the short run, and optimism in the long run - pessoptimism, as Palestinian author Emile Habibi put it (1989).

They want to continue with the occupation, but on the international level they couldn't say that. [So they are] trying to create occupation with different means.

(Interview with Zahira Kamal, FIDA, December 9, 1994).

Many argue like Zahira Kamal that Israel is in the process of reorganizing the occupation. Israelis are often described as being smart and cunning. The Israelis represent the superior to whom the Palestinians are constantly comparing themselves. According to Barth (1969), the formulation of national/ethnic identities occurs in *relation* to someone else. To be Palestinian implies to be the opposite of the Israelis. If Israelis are smart, then the Palestinians are not perceiving themselves as equally smart. Self-perception is constructed in comparison with others. These perceptions also stem from the history of the Palestinian Israeli conflict and from 28 years of repressive occupations as it is experienced by Palestinians: the Israelis come out as the winners in most situations. On the one hand, there is a sense of subordination to Israeli rule, making it difficult to trust the Israelis. On the other hand, despite their weakness, the Palestinians possess enough power to

create problems for the Israelis (e.g. *Interview with Jamil Tarifi, Fateh, November 10, 1994*).

Marwan Barghouti sees the occupation as a burden to the Israelis. In the discourse of and on the Palestinian Israeli conflict, the Palestinians have advocated liberation, independence and rights, whereas the Israelis have emphasised security and 'control'. Barghouti applies the notion of liberation also to Israel, which could be liberated both from the yoke of the occupation and from their security complex which is seen as an Israeli weakness:

The Israelis [have] during 50 years been living with war, with victims, with bombs []. The Israelis [now] have an historical chance to liberate themselves from the occupation. [...] but if the Israelis believe that we can live with Gaza and Jericho first and finally, I think they have illusions. We will not accept that. We can only accept it as a first step. [] [The Cairo agreement] was very bad for us. The Israelis translated Oslo as they wanted to translate it. In spite of that, we accepted it, because we are very interested in the implementation of the agreement [] in spite of all the obstacles, in spite of the security complex inside the Israelis. [Regarding] all issues, they said 'security'. If you discuss the air, they want security. If you discuss the colours, they say security. They are living with the complex of security. We have to liberate them from this.

(Interview with Marwan Barghouti, Fateh, October 23, 1994)

Although Israel's political body is sometimes considered as monolithic, and Likud/Labour are interpreted as based on largely the same political programme, with Labour being only better in

camouflaging their true intentions¹³, there was also a more pragmatic perception of internal Israeli dilemmas with Israelis being seen as different and divided. This, in turn, implies that there is no common Israeli strategy. It is not words or statements by political leaders that should be considered, but their interests. According to Faisal Husseini, it is in the Israeli interests to make peace, and that is what counts:

You can't say *the Israelis* if you ask me. [Are we talking about] Rabin, Peres or are we talking about Sharon or Olmert? Each one has [its own ideas], so there is nothing to call [Israeli], even in the negotiations, even in the delegation. Sometimes the leadership is saying something else, because there are differences between the Israelis themselves and their positions towards [different issues]. In politics, don't trust states. Trust their interests. And I believe their interest is to reach an agreement with us. (*Interview with Faisal Husseini, Fateh, Minister without Portfolio, PNA October 12, 1994*)

Many see the problems as a function of internal Israeli politics. The Labour Party, for example, has to seek alliances to its right as well as to its left, and this coalition makes it harder to implement the agreement, especially since the opposition was particularly acute, verbally and physically, following to the violence perpetrated by Hamas and Islamic Jihad in 1994-1995. Thus, the Israeli government is caught between its new partner in the peace process (the PNA) and its internal opposition in the same

¹³

For example interview with Mahmoud Ramadan, Fateh, April 22, 1995.

way as the PNA is caught between Israel and its Islamic opponents. Others make distinctions between Rabin and Peres.

Their problem simply is that they don't have a good majority in the Knesset. [...] Maybe I am naive. I don't know, but my impression is that the Israeli government knows that in the end they have to give up [] at least part of the occupied territories. Even the recent statement of Rabin after the bus attack¹⁴, it was very, very clear. [...] I think that they know that in the end they have to withdraw. The question remains to which line they will withdraw. What is their concept of withdrawal? But in principle, they are speaking of withdrawal.

(Interview with Ziad Abu-Zayyad, October 26, 1994)

Abu-Zayyad is convinced that Israel will eventually withdraw. Israel was talking about borders and separation, thus implying withdrawal, an end to the occupation, and eventual Palestinian statehood.

Another change in official nationalist discourse on Israel is reflected in the new sensitivity towards Israeli demands that the Palestinian Authority and

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After the bus bomb in Tel Aviv, October 19, 1994, Yitzhak Rabin stated the 'necessity' of separating Arabs from Jews, and declaring that Israel will continue to have security problems of this kind as long as Israel continues to occupy another nation of 2 million people (*Jerusalem Post*, October 20, 1994). Following the next suicide bombing in Beit Lid (22 January 1995), killing another 21 people, the issue of separation returned to the agenda, with discussions on a 'security fence' creating a physical division between Israelis and Palestinians (*Jerusalem Post*, January 31, 1995). Arafat, recognizing the political potential of 'separation', said in an interview with the Egyptian daily al-Ahram: 'If there is a political separation, meaning a Palestinian independent state with Jerusalem as its capital, then we are ready to endure anything to secure this goal' (quoted in *Jerusalem Post*, February 8, 1995). If 'separation' is a unilateral Israeli step, however, then it will be opposed by the Palestinians.

Police takes action against the Islamic movement in terms of preventing attacks and punishing those who carry them out. The turning point was the Beit Lid attack, when, as Nabil Sha'ath points out, a new Palestinian political discourse¹⁵ emerged. Israeli security became a Palestinian national concern. The PNA's use of repressive means against fellow Palestinians for the sake of Israeli security¹⁶ met, of course, with harsh criticism from the opposition. Both verbally and practically, a new strategic alliance between the PNA and the Israeli government developed. Attempting to gain legitimacy for this behaviour, the PNA communicates that it is really serving Palestinian interests.

We recognize that they have a problem about security. No doubt about that. And security is one of their [Israelis] conditions. It is one of our conditions also. We need security. We are the victims of the absence of security, it's not only them who are suffering from the absence of security.

(Interview with Ahmed Qrei'a, Fateh, Minister of Economy and Trade, PNA, February 21)

If the Israelis ask [us] to arrest, we should not arrest. If the Israelis ask [us] to create a security state court, I should not do it [] but if I need it, I will do it. It is a matter that I need it. [] Therefore, if what we are doing is a Palestinian policy, then it's OK. And I believe it is our policy, we should get a chance for this agreement to succeed. It is much easier to destroy the agreement, and to say bye, bye, and go to fight, or go to Intifada again,

¹⁵ Speech at a conference organized by UNU/WIDER at Notre Dame Hotel in Jerusalem, April 11, 1995.

¹⁶ Moreover, the protection of Israeli security interests finds itself in conflict with the protection of human rights standards.

but what's the result? Therefore, we should be realistic, but also maintain our power and responsibilities. Not according to the Israeli request, or orders [] but according to our interests.
(Interview with Ahmed Qrei'a, Fateh, Minister of Economy and Trade, PNA, February 21, 1995)

On the level of human relations, mainstream nationalism holds that Israelis and Palestinians must live together.

That's a fact that in this holy land, there are two different peoples and one cannot destroy the other people. We must live together. It's very difficult, but that's a fact.

(Interview with Sufiyan Abu Zayde, Fateh, December 4, 1994)

I have no problems with the Israelis, [we have a] relation of trust and no-trust, but they will be our neighbours forever.

(Interview with Ahmed Al-Dik, Fateh, October, 29, 1994).

The idea of neighbours was common in Fateh's political discourse about the Israelis. Israelis and Palestinians are to live not together, among each other, but *next to each other, related but separated*.

The transformation of perceptions from enemies to neighbours is naturally a painful process. As long as one has enemies the boundaries between 'self' and 'others' are clear and unambiguous. The boundaries between 'self' and 'others' creates a sense of security, since everyone knows to which group he belongs. To be neighbours also implies boundaries and friendly coexistence. The boundaries

become more porous which creates uncertainty and feelings of insecurity in the transitional period. As the conflict diminishes, the character of the boundary changes and becomes more relaxed and less disputed. Power relationships must be altered, however. Respondents frequently warned that if the Israelis do not start to treat Palestinians more fairly, the result will be increased violence and a reversal of the peace process. If Israel does not assure a just peace, then the Palestinians will not be good neighbours (*Interview with Alfred Toubbasi, November 14, 1994*).

Supporters of the peace process, perceive the relations with Israelis as *potentially* good. Many point out that during the occupation, Palestinians and Israelis have got to know each other, meeting as occupier and occupied, as soldier and stone-thrower, as prison-guard and inmate, as employer and employed. In brief, they met always in an asymmetrical relationship in terms of power and control, with one ruling and the other being ruled. Although these relationships are characterised by distrust, bitterness and hatred, there are also positive elements envisioning a better future, *together but separated*.

Palestinians and Israelis are destined to live side by side, to share the land for which they have fought so bitterly. Maybe political and geographical separation is necessary, but official discourse (on both sides) has confirmed that neither side will go

away, but is there to stay. Sufiyan Abu Zayde, like many other activists, spent 12 years in prison for attempting to kill a collaborator. In prison, he decided that he would dedicate his time to learn about the Israelis and to learn the Israeli mind.

I learned that they are very open-minded. They have democracy among themselves. I believe that they have an open mind, and they know what they want, but they like themselves. They think highly of themselves. [...] I think the [Israeli] state is democratic, [it's] not democratic between Israelis and Palestinians, you can't have [] democracy and occupation, but I mean democratic between the Israelis themselves, and we must learn that from them.

(Interview with Sufiyan Abu Zayde, Fateh, December 4, 1994)

Respondents often stress that Israeli society *in itself* is democratic and that the Palestinians must learn from that in their own building of state and society. At the same time, there are strong reactions against what is perceived as Israeli self-appraisal, they like themselves. They think highly of themselves. The Israeli self-image of ethnic superiority is a constant source of frustration. Palestinians reveal a certain inferiority complex towards the dominant Israelis.

Internal Relations

The Palestinian National Authority

The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is a peculiar political structure, being not a state, not local government, but something yet undefined and

interim. It could perhaps be best described as a quasi-government. Its functions and areas of control are restricted, and its *raison-d'être* is supposed to last only for an interim period. Authority and responsibilities are thus unclear, and a large amount of power remains in the hands of Israel. Some power is being handled by the United Nations Special Coordinator who manages, for example, payment of civil servants and police salaries. The situation is chaotic and the new structure is trying to gain *both* internal and external legitimacy.

The PNA views itself as a state-builder. The notion of *building something which is not there*, to start from scratch is strong in the PNA. The official leadership perceives the current process as a state-*building* project, i.e. as a matter of creating a state and a new (civil) society. Adding to this conception is that the Palestinians are now at the *starting point*, or even below it. At the same time, this implies the beginning of a new era, based on the structures inherited from decades of occupation. From here, as widely believed, there can only be progress: We are to emerge from the ashes, as Shtayyeh puts it (September 14, 1994).

This is a country to be made. It's a state-building, it's a nation-building, it's institution-building. [] It's a matter of putting things together from point zero. Not only from point zero, we are inheriting 27 years of Israeli destruction to our institutions, to our identity, to our national economy, to our infrastructure.

(Interview with Muhammad Shtayyeh, Fateh, PECDAR, September 14, 1994)

'We don't have a magic stick' is a frequently used utterance to describe the difficulties the PNA is having in implementing projects and politics. Given the perception of being at a zero point, it will take time to organise the state-building process.

I think we are going through one of the most difficult transformations. In April [1994], Palestinians threw stones at Israeli soldiers. On May 13, they saw joint Palestinian Israeli patrols in the street. Then you have the inside outside [conflict], you have the integration things, the institution-building, coming from out, coming from in. coming from down. I don't know []. But this is a very complicated process, and I am so happy that so far, the transition is going smoother than I expected. [] We will never be the same. [...] So we are starting from scratch. And we don't have a magic stick. There is a huge mountain as high as [Mount] Everest titled: Things that must be done. So we work 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. [] The piles of things done compared to the huge piles to be done will always look very small, very little in the eyes of the common Palestinian who has very high expectations.

(Interview with Sa'eb Erakat, Fateh, Minister of Municipal and Local Affairs, PNA, February 2, 1995)

Among many outside the PNA, there is a wait and see - attitude. On the one hand, there is no satisfaction, but the PNA should also be given some respite, it should be given a chance to prove itself, and people should not let their expectations run too high (e.g. *Interview with Zahira Kamal, FIDA, December 9, 1994*). The PNA is often given the benefit of the doubt, and there is hesitation in passing judgements of the performance of the Authority.

The performance of the PNA is not as it should be. And it's not as bad as some people expected. [] I have a lot of criticism towards this authority, but knowing the very difficult conditions they are working under; I find some excuses for what is happening, though there are things for which there are no excuses.

(Interview with Ziad Abu Zayyad, October 23, 1994)

Among the criticism made against the Authority are the appointments made by Yasir Arafat to positions in the PNA, which are strongly opposed in most circles outside the Authority, whether among Fateh or the opposition. The only way out of this situation is holding elections:

There is a hated word in the Palestinian political dictionary, the word appointment. Appointed ministers, appointed authorities. It's a handicap Jesus! Elections are so important for local needs, besides from the international things. Elections will show the true size of this or that party.

(Interview with Sa'eb Erakat, Fateh, Minister for Municipal and Local Affairs, February 3, 1995)

No longer is the Palestinian question solely about land and its liberation, it must now also take responsibility for internal restructuring and the creation of a political system. The related questions are: What kind of governing structure is to be established? What kind of representation? What kind of state-society -relations will emerge? These are central issues which have entered Palestinian political debate, with numerous workshops on democracy and elections being held.

There are many differences between a revolution, to fight and to be a government, they are going to lead a state now, to build. [] Try to build our society, [it is] not the same thing as to fight.

(Interview with Imad Ya'iesh, Fateh, January 12, 1995)

Here, there is a new distinction between to fight and to build. 'Fight' stands for what Palestinian nationalism has been centered around for the last 30 years. Now, a new process of building and construction is in the making. The ideology of revolution and liberation remains to a certain extent, but needs to adjust to the new concept of building and statehood.

The Opposition

In the aftermath of the signing of the DOP, voices were heard from several camps warning of the risks of a Palestinian civil war, due to the deep divisions in Palestinian society on the issue of self-rule. Until November 18, 1994, opponents and supporters alike were eager to refer to the fact that violence had not broken out. Both opponents and the authority stressed that for Palestinians to shed Palestinian blood is taboo.

Factionalism has been institutionalized along the cleavage of authority/ government vs. opposition. One dilemma of the authority is that the opposition does not recognize the legitimacy of the authority, thus reject being a loyal opposition. A related problem are the continued and even escalated attacks

against Israeli targets, carried out by Hamas' military wing and Islamic Jihad activists. The PNA is being caught in a dilemma, aspiring for peace with both Israel and its internal opposition. The image of the Palestinian police, and the Palestinian quasi-military apparatus cracking down on fellow Palestinians or brothers, is a sensitive issue, tragically highlighted in the events on November 18th, when clashes broke out between Islamists and the Palestinian police, leaving 13 dead and dozens more wounded. The incident was named Sad Friday, or Black Friday, adding another day of grievance to the Palestinian calendar of suffering; this time, however, it was internally-inflicted. Now the time has come to define relations between Authority and Opposition and to make clear whether the opposition will be an intra- or extra-parliamentary protest group. As long as the opposition is abiding to the law and acting within the rules and frameworks set up by the Authority, it will be considered a democratic opposition enhancing Palestinian democratic life. As soon as the opposition crosses this limit they has to count with repressive measures on part of the PNA.

Let us understand what we mean by democracy. Democracy means that you can take an opposition and go and protest against anyone as long as the opposition is not breaking the laws. [] As long as [you are] protesting and mobilizing people without breaking the law [it is within the area of democracy], but as soon as [you are] breaking the law, no one can stop [the authority] from arresting you. [] Don't break the law. Don't put us in a difficult position towards the Israelis. [] Don't [put] us in a difficult position with you.

(Interview with Faisal Hussein, Fateh, Minister without Portfolio, PNA, October 12, 1994)

Hamas attacks against Israel violate the agreements signed. This makes up the dilemma in which the PNA finds itself.

We signed this agreement with the Israelis, to give this agreement a chance. [we also pledged] a cease-fire with the Israelis, like Egypt had a cease-fire, Jordan had a cease-fire, Syria had a cease-fire. No one can go attacking Israeli targets, because we are committed to the agreement. [...] As I said, we are going through [a] very difficult transformation. Who is who? What will be the shared thing? What will be the regional interaction affecting our decisions? [] By the end I think the only way that we can come out of this dilemma is through national elections.

(Interview with Sa'eb Erakat, Fateh, Minister for Municipal and Local Affairs, PNA, February 3, 1995)

From the point of view of the PNA, there is a clear irritation towards the opposition which is not willing to play according to the rules. Ahmed Qrei'a states clearly that he thinks that the opposition is irresponsible since it is easy to be against, but more difficult to be realistic and to take responsibility for authority and governance.

I support the policy to contain all the opposition, if it s possible. I am with the policy to call all the opposition and those in the authority, to tell them this is my policy: I signed an agreement, I am committed to this agreement, this agreement should be implemented. Therefore I should give a chance for this agreement to succeed. Whoever wants to oppose it, welcome. He has the right to make demonstrations, without problems or troubles, he has the right to make appeals, he has the right to write in the newspaper, but not to use arms. [] If

this policy is quite clear to everybody, then I believe everybody will cooperate.

(Interview with Ahmed Qrei'a, Fateh, Minister of Economy and Trade, PNA, February 21, 1995)

According to many, the main reason for the high visibility of Hamas and the opposition lies with the Israelis. If they implemented the agreement instead of putting obstacles in the way, Hamas would not be so strong. In addition, in order to reduce the influence of Hamas on the Palestinian street, the Israelis should make an effort to strengthen the PNA.

The ideology of the PLO, the national movement and the Intifada, was all along based on non-cooperation and on being *opposed*; it was a *counter*-strategy based on the idea of liberation and rejection. Now, the PLO and the Fateh movement are cooperating with the Israelis, they have entered into a relationship with Israel, best described as a strategic alliance, while maintaining revolutionary and liberationist rhetoric, a combination which confuses not only the ordinary people. Against this background, Hamas has adopted a seemingly clear concept of liberation, remaining on the doctrinal level against any cooperation with the Israelis. The PNA has not yet succeeded in translating its perception of the current period as one of building the future into a coherent ideology replacing the old one. Thus, an ideology of revolutionary rhetorics remains while, at the same time, previous actions and patterns of behaviour fade away. Thus, Hamas is

perceived as much more consistent in presenting its ideology verbally and practically.

Hamas is working against the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority is not working against the Israelis. [...] The leaders in Gaza [compare] between Hamas which work against the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority which cooperates with the Israeli authority [though] without results. So the people who were very angry with Israel, are now angry with anyone who cooperates with the Israelis without the benefit for the Palestinians.

(Interview with Azmi Shu'aibi, FIDA, Minister of Youth and Sports, November 8, 1994)

For others, the conflicts within the Palestinian national movement express political pluralism:

Hamas [are] our brothers, they are part of the Palestinian nation and the Palestinian people, [they are] our brothers. After the Oslo Agreement, a lot of international observers believed that there would be conflicts, a civil war between different Palestinian organizations, but this has not happened. [] We are brothers, we are part of the same nation, they are Palestinians. [...] But now, when we reach a peace agreement, [and] when our brothers Hamas and Islamic Jihad want to start again this violence, all of these acts, it will not lead to anything. It will just lead to more bloodshed on both sides, and we do not want it. We signed this agreement to stop this bloodshed between us, so why start again?

(Interview with Jamil Tarifi, Fateh, Head of Palestinian side to the Liaison Committee, November 10, 1994)

Tarifi's statement is part of the typical old discourse among the Palestinian nation as an extended family, with relations of brotherhood (cf. Smith, 1991, p. 19

ff.). On the one hand, the Palestinians constitute one people, one nation, one family, in which Hamas and Fateh, Hamas and the PNA are brothers. On the other hand, dissociation from 'us' and 'them' is quoted. *They* are Palestinians, i.e. they are *also* Palestinians, like *us*, like the Fateh people or those who support the agreement, although they do not recognise the legitimacy of either the PLO or the PNA. A new they is being created: they are brothers, but they are not us, not the *core* of Palestinian identity. According to Tarifi, the violence against Israelis committed by Islamic movements, is furthermore causing trouble for the PNA. It disrupts the negotiations with Israel. Moreover, the 'brothers in Hamas have now adopted a strategy which has already been tried by 'us', by the PLO, by Fateh, but has failed.

Despite all assurances that violent conflicts would not occur between Fateh and Hamas or between the Authority and Hamas, the Palestinian police force and Hamas clashed (18th November, see above). Previously, clashes between the two camps had occasionally broken out in Gaza (e.g. in the Summer of 1992), but never as fatally as this time.

I'm sorry about what happened on this Black Friday, we call it Black Friday, but we hope this matter can be stopped and we call for the unity of our people. We believe in democracy and we call on all factions to be [united] under the roof of the authority. [...] It's a very bad thing that happened, but I thought some people pushed for this situation. Maybe not from the police, maybe not from Hamas, maybe other groups, that belong somewhere.

(Interview with Intisar al-Wazir, Fateh, Minister of Social Affairs, PNA, November 24, 1994)

Intisar al-Wazir (Umm Jihad) blames 'someone else', external factors for what happened on Black Friday. The vague accusation blaming others' is quite obscure. It was easy to blame Israel or collaborators in order to understand the event. Since collaborators constitute a category that is detested by both Fateh and Hamas, they are an easy target for blame. Using collaborators as the scapegoat also enables the parties to talk about conspiracy without directly addressing Israel. Instead of searching for appropriate ways to deal with internal conflicts, incidents occurring between Palestinian factions are blamed on Israel.

Internal problems are too sensitive to discuss openly. When in April 1995 a massive blast occurred in the Gaza City neighbourhood of Sheikh Radwan (killing six people and wounding dozens more, including four members of Hamas), the circumstances were unclear. Hamas accused Israel and the PNA of collaboration (*Jerusalem Post*, April 3, 1995), while Arafat responded: 'Stores in one of the most densely populated areas in Gaza? Now I have the right to ask how many stores are there? It is my responsibility to every child, to every family, to every woman, to save them from these stores' (*Jerusalem Post*, April 6, 1995). Arafat was thus trying to change the political opinion, calling Hamas' and Islamic Jihad's actions a threat against the PNA and Palestinian society. More attacks occurred in

April and six Israeli soldiers were killed in two suicide bombings near the settlements of Netzarim and Kfar Darom in Gaza. Tensions rose higher than ever as Palestinian police continued round up arrests on Islamic activists, while, at the same time, the newly created State Security Court began to try those already detained for planning further attacks. Also in April, talks between the Authority and the opposition resumed.

All the operations against Israeli soldiers and settlers - it is not a matter to kill Israelis and settlers, but to deliver a message to the Palestinian Authority that we are here, you cannot do what you want [without] asking us, and to deliver the same message to the Israeli side, that you made an agreement with the Palestinian Authority, with the PLO, but we say that there is not only a PLO and a Palestinian Authority, there are also others. We are strong, we are here, we are part of the Palestinian people and you [the Israelis] must take that into consideration. [...] I believe that what happened on that Friday [November 18th] is a lesson for all the Palestinian factions, for the Palestinian Authority, for Hamas, for [Islamic] Jihad. And the authority said that it must be a lesson for the Palestinians to know that it is impossible to enter into civil war in Gaza.

(Interview with Sufiyan Abu Zayde, Fateh, December 4, 1994)

3. THE LEFTIST OPPOSITION

The PLO's internal opposition has traditionally been constituted by what is called the Rejectionist Front, the strongest factions of which are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Both are today rather marginal organizations inside the West Bank and Gaza. According to an opinion poll carried out by the Palestine Center for Palestine Research and Studies in March 1995, the PFLP is supported by 3.6% of West Bankers and Gazans, and the DFLP by 1.6% (CPRS, Public Opinion Poll #16, March 16-18, 1995). Compared to previous polls (CPRS, Autumn 1993), according to which the PFLP gained 6-9%, this result implies a severe decline. Nevertheless, both factions remain an important part of the Palestinian political spectrum.

The Agreements

In the discourse of the Marxist/leftist organizations PFLP and DFLP, an outright rejection of the agreements prevails, since they are far short of consensus (e.g. as outlined in the PNC programme) and Palestinian national/ist aspirations. Mainstream nationalism maintains that Oslo and Cairo represent the first step towards statehood, whereas leftist-oppositional nationalism believes that the agreements are a step backwards, from active resistance to

passive compliance, with conditions set up mainly by the international arena:

What is taking place has nothing to do with real peace. There is no way to say that this is the starting point. The agreement is very clear, it is talking about transfer of powers and responsibilities rather than self-rule. It deals with part of the population; it deals with part of the Palestinian people. It doesn't talk about the Palestinians as a nation, as a people. Fragmentation is the starting point. Nobody recognizes the existence of the Palestinian refugees. The agreement does not deal with the territory, with the land; the land is separated from the people, the people are the ones who have to be considered in the agreement, [...] related to the land.

(Interview with Muhammad Jadallah, associated with the DFLP, September 21 and 28, 1994)

Jadallah claims that the DOP does not talk about the Palestinians as a nation, as a people¹⁷. Another reason for discontent is that self-rule is applied to the population and not the land, territory and population are thus disconnected.

We are talking about territoriality, a united territory, a united people, one people, one territory, and one form of rights []. Independence is independence. Sovereignty is sovereignty. Self-determination is self-determination. It can't be camouflaged by something else. You cannot tell me that you can run education and health, and then you say, well, but you have to remember that this is sovereignty, that this is independence. No, this is not independence. This is to run education and to run health. We have to abandon the times of poetry.

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To reiterate, the DOP as well as the 'Gaza-Jericho-First' talk about the Palestinian people, and the PLO as their representative.

If I run education, I run education - period. I can't say that I run education and this is sovereignty.
(Interview with Muhammad Jadallah, associated with the DFLP, September 21 and 28, 1994)

The opposition criticises that the agreements do not acknowledge that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are occupied territories, but deal with them as land disputes between the two parties¹⁸. To Palestinians opposing the agreements, it is a fundamental weakness of the agreement that it does not make it clear that the territories are occupied. In addition, there is discontent regarding the playing down of relevant UN resolutions. The DOP states that the final settlement should be based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, but the leftist opposition argues that those resolutions are effectively bypassed since a solution could be based on whatever the parties agree upon.

First of all, the agreement provides us with something that we, the Palestinians, never asked [for], never requested, [which] was never part of our political dictionary: autonomy. [] It doesn't even exist in the Palestinian language, not only the political language, but the Arabic language. People have started to say 'autonomia' as a new concept. So people who fought for the last 42 years in different ways, who sacrificed their lives, who lost their beloved ones, they did it for independence. They never thought that they did this in order to get autonomy. [] Now, that's deception. [...] Autonomy in this case provides a new interpretation to 242. [...] I can see it as a first step only if the accord says that this is just the first step towards independence.

¹⁸

In fact, the DOP does not define the status of the West Bank and Gaza as either 'occupied' or 'disputed'.

The agreement in itself is constituted in a way that prevents independence from developing. [...] Thirdly, Palestinians don't have the ability, or the strength, or the power, or the imagination, or the wisdom, the experience, the qualified persons, the luck, to work through these conditions to improve them to something else. Now, they are trying to sell it to the people as a first step. If this is the first step, I want to see what's the second step, or third step. Tell me!

(Interview with Riad Malki, PFLP spokesperson, October 7, 1994)

UN Resolutions 242 and 338 call for withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967¹⁹. The agreements, however, read "redeployment" of Israeli military forces from West Bank populated areas instead. Malki warns about the dangers of a reinterpretation of UN resolutions. Like mainstream nationalism, the PFLP and DFLP view the autonomy process as having a built-in dynamic, but they don't see that this dynamic will lead not to an independent state and argue that autonomy will be the final achievement. Leftist opposition is reluctant of the first-step - notion since it is not made clear what are the following steps. Hence, for the opposition, it is not Gaza-Jericho first, but Gaza-Jericho first and last. They build their argument on the weakness of the current Palestinian leadership and Israel's strength.

They said they will never give up our rights to statehood, self-determination and the rights of the

¹⁹

Arabic and Israeli interpretations vary whether it is 'occupied territories' as in the English version of the text or 'the occupied territories' as in the Arabic and French versions.

refugees to return. They came out with this. They came up with [a] new logic that we have to save whatever there is to save. [] Oslo is not an agreement, it is a conspiracy in the dark done by people who didn't have the mandate to do it. [...] There is a very big problem with this agreement. Jordan has a big role. [] Now they want to suffocate the Palestinians until King Hussein comes and says I [can pay] for teachers, for the army who didn't get their salaries for several months. [He will try to get] loyalties from the people, religious people and villagers. The king will say to Abu Amar 'I am sorry, but you didn't play your cards well and your people want me'.

(Interview with Maha Nassar, PFLP sympathizer, October 29, 1994)

The agreements are interpreted within the PFLP/DFLP discourse, that the PLO has sold out Palestinian rights, Palestinian land and the Palestinian cause. According to the conspiracy theory, the implementation of the agreements will be very difficult for Yasir Arafat, and it will be difficult for him to govern. Nassar argues that the Palestinians, once Arafat has failed, will turn to King Hussein, who will then assume power over the Palestinians, at least in the West Bank.

The moral is that one has to know the outcome of the process in order to accept it. The unknown is seen as unknown only to the Palestinians, however. The Israelis are perceived as having their view clear: limited Palestinian autonomy as the final outcome of the negotiations. The Palestinians are being lured into accepting a process, of which the outcome is determined by the Israelis. The Palestinians are too weak to have an impact on the process. The

alternative, as presented by the left, is to keep to international legitimacy and UN resolutions, with negotiations being strictly based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. This is the framework perceived fairest for any kind of negotiation. In other fora, the PFLP and DFLP went as far as calling for an international conference within the UN framework, i.e. for negotiations which take place under the UN umbrella. Meanwhile, the opposition wants the struggle against the occupation to continue, including - although the Intifada and its means of mobilization is the preferred way - military means. Most Palestinians consider the struggle against occupation as a legitimate right recognized by international law. Negotiations and struggle could thus go hand in hand.

Perception Of Israelis and Israeli Intentions

Israel's intentions are similarly perceived by the leftist opposition and mainstream nationalists. Leftist opposition leaders perceive the Israelis as very smart, very intelligent, due to the fact that they made Arafat sign something which is not beneficial for him or for the Palestinian people. Also in leftist liberation nationalism, there is an inferiority complex against the background of Israeli superiority.

The Israelis are very smart, very intelligent. They could manage to have somebody, like Yasir Arafat to sign, as if the whole Palestinian problem is solved, as if the Palestinian Israeli conflict is solved, [] and as if the Arab Israeli conflict is

solved. And as a matter of fact, the agreement does not oblige Israel to do much. []

The Israelis [] are our very close neighbours. They are more neighbours than the Jordanians, than the Syrians, than the Egyptians. I have them really next door []. But the Israelis want to be the ones who dictate, the ones to have the upper hand, always and always.

(Interview with Muhammad Jadallah, associated with the DFLP, September 21 and 28, 1994)

Jadallah shares the notion of neighbours with Fateh and FIDA supporters. Israel is even geographically closer than neighbouring Arab states.

The opposition considers that Israel is striving to create a system of cantons, of towns and villages separated from each other, similar to the Sharon Plan of 1981. In this regard, leftist opposition does not differentiate between Likud and Labour. The final solution, they claim, will be not more than limited and fragmented autonomy for both West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Israelis have benefited from the agreements in a number of ways: the door to the Arab world and its markets has been opened while the Palestinian state has been further removed from the agenda; at the same time, Israelis can now claim there is no more occupation and the suffering of the Palestinians has come to an end. Now, the Palestinian Police have taken over the job of Israel.

The Israelis achieved three things through these agreements. Number one, they found a way to the Arab countries []. Number two, they are putting the Palestinian Arabs a long step away from having their independent state. And number three, the bad aspects of the occupation will [be kept away] from

the Israeli population. And you know, the Intifada was hurting them. And they are paying no price []. And they have the Palestinian Authority doing their dirty work. I know some Israeli soldiers and some civilians, intellectuals, they were suffering really from running after children. They are human beings and they were really suffering from this situation, from beating children and young women, old women. [] Now, they got rid of this.

(Interview with Rabah Muhanna, PFLP sympathizer, January 20, 1995)

In Muhanna's description some Israelis have guilty feelings when inflicting pain upon others, but only because *they are the ones causing suffering*; it is not Palestinian suffering which affects them, but the fact that *the Israelis* are the cause of it.

Internal Relations

The Palestinian National Authority

Turning to perceptions of the PNA, the leftist opposition shows deep resentment. To them, the Authority lacks legitimacy in terms of both the way it has been established/appointed and its functioning. Therefore, the term "Palestinian *National* Authority" is being rejected by those who oppose the agreements; instead, PFLP/DFLP use the wording Palestinian Authority, exactly as Israel does.

The performance of the authority is very bad. I don't think that they have a possibility or a chance to be qualified as [an authority]. You have individuals that run authorities as they can, but it is not a matter of qualification. I think it is so limited, so poor, so bad, and the only thing operating in the

country is the five bodies of security. And the rest of the Palestinian Authority is just trying to follow the instructions of the one man and the five different security instruments. [...] It is not national. National means that it covers all Palestinians. And they are not covered, it s [only] Gaza and Jericho.

(Interview with Muhammad Jadallah, associated with the DFLP, September 21 and 28, 1994)

It is perceived as a major contradiction that the Authority has been established because of the occupation and not as an opposing structure to occupation. The opposition, especially the left-wing, is also strongly concerned with the military structure set up by the PNA. PFLP/DFLP are promoting a democratic struggle, thus challenging the authoritarian style of the PNA. Two kinds of struggle is the new slogan. Conspiracy theory prevails though, and many believe that Israel is - and was - counting on a Palestinian civil war.

The opposition views the PNA as a contemporary version of the Village Leagues, set up by Israel in the early 1980s in a failed attempt to create collaborative structures. Israel is perceived as turning Arafat into a new Antoine Lahad²⁰, an advanced form of collaboration:

Now we have two kinds of struggle. There is the national struggle against the occupation, and the second is a democratic struggle, i.e. the struggle against the Palestinian authority. [The

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The head of the South Lebanon Army, cooperating with the IDF in the security zone in South Lebanon.

contradiction is that] it is an authority which is dependent on the Israeli occupation. [] It is not a civil authority. It is an authority of Palestinian Shabak and military people. These people who are ministers, they are only formal people, they are not the main rulers. [...] It's very bad individual leadership: military and Shabak leadership. [] The only way to relate to it is to oppose it. [...] The problem is here how to try to avoid a civil war. [] Our struggle against the authority will be in political, peaceful ways and through mobilizing people without violence. [] There is a contradiction with the authority, but we will not go violent against the authority, to kill people from the authority as example, [] but if we are fought against by the authority, we will defend ourselves.[...] The Oslo Agreement has two parts: one is written, and the other part is not written. The unwritten one is to lead the Palestinian people towards civil war.

(Interview with Walid Salem, PFLP sympathizer, September 27, 1994)

The PFLP/DFLP compares the authoritarian leadership style of the PNA with the style of Arab regimes. The authority acts the same way the Arab regimes do, badly disappointing the Palestinians who used to claim that whenever a Palestinian state is established, it would be the first democracy in the Arab world. The Palestinian national movement, despite of all obstacles and the absence of territorial control, had developed since the 1970s institutions and structures based on some sort of democracy. The quasi-democratic system of the PLO was one of the characteristics of the Palestinian movement, and something of which the Palestinians have always been proud. To treat the Authority as equal as Arab

regimes is part of the opposition's political discourse downgrading the Authority.

This authority is the same [as any Arab regime], they have the same way of lying as the Arab regimes. [...] The Palestinian people were convinced that they are superior to the other Arab countries [such as] the Jordanians, the Egyptians, but it seems since the implementation that we are not superior, we are the same. Our rulers are repeating what happened in Egypt and Jordan and everywhere in the Arab world.

(Interview with Walid Salem, PFLP sympathizer, September 27, 1994)

The opposition clearly differentiates between the Authority and the people. In the struggle for national liberation, leadership and people were the same, united; but in the new context, boundaries are drawn between governor and governed, an inevitable process which occurs in most societies. A revolutionary movement, challenging and fighting existing power structures, is very popular. When it *becomes* itself a power structure, it will be rather difficult to maintain this popularity or to even gain legitimacy. The PLO is still the symbol of the Palestinians and their cause, but the PNA has failed so far to become a symbol of national identity. Yet, it has not even achieved to represent the Palestinians in the West Bank. The opposition attempts to portray themselves as those representing the people where the Authority seems to have failed. Given the poor popular support for the PFLP and DFLP, however, the left has a problem in accounting for their weak standing in society, which contradicts their self-

perception as those who are at the forefront of people's struggle. The real boundaries are rather created between the opposition and the ruling elite. Class discourse is widely used to describe the situation which emerged following the establishment of the PNA. The peace process and self-government is seen as serving the elite's interest in ruling and occupying positions.

The Palestinian Authority is a one-man dictatorship with appointments [that are] not based on professionalism. [] Suddenly you see well-known collaborators in high positions. [...] The Palestinian Authority is not national because 1) it was not established through national consensus, not all the parties approved it, 2) the basis of this Authority is not national, you cannot call Fateh in its dominant position national, it is the Authority of one faction. It is a dictatorship, even the smallest things are taken to Abu Amar. (*Interview with Maha Nassar, PFLP sympathizer, October 29, 1994*)

Harsh criticism is raised against the PNA security apparatus. The performance of the various security bodies is the real issue drawing the division line between the PNA and the opposition.

The first shock is that we Palestinians are used to have security forces from the occupation, and the occupation is the enemy. Now, any other security forces are, again, like the enemy. If we are all Palestinians, security forces must not be the ones that controls me, it has to control the other. [] They are similar to those who are still there, the Israeli security forces. So they cannot be *part of me*, if they are controlling me, controlling my moves, my way of thinking, my political stand. [] They are [like] the Arab regimes, and we hate the Arab regimes. [...] We know that being killed or arrested by the

enemy, by the occupation is because we are doing something good to our own people and own country; it is considered the normal price for you to oppose the enemy and the occupation, but to suffer from those who are supposed to be your brothers is not easy. (*Interview with Muhammad Jadallah, DFLP associate, Sept. 21/28, 1994*)

The relationship between the Authority and the opposition is becoming increasingly difficult, mainly because the *Palestinian* Authority - under external pressure - is using its power against the *Palestinian* opposition, while it has not yet obtained internally the legitimacy to use violence. Of course, the PLO had always an internal opposition, but not in such a blunt way. The Authority has gained international legitimacy more easily than internal. While they used to be brothers in the same cause - although with different approaches and strategies - they are now against each other. The Palestinian police is perceived as a body set up to control the Palestinian population, mainly for the benefit of Israel. The cause is no longer considered the same and the PNA and the opposition seem to split into different collective entities. They were expected to symbolise together the Palestinian 'we', but this is not the case. Along the line drawn by the repressive methods of the Palestinian police, new identities of 'us' and 'them' are created. It can no longer be argued that Palestinian rule is different and better than either Israeli and Arab rule; the performance of the Palestinian police and security forces reminds many on the methods used by the occupier, or shows great

similarity to those used by the Arab regimes. To be like them is humiliating.

Are they so weak that they need five security apparatuses in order to check the opposition? Are they not convincing enough so that they have to impose the law by force? Are they lacking legitimacy and because of that they need the defensive line by creating pressure? It is obvious that this is a reflection of an instable, weak authority that lacks legitimacy. And by terrifying people, by scaring, detaining, kidnapping, interrogating and assassinating them, they will deter others. [] I don't think that the Palestinians who lived under Israeli occupation for the last 28 years, will tolerate that the PLO comes in and [there will be] this result. I believe that people are starting to revise their positions and to rethink again about their commitment to an authority like that.

(Interview with Riad Malki, PFLP spokesperson, October 7, 1994)

The use of force and other repressive measures is also seen as a reason for opposing the authority and as a source for tension between people and the authority/police.

Time will come. this is really [an] historical process. it's a revolution, time will come. Now, the Popular Front and others can accelerate that time [], so people can stand up and can initiate [a] new Intifada, as they initiated the Intifada against the occupation. This time they will initiate a new Intifada against tyranny, against lack of democracy, against violation of human rights, against totalitarianism, against arbitrary detention, against many things. *(Interview with Riad Malki, PFLP spokesperson, October 7, 1994)*

According to Malki, the PFLP has a clear position, which basically rejects the current political process. In Malki's view, people will start to feel the negative aspects of the process, and this will lead automatically to mobilization for a new uprising. Theoretically based on a kind of historical materialism, the PFLP argue that a new revolution will inevitably break out - it is just a matter of time, possibly accelerated by mobilization on part of oppositional forces. In a rather romantic manner, PFLP/DFLP use the popular and popularized notion of *Intifada*, adding the word 'new', which stands for new objectives and new targets: for democracy and against tyranny and authoritarianism. In contrast, Muhanna expressed some confidence in the PNA, not because its competence or abilities but because it is a *Palestinian* Authority, which implies that there is a limit in terms of despotism and oppression:

Those oppressors are Palestinian people, so there is a limit for their oppression. And again, the Palestinian occupied territories are different from the Arab countries in the terms that they learned a big lesson during the [Intifada], and this will [be] reflected upon the [PLO] also, because they will not easily accept oppression from their fellow Palestinians.

(Interview with Rabah Muhanna, PFLP sympathizer, January 20, 1995)

The opposition is thus redefining its struggle, although rather vaguely. While the struggle against the occupation has to and will continue, another struggle has been added: the struggle against the Authority. The PFLP and DFLP have not been very

visible since the signing of the agreements. PFLP has hardly taken responsibility for any attacks against Israel during 1994/1995, while the DFLP has been somewhat more noticeable militarily. Neither has been active in popular mobilization, and both mainly remain attractive to the intelligentsia with little popular appeal. The most spectacular DFLP attack took place in early February 1995, when gunmen opened fire on an Israeli car as it escorted a gasoline truck to a Gaza Strip filling station, killing an Israeli security guard and wounding another moderately. This attack was heavily criticized by the PNA (*Jerusalem Post*, February 7, 1995) which reacted by arresting many DFLP members. In this context, it should also be mentioned that rumors abounded in Spring 1995 that PFLP and DFLP leaders residing outside the Occupied Territories wanted to return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This could be seen as an attempt of the opposition to become more effective if acting from inside the autonomous areas. Another interpretation would be that both PFLP and DFLP would become even more marginal if they continued their political activities from abroad. A third assumption is that Syria - potentially about to reach an accord with Israel - is eager to get them out of Damascus (*Jerusalem Post*, March 28, 1995).

According to PFLP/DFLP discourse, the PLO is no longer legitimate, since its current leadership has sold out both territory and principles. Present feelings are dominated by bitterness. As Jadallah states, he, for example, had been prepared to die for

the PLO and its principles, but now, those very principles that he was ready to give his life for have been compromised. The PFLP/DFLP lost the foundation on which their view of the Palestinian struggle had been historically based.

I used to fight for the PLO, to go to prison for the PLO, and to shout wherever I go for the PLO. [] Our people died because of the PLO and went to prison because of the PLO, [and] the PLO used to represent for us the hope, the future, the national rights, the liberation movement, that is the PLO. To liberate Palestine, that is to say the right to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish an independent Palestinian state. If these elements are absent, are not any more part of the Palestinian programme, are not anymore part of the PLO programme, there is no PLO. [] The PLO is one simple thing and one single thing, and very obviously cannot be camouflaged by autonomy or Declaration of Principles or Palestinian Authority.
(Interview with Muhammad Jadallah, associated with the DFLP, September 21 and 28, 1994)

The legitimacy of the PLO used to derive from its *struggle*. If there is no more struggle, then the PLO is no more legitimate. This simple calculation must, however, also be seen against the background that the support for the PFLP and DFLP has declined considerably since the start of the peace process, mainly because they failed to present a credible alternative.

Whereas mainstream nationalism, both as reflected by PNA ministers and rank-and-file activists, perceive the end of the Intifada as one of the reasons for entering into negotiations and

changing strategy, PFLP/DFLP discourse has it that the Madrid-process and later the signing of agreements killed the uprising.

Before the agreement, there was national unity. The Intifada operated by the Unified Leadership of the Intifada. Where is that now? It doesn't exist. Before, all factions used to cooperate []. After the agreement, they never sat together or held [a] meeting together. That's it. The agreement put an end to national unity, and really divided us. [] After Madrid the situation deteriorated rapidly.

(Interview with Riad Malki, PFLP spokesperson, October 7, 1994)

National unity has thus been damaged by the agreements: for some movements within the Palestinian political spectrum the image of the common enemy faded away, and this, in turn, has had an negative effect on national unity.

It could be argued, however, that the PFLP and DFLP actually follow in the footsteps of mainstream nationalism: 1) the struggle is perceived as phased, with a state in the West Bank and Gaza as the first step in a longer process (the DFLP was actually in the forefront in advocating a phased strategy in the early 1970s, and together with Fateh brought about the 1974-decision in the PNC in favour of a phased strategy); 2) although the dream is to have a democratic state in all of Palestine, an independent state in parts of Palestine is in practice accepted; 3) popular mobilization *and* negotiations are preferred to armed struggle; 4) UN Resolutions 242 and 338 are accepted; 5) in fact, only few military

attacks have been carried out since the signing of the agreements, and only by the DFLP; and 6) there is no effective mobilization against the Palestinian Authority, despite the strong rhetorical rejection.

4. THE ISLAMIST OPPOSITION

Islamic nationalism entered Palestinian politics in full strength with the beginning of the Intifada, which was followed by the notion of "Jihad" and the emergence and formation of Hamas (see Abu-Amr, 1994; Legrain, 1994). Religious movements in the Palestinian society began to combine religious and nationalist discourse. Although Hamas and Islamic Jihad are different movements, they are here treated under the same heading.

Hamas opposes all forms of peace negotiations on principle. Article 13 of its Charter states:

As far as the ideology of the Islamic Resistance Movement is concerned, giving up any part of Palestine is like giving up part of its religion.
(Hamas Charter, translation by Muhammad Maqdsi, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXII, [88], No. 4, Summer, 1993, p. 126)

All of Palestine is to be liberated and an Islamic state to be established. In practice, however, several Hamas leaders are much more pragmatic, leaving the door open for a dialogue with Israel. Ahmed describes this position as deliberately ambiguous (Ahmed, 1994, p. 114). Hamas has ruled out the possibility of participating in the PNA and in participating in any elections for a Palestinian Council under the current conditions and circumstances set by the DOP and the Cairo Agreement. It has, however, expressed its willingness to participate in and even called for

municipal elections. In addition, there are Islamists in the West Bank, such as Sheikh Bitawi, who accepted appointments to the Authority. Abu-Amr describes this behaviour as a dichotomy between doctrine and practice (*Interview with Ziad Abu Amr, January 18, 1995*).

The Agreements

From a doctrinal point of view, the Gaza Jericho Agreement is seen as "a great historic act of treason and a dangerous one which will begin the dissolution of this leadership which has sold the struggle, sold the blood and sold the rights of the Palestinian people" (Sheikh Hamameh in Ahmed, 1994, p. 110).

The aim of the peace process as well as the Oslo and Cairo Agreements are, to make the Israeli occupation legal, and to integrate the Israeli state into the political structure of the Middle East. This meets with Israeli interests, while there is nothing in it for the Palestinians.

The agreement came about in a time when the Arabs are weak,[and] the other party is strong. [...] It won't do anything for the peace itself. The situation might be worse even than it was before these agreements. [] The most important points are delayed. They said that the conclusion of the peace treaty will be after three years, this is very bad. So Israel thinks that within three years, maybe the situation will be better for her. [...] With Jordan, they didn't delay anything. They did it right away.

(Interview with Sheikh Bassam Jarrar, October 19, 1994)²¹

The sole aim of the Madrid conference and then Oslo and Cairo was to make the Israeli occupation legal, to legitimize the Israeli occupation, to let the Israeli state become part of the Islamic world or the Middle Eastern world.

(Interview with Sheikh Jamil Hamameh, November 16, 1994)²²

None of the above quotations contains an outright rejection of negotiations *per se*. It is the *content* of the agreements that are criticized. The agreements are interpreted as instruments to make the occupation legal, and as such, they are strongly rejected. The Palestinians (as Muslims) are considered the 'true owners of Palestine', the land belongs to them (or to Allah), and is not negotiable. To accept autonomy is incongruent with what is *right*.

We refuse autonomy, because this does not actually represent the facts in the area. We are the true owners of Palestine, the Jews have no rights to establish their state on the expense of the Palestinians. Autonomy means that we are going to recognize Israel as the true owner of the land, and we [would be] a national minority within the Israeli society []. We refused to go to Madrid and we warned our colleagues [] about the draw-backs of

²¹ The participation of Sheikh Bassam Jarrar in this study is not as a member of any organization, but as an Islamic teacher. Abu-Amr (1994) describes him as a 'prominent Islamic leader'.

²² Also Jamil Hamameh declares that he has no formal, organizational links with Hamas or any other political organization, and his participation in this study is not as a member of any party or organization.

such conduct. [...] There are no signs of sovereignty; the situation is only justifying the existence of Israel as an occupier. [] This is an unacceptable thing for the Palestinians. [] They succeeded to open the Arab gates widely and to minimize all the elements of pressure on the Israeli side. Rabin went to Muscat, he went to Egypt []. Now, [in] one or two [years], nobody will support the Palestinians whether from the Arab, European or American side, so this will be Gaza Jericho first, maybe Gaza Jericho last, plus some places, like Ramallah.

(Interview with Mahmoud Zahhar, Hamas, January 11, 1995)

The agreements also opened the door to Israel, and Rabin could go to Muscat. The notion of 'gates' and 'doors' that are opened symbolize that Israel is now able to enter and penetrate the Middle East, where according to Hamas, it does not really belong. Doors and gates which are opened or closed represent mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion. According to Islamic nationalism, the doors should remain closed.

The Islamist leadership assesses the agreements more vaguely and ambiguously than the leftist opposition. This allows them pragmatically a wide range of interpretations. Hamas is the only organization large enough to challenge Fateh and the Authority. In opinion polls carried out by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies between October 1993 and March 1995, Hamas got between 12% and 18% of popular support, making it the largest group after Fateh, and the only faction besides Fateh to obtain more than 10%. Hamas has not yet decided

where to place itself within the new situation, but is playing in several directions simultaneously. On the one hand, the military wing of Hamas has carried out several spectacular attacks against Israeli targets since the agreements were signed. While Hamas' political leadership is openly criticising the Authority and the agreements²³ signed, it sometimes takes a more conciliatory position. The Islamic movement is thus in the process of trying to elaborate the best bargain without compromising too much on ideology or doctrine. This strategy became obvious in 1990, when Hamas sent a memorandum to the head of the PNC, requesting integration in PNC, although on condition of a 40-50% representation of Hamas and of ideological concessions (Legrain, 1994, p. 422; Abu-Amr, 1994). Many observers acknowledge that, were Hamas to achieve what they consider a fair deal in terms of power sharing, they would find a way to join the Authority (e.g. *Interview with Ziad Abu Amr, January 18, 1995*).

Hamas' long-term solution is an Islamic state in all of Palestine. This state should be established in all of Palestine, meaning from the river to the sea, although Islamist verbal discourse is rather vague in this regard. Islamist dogma says that the state of Israel should disappear, although Jews could stay and live in the Muslim state.

²³

For example accusing the Authority of collaborating with Israel and of betraying the Palestinian cause.

My initial aim is to get rid of the Israeli occupation. We are against the Israeli occupation and nobody can deny that it is my right to seek to get rid of the Israeli occupation. I am a Muslim, and as a Muslim, I believe in the Islamic solution, and I believe that Palestine is Islamic Waqf, it is part of the Islamic world. And I do not differentiate between any part of Palestine. My sole aim is to get rid of the Israeli occupation. I believe that the Islamic solution can solve the problems of the whole world, not only the Islamic world. I am a Muslim, and all Muslims respect other religions, respect other peoples. I am not against Jews as a religion, I am not against them as a nation, but I am against the Israeli occupation, or any other kind of occupation.

(Interview with Sheikh Jamil Hamameh, November 16, 1994)

In conformity with mainstream nationalism as well as traditional oppositional discourse, the Islamists see the struggle against the occupation as a 'right, which is given strength through its divinity. Since Palestine is considered Waqf, however, no differentiation is made for any part of Palestine. The above quotation could be interpreted in different ways, occupied could mean West Bank/Gaza Strip or all of Palestine. Sheikh Hamameh underlines that he is not against Jews in terms of faith and people, but against the Israeli occupation. This could be, in fact, interpreted as a recognition of Jewish nationhood.

It is still our land. It's our land. Nobody can deny this. No moral bases, no political bases, no historical bases give the Israelis the right to establish their state on our land. It's our land.

[Asked if there are any conditions under which Hamas could accept a two-state solution, Zahhar replied:]

No. No. This is not a political issue. It is an Islamic issue. So we are not here representing our views, we are representing our religion.

(Interview with Mahmoud Zahhar, Hamas, January 11, 1995)

Palestine is ours, morally, politically and historically, argues Zahhar. Religious values are non-negotiable and built, at the same time, the base for the struggle. Islamic phrases are used to emphasise the justice and legitimacy of the cause. Zahhar represents the hard-liners in the political leadership of Hamas, while leaders such as Ismail Haniye and Imad Falouji, for example, rather represent the moderates. According to Imad Falouji, Hamas will consider cease-fire and eventual peace if Israel withdraws from the territories occupied in 1967 (*Interview with Imad Falouji, May 18, 1995*). An Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank would be a positive thing to consider, indicating the preparedness to consider a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza instead of liberating Palestine from the river to the sea .

It would be a positive sign for the Arab people to consider, if they withdrew from the West Bank. But they never showed us any positive sign, acceptable to deal with. [] If they show us that they want to live and that they don't want to be our enemy, we will start to change our ideas about them, too. But they never did this.

(Interview with Sheikh Bassam Jarrar, October 19, 1994)

There is an openness in Jarrar's remark, which is hardly reflected occurs in contemporary discourse on Islamic movements. In effect, Islamist movements in general and Hamas in particular, do not represent stubborn rejectionism, as often claimed. Hamas has different trends, with more or less conciliatory approaches. The moderate trend does not *per se* reject compromise solutions or negotiations, and its rejection of the current agreements are not a principle but due to the perception that Israel has not gone far enough, while the Palestinians have not gained anything worth mentioning.

The idea to liberate parts of Palestine as a step towards achieving the goal of establishing an Islamic state (*Interview with Sheikh Ahmed Bahhar, Hamas, January 19, 1995*), reflects the PLO discourse of the 1970s, which led in 1974 to the PNC decision that Palestine could be liberated in stages.

Islamic Jihad discourse is less compromising:

We have to get rid of Israel from this area, because Palestine is Arabic and Islamic land, and those who are strangers they represent a dangerous challenge to our civilization, and our religion and the future of our generation. So we don't accept its existence in the area at all.

(Interview with Sheikh Abdullah Shami, Islamic Jihad, November 24, 1994)

Since Palestine is Islamic, Israel stands for the strangers, those outside the social boundary of an Islamic us. While this is true in cultural terms, Israel has succeeded to force itself geographically on

Islamic land. Thus, they have crossed the physical border, and have become dangerous .

I believe in their way to liberate Palestine, all of Palestine, because the right could not be divided. There is one right, not more than that and not less than this. And I will [continue] until I receive my goals or I die. This is our way, and this is our right. We will continue

(Interview with Ala Saftawi, Islamic Jihad sympathizer, January 19, 1995)

Saftawi is ready to struggle for this right and cause till the very end. While Hamas is a mass movement, implying a real challenge towards the PNA, Fateh and the PLO, Islamic Jihad, has no such ambitions. Instead, being a small but quite active organisation, it perceives itself as the vanguard of the society *(Interview with Ala Saftawi, Islamic Jihad sympathizer, January 19, 1995)*, which can afford to display a harsher tone.

Strategically, Hamas is acting on all fronts simultaneously. On the one end of the scale, there are discussions about transforming into a political party which acts openly and has a political programme. This party is not to replace Hamas, but rather to enable Hamas to take part in the political process, without giving up its ideology.

On the other hand, military attacks against Israeli targets are carried out. These attacks are a way to demonstrate that the Israelis are vulnerable too. Through these actions, the Islamic movements

place themselves in the position of the enemy of Israel, the challenger in the battle over Palestine. Attacks continue in order to pass the message that Israel has still a conflict with the Palestinians, with the difference that the soldiers in this war are now made up of Islamist activists. The goal of these attacks is not solely to kill Israelis but to maintain that the Islamic movements have the means and the power to disrupt the whole process. Therefore, they should not be ignored, neither by Israel nor by the PNA.

Perception Of Israelis And Israeli Intentions

According to the Islamic movements, Israeli intentions regarding the current negotiations are to legitimize the occupation, and the agreements, therefore, serve only to meet Israeli needs and interests. Islamic movements here have a similar perception as the leftist opposition: Israel is not interested in peace.

Israel has been here for 27 years, and they never give us any sign that [they are ready] to make peace with us, so the way we deal with them, we don't see any sign that they need to make peace with us. They didn't even give us anything to make us even think they want to make peace with us.

(Interview with Sheikh Bassam Jarrar, October 19, 1994)

Jarrar is talking about the West Bank and Gaza Strip rather than all of Palestine ; Israel is occupier since 27 years, and still doesn't want peace:

The Arab people believe that Israel being in the Arab world is a danger. That's what they believe, because that's what Israel has shown the Arabs since 1948. [] Up to this moment, the Arab people don't even accept the idea for Israel to be part of the Arab world. Because it shows that it is an enemy state to the Arab people. [...] They think that if they put more pressure on us, they could use us more. But they don't know how Arab people think. When they are on top of us, they might have some days, some time when it's quiet, but they will see sudden explosions which they don't expect. Everything is possible, but Israel thinks that they will have peace by power.

(Interview with Sheikh Bassam Jarrar, October 19, 1994)

Sheikh Bassam Jarrar argues that Israel is dangerous to the Arab world, because it does not want to live in peace with the Arabs. This is again a discourse about boundaries, and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion: who belongs and who doesn't?

The mention of quiet times which might be followed by unexpected disturbances is a clear warning. Israel is perceived as powerful, but the Islamists argue that Israel will not be powerful for ever.

A typical component of Islamic discourse is that Jews have always been protected by Islamic rule, while persecuted in Europe. This glorious past is to be resurrected. History has shown that this is the best choice for Muslims, Christians and Jews. Since Muslims are anyway the majority in the Middle East, Muslims should rule.

From where did the Jews come? Are they the main race of this land? Of course not. But they came as immigrants from abroad and made our own people refugees. [] If an Islamic state is built on Palestinian land, we will give them [a] choice: anyone of them [who] wants to live in Palestine, will be welcome to live like us, and if anybody [who] wants to leave to the place from where he came - we will not prevent him from leaving.

(Interview with Sheikh Abdullah Shami, Islamic Jihad, November 24, 1994)

Jews are seen as alien , strangers who do not belong to the land. They have immigrated here, and trespassed a social and geographical boundary. Under Islamic rule, they can choose whether to stay or whether they want to leave.

We look at Israel as a Western tool in our area for furthering the division of our people, our Islamic people, our Arab people; and for Israel, to be a [badge], not only a military badge or an economical [badge] in the area for the West, but also a cultural badge. Cultural, that means [] the way of life, behaviours, cultures, traditions, all these things which are different. We look at Judaism as an Eastern reality, not a Western reality. Israel is a Western reality, not an Eastern reality. Israel is not the right Judaism. Israel is the product of Zionism. We see that the Jewish people were pushed to die in our area for Western reasons, for Western goals. For the West. [] We can't resolve the question of Israel by pushing the Jewish people in the sea, like some Arab leaders said, like Abdel-Nasir. [] No, this is not a solution. Islam refuses this way as we understand Islam. But if there will be a solution, a radical solution that the Israel state must be I don't want to use Western vocabulary ... destroy, no. Destroy means that you want to destroy the people and the state and the organs of the state, no. We hope that Israel as a regime disappears []. We want the Jewish people to be here. [] We want all who

were killed in Europe to be in the territories. This is the goal of Islam, but we don't want that these people come to rule and suppress us. We don't want - and Islam prevents this - to have a butchery in Palestine. This is enough; we want that Israel disappears as an organ, and the Jewish people stay still here with us. Like they lived with us during 14 centuries. They lived with us! (*Interview with Ala Saftawi, Islamic Jihad sympathizer, January 19, 1995*)

According to Ala Saftawi, Israel does not represent true Judaism, which is an Eastern reality, and has a rightful place in the Middle East and in Palestine. Israel, however, represents some kind of false Judaism, and can - as a Western creation - not be accepted. As such, Israel should disappear, while the Jewish people can stay. If the Jews accept their rightful position like they did in the past, then Muslims and Jews can live together. Although the Islamic opposition also views the Israeli self-perception as being superior, there is not the same inferiority complex as in mainstream and leftist nationalism. Islamic movements have found a way to deal with the issue by referring to the number of believers: in this regard, Jews are clearly inferior to Muslims. The use of this argumentation is widely used among the Islamists: it makes Palestinian to feel superior to Jews, although living under their occupation.

In Autumn 1994, a dialogue between Hamas and Israel was considered possible by several parties.

I believe that there must be and it is not impossible or strange to have such a dialogue between the

Islamic movement and the Israeli government. We are perceived by others as fossilized. We are not. We are dynamic. We have civilization, we have beliefs, we have concepts, and we can deal with our matters. I see that it is my right to fight against occupation, any kind of occupation. This is my right. I can't avoid killing others in that fight. This is a kind of war. I believe that there must be some kind of dialogue between the Israeli government and the Islamic movement, to avoid killing civilian people. Why can't we make an agreement between the Israeli government and the Islamic movement to avoid killings, to avoid injuring civil people from both sides? Why? (*Interview with Sheikh Jamil Hamameh, Nov. 16, 1994*)

Sheikh Hamameh is one of the advocators of such a dialogue in order to stop the killing of civilians. This is an ultimate challenge to the PNA. If Israel were to negotiate with *both* the PLO/PNA and Hamas, it meant that the PLO is not the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and that there is in fact a challenging alternative'. For the Islamists meanwhile, such a dialogue implies a de facto recognition of Israel: how could one negotiate with or talk to someone who doesn't exist? It might not, however, imply a recognition of Israel's *right* to exist.

Internal Relations

The Palestinian National Authority

The Islamic movements are unambiguous when it comes to assessments of the PNA. They oppose the peace accords and therefore, they refuse to

cooperate with the PNA. The criticism raised against the PNA is in its substance much the same as it is in PFLP/DFLP circles. The concentration of power in the hands of Arafat is considered the main problem.

Everything is in the hand of Arafat. Nothing can be done except by approval of Arafat. Through this monopoly, you can't create a new system. [] There is social and moral deterioration. We have a lot of manifestations of corruption.

(Interview with Mahmoud Zahhar, Hamas, January 11, 1995)

The Islamic movement does not try to put obstacles in front of the Palestinian Authority. It does its best not to clash with the Palestinian Authority. If this Authority will succeed, then this will benefit the Palestinian people, but they didn't succeed yet. If they don't succeed, then there will be people to take over, and to fill the gaps. But the Palestinian Authority is doing wrong things. So they will [force] the Islamic movement to be in conflict with them. It is not right for the Israelis to ask the Palestinian Authority to protect them outside Gaza and Jericho. They make [Arafat] responsible for everything. Is it true that Arafat is stronger than Israel? It's obvious that he should try to protect Israel from [attacks in] the self-rule area, but it's not right to protect Israel inside Israel itself. It's assumed that people will fight Israel from outside Palestine and Israel itself. And what can Arafat do? Up to this moment, he is not responsible for what happens in the West Bank. To summarize, if the Palestinian Authority deals with the people as an authority, a real authority, then there will be no conflict with the Islamic movement. But if Rabin makes them responsible for any situation, Rabin make the authority a hostage, and makes it responsible for anything that happens. If anything happens in Argentina, will the authority be responsible for it?

(Interview with Sheikh Bassam Jarrar, October 19, 1994)

One position, represented by Islamic personalities from the West Bank, is to let the Authority prove itself. Bassam Jarrar does not put himself in opposition to the Authority, he leaves the door open for different interpretations. For him, the Authority didn't succeed so far, which is a latent warning: there are people to fill its place, i.e. Hamas. Here, again, Israel is seen as the main problem, pressuring the Authority to take action.

If we have an idea how to create plans to reconstruct our society, in the field of education and other civilian administration, then we could consider cooperating; but [there is] no single sign about their intention to do anything. They are only increasing the number of policemen. [] There is no performance at all. [] Nobody is able to say yes or no, except Arafat. [] We have no problems with Fatah. And we are not in Lebanon, we are here. You can see in one family that one is a member of Hamas, and a second one of Fatah. We have no problems with Fatah. [] And even the Fatah movement has trouble with the Authority.

(Interview with Mahmoud Zahhar, Hamas, January 11, 1995)

Thus, it would be possible for Hamas to cooperate with the Authority, at least in certain areas such as education, civil matters, and the juridical structure. Hamas leaders do not acknowledge any problems with the Fatah movement. Their opposition has not so much to do with the Authority itself, but with the fact that it has been established and acts within the framework of the rejected agreements.

We welcomed at the very beginning the Palestinian police when they came, and we are ready to

collaborate with the Palestinian Autonomy Government in those fields which serve the Palestinian people. But beyond the Oslo Agreement, because we reject that agreement. *(Interview with Ahmed Bahhar, Hamas, Jan.19, 1995)*

Ala Saftawi²⁴ of Islamic Jihad does not deny some legitimacy of the Authority since Fateh was the leading force of the Palestinian national struggle for the past 30 years, and have, as such, gained some credibility and legitimacy. Since the Authority depends on Fateh, the Authority is not void of legitimacy. But the era of national struggle and of Fateh has come to an end, and now is the time for Islamic national struggle :

I think that Arafat is a historical person, a historical leader for our Palestinian people. But his period is gone. Finished. What we called the national movement struggle is finished. And now is the Islamic national struggle. [] Time goes and other symbols come. Generations go after generations. This is the generation of Islamic struggle and militants. [...] We don't look at this Authority as [a] legitimate authority, we look at it as a Palestinian Authority who has some credibility because it comes from Fateh, which guided our struggle for 30 years. There are some areas for cooperation; social issues, for example, or in the municipalities against drugs.

(Interview with Ala Saftawi, Islamic Jihad sympathizer, January 19, 1995)

²⁴

Ala Saftawi's father was Asad Saftawi, a Fateh-leader who was killed by Israelis in 1994.

Internal Conflicts

Like mainstream nationalists, Islamic leaders tend to see the agreements as conflict-generating. Two days before the November clashes outside the Palestine mosque broke out, Sheikh Hamameh said:

We can't hide the fact that there is a disagreement. Let us consider that there is a disagreement between the Palestinian Authority and the Islamic movement. Each one has [] his point of view. We can't hide that, but in fact, both of them proved that they deal with each other in a civilized manner []. There is no conflict between them. They are dealing with each other in according to what benefits the Palestinian people, without considering the disagreement between them. [] It's not limited to the Oslo agreement, it is about daily issues of the Palestinian people, anything that helps the Palestinian people [] without any consideration of other political issues.

(Interview with Sheikh Jamil Hamameh, November 16, 1994)

The line of disagreement is not drawn along the agreements since even those who think that the agreements are bad, also work in the Authority. The contradiction starts when it comes to terms with the implementation of the agreements.

Those who are in the Authority say that the agreement is very bad. There is no contradiction. The contradiction is that they have some responsibilities to take [], they have their projects after signing the agreement of Oslo and we, the Islamic movements, have our own projects of struggle. [...] I don't think that what has happened on that Friday [the 18th of November 1994] will be repeated. I think that the Israelis want to try to

make something like this. But the Authority doesn't want this. The Palestinian opposition movement doesn't like this. The people reject this, because what happened was really a big crime. [...] We accept that the Palestinian Authority put us in prison. We are like the guards of the prisons. These prisons don't only belong to Fateh or the Authority. They belong to all the people, also to Islamic Jihad. If our brothers will put us in prisons, we accept it. If they will sentence us, we accept this. We will not harm our brothers in the Palestinian Authority, but we will continue our struggle in the autonomous areas as we like.

(Interview with Ala Saftawi, Islamic Jihad sympathizer, January 19, 1995)

Islamic Jihad will not challenge the Authority, nor will it fight the Authority, *unless* the Authority strikes first, so that it will be a matter of self-defense, according to Saftawi. He argues that Islamic Jihad will accept to be put in prison. To be put in prison is something honourable as it shows one as activist and fighter. To be put in Israeli prisons has been and remains a form of sacrifice for a higher cause, even under Palestinian rule. To the Islamists, the main line of confrontation is still Israel, and this will not change. Between the factions, there seems to be a common perception of Israel as wanting a civil war.

With Black Friday, all assurances became meaningless and the relationship between the Authority and Hamas has been uneasy. Hamas put the blame on both the Authority and on Israel. The Authority is certainly perceived as bearing the main responsibility for what happened, although it was acknowledged that, most likely, external

circumstances had played a role, too. The Authority has proved to be a threat to the people; this, according to Bahhar, has considerably widened the gap between the people and the Authority. The Authority and the Palestinian police are viewed as agents of Israel, used in revenge for the Tel Aviv bus bombing.

The whole responsibility is upon the Palestinian Authority. Since they are responsible for the security they are responsible for what happened in that Friday. As a consequence, the gap between the Authority and the people has widened, because this authority which is to protect the Palestinian people, has opened fire against Palestinians. The Palestinians discovered that this Authority does not deserve their support [] We had a dialogue between the movement and the Authority, but nothing came really out of this dialogue, because the authority wants the conflict between Fateh and Hamas. But in fact the conflict is between Hamas and the Authority. [] We realize that Fateh is the party of the Authority, but the problem is between the people and the Authority. [] It seems as if there's some pressure from Rabin, ...that day, the 18th of November, was also the mourning day for the people who had been killed at Dizengoff²⁵. So the massacre was to satisfy the Israelis.

(Interview with Sheikh Ahmed Bahhar, Hamas, January 19, 1995)

Tension between the PNA and Hamas again rose in the aftermath of the Beit Lid bombing, the explosion in Sheikh Radwan and the suicide bomb attacks in the Gaza Strip in April 1995. Palestinian police arrested dozens of Islamic leaders, and it was in

²⁵

The Tel Aviv bus bomb on October 1994.

connection to the Beit Lid event that Arafat decreed the establishment of security courts under Egyptian martial law. As Palestinian police continued to crack down, Hamas warned the Authority that it is about to cross a red line (*Jerusalem Post*, April 12, 1994) and a dialogue between the Authority and its opposition began.

5. THE THIRD TREND: REFORMISM

In the wake of the self-government agreements, a third trend has emerged, which, although it has no clear common agenda yet, focuses on internal politics and democracy. It accepts negotiations with Israel, but not under the current circumstances which put the Palestinians in an unfavourable position. This stream consists of at least two political groups: 1) the PPP, which is the only faction which could be said to represent the reformist approach, and, 2) independents with no organizational basis. The individual most obviously connected to this line of thinking is Haidar Abdel Shafi, former head of the Palestinian delegation to Madrid and Washington. In Spring 1995, he was the leading figure in promoting and eventually establishing the "Movement for Democracy Building." The goal of the movement is to foster a democratic culture in Palestinian society and to critically examine the negotiation process (*Interview with Haidar Abdel Shafi, March 29, 1995*). It remains doubtful whether one could talk about this as a trend or a movement, since reformism lacks a clear organizational dimension.²⁶

²⁶

The persons included under this heading, are PPP-representatives and independents. Some Fatch- and FIDA-individuals could be perhaps also better described as reformists than as mainstreamers, since reformist are considered those with more far-reaching criticism against both Oslo and Cairo and with an independent position vis-a-vis the Authority. Hanan Ashrawi has been included in this trend as well.

The Agreements

Reformist nationalism supports peace negotiations with Israel, but believes that the current balance of power makes it virtually impossible to come out with an agreement which is beneficial to the Palestinians. To overcome these given circumstances, certain conditions on both the Israeli and the Palestinian side have to be met. As Israel is concerned, for example, there must be a total freeze on settlement activities; regarding the Palestinians, there is an urgent need to put their house in order and to agree on what the red lines are, before negotiating any further with Israel. Without a common understanding, any agreement with Israel will be only a further contribution to weaken the Palestinian movement.

I was concerned about the contents of the agreement. I could see right from the beginning that this was a bad agreement, because it did not challenge the Israeli claims to the territories. [] It could become irreversible [only] if the Palestinians were able to put their house in order and make use of their Palestinian potential []. I was preaching the importance of putting the Palestinian house in order to be able to take crucial decisions [and] to find a way to establish the needed unity. [] And of course this is one of the bad things about the agreement, that it was adopted before establishing this unity, so actually it deepened the disarray among the Palestinians.

(Interview with Haidar Abdel Shafi, August 28, 1994)

Haidar Abdel Shafi focuses more on internal structures and societal issues than on the agreements themselves. The current disunity is seen as the result

of a leadership which accepted agreements with an external party before reaching a national consensus. The reformists criticism of the agreements intensified in Spring 1995 with Abdel Shafi calling for a freeze of the negotiations in response to Israel's continuous land expropriation and settlement policy (*Interview, May 18, 1995*).

Typical PPP discourse characteristically supports the more general Oslo accords as a framework for peace, but is against the subsequent, more specific Cairo Agreement. The DOP was welcomed as it recognised the Palestinian people and their representative, the PLO, and boosted the PLO standing in the international arena. The Palestinians were in fact given a chance, but missed the opportunity; they failed to determine the course of the negotiations which develop to their disadvantage. The reformists argue that the Palestinian negotiators were not competent enough and that they were manipulated by the much stronger Israeli negotiation team.²⁷ While the PFLP/DFLP criticize the accords for confusing independence with autonomy, the PPP criticize it for confusing withdrawal and redeployment. They argue that Israel should have withdrawn completely from the Gaza Strip, but, instead, Israeli military presence is kept strong in order to protect the settlers. What has been achieved so far, is nothing but redeployment of Israeli army bases.

²⁷

It was sometimes reported that the Israeli negotiation team told the Palestinian team about weaknesses in agreement texts which would be of disadvantage to the Palestinians.

We don't support the Cairo agreement. We supported - with reservations - the Oslo agreement because it was an agreement on principles. These principles could be negotiated in a fair way. We think that the negotiations interpreted the Oslo agreement in Israel's interest.[...] There was a talk about the principle of with-drawal from the Gaza Strip. The Israelis understand withdrawal as redeployment, I understand withdrawal as withdrawal. [] So the Palestinian negotiators were manipulated by the Israeli negotiators, in fact, they ended up with just redeployment inside the Gaza Strip. [] The Israelis are strong, of course, and the Palestinian negotiators were unaware of this strength. I think the Palestinians have scored a success, though; in Washington they have proved to the whole world that they want peace with Israel, that they are a people. This is the card the Palestinians couldn't play well. They should have stuck to a more vigilant position, a more stiff position. This agreement has no mechanism to develop - nothing will come out of it. There will be no independence.

(Interview with Bashir Barghouti, PPP, September 4, 1994)

The interim period and the phased process is seen as problematic. Final status negotiations, it is argued, should instead start right away.

I believe that the peace agreement in Cairo has generated these problems, because the Cairo agreement went far beyond the Oslo reference. The DOP is based on UN Resolution 242, but in the Cairo Agreement it was not clearly stated and they try to avoid this principle. They also talk about redeployment of the Israeli occupation army [rather than withdrawal] and about administrative issues []. The Cairo Agreement supports all the time Israeli security while it doesn't care for Palestinian security. [...] So, let us as Palestinians say, It's OK, we tried and we were very faithful to this agreement, but it doesn't work. Maybe it's time to

sit again and try to have a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian Israeli conflict based on [UN Resolution] 242. [] Why should we have this interim period? I don't understand; we experienced it, it's more than one year now, and nothing came out. (*Interview with Amal Kreishe, PPP, November 5, 1994*)

Similar to left-wing and Islamic opposition, the PPP sees the negotiations not as real negotiations between equal partners, but as strongly affected by the balance of power which allows Israel to dictate the direction in which the process is heading. Israel is perceived as imposing its will upon a much weaker negotiation partner. Like the opposition, PPP also argues that the Cairo Agreement is a reorganization of the occupation .

It's moving towards dictation rather than negotiation. It starts with Israeli proposals and it ends with agreements that are extremely similar to those initial Israeli proposals, so Israel here is dictating its will and transfers it to an agreement with the Palestinian side. [In doing so, Israel] uses the weakness of the PLO, and makes use of the lack of democracy in the decision-making process of the PLO. [...] And we envision this Cairo Agreement as a step towards reorganizing the occupation rather than as a step towards ending the occupation.
(*Interview with Ghassan al-Khateeb, PPP, October 5, 1994*)

Hanan Ashrawi argues in similar terms as the PPP, saying that the Oslo Agreement could have been turned into better results than those achieved in Cairo, particularly criticising the vagueness of the DOP:

I thought the Oslo Agreement could go either way. At first, it was a flawed agreement and it had gaps, absence of vital details, it had no assurances and guarantees. It also adopted the policy of fragmentation [...]. As I said, we started a new system of negotiation, sign first and negotiate later, so it had potential to go either way. And what you do with it is what counts. Unfortunately, what was done with it was to allow Israel to maximize its gains, and minimize its losses, it allowed the process to adopt Israeli priorities and to maintain Israeli control and domination. It adopted the whole system of fragmentation - a functional approach. [] It placed the Palestinian side, I discovered, on probation. They have to demonstrate to the Israelis that they can deliver and Israel is in sole control of the process. (*Interview with Hanan Ashrawi, February 24, 1995*)

That Israel puts the Palestinians to a test is seen as degrading and not helpful for the negotiations. Some independents, although highly critical of the Authority, are equally critical of the opposition whose rejection of the agreements they consider as unrealistic and not constructive at all. They argue that the discussion should no longer center around the question whether the agreements are good or bad; since they are a reality which cannot be denied, the discussion should rather focus on how to implement the agreements properly. The opposition is in fact playing into the hands of the Authority, since no alternative policies or agendas are offered:

I think that the people will see the process, despite the criticism as a matter of fact, that we can't afford to reject, we have to be involved in it. I think that there is a majority that's perhaps not comfortable with the agreement. But the agreement is a fact, and I think the opposition's stand is not reasonable,

they want to destroy the agreement, but they don't provide any alternatives.

(Interview with Heidar Abdel Shafi, August 28, 1994)

Perception Of Israelis And Israeli Intentions

Many reformists believe that Israel is still claiming all of Palestine. According to Abdel Shafi, there is no major difference between Labour and Likud, they differ in methods used, but the goal is basically the same (*Interview, August 28, 1994*). The reformists argue that Israel wants only to maintain its military occupation of the West Bank while getting rid of Gaza.

All the procedures related to the peace process give the occupation a new face, but still, it's an occupation. Maybe it will not be military in some phases, but it is an occupation. [...] So on the one hand, Rabin all the time declares that he's for peace, and he's confronting the Likud by building this relationship with the PLO, and at the same time doing the same things that the Likud did before.

(Interview with Amal Kreishe, PPP, November 5, 1994)

Reformists strongly believe that Israel wants at best limited functional autonomy, with no territorial control. In the reformists' view the current balance of power is difficult to overcome, and this is one factor effectively hindering a fair agreement from being reached. Hanan Ashrawi is aware of the different tendencies in the Israeli camp:

I think they want to maintain control, to separate the land from the people, adopt the functional approach, the fragmentational approach of gradualism with the Israelis to be the sole decisive factor. They want peace on their own terms, and they don't want in any way to have a genuine territorial dimension or any aspects of sovereignty. [...] I can't say that the Israeli side is monolithic, there are differences. Some of them want to keep sovereignty over the land and the settlements, some want to give the West Bank to Jordan, some want to have a Palestinian state, but truncated, and as a weaker neighbour and as a security guarantee. [...] Rabin is involved in the issue 'too little too late', holding back... he doesn't make concessions, floundering, he doesn't have a political vision, he has immediate military and domestic political considerations rather than a wide historical vision.
(Interview with Hanan Ashrawi, February 24, 1995)

Internal Relations

The Palestinian National Authority

Reformists express severe criticism of the Authority, mainly in terms of a lack of democratic principles and organisational skills. Although it has become common among all trends to focus and assess internal relations, it is the reformists and the mainstream which are more prone to state- and society-building. The difference between reformists and the opposition is that the former are directly involved in a discussion with the Authority about a number of issues, while the latter is not. The reformists try to lobby for their preferred policies.

There is much to be hoped for. The people who lead the Authority, they do not know their powers.

[...] We try to pressure the National Authority for a better performance, to broaden the base of decision-making, to establish a collective leadership, and to get going about the election process. This is the main thing we are engaged in, there is nothing else to do. [...] Elections could be a starting point for democratizing the Palestinian society and to establishing the Authority of the people, that's what's needed.

(Interview with Heidar Abdel Shafi, August 28, 1994)

Generally, the reformist trend has more in common with the mainstream nationalists than with the opposition. This goes as far as the acknowledgement of the need for new goals, tasks and strategies for the Palestinians are concerned. In this regard, democratization is considered the most urgent need. Reformists' criticism is mainly raised against the large bureaucratic apparatus being established, both in terms of military personnel and the civil servants. It is somewhat feared that the military sector could take over civil spheres.

The leadership of Fatah, most of them, as persons, as individuals, were refugees when they were very, very young. [...] They were educated and had all their experiences in Kuwait, in the Gulf, in Saudi Arabia. [...] I always say if you open the head of Yasir Arafat, you will find a mixture of Hafiz al-Assad, and Saddam Hussein, and King Hussein, and Abdel-Naser. Arafat is concentrating on getting the maximum amount of money as donations from the outside world and he is creating a very artificially big apparatus, civil and military. Now he is spending 9.5 million dollars monthly in salaries for the police. Why the hell do we need this? And he is, if you read the newspapers, every day appointing ministers and deputy ministers, and deputies and advisors to the ministers and general

directors; [That is] expanding in a very unhealthy way, and it's not related to the economy, to the level of economy. We can neither finance this structure with taxes at this stage, nor it's healthy to remain dependent on foreign aid. [...] There is no harmony between the level of economy and the size and expenditures of these administrations and security apparatus.

(Interview with Ghassan al-Khateeb, PPP, October 5, 1994)

The PNA is in the process of establishing a large 'state' apparatus, as is often the case with newly established states. The reformists are highly critical of this development. Reformists could play a crucial role in accepting the legitimacy of the Authority, while, at the same time, serving as the watch-dogs of this Authority and trying to foster civil society as a counter-point to the "official" structures set up by the PNA:

The main task of the Palestinian people is to get rid of the occupation. The agreement did not achieve this goal, which is strived for by all Palestinians, even by the PLO [...]. We don't see that we have to have a reason to kill the agreement, because killing the agreement means that you are asking the Israelis to come back to the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, and this is not the solution. [...] We can criticize this authority and, at the same time, put demands before this authority, but within the context of the general struggle against the occupation [...]. The criterion is: where does this authority stand in the struggle against the occupation? We take the position that we are not boycotting them and we are not cooperating with them on the political level.

(Interview with Bashir Barghouti, PPP, September 4, 1994)

The reformists' approach is located somewhere between the Authority and the opposition. The Authority is a fact; boycott it is not a solution and cooperation not the only option left. Practical political criticism does not mean ideological rejectionism. In addition, to work actively against the Authority and the agreements would be futile since it would imply 'asking the Israelis to come back'. The reformist trend could be thus - as a rather general attitude - described as 'loyal' opposition, with some more oppositional and others rather loyal. They do not support the agreement *per se* but have reservation - to different extents.

Independents, are concerned about the military structure, but not in the same way as the opposition is. While the latter perceives the PNA's security apparatus as a direct threat, the reformists' concerns are more about a possible militarization of the society. This goes along with the reformists' fear to lose ground in terms of being unable to maintain their influence and positions. The majority of the reformists are those 'personalities' who became well-known and gained political power with the Madrid negotiations, but then were sidestepped by Oslo'.

In terms of negotiations, we have been severely deficient. Unfortunately, there is an absence of political will and the determination to stand up for Palestinian rights. [The Palestinians] ended up discussing technicalities and taking a firm decision on issues that are symbolic or technical, and at the same time, there is an absence of a very clear strategy, an absence of mobilization of resources, of skilled people, of technocrats, professionals to

negotiate. [...] I think we haven't really used our best capabilities. The only resource we have is human. In terms of negotiations and political guidelines - I think that there is a weakness. In terms of internal issues, I think that the question is how to build the institutions. Institution-building is part of the nation-building process. [...] But at the same time, I also know that they are working with very severe handicaps. It doesn't justify it; I keep saying that they are accountable, but they don't have sufficient authority to be sufficiently accountable. Because Israel can intrude at any moment and close down the territories and create a massive prison and pressure cooker. But I don't think that that should prevent them from doing things that are within their limits that should have been done.

[...] We don't need slogans anymore, we have to deal with realities of life, respect people's intelligence. And also, don't adopt Israeli targets. The security of the Israelis should not be at the expense of the Palestinians. And the military focus should completely change. There is undue emphasis on military systems and military structures, on security issues, rather than on civilian and civil issues. [...] Unfortunately, this transformation of the mentality from revolution and national liberation to a military mindset, including all this secrecy and manipulation and so on, has not really taken place smoothly. [...] We need now statesmen and - women, not revolutionaries.

(Interview with Hanan Ashrawi, February 24, 1995)

Internal Conflicts

There is a consensus among all political trends that the agreements have caused internal conflicts.

Unfortunately, the agreement itself is paving the way for clashes, not because any Palestinian wants these clashes. When you have an agreement according to which you are supposed to hand over to the Israelis anyone who commits or is suspected

of planning anything against Israel, you will find yourself soon in a very tricky position with the people and their families. It will cause more tension. And who knows, in that fragile socio-economic setup in Gaza Strip, what will be the outcome? [...] You have four armed groups in the street: the Israeli army, the settlers, the Palestinian police and the opposition; maybe someone throws a stone and you have a flare up of clashes. So there are not guarantees. No matter what your intentions are, maybe you find yourself entangled in such a situation.

(Interview with Bashir Barghouti, PPP, September 4, 1994)

Agreements reached with external parties are considered as conflict-generating. Reformists are not bound to the actual process and discussions on the agreements as the supporters and opponents are, so that they can speak more openly on the issue of internal conflicts. Ashrawi acknowledges that the agreements have speeded up the internal discussion about democracy, accountability, and the need for a 'new national consensus'. A national consensus must be reached in relation to the newly emerged issues. The debate - like among mainstream nationalists - around the Palestinian cause is no longer *solely* about liberation and independence, but also about governing structures:

Any agreement, external agreement, is liable to unleash internal conflicts, or let's say internal problems and issues. What it has unleashed in some way are questions about internal governance, about accountability, about democracy, about participatory inclusive democracy, about strategy, about the definitions of national unity. It has unleashed a call for a new national consensus.

which I subscribe to, we need a new national consensus. And we need also the evolution of new political systems and structures. So all these things came as a result of a resolution of, let's say, an external conflict, which gives more room for internal needs to express themselves.

(Interview with Hanan Ashrawi, February 24, 1995)

The reformists are often equally critical of the opposition as of the Authority. They have the unique opportunity of serving as intermediaries. Haidar Abdel Shafi, for example, is highly respected in Palestinian society and has repeatedly been involved in mediating between the Authority and the opposition. Hanan Ashrawi, being in charge of a semi-independent citizen's rights institution, which often is described as a watch-dog of the PNA, finds herself in a similar situation. Delegations from the PPP have also taken part in the dialogue initiated between the Authority and Hamas *(Interview with Amal Kreishe, PPP, November 5, 1994)*.

6. CONCLUSION

The three political trends examined and discussed above, describe the current situation from different perspectives and therefore, in different ways. Summarised these are:

(1) the *(mainstream) state-building approach*: those associated with this trend see the current period as a first step in an irreversible process which eventually will lead to Palestinian independence and statehood;

(2) the *opposition front*: opponents of the current process stress that today's policy is a deviation from the national consensus achieved in the PNC, and that the accords apply to Israeli interests only, thus, sell out of the Palestinian national cause;

and (3) the *reformist approach*: the reformist camp favours a third strategy consisting of negotiations with Israel, but stressing the need for a Palestinian consensus on basic issues, worked out *before* the negotiations commence.

Despite divergences and the fragmentation of Palestinian nationalism, there is more or less an agreement that the two-state solution is the only acceptable and the most realistic solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Concerning the *goals* behind the peace process, it could be argued that there is a common understanding for accepting the two-state solution, and this understanding has been

strengthened by the agreements. Deviations from this occur within the different oppositional trends; while the leftist opposition is heavily influenced by Pan-Arabic ideals, the Islamic movements opt for an Islamic solution (*Islam al-huwwa al-hal*). Territory-wise, however, it seems that both the PFLP/DFLP and - at least part of - Hamas have more or less accepted that the West Bank and Gaza Strip, rather than 'all of Palestine', constitute the territory on which the Palestinian state is to be built. Serious divergences concern strategies and tactics how to achieve the goal of an independent state, starting with the question whether 'Oslo' and 'Cairo' are steps towards a Palestinian state or not. Accordingly, the current rift within Palestinian society is created by the different readings and interpretations of the signed agreements. When it comes to *ideology*, it is all another matter. Then, the liberation 'from the river to the sea' is still the long-term plan for both PFLP/DFLP and Hamas/Islamic Jihad. They - as others as well but in a more romantic manner - still dream of a state embracing today's Occupied Territories *and* the 'land of 1948'.

Opinions also highly differentiate when it comes to the interpretation of the agreements signed with Israel. Mainstream nationalism regards them as the first step in an ongoing process at the end of which a Palestinian state will emerge. From the opposition's point of view, the agreements will only lead to continued, modified occupation, combined with limited self-rule by an illegitimate Palestinian

Authority. What is further remarkable is a somewhat surprising difference between the left and the religious camp when it comes to the assessment and evaluation of the negotiations and the performance of the Palestinian Authority: according to their attitudes as expressed in the interviews, PFLP/DFLP respondents seem unexpectedly more irreconcilable than those of Hamas or the Islamic Jihad, whose statements are rather vague. An explanation for this could be the fact that Hamas is currently the only organization effectively able to challenge the Authority and Fateh, while the PFLP/DFLP factions play rather marginalised roles and as such, can allow themselves to put their criticism in a strong wording. However, the strength of Hamas may well be exaggerated, and the current support of 12-15% that Hamas usually achieves in opinion polls, makes them the second power after Fateh; it is not enough, however, to push for power sharing or to run independently against the Authority. Therefore, Hamas is playing a game best described as ambiguous: on the one hand, it is as critical as necessary in accordance with the movement's underlying ideology, while on the other hand, it is pragmatic enough to leave the door open for some kind of cooperation, although, of course, there are divergences within Hamas. The position of the much less pragmatic PFLP/DFLP has increasingly weakened, and this trend will most likely continue as long as they place their ideology above realistic approaches and functional strategies. However, it could be expected that the PFLP/DFLP, in the light

of the current situation where support for Marxist organizations is continuously declining and the risk of being left out completely becomes clearer, will adopt a strategy of adjusting to the new context. For the time being, however, their influence on Palestinian nationalism has been drastically reduced.

The perception of Israeli intentions are negative in all three camps, but least so among the supporters of the peace process. Suspicions and doubts against Israel's real aspirations prevails and frustration over consistently new emerging obstacles and delays in the negotiations is the overall dominating feeling. While for mainstream nationalists the *implementation* of the agreements is the main hinderance to reach any progress, the opponents and reformists consider the *agreements* themselves responsible.

Mainstream nationalism has been urged to change attitudes, now being in effect allied with the Israelis in the peace process as well as being committed to contribute to Israel's security. For the first time in the history of Palestinian nationalism, Israeli security is interpreted as a Palestinian *national* interest. In practice, that has created a new alliance - between the Israeli government and the PNA.

The agreements have had their main impact on internal relations, with Palestinian nationalism becoming less externally oriented and more focused on the inside. The de facto PNA-Israel alliance puts

the Palestinian leadership at odds with its critics and opponents. The splits that have occurred may be hard to overcome, although there are constant attempts at concealing internal conflicts and contradictions. Throughout the various political camps the call to avoid, under any circumstances, civil war is constantly heard, although it is also stressed that such will not happen, since it is too sensitive. The opposition is extremely critical of the Authority, above all condemning the heavy police/security apparatus and the resulting militarization of internal politics and society. The PNA accuses the opposition of sabotaging the peace process but invites it to start a national dialogue and even to join the Authority. The PNA also constantly warns the opposition not to obstruct the implementation of the agreements recalling that they are a fact whether one likes it or not. In the Spring of 1995, however, the PNA changed its way of dealing with opponents, cracking down hard on Hamas and Islamic Jihad and expressing its willingness to consider Israeli security concerns.

Palestinian nationalism is undergoing a dramatic change; being challenged with effective state-building, nationalism automatically becomes more inward-looking, focussing on internal structures, policies and *governance*. In general terms, official 'state'-nationalism in its early phase always unleashes reactions from the intelligentsia and other social strata. Official 'state'-nationalism strives to achieve the largest possible internal unity while at the same

time keeping to the obligations it owes to Israel. Oppositional nationalism, in turn, feels obliged to react and strives to change the status quo. The real challenge for a common Palestinian nationalism today is, therefore, to strike a balance between the inclusion of Islamists, the claims of the leftist camp, the demand of the civil intelligentsia for participation and democracy, and Fateh's commitment to peace. At the same time, the PNA has additionally to consider the claims of revolutionaries and fighters for their proper share in terms of power and positions.

The relationship between the Authority and the opposition will be dependent upon how all-embracing the PNA can be, and how efficient it will be in promoting symbols of identity recognizable and adoptable to all movements within Palestinian society. A complicating fact is that remnants of the old discourse in fact remain, along with the former practice of 'armed struggle', but are now considered to be oppositional. The transformation from revolution to self-government is bound to be chaotic rather than smooth. While the national aim has not been realised, Palestinian nationalism finds itself challenged with reformulation. During the interim period - for how long it will last is still uncertain - the main task will be to effectively merge the two issues of *external* negotiations with Israel concerning the fate of the West Bank, Jerusalem, refugees and other remaining issues, and of *internal* negotiations on what *kind* of state will be built. To find the right balance regarding this mixture of external and

internal considerations is the key to redefine the peculiar circumstances of Palestinian nationalism in the mid-1990s. At the end of the road a Palestinian state is expected to emerge, but in order to achieve this, the Palestinians will have to pass through a difficult period of state-building; this is even more complicated by the fact that crucial territorial and other issues remain to be negotiated and the process of institution-building must start from the scratch.

The Palestinian case is typical for 'Third World'-state-building: considerable weakness vis-à-vis external structures in conjunction with a lack of internal cohesion concerning strategy and policies, compounded by the extensive use of repressive measures. The absence of a common ideological base is substituted by military might, with the state-in-the-making focussing primarily on control and coercion. The current dilemma is constituted by a self-rule authority which is simultaneously 'powerful' and 'fragile': whereas the Authority is *weak* and unable to encourage an integrative, homogenizing nation-building process, its control organs, the security apparatus, is *strong*;

The atmosphere of general optimism and enthusiasm that prevailed in 1994 and 1995 - despite the shortcomings of agreements made - is in 1997 nowhere to be found. Benyamin Nethanyahu's take-over of power in Israel in the elections of 1996 has

implied that the peace process has set in a reverse gear, in all respects. With all the provocations by the Netanyahu government, the peace process seems to have reached a dead end. Nevertheless, from a historical perspective, we should not forget the unprecedented steps that were taken in a few years between 1993 and 1995. Also, since the writing of this essay, the Interim Agreement was signed in September 1995, paving the way for a serious inbreak of Palestinian control in the West Bank. Although the division of West Bank territory in A, B and C areas make any present day talk of sovereignty meaningless, it does mean that Palestinian control has expanded also territorially. The elections of 1996 supplied a further step in the state-building process, and there is still a point to be made an irreversible process. In fact, despite the limitations and restrictions, there is today a semi-state in the West Bank and Gaza. Thus, despite the time that has passed since the research for this study was carried out, the general conclusion seems still to be valid. Also concerning the daunting picture of an authoritarian PNA-regime, which in the midst of external pressures is degenerating with severe human rights violations and corruption on its responsibility.

APPENDIX I - Interviewees

Abdel Shafi, Heidar, August 28 and March 29, 1995. Independent; physician; President of Red Crescent Society; delegate to the founding meeting of the PLO in 1964; member of the PNC until 1967; involved in the Palestinian National Front in Gaza during the 1970s; head of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid and Washington negotiations.

Abu-Amr, Ziad, January 18, 1995. Associate Professor of Political Science at Bir Zeit University; author of a recent study on the Islamic movement in Palestine.

Abu Middein, Freih, March 30, 1995. Independent; PNA Minister of Justice; lawyer from Gaza; member of the Palestinian delegation to the negotiations in Madrid and Washington.

Abu Zayde, Sufiyan, December 4, 1994. Fateh; PNA Director General of Israeli Affairs; imprisoned from 1981-1993 for attempting to kill a collaborator; studies Political Science at Ben-Gurion University in Beersheba one day a week; translates Hebrew newspapers for some of the PNA ministers.

Abu-Zayyad, Ziad, October 26, 1994. Fateh sympathizer; journalist; co-editor of *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*; senior delegate of the Palestinian team to the Multilateral Talks on Arms Control and Security; also advisor to the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid and Washington negotiations.

Al-Dik, Ahmed, October 29, 1994. Fateh; member of the Fateh Higher Committee; deported to South Lebanon in 1988; returned in 1994; was in Tunis and worked as assistant to the PLO's UN observer during exile.

Ashrawi, Hanan, February 24, 1995. Independent; Head for the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights; spokeswoman for the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid and Washington negotiations.

Bahhar, Ahmed, Sheikh, January 19, 1995. Hamas; lecturer at the Islamic University, Gaza; Head of the Islamic Society, Gaza; considered one of the top leaders of Hamas; was among those deported to Marj al-Zahour in December 1992.

Barghouti, Bashir, September 4, 1994. Senior figure in the PPP; editor of the weekly *al-Talia*.

Barghouti, Marwan, October 23, 1994. Fateh; Secretary-General of Fateh Higher Committee/ West Bank; during the early 1980s, active in establishing the *shabiba* movement inside Fateh; deported in 1987; returned in April 1994; in exile (in Amman, Baghdad and Tunis) coordinating between the 'interior' and the 'exterior' during the *Intifada*.

Erakat, Sa'eb, February 3, 1995. Fateh; Minister of Municipal and Local Affairs, PNA; member of the Palestinian delegation to Madrid and Washington; Head of the Palestinian delegation to negotiations on elections.

Freij, Elias, November 2, 1994. Independent; Mayor of Bethlehem since 1972; PNA Minister of Tourism and Antiquities; member of the Palestinian delegation to Madrid and Washington.

Husseini, Faisal, October 12, 1994. Fateh; Minister without Portfolio, PNA; head of the Orient House, Jerusalem; member of the Palestinian delegation to Madrid and Washington; appointed its head in 1993, after the Israeli Labour government finally allowed participation of East Jerusalemites.

Hamameh, Jamil, November 16, 1994. Executive Director, Islamic Committee of Sciences; Secretary for the Jerusalem Schools & Clinics Association; member of the Executive Committee of the Higher Islamic Council; Assistant Director, Islamic College of Science and Technology, Abu Dis, Jerusalem; widely believed to be second-in-command of Hamas in the West Bank (e.g. Ahmed, 1994, p. 21).

Jadallah, Muhammad, September 21 and 28, 1994. DFLP Spokesperson; physician/surgeon; Head of the Union of Health Care Committees; member of Medical Association, Jerusalem.

Jarrar, Bassam, October 19, 1994. Islamic teacher at UNRWA school in Al-Bireh; Imam of Ramallah Mosque; member of Higher Islamic Council, Jerusalem.

Kamal, Zahira, December 9, 1994. FIDA; Chair, Palestine Federation of Women's Action; presently with

UNDP (women in development projects); board member, Women Studies Center, Women Center for Legal Aid and Counselling, and the Jerusalem Women Center (Jerusalem Link); Executive Committee member, Women Action Committee; coordinator of the Women Affairs Technical Committee; member of the Palestinian delegation to Madrid and Washington; member of the Palestinian delegation to the negotiations on elections.

al-Khateeb, Ghassan, October 5 and 12, 1994. PPP; Director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC); lecturer at Bir Zeit University; member of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks in Madrid and Washington.

Khreishe, Amal, November 5, 1994. Member of the Central Committee PPP; in the Board of the Union of Palestinian Working Women's Committees.

Malki, Riad, October 7, 1994. PFLP spokesperson; Professor of Engineering, Bir Zeit University; Director of PANORAMA - Center for the Dissemination of Alternative Information.

Muhanna, Rabah, January 20, 1995. Sympathizer with PFLP; Medical Doctor, al-Shifa Hospital, Gaza; involved in Union of Health Work Committees.

Nassar, Maha, October 29, 1994. PFLP sympathizer; teacher of Science and Physics, private high schools; coordinator, Public Relations, Union of Palestinian Women's Committees.

Qrei'a, Ahmed (Abu 'Ala), February 21, 1995. Fateh; PNA Minister of Trade and Economy; Director-General of Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR); high-ranking PLO official involved in the secret Oslo talks; negotiated the economic agreement (Paris Agreement) between Israel and the PLO; director of Samed (PLO investment fund).

Ramadan, Mahmoud, April 25, 1995. Fateh; works at An-Najah University, Nablus.

Saftawi, 'Ala, January 19, 1995. Islamic Jihad sympathizer; editor in-chief of the weekly *al-Istiqlal* (which was closed for a number of weeks after the Beit Lid attack in January 1995).

Salem, Walid, September 27, 1994. PFLP sympathizer; journalist; at az-Zahra research center since 1988; member of the board of PANORAMA.

Shami, Abdullah, Sheikh, November 24, 1994. Islamic Jihad; Imam of Shuhada mosque; speaker for Islamic Jihad; among those deported to Marj al-Zahour in 1992; returned at the end of 1993; worked also as history teacher; arrested by Palestinian police in the aftermath of the Beit Lid attack (January 1995) and released in early May, 1995.

Shtayyeh, Muhammad, September 14, 1994. Fateh; Director for Financial, Administrative & Support Services at PECDAR; member of the Palestinian delegation to the negotiations on elections.

Shu'aibi, Azmi, November 8, 1994. FIDA; PNA Minister of Youth and Sports; dentist; deported 1985 for alleged membership in the Palestinian National Front; returned in 1993 with the first group of returnees.

Tarifi, Jamil, November 10, 1994. Fateh: Head of the Liaison Committee with Israel; advocate; from 1976-82 Deputy Mayor of Al Bireh; member of the Palestinian delegation to Madrid and Washington.

Toubbasi, Alfred, November 14, 1994. Independent; dentist; deported from the West Bank in 1974; spent his exile-years in Jordan and Lebanon; returned in the Autumn of 1994; active in the establishment of the first PNC in 1964 as well as in the formation of the Palestinian National Front in the 1970s.

al-Wazir, Intisar (Umm Jihad), November 24, 1994. Fateh; PNA Minister of Social Affairs; member of the Council of the PLO's General Union of Palestinian Women; member of the PLO Executive Committee since 1988; within the PLO responsible for Social Affairs and distribution of funds to martyrs' families; widow of the legendary Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), who was assassinated by Israelis in Tunis, in 1988.

Ya'iesh, Imad, January 12, 1995. Fateh; Nablus representative in the Fateh Higher Committee; Director of the Italian-Palestinian Economic Institute; during the Intifada, responsible for Fateh in the Nablus area.

Zahhar, Mahmoud, January 11, 1995. Spokesperson for Hamas; surgeon (private clinic in Gaza); lecturer at the Islamic University, Gaza; Director, Medical Department of the Islamic University; among those deported to Marj al-Zahhour in December 1992.

APPENDIX II - Documents

A. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 13 September 1993, Washington, D.C. (Oslo-Agreement)

The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

Article I: Aim of the Negotiation

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council, ("the Council") for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article II: Framework for the Interim period

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III: Elections

In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic

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Article III: Elections

In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic

principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV: Jurisdictions

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V: Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations

The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.

It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI: Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities

Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and

its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII: Interim Agreement

The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate and agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement").

The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.

The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.

In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII: Public Order and Security

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

Article IX: Laws and Military Orders

The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.

Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X: Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

Article XI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic Fields

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Article XII: Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a continuing committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this committee.

Article XIII: Redeployment of Israeli Forces

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV: Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

Article XV: Resolution of Disputes

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Programs

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan", the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII: Miscellaneous Provisions

This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.

All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

ANNEX I

Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections

Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.

In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:

- a. the system of elections;
- b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and
- c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed

arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of

licensing a broadcasting and TV station.

The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because

they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

ANNEX II

Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area

The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

The above agreement will include, among other things:

- a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.
- b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.
- c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.
- d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
- e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.
- f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and

unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.

g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:

a. Gaza - Egypt

b. Jericho - Jordan.

The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

ANNEX III

Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint

exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.
5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.
6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.
7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.
8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.
9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.
10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.
11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.
12. Any other programs of mutual interest.

ANNEX IV

Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Development Programs

1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.
2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:
 - a) an Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
 - b) a Regional Economic Development Program.
- A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements :
 - (1) A social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.
 - (2) A Small and Medium Business Development Plan.
 - (3) An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.)
 - (4) A Human Resources Plan.
 - (5) Other programs.
- B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:
 - (1) The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.
 - (2) The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation for the Dead Sea area.
 - (3) The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) - Dead Sea Canal.
 - (4) Regional Desalinization and other water development projects.
 - (5) A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of decertification.
 - (6) Interconnection of electricity grids.
 - (7) Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.

(8) A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.

(9) Regional cooperation in other spheres.

3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards its success. The two parties will encourage intercessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

A. General understandings and agreements

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

B. Specific understandings and agreements

Article IV

It is understood that:

1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.
2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI (2)

It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows :

- (1) The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorized Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and other authorities agreed upon.

- (2) It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.
- (3) Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.
- (4) Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII (5)

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII

It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X

It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee.

It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint

Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

ANNEX II

It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel For the Palestine Liberation Organization

Shimon Peres (signed)

Mahmoud Abbas (signed)

Witnessed By:

(Warren Christopher)

(Andrei Kozyrev)

United States of America

The Russian Federation

B. Gaza-Jericho Autonomy
Agreement
4 May 1994, Cairo
(Cairo-Agreement)

The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (hereinafter "the PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people,

PREAMBLE

Within the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated in Madrid in October 1991;

Reaffirming their determination to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights;

Reaffirming their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement through the agreed political process;

Reaffirming their adherence to the mutual recognition and commitments expressed in the letters dated September 9, 1993, signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO;

Reaffirming their understanding that the interim self-government arrangements, including the arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area contained in this Agreement, are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

Desirous of putting into effect the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed at Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993, and the Agreed Minutes thereto (hereinafter "the Declaration of Principles"), and in particular the Protocol on withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area;

Hereby agree to the following arrangements regarding the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area:

Article I: Definitions

For the purpose of this Agreement:

- a. the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area are delineated on map Nos. 1 and 2 attached to this Agreement;
- b. "the Settlements" means the Gush Katif and Erez settlement areas, as well as the other settlements in the Gaza Strip, as shown on the attached map No. 1.
- c. "the Military Installation Area" means the Israeli military installation area along the Egyptian border in the Gaza Strip, as shown on the attached map No. 1; and
- d. the term "Israelis" shall also include Israeli statutory agencies and corporations registered in Israel.

Article II: Scheduled Withdrawal of Israeli Military Forces

1. Israel shall implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and from the Jericho Area to begin immediately with the signing of this Agreement. Israel shall complete such withdrawal within three weeks from this date'.
2. Subject to the arrangements included in the Protocol concerning Withdrawal of Israeli Military Forces and Security Arrangements attached as Annex 1, the Israeli withdrawal shall include evacuating all military bases and other fixed installations to be handed over to the Palestinian police, to be established pursuant to Article IX below (hereinafter "the Palestinian Police").
3. In order to carry out Israel's responsibility for external security and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis, Israel shall, concurrently with the withdrawal, redeploy its remaining military forces to the Israeli settlements and Military Installation Area, in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Subject to the provisions of this Agreements, this redeployment shall constitute full implementation of Article XIII of the Declaration of Principles with regard to the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area only.
4. For the purpose of this Agreement, "Israeli military forces" may include Israeli police and other Israeli security forces.

5. Israelis, including Israeli military forces, may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. Palestinians may use public roads crossing the settlements freely, as provided for in Annex I.
6. The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public order and internal security of Palestinians in accordance with this Agreement and Annex I.

Article III: Transfer of Authority

1. Israel shall transfer authority as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian Authority, hereby established, in accordance with Article V of this Agreement, except for the authority that Israel shall continue to exercise as specified in this Agreement.
2. As regards the transfer and assumption of authority in civil spheres, powers and responsibilities shall be transferred and assumed as set out in the Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs attached as Annex II.
3. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of the agreed [powers and responsibilities are set out in Annex II.
4. Upon the completion of the Israeli withdrawal and the transfer of powers and responsibilities as detailed in Annex II, the Civil Administration in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area will be dissolved and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the military government shall not prevent it from continuing to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified in this Agreement.
5. A Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereinafter "the CAC") and two Joint Regional Civil Affairs Sub-Committees for the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area respectively shall be established in order to provide for coordination and cooperation in civil affairs between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, as detailed in Annex II.
6. The offices of the Palestinian Authority shall be located in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area pending the inauguration of the Council to be elected pursuant to the Declaration of Principles.

**Article IV:
Structure and Composition of the Palestinian Authority**

1. The Palestinian Authority will consist of one body of 24 members which shall carry out and be responsible for all the legislative and executive powers and responsibilities transferred to it under this Agreement, in accordance with this Article, and shall be responsible for the exercise of judicial functions in accordance with Article VI, sub-paragraph 1 b. of this Agreement.
2. The Palestinian Authority shall administer the departments transferred to it and may establish, within its jurisdiction, other departments and subordinate administrative units as necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities. It shall determine its own internal procedures.
3. The PLO shall inform the Government of Israel of the names of the members of the Palestinian Authority and any change of members. Changes in the membership of the Palestinian Authority will take effect upon an exchange of letters between the PLO and the Government of Israel.
4. Each member of the Palestinian Authority shall enter into office upon undertaking to act in accordance with this Agreement.

Article V: Jurisdiction

1. The authority of the Palestinian Authority encompasses all matters that fall within its territorial, functional and personal jurisdiction, as follows:
 - a. The territorial jurisdiction covers the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area territory, as defined in Article I, except for settlements and the Military Installation Area. Territorial jurisdiction shall include land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
 - b. The functional jurisdiction encompasses all powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement. This jurisdiction does not include foreign relations, internal security and public order of settlements and the Military Installation Area and Israelis, and external security.
 - c. The personal jurisdiction extends to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction referred to above, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.

2. The Palestinian Authority has, within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial powers and responsibilities, as provided for in this agreement.
- 3.a. Israel has authority over the settlements, the Military Installation Area, Israelis, external security, internal security and public order of settlements, the Military Installation Area and Israelis, and those agreed powers and responsibilities specified in this Agreement.
- b. Israel shall exercise its authority through its military government, which, for that end, shall continue to have the necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam.
4. The exercise of authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and airspace shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
5. The provisions of this Article are subject to the specific legal arrangements detailed in the Protocol Concerning Legal Matters attached as Annex III. Israel and the Palestinian Authority may negotiate further legal arrangements.
6. Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall cooperate on matters of legal assistance in criminal and civil matters through the Legal Sub-committee of the CAC.

Article VI:

Powers and Responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority

1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Palestinian Authority, within its jurisdiction:
 - a. has legislative powers as set out in Article VII of this Agreement, as well as executive powers;
 - b. will administer justice through an independent judiciary;
 - c. will have, *inter alia*, power to formulate policies, supervise their implementation, employ staff, establish department, authorities and institutions, sue and be sued and conclude contracts; and
 - d. will have, *inter alia*, the power to keep and administer registers and records of the population, and issue certificates, licenses and documents.

2. a. In accordance with the Declaration of Principles, the Palestinian Authority will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or *permitting their establishment in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area*, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions.
- b. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the PLO may conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states of international organizations for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority in the following cases only:
- (1) economic agreements, as specifically provided in Annex IV of this Agreement;
 - (2) agreements with donor countries for the purpose of implementing arrangements for the provision of assistance to the Palestinian Authority;
 - (3) agreements for the purpose of implementing the regional development plans detailed in Annex IV of the Declaration of Principles or in agreements entered into in the framework of the multilateral negotiations; and
 - (4) cultural, scientific and educational agreements.
- c. Dealings between the Palestinian Authority and representatives of foreign states and international organizations, as well as the establishment in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area of representative offices other than those described in subparagraph 2.a. above, for the purpose of implementing the agreements referred to in subparagraph 2.b. above, shall not be considered foreign relations.

Article VII: Legislative Powers of the Palestinian Authority

1. The Palestinian Authority will have the power, within its jurisdiction, to promulgate legislation, including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts.
2. Legislation promulgated by the Palestinian Authority shall be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
3. Legislation promulgated by the Palestinian Authority shall be communicated to a legislation sub-committee to be established by the CAC (hereinafter 'the Legislation Sub-Committee').

During a period of 30 days from the communication of the legislation, Israel may request that the Legislation Sub-Committee decide whether such legislation exceeds the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority or is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.

4. Upon receipt of the Israeli request, the Legislation Sub-committee shall decide, as an initial matter, on the entry into force of the legislation pending its decision on the merits of the matter.
5. If the Legislation Sub-committee is unable to reach a decision with regard to the entry into force the legislation within 15 days, this issue will be referred to a board of review. This board of review shall be comprised of two judges, retired judges or senior jurists (hereinafter "Judges"), one from each side, to be appointed from a compiled list of three Judges proposed by each.
In order to expedite the proceedings before this board of review, the two most senior Judges, one from each side, shall develop written informal rules of procedure.
6. Legislation referred to the board of review shall enter into force only if the board of review decides that it does not deal with a security issue which falls under Israel's responsibility, that it does not seriously threaten other significant Israeli interests protected by this Agreement, and that the entry into force of the legislation could not cause irreparable damage or harm.
7. The Legislation Sub-committee shall attempt to reach a decision on the merits of the matter within 30 days from the date of the Israeli request. If this Sub-committee is unable to reach such a decision within this period of 30 days, the matter shall be referred to the joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee referred to in Article XV below (hereinafter "the Liaison Committee"). This Liaison Committee will deal with the matter immediately and will attempt to settle it within 30 days.
8. Where the legislation has not entered into force pursuant to paragraphs 5 or 7 above, this situation shall be maintained pending the decision of the Liaison Committee on the merits of the matter, unless it has decided otherwise.
9. Laws and military orders in effect in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area prior to the signing of this Agreement shall

remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in accordance with this Agreement.

Article VIII: Arrangements for Security and Public Order

1. In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, the Palestinian Authority shall establish a strong police force as set out in Article IX below. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against external threats, including the responsibility for protecting the Egyptian border and the Jordanian line, and for defense against external threats from the sea and from the air, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.
2. Agreed security arrangements and coordination mechanisms are specified in Annex I.
3. A joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes (hereinafter "the JSC"), as well as three joint District Coordination and Cooperation Offices for the Gaza district, the Khan Yunis district, and the Jericho district respectively (hereinafter "the DCOs") are hereby established as provided for in Annex I.
4. The security arrangements provided for in this Agreement and in Annex I may be reviewed at the request of either Party and may be amended by mutual agreement of the Parties. Specific review arrangements are included in Annex I.

Article IX: The Palestinian Directorate of Police Force

1. The Palestinian Authority shall establish a strong police force, the Palestinian Directorate of Police Force (hereinafter "the Palestinian Po-lice"). The duties, functions, structure, deployment and composition of the Palestinian Police, together with provisions regarding its equipment and operation, are set out in Annex I, Article III. Rules of conduct governing the activities of the Palestinian Police are set out in Annex I, Article VIII.

2. Except for the Palestinian police referred to in this Article and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area.
3. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian police described in Annex I, Article III, and those of the Israeli military forces, no organisation or individual in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment, unless otherwise provided for in this Agreement.

Article X: Passages

Arrangements for coordination between Israel and the Palestinian Authority regarding the Gaza-Egypt and Jericho-Jordan passages, as well as any other agreed international crossings, are set out in Annex I, Article X.

Article XI:

Safe Passage between the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area

Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area are set out in Annex I, Article IX.

Article XII:

Relation Between Israel and the Palestinian Authority

1. Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.
2. Without derogating from other provisions of this Agreement, Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall cooperate in combatting criminal activity which may affect both sides, including offenses related to trafficking in illegal drugs and

psychotropic substances, smuggling, and offenses against property, including offenses related to vehicles.

Article XIII: Economic Relations

The economic relations between the two sides are set out in the Protocol on Economic Relations signed in Paris on April 29, 1994 and the Appendices hereto, certified copies of which are attached as Annex IV, and will be governed by the relevant provisions of this Agreement and its Annexes.

Article XIV: Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall exercise their powers and responsibilities, pursuant to this Agreement, with due regard to internationally accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law.

Article XV:

The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee

1. The Liaison Committee established pursuant to Article X of the Declaration of Principles shall ensure the smooth implementation of this Agreement. It shall deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes.
2. The Liaison Committee shall be composed of an equal number of members from each Party. It may add other techniques and experts as necessary.
3. The Liaison Committee shall adopt its rules of procedure, including the frequency and place or places of its meetings.
4. The Liaison Committee shall reach its decisions by agreement.

Article XVI:

Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt

1. Pursuant to Article XII of the Declaration of Principles, the two Parties shall invite the governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the government of Israel and the

Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements shall include the constitution of a Continuing Committee.

2. The Continuing Committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.
3. The Continuing Committee shall deal with other matters of common concern.

Article XVII: Settlement of Differences and Disputes

Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. The provisions of Article XV of the Declaration of Principles shall apply to any such difference which is not settled through the appropriate coordination and liaison mechanism, namely:

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be settled by negotiations through the Liaison Committee.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between the Parties.
3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties, the Parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVIII: Prevention of Hostile Acts

Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and against their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders. In addition, the Palestinian side shall take all measures necessary to prevent such hostile acts directed against the settlement, the infrastructure serving them

and the Military Installation Area, and the Israeli side shall take all measures necessary to prevent such hostile acts emanating from the settlements and directed against Palestinians.

Article XIX: Missing Persons

The Palestinian Authority shall cooperate with Israel by providing all necessary assistance in the conduct of searches by Israel within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area for missing Israelis, as well as by providing information about missing Israelis. Israel shall cooperate with the Palestinian Authority in searching for, and providing necessary information about, missing Palestinians.

Article XX: Confidence Building Measures

With a view to creating a positive and supportive public atmosphere to accompany the implementation of this Agreement, and to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and good faith, both Parties agree to carry out confidence building measures as detailed herewith:

1. Upon the signing of this Agreement, Israel will release, or turn over, to the Palestinian Authority within a period of 5 weeks, about 5,000 Palestinian detainees and prisoners, residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Those released will be free to return to their homes anywhere in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Prisoners turned over to the Palestinian Authority shall be obliged to remain in remainder of their sentence.
2. After the signing of this Agreement, the two Parties shall continue to negotiate the release of additional Palestinian prisoners and detainees, building on agreed principles.
3. The implementation of the above measures will be subject to the fulfillment of the procedures determined by Israeli law for the release and transfer of detainees and prisoners.
4. With the assumption of Palestinian authority, the Palestinian side commits itself to solving the problem of those Palestinians who were in contact with the Israeli authorities. Until an agreed solution is found, the Palestinian side

undertakes not to prosecute these Palestinians or to harm them in any way.

5. Palestinians from abroad whose entry into the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area is approved pursuant to this Agreement, and to whom the provisions of this Article are applicable, will not be prosecuted for offenses committed prior to September 13, 1993.

Article XXI: Temporary International Presence

1. The Parties agree to a temporary international or foreign presence in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (hereinafter "the TIP"), in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
2. The TIP shall consist of 400 qualified personnel, including observers, instructors and other experts, from 5 or 6 of the donor countries.
3. The two Parties shall request the donor countries to establish a special fund to provide finance for the TIP.
4. The TIP will function for a period of 6 months. The TIP may extend this period, or change the scope of its operation, with the agreement of the two Parties.
5. The TIP shall be stationed and operate within the following cities and villages: Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah, Deir El-Balah, Jabaliya, Absan, Beit Hanun and Jericho.
6. Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall agree on a special Protocol to implement this Article, with the goal of concluding negotiations with the donor countries contributing personnel within two months.

Article XXII: Rights, Liabilities and Obligations

1. a. The transfer of all powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority, as detailed in Annex II, includes all related rights, liabilities and obligations arising with regard to acts or omissions which occurred prior to the transfer. Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding such acts or omissions and the Palestinian Authority will bear all financial responsibility for these and for its own functioning.
- b. Any financial claim made in this regard against Israel will be referred to the Palestinian Authority.

- c. Israel shall provide the Palestinian Authority with the information it has regarding pending and anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against Israel in this regard.
 - d. Where legal proceedings are brought in respect of such a claim, Israel will notify the Palestinian Authority and enable it to participate in defending the claim and raise any arguments on its behalf.
 - e. In the event that an award is made against Israel by any court or tribunal in respect of such a claim, the Palestinian Authority shall reimburse Israel the full amount of the award.
 - f. Without prejudice to the above, where a court or tribunal hearing such a claim finds that liability rests solely with an employee or agent who acted beyond the scope of the powers assigned to him or her, unlawfully or with willful malfeasance, the Palestinian Authority shall not bear financial responsibility.
2. The transfer of authority in itself shall not affect rights, liabilities and obligations of any person or legal entity, in existence at the date of signing of this Agreement.

Article XXIII: Final Clauses

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing.
2. The arrangements establishing by this Agreement shall remain in force until and to the extent superseded by the Interim Agreement referred to in the Declaration of Principles or any other agreement between the Parties.
3. The five-year interim period referred to in the Declaration of Principles commences on the date of the signing of this Agreement.
4. The Parties agree that, as long as this Agreement is in force, the security fence erected by Israel around the Gaza Strip shall remain in place and that the line demarcated by the fence, as shown on attached map No. 1, shall be authoritative only for the purpose of this Agreement.
5. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the negotiations on the Interim Agreement or on permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the Declaration of Principles. Neither Party shall be deemed by virtue of

having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any to its existing rights, claims or positions.

6. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity of which will be preserved during the interim period.

7. The Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area shall continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and their status shall not be changed for the period of this Agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall be considered to change this status.

8. The Preamble to the Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps hereto, shall constitute and integral part hereof.

Done in Cairo this forth day of May 1994.

For the Government of the State of Israel
Yitzhak Rabin

For the PLO
Yasser Arafat

witnessed by:

The United States of America

The Russian Federation

The Arab Republic of Egypt

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