

# Annual Report



# 1996

**PASSIA**

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

# PASSIA ANNUAL REPORT 1996





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# CONTENTS

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Introduction .....	1
The Year That Was .....	3
1. Research Studies .....	5
2. PASSIA Meetings .....	11
2.1 Dialogue & Briefings .....	11
2.2 Diplomatic Meetings .....	51
2.3 Visiting Diplomats & Political Representatives .....	65
3. The Question of Jerusalem .....	67
3.1 Dialogue .....	67
3.2 Seminar on Dr. Kamel Al-Assali .....	73
4. Education and Training in International Affairs .....	75
5. Conferences and Seminars .....	81
6. PASSIA Desk Diary .....	99
7. PASSIA Joint Project: Building a Base for Common Scholarship and Understanding .....	101
8. Putting PASSIA Online .....	128

## Appendices

I. PASSIA Administration .....	129
II. Board of Trustees .....	130
III. Financial Support .....	130





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# INTRODUCTION

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The PASSIA Annual Report for 1996 - the sixth of its kind - describes PASSIA's ongoing activities and the work undertaken by PASSIA throughout the year of 1996.

The first chapter contains information on the **PASSIA Research Studies Program** and reviews of the publications released by PASSIA in 1996 as part of this annual project.

The next section lists all **meetings, roundtable and briefing sessions** that took place at PASSIA or that involved PASSIA in one way or another throughout the past year. For many of these events, which covered a wide range of topics, summaries or comprehensive proceedings are provided. The second part lists and describes meetings held with locally residing or visiting diplomats and political representatives.

The third chapter is devoted to the **question of Jerusalem**, which has been a main subject in PASSIA activities ever since its foundation. The chapter contains meetings, conferences and other events related to the issue of Jerusalem, that PASSIA hosted or in which it was involved. The chapter concludes with a summary of a special seminar on *The Late Jerusalemite Scholar Dr. Kamel Al-Assali* that PASSIA held in order to provide a comprehensive reading of Al-Assali's writings and studies on Palestinian history, heritage and culture, in particular with relation to the question of Jerusalem.

Chapter 4 describes the seminar on *The Foreign Policies of Arab States* which PASSIA held as part of its annual program on **Training and Education in International Affairs**. The seminar was designed to provide the participants with the ability to understand and analyze foreign policy formulation in general and to examine the actual policy positions of leading Arab states with roles to play in the Middle East peace process. The chapter includes information on the seminar program, the lectures given and the participants.

As one of the main Palestinian academic think tanks PASSIA was invited to many **conferences, seminars and workshops**, both worldwide and locally dealing with the Palestine Question and wider international affairs. The fifth chapter lists all conferences and seminars attended by PASSIA in 1996 and summarizes the proceedings of some of them.

A detailed description of the **PASSIA Diary 1997** and its contents is provided in Chapter 6.

Chapter 7 summarizes a **special project** that PASSIA jointly undertook during 1995-96 with the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, Amman. The project, entitled *Palestine, Jordan Israel - Building a Base for Common Scholarship and Understanding in the New Era of the Middle East*, consisted of a series of workshops in which academics from the three countries addressed subjects of mutual interest. The goal was to develop a forum for open, multilateral dialogue which promotes an analytical approach to issues of relevance.

The final chapter includes a list of all **PASSIA publications**, including annotation.

In the **appendices** details about PASSIA's board of trustees and administration can be found, as well as on its networking activities and on the financial support PASSIA received for its 1996 projects.

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# The Year That Was

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**1996** has been a year full of disturbing events despite the focus on the continuation of the negotiations and the implementation of the interim provisions set forth in Oslo I and II. 1995 ended with the long awaited, though very partial, Israeli redeployment from major West Bank towns. However, the sense of optimism which followed this move was abruptly diminished by the first painful event of the new year: the assassination of Hamas activist Yahya Ayyash ("The Engineer"), murdered by Israeli agents in Gaza on 5 January. Also in January, Palestinian women prisoners went on a hunger strike to protest their still not being released from Israeli jails. On 16 January, the Knesset passed the Oslo II bill with a thin majority vote of 48 to 44. The next day, the IDF withdrew from Abu Dis, and on 20 January, the first Palestinian political elections took place, albeit under unsatisfactory conditions, whereby voters, mainly in Jerusalem, were threatened by the Israeli army.

In February, Yasser Arafat was sworn in as the first elected President of Palestine, and the newly elected 88-member Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) held its inaugurating session in Gaza. In February and March, a series of suicide bomb attacks, carried out in Jerusalem, Ashqelon and Tel Aviv, and widely regarded as revenge for the killing of Ayyash, left dozens of Israelis dead. Israel reacted by completely sealing off the Palestinian Territories, massive raid and arrest campaigns, closing down Islamic institutes, and destroying the houses of the families of those involved in the bombings. Acting Prime Minister Peres declared a war on Hamas and announced a halt in the peace talks with the PLO. The urgently convened international summit on combatting terrorism held in Sharm Al-Sheikh was not able to ease the tension and, by the end of March, just another deadline for Israeli withdrawal from Hebron had passed.

In April, thousands of Palestinian students took to the streets in an unprecedented protest against the PNA security apparatus's raid on An-Najah University. On 18 April, President Arafat and PM Peres resumed their talks and confirmed the commencement of the final status talks in May. A few days later, the PNC met for the first time since 1964 on Palestinian soil and voted to amend the PLO Covenant in accordance with the Oslo stipulations.

The month of May saw the beginning of the final status talks between Israel and the PNA in Taba, President Arafat's announcement of his new cabinet, and the swearing-in of the new PNA government in Ramallah. Palestinian concerns, however, were not eased by these events as the situation on the ground remained very much the same, and all remaining was lost when the extreme nationalist half of the Israeli electorate - openly opposing the Oslo process - returned Likud to power on 29 May, although by a very tiny margin.

With the announcement of the final election results in early June, and of Benjamin Netanyahu as the new Prime Minister, Palestinian frustration came to a peak. The concern about the new right wing government spread throughout the Arab world and led to a series of inter-Arab meetings, the first of which was a trilateral Jordanian-Egyptian-Palestinian summit which convened in Aqaba immediately after the elections. A few days later, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad and Saudi Crown Prince Abdul Aziz met in Damascus, where they called for a pan-Arab summit to discuss the peace process in the light of the Israeli election results. The summit took place from 21-23 June in Cairo and focused on a redefinition of the Arab peace strategy. The G7 and Russia also expressed concern for the continuation of the peace process at their meeting in Paris by the end of June.



The first news in August recommended that the new Likud government disregard the spirit of the Oslo agreements and rejects the 'land-for-peace principle: the Israeli cabinet voted unanimously to cancel restrictions on settlement development in the West Bank and Gaza. August also witnessed the tenth death of a prisoner in PNA custody and the PNA's refusal to release the students held since the April demonstrations, as ruled by the Ramallah High Court.

Continued Israeli settlement expansion and house demolition policies remained a major concern throughout the year and on 29 August, Palestinians throughout the territories observed a four-hour general strike, called for by Arafat in protest of these policies; and in September, the Arab League held an extraordinary meeting in Cairo to discuss Israel's continuous settlement construction.

Another ongoing concern was Jerusalem, cut off the rest of the Palestinian Territories for the fourth consecutive year. Despite the fact that the Oslo Agreement stipulated that the Jerusalem question be discussed in the final status talks and notwithstanding international condemnation of unilateral actions taken to change the *status quo* of the city, Israel constantly tried to create more facts on the ground prior to the commencement of the negotiations on the city. The West Jerusalem Municipality continued its campaign to destroy 'unlicensed' Palestinian homes. In the first few months of the Netanyahu government alone, two buildings were destroyed and 41 houses received demolition orders. Palestinian institutions in the city remained subject to harassment, due to their alleged affiliation with the PNA. Moreover, new discriminatory bureaucratic methods were introduced to control the number of Palestinians who legally reside in the city, whereby Palestinian Jerusalemites have to prove that the city is their "center of life".

A major crisis erupted when the Israeli government inaugurated a tunnel under the Al-Haram Al-Sharif compound, linking Via Dolorosa with the Wailing Wall, on 24 September. In the wake of the opening, clashes between Palestinians and Israeli forces broke out and the Intifada-like civil unrest rapidly spread from Jerusalem throughout the Palestinian Territories, with the main battlefields being Al-Bireh/Ramallah and Bethlehem, areas which the Israeli army entered for the first time since the redeployment. In the course of the clashes, Nablus became another center of tension when Israel positioned tanks at the edge of the city for the first time since 1967 after seven Israeli soldiers were killed and tens more captured during a battle at Joseph's Tomb on 26 September. The next day, Israeli soldiers invaded the Al-Aqsa compound and fired at worshippers. By the following day when, in the wake of the impending summit in Washington, the situation calmed down, 62 Palestinians had been martyred and more than 1,600 injured, while 14 Israeli soldiers had been killed and 50 wounded.

The summit in Washington on 3-4 October between Arafat, Netanyahu, Clinton, and King Hussein bore no results, and the PNA could do no more than repeat its condemnation of the tunnel opening. In Jericho, King Hussein - the first Arab leader to visit the autonomous Palestinian areas - announced his strong opposition to the Israeli stand on the peace talks. Also in October, French Prime Minister Chirac, in an address to the PLC in Ramallah, confirmed France's support of Jerusalem becoming the capital of the Palestinian state. Throughout the month Israeli settlers became increasingly volatile, attacking Palestinian civilians and killing three, among them 11-year old Hilmi Shushieh.

The tension remained high throughout November and US envoy Dennis Ross returned to Washington with no progress achieved in the talks on redeployment from Hebron.

At the beginning of December, in another concerted Arab action, the Arab League convened and sent a warning to Israel that its settlement policy was seriously threatening the peace process. The year ended with the reopening of Hebron University and Polytechnic after ten months Israeli-imposed closure.

# 1.

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## RESEARCH STUDIES PROGRAM

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### Introduction

Each year the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) undertakes its *Research Studies Program*. Under the auspices of this program, PASSIA has been able to publish over 90 different studies on a huge diversity of subjects relating to the Palestine Question over the past ten years. PASSIA intends to continue its efforts to provide background information, theoretical material and in-depth studies on relevant issues, and thus, to assist academics and professionals to develop and exchange their ideas as well as to contribute to the enrichment of the Palestinian library.

As part of this program, PASSIA commissions a number of researchers each year to conduct research reflecting a plurality of perspectives, Palestinian and foreign, within the context of academic freedom. The studies published by PASSIA are widely distributed both locally and internationally and aim at providing a better understanding of Palestinian affairs, perspectives and aspirations. In the light of the current stage in Palestinian and regional history, it is becoming even more crucial that reliable and informative data be dispersed throughout the local and wider communities. PASSIA's research studies are a reference source for academics, diplomats, professionals, libraries and anyone with an interest in the Palestinian issue, the field of international affairs, and the developments in the Middle East.

The researchers do not need to have a full-time affiliation with PASSIA and the authors of PASSIA publications throughout the years, including Palestinian, Arab, Israeli and international academics, scholars and experts, have been as diverse as the subjects covered.

In 1996, PASSIA contracted eight researchers to prepare proposals for research studies; after review by the Academic Committee, the following six were approved for publication:



## **Women in Contemporary Palestine: Between Old Conflicts and New Realities**

by **Maria Holt**, May 1996, (Arabic, Pp. 117 and English, Pp. 102)

Review by Sarah Cave, Middle East International, 6 December 1996, p. 23)

Maria Holt has produced a concise but comprehensive overview of the position of women in Palestinian society and their role in the national movement. She successfully weaves together a number of different threads in the historiography of Palestinian women to enable recurrent themes and attitudes to be elucidated.

The first two chapters provide a historical overview of women's involvement in the national movement from the British Mandate era to the present day. While providing a brief introduction to the major turning points in Palestinian nationalism, and women's activism within the struggle, Holt also introduces a number of significant themes which are developed in subsequent chapters: the significance of women as symbols of moral purity and honor; the conflict between social change and cultural conservatism in relation to women's domain; and the importance of different forms of cultural assertion. Each of these themes is explored through extensive and constructive use of secondary sources, as well as personal interviews. Thus the reader is introduced to the range of scholarship and the key debates surrounding Palestinian women's activism. In this sense the book is an invaluable source for those interested in the role of women in the national movement. It is meticulously sourced and referenced. Good use is made of material from newsletters and other organizational documentation that is not widely available, as well as the more established Palestinian and Western authors in the field.

*Women in Contemporary Palestine* is welcome particularly for its insight into the movement and its appeal to women. It is all too easy to dismiss their role as reactionary. Tempting as this may be, it does little to further our understanding of what has become one of the most coherent and substantial political and ideological challenges to the PLO. Maria Holt does not take this approach, but instead seeks to elucidate the appeal of the Islamists to sections of Palestinian society - including women. In doing this she highlights the role of youth and suggests that some women "far from being the unwilling repositories of the ideological agenda, are full partners in what they regard as an empowering and inescapable project."

This short book highlights many of the contradictions and dilemmas of women's participation in the national movement, and thus serves as a thought-provoking introduction to the current debates about women's status and their role and contribution to the national movement.

## **The Struggle for Jerusalem**

by **Dr. Sami F. Musallam**, May 1996, (Arabic, Pp. 170 and English, Pp. 132)

This study examines the conflict between Jordan, Israel and the PLO as well as within the Palestinian camp over the issue of Jerusalem in the period leading up to and following the Oslo agreements. Musallam starts by outlining the difficult circumstances that now surround the issue of Jerusalem. The Israeli government has continued to enlarge its settlements in the Greater Jerusalem area and to try to isolate Jerusalem from the rest of the Palestine. This violates the Oslo accords' stipulation that no party should



undertake unilateral actions that affect the ultimate status of Jerusalem, which is supposed to be determined through negotiations. Against this background, he details the vicissitudes of the struggle as the Jordanians, Israelis and Palestinians have jockeyed to gain sovereignty and control over the city.

The first chapter deals with Chairman Arafat's famous speech in South Africa in which he called for a *Jihad* for Jerusalem. The Israelis' response was one of outrage that Arafat had broken his commitment to look for a peaceful resolution to this issue. However, Musallam shows that the Israelis misunderstood the quote and took it out of context. Furthermore, the Israeli did not take advantage of the Palestinians' explanations of the statement as a chance to show their goodwill. Instead they insisted on an interpretation of Palestinian behavior based on negative stereotypes built over the years of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the next chapter, Musallam recounts the Israelis' failure to deliver one of three letters that had been understood as a *sine qua non* for the PLO to sign the Declaration of Principles (DoP). Letters recognizing the PLO and vowing to amend the Palestinian National Council (PNC) Charter were exchanged as planned, but the letter in which Peres committed Israel to respecting Palestinian individual and institutional rights in Jerusalem was never delivered. This constituted a breach of faith by the Israelis, and Musallam shows how Israeli efforts to stall its transmittal suggest that Israel still has not fulfilled its role as a good faith partner in its negotiations with the Palestinians.

Subsequently, Musallam details the way in which the Israeli government attacked Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem - including Orient House - as well as its efforts to deny international legitimacy to Palestinian claims to the city through its interference in the Paris meeting that was supposed to deliver aid to the Palestinians from international economic donors.

Finally, the last chapters describe the tensions that arose between the Palestinians and the Jordanians as the Jordanians staked their claim to Jerusalem. The Jordanian government, in the Washington Declaration and in its peace treaty with Israel garnered recognition of its special role in administering the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem. The Palestinians understood this as a Jordanian attempt to wrest control over Jerusalem away from them. A conflict ensued as the Jordanians tried to justify their actions while the Palestinians tried to convince the Jordanians that their act had divided the Arabs and weakened the Palestinians' claim to the city, both of which negatively affected the future of Arab Jerusalem to the benefit of the Israelis. Musallam goes over all the exchanges between various elements on the two sides as well as throughout the Arab and Islamic world.

In the last chapter, Musallam gives some practical suggestions about the requirements for reaching a peaceful and fair solution on the issue of Jerusalem. He recommends that the issue of Jerusalem not be postponed and emphasizes that the Israelis can neither expect to get away with continuing to unilaterally establish facts nor to continue ignoring Palestinian rights to Jerusalem as their capital and as an integral part of the West Bank. On the Palestinian side, Musallam calls for wider Arab cooperation, for Palestinians to be well-educated about the practical realities with regard to the struggle over Jerusalem and Palestine, and for cooperation with the world community in securing Palestinian rights in the city.

This study is excellent in that it draws together the many events relating to the complex struggle for Jerusalem over the last few years. Often we fail to properly identify the significance of events in that we look at them in isolation. This text accurately puts

vant only for top policy-makers. Some advice for grass roots and community-level policy-makers as well as NGOs would also have been helpful. Additionally, Musallam does not deal systematically with trying to understand the Israeli positions on some of the issues. This is, however, a minor point in that it is noticeable only in one or two places, and in that it would be more appropriate to confront the Israelis or an Israeli scholar to address these points anyway. The book gives an excellent taste of both the specific issue of Jerusalem as well as the difficulties that will arise in negotiations with the Israelis in the final status negotiations.

## **Constitutionalism and Palestinian Constitutional Development**

by **Gregory S. Mahler**, June 1996, (English, Pp. 92)

This study attempts to assess the prospects of a constitutional government arising in Palestine, and addresses the factors working for and against this possibility.

The book is divided into three sections. In the first section, Mahler draws on examples from constitutions and governmental systems throughout the world to illustrate some general ideas about constitutionalism. He details the various functions which constitutions can serve: statements of ideology, explanation of basic laws, organizational frameworks for governmental institutions, mapping out areas of jurisdiction for various levels of government, and laying out ways of amending the constitution. Mahler also goes over various ways of arranging power in a political system: federal, confederal and unitary. Finally, he discusses the extent to which it is important to analyze a state's constitution. What can the text itself tell us and what can we learn from an analysis of the constitution in the context of the local political culture? Are constitutions ever relevant? The most basic conclusion that Mahler reaches in his discussion, however, is that whether or not a government has a formal written constitution is not as important as whether the government is constrained by the laws of the state - that is, whether it has constitutional government. Indeed, some governments have extensive constitutional texts that they disregard while others have no formal constitution yet adhere to guiding legal principles.

In the second part of the book, Mahler goes on to discuss constitutionalism in the Middle East. He starts with a brief discussion of existing literature on whether political culture in the Middle East is suited to foster democratic constitutional government. The conclusion here is that there are significant factors that hinder a democratic constitutional government in the region - such as a clash between Islam and the state. Furthermore, the imposition of constitutional democratic systems in the Middle East has met with a great deal of resistance because it has not come from the people, but rather it has invariably been carried out by outside powers or their local representatives. Mahler then proceeds to examine briefly the constitutions of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria. The analysis is primarily according to the letter of the texts. This seems slightly inappropriate since Mahler emphasizes the importance of constitutional government over formal constitutionalism. Thus, it might have been more helpful to examine fewer cases and to go into greater detail about the relationship between the text of constitutions in the Middle East and how they are carried out in practice in their specific local political cultures. After all, the ultimate purpose of the book is to analyze the Palestinian case in its context. However, in Mahler's

defense, there seems to be a lack of available information about the political culture in these states to analyze them in practice.

The last section of the study deals with Palestinian political culture as well as the experience of Palestinians in their efforts towards a democratic political entity and a constitution from the founding of the PLO in 1964 through the present. The primary evidence cited is from surveys conducted among Palestinians with regard to their ideas about democracy generally, and especially their views of the January 1996 elections for the position of Ra'ees [President] and for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). Mahler concludes that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians are committed to the idea of democracy. The main opposing elements are those in the Islamist camp. However, even the Islamists' answers to virtually all the questions asked suggested that they are committed to democracy. Most of the causes for concern with regard to Palestinian democracy had to do with "irregularities" in the election campaign. These caused some Palestinians - especially Islamists - to view this significant experience in democracy rather negatively. Overall, however, the positive aspects of the election outweighed the bad and emphasized the commitment of Palestinians to democracy. As for the constitution, Mahler shows how the revisions of the constitution have shown the increasing sophistication of Palestinians, and their increasing attention to making sure that the constitution will protect citizens' rights and limit the power of the government.

Overall, Mahler's theoretical work is extremely well-organized and well-written. He pinpoints the most important issues and presents the reader with productive ways of thinking about the important issue of a Palestinian constitution. His treatment of the texts of the various Middle East constitutions and the successive drafts of the Palestinian constitution is expert. He comes up with an insightful analysis of the progress thus far on the constitution and on some of the problems associated with the last election. However, because of the complexities of Islam and the Palestinian scene, it would be beneficial to have someone more familiar with Palestine and Islam who could provide a more nuanced look at the case of Palestine. This could lead to specific suggestions for how certain laws and customs could be integrated into a constitution that truly reflects the people of Palestine, or of the role of grassroots organizations, NGOs, and interest groups in coming up with laws for Palestine. Mahler's work, the first of its kind, will be an excellent theoretical base to start from.

### **The Judaization of Jerusalem - Israeli Policies Since 1967** by *Allison Hodgkins*, December 1996, (English Pp. 88)

Hodgkins's study on the Judaization of Jerusalem covers Israeli policies on Jerusalem since 1967 until the present. It shows that successive Israeli governments have set out with all determination to implement the Jewish vision of Jerusalem as "the eternal, undivided capital of the Jewish state." With the latest Israeli measures in East Jerusalem - the opening of the Hasmonean tunnel, the closing down of Palestinian institutions and the decision to start the construction of a new settlement - the book is more acute than ever. From the empirical evidence it provides, it becomes obvious that Israel aims at creating as many irreversible geographic and demographic facts as possible on Jerusalem's soil in order to secure exclusive control over the city and to prejudice the final status negotiations. Since the signing of the Oslo agreements, Israeli actions have even accelerated. Israel has been successful in altering the geographic and demographic layout of the city and in ensuring its physical domination while minimizing dissent from within and abroad. But the basic rights of the Palestinian residents cannot be



four chapters on the different aspects of Israeli policies on Jerusalem as well as a conclusion and an appendix with maps, statistics and important documents on the issue. Hodgkins first analyzes the evolution of Israeli policy on Jerusalem under the successive Israeli governments from Eshkol to Netanyahu on the national level as well as on the municipal level, where policies on Jerusalem have mainly been developed and enacted. The next chapter deals with the destruction of Jerusalem's geographic identity through the means of land control, land confiscation, the blocking of Palestinian development and settlement construction. The third chapter covers the mechanisms of establishing demographic superiority by encouraging Jewish immigration and attacking Palestinian residency rights, while the fourth chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the purpose and practice of legitimizing Israeli sovereignty over the city.

The appendices give a good overview on the most important documents on Jerusalem, the maps and graphics visualize to the reader the effects of Israeli land expropriation and settlement policies in Jerusalem as well as the demographic distribution within the city boundaries. Statistical data are provided on the Arab population in East Jerusalem and on Jewish settlements. Listed are also Israeli military orders as the legal base for confiscating and expropriating Palestinian land, as well as Israeli town planning schemes and the most important UN Security Council decisions concerning the issue. This gives the reader a comprehensive picture of the issue.

### **Documents on Jerusalem**

by **PASSIA Research Staff**, December 1996, (English Pp. 350)

This compilation of documents, statements and other resources is intended to provide for researchers and anyone else interested in the issue of Jerusalem a comprehensive resource work of the different attitudes towards Jerusalem as they have evolved throughout history. The aim is to give an overview of the general positions of the different parties involved: therefore, the full or partial texts of more than 340 statements, documents and resolutions concerning the question of Jerusalem are arranged by their source of origin (e.g., Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Palestinian, Israeli, Arab, US, UN, and European positions). The document section is preceded by an introduction (by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi) that offers a brief overview of the status and historical evolution of the Jerusalem question. The book also includes an index, listing all documentary entries in chronological order, i.e., by the date of their original appearance.

The documentation section is followed by a comprehensive chronology of Jerusalem's history from ancient times until today. The last two sections provide a selected bibliography on the topic of Jerusalem and a few maps.

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## PASSIA MEETINGS 1996

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### Introduction

Since its foundation in March 1987, PASSIA has provided a forum for dialogue and the free expression and analysis of a plurality of Palestinian perspectives and approaches. Through the Meetings Program, PASSIA strives to promote a better understanding of both concerns and issues within Palestinian society and in relation to international affairs. In order to forward discussion and debate among Palestinians as well as between Palestinians and their foreign counterparts, PASSIA briefs foreign visitors and missions on current Palestinian affairs and provides the venue for encounters, dialogue and roundtable discussions involving representatives from various groups including:

- Scholars and intellectuals from the Palestinian community here and abroad.
- Members of Palestinian political factions and schools of thought.
- Israeli academics and political figures.
- Representatives from the diplomatic corps.
- Visiting scholars from Europe, the US and elsewhere.

In 1996, as for the past three years, roundtable meetings were greatly curtailed by the Israeli closure of Jerusalem which often prevented Palestinian scholars and professionals from the West Bank and Gaza Strip from participating in meetings and other activities at PASSIA.

As one of the major independent Palestinian academic institutions, PASSIA also regularly receives invitations to meetings with visiting foreign dignitaries. Meetings held at PASSIA and other venues are listed below. Details are presented in the following order: date; venue (PASSIA - unless differently stated); speaker or visitor; topic; participants.

**10 January**

*Meeting with Dr. Steve Heydemann, Co-Director of the Program on Peace and Security at the Social Science Research Council, New York*

**Topic: Cooperation between Palestinian Institutions and American Research Centers**

**Summary:**

Dr. Heydemann came to explore the idea of holding an international conference or academic exchange programs in Jerusalem, with participants from the US, Canada, Israel and Palestine. PASSIA was to be invited to chair one of the proposed sessions. However, at a later stage the conference was indefinitely postponed.

**25 January**

*Meeting with Dr. Theodor Hanf and Ms. Petra Bauerler, both from the Arnold Bergsträsser Institut, Germany*

**Topic: Assessment of the Palestinian Elections**

**Participants:** Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA, and Dr. Bernard Sabella, Professor of Sociology, Bethlehem University.

**Summary:**

The German visitors had come to Palestine to conduct research based on opinion surveys in conflict situations. They had already undertaken research in Sri Lanka and South Africa and Dr. Hanf is to publish a book on the subject. They visited PASSIA to hear an independent assessment of the recent Palestinian elections.

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* said that he believed that the Palestinian elections had ended the era of factions as characterized by the PFLP, the DFLP, Fatah, Fida, the Communist Party, etc., and that new "groupings" will emerge in the elected Council, with Hamas forming its own political party, the Islamic Salvation Party outside the Council.

He predicted that one group in the Council will form around individuals such as Dr. Haidar Abdul Shafi, and Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, and will include figures such as Raweh Shawwa and Dr. Azmi Shu'aybi as well as academics such as Dr. Ziad Abu Amr. They can be defined as an intellectual progressive group, with a self-image as democrats, but without a significant constituency. Their personal relationships, rather than any shared program or agreement on particular issues such as Jerusalem, will lead to their coalescence as a group. Dr. Haidar Abdul Shafi is likely to be the focus due to his age and standing. They may eventually form a Social Democratic Party.

The second group will consist of an alliance between the returning PLO old guard and younger Fatah activists. This is suggested, for example, by the results in Tulkarm, where Tayib Abd Al-Rahman, considered very close to the Chairman, and Mufid Abd Rabbo, a local activist, won seats. It is possible that these two elements will form two wings of a future group. The two groups, over the 18 months since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), are not in competition but are cooperating. Other examples are the elected members Salah Tam'ari (Bethlehem) - representing the old guard - and Abdul Fatah Hamayl (Ramallah) - representing the Intifada leadership.

A third group may comprise of figures entirely associated with the Chairman and could be described as "the President's men."

A fourth group would be made up of the young generation, middle class professionals, often with links to notable families, but deriving their political significance from their professional background. Examples are Maher Al-Masri and Ghassan Shaka'a, both from the Nablus constituency.

Another topic discussed was the future of the secular opposition such as the PFLP and DFLP. *Dr. Abdul Hadi* said that some figures see the necessity of their involvement in politics in the post-election context, but do not feel comfortable with any of the above groupings.

*Dr. Theodor Hanf* interjected that his findings showed that an Islamic party participating in elections could expect to gain 20-25% of the vote, with the potential to build on this. There is also a group, about 6-9% of the electorate, mainly urban, middle class and secular, which could form a western style Social Democratic constituency, concerned with principles such as the rule of law and supremacy of parliament. He queried whether such a group could find a significant role in the absence of trade unions. A response was that there was little prospect of unions emerging.

*Dr. Hanf* described the Palestinian electoral system as very strange, with multi-member constituencies of various sizes enabling certain candidates to be elected with quite low levels of support, and strong candidates being able to be elected without affiliation to a party. *Dr. Hanf* asked whether there had been infighting or internal deals within Fatah for Arafat's blessing.

An analysis of the Fatah candidate selection procedure and of how the Central Committee had discussed the formation of lists, with representatives from the constituencies speaking and nominating candidates, shows some internal bargaining. Chairman Arafat personally received candidates wishing to stand prior to the formation of the lists, and was receptive to everyone who wanted to stand. An example was Ahmad Ghneim, an Intifada activist, who won in the Fatah primaries in Jerusalem but was persuaded not to stand: as compensation, he was appointed Director General in the Ministry of Local Government.

Most Fatah activists opposed the Central Committee's action in changing the lists after the primaries. Two schools of thought emerged: (1) Fatah is a movement not a party and everyone wishing to stand can do so; (2) Fatah cannot split or compete with itself if the movement is to retain its significance within society.

In Jerusalem, attempts to form a national coalition list comprised of all factions, including Hamas affiliates, led to delays in forming a Fatah list. Faisal Husseini resisted efforts to persuade him to head the list.

The role of the notable families in the elections was also discussed. The decline of the role of the families in Palestinian politics can be traced to the dominance of the middle class in the PLO, whose leadership came from an entirely different social background, and whose constituency included the refugee camps. During the Intifada, individual members of notable families played roles, but as activists, not notables. This continued in the elections as candidates from notable families emphasized their professional or activist background.

*Dr. Hanf* brought up the subject of the PFLP and the DFLP, which, according to his research on detentions by the Israelis had borne the brunt of the Intifada, and it might be surmised, had therefore been the most prominent in Intifada activities.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* expressed the opinion that the PFLP and DFLP as political forums were dying. However, he noted the existence of pragmatic elements that want to become involved in the self-rule experiment, neither exaggerating the gains of the current process, nor underestimating what Palestinians can achieve under the present circumstances.

*Dr. Hanf* went on to outline several possible future scenarios, the worst case being a continuation of the negotiations without results and a lack of private investment. In the context of heightened expectations, this would lead to public disappointment and discontent, an extra-parliamentary opposition of both left and right, potentially willing

scenario, also possible, was the assassination of political leaders, which could lead to a civil war. He foresaw in these circumstances a power struggle between the various security and military apparatuses. He said the elections as a whole presented three very different pictures:

- (1) In Gaza people exercised their right to vote in an atmosphere of euphoria, a result of the passage of two years since the end of the occupation and the establishment of the PNA. Some results were surprising.
- (2) In the West Bank, the atmosphere was more subdued, due to the fresh memories of the occupation. Differences in voting behavior between towns and villages emerged, the latter giving greater support to the old guard of the PLO, with cities giving more support to local Intifada activists, for example Abdul Fatah Hamayl (Ramallah). In Ramallah, the fact that there was only one Christian seat meant that people had to carefully consider which Christian candidate to vote for. In the event, it was won by Ghazi Hanania. In the north of the West Bank, candidates from notable families ran together, such as Ghassan Shaka'a and Maher Al-Masri in Nablus.
- (3) In Jerusalem, it was discouraging to see the manner in which the elections were conducted, with the city 'reoccupied' with a massive Israeli military presence, violating the arrangements made in the Oslo II agreement. Former US President Jimmy Carter pointed out the level of Israeli intimidation of Palestinians, including the filming of voters. This came in the context of rumors and threatening posters in the run up to the elections that participation would lead to Palestinians losing their residency rights in the city or national insurance and medical benefits to which they had contributed. Queries about the fairness of the elections in Jerusalem were raised as early returns showed that three female candidates were likely to be elected, while in the event, only one, Hanan Ashrawi, was successful.

The meeting concluded with miscellaneous points made about the elections, such as the professionalism of the former Communist Party, sources of funding for candidates and the effect this might have on party formation, and the fact that no foreign elements such as the Saudis, Jordanians, Egyptians, Europeans, or Americans had directly intervened.

#### **27 January**

*Meeting with Francoise Clement, Program Coordinator, Centre d'Etudes et de Documentation Economique Juridique et Sociale (CEDEJ), France*

**Topic: CEDEJ's Program on Economic Change in the Middle East in the Times of the Peace Process**

#### **Summary:**

Francoise Clement and Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi discussed the most relevant points with regard to trade and investment in Palestine at this stage of the multilateral negotiations and of the development of intra-regional economic relations. Furthermore, Ms. Clement inquired about governmental bodies and research institutions that could provide additional information for and cooperate with the CEDEJ project.

#### **13 February**

*Visit of students from the School of International Training, Jerusalem/Vermont, USA*

**Topic: Palestinian Elections and State Building**

**21 February**

*Meeting with Ms. Sandra Turland, Personal Assistant to the Deputy Director of Education in Northampton, England*

**Topic: Palestinian Elections and The Peace Process / Preparation for a Group to Visit Palestine**

**22 February**

*Meeting with Ms. Margrit Schmidt from the Bruno Kreisky Forum, Vienna, Austria*

**Topic: Projects of the Bruno Kreisky Forum and PASSIA Activities**

**29 February**

*Meeting with Mrs. Wendy Senor Singer, Deputy Director of the Israel Office of the American Israel Public Affairs (AIPAC), USA*

**Topic: AIPAC, the US Congress, the Palestinian National Council; the Palestinian Legislative Council; PASSIA's Work**

**10 March**

*Visit of students of the School of International Training, Jerusalem/Vermont, USA*

**Topic: Palestinian State-Building and Democratization**

**13 March**

*Meeting with a delegation from the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Jerusalem*

**Topic: Opening Stages of the Palestinian Legislative Council; Assessment of the Council's Activities Thus Far**

**16 March**

*Meeting with the Jerusalem Center For Women (JWC), Jerusalem*

**Topic: Assessment of the Palestinian Elections and Women's Role/Participation**

**Participants:** PASSIA Staff; Sherene Abdul Hadi, Program Coordinator, JWC; Maral Kaprielian, Shipment Officer, EU Representation, Jerusalem; Rana Nashashibi, Palestinian Counseling Center; Mihaya Qawasami, Journalist, The Boston Globe; Abdul Rahman Abu Arafah, Arab Thought Forum; Rima Shwaily, Palestinian Counseling Center; Ghada Zughayr, Director, JCW.

**Summary:**

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* welcomed the participants from the Jerusalem Center for Women (JCW) and noted that the original idea from the JCW had been to hold a roundtable discussion on the Palestinian elections and women's issues with more participants, but the currently intensified closure of Jerusalem had precluded this. He therefore suggested that the meeting be regarded as a preparatory meeting for a future roundtable discussion to be held when conditions permit. He then mentioned the common interests of PASSIA and the JCW, such as promoting democratization and the development of civil society, and hoped that the meeting would point out some avenues of future cooperation.

*Ghada Zughayr* described the JCW's project to document the 1996 Palestinian elections in terms of women, so as to attempt to advance the position of women in future elections. The project, which began in December 1995, entails the study of three elections: the presidential, the legislative and the upcoming municipal. Two opinion polls were conducted before and after the presidential/legislative election, and more are being planned for the municipal elections. This is the first time that polls have included questions on specifically women's issues. The polls have been conducted as part of the JMCC's monthly polls, with four questions per poll being directly related to women's



due by the end of the year.

Issues concentrated on are:

- Strategies adopted by women candidates during the election campaign.
- Difficulties faced by women in participating in the elections.
- The implications of the electoral system for women.
- The implications of the registration system for women.
- Behavior of women voters.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* responded that PASSIA welcomes the idea of such joint roundtable discussions. An assessment of the elections from the point of view of women was necessary: for example, how some women activists in the Old City of Jerusalem had succeeded in mobilizing female voters and thereby improved female participation. An assessment and comparison of the various campaigns by female candidates was also necessary. Some female candidates ran very professional campaigns, but were not elected due to the electoral system. *Dr. Abdul Hadi* brought up the newly formed Palestinian Council for Peace and Justice, which includes many Palestinian institutions, representing all political factions as well as independent organizations, and recommended that the JCW become involved with this body.

On the question of municipal elections, *Dr. Abdul Hadi* emphasized PASSIA's interest in Jerusalem and raised the possibility of the formation of a East Jerusalem municipality.

*Ghada Zughayr* agreed that issues such as this are relevant, but stressed the need to avoid political issues dominating the agenda of the women's movement as had happened too often in the past.

Returning to the subject in hand, the elections, there was no consensus among prominent women politicians as to the desirability of a quota system for women. There was no female representation on the Central Elections Commission (CEC). However, it was to be hoped that momentum from the elections would lead to continued debate in Palestinian society and the meetings of the PLC, for example, over personal status laws. It was also to be hoped that this momentum would be maintained, something which had not been the case following the Intifada. An encouraging sign was that some male candidates had raised women's issues during their campaigns.

*Abdul Rahman Abu Arafah* mentioned the debate on the issue of a women's quota prior to the election, and the differing interpretations of the election results in terms of the number of women elected. The five female members represent approximately 5% of the Council, which is comparable with the situation in Israel, Jordan, the US and some European countries. Would a quota system therefore still be valid?

*Ghada Zughayr* responded that there were two assessments of the results:

- Some women feel that the result was good considering there was no quota.
- Some feel that the result was poor, and that women are entitled to a more representative representation than a quota or an alternative electoral system would provide.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* raised the question of appointments of women as deputy ministers and to leading positions in the bureaucracy.

*Ghada Zughayr* responded that here, also, a quota system would be appropriate, but that women lacked a mechanism for lobbying for this.

## *Dialogue & Briefings*

*Rana Nashashibi* pointed out that when discussing issues such as quotas or lobbying, it is necessary to bear in mind the local system. A choice needs to be made whether to lobby within the system, i.e., through Chairman Arafat, or to work from below in order to change the system. The former course would be a mistake as it would serve to perpetuate the system of 'one-man' control. The second strategy would require lobbying across a wide range of issues, not solely women's concerns. Society as a whole is affected by such patriarchal mechanisms.

*Maral Kaprielian* questioned whether there was a 'women's movement,' having the impression that rather there are small groups of women working in different sections of society.

*Ghada Zughayr* responded that the women's movement suffers from a lack of strategy and insufficient networking, and political factionalism mirroring that of wider Palestinian society. Fatah has historically been the largest faction and is now viewed as the party of government. The perception is that Fatah is patronizing to women. It is necessary for the women's movement to make a rapid assessment of the post-elections situation and to rebuild itself from the grass roots level in order to counteract its isolation.

On the question as to whether the Palestinian women's movement could be described as feminist, *Rana Nashashibi* said this was possible on the political level, in terms of women's participation in the national movement, but not, for example, in terms of women's sexual freedom.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* said that the position of women in Palestinian society needs to be put in its regional, that is Arab, context. The women's movement can be an agent for change in Arab society, but needs to operate in conjunction with other forces. One problem is that there is no media coverage of women's issues, and this is one factor to be addressed.

*Rana Nashashibi* pointed out that Hanan Ashrawi's election campaign and victory had transcended gender, and questioned what had enabled this: media coverage, reputation, successful fundraising, or a combination of all three? It was agreed that Hanan Ashrawi is not a good example for generalizing about the position of women in Palestinian society.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* questioned why women candidates in Jerusalem had not run on a joint list.

*Ghada Zughayr* stated that the open list system had diverted women's votes, and pointed to the example of a Fatah leader standing in Ramallah, who had not been elected because she was a woman.

*Abdul Rahman Abu Arafah* pointed out that the quota system, whether on religious or gender lines, contributes to the fragmentation of Palestinian society.

*Rana Nashashibi* responded that women are in a weak position in Palestinian society, as was reflected by the elections, but this could be remedied by a quota system.

*Ghada Zughayr* said that instant equality was not possible and pointed out that the CEC had not spent much of its budget on the education of women voters.

*Rana Nashashibi* responded that there was not simply a failure to educate women: the CEC had often sent male-only teams to register voters, knowing that in the absence of male relatives many women could not receive them in order to register. This led to many women not being registered and was an institutional attempt to reduce the proportion of women registered to vote. Returning to the Arab context, will there be an attempt to change matters from above, as in Tunisia under Bourguiba, or is grass roots action the answer? Voter behavior demonstrated a tendency to vote for those already in

**10 April**

*Meeting with Simon May, Director of Whatman plc, former European Affairs Advisor to Douglas Hurd and Edward Heath, London*

**Topic: Initiation of a "Groupe de Reflexion" in Brussels on the Most Productive Ways for European Groups to Become Involved in the Peace Process**

**22 April**

*Meeting with a delegation from the American Israel Public Affairs (AIPAC), USA*

**Topic: Palestinian Elections**

Participants: Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA; Leonard Davis, Director of the AIPAC Jerusalem office; Robert S. Brender, Educationalist, US; Lawrence Reed, Economist, President of MACKINAC Center for Public Policy, US; and Kendra Shrode.

**24 April**

*Meeting with Vanessa Kirsch and Alan Khazei of Citizens in Action around the World*

**Topic: Palestinian Civil Society**

**Summary:**

Vanessa Kirsch and Alan Khazei were on a nine-month tour around the world during which they spoke to people in 25 countries about the role of civil society. The objective of the project was to enrich their own programs in the US and to share what they had learned with those interested in similar projects abroad.

**25 April**

*Institute of Israeli Arab Studies, Jerusalem*

*Presentation by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, addressing teachers and students of the Institute of Israeli Arab Studies*

**Topic: Palestinian-Jordanian Relations**

**5 May**

*Orient House, Jerusalem*

*Meeting with a delegation from the Italian Local Authorities for Peace*

**Topic: Palestinian Society**

**16 May**

*Roundtable with a presentation by Dr. Gregory Mahler, Professor of Political Science, University of Mississippi, US*

**Topic: A Theory of Constitutionalism and Palestinian Constitutional Development**

Participants: PASSIA Staff; Ayman Ayoubi, Businessman; Hania Bitar, Business Manager, The Jerusalem Times; Terry Boulatta, Project Coordinator, WATC Ramallah; Hanan Elmasu, Jerusalem Center for Women; Allison Fine, Researcher; Osama Halabi, Lawyer; Allison Hodgkins, Academic Director, School for International Training; Maral Kaprielian, EU Representation, Jerusalem; Elias Khoury, Lawyer; Dr. Riad Malki, Director of Panorama, Jerusalem; Dr. Anis Al-Qaq, Deputy Minister of Planning and International Cooperation; and Nancy Shalala, International Foundation for Electoral Systems.

**Summary:**

Dr. Gregory Mahler gave an overview of his research on constitutionalism in the Middle East, and especially on the forging of a constitution in the new state of Palestine (published by PASSIA; see *Research Studies*). He started by reviewing constitutionalism in general. According to Dr. Mahler, a constitution is generally a reflection of the basic

## *Dialogue & Briefings*

ideology of a state and often presents the state's most fundamental laws. It also provides a framework for organizing responsibilities and power structures in a government. Finally, a constitution generally contains a mechanism by which it can be amended. However, Dr. Mahler stressed that the key in assessing constitutionalism in practice is not whether or not a state has a viable written constitution, but whether the government is constrained by some explicit or implicit set of basic laws: ideally, certain fundamental principles should be stronger than any individual or regime. Thus, states with fully developed constitutions, like the former Soviet Union or Syria, can be said to have a less constitutional government than Great Britain, which has no formal constitution. Dr. Mahler asserted that the "political culture" of a state is often more important than the actual written constitution in determining if a state has constitutional government. This raised several questions which Dr. Mahler asked the group to talk about. How should a constitution and political culture be reconciled? Should a constitution reflect political culture or try to counteract trends considered detrimental to the interests of the people? What is the political culture of Palestinian society? He concluded by noting that elsewhere in the Middle East, the key obstacles to achieving truly democratic constitutional governments have been the imposition of outside systems and the controversy over the relationship between Islam and government.

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* said he felt that the key question is how to empower the people vis-à-vis the government. He wondered how we can ensure that the Palestinian people will be able to monitor their government's performance, in contrast to other political systems in the Arab world. He also noted that recent Palestinian history has resulted in the development of a national movement. However, new structures and mechanisms are required for a normal, legitimate government.

*Dr. Riad Malki* asserted that those who write a constitution determine its content. Thus, great care must be taken to ensure that the constitution is not merely an elite imposition. He also wondered about the importance of a constitution in that in countries such as the US, the amendments to the constitution are often more important than the constitution itself.

*Osama Halabi* countered that this is the essence of the American constitutional system, and thus strengthens the argument that the constitution is important.

*Dr. Malki* criticized the notion of a Middle East political culture, due to Iranian, Turkish, Israeli and inter-Arab differences. Finally, he noted that in the West, democracy resulted from a long series of wars and violent upheavals. The Arab Middle East has had a very different history, which must therefore lead to a different kind of political system. Consequently, importing a Western-style democracy is a recipe for disaster.

*Terry Boullata* stressed that an effective NGO and lobbying community is crucial to the success of constitutional government for the Palestinians. She argued that an intermediary between interest groups and the government is indispensable in assuring that the people are well-represented in their new government. She cited the example of Palestinian women, whose rights are in constant peril in Palestine. She asserted that without mutual respect between the NGO community and the government, a stable democratic state will not develop.

*Elias Khoury* stressed that Palestinians must be open-minded in drafting a constitution. They must be willing to look at Palestinian society as it is, as opposed to an idealized version or a version that is biased by normative goals. There must be a genuine effort to discover the will of the people and their views of government. He raised the possibility that maybe Palestinians are not ready for democracy. Khoury pointed out that Israel's founders were well-schooled in political philosophy and had a sophisticated understanding of different forms of government. Meanwhile, Palestinian leaders have been nurtured in an atmosphere of clandestine organization and revolution, and lack a good understanding of the exigencies of democratic and transparent rule. Finally, he added



*Osama Halabi* observed the tension in Palestinian society between West and East. He noted that the West is often insensitive in asserting its own values as universal. On the other hand, Palestinians can learn a great deal from the West. Unfortunately, however, there is often an immediate reaction among Palestinians that anything from the West is bad. Halabi noted that, paradoxically, there is a tendency among Palestinians to assume that experts from the West are better-qualified, and there is thus too much reliance on the West for things that the Palestinian community can provide for itself.

*Allison Fine* related the fears of Palestinian Intifada leaders that a Palestinian state will fall into the same pattern of authoritarianism that other Arab governments exhibit. She expressed a need to pinpoint a specifically Palestinian political culture, as opposed to relying on the inaccurate model of a Middle Eastern political culture.

*Hanan Elmasu* expressed the need for increased education and infrastructure in cultivating a democratic society. She emphasized the importance of a grass roots connection to the government.

*Maral Kaprielian* asserted that people have no experience in participatory government and thus do not even know their rights in many cases. She echoed Elmasu's emphasis on education.

*Hania Bitar* noted that what Westerners often see as undemocratic measures, such as a ban on alcohol, are not necessarily undemocratic in a Palestinian context. She challenged the notion that Islamic *Shari'a* and democracy are incompatible, and asserted that it is possible and appropriate to have both in a new Palestinian state.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* lamented the politicization of Islam, and noted that it has often been altered to serve the interests of certain regimes or individuals. He also expressed concern about the functioning of PNA institutions thus far, citing the example of members of the legislature who are not even aware of their responsibilities. Finally, Dr. Abdul Hadi gave an analysis of Palestinian NGOs and noted that most of them were designed to address the challenges of the period of the Intifada. He maintained that none of the NGOs has a solid base for the future, and that they must restructure themselves for the challenges of a new era.

*Ayman Ayoubi* stressed the need for checks and balances in the new government to prevent any individual or group of people from imposing its will over the people.

*Dr. Anis Al-Qaq* recommended that the Palestinian constitution be written without reference to official documents signed thus far, which all bear the influence of Israel. He also emphasized the importance of Palestinians learning from their experiences in the Diaspora, from the other Arab states' errors and from the Israelis. Al-Qaq noted that the unique opportunity to build a new state should not be compromised, as it was in the biased Palestinian election arrangements. He cited the protests surrounding the elections as a sign that a nascent democratic political culture exists and as a cause for optimism about Palestinian democracy. *Allison Hodgkins* supported this assessment that there is a solid base for democracy.

*Hania Bitar* was less sanguine, and noted the disenchantment of the people over the "cooked" results of the elections, as well as their fear that a constitution might also be imposed from above.

*Dr. Mahler* thanked everyone for their input and agreed with the general consensus that the new constitution must reflect the will of the Palestinian people, as well as that time must be allowed so that people feel that their concerns have been respected and so that implementation mechanisms can be developed.

**20 May**

*Meeting with members of the Hadassah College of Technology, Jerusalem, and the Fachhochschule für Druck, Stuttgart, Germany*

**Topic: Possible Cooperation between the Two Colleges and Palestinian Institutions**

**Participants:** PASSIA Staff; J. Wassermann and Lutz Lichtenau, Fachhochschule für Druck Stuttgart; and Avraham Zur, Hadassah College of Technology.

**Summary:**

The Hadassah College of Technology, in cooperation with the Fachhochschule für Druck Stuttgart, approached PASSIA about a joint project for Israeli-Arab-German students of non-print information technology. The basic idea was to take a group of students to Germany (Fachhochschule für Druck Stuttgart) for training in non-print information technology; at the same time, the students would work together on a small project rather than arguing about larger political issues.

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* raised his concern that this project was too limited in scope and that 12 days of training would not be enough to meet the Palestinian community's printing needs.

*Dr. Lutz Lichtenau* agreed and added that the proposed project would be a good step for future long-term programs or university courses.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* suggested that he would speak to people on the Palestinian side to see if this kind of a program could be successful.

*Avraham Zur* asked why Palestinians do not go to the Israelis for basic training in such technology as this would be easier and cheaper.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* responded that there are still psychological barriers related to the experiences under occupation as well as unresolved political issues that make this difficult. (The project never materialized.)

**22 May**

*Meeting with Nikolas Nordstrom, Swedish Social Democratic Party Youth, Sweden*

**Topic: The "Peace College Project"**

**Summary:**

The group of the Swedish Social Democratic Party Youth was interested primarily in exploring avenues for cooperation between young Palestinians, Israelis and Swedes. The discussion centered around a "Peace College Project" in which young people from the three countries would study together issues related to peace. The group was also briefed about PASSIA and its activities as well as on the general situation of Palestinians and their institutions in Jerusalem.

**23 May**

*Visit of German students from the Free University of Berlin*

**Topic: Palestinian Perspective on the Peace Process**

**2 June**

*at George's Guest House, Jerusalem*

*Meeting with a group of Episcopalians from the US*

*Presentation by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi*

**Topic: The Current Situation in Jerusalem - Social, Political and Religious Aspects**

**Topic: The Limits of State Power in the Middle East: Social and Economic Constraints**  
Participants: PASSIA Staff; Nahla Asali, Birzeit University; Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Researcher, Al-Quds University; Dr. Albert Aghazarian, Head of Public Relations Office, Birzeit University; Issa Kassissieh, Orient House; Lea Perez, US Consulate, Jerusalem; Allison Hodgkins, Academic Director of the School of International Training, USA; Susan Ziadeh, US Consulate, Jerusalem; Hania Bitar, Jerusalem Times Newspaper, Jerusalem; Amjad Hidmi, US Consulate, Jerusalem; and Dr. Anis Al-Qaq, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.

### Summary:

Dr. Emile Sahliyah covered two basic topics: the limits of state power in the Middle East and democratization in the Arab World. On the former topic, he noted that while much has been written about the decline of the power of the state over the past few years, it is assumed that the state is still unchallenged in the Middle East. He questioned this notion, saying that ethnic/sectarian tensions, economic difficulties, transnational ideologies (pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism), regional and extra-regional intervention and the lack of democratic political systems all pose serious challenges to the state in the Middle East.

*Dr. Sahliyah* then went on to explore the last of these topics in an attempt to explain the essentially complete failure of the Arab world to democratize while countries in Africa, South America, Europe and Asia have all made steps in this direction. He gave an overview of the most widespread arguments for the lack of democratization. He named the patriarchal nature of Arab society, the practical application of Islam in Middle Eastern society, rentierism, the political economy of oil, the lack of a well-educated, economically self-sufficient and politically independent middle class, the absence of sufficient grass roots activity for democracy, and the involvement of the US as the most commonly articulated explanations for the poor record of democracy in the Arab world.

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* brought up several points in response to the presentation. First, he noted the fundamental dispute between those who believe progress without democracy is impossible and those who believe democracy is not essential to progress. Secondly, he raised the question of *shura*, its relation to democracy and how it has been exploited in the past. Thirdly, he asked about the role of women, and noted that this is a major issue in Palestinian society. Finally, he brought up the example of the arrest of Iyad Sarraj as an example of Arafat acting as all the other non-democratic Arab leaders act.

*Dr. Sahliyah* remarked that some of these comments touched on the crucial question of what we mean when we speak about democracy. It has many aspects: institutional separation, cognitive recognition by leaders of democratic principles, procedural democracy (i.e., suffrage, limits on political officials, contested elections, etc.), pluralism/interest-group representation, economics (the question as to whether poverty and democracy are incompatible), social democracy (social equity in exchange for giving up political rights, as Syria claims), or the fundamental civil rights of all people. He noted that the last of these is the most important, and that specific political and other types of arrangements will fall into place if people's basic civil rights are respected.

*Nahla Assali* asked if democracy and Islamic concepts of *shura* and *Zakat* are reconcilable.

*Dr. Sahliyah* responded that democracy has been flexible and has adapted to new realities, and so must Islam. He asserted that Islamic concepts have traditionally been applied in an elitist way and must be interpreted with the modern world taken into consideration. He noted that Israel is an example of a society with significant fundamentalist elements that play by the rules of democracy. Most important, he stated, is that the civil rights of all be respected - everything else will then take care of itself.

## Dialogue & Briefings

*Sheikh Jamil Hamami* pointed out the differences between democracy (the rule of the people over themselves) and *shura* (people raising issues in public) as well as between taxes (regressive and taken by force) and *Zakat* (progressive and moral). He quoted the leader of the Islamic Welfare Party in Turkey as saying not to fear Islamic government, which will respect the opinions and rights of all people. *Sheikh Hamami* and *Dr. Sahliyah* then engaged in a dialogue in which the former emphasized many of the shortcomings of democracy while *Dr. Sahliyah* emphasized the need to be flexible in interpreting Islam as well as democracy in the context of the modern world.

*Dr. Albert Aghazarian* interjected that this was an old issue dealing with the question of one's basic world view and, as such, was too big to be easily resolved. He pointed out, however, that the Islamic concept of *Ijtihad* is a built-in mechanism of flexibility and that there is undoubtedly room for dialogue between secularist and religious thinkers.

*Dr. Anis Al-Qaq* stated that there is no perfect model of a democratic political system. He noted that the question to be raised is why one country is more democratic than another, and specifically, why Palestinian society is showing undemocratic tendencies. He wondered if some kind of national training or education is necessary to prepare people to participate in a democracy. He gave the example of Israel where the army is a common experience that serves as a bond and as a link to Israel and its system.

*Dr. Aghazarian* said that Israel was the worst example to use of how to build a democratic society. He also criticized *Dr. Al-Qaq* for what he saw as a tendency to justify some of the policies of the PNA. He emphasized a need to look squarely at reality and not to justify observed shortcomings.

*Issa Kassissieh* asked about the possibility of compromise between the Islamist and secularist camps. He also wondered about the American sanctioning of the PNA's decision to establish military courts and asked whether this is what the Palestinians had to look forward to in a democracy.

*Sheikh Hamami* responded that there is no problem in establishing a dialogue between Islamists and secularists. The main problem has been that there has been insufficient communication between the leadership of the PNA and the people. There are some forms of limited pressure from the people, but arresting Sarraj and putting people in front of military courts is unacceptable.

*Lea Perez* defended the US in saying that its efforts are designed to save the peace process, without which the Palestinians will be much worse off. She noted that any American would deplore the activities of the military courts. At the same time, she emphasized that the Palestinians were ultimately responsible for setting up those courts and for finding ways to protest and change them. The Palestinians should not blame the Americans for the way other Palestinians choose to deal with terrorism.

*Ilison Hodgkins* asked about the possibility of conducting a national struggle and building a democratic state at the same time, given the different exigencies of these two tasks.

*Isan Ziadeh* noted Iraq and Syria as examples of Arab societies that have sizable middle classes, yet have not evolved into democracies. She asked what could be learned from this observation in the light of *Dr. Sahliyah's* initial remarks.

*Mania Bitar* pointed out that the Palestinians have a sizable middle class that is well-educated but still not economically strong. She wondered what effect the middle class could have on the development of Palestinian democracy.

In conclusion, *Dr. Sahliyah* noted that dialogue between secular and Islamist elements is indispensable in the state-building process. He reiterated the primary importance of civil rights and noted that even with the difficulties posed by external conditions,



**25 June**

*Meeting with a delegation from Centro Espagnol de Relaciones Internacionales (CERI) Madrid*

**Topic: Cooperation between CERI and PASSIA**

**Participants:** Dr. Gema Martin Munoz, Jesus Nunez Villaverde, Isaias Barrenada Bajo, Begona Valle Simon, from CERI; and Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA.

**Summary:**

*Dr. Gema Munoz* explained that CERI is trying to form a team to study the Levant as there is currently little expertise on this subject in Spain. Similar to PASSIA, CERI undertakes research, publication and meetings but has focused on the North Africa region in the past. The CERI research team hopes to publish a book on the current situation in which the PNA is trying to establish a state, as well as to establish themselves as a Spanish interlocutor on this subject.

*Jesus Villaverde* mentioned that the goals of CERI's trip were to see who could be of help in establishing relationships for future cooperation, and to find good sources of information about the region.

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* responded that the resources of PASSIA were at their disposal and that PASSIA would be very interested in cooperating on research projects.

The CERI team then introduced the foci of their respective field of study:

Dr. Munoz - institutional development of the PNA;

Isaias Bajo - effect of peace process on Israeli society, especially the Arab community;

Jesus Villaverde - local, regional and domestic economy;

Begona Valle Simon - the Islamist movement's role in Palestinian politics;

and Alvarez-Ossorio - the Palestinian-Israeli track in its regional context.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* said that Palestinians could consult with CERI and give their point of view on these subjects, and, in turn, learn from CERI's experience and knowledge. Contacts, roundtables to discuss research findings, and cooperative research would all be productive areas for cooperation.

At the request of the delegation, *Dr. Abdul Hadi* then gave a brief summary of the current political situation. He noted that pessimism prevails because of what Netanyahu's victory says about Israeli society, and especially because of the political arrogance of Netanyahu and the potential for the suffering of the Palestinian people to be exploited. He emphasized that the Palestinians must take a strong unified stand when facing Netanyahu. The Arab summit produced good resolutions: now it is time to get the Palestinian house in order. He concluded with an analysis of the PLC, saying that the beginnings of incipient political parties are slowly emerging. There is a group of progressive, social democratic intellectuals, and there are those whose leadership abilities are the result of their activity in the Intifada. The first group has the reins of power and international support. The intellectuals are respected by the man in the street but not entirely trusted. Overall, the problem is that the groups are more interested in talking with each other and strengthening their own relationships than in becoming active on political issues.

15 July

Roundtable with a presentation by George Hawatmeh, *The Jordan Times*, Amman

**Topic: Media and Jordanian-Palestinian Relations**

Participants: PASSIA Staff; Maral Kaprielian, European Commission, Jerusalem; Dr. Riad Malki, Panorama Center; Hania Bitar, *The Jerusalem Times*; Terry Boullata, WATC; and Dr. Nazmi Al-Ju'beh, Birzeit University.

**Summary:**

George Hawatmeh started by stating that there has been a great deal of cynicism about Jordanian-Palestinian relations, especially in the international media. This may have made the conflict seem greater than it actually is. Yet the goals of the two sides have been complicated by the electoral victory of Netanyahu.

He noted the differences in the Palestinian and Jordanian media. The PLC discusses contentious issues frankly, but the media does not cover these discussions. Meanwhile in Jordan, the media, while ultimately subject to censorship, covers almost everything. Much of the censorship comes elsewhere as the parliament's discussions usually do not really address difficult issues. Much of the problem in Jordan is that the press sees itself as a reflection of society rather than as a watchdog: thus there is very little thoughtful, critical analysis.

As far as the question of Palestine, the Jordanian press has two issues. The first is that of the situation in Israel/Palestine and the second is that of the Palestinians in Jordan. On the first issue, the Jordanian press has largely had a neutral effect: it has not really worsened or improved relations between the two sides, both of which it theoretically has the power to do. On the second aspect, although Palestinians are proportionally represented in the media, there has been little effort to address the issue of the inequality Palestinians in Jordan suffer. This tends to increase the existing tension between the two groups.

George Hawatmeh summarized the Jordanian media as follows:

- *Al-Rai*: Largest circulation (70,000); 61% government-owned; mostly staffed by East Bankers and seen as reflecting the mainstream East Bank establishment; under increasing pressure to meticulously toe the government line.
- *Al-Dustoor*: owned by the Sharif family and thought of as generally reflective of the Palestinian-Jordanian point of view.
- *Al-Aswaq*: owned by a holding company headed by Palestinian-Jordanians who came from Kuwait.
- *The Jordan Times*: 61% government-owned.
- Tabloids: *Shihan*, *Al-Bilad*, *Al-Hadaf*, *Al-Sabeel* (Islamist), *Al-Majd* (Ahmad Jibril-leaning, Nasserist thought to have Syrian backing).
- Party weeklies: supposedly regular, but not so in practice.
- Radio/TV Jordan: in Arabic and English. There is talk of trying to privatize these, but this is rather unlikely.

George Hawatmeh noted the feasibility of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian English daily, in which European investors have expressed interest.

Hania Bitar questioned the viability of this, noting the many political and practical handicaps in both countries.

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi expressed his concern about journalism as a profession among Palestinians. He noted that there are few Palestinians who are well-trained or even seriously committed to journalism. They are rarely specialized in specific topics and are usually incapable of providing analyses or investigative journalism (as opposed to rote recording of events as presented to them). He wondered what steps could be taken to alleviate this problem, and asked if a special school should be set up.

and level of development, etc. all affect journalism, and there is no one source which can be cited as the reason for poor mass media. At the same time, the situation is vastly improved as compared with 25 years ago.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* brought up the additional fact that people do not read critically either being mainly concerned with the social announcements. *Hania Bitar* added that low salaries have driven any good journalists that exist to work as stringers for foreign media companies. *George Hawatmeh* also noted that the Israeli government effectively coordinates its activities with press coverage, while the Jordanians and Palestinians still view the press as a hindrance rather than a potentially helpful tool.

*Maral Kaprielian* noted that the above issues are subordinate to the real problem which is that there is no real freedom of expression. The fear of people to criticize and voice their real opinions is the ultimate problem with the media, and this is the main area that needs to be addressed in order to see an improvement.

*George Hawatmeh* agreed in principle, but noted that in practice, good media is much more complicated than simply promoting freedom of expression: financial considerations, an interested and critical public, and capable and motivated people in the media industry are all essential prerequisites for a good mass media. For instance, *Al-Ahram* in Egypt could not provide its quality products without the resource base of the *Al-Ahram* institution.

*Hania Bitar* noted that the lack of a strong, universally-accepted union is a key problem in Palestine and asked about the situation in Jordan.

*George Hawatmeh* responded that the union in Jordan is a farce: the same people who control the union, control management of the media industry. Furthermore, the union comprises serious journalists as well as those who simply copy-edit official rhetoric. Thus those in the union do not really share mutual concerns.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* stated that the closure of Jerusalem has crippled Palestinian institutions, adding that this should be a key issue for any Arab nationalist organization. He asked that *George Hawatmeh* take this message back to *The Jordan Times* and the Jordanian media in general.

*George Hawatmeh* pointed out that he had heard that 60 Palestinian journalists had recently been given permission to enter Jerusalem. Participants noted that this is mostly for purposes of Israeli rhetoric because the permits are subject to security checks on which the Israelis often drag their feet in order to limit the entry of journalists.

**23 July**

*Meeting with Fatène Benhabylès of Cities Unies, Paris; and Narjess Saidane of the Fonds Coopération Décentralisée, Paris/Jerusalem*

**Topic: Divided Cities and Potentials for Cooperation on Municipal Level/Town Partnership Schemes**

**Summary:**

The discussion centered around the issue of divided cities, such as Jerusalem, Belfast, Beirut, Berlin and Nicosia, and the possibility of holding a conference on this subject with a focus on Jerusalem in order to put it in the center of world attention and end its state of neglect on the part of the international community.

Ideas advanced during the meeting for sample topics included civil society, institutions, political environment, urban infrastructure, demography/minorities, legislative socioeconomic divisions, access of all in divided cities, urban planning and education.

Euro-MeSCo and Cities Unies-France were mentioned as possible facilitators or venues for such a conference. *Fatène Benhabylès* noted that a potential difficulty could be that Cities Unies does not have extensive connections to the NGO community. She added that her organization would be interested in organizing such an event but does not have the means to fund it; possibly a budget proposal could be submitted to the EU.

**25 July**  
*Roundtable with a presentation by Dr. Ziad Abu Amr, PLC Member (Gaza Constituency), and Professor of Political Science, Birzeit University*  
**Topic: The Palestinian Legislative Council**  
**Participants:** PASSIA Staff; Dr. Riad Malki, Birzeit University; Kai Boeckmann, German Representative Office; Ali Kazak, PLO Ambassador to Australia; HE Richard Dalton, British Consul-General; Lori Kresse, US Consulate-General; Issa Kassissieh, Orient House; Adin Talbar, Danish Consulate; Gines L. Oliver, Spanish Cooperation; Hania Bitar, The Jerusalem Times; Anita Vitello, Journalist; John Daniszewski, LA Times; Susan Ziadeh, US Consulate; Dr. Albert Aghazarian, PR Director, Birzeit University; Michael Kresse, US Consulate; Rami Nasrallah, Orient House; and Bea Onisti, Panorama Center.

Dr. Ziad Abu Amr's presentation at PASSIA was intended not only to allow participants to hear his observations, but also to give them the opportunity to ask questions, challenge his conclusions, and hear the reflections and relevant experiences of the broad range of people attending the meeting.

*Dr. Abu Amr* began by saying that the basic task he would like to undertake today is to contextualize the PLC in the hope of arriving at a better understanding of its workings. Understanding the background and circumstances within which the PLC evolved and now operates is essential in evaluating its successes and failures as well as possible future pitfalls and opportunities for improvements.

**Summary:**  
Initially both the PNA and the Israelis had serious doubts about allowing elections for the PLC to even occur. This raises the question of why these two parties did not stop them from taking place. It seems the answer lies in the fact that they both saw the elections as being a way of supporting their aspirations in the peace process. However, this is not how the situation has turned out, and Arafat and the Israelis have thus begun to try to restrict the PLC's activities. Indeed, Israeli behavior towards the body has shown that Israel is not interested in a democratic Palestinian political entity - as it had often claimed to be in the past - now that it realizes that such a government may not follow the dictates of the Israeli government.

The January 1996 elections were a remarkable event. For some time before the elections, there had been social malaise among Palestinians as they became increasingly disenchanted with the PLO-Israeli agreements, the conditions of their daily lives, and the prospects for progress towards an equitable future peace. The elections were seen as a way out of the stagnant political situation and a move towards national independence. Additionally, the historic importance and novelty of the first-ever Palestinian elections aroused a great deal of popular enthusiasm. Palestinian society was mobilized more than at any time since the enthusiastic days of the Intifada. Unfortunately, with the novelty gone, and with the dashing of many people's hopes of the PLC rapidly solving problems in Palestinian society, the next elections may not inspire the same enthusiasm. It seems that the initial wave of excitement about democracy has ebbed with the realization that power still lies in the hands of Israel and Arafat, and not the people. This is the backdrop against which the PLC arose. Let us look at some of the PLC's activities to see what lessons can be learned.

On the positive side, there are some encouraging signs from the first several months of the PLC's activities. The members have shown exceptional commitment and dedica-



couraging element has been the freedom and frankness of discussion that has occurred in our meetings. I have been pleasantly surprised that no subject has been taboo and there has been earnest and often heated debate about even the most politically sensitive topics. This spirit of feeling free to express what one really feels is unmatched in the Arab world.

However, many factors have aroused severe frustrations for us in the PLC. The most serious of these is the relationship between the PLC and the executive branch of the PNA. In our first few months, the PLC has passed over 60 resolutions, which have all sat idly waiting to be signed by Chairman Arafat. We are told that it is normal to have competition between the legislative and executive branches in a democracy, but it seems that the balance of power in our case leans much too heavily in the favor of Arafat and his executive committee. Indeed, the PLC has no real leverage, and any time it threatens the executive's way of thinking, the result is simply that PLC activities are suspended. Examples abound of issues that we want to address but cannot. For instance, there are many prisoners sitting in PNA jails who have not yet been formally accused. The PLC staunchly opposes this practice but is utterly unable to do anything about it. Another important example is the Council's request to bring a draft of the Basic Law for discussion. Again, Arafat has used his power to prevent this possibility in order to concentrate control over this important issue in his executive branch. Suspending the PLC's ability to function is Arafat's standard way of frustrating its efforts to challenge his power.

Foremost among the problems between the branches is Arafat himself. First, it is hard for him to move from his *modus operandi* of the days of the revolutionary struggle - when he concentrated all power in himself - to a style in which he delegates more responsibility - as one would hope for in a democratic political system: it is difficult for him to get used to the idea of letting power emanate from sources other than himself. Thus, when we try to criticize, hold accountable, or question one of his ministers, he interprets this as a personal attack and responds by shutting down the activities of the Council for several days. Secondly, his personal charisma, qualifications and popular legitimacy give him a great deal of power and often enable him to intimidate PLC members into acceding to his wishes. Thirdly, the ambiguousness of the Palestinian political entity gives Arafat power. Because he is the head of the PLO, the PNC and the PNA, each of which has a different mandate, he can often refer to the most convenient one to justify whatever action he feels is appropriate. Finally, there are many members of the cabinet and throughout the PNA who are beholden to Arafat for their positions. They fear that if the PLC gains power it will threaten their own political power. They are thus a force that supports Arafat's efforts to stymie the PLC's goal of independent action.

The stranglehold of Arafat's executive branch over the legislative has, in turn, led to problems between the PLC and its constituency: because the legislative branch is largely impotent, members cannot respond to the demands of citizens, who then lose faith in the ability of their elected council and in the whole political system in general. Overall, member-constituency communication has been frequent and productive. The problem is that there are almost never new developments, rather continuations of established frustrations.

Another cause for frustration has been the lack of press coverage. Thus, while the PLC discusses important topics in a spirit of the frank exchange of ideas, the public is largely unaware that this is taking place. What is the practical benefit if more issues are discussed than in the Jordanian parliament if no one hears about it? The members of the press have all been co-opted by PNA money or cowed by its threats into refraining from printing material that challenges the official line.

**Discussion:**

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* asked if there were any blocs or groupings forming in the PLC.

*Dr. Abu Amr* noted that voting occurs almost exclusively according to members' positions on issues as opposed to by groups with which members are affiliated. This is a positive point in that it eliminates the possibility of the dominance of a certain political majority over the voice of the opposition. The only possible grouping is that of several independent Islamists who walked out of a session as a group to protest Arafat's stalling on the issue of the Basic Law. He added that this was a healthy development in that it showed the Council is starting to learn and use parliamentary procedure.

*Ali Kazak* noted that *Dr. Abu Amr's* statements seemed to be a critique of the democratic system, since party loyalty in voting characterizes most democracies.

*Dr. Abu Amr* recognized that this is true in countries such as Australia but pointed out that the specifics in the case of Palestine mean that party voting would probably just mean the tyranny of a majority directed by one individual.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* asked about the PLC's policy towards Jerusalem.

*Dr. Abu Amr* responded that Jerusalem has only been discussed in reference to specific incidents, such as the effort of some Jews to pray in Al-Aqsa Mosque. An overall policy still has not been developed. This reality stems from the fact that Jerusalem is a complicated issue: while most members agree in theory on a policy towards Jerusalem, the PLC does not want to put itself in the position of adopting a law that commits it to a policy that is impractical in the current political situation.

He continued that Jerusalem and other "final status" issues are very important for Palestinians and this has caused a problem between the PLC and the people: namely, because the PLC is the only truly representative body for Palestinians, people have invested almost all their hopes and expectations in the Council. Unfortunately, as we have seen, the PLC is not very powerful and cannot fulfill people's aspirations.

*Dr. Abu Amr* stated that he tried to lower people's expectations during the election campaign because of Israel's and Arafat's power over the PLC, but citizens still look to the Council and are inevitably disappointed. Thus, the Council has issued statements, but the press blackout and political restrictions hamper its effectiveness.

*Anita Vitello* remarked that now that we know the limitations on the PLC, it would be helpful to hear what it can do.

*Dr. Abu Amr* answered that there is very little it can do. The PLC has passed supposedly binding resolutions and frequently issues statements, yet because of the press blackout these are usually heard by no one. Meanwhile, they basically never have any effect on those who should implement them because these people are controlled by Arafat. He noted that the PLC must make more strenuous efforts to wrest control from Arafat by using parliamentary procedure and other means to protest his heavy-handedness.

*Lori Kresse* responded that the talk that has occurred in the PLC has been important and should be disseminated to the public. She noted that publishing the proceedings of the Council would be good, constructive pressure on Arafat.

*Dr. Abu Amr* agreed this would be a good idea and that it is a possibility that the PLC must explore and develop. However, he emphasized that radio and television are the only really influential media because printed material is not that widely read. Even newspapers are considered more important for their social announcements than their use as a way of spreading information about political developments.

Without this policy, each member may meet with Israelis according to the circumstances. This can then send mixed messages about what kinds of meetings and arrangements for interaction the Palestinians consider legitimate. He noted that the Political Committee has been designated to draft a policy on this matter.

*Kai Boeckmann* asked what the role of the Council would be in the negotiations.

*Dr. Abu Amr* replied that technically there is no role since the agreements are between the PLO and the state of Israel. However, as the only official popularly-elected Palestinian body, and as the representative of over two million Palestinians, the Council does have to lend its voice and assert itself to affecting the negotiations on final status issues.

*Gines Oliver* asked what the source for drafting the Basic Law would be.

*Dr. Abu Amr* said that it would come largely from Egyptian precedents due to the legal educational background of many of the Council members. There will also be a great deal of influence from Jordan because of the close ties in all areas between the two societies. Finally, there will be material taken from the West. He pointed out that all these main sources are from outside. He noted that the only internal source so far has been a draft which the Palestinian institution Birzeit University supplied, and added that this draft had been very encouraging and useful.

### **7 August**

*Meeting with Dr. Philip Gordon, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London*

**Topic: Exchange of Ideas and Views on Aspects of Cooperation between the Two Institutes**

### **8 August**

*Roundtable with a presentation by Dr. Salim Tamari, Director, Institute for Jerusalem Studies, Jerusalem*

**Topic: Palestinian Refugees**

Participants: PASSIA Staff; David Viveash, Canadian Embassy; L. Fay Kristensen; Michael Nojeim, Ohio University; Mary Pring, British Consulate; Dr. Zakaria Al-Qaq, IPRCI; Walid Salem, Panorama Center; Issa Kassissieh, Orient House; Sandro Tucci, UNRWA; and Elisabeth Eklund, Swedish Consulate.

### **Summary:**

*Dr. Salim Tamari* started by stating that, in contrast to other issues where Labor at least made some symbolic gestures, the position of the new Likud government on the subject of refugees is no different than that of its predecessor. Although Labor seemed to favor more eventual control by the PNA of the comings and goings of Palestinians from the territory under its supervision, the main substantive policies of the two parties are the same. This is clearly evident in the continued intransigence of the Israeli delegation to the working group on refugees in the multilateral negotiations. Indeed, the members of the delegation are essentially those originally appointed by Yitzhak Shamir.

Against this background, *Dr. Tamari* said that he would talk primarily about how the issue has developed over the past five years, and the areas in which Palestinian, Arab and international initiatives that positively affect the plight of Palestinian refugees.

*Dr. Tamari* noted that despite the general bleakness of the situation there have been some positive developments. For example, around 50,000 Palestinians, only half of whom are with the security forces, have been repatriated since the Madrid conference

in 1991. Furthermore, Oslo II stipulated that there should be a committee dealing with those who lost their homes and displaced persons. Indeed, Israel's even accepting a working group on refugees was considered a concession for them because it was not part of Israel's overall plan for dealing with economic and regional security issues in an effort to increase normalization between itself and the Arab world. Yet any advantage that is gained by the Palestinians in having this committee is counterbalanced by the fact that Israel has a veto over all the committee's decisions. Nonetheless, the very existence of the committee as well as the negotiations has meant that the issue of refugees has been recognized as a key political issue on the path to solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as opposed to simply a humanitarian issue. Complaints that the committee has achieved few tangible results are not unfounded, yet the fact that the process of resolving this issue is being talked about is extremely important.

Dr. Tamari noted many of the negative aspects of the current situation of the efforts to resolve the complaints of Palestinian refugees. The refugee issue is probably the least solvable of all the issues in that it involves changes in fundamental ideas of Zionism, sovereignty concessions, and people returning to their homes. Due to the contentiousness of these issues, the refugee issue is often diluted and held hostage to the need to compromise on other issues. Other major problems include the differences between the ideals of Palestinian refugees still outside Palestine and the practical considerations of the PNA which is now dealing with the day-to-day problems of administering the lives of many Palestinians in the Palestinian Territories. Thus while groups in the West are virulently accusing the PNA and Chairman Arafat of "selling out" on the principle of the right of return, compensation, etc., the PNA has to deal with the practical problems of its economic capacity to absorb refugees and the give and take of negotiations. Palestinians in the Diaspora are becoming increasingly bitter as the PLC seems to be gaining power at the expense of the PNC.

With regard to the progress of the talks, Dr. Tamari noted that earlier rounds have focused on interim issues. For instance, the Quadripartite Committee formed in the wake of the DoP seemed to stand a good chance of coming to some agreements on the repatriation of a limited number of displaced persons to wherever they were living in the West Bank in 1967. The limited number of these people and the fact that they would not be returning to places inside the green line promised to make agreements feasible: in the end, however, this issue turned out to be even harder to deal with than any other. Dr. Tamari surmised that maybe the reason the negotiations on such a plan were so difficult was precisely because it was feasible. With Likud, things are even more difficult because while Labor, in principle, agreed to the return of displaced persons, Netanyahu says no to the return of both refugees and displaced persons.

According to Dr. Tamari, many critics of the negotiations claimed that the PNA had gained basically nothing in the field of resolving the issues of refugees because the Israelis control all the entrance points to the Palestinian Territories. Some progress had taken place, but this was not reflected in the concrete agreements reached. This is unfortunate because Netanyahu's Likud will use this fact to comply only with the bare minimum of what was reached under official agreements. For instance, while there were agreements to reunite some families, this was not put down as an agreed upon principle, so Israel has been able to stall on this issue.

With regard to a Palestinian position on the conditions necessary to resolve this issue, Dr. Tamari noted that the PNA does not have a position, although there are some areas where reaching a consensus seems likely. Rashid Khalidi has made the most successful effort to frame these conditions in a way that does not simply reiterate idealistic dreams, but rather sets practical guidelines:

- Israel must assume moral accountability for the problem.
- Israel must recognize the right of Palestinians to return, in exchange for Palestinian recognition that this cannot involve a literal return to their original homes but

state and Jordan.

- Palestinians in Lebanon can go to the Galilee, the Palestinian state or stay in Lebanon. Those who go to the Galilee will have Palestinian and Israeli citizenship while those Jews who choose to stay in the Palestinian state can be citizens of Palestine.

Dr. Tamari criticized some of the elements of Khalidi's proposal, saying that the idea of compensation for those who lost property and reparations for those who do not return is regressive, as these are the people who are in the best financial shape. Money for reparations and compensation should go to poorer Palestinians who return and have to start their life over once again. The right of return should not be conditional; there should be no difference in the rights of a refugee, a displaced person or an emigrant to return to Palestine. Dr. Tamari also reiterated the importance of emphasizing that the issue of reparations for Jews who lost property in the 1950s is an Arab-Israeli issue, not a Palestinian-Israeli issue, and the two are therefore not linked. Finally, Dr. Tamari mentioned the importance of Jerusalem as a part of the issue of refugees. There are the latecomers (those who lost residence rights because of absence), those who lost residence rights because they reside in the West Bank, and those who left West Jerusalem. He emphasized that the Palestinians have a substantial claim to West Jerusalem, and that all the talk about only taking East Jerusalem represents an international defeatist attitude which is due to constant subjection to Israeli rhetoric.

### **Discussion:**

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* asked what refugees in the camps had to say about the working committee's efforts.

*Dr. Tamari* responded that it varies. In Lebanon, the dire conditions have caused Palestinians to take matters into their own hands by either emigrating or turning to radical solutions. In Syria, the material conditions are better. However, in both these countries as well as Jordan there is a general feeling that the refugees have been forgotten.

*Issa Kassassieh* asked why there has not been a greater effort to include the members of the refugee communities in the other Arab countries. He asked why the dialogue always addresses the concerns of the Israelis and the international community instead of those of the refugees.

*Dr. Tamari* answered that the weakness of the Palestinian side at present means that its hands are tied. He noted that giving false hope to refugees about an imminent glorious return would do more harm than good, so he and the Palestinian refugee delegation have been trying to be realistic. Secondly, while the Palestinian delegation always raises the issues of these refugees as laid out in UN Resolution 194, the international community disregards these matters and Israel has the power to veto any declarations by the working group that mention the political status of refugees in Arab countries. Dr. Tamari continued that efforts to include members of these communities in the working groups have been thwarted by the governments of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. He noted, however, that despite Arafat's actions, which many have described as a sell-out, he will not really sell out the Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora because of the effect it would have on his legitimacy.

*David Viveash* noted that since Oslo, other issues have taken precedence over the issue of refugees. This is largely due to the fact that the seat of power has moved to Palestine and there is thus a corresponding focus on the practical difficulties of dealing with day-to-day problems. He also mentioned that the lack of an organized body that devotes all its attention to this issue cripples the Palestinian side.

*Dr. Tamari* agreed thoroughly but mentioned that PNC Executive Committee member As'ad Abd Al-Rahman had been assigned to take charge of the refugee file. He also noted that there is an effort underway to involve the NGO community in these issues.



## *Dialogue & Briefings*

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* stated that he had heard news of an agreement to return 100,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to the Galilee, while all other refugees are to be assimilated into the places in which they now reside if they do not want to return to the territories under the control of the PNA.

*Dr. Tamari* responded that there are many reports of different arrangements and that he was not sure about how true or false this particular proposal was. He noted that the key issue in this proposal is Israel's desire to prevent a complete return of refugees. Meanwhile, the most important point for the Palestinians is that they - not Israel - should maintain control over which Palestinians can return.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* pointed out that the idea of many individual claims for reparations is not the best strategy. He used the example of Germany after World War II, when it channeled reparations payments through the state of Israel, as the most efficient way to proceed.

*Dr. Tamari* disagreed, saying that while there were collective reparations that went through the state of Israel, many Jews elsewhere also filed individual claims. Even some Israelis - but not those in official positions - have suggested this as a model for the Palestinians.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* asked about the role of the French in the issue of family reunification.

*Dr. Tamari* said the French have been very forthright on this issue. They have worked to increase the quota of family reunification cases Israel addresses and to improve the rights of women and children. Yet the Israelis have stalled. They have used the issue of the approximately 25,000 Palestinians who have entered the Palestinian Territories illegally and never left. They say that when these people leave, they will start addressing the family reunification issues. *Dr. Tamari* pointed out that this in effect makes hostages of families who cannot be reunited because they are being punished for the actions of people with whom they have absolutely no connection. The French oppose this and have threatened to leave the working committee if Israel persists in its policies.

*Dr. Zakaria Al-Qaq* asked about the realities of the PNA's absorption capacity.

*Dr. Tamari* said this is complicated. Those returnees who return with capital and skills would actually help the economy, while others, namely the poor and unskilled, would be a big burden. If many of the latter entered Palestine, it might hurt the economy so badly that there would be a simultaneous mass exodus, which might result in a net loss. Nonetheless, the PNA cannot allow only upper class Palestinians to return. In the end, there is a self-regulating process whereby people will not be likely to come if they know they will not be able to find work and this will probably determine the number of returnees.

*Walid Salem* noted that the idea that the refugees abroad are all against Arafat is exaggerated. He stated that what is actually happening is that opposition parties use these desperate refugees as tools to air their own grievances and that this is the real problem. He asked if Likud would be willing to accept 50,000 refugees back inside the Green Line and displaced persons back to the West Bank as Labor had seemed willing to do. He also asked about those who had been uprooted after 1967. Finally, he questioned *Dr. Tamari's* earlier statement that many agreements had been reached about principles but that Israel was using technicalities to delay their implementation.

*Dr. Tamari* said that the changes that have occurred to villages since 1967 have not been discussed because as of now the issue of the right to return is not actually on any agenda. With regard to the differences in Labor and Likud, he noted that paradoxically, Likud might be more open to individuals' return because it is more attached to the idea of keeping Eretz Yisrael as an undivided whole. The police state that now

Michael Nojeim asked about the process of the negotiations. He noted that Israel's clever use of protocol seemed to give it an edge.

Dr. Tamari said this was not the case in that most of the negotiations for the multilaterals take place in bilateral meetings, and that the multilaterals are just for hammering out the language of final statements and for nominally including the international community. The Palestinians do not really hope to gain tangible results from the multilaterals, but rather to air their grievances on the issue of refugees in an atmosphere in which the Israelis do not feel free to intimidate their interlocutors (as in the bilateral meetings).

David Viveash agreed and noted that the multilateral meetings have been a good way to keep humanitarian aid coming to the Palestinians, as well as to remind the Israelis that they cannot dictate all the terms of various agreements and then expect the international community to pay the bill.

### **15 August**

*Roundtable with a presentation by Dr. Ibrahim Abu Lughod, Head of the Palestinian Curriculum Development Center, Ramallah*

#### **Topic: Education Strategies and the Future Needs of a Palestinian Curriculum**

**Participants:** PASSIA Staff; Dr. Riad Malki, Panorama/Birzeit University; Kai Boeckmann, German Representative Office; Walid Salem, Panorama, Jerusalem; Giries Khoury, Ex-Chairman, Jordanian Bar Association; L. Fay Kristensen, Writer/Canadian Foreign Affairs; Ahlam Abbasi, Orient House; Dr. Ziad Abdeen, Al-Quds University; Dr. Marwan Darwish, IPCRI, Jerusalem; Hania Bitar, The Jerusalem Times; Maria Luz Jarufe, Teacher, Chile; Zahira Kamal, MOPIC; and Amal Kawar, UNDP.

#### **Summary:**

Dr. Ibrahim Abu Lughod: I am glad to be back here in Jerusalem; it is important to keep struggling for Jerusalem. Our center, together with Birzeit University, will hold a conference on Palestinian education in Jerusalem.

This is the first time we have spoken about a Palestinian curriculum in public. We have almost completed the curriculum and expect to finish in about three weeks time. Palestinian education has been important since the 1920's, but we have never had control over education or over the curriculum. This move of developing a curriculum (since 1994) is a large step. Education was the first authority transferred from the Israelis to the Palestinians. Some 600,000 people including 28,000 teachers were able to get things started within two months of the transfer. Already key changes have occurred and we hope to totally revamp the curriculum.

All states need a good education system in order to address problems and form a national identity. Since the time of the British, we have been working on education. The British used education to build cadres that would serve the Mandate. It had some good elements, but was totally imposed. The education system had a purpose, as it does now. Palestinian educators rebelled against the British system to get one reflecting Arab Palestine and its needs.

Between 1948 and 1967, Jordan and Egypt ruled and introduced their own curricula, much of which is still in use, except for what has been changed by Israel according to its interests. After 1967, the education system was frozen. It did not develop according to the growth in population so that many schools have to work on a two-shift basis: many facilities need to be improved. Oslo had many bad points, but we did get total control over education and the curriculum is a crucial factor for a society.

## Dialogue & Briefings

In 1948, Arab-Israelis were taught a Zionist curriculum. By the 1960s and the emergence of the PLO, a real interest in education developed. The PLO had a department that was responsible for building schools in the Diaspora, i.e. Kuwait and Lebanon, etc. It also provided scholarships to enable students to study in other countries.

In the early 1970s, the PLO had already formed a committee on curricular issues in response to the fact that Palestinian children had no chance to learn about Palestinian culture and history elsewhere. Even in Lebanon and Syria, Palestinians didn't study about Palestinian history but were trained for the interests of local powers.

Knowledge, skills, and values were the things that Palestinians learned about in the UNRWA seminars in the 70's, as the Palestinians started dealing with the curriculum.

UNESCO has long been a key supporter of the Palestinians and the PLO. In 1990, it organized, in cooperation with the PLO, the first seminar on Palestinian elementary curriculum: fifteen Palestinian and ten international experts participated and came up with the following three conclusions:

- (1) UNESCO should address Palestinian curriculum.
- (2) There is a need to establish a center for curriculum development.
- (3) There should be a seminar on secondary education.

Another seminar was held in Jerusalem after Oslo. Arafat agreed with the head of UNESCO that UNESCO would help develop the education sector with Italy's financial support (US\$300,000). A curriculum center was established with a one-year mission to evaluate what is in place now, and on the basis of the evaluation, to recommend and draft a plan for the future.

We have understood since the 1970s that the Egyptian and Jordanian curricula are not appropriate. They clearly needed to be thrown out, but on the deeper level - what are their benefits? You'd think it's the same everywhere, but things are always changing. Test results showed that the Palestinian education system was weak. The *Tawjihi* has always been thought of as a means to get into university, but only about 2% of the people enter university. We have been like this since the time of the British. The *Tawjihi* is still just a game of memory, not skills. Students should be taught vocational skills to enable them to use computers and other new inventions.

An analysis of the context and seminars with teachers revealed that the teachers could not get through the material in books except by encouraging memorization. Comparisons between Palestinian and European systems were made to see which systems work best.

The findings of the group were as follows:

- The existing curriculum is not usable. Even Egypt and Jordan are changing theirs. Everyone realizes that this curriculum limits students' achievements.
- Guidelines: basic knowledge in core fields, and some specifically Palestinian fields, taking into consideration that the curriculum is for a specific people (Palestinians), time (now), and place (West Bank and Gaza Strip).
- A need to take into consideration that Palestinians are the people of Palestine, i.e. their identity, is tied up with the land: they are Arabs and belong as such to the Arab world; yet they are also international people affected by the outside world.

Having arrived at their findings the group came to the following conclusions:

- The need to study Arabic and English (from the 5th grade), to enable students to be functional in English by the end of high school. Students should be able to choose Hebrew or French as a third language. These languages are of key importance for regional and international contacts. We want to give people maximum opportuni-

- The dichotomy of science or humanities is artificial. Certain sciences are not inherently better. We are abandoning this. Now there is an effort to provide basic information and choices. Currently, once you go vocational, you remain so for the rest of your life. The new system will be more flexible.
- There is a need to make people think and solve problems, not simply memorize, be obedient and conform. The aforementioned recommendations will take five years to be implemented. If Palestine is to become modern and unified (overcome tribalism, etc.) we need to revamp the education system. Education is a value and a means to change, as well as to keep people alive.

*Geris Khoury:* Hebrew and French shouldn't be put on the same level. Is today's curriculum totally worthless or is there something to build on? And what is the role of the Council for Higher Education?

*Dr. Abu Lughod:* We don't equalize the Hebrew and French languages morally but both are useful. As for the Council for Higher Education, it is a good institution but it is not really related to elementary and high school education.

*Hania Bitar:* What about methodology?

*Dr. Abu Lughod:* Curriculum is part of methodology.

*Ahlam Abbasi:* We have no research skills nor the love to read.

*Amal Kawar:* And what about Spanish - it is a key language, too, and we have a large Palestinian Spanish-speaking community.

*Zahira Kamal:* How you teach is more important than what you teach. There is some good material but teachers are not taught how to teach. How do we train teachers? You can do better with this curriculum. We must inculcate the value of discovery: research, reading and composition.

*Dr. Abu Lughod:* All teachers have to be re-trained. The Ministry has already applied for a grant for this purpose. You also have to test the new material. At Birzeit, I have discovered that people are unable to research or even write. My battle was to make everyone write a thesis.

*Dr. Ziad Abdeen:* I never felt at a disadvantage as a student, but did as a professor. There are five necessities: availability, affordability, accessibility, ability, and competency in communication, comprehension and conceptualization. Take into consideration that one should be value-driven, not rule-driven. What about the '48 Arabs and the Israeli system?

*Dr. Abu Lughod:* We talked extensively to those in charge of Arab education in Israel. We also met with directors of Jewish education institutions. Now Arabs have more control in the Arab-Israeli curriculum. Israel teaches students to think.

*Dr. Marwan Darwish:* What sort of values do you want to convey? How do you tackle the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

*Dr. Abu Lughod:* Our approach must be to tell the truth. Everything else follows. Who knows the outcome? Interpretations vary of course, but we must honor our commitment to the truth and other values like productivity. The issue of religion is tricky - here again truth is the key value.

*Kai Boeckmann:* What will be offered in the new *Tawjih*? Is it vocational training? What about teaching German? There are many scholarships from Germany, maybe more than from anywhere else, but they require a good command of the language.

## Dialogue & Briefings

*Dr. Abu Lughod:* There will be no more *Tawjihi* but a certificate. Why go to school for 12 years just for one test? You should receive a certificate that evaluates you. We might come up with an aptitude test, but not an achievement test. Sectors will give their own tests. Equal value and weight will be given to vocational training. Everyone will do an interdisciplinary course and can choose electives in other fields as well. Society doesn't change itself but rather is changed by people pushing. Yes, there are problems, but this doesn't mean running away from them. Of course you have to be in step with society, but you must also be prepared to take the lead.

*L. Fay Kristensen:* What about parents?

*Dr. Abu Lughod:* We are looking into PTA's [Parent-Teacher Associations]. This is not my field but there are efforts to include these associations, maybe in a kind of town meeting.

*Dr. Riad Malki:* You said our curriculum is bad, but the new one will come into effect only in 2001. What will we use in the meantime?

*Dr. Abu Lughod:* There is already a new look on the "National Education" course and books. The Ministry of Education is already plugging holes. We are introducing things by phases which have already begun, everything will be properly in place. So far we have been producing ahead of schedule and we hope to continue along this line.

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi:* We always hear about the Palestinians being more educated than other Arabs, but there are also other voices that say this is not true. On another issue, who writes history, especially Palestinian history?

*Dr. Abu Lughod:* Well, the history of the Arabs has not really been written. There is no Palestinian history. This is the job of Palestinian academic institutions. Having one book is not enough. We don't want one interpretation - let us rather get the facts at least. Once students are armed with the basic facts, our teaching of how to think will take over.

**27 August**

YMCA, Jerusalem

*Presentation by Dr. Abdul Hadi to members of the Danish Parliament and Dan Church Aid*

**Topic: The Current Political Situation**

**12 September**

*Roundtable with a presentation by Dr. Asher Susser, Senior Fellow, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University*

**Topic: The Evolution of Jordanianism**

*Participants:* PASSIA Staff; Dr. Sami Musallam, Director General, President's Office, Jericho; Mr. Walid Assali, Lawyer; Mr. Abed Abu Diab, Jerusalem Electricity Co.; Mr. Nabil Al-Jabari; Hashem Khatib, Banker; Dr. Michael Stahl, Swedish Consul General in Jerusalem; Christian Peter Hanelt, Director of Middle East Program, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh; Dr. Anis Al Qaq, Ministry of Planning; Manuel Cacho, Spanish Consul General in Jerusalem; HE Afif Safieh, Palestinian General Delegate in the UK and Palestinian Representative to the Vatican; Ahmad Kamal, Egyptian Consul, Tel Aviv; and Jorge Torres Pereira, Portuguese Consul, Tel Aviv.

**Summary:**

Dr. Asher Susser noted that the presentation is the product of a recent study - a discussion of Jordan-Palestinian relations - and part of a collection of essays produced by the Dayan Center on Arab minorities in the Middle East. The study was based on the following two approaches:



primordial but a modern day creation i.e., a twentieth century phenomenon which has emerged because of modernization.

The paper addressed three different phases:

- (1) Abdallah and Arabism (not Jordanianism).
- (2) King Hussein's period from the first years of his reign to 1967 (*wihdat al-daffatain* and *Arab Hashimiyya*).
- (3) Post-1967 (the maturing of the Jordanian identity).

### **Phase 1: The Early Years**

For Abdallah, Trans-Jordan was a stepping stone to Greater Syria. In 1921, he said that he had had enough of the wilderness: the largest town was Salt with 20,000 people, while Jordan did not have an urban center. He envied his brother Faisal in Iraq, who bore the title of king rather than prince. Abdallah's ambitions were not limited to Trans-Jordan as was implied in the name of his armed forces, the Arab Legion or *Al-Jaysh Al-Arabi*. This phase did not deliberately promote Jordanianism.

The Great Revolt was intended to allow for a Greater Syria, but Abdallah did not have support for this. Therefore, he turned to the point of weakest resistance i.e., Palestine, and was supported by the British and the Jordanian people. Stabilizing Jordan became Abdallah's achievement, albeit not his aim. He annexed the West Bank.

### **Phase 2: Unity of Two Banks**

Assimilation of Palestinians:

- a) The ratio of Palestinian refugees to non-refugees in both banks combined was 2:1.
- b) The name 'West Bank' was a Jordanian invention, which was intended to de-Palestinianize the area and to promote its acceptance as an extension of the East Bank.
- c) The kingdom bore the identity of Hashemite Arabism which contradicted Abdallah's stepping-stone approach to Arabism.

For Hussein, Hashemite Arabism was not expansionist but aimed at maintaining the Hashemite goals. In this phase Jordan was Palestine and Palestine was Jordan. There was neither a place for Palestinian identity, nor an emphasis on Jordanian identity. The text books of the time illustrate an identity which is Arab and not particularly Jordanian. The state opposed the Palestinian identity, as in the reforms of 1950.

### **Phase 3: Watershed of 1967**

- (1) Consequences of 1967:
  - a) Re-emergence of Palestinians not under Jordan's wing.
  - b) A process of Jordanization of the West Bank was lost.
  - c) Eclipse of Pan-Arabism: Abdul Nasser's military defeat was also an ideological disaster which increased the legitimacy of separate state identity.
- (2) After 1967 a new era in Jordan and the region began. A separate history began to emerge for the Jordanian and Palestinian identities, which culminated in a clash, i.e., the civil war in 1970. Jordanians began to fear the Palestinian national movement. The PLO had the idea of taking over Jordan. This corresponded to the Israeli right wing plan that Jordan could be an alternate homeland for the Palestinians. Consequently, the term *Al-Watan Al-Badil* (alternative homeland) emerged.
- (3) Palestinian plans of a national armed struggle on the one hand, and the Israeli right notions that Jordan was a Palestinian alternate homeland on the other, aroused Jordan's fears. Distinct group identities between Palestinians and Jordanians developed. This distinctive divide widened by 1970, after which Jordan took several measures:

## Dialogue & Briefings

- a) Jordanian policies limited movement as migration between 1948 to 1967 flowed from the West Bank to the East Bank.
- b) After the 1970 civil war Jordan did not adopt policies to Jordanize the Palestinians.
- c) Palestinians were expelled from military posts.
- d) Jordanizing (*ardanaḥ*): a new slogan emerges, 'Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine.' This resulted in Jordan severing ties with the West Bank in 1988.
- e) Jordan began to search for a usable past. It merged pre-Islamic with Islamic, Roman (Jerash) with the tombs of the *Sahaba*, all to formulate a particular Jordanian past. This is visibly apparent in the Jordanian postage stamps which illustrate themes of Jordanian identity and the shift from pan-Arabism to specific Jordanianism.

This creation of usable pasts is part of the invention of tradition and of a local memory of a nation state. Jordan projects itself as the spring of civilization rather than a recent creation. The Jordanian national charter of 1991 is relevant in that it downplays the Arab Revolt in a specific paragraph. The legacy of the Arab Revolt is overshadowed by a Jordan which disseminates democracy to the Arab world. Jordan is no longer a stepping-stone to other states but an example for other states to follow. This theme associates Jordan with self-determination rather than a manifestation of colonial border arrangements.

Where do Palestinians fit in the East Bank? Jordanianism was not intended to exclude Palestinians of the East Bank but to include them. The Jordan of today is the inheritor of the Jordan of the past's position, by which it sought to inherit Palestine; hence the slogan that Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan. After March 1972, King Hussein talked of a federation, which reflected the country's realization that it could not return to the *status quo anti* and consolidate the identity of the East Bank.

The dualist policies pursued after the 1970s aimed at reaffirming Jordanian identity in the East Bank, and at imposing restrictions on Palestinian travel to avert an influence on the East Bank.

Jordan affirms its patronage to the East Bank only and says that Palestinians in the East Bank are Jordanians. Consequently, it recognizes Palestinian identity in the West Bank but not in the East Bank. The Rabat resolution of severance in 1988 manifested a theoretical consequence; the Oslo agreements on the other hand had more practical consequences as they led to a Palestinian entity. So Hussein emphasized that there is one people on the soil of the East Bank using the term *al-ansar* (the Jordanians) *wa al-muhajirin* (the Palestinians). Consequently, all East Bankers are Jordanians and anyone who tampers with this is the enemy. The King allowed for vociferous troops and an ultra nationalist right wing to emerge.

Any Palestinian in Jordan who wanted to maintain his identity was obliged to return to Palestine. Hence Allaf's term *muta-ardinin* or those who pretend to be Jordanians. The subsequent tension has been greater than ever since 1970: this tension is the result of built-in functional cleavages between Jordanians and Palestinians which, although not religious or ethnic, have left the Palestinians in the private sectors. At this point, Dr. Susser mentions the tribal aspect of the state of Jordan.

Abdallah achieved a tribal state by conscripting the tribes into the military, and they subsequently became the main fighting force for the regime. A quintessential monarchical lineage formed, which weakened the tribes as autonomous entities. Tribalism has become Jordanianism. The tribes in Jordan sense themselves as one Jordanian tribe against the Palestinian tribe. This perpetuated a "beduocracy": a bureaucracy which brings in its own kin and consequently forms an alliance between this machinery and the state. In contrast, the Palestinians have become integrated in the economy of the state but not in its echelons.

1. *Peace Process*: In 1948 Jordan wanted to preserve its stake in the West Bank but the Palestinians wanted to be separate. Now Jordanians and Palestinians are committed to the peace process which has enhanced the disengagement. More Palestinians in Jordan have declared their loyalty to the King and to Jordan following the liberalization policies, yet many Jordanians are suspicious of the Palestinians' dual loyalty and their economic clout.
2. *Functional cleavage: The army*: Political liberalization gave the Palestinians general status in the state and improved their economic status and the gap between the military and the private sector seems to have grown. Peace with Israel meant the reduction of the army and an increase in trade, which will benefit the Palestinians.

A study by Mustafa Hamarneh's institute [Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, Amman] showed that the riots of 1989 and August 1996 occurred in the bedrock of the Hashemite sector and not the Palestinians'. They were an expression of discontent in the Southern East Bank.

#### *Conclusions:*

The majority of Palestinians in the East Bank want a federation, while there is a majority support in both banks for a confederation. Jordan faces problems of how to reconcile its government's cleavage with its desire for unity between the East and West banks. The government's cleavage is the result of a relative historical shallowness produced by the modernization of the twentieth century and is not primordial like the separations between the Alawis and Sunnis or between the Druze and Maronites.

Historical ties between Jordanians and Palestinians in the East and West Banks are divided into three phases. The relations are east-west oriented, e.g., Nablus and Karak ties, rather than north-south oriented.

Both Palestinians and Jordanians want to preserve their ethnic identities, but they also want a recognition of sorts.

#### **Discussion:**

*Dr. Abdul Hadi*: Thank you for the discussion on the phenomenon of nationalism in Jordan. Would you kindly elaborate on the following points:

- King Abdallah's talks with the Zionist movement and his position on the Arab revolt.
- King Abdallah's plan of 1938 and King Hussein's plan of 1972 (federation thesis), and the monarch's attitudes vis-à-vis the Arab Higher Committee in the 1930s and the PLO in the 1960s.
- How did the King view Oslo and why did the Palestinians play it alone?
- What is the impact of Palestinian-Syrian relations on Jordan?

*Dr. Susser*: Abdallah, after 1924, never felt threatened on the East Bank. He sought some measure of expansion into Palestine when it was not possible to expand into other states. He established common interests with the Zionists, but did not collude with them. One common interest was to defeat the Mufti Haj Amin who was everything that Abdallah was not, i.e., anti-British and widely supported.

Hussein feared the notion of *watan al-badil*. However, the Israeli right never considered how Jordan regarded this as a threat to its sovereignty, and Arik Sharor never thought what such plans would mean in terms of restructuring the Middle East.

Palestinians in 1969 did not think of taking over Jordan to establish an alternate homeland but as a means to liberate Palestine. Jordan has felt more secure since signing its treaty with Israel in 1994 because the treaty implies that Israel does not believe that Jordan is Palestine. Jordan put too much emphasis on the Zionist threat.

## Dialogue & Briefings

As for federation, Jordan realized that it would be very difficult to restructure the West Bank to the pre-1967 order in the light of the Zionist threat. Jordan had to come up with another formula following Black September in 1970. The federation concept was regarded by the Jordanians as a downgrading from inheritor status to senior partner. This meant *qutrayn* and not *dawlatayn* as previously stated in 1965. Jordan could maintain the federation notion and recognize the Palestinians.

This posed a dilemma as the King emphasized *tansiq* (coordination). Oslo was a shock and caused Jordan to be anxious for two reasons:

- (1) The Jordanians felt that there was the possibility that Israel had dramatically changed its attitude of 1948-50, which recognized that Israel and Jordan had a common interest. It was important for Jordan to ensure that it was not threatened by Israel.
- (2) The Jordanians feared that Israel and the Palestinians would make agreements without taking Jordan into account. The Paris agreement, for example, deliberately kept Jordan out. Consequently, Palestinian relations with the King deteriorated.

As for the eclipse of pan-Arabism, Jawad Anani expressed an unapologetic response which emphasized *al-khusousiya al-qutriyya* (state particularism). A historical contrast was evolving.

Abdallah did not like the Mufti any more than the Hashemites liked him. Jordan feared that Palestinian nationalism would lead the East Bank into deterioration. Shuqayri used to say that Jordan was not a legitimate state and that Palestine spread from the Mediterranean to the Syrian-Iraqi desert. The relation between King Hussein and Arafat is now much more a question of tactics, not that Palestinians have excluded Jordan *per se*, and the tension has reduced.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi:* In 1982, according to Uri Avneri, in his book *My Friend the Enemy*, Sharon promised Arafat via Sartawi that '[Israel] would help you get Jordan.'

*Dr. Susser:* I have reservations about taking Avneri's quotes seriously. In 1970 Israel did help Jordan indirectly by holding off Syrian mobilization. Sharon said: "Let the Palestinians take Jordan." But Sharon and his plans were not popular following the war in Lebanon and the assassination of Bashir Jemayyil.

We are now beyond semantics and Likud plans. Oslo cannot be ignored, not even by Netanyahu. Syria would not object to Israeli-Palestinian relations but Israel is not able to shape this relationship. Israel would like to see stability in Jordan. Israel would not support a Palestinian entity to replace Jordan nor would Israel see itself in the peace process without Jordan's partnership. But the bilateral agreements of Oslo caused panic in Jordan. Jordan is not Palestine for domestic reasons, and because the Palestinians would not accept it. Netanyahu recognized that the plan of transforming Jordan into a Palestine is not potentially feasible because of the facts culminating from Oslo.

*Mr. Torres Pereira:* I would like to add the Islamic factor to the equation, particularly since Islamists are on the rise in the South of Jordan.

*Dr. Susser:* The Islamists factor is important but I do not think that they would be able to change the Palestinian and Jordanian association unless they were to take over Jordan and the PNA. It is impossible politically for the Islamists to do this. In Jordan there is a mixed relationship between Jordan and the Islamists. The *modus vivendi* that exists between the two depends on the balance of power, which is in the regime's favor. Neither side wants a clash.

*Mr. Christian Peter Hanelt:* I have several questions:

1. Would relations between the PNA and Jordan be better if personal relationships were put aside?
2. If the King should die, is he likely to lead to the King's death?

4. As for the religious system: are Jordan's attempts to gain more control over Jerusalem political or tactical? Would Hussein have full power in East Jerusalem?

*Dr. Susser:* In response to your first question: I would say that the mistrust of Arafat and Hussein is a fact of life. The two personalities have had difficulties and differences which I believe could be better addressed by people within the PNA structure rather than by Arafat himself.

As for the second question: loyalty is to the King. The Palestinians in Jordan are relatively well equipped to affect the structure, more so than other parties in the East Bank. However, Palestinian loyalty in the East Bank relies on the stability of the state. If this is changed then the power structure will also change, but I do not think this is likely to happen.

The Israelis think that Jordan is a personification of the King, but Jordan is not a one-man show. The King is just a manifestation of the evolution of Jordan's elite and military establishments. They are happy to preserve themselves and to protect themselves from domestic contention.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi:* As opposed to the Saudi case for example?

*Dr. Susser:* Well, the Saudis could not have manipulated the Iraqis. The major factor is the self-interest of the Jordanian political elite, who wish to maintain the structures of the military, the *mukhabarat*, and the bureaucracy. The succession would go from King Hussein to Hassan without the collapse of the 70-year old structure. Jordan is not Saudi Arabia.

Regarding the third question, namely Jordan's fear of the Palestinian economic stature; Jordan has severe domestic problems which manifested in the riots of August 1996. The regime has to find a way to restructure economically and to compensate East Bankers. The fear of Palestinian economic power increased as a result of the peace process. The riots do not mean that the state is cracking, but rather that it has to assume the role of a redistributor of wealth. This has developed a new kind of Jordan-Palestinian problem. Palestinians in Jordan will not rock the boat. The King does not like Likud. If the King feels that the Palestinians are rocking the boat, they will lose their economic advantage in Jordan. I am sure they would not want to see this happen.

As to the last question, the holy sites: the Jordanians do not want to rule East Jerusalem. They see Arab East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, but would like to have control over the holy sites. This, however, carries a built-in disadvantage because the King and/or his *mukhabarat* are not in Jerusalem to implement the Israeli-Jordanian decision on this matter. Can such a decision be implemented by proxy? Is Israel going to establish Jordanian Hashemite sovereignty in Jerusalem by force? Everything Israel and Jordan agreed upon on the matter of controlling the sites remains unimplemented. Israel does not run the Muslim holy places; Jordan's argument that Israel is a threat to the Muslim holy places is an excuse which it uses before the Arab world.

*Dr. Sami Musallam:* Thank you for your presentation. To comment on what you said at the end, is not the Jordanian position merely the Hashemite position on custodianship, sought by the country following the assassination of Abdallah in July 1951 and requested from MacMahon? The documents are there for everyone to read. Peres and Majali talked about this in their discussions with Clinton. The King went to Clinton to emphasize his desire to have a special relationship with Jerusalem by stressing his personal attachment, and the fact that his grandfather was assassinated there. This argument is put forward by the King while the regime is inclined to follow the agreement with the PLO. I think that Jordan's government and regime know that their claim on Jerusalem is weak. It is the personal feelings of the King that uphold this attachment.



## Dialogue & Briefings

If a change of rule occurs and Crown Prince Hassan - who is stern on Palestinians - takes over, will there be a change in Palestinian affairs because of Hassan?

The study lacks the relevance of the PNA and its influence on events. One cannot exclude Palestinian, PLO and PNA factors as well as the popular factor which also has independent influences on Palestinian-Jordanian relations.

*Dr. Susser:* On Jerusalem, I do not disagree with what you said. On the matter of Hassan and the Palestinians, this is a convoluted matter. He has an image of being hostile towards the Palestinians since he was part of Wasfi Tal's group in his early twenties. If Hassan were to succeed King Hussein, he would have no choice but to follow the former's footsteps, but perhaps in a different manner. However, the cleavages in Jordan would not differ.

The PNA is very cautious not to meddle in Jordanian affairs, not because the PNA's priority is to establish a Palestinian state but because it does not wish to exacerbate the dual loyalties of the Palestinians in Jordan. One cannot preserve one's Palestinian identity and have influence in Jordan, otherwise arguments would be made to disenfranchise the Palestinians in Jordan. The PLO and the PNA have very little to gain from meddling in Jordan's internal affairs. The Jordanian-Palestinian relations are complicated enough.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi:* What if the Chairman dies?

*Dr. Susser:* People say that politics evolve around Arafat. The question arises whether his absence would exacerbate Jordanian-Palestinian relations. Irrespective of Palestine's status as an autocracy or an elected entity, a built-in animosity does not exist and so I do not see Arafat's disappearance as a problem. I have a built-in bias about history. The question is whether history shapes a personality or whether a personality shapes history. I think history shapes a personality.

*Mr. Afif Safieh:* You need to optimize and extend your observations. You imply that Jordan is the target of destabilization, and you allude to a return to 1950s relations with Iraq: this issue alone would require another discussion session.

*Dr. Susser:* With reference to Iraq, it was never detached from the Palestinian context. The problem lies in how to preserve Jordan's identity because there is no way to completely break away from the Palestinian identity. The King has an interest in separating Jordan from the Palestinian fate. The Jordanization idea has emerged but without calling for the exclusion of the Palestinians. Abbadi's extreme school of thought attempts to simplify issues as black and white.

A lot has changed since the time when Jordan needed Iraq in a strategic alliance *vis a vis* Israel. Strategically, Jordan now needs Iraq less, if at all. Hussein has less interest in Saddam's regime, which has become more a liability than an asset. The King cannot develop the relations of the 1950s.

*Mr. Afif Safieh:* Israeli scholars and apparently Israel analyze the Palestinian issue in terms of Jordan and Israel. Palestinians are prone to a dual-lung analysis: the West Bank with Jordan, and Gaza with Egypt within a complex regional arena, with each column covering three political centers: Lebanon, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Lebanon, for example, gives a real idea of Palestinian complexities. This factor is relevant in analyzing the Palestinian dimension. Israel is very reductionist when it analyses Palestinians.

*Dr. Susser:* I do not think that Israeli academics have the power to shape the Israeli government's policies. With regard to the presentation, what we see as descriptive you see as prescriptive. The figures and slogans were not created by us, e.g., terms such as *al-ansar wa al-muhajirin*. I am trying to analyze what Palestinians and Jordanians are

**28 October**

*Roundtable with a presentation by Dr. Peter Pawelka, University of Tübingen (FRG)*

**Topic: The Political Economy of Foreign Policies in the Middle East**

**Participants:** PASSIA Staff; Dr. Helga Baumgarten, Lecturer, Birzeit University; Dr. Musa Budeiri, Lecturer, Al-Quds University; Dr. Sami Musallam, Director, President's Office, Jericho; Dr. Michael Stahl, Swedish Consul General in Jerusalem; Dr. Anis Al-Qaq, Ministry of Planning; Diana Safieh, Travel Agent, Jerusalem; Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Chatham House, London; Dr. Mohammed Jadallah, Physician, Jerusalem; Terry Boullata, Program Coordinator, WATC-Ramallah; and Abdel Rahman Abu Arafah, Arab Thought Forum, Jerusalem.

**Presentation:**

It is not my intention to give you a lecture on empirical or actual foreign policy in the Middle East, because this would be like carrying coals to Newcastle. I would just like to present to you some academic ideas on a more complex approach of foreign policy analysis. I feel very honored that you are ready to listen to me despite the pressing problems with which you have to deal on a daily basis.

The analysis of foreign policies in the Middle East is a much neglected field of social science research. This does not mean that little has been written about the foreign policies of individual countries, regional conflicts, or the region in international politics, but this literature has seldom been systematically occupied with the character and the behavior patterns of the foreign policies of weak, dependent and underdeveloped states.

- Most of the literature is descriptive, and does not highlight regularities, abstract connections, or theories.
- Many writers treat the foreign policies of the Third World only as the object or the reflection of the foreign policies of the great powers.
- Another part of the literature is dominated by the neo-realistic school with their preference for power, influence, geopolitical interests and psychological analysis: the foreign policy of statesmen.
- Just seldomly, we meet the decision-making approach or quantitative analysis.

Nobody asks about the special features of the foreign policies of the Third World and their ability to assert themselves in the highly structured international system.

Surprisingly, the yield of the dependency approach for the foreign policy analysis of the Third World was also quite meager. It was recognized, that the political economy must be taken into account; but it was precisely this idea of dependency, that had a paralyzing effect on the analysis of foreign policy. What scope for action should then be investigated? It was only occasionally mentioned, that the developing countries, too, were relatively autonomous in their foreign policies. This general assessment applies equally to the Middle East.

With these problems in mind, we should like to argue for a foreign policy analysis of the Middle East. We begin with a few unusual observations in the Middle East, aspects of the international political economy of this region, which are not found to an equal extent in other parts of the Third World:

- an unusually large transfer of resources from the industrialized countries into the region (North-South),
- frequency and variety of state and social income from outside the national borders,
- a high degree of material integration of the region into the global system,
- extreme conflict-richness of the region, linked with an unusually intensive involvement of the great powers, and

## *Dialogue & Briefings*

- a long historical tradition of financial policy intervention by the great powers in the political systems of the region.

The region of the Middle East has been forcibly integrated in the world economic system since the middle of the 19th century. For the sake of this lecture, we shall assume that there are two periods of integration to be distinguished:

Until World War II, the process of development in the Middle East largely followed the usual pattern in the Third World. Integration into the international system took place on the basis of agricultural raw materials exports to the industrialized countries, and industrial consumer goods imports from those countries to the Middle East. These exchange processes were secured, first of all, by political and military influence and later by colonial rule. Following World War I, this task was taken over by domestic regimes, which were recruited from classes created by capitalism. These neo-colonial regimes were unable to cope with the crises occurring in the 1940s, and fell victim to revolutionary movements.

Following World War II, a new socioeconomic structure crystallized in the Middle East. The economic interests of the industrialized world have since shifted from the export of agricultural raw materials to minerals, and from the import of industrial goods to a broad spectrum of production equipment, high technology and luxury goods. The political economy of the Middle East differed from that of the other regions of the Third World in that it had at its disposal a strategic resource of the industrialized societies: mineral oil, which is currently the major source of energy.

The position of supremacy of the Middle East in the energy market explained the unusual interest of the big powers in this region. Within the region, the socioeconomic dynamics shifted from the old agricultural areas to the periphery of the Middle East.

The change was reflected on the political level in a division of the region, lasting two decades, between the revolutionary agrarian systems and conservative oil-producing states. The socioeconomic conflict ended in the 1970s in the victory of the oil states. But the homogeneity of the region and security policies of the oil states and the great powers led to a share in oil revenues. In the Middle East, a whole hierarchy of states emerged, whose revenues/incomes consisted of rents from raw-materials and various rent equivalents or were highly influenced by them.

This specific type of income, not dependent on capital investment and productive work has produced essential features of the economy, the political structure, the social development and mentality in the Middle East. What we are interested in here, however, is the question of how foreign policy is shaped by the earning of rents.

Rents in the foreign policies of the Middle East can be seen from two viewpoints:

- (1) Foreign policy, in cooperation with trade policy, is the main instrument for obtaining rents and is thus equivalent to tax policy. Foreign policy here becomes the central political field of the elite, because it regulates the acquisition of the material basis of the system. Foreign policy serves to absorb internationally circulating resources by state participants in favor of internal development, clientele formation, self-legitimization and self-privilege.
- (2) Rents, in the foreign policy process, can also be regarded as a means of providing political inputs. External states, international organizations and banks and multinational corporations intervene in political systems in order, with the help of financial benefits or other material resources, to promote the whole political elite, or parts of them, or individual social groups, or to mobilize or pacify them.

Political rents in the foreign policy process always have two sides: they strengthen their recipients, keep them in power and give them a chance to develop. But they also mold

skills and a great deal of imagination in order not to let the revenues dry up.

However, since all rent recipients are subject to fluctuations on the world markets due to international circumstances, no rentier state can afford abstinence in foreign policy. If producer states have to maintain their material basis through continued investment, rentier states are forced to maintain or to increase their market value by foreign policy.

The modern rentier state in the Middle East is the product of the oil price escalation in the 1970s, the "regional oil economy" with its allocation policy and the complex integration of the region into the world economic system.

International rents also played an important role in the political culture of the Middle East during prior periods. Our thesis is that international rents in the political culture of the Middle East are a modern equivalent to pre-capitalist tributes, which the political elite generally handle in a similar manner to their predecessors.

The same state of affairs can be formulated differently: the rentier state attitude of large parts of the political elite in the Middle East is the result of world economic superposition and periodically recurring financial "alimentation" of the political elite from the protagonists of the international system.

The modern history of the Middle East shows that imperialism has paid political rents to the bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire and the traditional *sheikhs* of the tribal societies in Arabia, while it has given a share in agricultural rents to new social groups in the region: large landowners, non-Muslim minorities, and ethnic and religious groups.

In the course of imperialistic penetration, rents kept traditional bureaucracies alive and strengthened them politically; as a consequence, Ottoman bureaucracy did not find any relationship to its own economic base, so that the alienation between the political and economic elite played a crucial role in the erosion of the empire. Rents also helped traditional tribal leaders to achieve an unusual concentration of power. Moreover, they helped the European powers to intervene in the social transformation processes of the Middle East and to establish numerous direct ties to individual confessional, ethnic and social groups.

The goal of the imperial power was to arrange these various forces accordingly to their own interests and to play them off against each other, and in order to do this, political rents and monopolies and economic privileges were granted. To counter this, however, the regional political forces for their part learned to exploit the rivalries of the great powers, to mobilize the lower and middle classes and to bring conflicts to a head through ethnic and religious alliances.

Then, the great powers, too, became the "prisoners" of their oriental ties and the source of fresh political, economic and military benefits, only in order not to lose influence, prestige, diplomatic positions, economic opportunities and strategic positions.

I apologize for not having time to specify this thesis, because I have to concentrate on current policy.

In the 1970s, the oil revolution has put rent policy in the Middle East on a new and very special basis. This new material structure of the Middle East had a lot of consequences. Even in the field of international politics and foreign policy, I can only indicate to some of them:

- The international funding of the whole regional system had eliminated the ideological regulative conflict between Ba'athism and Nasserism on the one side and conservative and traditional positions on the other.

## Dialogue & Briefings

- The highly structured regional international system of states transferred to a more multipolar system of competition.
- The fragmentation of the region weakened the region as a whole with regard to its relations with both regional outsiders and the international system, in general.
- Foreign policy influence was now exercised above all through economic incentives or material pressures and diplomacy, and only in exceptional cases by force.

Foreign policy in this context is not separable from rent seeking and from the acquisition of rents. We shall base ourselves on two different types of internationally revenue earning states, which differ above all by class of rents and the political conditions of rent acquisition: oil rentiers and recipients of political rents. In the foreign policies of the oil countries, we may distinguish three functions relating to the problems of rents:

1. Foreign policy serves, firstly, the acquisition of state revenues. Oil producing countries, first of all, need to control, as much as possible, the international energy market.

This has been a very hard task with some success and many failures. We have much research on oil policies of states, international organizations and corporations: but it was not until very recently that academic studies revealed that the oil policies of the OPEC members are subject to rational calculations of interests, which take account of the behavior of partners in recurring decision situations. This required considerable capability of foreign policy action in view of the heterogeneity of the OPEC members.

2. Foreign policy serves the stabilization and extension of rents.

A central aspect of oil rentiers is the defense and improvement of their rent income through diversification; namely investment in capital participation in industries and banks of the industrialized states or the up- and downstream expansion in the oil business, in which a multiplier effect of rent acquisition is triggered. In their third function, the foreign policies of the oil-exporting countries served to safeguard the flow of revenues. The oil states cannot be interested in oil exports being disturbed by regional political turn-overs and radical regimes. By their political influence and their regional allocation policy, they contributed to attaching the region as a whole more firmly to the industrial states.

Certainly not all oil states followed the rules of foreign policy outlined here (Iraq, Libya, and Iran for instance). Thus, the question arises, whether the fact of being a rentier state determines foreign policy behavior at all. Our answer is that while international rents lead to regularities in foreign policy behavior, intervening variables, such as the character of the regime, the degree of social differentiation or the relation of the quantity of rents and the size of the society, may temporarily interrupt or permanently modify this behavior.

Far more complex and more paradox are the foreign policies of those states in the Middle East, which have no oil (or an insufficient amount), but were drawn into the regional cycles of the 1970s.

Whereas the oil rentiers were, above all, beneficiaries of raw materials rents, which originated under the influence of international markets and world political circumstances, the "semi-rentiers" tried to mobilize financial resources, which served the political safeguarding of raw materials rents within the region. But they also often lived on the "fall-out" from raw material rents, contracts and "jobs" given to them by the oil-rentiers.

The opening of the state-centered economic systems in the early 1970s (*infitah*) has been interpreted in various ways as structural adjustment to the private economic and market oriented rules of the capitalist system.



wide rent flows. The actual goal of the various opening up policies was to maximize cross-border production factors (capital, labor and technology) in favor of state revenues and economic stimuli.

Under the pressure of economic and social problems, the semi-rentiers therefore began to put their foreign policies entirely in the service of rent-raising. Every regime tried to find its own ways and means to put its own political, military or cultural importance into a favorable light for improving revenues, for example as a front-line state against Israel (Jordan), as a mediator in a regional sphere of influence (Syria), or as a peace-maker and regional great-power (Egypt).

Towards the end of the 1970s, all regimes had stabilized politically on the basis of Western credits, financial aid from international organizations, cash injections from the oil states and the participation of the labor force in the development boom of the Gulf.

Yet, access to rents by the semi-rentiers is purchased dearly. In contrast to the oil-rentiers, the semi-rentiers could not rely on one central source of revenue. They had to improve the framework conditions for a number of slim and uncertain rents, not least the unstable political rents.

In addition to this, the governments were not accepted as the only recipients of external help and payments. They now had to make those rents possible, too, which benefited social groups, which were to raise external capital independently with its backing and approval. This had to result in additional political problems: inner-societal competition for the external resources and ultimately conflicts over political participation and power.

Since the mid-1980s, the rent-receipts in the Middle East have been falling, which can be explained by:

- the weakness of the energy market,
- the breakdown of the East-West rivalry,
- the development of new military control mechanisms in the region, and
- the economic pressure from capitalism for structural adjustment.

It was not until the revenue crisis that the capacity of the rentier states came to light. Instead of bowing to the political and economic pressures of the hegemonic power and the international organizations, the semi-rentiers developed considerable capacities and skills as "survivors." The policy of rent-seeking continued.

Whereas they had succeeded in collecting sizable war dividends for loyalty and willingness to cooperate in the Second Gulf war or as a bulwark against fundamentalism, it is not out of the question that the Middle East peace process will harbor undreamed of possibilities of mobilizing international rents.

No less complex or difficult was the resistance of the semi-rentiers to the internal social and international pressure. With rents diminishing, they were forced to use their resources even more "economically" and, at the same time, more efficiently than before and to keep the penetration of the system within limits.

The penetration of some semi-rentiers had gone so far that external protagonists cooperated with political parties and organizations and with parts of the state bureaucracies and restricted more and more the decision-making processes of the cores of the elites. Such interventions had to be carefully controlled in order to pre-empt any deprivation of power.

As a rule, however, the elite cores could also profit. Bureaucratic or party political clients of outside interests were also able to raise funds from their external patrons. If used

skillfully, then, through balancing bureaucratic or political forces, the external financial backers could be brought into situations of competition.

Egypt is a very good example of such a rent acquisition policy between various American, European and Arab interests, intervening into the political system.

My point is not that I regard this as a desirable foreign policy: my intention is to demonstrate a whole spectrum of reaction strategies which weak rentier states can develop in order to assert themselves imaginatively and skillfully, even in apparently hopeless situations.

Foreign policy thus becomes the central political field of the system: the political elite act largely autonomously between the world economic and international system on the one hand and the national society assigned to them on the other. This view from the angle of political economy not only gives extra weight to foreign policy: it opens up to foreign policy analysis for more complex connections and interpretations.

**29 October**

*Visit of students from the School of International Teaching and the Friends' World Program of Long Island University, US*

**Topic: The Situation in Palestine - Three Years After Oslo**

**31 October**

American Colony Hotel

*Presentation by Dr. Abdul Hadi to a group from the "Technion" School*

**Topic: Assessment of the Current Situation: the Peace Process and the PNA**

**5 November**

*Roundtable with a presentation by Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman*

**Topic: The Palestinian Component in Jordanian Politics**

*Participants:* PASSIA Staff; Mr. Walid Assali, Lawyer; HE Afif Safieh, Palestinian General Delegate in the UK and the Vatican; Dr. Musa Budeiri, Lecturer, Al-Quds University; Sahar Barghouti-Gaerber, Research Manager, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Jerusalem; Martin Kobler, Head of the German Representative Office, Jericho; Dr. Riad Malki, Panorama, Jerusalem; Dr. Mohammed Jadallah, Physician, Jerusalem; and Pinhas Inbari, Journalist.

**Summary:**

Dr. Hamarneh began his presentation by saying that there has been mistrust between the Palestinians and the Jordanians since the experience of 1970 and after Jordan's implementation of its Jordanization policies. This mistrust was re-enforced by the outcome of the 1974 Rabat Conference.

The society in Jordan is now divided. While 82% of the private sector is in Palestinian hands, the bureaucracy - and particularly the higher level bureaucracy - is dominated by Jordanians. Statistics show that not one refugee moved up in this sector.

The Palestinians generally do not interfere in politics. For example, they stayed out of the riots of 1989 and 1996. While Jordanian scholars from the left attribute this to Palestinians being from a better class, Dr. Hamarneh explained that they actually fear being disenfranchised by the government. He added that the Palestinians in Jordan feel that any form of expression would bring a very suppressive response.

Dr. Hamarneh said that while the Palestinian Authority or the PLO have shown intentions to tackle this dichotomy of the Palestinians in Jordan, neither has a clear set of possibilities. They want the Palestinians in Jordan to hold Palestinian citizenship and

It was hoped that the Jordanian-Palestinian dichotomy within Jordanian society could be solved as a result of the King's stand in the Gulf War. Jordanian-Palestinian relations improved as the Palestinian outlook towards the King changed for the better. Many Palestinians who fled the Gulf to Jordan felt they had come home. Dr. Hamarneh said that Jordan had missed an historic opportunity to resolve the dichotomy. However, subsequent events did not improve the situation either.

Dr. Hamarneh said that people from the middle of the political spectrum in Jordan, including himself, tried to address the situation of the Palestinians. The Center for Strategic Studies conducted a study and measured a high level of Palestinian integration in Jordanian society. There was, however, inward polarization. The Center's study showed that feelings about the bureaucracy were accurate and that the Jordanians were apprehensive about becoming a minority in Jordan. The study also showed that while 82% of the private sector is owned by Palestinians, this could be misleading since street vendors were also categorized under private enterprise.

Dr. Hamarneh said that business enterprise - such as the Dead Sea example - created a healthy debate which strongly attached the Jordanian state's citizenship and citizenry. He added that people need to move towards policies which Jordanianize. This requires novel approaches to solve issues of minority status in Jordan; this entails settling concepts such as federation and confederation in order to address the fears.

### **Discussion:**

*Participant:* What percentage of the population in Jordan is Palestinian?

*Dr. Hamarneh:* There are no conclusive statistics available, but studies which are representative indicate that the Palestinians make up about 50% of the population. At least 6-7% of the Palestinians in Jordan consider themselves Jordanians.

*Participant:* How do the Jordanians' fears of becoming marginalized fit in with the structural adjustment programs?

*Dr. Hamarneh:* This contradiction will hurt in the future but not now. The move is to hire and promote on the basis of merit in any areas which are open to Palestinians, for example, in the Ministry of Health. Other areas such as security, the army and the foreign service remain accessible only to families with a historic allegiance to the King.

*Participant:* The basic problem in Jordan of having another population is not unique, and Jordan cannot expect the PNA to absorb all the Palestinians in Palestine, Jordan and Syria. Why not a confederation then?

*Dr. Hamarneh:* One in every two Jordanians has real fears. The case of Jordan is unlike that of Syria, where the Palestinians are integrated. With regard to confederation there has to be first a fully-fledged Palestinian state, independent from Israel.

*Participant:* What interest do the Hashemites have in a confederation?

*Dr. Hamarneh:* They wish to create a contradiction between the nationalists and the anti-Hashemites. The Jordanian majority feels the relationship between the Palestinians and the Jordanian communities. Inter-marriage is very high and it is very difficult to dismantle the two communities.

### **14 November**

*Meeting with Mr. Tor Martin Ingebrigtsen, Senior Country Analyst, Policy and Planning, from the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Export Credit in Oslo, Norway*

**Topic: Strategies in the Middle East**

## 2.2 DIPLOMATIC MEETINGS

Unless otherwise stated, the meetings took place at PASSIA.

### 4 January

Orient House, Jerusalem

*Meeting with the RT. Hon. Jeremy Hanley MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London*

**Participants:** *Palestinian delegation:* Mr. Faisal Hussein, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Dr. Riad Malki, Mr. Ghassan Khatib and Dr. Mohammed Jadallah; *British delegation:* Rt. Hon. Jeremy Hanley, Mr. Peter Ford, Mr. Chris Skilton, and Mr. Chris Innes-Hopkins.

### 7 January

*Meeting with Ms. Susan Moir, Deputy Director of the Middle East Division in the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

**Topic: The Assassination of Yahya Ayyash / The Political Environment in the Palestinian Territories**

#### Summary:

Susan Moir inquired what impact the assassination of Yahya Ayyash may have on the upcoming Palestinian elections and the negotiations with Israel. She also asked about the state of affairs regarding the relationship between Arafat and Hamas.

She was briefed that Arafat was caught between the sympathy of the Palestinian people for a martyr of the struggle and the pressure of the Israelis to dissociate himself from the Ayyash case and Hamas in general. It is expected that although the assassination may lead to a lower voter turnout and some candidates may withdraw from the elections, they will go on as scheduled. Hamas, despite its boycott of the elections, is preparing extensively for the municipal elections, which it sees as the real key to governing.

As for Israeli redeployment, it was important not to exaggerate the impact by calling the areas "liberated." The redeployment, however, should be regarded as a positive step by Israel in moving toward autonomy and possibly independence for the Palestinians.

During discussion of the role of academics and intellectuals in the current phase, an observation was made that there is a certain amount of hypocrisy among those who criticize the PNA but at the same time stay remote from the difficulties on the ground and enjoy a comfortable life elsewhere. With regard to the final status talks, it was said that the role of Jordanian-Palestinian cooperation will be crucial and of great influence.

### 7 January

Orient House, Jerusalem

*Meeting with a French delegation led by Mr. Phillippe Seguin, President of the French Parliament*

**Topic: Current Political Situation and Upcoming Palestinian Elections**

**Participants:** Mr. Faisal Hussein; Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, President of Al-Quds University; Dr. Mohammed Jadallah, Physician; Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA; and Mrs. Leila Shahid, PLO Representative in Paris.

#### Summary:

Topics discussed included the preparation and prospects of the Palestinian elections; the assassination of Yahya Ayyash by Israeli intelligence forces; the agreement the PNA

The French delegates expressed their strong support for the Palestinians' desire for freedom and independence, and said that the French role in the EU supported the Palestinian cause. They added that France is willing and interested to offer expertise in any field necessary to build Palestinian civil society.

### **9 January**

*Visit of Professor Dr. Karl-Heinz Hornhues, Member of the Bundestag [German Parliament] and Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Bundestag*

#### **Topic: Current Political Situation in the Palestinian Territories**

**Participants:** Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA; Dr. Riad Malki, Director, Panorama Center, Jerusalem; Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Director, Islamic Cultural and Scientific Society, Jerusalem; Dr. Nazmi Al-Ju'beh, Birzeit University; Mr. Martin Kobler, Head of the German Representative Office, Jericho; and Mr. Large, German Diplomat.

#### **Summary:**

The discussion centered around the recent assassination of Yahya Ayyash and its effect on the general political situation. The Palestinian delegation explained that the productive dialogue between the PNA and Hamas was jeopardized by the event and that Arafat himself had paid his condolences to Ayyash's family as he was considered a Palestinian martyr. Many Palestinians were shocked by the reaction of Leah Rabin, who said she wished her husband had been alive to see the assassination. However, it was noted that this is an example of the deep feelings of suspicion and hatred that still exist among the parties to the conflict. The assassination was also cited as an example of Israel's still not having altered its policy of violent retaliation.

On the upcoming elections *Dr. Abdul Hadi* noted that most candidates express support for the same issues but run without a real platform. The opposition maintains its presence and is preparing for the municipal elections where it expects to have more say. The main purpose of the elections was to legitimize the leadership which the Israelis would then have to recognize. On the topic of Jerusalem *Dr. Abdul Hadi* said the idea that the Israelis will be able to avoid compromising on the issue of Jerusalem, despite their statements to that effect, is a delusion.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* concluded by saying that there are many challenges ahead for the Palestinians, such as transforming the Intifada society into a civil society, to create and implement by-laws governing the people and to maintain the credibility of the elected government bodies. There was a reminder that democracy cannot simply be mandated; it must have an extensive infrastructure to support it. As for the economy, the closure and the high rate of unemployment have to be fought in order to move forward without looking back and build for the future.

*Professor Hornhues* said he had heard that Peres was in a weak position when it comes to security and this is why the Israeli side stresses the aspect of their internal security. He asked to which extent Palestinians would be ready to compromise on outstanding issues such as Jerusalem.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* replied by saying that it was the Palestinians who changed after the DoP and not the Israelis. As for the final status issues, he said that it is the Israeli tactic to separate the various issues but that for the Palestinian side, they are all one package. He reminded the visitor that the international view on Jerusalem was that it is not Israeli, and explained that the Palestinian stance was to share the city; to keep it an open - not "united" - city, with equally shared sovereignty and two municipalities, two flags, etc., for the two peoples who live in it.

*Dr. Riad Malki* said that both sides are changing but neither to the same extent, nor in the same way, nor at the same speed. Leah Rabin's remarks on the assassination of Ayyash showed that the transformation is very slow and there is still much hatred to

## Diplomatic Meetings

overcome. On Jerusalem he added that for decades Jerusalem was not talked about by the Israelis, specifically to pinpoint it as part of the West Bank with no real significance. To have highlighted the issue would have isolated it.

*Sheikh Jamil Hamami* said that the Palestinians have changed a great deal while the Israelis have not, and still possess the same mentality in terms of aggression and revenge; the killing of Ayyash was just the latest proof. He added that the Israelis are fooling themselves if they think they can continue like this and reach a final settlement without changing their attitude or without compromising on Jerusalem. Sheikh Hamami said that Jerusalem has an Arab, an Islamic and an international dimension, and he appealed to the three arenas to remain fully aware of Israel's position towards Jerusalem and its practices in the city.

*Dr. Nazmi Ju'beh* reiterated that Jerusalem's unity is a myth and that the city has been divided into two parts for more than 20 years. He said that Israeli annexation and statements to the effect that Jerusalem is "non-negotiable" are considered null and void, and that although it may be a red line, eventually the Israelis will talk about it. He recalled that they originally refused to talk to the PLO but eventually did. Dr. Ju'beh said that it was as simple as this: if they want peace they have to pay the price, i.e., Jerusalem. He added that the Palestinians have changed, and are not dogmatic anymore but more pragmatic. This is why they accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 383 as a basis for the peace talks. He concluded that Palestinian needs in Jerusalem are manifold, on the national, municipal, political and cultural level. They don't own Jerusalem but recognize its meaning for the Arab-Muslim world and the Christians.

*Professor Hornhues* said that he asked Netanyahu what he would do with regard to the peace process and the Oslo agreements if he won the elections. The response was: "a treaty is a treaty," but that his government would do it "better." Professor Hornhues then inquired about the Palestinian reaction to the report of the EU Observer Delegation.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* said that people should not forget that the elections were the first of this kind of political experience for the Palestinians, and that they were basically conducted in a serious manner although some mistakes were obvious.

*Dr. Ju'beh* added that elections require a democratic infrastructure that does not yet exist in Palestine. He said he was surprised by the report as the EU should have anticipated certain failures. The real challenges are still lying ahead: to build on these elections for the future, in terms of democratization, formation of a party system and manifestation of the notion of political pluralism.

### 11 January

*Visit of an Egyptian Delegation*

**Topic: Current Political Situation in the Palestinian Territories / Middle Eastern Countries' Foreign Policies**

**Participants:** Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA; *Egyptian Delegation:* Dr. Ali Sadek, Deputy Director of the National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES), Egypt; Ambassador 'Amran Al-Shaq'i; Dr. Ismat Abdul Hamid Hassan, NCMES; Dr. Fawzi Hussein Hamad, NCMES; Dr. Sayed Abdul Hamid, NCMES; and Dr. Mukhtar Al-Fayoumi, NCMES

### 17 January

American Colony Hotel

*NDI/Carter Center, Election Observer Delegation* - Briefing by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

**Topic: The Current Situation in the Palestinian Occupied Territories**

### Summary:

The members of the NDI/Carter Center Election Observer Delegation, led by former US President Jimmy Carter, underwent a three-day briefing program in preparation for



**17 January**

*Visit of a Delegation from the German Foreign Ministry*

**Topic: Current Political Situation in the Palestinian Territories and Elections**

**Participants:** Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA; Andreas von Hoessle, Diplomat, German Foreign Office; Dr. Gunter Mulack, Diplomat, Bonn; and Martin Kobler, Head of German Representative Office, Jericho

**18 January**

*Visit of a Delegation of French Diplomats and Election Observers*

**Topic: Current Political Situation in the Palestinian Territories and Elections**

**Participants:** Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA; Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Director, Islamic Cultural and Scientific Society, Jerusalem; Kucheida Hurre, Deputy; Rouviere Andre, Senator; Aidier Nathers, Deputy; Philippe Le Gras, Deputy; Daniel Garrigue, Deputy; Le Dorh, Administrative Secretary; Philippe Richert, Senator; Janine Jahbu, Deputy; Michel Antoine, Counselor, National Assembly; Jean Bardet, Deputy; Monique Papon, Deputy, Loire Atlantique; Marc Laffineur, Deputy Minister; and Yasmin Awartani-Barghout, Translator.

**23 January**

*Visit of a German Bundestag Delegation (Election Observers)*

**Topic: Current Political situation in the Palestinian Territories and Elections**

**Participants:** Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA; Mr. Feldman, MP, Germany; Kai Boeckmann, German Representative Office, Jericho; Martin Kobler, Head of German Representative Office, Jericho; Waltraud Schoppe, MP (Alliance '90/Green Party); Hermann Groehe, MP (CDU/CSU); Dagmar Schmidt, MP (SPD); Dr. Olaf Feldmann, MP (FDP); Jamil Rabah, Researcher, JMCC, Jerusalem; Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Director, Islamic Cultural and Scientific Society, Jerusalem; Suleiman Abu Dayyeh, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung; Terry Boullata, WACT, Ramallah; and HE Afif Safieh, Head of the Palestinian Mission to the UK and to the Vatican.

**Summary:**

The visiting MPs were part of the EU Election Unit and had been to various West Bank cities as observers on election day.

*Jamil Rabah* started by surmising that the elections were the first political elections in Palestinian history and thus an important historic event for the Palestinian people. He said traditional opposition movements will be weakened to the advantage of the mainstream and a new opposition that may emerge within the elected Council. However, he predicted that if there is not much change in the political situation within six months or so, the traditional opposition will gain more strength. He noted that Fatah benefited a great deal in that much of the opposition did not participate. This gave Fatah 75-80% of the seats despite the fact that it has only 40-45% of popular support. In addition, the recent redeployments of the Israeli army gave Fatah a boost. Of the 88 members of the Council, 51 are from Fatah lists throughout the various constituencies. Of these, 33 did not run as Fatah candidates but as independents as they were not placed on the official Fatah list. One elected PLC member is from Fida, another is closely linked to the PFLP, and three or four members can be said to be close to the Islamists although they run as independents. The rest of the Council are independents. Rabah added that the outcome of the Council election as well as for the Presidency was expected and reflected the latest pre-election forecasts.

*Sheikh Jamil Hamami* thanked the visitors for their interest in Palestinian issues and stressed that the Palestine Question is far from being solved. He confirmed that the outcome of the elections was no surprise and that a "one-color council" was expected. He said that the Islamists' pre-judgment of the elections was confirmed, including the interference of the Israelis in Jerusalem. Despite the problems during the elections, there were a great many positive things, an example being that the Palestinians as a

## Diplomatic Meetings

people - regardless of their political background - conducted the elections in a civilized manner and despite the difficult political situation. The example of former Minister Zakaria Al-Agha in Gaza has shown that the people judge: he was meant to be elected but he did not succeed because he failed to deliver as a minister. Sheikh Hamami continued that it is the task of the Palestinians now to concentrate on two things: to continue in their attempts to consolidate their state, and to work on the many important political issues despite the problems with the elections and their results.

Asked about whether minorities who lost the election would respect the decisions of the majority, and what the positions of the Christians would be, *Sheikh Hamami* stated that he did not know of any place in the world where Muslims and Christians get along so harmoniously as in Palestine where no serious problems between the two faiths have ever emerged.

There were several questions about the role of Hamas. *Sheikh Hamami* said that Hamas and other Islamists who boycotted the elections do not feel as if they have missed the train. They doubt that the Council will be able to function properly as a representative for the people, and they will focus on the municipal elections, as many believe that they can serve the people better on a local level and that they command an important amount of popular support among Palestinians. He also said that there had been some discussion among Islamists to found an Islamic Salvation Party, which would also be open for Christians. He stressed that pluralism is accepted and promoted by Palestinians.

As to why Hamas boycotted the elections and now criticized the performance of the PNA and Arafat, *Sheikh Hamami* said he was sure that Hamas would have won some seats had they participated and that their boycott does not mean that they have given up their role as an extra-parliamentary opposition.

*Terry Boullata* noted that while there was a significant amount of attention given to a Christian quota there was insufficient attention to protecting the interests of women. *Boullata* noted that 53% of the population is women and that while their participation and contributions were readily accepted during the Intifada, they are now once again outside of the decision-making process.

### 13 February

*Visit of a German Bundestag Delegation*

#### **Topic: Current Political Situation in the Palestinian Territories**

**Participants:** Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA; Dr. Zakaria Al-Qaq, IPCRI, Jerusalem; Dr. Riad Malki, Head of Panorama; Dr. André Gärber, Head, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Jerusalem; Martin Kobler, Head, German Representative Office, Jericho; Robert Maier, SPD, Germany; Ingrid Matthäus-Maier, MP, German Bundestag; Simon Lunn, North Atlantic Assembly, Germany; Gruubaun von Schenk, MP (SPD); Brigitta Voigt, Journalist, Germany; Karsten Voigt, President, North Atlantic Assembly, Germany; Matthias Mülmenstaedt, German Embassy, Tel Aviv; and Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Director, Islamic Cultural and Scientific Society, Jerusalem.

### 19 February

*Meeting with a Diplomatic Delegation from the UK*

#### **Topic: Palestinian Legislative Council and Palestinian National Council**

**Participants:** Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, PASSIA; Janet Hancock, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), London; David Haines, British Consulate General, Jerusalem; Mary Pring, British Consulate General, Jerusalem; and Sarah Armstrong, FCO, London.

#### **Summary:**

*Janet Hancock*, researching developments in Palestine since the elections for the PLC in 20 January, asked for an interpretation of the elections, including the future role of the PLC and prospects for democracy in Palestine.

establishment of the PNA. In Jerusalem, the city was reoccupied with a massive Israeli military presence, which constituted a clear violation of the arrangements made in the Oslo II agreement. A positive development was the degree of mobilization and participation among female voters. On the West Bank, however, there were mixed feelings, with participation in the elections being clouded by a sense of the occupiers being at the door.

*Janet Hancock* pointed out the symbolic value and significance of the elections in East Jerusalem.

Asked about the likely political formations in the PLC, *Dr. Abdul Hadi* identified four groups:

- (1) "The President's men," identified with the Chairman.
- (2) A progressive, intellectual group forming around individuals such as Haidar Abdul Shafi and Hanan Ashrawi. This group might evolve into a Social Democratic Party.
- (3) The most significant group, which may develop into a leadership role in the PLC and society, consisting of an alliance between the returning PLO old guard and younger activists.
- (4) Finally, those who are waiting to see how the Council develops and what factions emerge before committing themselves.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* added that it is still unclear when the PLC will meet for its first session, and how the Council can convene given the current Israeli closure of the Palestinian Territories. The lack of preparation among the PLC members for their duties and responsibilities is also cause for concern, and something which had been commented on by several members of the diplomatic corps in Jerusalem.

With regard to Jerusalem, he said that the Jerusalem Arab Council will be expanded to include the seven PLC members from the Jerusalem constituency, and heads of various Palestinian institutions in the city. This will expand the membership to around 30, providing a community body as an independent voice for the city.

He then explained that the members of the PLC will automatically become members of the PNC. The latter body has a membership of 680, of whom 186 are representatives of the Palestinian Territories: the 88 newly elected PLC members and the remaining 98, to be appointed by Chairman Arafat. The first to be appointed in this way was a losing candidate for the PLC in the Hebron constituency. The amendment of the Palestinian National Charter requires the assent of two-thirds of the PNC, that is, 454 members.

*David Haines* raised the question of how close this amendment is, reporting the assessment that the majority is secure, and Chairman Arafat is seeking to gain concessions from the Israelis by casting doubt on this.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* expressed the opinion that amending the covenant will certainly be necessary on issues such as detainees, settlements, and refugees. Some Diaspora returnees from among the members of the PNC, however, will see their individual return as sufficient compensation for the amendment. Other PNC members are unwilling to amend the covenant, seeing it as a historical document which has been superseded by events. The option of an entirely new covenant is attractive for these members. Above all, there is a need for the closure on the Palestinian Territories to be lifted before the PNC can convene.

*Janet Hancock* asked whether new elections for the PNC were a possibility and what would happen to its "frozen" members.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* pointed out that there was no time for new elections and that the PNC would convene with the same membership as in 1991, including the "frozen" one

## Diplomatic Meetings

who still count as members. With the recent start of the Israeli election campaign, Shimon Peres is insisting on an amendment of the covenant, rather than simply calling for a new one. Peres has also recently changed his mind about allowing Na'ef Hawatmeh, leader of the DFLP, into Palestine.

### 4 March

*Visit of a Delegation from the International Labor Office (ILO), Geneva, Switzerland*

#### **Topic: Political Situation and the Palestinian Authority**

**Participants:** W. R. Simpson, ILO, Geneva; Catherine Simpson-Comtet, ILO, Geneva; Fred Fluitman, ILO, Geneva; Zahira Kamal, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Ramallah; Dr. Bernard Sabella, Bethlehem University; Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Islamic Cultural and Scientific Society; and Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA.

The meeting was part of the ILO's annual mission to the Palestinian Territories and Israel. The ILO delegation was briefed about the current political situation and the difficult issues facing the PNA.

### 10 March

Orient House, Jerusalem.

*German Delegation from the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP), led by Mr. Wezel*

#### **Topic: Briefing about the Current State of the Peace Process**

### 21 May

*Meeting with Members of the US State Department and Army/Navy Officers (National War College/US Air War College)*

#### **Topic: Palestinian Perspective on the Peace Process**

**Participants:** Carolyn Bargeron; Mark G. Beesley; David H. Cyr; H.S. De Santis; S.T. Gilbert; G.G. Gisolo; Lora Griffith; Rich Holzkecht; T. Muckenthaler; Scott E. Nahrwold; J. Nay; J. Snell; J. Sporn; Donald Yamamoto; and Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA.

### Summary:

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi began the meeting with a short presentation about the Palestinian view of the peace process, looking at the positions of the Likud and Labor parties on major issues as they outlined them for the upcoming Israeli elections.

On the issue of Jerusalem, the Likud's position is that any compromise is unacceptable, and that it will not honor any concessions made by a Labor government. Meanwhile, the Labor party has proposed to separate functional jurisdiction, with the Israelis keeping political sovereignty and security authority while sharing municipal and religious authority with various parties.

On security issues, the Likud insists that Israel retain responsibility for both internal and external security throughout the Palestinian Territories. The Labor party favors conceding internal security to the PNA, while maintaining control over security on international borders and settlements. With regard to the issue of Israeli settlers, Likud has promised to continue expansion of settlement so that the Jewish population will be doubled in Jerusalem by the year 2000. Labor favors the slightly different strategy of consolidating and annexing the settlements near the green line and then allowing settlers deep in the West Bank to retain Israeli citizenship.

On the issue of the Golan Heights, the Likud has stated that it is reluctant to talk about it with the Syrians and is unwilling to give it up. The Labor party, on the other hand, has expressed a willingness to return the Golan to Syria in exchange for a full peace treaty, with international observation forces and early warning systems to ensure Israel's safety.

Both parties favor the normalization of relations with the Arab world. However, the Likud party considers Israel a part of the West and will try to further this concept. Meanwhile, the Labor party under Peres favors trying to make Israel a normal citizen of the Middle East, with the idea that regional economic cooperation will lead to regional security arrangements.

With regard to the Palestinian side in the peace process, most of the important issues have been postponed until the final status negotiations. These include land confiscation, the isolation of Jerusalem, the continued detention of Palestinian prisoners, the furthering of the separation between Gaza and the West Bank, the exclusion of West Bank and Jerusalem leaders from the PNA and the hampering of connections with Egypt and Jordan. This brought many disappointments.

As Palestinians look toward the final status negotiations, they are primarily concerned with the issue of Jerusalem and with assuring for themselves an independent, sovereign Palestinian state. On Jerusalem, their position is that it should be a city of two capitals, meaning two sovereignties, two municipalities, two peoples and two flags. There should be no division of responsibility for the Christian and Muslim religious sites, as both are Palestinian.

### **Discussion:**

*Question:* It seems there are really no economic structures upon which to build in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. How will you rebuild economically?

*Answer:* The Palestinian economy has been utterly destroyed by the Israeli occupation. We need Israel to leave us alone. They still interfere with price controls and other measures. We need to focus on our connections to the Arab world. Those in Gaza have concentrated on the relationship with Egypt, while those in the West Bank have focused on Jordan. We need to stop struggling internally on this matter and cultivate relations with both, as one entity and with one economy.

*Question:* Is the Israeli market crucial to your recovery?

*Answer:* If we can make it without them, we will. This is because there is still a mutual lack of trust. Additionally, with Israel still divided over whether it wants to become a real member of the Middle East, we do not want to tie our economy to that of Israel's.

*Question:* The example of East and West Pakistan shows the difficulties of states with non-contiguous territory. How will Palestine be able to deal with this?

*Answer:* This is a key point. Israel has been trying to increase the autonomy of the Gaza Strip while suppressing autonomy in the West Bank in the hope that Gaza will become an independent unit, while the Israelis will then share the West Bank with the Palestinians. There have to be measures to counteract this trend and to increase the coordination and links between the West Bank and Gaza. There is a need for practical measures that can help close the gap between the two.

*Question:* Would the Palestinians reject the peace process if they were unable to achieve concessions from Israel on Jerusalem?

*Answer:* No Palestinian politician or party could ever survive if they surrendered Jerusalem to total Israeli control. Jerusalem also cannot be divided in the way that Peres wants, according to which it will remain under Israeli sovereignty. We do not accept this. All the different functional areas must be treated simultaneously and there must be a compromise by Israel that respects Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem and recognizes its current status as occupied territory.

*Question:* What about the area in the Golan that you claim as part of Palestine?

## *Diplomatic Meetings*

*Answer:* This area, Al-Himma, is something that we have to work out with the Syrians once the Golan Heights are returned to them.

*Question:* You said that the Palestinian agenda is secular. What are the chances that this will remain so in the face of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in depressed areas throughout the Middle East?

*Answer:* A Christian friend of mine told me he would join Hamas if the Islamic movement could guarantee the return of Jerusalem. The divisions between Christians and Muslims are only those fomented by the Israelis. As for Hamas, there is a political wing with community organization and grass roots support that wants and must be encouraged to join the peace process. There is also the military wing. Unfortunately, the lines of communication between these wings have been cut as the leaders of the military have been imprisoned, exiled or killed. Many of the younger radical members of Hamas are uncontrollable because they have no leaders, and there is thus no way to bring them into a dialogue. This is all the more reason we need a Palestinian state; so that we can build something positive that these young people can feel a part of and channel their energies into.

*Question:* We hear a great deal about land confiscations from the Palestinians but very little from public sources. Is this because the Palestinian leadership wants to take pressure off Peres until after the election? Also, is there some sort of pattern to the confiscations - do the Israelis have some sort of a larger plan?

*Answer:* The Palestinians are nervous that there is a hidden agenda: if the Israelis are for separation, why have they continued confiscating land and building settlements?

*Question:* What about the relationship between the Arabs living in Israel proper and those in the Palestinian territories?

*Answer:* From 1948-67, the Arabs in Israel were portrayed as traitors and collaborators. But after 1967, they were seen as heroes for having kept their identity and struggled against the Israeli authorities. Then, after the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, the Arabs inside Israel became a bridge between the Arabs in the territories and those living elsewhere in the Arab world and other places. They portrayed a message of moderation and helped the Arab cause tremendously. Since the return of Arafat to Gaza, they have been more concerned with gaining equal rights as Israeli citizens. We do not really have much to offer them, but we have tried to keep communications open.

*Question:* How important will the Arab vote be in the coming elections?

*Answer:* Traditionally, Arabs have represented 14-19% of the voting population in Israel. They have, however, always been fragmented and weak. This year is a different story as they have put aside their differences: in this way, they will have an important impact on the coming elections. They may also increase their representation in the Knesset, but they will not be able to make any headway in reducing the power of Likud or Labor.

### **19 June**

Orient House, Jerusalem

*Meeting with a Norwegian Delegation.*

**Topics: Bilateral Cooperation; the Situation in the Middle East; Current Developments in the Peace Process.**

**Participants:** Harold Rosendal, Assistant Director, Norwegian Immigration Department, Ahren Orm, Advisor to the Norwegian Immigration Department; and Inmar Ejberg, Norwegian Department of Justice.



**Summary:**

The visitors noted that their organization's role is changing within the framework of the peace process and with the development of human rights violations in the PNA autonomous areas. They stated that the ICRC has always taken a strong position against Israeli measures, especially in terms of the Geneva Convention. They have continuously condemned the closure and the infringement of Zone A despite the agreements between the Palestinians and Israelis.

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* said that the ICRC has not issued equally strong statements condemning Israeli attacks on Palestinians as it did against the Palestinian suicide bombings. He added that there should be more immediate statements that respond to events. He noted that there was a constant stream of statements from Bosnia and that there ought to be from Palestine as well.

*Darcy Christen* responded that the ICRC has been extremely busy behind the scenes in an effort to develop comprehensive forms of dialogue. These efforts stressed that humanitarian issues must be addressed without always being bound to security issues. He conceded that the ICRC has not completed its mission operationally, but went on to say that a new phase of the ICRC's role will be undertaken and that it will include a stronger presence in Geneva and more balanced statements.

*Michel Muller* interjected that the main goal of the ICRC is to uphold humanitarian laws, to assist victims and to guarantee the organization's access to them. Political maneuvers are not an immediate part of their mission. Thus, while violations are often observed, the ICRC often does not really have the power to affect this in practice.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* suggested that the ICRC could monitor Israeli behavior more closely by officially stationing people or vehicles at checkpoints. This would pass an important symbolic message from the international community to the Israelis. He stated that this presence is more important than the ICRC realizes.

*Darcy Christen* noted that substantial progress was made regarding the passage of ambulances through checkpoints.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* warned that a tense period is imminent, with clashes in the Old City and closures of Al-Aqsa real possibilities. This will lead to a potentially critical human rights situation for which the ICRC must be ready. Israeli behavior over the past 29 years has provided many lessons, and human rights organizations must prepare to address problems as they inevitably arise in the upcoming period.

*Darcy Christen* agreed that there is a great deal of tension that may possibly explode. He added that another extremely serious problem is that of Palestinian detainees under PNA interrogation, especially after the last wave of arrests. Their situation is terrible and it is hard to obtain results from the PNA on this issue. He noted that the ICRC's goals are first and foremost humanitarian and thus the situation of prisoners in PNA detention is of critical importance, but the political situation is very sensitive and has hurt ICRC efforts.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* asked whether the ICRC was in contact with PNA Justice Minister Freih Abu Meddein. *Christen* replied that this makes little difference, especially since some PNA officials are actively against the ICRC which, in their view, is interfering with Palestinian sovereignty. But he noted the helpfulness of Jibril Rajoub, who was willing to discuss controversial matters and to open his files to the ICRC. He reported that his organization has information from numerous families about relatives who have disappeared without there being any information about their whereabouts.



PASSIA Roundtable on Jerusalem with *Professor Everett Mendelsohn* and *Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell* of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.







PASSIA Seminar 1996 "The Foreign Policies of Arab States":  
*Participants and Lecturers*



PASSIA Seminar 1996 "The Foreign Policies of Arab States": Participants  
background, center: Dr. Claire Spencer, HE Faisal Husseini, Dr. Rosemary Hollis







Yael Dayan, Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, and HE Afif Safieh



Guests



Meeting of Regional Arab Research Centers, hosted by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Beirut







The Israeli Team - Workshop 7 (from left to right):  
Dr. Asher Susser, Dr. Yossi Shein, Dr. Gad Barzilai



The Palestinian Team - Workshop 3 (from left to right):  
Dr. Giries Khoury, Dr. Riad Malki, Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi



The Jordanian Team and the External Partners - Workshop 8 (from left to right):  
Dr. Rex Brynen, Dr. Ibrahim Othman, Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Dr. Sabri Rbeihat, Ms. Ailie Saunders







Bertelsmann Foundation, Second Annual Conference on "Europe and the Middle East: Dialogue for Future Oriented Cooperation", Schlosshotel Kronberg.



Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi (right) at the MECC Conference "Muslims and Christians Together for Jerusalem", Beirut.

**3 October**

*Meeting with a Delegation from the Royal College for Defense Studies (RCDS), London*

**Topic: Current Situation in Palestine**

**Participants:** Col. D.R. Wilson, British Army; GP N.J. Day, Royal Air Force; Surg. Capt. C.W. Evans, Royal Navy; Eileen Roach Smith, US Department of Defense; Col. Petr Voznika, Army of the Czech Republic; Col. Jan Broedersen, Royal Netherlands Air Force; Timothy Daniels, Civil Servant, UK Ministry of Defense; Maj Gen. AJG Pollard, RCDS; Col. Guenther Schwarz, German Army; Col. Crichton Wakelin, Defense/Military Attaché, Tel Aviv; Ryutaro Matsumoto, Japan Defense Agency; Sgt. Antony Fyson, Defense Attaché's Office; Lt. Col. D. Mackaness, British Army, RCDS; Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA; Dr. Bernard Sabella, Bethlehem University; Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Director, Islamic Cultural and Scientific Society, Jerusalem; Mary Pring, British Consulate Jerusalem; and Dr. Zakaria Al-Qaq, IPCRI, Jerusalem.

**Summary:**

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* began by saying that there are two main interpretations of why and how things developed to the confrontations of the past week [angry outburst in September]. The Israeli version says that the Palestinian economic conditions of the past two years have been bad which has, together with an elected PLC that functioned below expectations, culminated in the recent outburst. The Palestinian version suggests that Netanyahu's 100 days in office were like the 90 days of siege the PLO faced in Beirut. This, along with provocative Israeli settlement policies, the non-redeployment from Hebron, the Israeli 'playing-games' policy with the PNA, the continuing Judaization of Jerusalem and lastly, the opening of the tunnel in the heart of Jerusalem have unavoidably led to the outbreak of protests.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* said that the past week was comparable to the Six-Day War, or the Intifada which was also a spontaneous reaction of the masses to unbearable occupation policies. After having reached Oslo, the Palestinian leadership finds itself once again at a crossroads and its credibility is in question. Nobody could know what height the outburst would reach but the frustration in the Palestinian street is obvious. The Palestinians realized that Israel is no partner and that even after 29 years they had reached only 50% of the Israeli people who are ready to deal with Palestine: the other 50% is not interested. Likud and Netanyahu say they will not share the West Bank or Jerusalem, and Israel will not leave Hebron. Before going to Cairo, Netanyahu said he would redeploy from Hebron. He did not, and President Mubarak lost face with Israel as a result. During the first days of the confrontations, and while on the European tour, Netanyahu called President Mubarak and King Hussein to encourage them to intervene and calm the situation. They told him to go to Chairman Arafat. The Palestinian leader for his part cannot be seen as unable to deliver.

Three times during the first 100 days of his office, Netanyahu visited Washington. The US has not put pressure on Israel but involves itself in crisis management rather than trying to resolve issues.

Chairman Arafat did not go to Washington alone or weak. He went with the '100-day war' which he had to bear, and with the backing of the Arab world. During Arafat's stopover in Egypt, President Mubarak confirmed his support but said he could not join him in Washington because he could not see Netanyahu after the latter had lied to his face.

Although King Hussein and Netanyahu have developed a good chemistry, the King's presence in Washington was to assure Arafat that no one in the Arab world is interested in taking his seat. He advised Chairman Arafat to press issues by himself and Arafat stood firm. The Arab message was that Netanyahu has to sit and negotiate with Arafat.

The provocative agenda Netanyahu presented in Washington was not to close the tunnel, not to redeploy, and not to compromise on settlements - all under the pretext of

Chairman Arafat knows his platform very well while Netanyahu is swimming, facing a divided Israeli society and army. The current phase is considered a testing period of brains and muscles whereby both sides are under pressure to deliver due to domestic constraints.

Palestinians cannot trust the new Israeli right wing government that has stationed its tanks at the entrances of Palestinian towns. The clashes woke the Israelis up, and they were faced with reality: Washington confirmed this. Netanyahu was forced to recognize that there is no other partner but Chairman Arafat.

After ten days of confrontations the Palestinians - with the backing of Amman, Cairo and Riyadh - expected the tunnel in Jerusalem to be closed and Israeli redeployment. Instead, Chairman Arafat has to control the anger in Gaza with empty hands and nothing to offer. How can one be surprised to see Palestinian police taking off their uniforms to fight alongside the children of the Intifada against the Israeli occupiers?

Under other circumstances we might have seen suicide bombs in addition to the stones, but Hamas is split since its moderate leaders have entered a national dialogue with the PNA. This developed with events such as the assassination of the "engineer." The movement is left with young ill-experienced people, inclined to spontaneous revenge. Hamas is going in two directions:

- (1) One side questions why it should be labeled with suicide attacks. It wants to go back to the rules, not under the Moslem Brotherhood label, but by establishing a movement peculiar to Palestine.
- (2) The other side is made up of inexperienced youths who question why they should change their direction. The struggle for Al-Aqsa is everyone's.

Regarding the role of the Diaspora, there were several attempts to establish a forum involving Diaspora Palestinians in Jordan but it was viewed as an anti-Arafat move. In Washington, a similar forum was established under the guidance of Professor Hisham Sharabi, and we have heard related news from Lebanon.

Palestinian security is another sensitive issue. Chairman Arafat has already established 11 bodies, but there is no system of continuous direct coordination between Israel and Palestine. The Chairman could use the issue of security coordination as a bargaining issue. The Preventative Security is supported by the EU and the US. The function of the National Police is not clear: is it to maintain the US's definition of security?

Another crucial and sensitive issue is Jerusalem, that is still occupied by Israel and where settlement construction continues as before, supported by the US. Palestinians are becoming a minority in the city but they continue to fight for their rights. Some 220,000 Palestinians live in Jerusalem, and more than 200 Palestinian institutions, in addition to the holy sites, including Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the religious bodies have maintained their presence. There have been talks on the issue of Jerusalem: key points included the custodianship of the holy sites, neighborhood councils, schemes such as the London borough system, and sovereignty (divided or shared / 1948 or 1967 borders). Palestinians are ready to negotiate these issues but Netanyahu is closing the files.

*Question:* Was Netanyahu's election one of the direct results of the bombings and Peres's handling of security?

*Answer:* Perhaps, but it began with the assassination of Rabin which reflects the existence of strong tendencies to the right in Israel, and this was before the elections.

*Question:* Netanyahu tried to find an alternative to Arafat. Did he view Jordan as a possible option?

## *Diplomatic Meetings*

*Answer:* The real question is whether Netanyahu will pull out his tanks and redeploy from Hebron. Netanyahu is aware that Jordan is not an option and Arafat - with the backing of Cairo and Amman - will remain steadfast. His influence, however, depends on the support of his people. One cannot deliver another leader easily: Chairman Arafat was elected and is therefore legitimate.

*Question:* What about normalization?

*Answer:* At the present time many Palestinian can neither go to university, nor to hospital, nor even wake up in the morning to go to work. Now is a critical moment; family dynamics are changing and pressure and violence are internalized. We have been living this occupation for 29 years. Now Netanyahu has taken a particular position and the world has to play to his tune. If Chairman Arafat would declare Zones A and B as a liberated and independent state he would have the support of the Arab regimes and Europe.

*Question:* Is it reasonable to declare independence?

*Answer:* We are in a better situation than in 1948 and the world will support us. We must not fall into the trap of the Israelis, we have tried muscles. The new Israeli government wants to suspend permanent status negotiations in order not to allow for a provisional government in the territories. Today, Arafat's legitimacy is there. If he was to bring everybody in, he could implement Oslo unilaterally.

*Question:* How much support would this need from outside?

*Answer:* If Europe supported the Palestinian security apparatus, and if the majority of the people supported Arafat, these, in addition to the economic and political support from Egypt and Jordan, would be significant moves.

*Question:* People do not have the basic necessities of life. Are there other areas of economic support? What are the reserves?

*Answer:* There are currently not enough resources to support an independent state. However, every village seems to be an independent state as it is difficult to travel from one to another. Understandings can be reached with Egypt and Jordan on economic relations. There is also the disparity between the levels of income. Per capita income for an Israeli is US\$15,000 per annum compared with US\$1,000 for Palestinians. This is a real difference and, together with an unemployment rate of at least 50% and the ongoing closure, seriously limits what one can and cannot do. Industrial zones are needed but Israel hampers their establishment. Many Palestinian businessmen here and in the Diaspora are not willing to invest under the current conditions.

The recent explosion of anger was necessary, and it will happen again. We are back to the situation where for many there is nothing to lose. But mind you, it was not Netanyahu who imposed the closure; it was the Labor party. Peres, in a single day, killed 50 persons in Qana. Netanyahu, in three days, killed 68 people. The Palestinian social fabric is fragile: the slogan of the streets has changed from "long live Palestine" to "Allahu Akbar."

*Question:* You are painting a bad picture. What is the reaction of the young?

*Answer:* This is a very important question. There was a lot of hope for a better future but the reality falls short of our expectations. The youth has no perspective which has turned some towards religious radicalism, as the phenomenon of suicide attacks has shown. Why build society if people cannot envisage a better future?

I look at the Israeli mentality as displayed by the Likud as an immature mentality that is unable to accept the stages of peace making. They still think that they can maintain



*Question:* What are the prospects for the future?

*Answer:* The peace process is not only governed by the moods of Netanyahu and Arafat; it is in many ways an international matter. Now, Israel is using the pre-election time in the US. Yet, Palestinians have gone through worse. We are a people with a cause. The worst thing would be if people lost patience in the Middle East region.

*Question:* If we don't see any international intervention, how can the negotiations continue?

*Answer:* Some 50% of the Israeli people bought the idea of peace. But the Israeli government has its own version of peace and disregards the Palestinian version. This is the dilemma we are in. We feel frustrated because we were ready not to look back anymore - no longer telling the stories of land loss - but to the future; otherwise nobody could have borne the negotiating so far. The Israelis, however, are obviously not mature enough to agree with Oslo. Netanyahu delivered nothing but provocations.

*Question:* What about the Syrian role?

*Answer:* Labor had even on the Syrian track at least some approach to Asad; there was an eight-point draft agreement between the Labor and the Syrians. I expect a storm within the Labor party in their coming election will eventually deliver a new leadership.

## **28 October**

*Visit of the Delegation from the German-Israeli Parliamentary Group*

### **Topic: Developments in the Peace Process**

**Participants:** Siegfried Vergin, MP; Christian Schmidt, MP; Waltraud Schoppe, MP; Jochen Feilcke, MP; Martin Kobler, Head, German Representative Office, Jericho; Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA; Abed Abu Diab, Jerusalem Electricity Co.; Dr. Riad Malki, Panorama Center, Jerusalem; and Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Islamic Cultural and Scientific Society, Jerusalem.

### **Summary:**

The meeting focused on the latest developments in relation to the peace process; the PNA and democracy; the Palestinian people's national goals; the outside-inside Palestinian relations; the importance of having an effective European role in the peace process; and the Israeli expansionist actions which contradict the context of peace.

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* placed the Palestinians' goals in the following three groups: an independent sovereign Palestinian state; an economy free from Israeli control and open to Egypt and Jordan; and a civil society with democracy. He stressed the difficulty of changing the image of the enemy while the Israelis continue their expansionist actions and persist in not recognizing the Palestinian basic right to have an independent Palestinian state.

In replying to a question concerning the way in which dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians is conducted, *Dr. Abdul Hadi* mentioned that discussions with Israeli academics are usually handled in harmony and that only very rarely do academics affiliated to right wing parties lead discussions to disaster; and he stressed the need for more dialogue and forums for discussion.

While discussing the effectiveness of the European donations in relation to the practice of democracy by the PNA, *Dr. Riad Al-Malki* attracted attention to the fact that the European states do not link the issue of preserving Palestinian human rights to providing donations to the PNA.

## 2.3 VISITING DIPLOMATS & POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES

Since 1987, PASSIA has been a favored venue for foreign political and diplomatic visitors to gain a Palestinian perspective on current events in the region. In addition, PASSIA is regularly invited to send a representative to meet visitors at other venues, such as Orient House or consulates. PASSIA's visitors in 1996 included:

### **Canada**

David Berger, Ambassador, Tel Aviv; David Viveash, Consul, Tel Aviv; Louis Sinard, First Secretary; Sandra McCardell, Second Secretary; Deidre Kent, Second Secretary; Kirsty Wright, Consultant, Canadian Dialogue Fund; Allan Rock, Minister of Justice, Attorney General of Canada; Susan Moir, Deputy Director, Middle East Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canada.

### **Czech Republic**

Col. Petr Voznika, Army of the Czech Republic (RCDS).

### **Egypt**

Mamdouh Hilmi, Consul General, Tel Aviv; Ahmad Kamal, Consul General; Dr. Ali Sadek, Deputy Director of the National Center for Middle East Studies; Ambassador 'Amran Al-Shaq'i; Dr. Ismat Abdul Hamid Hassan, National Center for Middle East Studies; Dr. Fawzi Hussein Hamad, National Center for Middle East Studies; Dr. Sayed Abdul Hamid, National Center for Middle East Studies; Dr. Mukhtar Al-Fayoumi, National Center for Middle East Studies.

### **European Union**

Thierry Bechet, EU Representative, Jerusalem; Michael Bahr, Matthias Burchardt, Bettina Muscheidt, Fernard Clement, EU Representative Office, Jerusalem.

### **France**

Stanislaw de Laboulaye, Consul General; Christian Jouret, Deputy Consul; Jean-Christophe Peaucelle, Acting French Consul, Jerusalem; Gilles de la Guardia, Commercial Counselor, French Consulate General, Jerusalem; Kucheida Hurre, Deputy; Rouviere Andre, Senator; Aidier Nathers, Deputy; Philippe LeGras, Deputy; Daniel Garrigue, Deputy; Le Dorh, Administrative Secretary; Philippe Richert, Senator; Janine Jahbu, Deputy; Michel Antoine, Counsellor, National Assembly; Jean Bardet, Deputy; Monique Papon, Deputy, Loire Atlantique; Marc Laffineur, Deputy Minister.

### **Germany**

Professor Karl-Heinz Hornhues, Member of the Bundestag [German Parliament] and Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Bundestag; Andreas von Hoessle, Diplomat, Foreign Office; Dr. Gunter Mulack, Diplomat, Bonn; Martin Kobler, Head of German Representative Office, Jericho; Kai Boeckmann, Representative Office, Jericho; Dr. Lore Gutzeit-Poeschel, Senator of Justice, State Government of Berlin; Robert Maier, SPD, Germany; Ingrid Matthäus-Maier, MP, German Bundestag; Simon Lunn, North Atlantic Assembly, Germany; Gruubaun von Schenk, MP (SPD), German Bundestag; Brigitta Voigt, Journalist, Germany; Karsten Voigt, President of the North Atlantic Assembly, Germany; Mrs. Waltraud Schoppe, MP (Alliance '90/Green Party); Mr. Hermann Groehe, MP (CDU/CSU); Mrs. Dagmar Schmidt, MP (SPD); Dr. Olaf Feldmann, MP (FDP); Siegfried Vergin, MP; Christian Schmidt, MP; Jochen Feilcke, MP; Col. Guenther Schwarz, German Army; Mr. Large, Diplomat; Matthias Muelmenstaedt, German Embassy, Tel Aviv.

### **India**

## **Japan**

Ryutaro Matsumoto, Japan Defense Agency (RCDS).

## **Jordan**

Samia Kabariti, Press Attaché, Embassy, Tel Aviv.

## **Netherlands**

Daan Rosenberg Polak, Consul, Tel Aviv; Sven B. Bjerregaard, Head of the Dutch Representative Office, Jericho; Mr. Jan Pronk, Minister for Development Cooperation; Col. H. Jo Vandeweyer, Defense Attaché, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Tel Aviv; Col. Jan Broedersen, Royal Netherlands Air Force (RCDS).

## **Palestine**

Afif Safieh, Head of the PLO Delegation to the UK, and PLO Representative to the Vatican; Ali Kazak, Head of the PLO Delegation to Australia; Leila Shahid, Head of the PLO Delegation to France.

## **Portugal**

Jorge Torres Pereira, Counselor, Portuguese Embassy, Tel Aviv.

## **Spain**

Manuel Cacho, Spanish Consul General, Jerusalem.

## **Sweden**

Karin Roxmann, Swedish Consul General, Jerusalem; Mrs. Lena Hjelm-Wallen, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Nicholas Nordstrom, Swedish Labor Youth.

## **Switzerland**

Ms. Salpi Eskidjian, Director of the Commission of Churches/International Affairs, World Council of Churches, Geneva.

## **UK**

Richard Dalton, British Consul General, Jerusalem; Sir Timothy Garden, KCB MPhil RAE Commandant, Royal College of Defense Studies; Sir John Moberly, Chatham House, London; RT. Hon Jeremy Hanley MP; Janet Hancock, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London; David Haines, Consulate, Jerusalem; Mary Pring, Consulate, Jerusalem; Sarah Armstrong, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London; Col. D.R. Wilson, British Army; GP N.J. Day, Royal Air Force; Surg. Capt. C.W. Evans, Royal Navy; Timothy Daniels, Civil Servant, UK Ministry of Defense; Maj. Gen. AJG Pollard, RCDS; Col. Crichton Wakelin, Defense & Military Attaché, Tel Aviv; Sgt. Antony Fyson, Defense Attaché's Office; Lt. Col. D. Mackaness, British Army, RCDS.

## **US**

Edward Abington, US Consul General, Jerusalem; Lea Perez, Susan Ziadeh, Cultural Officers, Consulate, Jerusalem; Lorraine Kresse, Sue Saarnio, Conny Meyers, Political Officers, Consulate, Jerusalem; Jake Walles, Deputy Principal Officer, Consulate, Jerusalem; Mr. Duncan McInnes, Consul for Public Affairs, USIS, Jerusalem; Anne Casper, Vice Consul for Information and Culture; Kim Delaney, Donna Ives, USAID, Jerusalem; Members of the US State Department and National/US Air War College: Carolyn Bargeron; Mark G. Beesley; David H. Cyr; H.S. De Santis; S.T. Gilbert; G.G. Gisolo; Lora Griffith; Rich Holzknacht; T. Muckenthaler; Scott E. Nahrwold; J. Nay; J. Snell; J. Sporn; Donald Yamamoto; Ambassador Kenton W. Keith, Director, Office of North Africa, Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs, USIA; Eileen Roach Smith, US Department of Defense (RCDS).

## **International Organizations**

W.R. Simpson, ILO, Geneva; Catherine Simpson-Comtet, ILO, Geneva; Fred Fluitman, ILO, Geneva; Darcy Christen, Michel Muller, ICRC, Jerusalem.



# 3.

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## THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM

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### Introduction

PASSIA's activities in connection to the question of Jerusalem have always had special significance and remained a priority in 1996. Being located in East Jerusalem, PASSIA experiences first-hand the effects of the Israeli occupation and closure as well as the impact both have on the activities of Jerusalem's Palestinian institutions. PASSIA strives to disseminate information on the city as part of all its activities. In 1996, PASSIA published two research studies on Jerusalem: *The Struggle for Jerusalem*, by Dr. Sami Musallam, and *The Judaization of Jerusalem*, by Allison Hodgkins (see Chapter 1). It also published a special resource book entitled *Jerusalem - Documents*, containing documents, statements, resolutions, a chronology, bibliography and maps on Jerusalem (see Chapter 1), and held a special seminar titled "*The Late Jerusalemite Scholar Dr. Kamel Al-Assali*" (see below).

PASSIA also participated in international and local conferences, in addition to hosting meetings with guest speakers and collaborating with other institutions to raise awareness of the issue of Jerusalem. The meetings listed below took place at PASSIA unless otherwise stated.

### 3.1 Meetings

The following is a listing with partial summaries of meetings held at PASSIA, and of workshops/conferences on various aspects of the question of Jerusalem in which PASSIA participated:

<p><b>31 January / 7 February</b> Orient House, Jerusalem <i>Palestinian Meeting</i> <b>Topic: Land Confiscation in Jabal Abu Ghneim and Devising a Plan of Action for Facing Settlement and Confiscation Plans</b></p>
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**24 March / 29 March / 31 March 1996**

Birzeit University

Conference organized by Birzeit University

**Topic: Towards a Palestinian Strategy on Jerusalem**

**Summaries:**

**(March 24)** In the context of the current peace process and the upcoming final status negotiations, this conference was designed to coordinate Palestinian policy towards Jerusalem. Aziz Haidar, Jan De Jong, and Anne Latendresse spoke in the first session about *The Israeli View of the Future of Jerusalem*. In the second session, *The American and International View of the Future of Jerusalem*, Naseer 'Aruri and Ibrahim Abu Lughod spoke and directed the discussion.

**(March 29)** The third session, a discussion on *The Arab Position Towards Jerusalem*, was led by Raja Shehadeh while Tawfiq Abu Bakr gave a speech to open the talks. The fourth session was a discussion on *The New Palestinian Political Discourse*. Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi of PASSIA gave a presentation and the session was then chaired by Dr. Salim Tamari.

**(March 31)** The fifth session, a discussion on *The Palestinian Negotiating Situation and Vision for the Future*, was chaired by Ibrahim Al-Diqaq. Ahmad Al-Qrei' and Hassan Asfour both addressed the group on this topic. The sixth session was a general discussion on the thinking of Chairman Arafat on strategy towards Jerusalem, and it was chaired by Mahmoud Abbas.

**25 June**

*Meeting with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), Cambridge, MA*

**Topic: A Project on Jerusalem**

Participants: Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, AAAS; Professor Everett Mendelsohn, AAAS; Dr. Bernard Sabella, Bethlehem University; Allison Hodgkins, School for International Training; Terry Boullata, WATC, Ramallah; Dr. Zakaria Al-Qaq, Director, IPCRI, Jerusalem; Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Director, Islamic College, Jerusalem; Dr. Riad Malki, Panorama Center, Jerusalem; Dr. Anis Al-Qaq, Deputy Minister, Planning and International Cooperation; Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, PASSIA.

**Summary:**

The American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS) introduced a project on Jerusalem in which Palestinians and Israelis came together to try to find common ground, in mutually acceptable terms, concerning the extremely difficult issue of Jerusalem. Their effort resulted in a precise detailing of some of these commonalties.

*Professor Everett Mendelsohn* gave a presentation outlining some current ideas about the question of Jerusalem. He noted that a look at Jerusalem's history throughout the 20th Century reveals that its borders have changed more than 30 times. He pointed out that Jerusalem's history has also been replete with different forms of government - under different regimes, with virtual sovereignty or autonomy. Thus, historically there is some sort of precedent for negotiating and adjusting administrative and sovereignty matters in Jerusalem.

*Professor Mendelsohn* noted that Israelis and Palestinians tend to focus on two major periods in Jerusalem's history. The period from 1948-67 is decried by Israeli Jews because of Jordanian policies in the city. Meanwhile the period since 1967 is decried by Palestinians because of the Israeli occupation. However, there are different camps

## *The Question of Jerusalem*

within the two sides - nationalist, religious, and economic - that have different ideas about what must be achieved for their side in the final status negotiations on Jerusalem. Professor Mendelsohn asserted that it is within the complex labyrinth of overlapping and interconnected relationships between issues that areas of agreement and cooperation are to be found.

*Professor Mendelsohn* then went on to deliver a list of basic premises relating to the negotiations over the final status of Jerusalem that a group of four Palestinians, four Israelis and three Americans compiled in a project under the auspices of the AAAS:

- Jerusalem should remain an open city, physically undivided.
- There should be an allowance for the expression of the national aspirations of both sides.
- Security should be mutual and indivisible - security for one at the expense of the other is not real security.
- Free access to all religious sites.
- Free political expression for both sides.
- There should be overall equality as opposed to equality in every field - concessions in one area should be compensated in other areas.
- The adoption of a borough system, whereby there can be smaller functional, administrative bodies that do not mean the city is divided: that is, the possibility of two municipalities.
- Political arrangements should be fair.
- Implementing agreements all at once is impossible and they will have to be implemented in phases.
- The agreement on Jerusalem must be seen in the light of the overall agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi* commented that one of the most important issues is that the different components of the question of Jerusalem (i.e., national, political, religious, civilian, historical, cultural, demographic, and economic, etc.) are all in one basket and cannot be separated or divided. He also said that any agreement that did not use the 1947 boundaries of Jerusalem was a nonstarter, in that recognizing Israeli confiscations and policies to Israelize the city is unacceptable. Furthermore, he emphasized that the premises of the AAAS did not mention Israeli settlements, and an agreement is impossible without resolving this issue.

*Dr. Anis Al-Qaq* commented that the basic presentation was acceptable but commented that Netanyahu's government has rendered the issues Professor Mendelsohn raised a theoretical exercise. There are more immediate, tangible problems that Palestinians in Jerusalem face. He asserted that economically, religiously, and geographically Jerusalem is the heart of Palestine and there can be no final solution which fails to adequately address the issue of the Holy City. He stated that it was occupied in 1967 and UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 should be applied to it. He added that it is important to study and implement functional divisions in the city.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* interjected that rectifying the damage suffered by Palestinian society in order to bring the two sides to equal terms was also essential.

*Terry Boullata* added that even more important is the need to freeze the current Israeli effort and establish more "facts" in Jerusalem.

*Sheikh Hamami* wondered how relevant the premises are with the current Netanyahu government, which sees the world in a narrow-minded way which does not account for changes in the international system. He noted that peace and stability in the region depend on resolving this issue, and failure to do so could lead to the violence of past decades. He further commented that the Arabs' current position of weakness is only



... he knows the Palestinians are weak and is aware that the Arab states are fundamentally rivals of the Palestinians, and that they can be counted on to abandon the Palestinians any time they see an opportunity for their own state to gain some advantage. Finally, he expressed his concern over the Palestinians' use of the phrase "Al-Quds Al-Sharif" in that it implies only the area of the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque, which jeopardizes the Palestinian national rights in Jerusalem.

*Dr. Bernard Sabella* iterated that the premises mentioned by Professor Mendelsohn were merely academic, given the current political situation and that hoping for some benefit from Arab unity is futile. He worried that Netanyahu might try to distract the Palestinian people by improving their quality of life with an easing of the closure. The dire situation of many Palestinians means there is a possibility that this might actually work. He also noted that Palestinians often diminish the importance of their bargaining chips: one third of the population in Jerusalem, international agreements, and the religious dimension. These are the tools they should use in their struggle for Jerusalem.

*Allison Hodgkins* reminded the group that all the pessimistic talk about the Likud seems to insinuate that the Labor party's fundamental plan was different, despite the fact that Labor's last four years in power brought 50,000 new Jewish settlers to Greater Jerusalem. She pointed out that concerted action on the issue of settlements and Israeli "facts" must be taken.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi* agreed and added that the Palestinians face three basic options: to confront Israeli policies and practices in Jerusalem, to leave Jerusalem, or to become Israelized. Since the last two are unacceptable, it is necessary to stand up to the new government. He emphasized that he was not talking about violence, but maintaining and strengthening the Palestinian presence in the city as an inseparable part of the West Bank, and using the courts, media, international and regional arenas and all other means at their disposal.

*Professor Mendelsohn* thanked everyone for their useful comments. He agreed on the need to stop Israeli settlements. He added, however, that the Israelis should not be demonized, because there are vibrant elements on the Israeli side with whom the Palestinians can work. Finally, he stressed that criticism is insufficient: the Palestinian side must come up with positive ideas and possible courses of action.

Some of the participants suggested that the AAAS project on Jerusalem should be extended in order to study carefully the new chapter of Palestinian-Israeli relations following the election of a right wing government in Israel, and that it is too early to publish its findings and determinations.

**10 August**

Office of Bishop Samir Kafity, St. George's Cathedral, Jerusalem

*Discourse on Religion*

**Topic: Focus on Faith**

**Summary:**

The discussion focused on the implications of the election of a new Israeli government on the Muslim and Christian communities here, and on the impact the current debate between religious and secular Jews over the Jewish character of the state of Israel has on non-Jews. The discussion was broadcast 15 August on the BBC World Services' (London) weekly religious current affairs program *Focus on Faith*.

**9 November**

*Meeting with Dr. Lore Maria Peschel-Gutzeit, German State Minister of Justice, Federal State of Berlin*

**Topic: The Question of Jerusalem**

**Participants:** Dr. Musa Budeiri, Lecturer, Al-Quds University; Mahmoud Abu Eid, Project Coordinator, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Jerusalem; Dr. Andr  G rber, Director, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Jerusalem; Hanna Siniora, Publisher, The Jerusalem Times; Walid Assali, Lawyer; Camille Mansour, Birzeit Law Center; Dr. Mar'ei Abdel Rahman, PLO; Andrea Peschel, Student.

**Summary:**

*Dr. Lore Peschel-Gutzeit* said that she was here in 1974, 1977 and 1979 and was very interested in hearing about the changes that have occurred in addition to the participants' point of view on Jerusalem as an occupied and polarized city that is full of symbols.

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi:* Since Oslo, the Palestinians have wanted Jerusalem to be on the negotiations agenda. Assisted by the technical committees the Palestinians concluded that there were three major concerns:

- One group said that the issue of Jerusalem was too big for the Palestinians to deal with alone and suggested enlisting the help of the Arab-Moslem world.
- The second group said people should be given the right to try and work to protect their rights in the city.
- Some Palestinians felt that by establishing a dialogue with the Israelis they could be seen as selling out on the issue of Jerusalem.

The clear points were that Jerusalem has to be our capital, that we need to revive our institutions, and the religious aspect that Palestinians, both Moslems and Christians, need to deal with Jewish views.

The task of the technical committees or Arab council was to represent the Palestinian civil society in Jerusalem and to try to maintain links with the West Bank, but is it possible to open the file on Jerusalem while the other side is not flexible regarding concessions? As for the question of sovereignty, we [the Palestinians] talk about shared sovereignty, meaning two municipalities and not of being only a part of the Israeli municipality.

The Palestinians of Jerusalem face many problems. The Israeli closure and policies aim at encircling Jerusalem geographically while cutting it off from the West Bank hinterland. At the same time, Israel imposes numerous restrictions, regulations and high taxation, and attempts to jeopardize business in the city, which forces people to move to the West Bank.

Movement restrictions prevent West Bank and Gazan Palestinians from coming to Jerusalem with the long-term aim of making them grow accustomed to living without the city in their minds and daily activities.

Today's political and economic address is Gaza or Ramallah but not Jerusalem as it used to be before the closure. The Orient House is totally crippled; national unity and mobilization is no longer possible as there is not a single place that is accessible to every Palestinian.

There were many meetings about Jerusalem and the problem of how to solve the Jerusalem question; many believe that the so-called Abu Mazen-Beilin document was the outcome. There is also a lot of interfaith dialogue going on.

The frustrating thing today is that three years after Oslo, we realize that we have at best half a partner in peace but not a full, committed Israeli partner. The Israelis do not want separation but to share the West Bank: they do not want to leave but to stay.

here because Israel ignores the fact that Jerusalem is an integral part of the Oslo agreement to which both sides must be committed.

*Walid Assali:* The Palestinian elections in Jerusalem had nothing to do with sovereignty as people could vote only in certain places, e.g., post offices. Moreover, mail boxes were used (the slit to the side) rather than ballot-boxes (with the slit at the top). This is one school of thought; another school of thought says that the elections were a form of Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem. The casting of votes at the post office was under the supervision and direction of Israeli police, which constituted a direct attempt to interpret the agreement in a manner suiting the Israeli viewpoint. The main problem is not the negotiations but Israeli practices in Jerusalem. The non-interference of the world community, especially regarding Israeli violations of the spirit of the text of the Oslo accords, is at the expense of the Palestinians. The Israelis can alter the *status quo* however they want with no regard to what they have signed.

*Hanna Siniora:* Negotiations on the issue of Jerusalem should have started in May 1996. An international legal position with reference to the 1948 UN Partition Plan should be taken and the same standards should be applied to claims in West Jerusalem as to those in East Jerusalem. In 1947, none of today's settlements existed. Also relevant to the Palestinian claims are the Palestinian villages that were destroyed in and around Jerusalem. Today, Palestinian development is severely hampered by restrictive Israeli permit systems and zoning measures.

*Camille Mansour:* There is an agreement but Israel is imposing its own mechanism, which we refuse to accept. It was this mechanism that prevented us from voting.

*Dr. Peschel-Gutzeit:* What has been decided about Jerusalem? Isn't Jerusalem part of the final status negotiations?

*Camille Mansour:* In the DoP it was agreed to postpone the question of Jerusalem and to deal with it in the final status negotiations. It does not say that Jerusalem is outside the West Bank. The problems have merely been postponed. Jerusalem is an extremely complex issue and the negotiators needed time to prepare the public gradually. The Palestinians agreed to the postponement in good faith as they believed it would lead to a freeze on settlements. Could you say something about Jerusalem's legal status?

*Dr. Peschel-Gutzeit:* There is an international basis for the Jerusalem question. Berlin was also a very complicated issue, and there are many similarities: there was no possibility to move freely, the Germans accepted, somehow, the *status quo* and did their utmost to ensure that the Russians would not make it a capital. Would Israel accept two capitals?

I see only one solution for Jerusalem in the long run, which includes free access to the holy sites, the elimination of all forms of discrimination, and the development of a plan for free entry of all Palestinians to Jerusalem. As for Germany, we have not recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital; the German position is that it is either a capital for both peoples or not a capital at all. I personally am not in the position to offer solutions, am here to listen to your views.

*Camille Mansour:* All we are asking is that other countries be consistent with their stand and international positions. You mention the balance of power but it is not a matter of the balance of power. A position should be an official position. We are not asking the Germans to send troops but Germany has economic agreements with Israel so why not use these venues? It is only a matter of consistency.

*Dr. Peschel-Gutzeit:* I am not in a position to criticize; how do you think we should move out of the impasse?

## *The Question of Jerusalem*

*Hanna Siniora:* We have a Palestinian university in Jerusalem: we could for example, have a twin university in Germany. That would also be some kind of a message.

*Dr. Peschel-Gutzeit:* Again, I am not Germany's minister of justice - I am only a state minister in Berlin. Apart from this, the issue you just mentioned would be dealt with by the minister of science. I am here as an individual. Germany is in a weak position: the Palestinians do not know us and there are special German problems. I have been asked these questions many times. The Palestinians still underestimate the constraints related to Germany's guilt complex. We try to change, but we also face other problems such as the unification.

*Dr. Abdul Hadi:* We would expect a balanced approach; we would like to see more pressure in your house. We see half a million Germans coming to Israel but not to Palestine. Germans are afraid of Israeli interpretations.

*Dr. Abdel Rahman:* We see the German position as weak and not up to the strength of the country itself. How long will the Holocaust be something we pay for? The French have declared support and are able to influence Middle Eastern development and to challenge Israel. There is also a European role with relevance to Germany. The Palestinians need economic assistance. Israel has an extremist government. For the first time, Israel has nuclear power and is led by a fundamentalist government.

### **18 October**

Palestinian National Theater "Al-Hakawati", Jerusalem

*Meeting organized by the Lobby for Palestinian Women's Rights in Jerusalem*

**Topic: Palestinian Residency Rights in Jerusalem**

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## 3.2 Special Seminar on the Late

Jerusalemite Scholar Dr. Kamel Al-Assali

### Introduction

The Palestinian scholar Dr. Kamel Al-Assali, who was born in Jerusalem in 1925, played a leading role in introducing Western literature and scholarship to Palestinian society. In recognition of the importance of his work and his contribution to the development of the Palestinian library through analysis, studies, translation and documentation, PASSIA held a seminar reviewing his work and assessing his achievements. PASSIA coordinated with leading academics from various Palestinian and regional universities and institutions to organize the seminar, which aimed at providing a comprehensive reading of Al-Assali's writings and studies on Palestinian history, heritage and culture, in particular with relation to the question of Jerusalem.

Several researchers and scholars were invited to either submit working papers, dealing with a specific topic, or to review such papers and to write a discussion paper accordingly:

1. *The Demography of Jerusalem at the End of the 11th Century, with Reference to the Contemporary status quo*

3. **Analytical Study of the Historical Resources in the Work of Dr. Kamel Al-Assali**  
 Presenter: Dr. Hassan Silwadi, Al-Quds University  
 Discussant: Dr. Mahmoud Attallah, An-Najah University
4. **The Current Demographic status quo in Jerusalem**  
 Presenter: Dr. Bernard Sabella, Bethlehem University  
 Discussant: All participants
5. **Dr. Kamel Al-Assali as Librarian, 1968-82**  
 Presenter: Mr. Yussef Qandil, Shuman Foundation Library, Amman  
 Discussant: Mrs. Afaf Harb, Birzeit University Library
6. **Documents and Records of the Jerusalem Shari'a Court in the Work of Kamel Al-Assali**  
 Presenter: Mr. Fahmi Al-Ansari, Al-Ansari Library, Jerusalem  
 Discussant: Mr. Khader Salameh, Al-Aqsa Mosque Library, Jerusalem
7. **The Life and Work of Dr. Kamel Al-Assali**  
 Presenter: Mr. Walid Al-Assali, Advocate, Jerusalem  
 Discussant: All participants
8. **The Heritage of Beit Al-Maqdis in the Writings of Dr. Kamel Al-Assali**  
 Presenter: Dr. Mohammed Al-Hizmani, Hebron University  
 Discussant: Dr. Abdel Qader Jabarin, Hebron University
9. **Ornamentation on Ummayyad Buildings in Jerusalem**  
 Presenter: Dr. Marwan Abu Khalaf, Al-Quds University  
 Discussant: Dr. Adnan Musallam, Bethlehem University
10. **The Political Face of Jerusalem in the Early Decades of Islam**  
 Presenter: Dr. Khalil Athammeh, Birzeit University  
 Discussant: Sheikh Jamil Hamami
11. **Introduction to the Book "Palästina im Umbruch" by the Late Alexander Schölch**  
 Presenter: Dr. Nizam Abbasi, An-Najah University  
 Discussant: All participants
12. **Jerusalem and a Political Solution**  
 Presenter: Dr. Ahmad Sa'id Nufal, Yarmouk University, Jordan  
 Discussant: Dr. Manuel Hassassian, Bethlehem University

## Publication

The studies and research papers of the symposium on the life of the Jerusalemite scholar Dr. Kamel Al-Assali and his works were published by PASSIA. The book is divided into 12 chapters and an introduction by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi of PASSIA.

**The Jerusalemite Scholar Dr. Kamel Al-Assali and the Question of Jerusalem with contributions by many authors**  
 (PASSIA Seminar, June 1996, Arabic, Pp. 475)

NB: For other publications on Jerusalem released by PASSIA during 1996 see *Chapter 1: Research Studies*.



# 4.

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## TRAINING & EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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### Introduction

With its *Education and Training in International Affairs* program - initiated in 1992 - PASSIA has pioneered educational seminars for Palestinian graduates. This program provides a much needed focus inside Palestine for training Palestinian graduates and mid-career professionals in the field of international affairs, with lectures and workshops held by Palestinian and foreign specialists of the highest level.

PASSIA's seminars aim at enabling the Palestinian participants to deepen their knowledge and expertise in specific areas of international affairs. Subjects dealt with thus far include *Strategic Studies and Security*, *The European Union*, and *Diplomacy and Protocol*. As well as the purely academic value of such programs, PASSIA aims to assist in the establishment of a cadre of Palestinians with training in these areas which will be of increasing importance as Palestine moves more and more into the international arena.

In 1996, the PASSIA Academic Committee decided to add the topic of *The Foreign Policies of Arab States* to its series of seminars. The seminar aimed at providing Palestinian graduates with the ability to understand and analyze the process of foreign policy formulation in general and to examine the actual policy positions of leading Arab states with roles to play in the Middle East peace process.

### Seminar Program

#### 1. Preparation

PASSIA consulted with Palestinian and European scholars in order to plan and implement the seminar. Consultation began in June and PASSIA advertised the proposed seminar in the local press, *Al-Quds*, *An-Nahar* and *Al-Ayyam*, during the months of August and September 1996. Notification was also given to national institutions such as universities, research centers, and PNA institutions. No course fees or travel, accommodation, food or other expenses were required from participants. The seminar was kindly supported by the Ford Foundation, Cairo.

#### 2. Participant Selection Procedure

PASSIA formed a committee specifically for the preparatory stage of the seminar. Its members were: Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Dr. Rosemary Hollis and Mrs. Deniz Altayli.



### **3. Reading Period**

The lecturers provided lists of reference materials covering the topics addressed in their respective lectures. Required reading material was photocopied and distributed to the participants in November in order that they could familiarize themselves with the concepts of the seminar beforehand. Each participant received a reading package including assorted articles and essays amounting to approximately 300 pages.

During the seminar, the lecturers distributed further reading material on their subjects and additional material recommended by the lecturers was available for the participants at the PASSIA library. The reading period included the preparation of a country-position paper, whereby each of the 15 participants was assigned one Arab state about which to collect the required information. PASSIA Researcher Awad Mansour was at the participants' disposal for whatever help they needed regarding their research work and was available throughout the seminar to answer any further questions.

### **4. Lecture Program**

From 9-20 December 1996 a series of lectures, workshops and other educational exercises was given by Palestinian scholars and foreign experts. In addition, European and US diplomats gave presentations on certain topics. There were also two sessions in which the participants themselves presented their research findings on country-related issues which they had prepared as part of the one-month preparatory reading period.

### **5. Social Activities**

During the two-week seminar beverages and luncheon for all participants and lecturers were provided by PASSIA. At one time during the seminar, PASSIA hosted an evening reception for all involved, as well as for representatives of Palestinian institutions, the diplomatic corps in Jerusalem/Jericho and friends of PASSIA. As part of the 1996 reception, PASSIA invited HE Afif Safieh, PLO Representative to the UK and to the Vatican, and Yael Dayan, Member of Knesset, for a Palestinian-Israeli encounter on *Prospects for Peace in the Middle East*. The event took place on 17 December 1996, at the Ambassador Hotel in Jerusalem, prior to the reception, and was attended by some 120 guests.

### **6. Writing Assignments**

Participants were required to write two essays; the first one, a position paper in English on one of the selected Arab states, had to be submitted at the beginning of the actual seminar. It was to cover basic data on the respective country or information on the country's foreign policy and its position vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. The participants presented these country-related topics during the seminar.

The second essay, in English or Arabic, on topics studied during the seminar was required for submission by the end of January 1997. Seminar lecturers compiled a list of suggested titles for these essays and participants selected one each for analysis.

Participants who performed all required tasks were handed a certificate stating their successful participation in the seminar program.

### **7. Publication**

PASSIA recorded all sessions and discussions of the seminar for publication in the Seminar Report on *The Foreign Policies of Arab States*.

# Lecture Program

## **DAY ONE: Monday, 9 December**

- *Opening Remarks and Introduction*  
by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA
- *The State in the International System - Alternative Theoretical Frameworks*  
by Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Head of the Middle East Program, Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), "Chatham House", London
- *The Arab States in the Regional and International System: Foundations*  
by Dr. Bahgat Korany, University of Montreal, Canada
- *Decision-Making Theory: Three Approaches*  
by Dr. Rosemary Hollis

## **DAY TWO: Tuesday, 10 December**

- *Arab States in the Regional and International System: Evolution*,  
by Dr. Bahgat Korany
- *Arab States in the Regional and International System: Contemporary Concerns*  
by Dr. Bahgat Korany
- *The Second Track - The Multilateral Talks of the Middle East Peace Process*  
by Dr. Joel Peters, Reading University
- *Country Profiles* (presented by the participants):
  - a) *Basic Data (population, resources, political system)*
  - b) *Policy Making Institutions/Processes*

## **DAY THREE: Wednesday, 11 December**

- *Defining the National Interest*  
by Dr. Rosemary Hollis
- *The Arab League and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*  
by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi
- *Country Policy Positions* (presented by the participants):
  - a) *General Priorities and Positions*
  - b) *Positions on the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Peace Process.*

## **DAY FOUR: Thursday, 12 December**

- *Egypt's Regional Role and Foreign Policy Imperatives*  
by HE Ahmad Kamal, Egyptian Diplomat
- *Syria: National Security and State-Building*  
by Dr. Volker Perthes, Research Institute for International Politics and Security, Ebenhausen, Germany
- *Syrian Interests and Role in Lebanon*  
by Dr. Volker Perthes
- *Arab States, the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Peace Process: Comparisons and Contrasts*  
Discussion with lecturers

## **DAY FIVE: Friday, 13 December**

- *The Maghreb States: Foreign Policy Priorities*  
by Dr. Claire Spencer - The Center for Defense Studies, King's College, London
- *The Maghreb States, the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Peace Process*  
by Dr. Claire Spencer
- *The Arab States and Jerusalem*  
by Faisal Hussein, Orient House, Jerusalem
- *Writing Position Papers*  
with Dr. Rosemary Hollis

## **DAY SIX/SEVEN: Saturday/Sunday, 14-15 December: WEEKEND**

by HE Edward Abington, US Consul General, Jerusalem  
*II: Europe, the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Peace Process*  
by HE Richard Dalton, British Consul General, Jerusalem

- *Exercise: Lobbying the External Powers*  
with Dr. Rosemary Hollis

#### **DAY NINE: Tuesday, 17 December**

- *Resources Scarcity as the New Regional Imperative*  
by Dr. Rosemary Hollis
- *War and Its Impact on Foreign Policy*  
by Dr. Yezid Sayigh
- *Film: "Palestine - The Story of a Land"* - followed by a discussion

#### **DAY TEN: Wednesday, 18 December**

- *The Evolution of Palestine*  
by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi
- *The PLO's Foreign Policy*  
by Dr. Yezid Sayigh
- *Jordan's Foreign Policy*  
by Dr. Yezid Sayigh

#### **DAY ELEVEN: Thursday, 19 December**

- *Political Islam in the Arab World,*  
by Sheikh Jamil Hamami
- *Foreign Policy Imperatives for Saudi Arabia,*  
by Dr. Rosemary Hollis
- *Exercise on Responding to a Regional Crisis as Policy-Makers for the Arab States,*  
with Dr. Rosemary Hollis

#### **DAY TWELVE: Friday, 20 December**

- *Policy Imperatives for Palestine - View from the PNA*  
by Dr. Sami Musallam, Director of the President's Office, Jericho
- *Policy Imperatives for the Palestinians*  
Participants' Views
- *Lebanon's Place in the Region*  
by Dr. Basma Kodmani-Darwish, Institute Francais des Relations Internationales, Paris
- *Concluding Session/Round-up: Discussion and Feedback*

## Palestinian Participants

#### **Rawan ABDELRAZEK, Jerusalem**

- BA International Relations, John Hopkins University, USA
- Desk Officer 'Asia', Orient House; previously, Research Assistant, Anthropology Department, John Hopkins University
- (Country prepared): Morocco

#### **Basima ADAWIN, Jerusalem**

- BA English Literature, and Diploma Education, Al-Quds University; currently, MA International Relations, Birzeit University
- Office Manager, Salaam Children; previously Correspondent, Press Agency and Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation
- Palestine

#### **Huwaida ARRAF, Jerusalem**

- Student (Political Science) Hebrew University, Jerusalem
- Lebanon

## *Education & Training in International Affairs*

### **Dina DA'NA**, Hebron

- BA English, Hebron University
- Field Officer, ICRC, Hebron; previously, Teacher Al-Azhar School; and Research Assistant, UNICEF
- Saudi Arabia

### **Saadeddin AL-HALAWANI**, Jerusalem

- BA Biology, Birzeit University
- Egypt

### **Firyal HASSOUNEH**, Nablus

- BA Business Management, Beirut University
- Project Director, Ministry of Social Affairs; previously, Director of Social Affairs, *ibid.*
- Morocco

### **Ruba HUSARI**, Ramallah

- Diplome d'Etudes, Universitaires Generales, Montpellier
- Correspondent, Al Hayat and BBC
- Saudi Arabia

### **Ali OMAR**, Nablus

- BA English Language
- Assistant to Tahsin Fares, Governorate of Nablus
- Lebanon

### **Nidal RAFA**, Haifa/Jerusalem

- BA Political Science, Haifa University
- Research Assistant, Knesset Interior Committee, Jerusalem
- Jordan

### **Mohammed AL-SA'DI**, Jenin/Ramallah

- BA English Literature, Yarmouk University, Jordan; Diploma in Broadcasting/Journalism, University of Wales, UK
- Editor/Reporter, Palestine Broadcasting Corporation; previously reporter, Qol Al-Arab
- Palestine

### **Najeh SHAHIN**, Hebron

- BA English Literature; MA Philosophy, Jordan University
- Faculty Instructor, RMTTC, Ramallah; previously at MCC; and Teacher in Amman
- Syria

### **Suha SHAHIN**, Nablus

- BA International Affairs, The American College in Paris; MA International Relations, Boston University, USA
- Previously Legal and Diplomacy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jordan
- Jordan

### **Ali SULEIMAN**, Bethlehem

- BA English Language and Literature, Birzeit University
- Researcher, Civic Forum - NDI (Bethlehem)
- Egypt

**DR. ROSEMARY HOLLIS**

Head of the Middle East Programme at the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House) in London.

**DR. MAHDI ABDUL HADI**

Head and founder of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), Jerusalem.

**DR. VOLKER PERTHES**

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Research Institute for International Politics and Security, Ebenhausen, FRG

**DR. YEZID SAYIGH**

Centre for International Studies, Cambridge University, UK

**PROF. BAHGAT KORANY**

University of Montreal, Canada

**DR. CLAIRE SPENCER**

The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London.

**DR. JOEL PETERS**

Reading University, UK, Visiting Researcher, Harry S. Truman Institute, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

**DR. SAMI MUSALLAM**

Director, President's Office, Jericho

**SHEIKH JAMIL HAMAMI**

Director, Society of the Islamic & Cultural Committee, Jerusalem

**HE AHMAD KAMAL**

Egyptian Diplomat

**HE EDWARD ABINGTON**

Consul General, US Consulate, Jerusalem

**HE RICHARD DALTON**

Consul General, British Consulate, Jerusalem



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## CONFERENCES & SEMINARS

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As a major Palestinian academic institution and think tank dealing with international affairs, PASSIA is invited to many conferences, seminars and workshops worldwide and locally which deal in some way with the Palestine Question. This chapter lists those conferences attended, and summarizes the proceedings of selected events that took place in 1996.

<b>Date:</b>	5 January
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>The Palestinian Vision of East Jerusalem</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Seven Arches Hotel, Jerusalem
<b>Organized by:</b>	Orient House

**Summary:**  
A documentary film, *East Jerusalem Beyond the Year 2000*, was shown to start this seminar that sought to educate attendees about various plans, ideas, aspirations and needs for the city of Jerusalem. The impetus for the conference was the beginning of 1996, the year in which the final status talks on Jerusalem, among other issues, would commence. Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi represented PASSIA at the seminar.

<b>Date:</b>	17 January
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>The Oslo II Agreement on Water and the Implications on Future Negotiations and Plans</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Notre Dame Center, Jerusalem
<b>Organized by:</b>	Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), Jerusalem

**Summary:**  
The Harvard University Middle East Water Project has been conducting studies and meetings to learn about the water situation in the Middle East, in order to facilitate practically feasible and mutually acceptable solutions to the current disputes between the Palestinians, Israel and Jordan. The committee's primary conclusions are that water for human consumption does not present a serious problem for the future, and the members predicted that household water costs will not rise substantially. Indeed, the total value of the water (its opportunity cost) disputed in even the most pessimistic projections is quite small in relation to the region's economies. On the other hand, agriculture presents more of a problem. Ensuring sufficient water for agriculture will necessitate improvements in infrastructure and recycling facilities.

The Project Committee recommended that water rights not be distributed as exclusive property, but rather that shares that can be bought and sold should be allocated. Thus supply and demand will regulate many important water issues. The main recommendations were to improve infrastructure and to coordinate national policies. It was em-



**Place:** YMCA, Jerusalem

**Organized by:** Sabeel, Middle East Council of Churches, Masonic Christian Institutions

**Summary:**

The conference included prayers, lectures, discussions, and educational tours of Jerusalem. Among the topics discussed were the history of Jerusalem, and the Christian presence in the city in particular. There was also a focus on current issues, such as Israeli policies towards the Christians in the city and strategies for future policies.

**Date:** 24 January

**Topic:** Refugees

**Place:** Notre Dame Center, Jerusalem

**Organized by:** Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture

**Summary:**

Afif Safieh, Head of the PLO delegation to the UK and the Vatican, and Shulamit Aloni, Israeli Minister of Communications, Sciences and Arts, in addition to Dr. Riad Malki, Director of the Panorama Center and Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA, Jerusalem, spoke at this discussion of refugees that was held on the occasion of the release of Volume II, No. 4 of the *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*.

**Date:** 14 February

**Topic:** Women and the Palestinian Elections

**Place:** American Colony Hotel

**Organized by:** Bat Shalom, The Jerusalem Center for Women

**Summary:**

Hanan Ashrawi, Zahira Kamal, Rana Nashashibi, Ghada Zughayar, Daphna Golan and Amira Hass were invited to discuss the role of women in the elections of January 1996.

**Date:** 27-28 February

**Topic:** Europe and the Future of the Middle East - an Agenda for Peace

**Place:** Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem

**Organized by:** Körber-Stiftung, Germany (Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis)

**Summary:**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi attended this conference in the wake of several suicide bombing attacks against Israelis by Islamist activists. This topic led to a heated debate and much attention centered around the recent events. The conference was broken up into three sessions: *The Peace Process - Visions and Realities*, *The Transformation of States and Societies in the Region*, and *The Role of Europe and European Countries in the Middle East*. Speakers included Palestinian, Israeli, and European governmental officials, representatives of international organizations, and academics.

[The proceedings of the meetings were published - in English and German - by the Körber-Stiftung under the title *Europe and the Future of the Middle East - An Agenda for Peace* (Hamburg, 1996, Pp. 136).]

**Date:** 11 March

**Topic:** Current Palestinian Politics

**Place:** US Consulate General, Jerusalem

**Organized by:** US Consulate General, Jerusalem.

**Summary:**

Dr. Abdul Hadi spoke at a seminar for a group of American officers above the rank of Lt. Col. who were participating in a course which was organized through the Air War

## *Conferences and Seminars*

College. During the one-year course, the officers were taken to places around the world to learn about the politics of the area.

<b>Date:</b>	18-20 March
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>Europe and the Middle East: Dialogue for Future Oriented Cooperation</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Schlosshotel Kronberg, Kronberg, Germany
<b>Organized by:</b>	Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh

### **Summary**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, head of PASSIA, attended this conference, which featured prominent academics, business people, financial and security experts, as well as former and current high-ranking governmental officials from the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. The conference consisted of a series of lectures and discussions and aimed at developing perspectives for future cooperation between Europe and the Middle East-North Africa region. It was divided into three main sections, dealing with security concerns, economics, and governance and political legitimacy.

<b>Date:</b>	March 25-27 / June 6-7 / July 11-13 / December 21-22
<b>Topic:</b>	Series of Workshops on <b>Jordanian-Palestinian Relations: Where To?</b>
<b>Place:</b>	London, Amman, Nablus, respectively
<b>Organized by:</b>	Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman Center for Palestine Research and Studies, Nablus

### **Summary (25-27 March)**

This series of five conferences treated the subject of the future of the relations between Jordan and the Palestinians in the context of the significant events that have transpired in the Middle East over the past several years. The conferences brought together Palestinians, Jordanians and British thinkers, who tried to come to some conclusions about these issues.

### **Summary (6-7 June)**

Substantive issues presented and discussed included the following: implications of Israeli election results (Khalil Shiqaqi); reactions in the PNA (Asa'ad Abdul Rahman); land and water in the context of Jordanian-Palestinian relations (Tariq Al-Tel); trade and the Palestinian economy (Hisham Awartani); trade and the Jordanian economy (Hani Hourani); infrastructure (Ibrahim Badran); political elites and the rentier system (Yezid Sayigh); and the Jordanian-Israeli economic relations and their effect on Jordanian-Palestinian economic relations (Farida Salfiti).

### **Summary (17-18 September)**

During the first day sessions the foreign policy positions of the US, Europe and Egypt in relation to the peace process were presented by a number of the participants and then discussed by the group as a whole. During the second day sessions strategic issues were discussed, including: security and the strategic setting, and military security in the Middle East.

### **Summary (21-22 December)**

The meeting took place in Nablus, where the participants introduced papers discussing four scenarios of how the relations between Jordan and the Palestinian entity would develop. The four scenarios can be summarized as follows:

- (1) Drift: no actor drives, general inaction, "wait and see."
- (2) Separation: non-cooperation and separation between Jordan and the Palestinian entity, deliberately pursued by both independently.
- (3) Cooperation: Jordan and Palestine work deliberately toward some form of

possible in the arrangement on the West Bank.

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi presented a paper discussing the implications for Jerusalem in each of the four different scenarios.

<b>Date:</b>	26-28 May
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>The Fourth Arab Strategic Conference: Peace and Future Arab Choices</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Al-Ahram Center, Cairo
<b>Organized by:</b>	Al-Ahram Center/Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan

**Summary:**

This was the fourth annual conference of its kind. Arab intellectuals, academics and experts came from throughout the Arab world to discuss various elements of the peace process, the future of the Arab League, democracy and political systems in the Arab world, as well as military, cultural, economic and environmental issues facing the Arab world. Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi spoke on *The Palestine Question and the Final Status Talks*. After putting the current situation in the historical context of Arab/Palestinian strategies towards the Palestine Question, Dr. Abdul Hadi described the political situation in the Palestinian Territories as it has developed since the Oslo agreements. He outlined the positions of the two major camps in Israel and what these would mean in terms of Israeli policy towards the Palestinians.

<b>Date:</b>	7-8 June
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy in the Mediterranean: How to Achieve the Goals of the Barcelona Conference</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Sesimbra/Lisbon, Portugal
<b>Organized by:</b>	Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo)

**Summary:**

Along with Dr. Basma Kodmani-Darwish (Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Paris) and Dr. Mark Heller (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv), Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi (PASSIA) addressed the conference on the subject of *Armament and Proliferation, Crisis Management and Prevention - Confidence-Building Measures in the Mediterranean*. Dr. Abdul Hadi gave the Palestinian perspective on this issue and also addressed the effect of the results of the Israeli elections on the peace process.

<b>Date:</b>	14-16 June
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>Muslims and Christians Together for Jerusalem</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Beirut, Lebanon
<b>Organized by:</b>	Middle East Council of Churches

**Summary**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi represented PASSIA at this conference, whose aim was to bring together Muslims and Christians throughout the Arab world to show their solidarity in the Arab struggle for Jerusalem and in trying to arrive at strategies for the future of Arabs in the city. Dr. Abdul Hadi was one of the few representatives of Arab Jerusalem, and gave a speech entitled *Jerusalem: Current Practices and Future Horizons*. The final declaration emphasized the absolute necessity for Christians and Muslims throughout the world to unite their positions in fighting for Arab rights in Jerusalem. The declaration also strongly censured Israeli policies that violate the human rights of Arab Jerusalemites and that aim to empty the city of its Palestinian inhabitants.

<b>Date:</b>	22 June
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>The Israeli Elections: A Reading of the Influential Factors and an Analysis of the Results</b>
<b>Place:</b>	The Martyr Hatim Jouhary Hall, PNA Ministry of Information, Ramallah
<b>Organized by:</b>	PNA Ministry of Information

**Summary:**

Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Dr. Azmi Bishara and Dr. Ali Al-Jarbawi spoke on the causes and effects relating to the Israeli elections of 29 May, which caused considerable concern throughout the Arab world and especially among Palestinians. Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi and Khamis Ghosheh represented PASSIA at the meeting.

<b>Date:</b>	28 June
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Palestinian View</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Royal College of Defense Studies (RCDS), London
<b>Organized by:</b>	Royal College of Defense Studies - 1996 Course: Middle East Phase

**Summary**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi joined Patrick Seale, Edward Mortimer, Abdallah Bishara, Joseph Alpher, and Dr. Michael Burrell in addressing the specially selected senior military participants in the Royal College of Defense Studies's course in international politics. Dr. Abdul Hadi addressed the participants on the Palestinian view of the Arab-Israeli conflict in its current context.

<b>Date:</b>	2-3 July
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>Making Peace Pay: Balancing Security and Prosperity</b>
<b>Place:</b>	London
<b>Organized by:</b>	John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

**Summary:**

Former and current regional governmental personages were featured at the conference and included Dr. Nabil Sha'ath, Mr. Moshe Shahal, Professor Moshe Arens, and Dr. Jawad Anani. The topics of the panel discussions were *Balancing Trade and Security in the Region* and *Development Strategies for the Palestinian Economy in a Regional Context*. The discussants included academics, business people and members of international organizations from Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the US.

<b>Date:</b>	1-4 August
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>Meeting of Regional Arab Research Centers</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Maryland Hotel, Brumaneh Na'ass, Beirut
<b>Organized by:</b>	The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies

**Participants:**

- Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), Beirut; Dr. Paul Salim and Dr. Kamal
- Lebanese Association for Educational Sciences, Beirut; Dr. Adnan Al-Amine
- Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo; Dr. Abdul Monem Said Ali
- Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, Cairo; Dr. Sa'ad Addin Ibrahim and Dr. Fathia
- Jordan Center for Strategic Studies, Amman; Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh
- Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Center, Amman; Dr. Hani Hourani
- Center for Palestine Research Studies (CPRS), Nablus; Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi
- Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), Jerusalem; Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi
- Ford Foundation, Cairo; Dr. Salim Nasr

centers in these elections were discussed. PASSIA's presence at the meetings was a manifestation of its support for coordination of research efforts in Arab countries.

### **Day 1**

*Morning:* Ms. Rosie Nasser, Project Manager at LCPS met Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi and Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi at the airport and gave them an informative two-hour tour of Beirut in this crucial stage of post-war rebuilding.

*Noon:* Introductory meeting at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut

*Afternoon:* Brief meeting at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies

The meeting covered the upcoming Lebanese elections of 1996, the formation of a private Lebanese society for observing elections, and the comparison of Lebanon with Palestine and Jordan as case studies. Because PASSIA's activities focus on Palestine and not elections in Lebanon, its role centered less on taking operational benefit from the meeting and more on imparting its knowledge and experience with the recent elections in Palestine. The PLC elections provided PASSIA, as an organization in Palestine and particularly in Jerusalem, with a valuable insight into elections in a society that has never before had political elections. The case of the Palestinian elections, which CPRS's Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi presented, was of great interest to the participants - especially the Lebanese - as the elections were held under such difficult conditions.

The parliamentary elections in Lebanon in 1992 were the first in 20 years, yet the results were unsatisfactory. There were problems and disputes over the basic laws pertaining to the elections as well as many other problems: confusion and complaints about districting; the fact that the elections took place at the time of a Syrian army redeployment; low voter turnout (15-16%); and the government's failure to publish the election results.

The LCPS has organized a project to publish a book on the 1992 elections. The center has also organized a team to discuss election laws for 1996, which met and came up with draft position papers and engaged in discussions about alternative election laws. With the National Democratic Institute supplying information support, 40 Lebanese personalities formed the Lebanese Society for Democratic Elections, to which 300 people applied to become members. The Lebanese Minister of the Interior responded by declaring this society outlawed. When the society issued a statement attacking the election laws, the state postponed the elections to take the opposition off-guard and to prepare its campaign against them.

The 1996 laws are very similar to those of 1992 and prejudice the success of party lists. In other words, in the largest districts (the North, the South, and Beirut) the results are known before the elections even take place. There is a great deal of popular opposition, especially among Christians, to the law. Thus, although there does exist the impulse for democratic elections in the country, the government and the power of fair democratic laws are weak and the election results will probably be "cooked."

One key example of this phenomenon is that the Ministry of the Interior supervises the elections, yet the Minister of the Interior is a candidate. There is a strong possibility that he will use his employees and the military to influence the results of the elections. There are various other obstacles standing in the way of free, fair elections, such as extensive Syrian influence in finalizing the party lists. Currently all candidates for the elections are going to Damascus to have their candidacies approved. Meanwhile, the written media deals with the elections only as an advertiser and not as a watchdog or a source of criticism, analysis or commentary. There is no law about audiovisual media coverage of the campaign, so reporters have so far simply been prevented from holding interviews or programs about the elections. Finally, there are no laws about fundraising and campaign financing, which opens further avenues for problems.



## *Conferences and Seminars*

1996 will be the first time since 1963 that voters participate in municipal elections. The LCPS is preparing a study on the future of municipal elections in Lebanon.

A general discussion followed in which the Jordanian case, in which there were no private observation groups, was compared to Lebanon.

### **Day 2:**

The second day of the conference included a detailed discussion of past experiences and ways to improve the coordination/cooperation between the eight centers of the Arab Mashriq participating in this seminar. The main topics discussed were as follows:

- Mashriq center experiences and current projects.
- Institution-building: role of board of trustees, administration, defining organizational goals and mission, delegating/distributing work efficiently, and decision-making.
- Staffing: training, administrative staff, and researchers.
- Research planning: arranging research agendas and projects.
- Financial planning and fundraising.
- Relationship between research and general organizational operations.

### **Day 3:**

The participants discussed and agreed upon future meetings and projects.

<b>Date:</b>	12 August
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>The Palestinian Intellectuals' Role in Encountering the Recent Political Changes in the Region</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Ramallah
<b>Organized by:</b>	Ministry of Culture, Ramallah

<b>Date:</b>	18 August
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>The Role of the Palestinian NGOs in Strengthening the Palestinian Civil Society</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Jerusalem
<b>Organized by:</b>	Panorama, Jerusalem

<b>Date:</b>	5 - 6 September
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>Regional Netherlands Milat Conference</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Royal Netherlands Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel
<b>Organized by:</b>	Royal Netherlands Embassy, Defense Office, Tel Aviv, Israel

<b>Date:</b>	18 -19 September
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>Unit for Strategic Studies: How to Activate the Dispersed Palestinians</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Geneva, Switzerland
<b>Organized by:</b>	Welfare Association

### **Summary:**

The participants stressed the need to establish a unit for strategic studies, but differed in their perspectives to its priorities. Many suggestions for the unit's future main roles were introduced. Participants suggested that it should assess the activities of the Palestinian Studies centers and promote a plan for action; help the existing centers through helping them in assessing their work and providing training; and provide a data base with information on the communities of the dispersed. Participants also stressed the need to activate the Palestinian Diaspora; for example, through holding conferences and conducting campaigns through the media to convince the Palestinians of the importance of being active in influencing the decision makers and promoting

### **Summary:**

The goal of the panel was projected towards advancing the theory of conflict resolution by looking at the Oslo process from a number of different viewpoints. The following is a summary of Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi's presentation on *Oslo - The Conflict, the Mediators and the Breakthrough*:

During the last ten decades, the Arab-Israeli conflict went through various phases, that may be classified as the international, the Arab and the Palestinian era. Although they each represent a certain period, they are interconnected and overlap in terms of dates, places, proposed solution (political and military) and respective outcomes. The evolution of the conflict throughout these three eras shows that each left its mark and influenced the others in terms of players, mediators and issues of concern. None can be studied independently or separated from the others since each stage of the conflict evolved over time and led, eventually, to some kind of result, which influenced the development of stages yet to come. Moreover, what may be viewed as a breakthrough at any one stage in any of the eras has to be seen as a product of preceding events. In order to understand the full meaning of what is widely chronicled as the "breakthrough" at Oslo in October 1992, there is a need to trace and study certain events as they occurred during the three eras.

### ***The International Era***

The political environment of the time included the "renaissance" of the Arab national movement and the birth of the Zionist movement, both of which faced three major, contradicting political documents: the Hussein-MacMahon Correspondence of 1915, in which the British invited the Arabs to become allies against the Turks and offered, in return, to help them establish their sovereign independent Arab states; the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, which outlined the new colonial map of the Middle East as drawn up jointly by the British and the French; and the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which the British declared their support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

At the doorsteps of the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 we saw the British officer T.E. Lawrence adopt the role of a mediator and attempt to satisfy both sides' aspirations by drafting the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement. The Arabs, including the Palestinians, did not recognize nor accept the concept or the content of that document, arguing that since Faisal spoke no English and Weizmann no Arabic, the document reflected Lawrence's "interpretation" in accordance with British "wishful thinking" and was merely an attempt to close the gap between the three contradicting political documents. However, as the British and French governments held the mandates in the region for several decades, the international era was dominated by third party involvement.

### ***The Arab Era***

As an outcome of World War II the geopolitical map of the Middle East was redefined. The Palestinians emphasized their Arab roots and their status as an integral part of the Arab nation with all its aspirations. With the establishment of the Arab League in 1945, a central Arab political address was realized. At the same time, the Jewish-Zionist political decision-making apparatus moved from London to Washington, and thus, the center of influence and alliances was shifted. Soon after, a series of events - the UN Partition Plan for Palestine of 1947, the subsequent first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, and the establishment of the Israeli state - led to the uprooting and expulsion of the Palestinian people and their search for refuge in the neighboring Arab countries.

The mediators, their proposals and ideas for resolving the conflict, and the manner in which they were introduced during this era were not very different from those of the

## *Conferences and Seminars*

previous period, although they had been somewhat adjusted to the new balance of power in terms of intervention, interpretation and reasoning.

The bi-national state thesis, for example, which had previously been discussed between Jewish, British and Palestinian intellectuals, was now (July 1947) presented by King Abdallah to the UN Commission as a collective Arab position. Similarly, the plan to partition Palestine, originally proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937 and developed by the Woodhead Commission in 1938, was now presented in the Partition Plan of Resolution 181, passed by the UN General Assembly. Thirdly, the proposed annexation of the Arab part of Palestine to the Jordanian state, which had been discussed most intensively between King Abdallah and Zionist leaders in August 1946, was now brought up by the Swedish UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte. Finally, the question of Jerusalem was continuously addressed as a key component of any future political settlement, with many proposals that essentially promoted a 'special status' for the city. The real novelty in this era was the shift in priorities, which put the issues of borders, refugees and direct negotiations towards mutual recognition at the top of the agenda.

### ***The Palestinian Era***

The Palestinization of the Arab-Israeli Conflict was accelerated by the Israeli occupation of the remainder of Palestine in the course of the June 1967 war. The Palestinian era reached its peak with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in Washington DC on September 13, 1993.

This era witnessed many political phases with numerous attempts to build a bridge between and by the two people immediately concerned: Palestinians and Israelis. More than 30 years have left a long record of contacts, dialogue, confrontation and, more recently, numerous meetings between individuals and groups from both sides, sometimes with the presence of a third party.

The first phase (1967-1970) was determined by the shock of the Arab defeat, the fear of the unknown future, the absence of a leadership and the total military occupation. The Palestinians "inside" responded with a policy of non-cooperation with the occupiers, while waiting for a solution to come from outside, either internationally (UN Resolution 242 of 1967), regionally (Arab Summit, Khartoum, August 1962) or from the PLO. However, none of the outside players delivered a solution, while the Palestinian society inside was crippled by the lack of an economy, health, welfare or education services and institutional development.

The Israeli policy, from as early as 1967, had three main aims as described by Moshe Dayan, then Defense Minister: to maintain daily contact between the Palestinians and the Arab world to divert the Palestinian focus from Israel to outside; to use the Palestinians to pass political messages to Cairo and Amman; and to initiate direct contact with the Palestinians, hoping that they will accept to accommodate themselves to the Israeli reality.

In the second phase (1970-1982), the Palestinians "inside" adopted a new policy: *sumud* (steadfastness), i.e., keeping their civil society functioning and developing institutions and their leadership. This phase was characterized by the loss of power and status of local notables and old families, the rise of a national front, the formation of the National Guidance Committee, and acceptance of the challenges of confrontation but with a willingness to negotiate. The "outside" leaders voiced their desire for a peaceful solution based on coexistence and mutual recognition. However, this new development in Palestinian thinking was faced with many sacrifices and the assassination of PLO leaders abroad, which brought the Palestinians to a state of isolation.

The third phase (1982-87) witnessed Israel's invasion of Lebanon, followed by the Palestinian resistance movement's exodus. The Israelis hoped that these two events had cleared the way to reach a political settlement with "moderate" Palestinians inside the territories. The Israeli plan was "an autonomy" based on the Jordan Option. The Jordan-

man Arafat, and the academic dialogue between Abba Eban and Walid Khalidi.

The meetings resulted in three main initiatives, none of which led to a breakthrough:

- (1) The Abba Eban-Siniora "declaration" acknowledging the destiny of the Jewish and Palestinian people to live side by side in one land, jointly calling for negotiations and the repudiation of violence and terrorism.
- (2) The Moshe Amirav-Faisal Husseini draft document, the importance of which Mahmoud Abbas later described as follows: "*[it]... prepared a suitable base for dialogue and contact and compiled ideas on which we (Palestinians and Israeli negotiators) could build and which assisted us in reaching what we achieved on 13 September 1993.*"
- (3) Guidelines for a political settlement drafted by King Hussein and Peres, dated 11 April 1987.

At the time of the fourth phase (1987-90), the Palestinians "inside" had reached a stage of desperation and anger, which made them feel they had nothing to lose. They decided to change the *status quo*, i.e., to end Israeli occupation and to build a new society based on self-reliance, and to direct it towards freedom, independence and statehood. This phase was introduced with what became known as the Intifada.

The Intifada had three main characteristics: no fear of direct confrontation with the military occupiers; the Palestinization of the Palestinian Territories; and the elaboration of a political settlement based on a two-state solution.

Several mediators rushed to the scene with many ideas on how to bring the two sides - the occupier and the occupied - together in a peace conference:

- The Egyptians proposed an initiative in January 1988 that called for a six-month truce and a freeze on settlements.
- US Secretary of State George Shultz added to the Egyptian idea in March 1988 by suggesting that negotiations be held along the provisions laid down in the Camp David Accords, and that Palestinian self-rule be achieved by February 1989.
- Mikhail Gorbachov encouraged PLO leader Yasser Arafat to recognize Israel's right to exist.
- The "inside" Palestinian leadership favored two initiatives: (a) issuing a declaration of independence; and (b) forming a provisional government-in-exile. Meanwhile the "outside" PLO leadership expressed its readiness to sit down with Israel if Israel in turn, agreed to withdraw from the Palestinian Territories.

On 2 August 1990, delegations from the Palestinian and Israeli mainstream met in Jerusalem to sign a joint statement, which included mutual recognition and a call for direct negotiations; however, the Gulf Crisis halted their work. At the same time, the world witnessed the fall of the Soviet Union, the Arab world dividing over the issue of the Gulf War, and Israel remaining the strongest military arsenal in the Middle East while the PLO had no military power, or Arab financial or political support.

The Palestinians (inside) faced land confiscation, settlement building and, since the beginning of the Intifada, four years of social and economic suffering. Their options were limited when US President George Bush introduced a new initiative - commencement of negotiations - on 6 March 1991. The US formula to the Madrid Conference was based on the implementation of UN Resolutions 242 and 338; the principle of "land for peace"; the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; and security and peace for Israel.

Israel made it clear that its participation in Madrid was conditional on the following elements regarding the Palestinian participation: no to Jerusalemites, no to PLO members, no to an independent Palestinian delegation, no to the Palestinian flag and no to a Palestinian state.

## *Conferences and Seminars*

The Palestinians realized that they could not deter those who were invited to go to Madrid, nor change nor amend the terms of reference; nor could they afford to stay away. Thus they accepted the challenge of negotiations, confident that they would be able to change the conditions and influence other parties based on the mechanism of the Intifada, "establishing new realities." In Madrid, they were acknowledged, and perhaps for the first time, the world showed concern for what they had to say.

The Palestinian delegation to Madrid was nominated by the PLO "outside" leadership in Tunis. Some classified the delegates as representatives of certain interests (e.g., villages, tribes, political factions or professions); others maintained that their selection was the result of PLO recognition of their long years of suffering under occupation.

In Washington, the talks were of the nature of a diplomatic game, which in itself created special problems for a "people" acting in the role of a "nation-state." After 22 months of Washington negotiations, the Israelis presented their version of a transitional phase: the old autonomy plan, starting with the gradual transfer of 12 technical civil departments from Israeli to Palestinian hands, but without any mention of authority transfer, military withdrawal, or recognition of Palestinian rights to the land, water, or Jerusalem, and nothing on the question of sovereignty. In addition, the Israeli plan limited Palestinian rule to only one-third of the Palestinian Territories, meaning all authority would remain in Israeli hands, including borders, continued settlement activities etc. The Palestinians developed and presented a "political document," later known as PISGA (Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority), confirming the Palestinian demand to freeze all settlements, guarantee the geographic integrity of the Palestinian Territories, and to hold democratic elections. The Israeli Autonomy Plan and PISGA were the only documents trying to close the gap between the two sides that emerged without the interference of a third party.

### ***The Oslo Channel***

Following nine months of negotiations in Madrid, five rounds of talks at the US State Department and the exchange of numerous documents outlining the totally different positions of the Palestinian and Israeli sides, and after it became obvious that neither the mediators nor the US could successfully influence the talks in one way or another, the negotiations had seemingly reached a deadlock.

Throughout this period, both the Israeli government and the PLO were very much concerned with the role, performance and future of the Palestinian delegation, though for different reasons. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was extremely worried that the PLO would infiltrate the Palestinian delegation, and he constantly opposed any attempt to this end. He even outlawed any contact between the delegates and the outside PLO and dismissed Science Minister Ezer Weizmann from his cabinet after the latter established contact with the PLO representative to Switzerland, Mr. Nabil Rimlawi. Shamir wanted to maintain the umbrella of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. He sent verbal messages to Amman suggesting joint economic and tourist projects in the Red Sea area (Aqaba-Eilat), anticipating the implementation of the old Likud plan for a Jordanian role on the West Bank that leaves the "Jordan option" open to interpretation.

Meanwhile, PLO Chairman Arafat tried to balance the Likud's plans by opening various back-channels with the Labor Party. Among these attempts was his encouraging Faisal Husseini to meet with Peres, Ephraim Sneh and others. Throughout nine rounds of talks in Washington - after newly-elected Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin took office, formed a new government, and resumed negotiations with the Palestinians - the Palestinian delegation remained loyal to Arafat and the PLO leadership and refused to bypass either of them. Arafat saw the delegation as a "Trojan Horse" and encouraged Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi to convince Washington of the need for the PLO to take part in direct talks. However, Washington's advice was not to rush things, nor to jump to later phases, as, according to the US, the PLO's role was yet to come.



the PLO governed by desires but by results and, despite the loyalty of the delegates to the PLO and to his leadership, he realized that those who delivered were likely to become future leaders. There were several indications of such an unwelcome development; for example, it was the Jerusalemite leader Faisal Husseini, who, in his capacity as the head of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks, exchanged official correspondence with US Secretary of State Baker, who was officially received at the State Department, and who, before the end of the eighth round of talks, was received by President George Bush at the White House.

The situation Arafat faced at this time resembles that of Chaim Weizmann, leader of the World Zionist Organization, and David Ben Gurion, leader of the Jewish Agency "inside" Palestine, in 1948: following Israel's declaration of independence and the establishment of the Jewish state, the "outside" leader Weizmann became the symbol of the state and its head, but it was Ben Gurion who formed the government and ruled as Prime Minister.

With this background in mind, Chairman Arafat and the PLO leadership in Tunis saw that the official negotiations in Washington would lead to nowhere. Recalling the experience of Vietnam, Algiers and Camp David, Arafat and his inner cabinet were convinced that other channels must be opened. The PLO badly needed the peace talks to progress in order to maintain its legitimacy as the official representative and leadership of the Palestinian people, especially in the light of an increasing opposition steered by the radicals in Damascus and the Islamic trends of Hamas and Jihad Islami, and in order to face King Hussein whose popularity was rapidly growing. Progress in the peace process was furthermore crucial in order to contain the already recognized "inside" Palestinian leaders, and to grab the possibility of establishing direct secret contacts with Israel. The opening of new channels besides the official talks in Washington was encouraged by the Israeli Knesset decision to lift the ban on contact with the PLO.

Rabin and his inner cabinet thought along similar lines, realizing that the Palestinian delegation itself was not capable of signing an agreement with Israel nor of governing any interim regime, and that it lacked legitimacy as it was not elected by the community but chosen by Israel in back-door coordination with the US and the PLO. The Israelis also comprehended that (a) any agreement would require a strong and highly legitimate Palestinian authority in order to gain acceptance and in order for its security and police forces to be able to control the Palestinian Territories; and (b) Israel's only alternative to dealing with the PLO was the Islamic movement and its leaders. This, however, would imply the transformation of the political conflict into a religious one - something the Rabin-Peres government could not afford.

Thus, numerous channels of Palestinian-Israeli contacts were opened behind the official talks in Washington. Some of these contributed major elements to the final text of the accords. One of these channels was the "inside", i.e., Faisal Husseini's and Hanan Ashrawi's contacts with and through Washington, ordered by and directly reported to Arafat, but without the knowledge of any other member of the delegation or of any other PLO leader in Tunis. Another channel was the indirect contact with and through Cairo of Arafat himself and members of his inner cabinet. A third channel was proposed by PLO Executive Committee member and head of the Palestinian negotiation committee, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen): to open a back-channel contact with and through the Russians in Moscow in order to balance the Washington track. The Russians made a great effort to convince the Israelis of the need for their intervention, but Foreign Minister Peres' answer was that there were already enough parties involved.

At a time when the talks had seemingly come to a deadlock and the two parties urgently needed to break out of their domestic constraints and to deliver some kind of an interim arrangement, an intermediary appeared and introduced an issue that addressed a major concern of both sides, despite their different motivations. Terje Larsen, founder of the Norwegian Institute for Applied Sciences, who at the time was working on a

project to alleviate Gaza's chronic social problems, suggested to focus on "Gaza first" as an initial step towards a comprehensive agreement. Gaza was of particular interest to the Israelis and Palestinians. Peres's thinking had centered for years on the notion of withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and Rabin had repeatedly expressed in public speeches the wish that Gaza would disappear from the map and "sink into the sea." On the other hand, Arafat and most PLO leaders were aware of and seriously concerned with Gaza's daily cry for freedom and the need to rid the area of the Israeli occupation. As far back as in 1974, at the Rabat Arab Summit where the PLO was recognized by the Arab leaders as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and Arafat had mentioned Jericho as a possible base for PLO authority and talked about the need to have a strong PLO presence in Gaza as well.

Terje Larsen suggested that Israeli Labor politician Yossi Beilin - who regarded Gaza as one of Israel's biggest political and military problems in need of an immediate solution<sup>1</sup> - should meet Faisal Husseini and discuss the issue. The meeting took place shortly before the June 1992 Israeli elections, but a second meeting did not materialize after Beilin became Peres's Deputy Minister in the Rabin government and Husseini received too much public and media attention. The Israelis also knew that Arafat would not welcome such a contact with the "inside leaders," and were aware of the conflict and mutual fear defining the Palestinian inside-outside relationship at that time.

Yossi Beilin overcame this situation by giving the green light to one of his academic colleagues, Professor Yair Hirschfeld of Haifa University, to contact Ahmad Qrei'a (Abu Ala'), the PLO's financial expert, at the multilateral meetings on 3-4 December 1992, in London. Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi, together with the PLO representative in London, Afif Safieh, encouraged Qrei'a to meet Hirschfeld and arranged the first encounter. Meanwhile, Terje Larsen persuaded Hirschfeld to attend. PLO leaders in Tunis viewed this meeting as a watershed, marking the beginning of direct, secret negotiations between the PLO and Israel. They were extremely concerned that the "inside" delegation, i.e., Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi, Haidar Abdul Shafi and others would not learn about the development of this channel. Abu Ala' later revealed that whenever Hirschfeld, during the talks, made attempts to approach Husseini, Ashrawi or any other Palestinian activist from inside the territories to discover their views, the PLO threatened to halt the talks. The PLO inner cabinet that supervised this back-channel consisted of Chairman Arafat, Abu Mazen and Abu Ala', while Peres, with his close advisors<sup>2</sup>, and Beilin, with his academic team<sup>3</sup>, negotiated on the Israeli side. Both parties were keen to maintain the secrecy of the talks and the Norwegian mediator committed himself to take full responsibility for facilitating the meetings but without intervening in their substance.

The two leaderships both faced domestic constraints and feared a political storm that would shake their foundations. The Palestinians faced two crises: the first arose over the resignation of the Palestinian delegation's leading figures, namely Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi and Sa'eb Erekat, due to differences with Arafat regarding strategies and because of the absence of a centralized body to coordinate and govern the negotiation process. Additionally, they suspected the existence of another channel, undermining their own efforts behind their backs. The second crisis emerged when three PLO leaders (Abu Mazen, Yasser Abed Rabbo and Mahmoud Darwish) resigned due to differences with Chairman Arafat regarding the handling of the PLO's financial affairs and the possible bankruptcy of its institutions. Arafat contained the first storm by accepting the establishment of a higher coordinating body to supervise the negotiations, and allowing the participation of leaders from the inside. He managed to abort the second crisis by disclosing the news of the successful developments on the Oslo track

<sup>1</sup> Mohammed Hassanen Haikal, *Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations*. London: HarnerCollins Publishers, 1996, p. 435.

On the Israeli side, there was the case of Mr. Dore for the Shas Party who was - after being convicted of bribery by the Israeli High Court - asked to resign, or otherwise be dismissed from office by the Prime Minister. As a result, the Shas Party withdrew from the government, which in turn shook and weakened the coalition, leaving it dependent on the Arab vote in the Knesset. At the same time, rumors of alleged secret Israeli-Jordanian negotiations stirred more dissension within Israeli ranks, especially as the rumors served as "an invitation" to Hamas and other Islamic organizations on both banks of the Jordan River to coordinate positions and prepare strategies to face any outcome of the alleged talks.

The main components of the Israeli agenda for the breakthrough were: a partial staged Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian Territories, beginning with Gaza; postponing difficult and complicated issues to later rounds of talks (final status of the Palestinian Territories) - thus, leaving the future of the territories, for the time being, enveloped in fog; and building a strong foundation of economic cooperation. With the "Gaza-Jericho first" concept, Israel was able to make the future of Palestinian autonomy dependent on the ability and performance of the Palestinians during a transitional phase in which they were transformed into a scattered "bantustan" with Israeli *de facto* sovereignty.

The Palestinian agenda was determined by:

- The notion that an agreement would mean a historical breakthrough in terms of mutual recognition, possibly in the form of a declaration of principles or a framework agreement similar to the Camp David accords.
- The importance of the "Gaza-Jericho First" formula as an incentive to market the proposed declaration of principles by establishing an official, recognized PLO authority on Palestinian soil.
- The realization that postponing the difficult issues would make way for needed compromises.
- The realization that an agreement would open the door for other agreements with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.

For the Palestinians, Oslo was thus a means to establish an official and recognized PLO authority in part of their homeland and to have the territorial integrity of the Palestinian Territories recognized.

The Norwegian mediators contributed a great deal to what the world witnessed as the first ever historic handshake between top Israeli and Palestinian leaders on the lawn of the White House on 13 September 1993. The substance of the DoP was the exchange of "land for peace" and limited Palestinian self-rule during a transitional phase, until the final status talks on the remaining major issues would provide for a permanent settlement. In fact, this understanding was consistent with the principles of the initial Madrid Peace Conference, the invitation to which - dated 18 October 1991 - read as follows:

*"The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian interim self-government authority, to elect a council for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for the transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338."*

## **Conclusion**

The nature, scope and results of the meetings from 1967 until 1990 can be summed up as follows: they helped in exploring opinions and ideas in the search for short and long-term solutions and illustrated the various reactions of the local communities to the respective suggestions and outcomes of these meetings. They also helped in shaping the Palestinian leadership and in coordinating among various figures and schools of thought, and they contributed to the promotion of a national leadership, although, on the other hand, they divided the people into moderates, independents, extremists and

## *Conferences and Seminars*

loyalists, into mainstream and opposition, inside and outside, thus preventing the emergence of a real national alliance. Finally, they paved the way for others to enter new rounds of negotiations, by exposing preconditions and offering starting points for future meetings based on the achievements and failures of all the procedures and attempts to resolve the conflict that occurred previous to Oslo.

The Oslo "breakthrough" provided one of many opportunities to build a just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict but it seems that too many people are prisoners of past ideologies, principles and positions and do not realize the importance of looking forward to the future. Furthermore, they tend to underestimate the power and options of the other side. The major lesson to be learnt from the Oslo experience is that it needs more than the will and courage, and than pressure and constraints to force legitimate leaders to reach political agreements to put an end to deep-rooted historical conflicts. The role of the external parties involved in the Oslo phase has been that of assisting the two sides directly involved in the conflict in taking up their new positions and in reshaping their relationship, while, at the same time, scoring points and striking alliances of their own. It is true that the role of leaders is to lead, to bring about agreements, and to gain and maintain the consent of their people, but leaders with the required commitment and vision are not always available; and if they are, they may not have enough time to fulfill their dreams.

The Oslo blueprint delivered mutual recognition and conformed to the common interest in minimizing the role of Islamic groups and extremist bodies on both sides. Today, three years after Oslo, there is a Palestinian Authority with an elected legislative council governing the autonomous areas of the Zone A category, and coordinating with Israeli security forces in the territory falling in the Zone B category, while most of the Palestinian Territories - Zone C - remains under Israel's full control. The Palestinians, after accepting the transitional phase as an opportunity to establish their civil society and institutions and to build bridges of trust, understanding and cooperation with the other side, are now facing a new dilemma. It took them two decades of steadfastness under occupation, five years of challenging the occupiers, during the Intifada, and three years of long and painful negotiations in Madrid, Washington and Moscow to bring about the historic signing of the DoP, the reconciliation document signed with the Israeli Labor Party, representing half of the Israeli society.

Following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995 by a Jewish extremist, and, six months later, with the defeat of the Labor Party, the rise of the right wing Likud Party and the direct election of Benyamin Netanyahu as the new Prime Minister, the Palestinians realized that not even half of the Israeli society accepts a political settlement on the basis of the land-for-peace formula. It took Mr. Netanyahu 100 days in office to evoke a storm in both societies as well as in the region as a whole. The angry Palestinian outburst in September 1996 - in response to the Likud government's policies and practices - brought the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to yet another crossroads, with no clear indication of what lay ahead.

<b>Date:</b>	28 November
<b>Topic:</b>	<b>A Vision for Jerusalem 2000</b>
<b>Place:</b>	Capitol Hotel, Jerusalem
<b>Organized by:</b>	Higher Council for Tourism

### **Summary:**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi suggested to the participants the need to form work groups to study the religious, political, cultural, public and information spheres in the city so as to be fully prepared before decisions are made concerning the Jerusalem 2000 celebrations. He also suggested the need to found a central committee whose role would be to coordinate between the Orient House and the Higher Council for Tourism. Both suggestions were accepted.

- 26 January  
*Palestinian Election from a Women's Perspective: Documentation and Strategies*  
National Palace Hotel, East Jerusalem  
Women's Affairs Technical Committee
- 9-11 February  
*Democratic Participation in the Society and the Political System*  
YMCA, East Jerusalem  
Panorama, Jerusalem
- 17 February  
*The Palestinian Legislative Elections*  
Municipality Hall, Al-Bireh  
Ministry of Information
- 24 February 1996  
*Palestinian Refugees Repatriation Projects*  
Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Center, Ramallah
- 26-27 February  
*The Future of Jerusalem: Mock Negotiations / Jerusalem Visions*  
Notre Dame Center, Jerusalem  
IPCRI
- February (every Thursday)  
*Conservation of Palestinian Architecture*  
RIWAQ Center, Al-Bireh  
Center for Vernacular Architecture, RIWAQ
- 22 March  
*Jerusalem: the Eve of the Final Status Negotiations*  
Ambassador Hotel, Jerusalem  
The Alternative Information Center
- 30 March  
*Between Jihad and Peace: Islamist Alignments in a Changing Middle East*  
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University
- 7-8 May  
*Development of Humanities Colleges Conference*  
An-Najah University  
Public Relations Office, An-Najah University
- 26-27 May  
*Peace and Options for The Arab Future*  
Strategic and Political Studies Center, Cairo
- 28 May  
*Jerusalem's Status in International Law*  
Birzeit University Law Center
- 30 May  
*Terrorism: Definition and Effects*  
Al-Quds University Campus, Al-Bireh  
Law Faculty, Al-Quds University
- 14-15 June  
*Investment and International Commercial Contracts*  
Birzeit University Law Center



## *Conferences and Seminars*

- 20 June  
*The Israeli Elections and their Effects on the Peace Process*  
Friend's Boys School, Ramallah  
Sabeel
- 20 June  
*Environmental Impacts of Development along the East Mediterranean Coast*  
Protestani Center, Ramallah  
EcoPeace, Middle East Environmental NGO Forum
- 22 June  
*Israeli Elections and their Reflections on Palestinian-Israeli Relations from a Feminist Perspective*  
Jerusalem Center for Women, Jerusalem
- 20-22 June  
*Mediterranean - Which Proposals for the Stability Pact?*  
Marseilles, France  
Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies
- 24-26 June  
*Towards A Just and Comprehensive Settlement of the Question of Palestine*  
UN Headquarters, New York  
UN North American NGO Symposium on the Question of Palestine
- 24-29 August  
*National Democratic Institute's International Visitors Forum*  
Chicago, Illinois, USA
- 25-29 August  
*The Responsibility of Jews, Christians and Muslims Towards Peace in Jerusalem*  
Thessaloniki, Greece
- 1-4 September  
*Alliances and International Security*  
International Institute For Strategic Studies, London  
Dresden, Germany
- 2-4 September  
*Building NGO Partnerships for a Just and Comprehensive Settlement of the Question of Palestine*  
UN International NGO Meeting/European NGO Symposium "Question of Palestine"  
Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland
- 21-22 September  
*The Middle East in the World Today*  
The Australian Middle East Studies Association / Monash University
- 11-12 October  
*Stability Pact for the Mediterranean*  
Foundation for International Studies  
Valetta, Malta
- 7 November  
*The Role of Higher Education under an Independent Palestinian State*  
An-Najah University, Nablus
- 10 November  
*Tourism and Archeology in Jerusalem*  
Al-Quds University, Hind Al-Husseini Faculty of Arts  
Public Relations Office, Al-Quds University
- 11 November

- 28-30 November  
*Political & Security Cooperation: Armament, Disarmament and Confidence Building*  
EuroMeSCo Working Group Meeting  
Rabat, Morocco
- 1-4 December  
*The Middle East Peace Process - Three Years After Oslo*  
Madrid, Spain  
CERI
- 2-3 December  
*The Arabs in Israeli Politics: Dilemmas of Identity*  
The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies / Program on Arab Politics in Israel  
Tel Aviv University
- 12 December  
*Palestinian Public Finance: The Present Tax System in the West Bank and Gaza*  
Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS)  
MAS Lecture Hall, Ramallah
- 15 December  
*Sustainable Development: New Concepts in Environment Management and Planning*  
EcoPeace: Middle East Environmental NGO Forum  
Jericho Center for Culture and Art, Jericho
- 15-17 December  
*Freedom of Speech and Incitement against Democracy*  
Hyatt Regency Hotel, Jerusalem  
Center for Human Rights, Hebrew University
- 18 December  
*Expectations for the Future Role of the Municipalities: Acquaintance with Municipality's Roles, Responsibilities and Municipalities Draft Law*  
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Jerusalem  
Municipality Hall, Al-Bireh
- 20-21 December  
*Readings on the Palestinian Basic Law's Project*  
The Center for Religious Studies in the Holy Land  
Bethlehem Hotel, Bethlehem

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## THE PASSIA DIARY

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### Introduction

To present relevant historical facts, figures, events, addresses and statistics related to Palestine in a widely accessible form, PASSIA invented its diary in 1988. At that time, it did not realize the extent of the vacuum it helped to fill. Each year ever since, PASSIA has made efforts to improve and extend its diary and it can be said that the diary has become an invaluable source of information on Palestinian institutions, affairs and issues, both here and abroad. Throughout each year PASSIA updates existing information and adds new data and documentation as it becomes available.

The 1997 edition contains 270 pages, divided into three sections:

The first section of the desk diary is the comprehensive **Directory**, which contains details of Palestinian and international institutions operating in the Palestinian Territories. The comprehensiveness of the directory is unique and makes it an invaluable resource for all those interested in or working on the Palestine Question. Among the information provided one finds names of contact persons, phone and fax numbers, e-mail and mailing addresses, and a brief mission statement for each organization. Directory entries include:

- Ministries, Agencies and Institutions of the PNA
- Associations & Unions
- Economic, Educational & Financial Institutions
- Local and Foreign NGOs
- Media Agencies & Press Offices
- Offices & Institutions of the Service Sector
- Refugee Camps
- Local Government & Municipalities
- Hotels & Restaurants
- Offices dealing with Computer & Communication
- Research Centers
- Charitable Institutions
- Cultural Centers
- Human Rights Organizations
- Health Organizations
- Diplomatic Missions
- Religious Forums
- Women's Organizations
- Air Lines & Travel Agencies
- Agriculture & Industry

- a day by day planner
- calendars for the previous and following years
- address and note space
- dates of importance to Palestine and wider international affairs, anniversaries and national holidays of foreign countries

The final section of the diary consists of the **PASSIA Agenda**, a source of information and facts about the Palestine Question and contemporary Palestinian society.

The agenda begins with 14 brief chapters in which many aspects of Palestinian society and the Palestine Question are described, supported by many tables, statistics and suggestions for further reading. These **Facts & Figures on Palestine** include the following sub-categories:

- |  |                                   |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| ● History (late Ottoman and Mandate periods) | ● Israeli Occupation & Intifada   |
| ● PLO, Palestinian Politics and Factions     | ● Geography                       |
| ● Population                                 | ● Religion                        |
| ● Refugees                                   | ● Settlements                     |
| ● Economy                                    | ● Education                       |
| ● Health                                     | ● Land & Water                    |
| ● Human Rights                               | ● State Building & Administration |

Another major section of the agenda is devoted to **Jerusalem**, including:

- a comprehensive historical chronology
- facts and figures of the city from the past until today
- demographic information
- Israeli policies and practices
- details of settlements in and around the city
- a bibliography.

The final part of the agenda includes a detailed **Chronology on Palestinian Contemporary History**, i.e. from the beginning of the peace process to the present day, (1993-1996) as well as a selection of partly colored **Maps**, including geopolitical maps of West Bank districts, maps of Jerusalem, Gaza, and of Palestine within the Middle East.

### **PASSIA DIARY 1997**

by **PASSIA Research Staff**, November 1996, (English, pp. 272).

# 7.

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## PASSIA JOINT PROJECT 1995/96

Building a Base for Common Scholarship  
and Understanding -

PALESTINE - JORDAN - ISRAEL  
in the New Era of the Middle East

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### Introduction

Three players at the heart of the transformation process the Middle East is undergoing are Palestine, Jordan and Israel, and despite the importance of internationally applauded agreements reached between them during 1993 and 1994, the real process of achieving durable peace among the people has only just begun. There are many obstacles which could prevent the peace process from reaching the conclusions broadly aspired to: moreover, misunderstandings and mistrust generated by decades of conflict still exist in the general outlook of each of the societies involved.

Against this background, three institutes - one Palestinian (PASSIA), one Jordanian (Center for Strategic Studies) and one Israeli (Moshe Dayan Center) - consulted together and decided that a significant contribution can be made to resolving differences and promoting understanding by pooling their resources and their expertise through a program of dialogue, presentation of position papers and workshops.

The three institutes found that the comprehensive amount of knowledge accumulated on each of the entities independently, regarding their separate identities and existence, their histories and their relationship to others in the region, too often remained the exclusive preserve of each individual country. The workshops were designed to address particular subjects and to develop a forum for open, multilateral dialogue which promotes an analytical approach to the relevant issues.

### Partner Institutions

#### **1. THE PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (PASSIA), JERUSALEM.**

PASSIA was established in 1987 as an independent non-profit making Palestinian institution, unaffiliated with any government, political party or organization, which undertakes studies and research on the Palestine Question in its national, Arab and international contexts. PASSIA has accumulated considerable experience in academic research, pub-



connections and academic scholarly exchange have been established with institutions, and scholars in Europe and North America. Thus, PASSIA has access to an extensive pool of Palestinian academic expertise as well as links with Israeli and international institutions. It has a proven record of dialogue, symposia and workshops - international, inter-regional and intra-Palestinian - which have always been open, self-critical and conducted in a spirit of harmony and cooperation.

## **2. THE MOSHE DAYAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN STUDIES AT TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY, TEL AVIV**

The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies is a research center devoted to the study of modern history and contemporary affairs in the Middle East. It was first established as the Shiloah Institute in 1959 under the auspices of the Israel Oriental Society. In 1965, it was incorporated into Tel Aviv University and 1983 saw the establishment of the present center which combined the Shiloah Institute and various documentation units dealing with the Middle East. The center is funded by the University of Tel Aviv and by its own endowment.

The Moshe Dayan Center seeks to impart a better understanding of the Middle East - past and present - to academic and general audiences in Israel and abroad. Some of its conferences have dealt with *Shi'ism and Politics*, *Iranian Foreign Policy*, *Central Asia, the Middle East*, *Minorities in the Middle East*, the *Intifada*, and *Demography and Politics in the Region*. Since 1976, the center has produced the *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, an annual account of political, socioeconomic change in the Middle East. The center also contains an outstanding documentation center which includes the most comprehensive collection of post-1950 Arabic press in the world. The center is the largest of its kind in Israel with some 25 research associates and a large number of support staff.

## **3. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF JORDAN, AMMAN**

The Center for Strategic Studies was established in 1984, and its first director was Dr. Kamal Abu Jabr. The objectives of the center have always been to conduct research studies in the fields of politics, economics, social science, and military issues.

The center succeeded, together with the Al-Ahram Strategic Studies Center, in holding the first Arab conference on strategy and following this success, held two more. Three years ago, the center turned its attention to redefining the concept of strategy in line with new regional and global developments. It paid special attention to Jordanian related issues and strongly promoted the necessity of more far-sighted and long-term planning. The general direction of its research then became more focused on issues such as political change, the economy, democracy, demography, and the environment, and it was the first institute of its kind to conduct and publish a variety of wide ranging polls. Among others, the center established a unit for Israeli studies in order to study Israeli society and its development from an objective scientific approach.

## **4. ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES (RUSI), LONDON**

As part of the project, a conference was to be held in London. In order for the conference to succeed, the fourth partner involved in this project was the coordinator and facilitator of all activities in London on 1-2 July 1996. RUSI already had connections with PASSIA and the Dayan Center through previous programs and it is currently developing contact with the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman.

RUSI is a long-established, independent professional body based in London with worldwide membership of individuals and organizations, dedicated to the study, analysis and debate of issues affecting defense and international security. One of the oldest

institutions of its kind in the world, RUSI has been at the forefront of contemporary political-military thought through debates, public and private seminars, conferences, lectures and a wide range of publications.

## **5. INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR ARAB STUDIES (ICAS), AT MCGILL UNIVERSITY, MONTREAL**

The Inter-University Consortium for Arab Studies (ICAS), established in 1989, is a collaborative undertaking of McGill University and the University of Montreal together with other associated Canadian research institutions. It seeks to promote and facilitate research on issues concerning the Middle East and the Arab world as a whole.

In order to achieve this, ICAS has pursued four mandates dealing with the following:

- the encouragement of academic and research cooperation;
- providing research resources to students and scholars;
- conducting specific research projects on the contemporary Middle East;
- supporting training and research of an emerging generation of Canadian scholars.

Encouraged by the Canadian Embassy in Tel Aviv as well as by the substance of the project, the Department of Political Science of the McGill University approached PASSIA in 1994, proposing to be the fifth partner involved in the project.

## **The Project**

The intention of the project was to draw on the expertise of each of the three regional institutions and to allow specialists to meet on an equal footing in order to discuss specific issues of mutual interest.

The emphasis was on domestic developments in the three societies as an understanding of the countries and the people among whom peace is intended to prevail is a prerequisite for any conflict to be truly resolved, and gaining an objective awareness of the outlook in societies next door is part of the process. Each of the eight workshops was to involve nine scholars, three from each institution, chosen according to their expertise on each of the designated topics. It was decided that one scholar from each team would present a paper which would then be discussed by the remaining participants.

## **The Workshops**

### **WORKSHOP ONE: Domestic Constraints on Middle East Negotiations** *14-16 July 1995, PASSIA, Jerusalem*

#### **The Palestinian Team:**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA  
Dr. Riad Malki, Director, Panorama Center for the Dissemination of Information, Jerusalem  
Professor Said Zeedani, Professor of Philosophy, Birzeit University

#### **The Jordanian Team:**

Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director, Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, Amman

#### **The Israeli Team:**

Dr. Asher Susser, Head, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv  
Dr. Elie Rekhess, Senior Researcher, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies  
Professor Yohanan Peres, Sociologist, Tel Aviv University



Professor Yonanan Peres mentioned the following *obstacles to peace* Israel is facing:

*Structural considerations:* these aggravate concession-making and include: the smallness of the three territories (Jordan, Israel, Palestine), in all regards (economy, security, etc.); the deep historical cleavages and mistrust due to the long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict; an Israeli leadership which thinks of peace first in terms of CVs, power and positions; a religious competition between Judaism vs. Islam and Christianity; and the internal religious conflict between secularists and religious observers.

*The historical context of the peace process:* Zionism and Palestinian nationalism are "second-wave" national movements. The military sphere is replaced by "unification" and "cooperation" in fields such as the economy and culture, etc. This is still new and people are confused by the picture of the enemy who has now become an "ally."

*The "Masada-Complex":* the fear of defeat still exists and has caused Jewish hypersensitivity to anti-Semitism. For Israelis today the question is not whether the Arabs are motivated to fight us - this is taken for granted anyway - but whether they have the opportunity to do so, and whether they would take it.

*The issue of consistency:* Jordan, Israel and Palestine are all incapable of surviving without external allies, which they must consistently keep interested. Today's concessions center around questions such as if the argument for Hebron to be returned to the Palestinians is that it is Arab land, then what about Jaffa? Where is the line to be drawn for concessions since the whole of Israel is built on Arab land? What is the justification for returning one place but not the other?

*Constraint of the electoral balance:* the Israeli electoral situation is characterized by a long-term balance with small fluctuations, between two major parties, which are often dependent on coalition with rather insignificant groups. The Rabin coalition is built on a majority of less than 0.5% over the right wing opposition! This creates a very unstable situation. Such "skin-majorities" are typical results and any organized minority - such as Russian immigrants (10%) - could claim to be *the* crucial coalition partner without which it would be impossible to win the next elections. Furthermore, the borders between the parties are quite blurred: there are MKs in the current Knesset who are in fact much closer to the Likud or right wing.

*Public opinion:* a public opinion poll (June 1995) about the peace process has shown a gradual but clear decline of support for the peace process. The response indicates also that general principles are easier to reach than specific ones: 60% agreed in general on the "Concept of Peace," while only 38% agreed on the actual "Oslo Agreement." Mistrust still proves to be strong with 71% fearing that the Arabs would destroy Israel if they could. Only 36% believe that the Oslo Accords will lead to peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and only 48% believe that peace between Arabs and Israel is possible in the near future.

**Discussion:** Ashkenasi vs. Sephardi Jews; Arab-Israelis and their parties; Islamic fundamentalists in Israel and Hamas; Israeli elections 1996; peace process; Arab Druze; land confiscation and Israeli "morality"; security concerns; coexistence in the Middle East.

## **Domestic Constraints on Middle East Negotiations - A Jordanian Perspective** **by Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh**

Dr. Hamarneh listed the following main *constraints to peace* from Jordan's perspective:

*Lack of information:* e.g., Jordanians were not aware about Israel's occupation of Jordanian land until Madrid, when this issue was put on the agenda.

*Public opinion:* following the peace treaty with Israel, Jordanians witnessed neither a change in the Israeli attitude towards them, nor any economic benefits. For the people it is as if they contributed to the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but did so while

failing to settle the refugee problem and the Jerusalem question, and by selling out the Palestinian people on the West Bank.

*The government's attitudes and policies:* since the secret initiation of peace, a lot of censorship as well as other forms of oppression has occurred, and democratic achievements are on the wane.

**Discussion:** Jordanian-Palestinian relationship; Arab states and normalization with Israel; King Hussein-Arafat relations; what comes after the King?; political elite in Jordan; Palestinian Authority - performance and relation with Jordan.

## Domestic Constraints on Middle East Negotiations - A Palestinian Perspective by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

### Background

With the Intifada, Palestinians entered a new chapter in their struggle for freedom and independence; family/clan policies faded away and a new generation of young middle class activists emerged. After the phase of *sumud* (steadfastness), these new activists aimed at changing the *status quo*: the establishment of the state of Palestine now comprised only 22% of historical Palestine, i.e., for the first time, the West Bank and Gaza appeared as the territory for the future state, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

During the Middle East peace negotiations, the Palestinians inside delivered the "PISGA" (Palestinian Interim Self Government Arrangements) Plan which consisted basically of a national authority, a transitional phase, Israeli military withdrawal and elections. The "inside" attempted to lead, while the "outside" (PLO) was far away. Therefore, the PLO opened five secret channels of negotiations, one of which was Oslo and led to the DoP, thereby putting the PLO in the driver's seat again.

### Constraints Concerning the Current Process

- *Jerusalem* (land, demography, Israeli closure policy, Palestinian institutions).
- *Palestinian national legitimacy*: Palestinian national legitimacy is institutionalized in the PLO (PNC, Central Council, Executive Committee), but following Oslo, all of these institutions were challenged by pro- and anti-Oslo issues, the domestic vs. Diaspora leadership argument, and the question whether the PNA's performance was satisfactory or not. The leadership is witnessing a crisis: the Arafat-appointed figures are not real leaders, nor are they recognized, and only elections can deliver new faces and new thinking while legitimizing leaders. As for now, though, the elections are designed as "Fatah-elections." Another problem is the national political agenda vs. cities' agenda: Hebron and Gaza for example, are "special cases" and we can expect others under the Israeli concept of redeployment. It makes it almost impossible to unite everyone under one agenda. The problem of the special cases threatens to replace the national cause, and there is also not a single place to which everyone has access in order to meet and discuss. The Israeli agenda aims at a "Ghettoization" of Palestine. The geopolitical fragmentation leads inevitably to a national fragmentation of the people, and to division and competition of interests.
- *Performance of the PNA*: the competence and credibility of officials are questioned, and despite a huge number of civil and security staff nothing seems to move. Regarding the negotiations agenda and the negotiators: Arafat is dealing autocratically with his staff, and there are neither clear responsibilities nor continuity within the negotiation team. Other problems regard confusion regarding spending, accountability, institutions, civil servants and police.
- *Legal system*: the current legal situation in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip is still a "jungle," a combination of Egyptian, Jordanian, Israeli and British (Mandate) laws and by-laws. The shape of a future Palestinian constitution is still unclear, as are future internal and external security arrangements, the status of religion, and new Palestinian laws.



- *Revival of the Jordanian option*: cooperation between Jordan and Palestine will be necessary but we need to build a relationship.
- *Prospects: possible scenarios*: (a) the existence of two *de facto* bi-national states: Jordan (Palestinian-Jordanian) and Israel (Israeli-Palestinian) with one nation always having less rights and opportunities than the other; (b) a clear divorce, accompanied by a leadership legitimized through elections, a Palestinian entity on Palestinian national soil, and a Palestinian state; (c) Jordan having a say on the West Bank while Palestinian issues are pending and not yet resolved.

**Discussion:** PLO vs. PNA; ideological and leadership crises within PLO bodies; current legitimacy and coming elections; future negotiations; Palestinian-Jordanian relations; refugee issue; PNA performance and future prospects; Palestinian opposition; Palestinian sovereignty; the amendment of the Palestinian covenant.

## **WORKSHOP TWO: The Opposition and its Role in the Peace Process** 24-25 November 1995, PASSIA, Jerusalem

### **The Palestinian Team:**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA  
Dr. Riad Malki, Director, Panorama - Center for the Dissemination of Information, Jerusalem  
Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Former Spokeswoman, Palestinian Delegation to the Middle East Peace Talks

### **The Jordanian Team:**

Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director, Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, Amman

### **The Israeli Team:**

Dr. Asher Susser, Head, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv  
Dr. Elie Rekhess, Senior Researcher, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies  
Professor Ephraim Yaar, Head, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University  
Dr. Tamar Hermann, Director, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research

### **Summary:**

## **The Opposition and its Role in the Peace Process - A Palestinian Perspective** *by Dr. Riad Malki*

There has never been a classical opposition in Palestine, on the one hand because there were no elections, and thus no government-opposition situation, on the other, because opposition exists only regarding specific issues (e.g., the peace process), but not in general. *Vis-à-vis* other topics (e.g., the occupation) there is often unity among the factions. The opposition lacks the experience of being an opposition; it does not know how to play the role properly.

The Palestinian people experienced separation between factions only on certain issues but disputes always ended with a reconciliation, so no real "feeling" for opposition has developed. Furthermore, the concept of opposition found no space within the PLO system which is based on and functions by consensus. Thus, even during the last 18 months, perhaps with a few exceptions, the public never saw a serious confrontation between the PNA and the opposition. Relations are rather characterized by the development of a dialogue between the two camps.

Today, the opposition has two basic options: to find and define an entirely new role, or to continue its traditional role with some possible extensions. For the time being, the opposition has chosen the second option: not to destroy what the PNA tries to build, and to 'swallow' policies and decisions rather than actively display real opposition. The existence of such a loyal opposition is to the PNA's advantage, and there is no real threat of a civil war.

Previously, the opposition *did* prevent peace initiatives since they were regarded as failing to achieve justice and the recognition of Palestinian rights. After the Gulf War



and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, however, new realities emerged and made it impossible to talk in the old terms regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This made the opposition look at Madrid in a new way which could best be described as the *concept of phases*: it became more pragmatic and receptive to the idea of various stages which eventually will lead to a Palestinian state.

The opposition differs between the Jerusalem-Madrid-Washington stage and the Oslo/post-Oslo stage of the peace process. The first stage is considered the "premature" stage since the opposition was still in the making, did not materialize in terms of actions/statements and did not even seriously count with an outcome of the peace negotiations as all previous peace initiatives had failed.

With the shock of Oslo the "mature" stage began. The opposition felt it was time to respond and increased its political activity considerably: meetings and lobbying took place in order to create public opinion, and military actions were launched, although initially by the Islamic opposition rather than the PFLP or DFLP.

The position of today's opposition can be best described as "rejectionism." As things develop and the PNA sets up offices, the activity of the opposition declines, although the PNA's policy of detaining members of the opposition groups has also played a role in restricting opposition activities. Another factor is that the DFLP/PFLP were always attached to the PLO system; therefore, they have opted for "contained confrontation," i.e., confrontation, but with recognized limits in order not to reach a point of no return in regard to their relation with the PNA. In contrast, Hamas and Islamic Jihad were neither used to the PLO style and leadership (Arafat) nor bound by traditional ties, and thus went beyond certain limits, launching numerous military attacks on Israeli targets.

After Oslo, the opposition began to discuss among themselves and with the PNA the new relationship between the two sides. Initially, the opposition decided not to deal with the PNA at all but when pressure started mounting the leadership outside was forced to revise its position. Now, its members contact Arafat on certain matters. The PNA, however, has more of an interest in maintaining contact with Hamas because of its military actions which are counterproductive to the PNA's activities.

The opposition is still preoccupied with more pressing current issues such as Oslo I and II and the coming elections, so it has not yet had time to discuss the permanent status negotiations and its role regarding them. It can be assumed though that its role will be very limited, due, in part, to the existing sense of continuity as far as the negotiators are concerned which doesn't leave place for the opposition. The opposition sees its future in representation in local councils (i.e., village or municipal councils), from where it will be able to articulate its opposition. Furthermore, it sees peace as a risk which it does not want to take. Thus, Fatah decides, takes the risk and pays the price while the opposition prefers to see what happens and then to decide if it agrees or not.

**Discussion:** the opposition during the Intifada; the opposition's failure to present an alternative agenda; evolution of the PLO outside vs. development of the political structure inside and their *de facto* competition; anti-systemic vs. systemic opposition; Islamic vs. secular opposition; opposition during the state-building process; Palestinian elections; Syria and its impact on the opposition.

## **The Opposition and its Role in the Peace Process - A Jordanian Perspective** **by Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh**

The process of political development and participation in Jordan has some unique characteristics starting with the Jordanian state being a result of territorial reconstruction in the region following World War I. Jordan has developed from without while other states are usually built from within.

1989 saw an unprecedented democratization campaign. In April 1989, it became clear, however, that the Palestinian community of Jordan was out of the game; the elections

step back from democratization and the beginning of an "erosion" regarding the King's popularity. Jordan's economic opening to the West, which was soon followed by a political opening, might have strengthened the government but was not actually approved by the people.

At the beginning of the peace process with Israel, the opposition said it could understand Jordan's need for peace but stressed that it could not agree due to its own point of view. The government became increasingly authoritarian, banning the opposition almost entirely from the media and meetings under the pretext of securing the peace treaty. However, a poll conducted in August 1994 showed that two-thirds of the population supported the Washington Declaration [July 1995], mainly for the sake of ending the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the people were very doubtful about Israel's seriousness.

In Jordanian elections, it is almost impossible to run along issues as patronage (services) and tribalism still play a major role. A constituency build on tribal structures and the state of the Palestinian-Jordanian relationship are two aspects that effect the opposition considerably. Even Palestinians who feel comfortable in Jordan are, after all, Palestinians. This self-defense mechanism traces back to the exclusion of Palestinians from the entire Jordanian bureaucracy/public sector. This discrimination has forced many Palestinians to emigrate (Gulf countries) or into business. A recent study by the Center for Strategic Studies has shown that today, 83-84% of the capital of the Jordanian private sector is Palestinian-owned. While the public sector is almost entirely occupied by Jordanians, the private sector is mostly in Palestinian hands.

Sooner or later the public sector must be reduced; this will affect mainly Jordanians. At the same time, the private sector becomes more powerful. Reforms are urgently needed and should include more innovation, new forms of property rights, and more Palestinian participation, etc., all of which would have a positive effect on the redistribution of the domestic income. Such reforms need state intervention, however, and the government does not show any movement in this direction.

**Discussion:** King's legitimacy (Western, Israeli, Jordanian viewpoint); Jordan's democratization process; Jordan-Israeli peace; ethnicity and identity in Jordan; issue of Hashemite vs. Jordanian; Jordan's plans vis-à-vis the West Bank and Iraq; King Hussein-Arafat relations; return of refugees; Islamic fundamentalism in Jordan; security issues.

### **The Opposition and its Role in the Peace Process - An Israeli Perspective by Professor Ephraim Yaar**

Israel's political parties and their stand towards the peace process have to be seen against the background of their historical evolution. The roots of Israel's main political parties and their characteristics go back to the formative years of the *Yishuv* (pre-state era). Parties were formed as soon as Jewish settlement began, i.e., in the 1920s. Israel represents a classical case of *Parteienstaat*, where political parties play a more important role and have greater influence than in other democracies because they and their constituencies have always been strongly ideological. Today's parties have - in their identity and ideology - emerged from those in the pre-state era.

Israel's multi-party system dates back to the beginning of Zionism. It developed due to two main reasons:

- The electoral system of "relative representation," invented in order to allow wide support and participation among the various Jewish communities in Europe. A major result of this was the need to form coalition governments ever since.
- The ideological cleavages within the Zionist movement, within which the underlying ideologies have been the same for about 100 years. This has contributed to the development of a multi-party system, since the creation of many smaller parties is very likely if political parties are formed on ideological rather than pragmatic bases.



The political spectrum during the *Yishuv* reflected the three ideological dimensions:

- socialist vs. capitalist vision of society;
- strategy/attitudes vis-à-vis a) England and b) the Arab world (accommodation vs. conflict);
- secular-religious issue.

After 1948, the Israeli political structure remained much the same. The change came with the War of 1967, when Israel witnessed an unprecedented revival of nationalism, particularly among the religious Jewish-Orthodox communities. Previously, the religious camp was mainly interested in annual budgets and its representation in the government. With the occupation, a "messianic spirit and vision" re-emerged. Particularly the younger members of the religious parties became the spearhead of the national forces, joined the radical secular right and laid the foundation for an ideological joint venture between the religious and secular ultra-nationalists. Since then, the political spectrum of Israel can be described along a single dimension: the left-right continuum, now expressing where someone stands towards the Arab/Palestine-Israeli conflict. (In the current Knesset, 56 members out of 120 are left while the remainder, i.e., the majority, are right.)

Today, when examining the attitudes towards the peace process in terms of the degree of religious adherence, one finds that religious observance is the main parameter. A poll of 29 October 1995 confirmed the general rule: the more religious one self-defines himself, the less likely he is to support the peace process. Most supporters come from the secular camp, but many of those would not go as far as supporting the evacuation of settlements, for example, for the sake of peace.

**Discussion:** Rabin assassination and effect on Israeli political system/peace process/elections; secular vs. religious vs. national forces; the implication of Rabin's assassination for the religious right; right wing settlers and their future; de-legitimization of right wing groups vs. decline of democratic values within Israel.

### **WORKSHOP THREE: Religion and State**

*9-10 February 1996, PASSIA, Jerusalem*

#### **The Palestinian Team:**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA

Dr. Riad Malki, Director, Panorama Center for the Dissemination of Information, Jerusalem

Dr. Giries Khoury, Head, Al-Liqa Center for Religious and Heritage Studies in the Holy Land, Bethlehem

Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Director, Islamic Cultural Society, Jerusalem

#### **The Jordanian Team:**

Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman

Hani M. Hourani, Director General of Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, Amman

Musa Shteivi, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Faculty of Arts, University of Jordan, Amman

#### **The Israeli Team:**

Dr. Asher Susser, Senior Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University

Dr. Benyamin Neuberger, Professor of Political Science at the Open University of Israel, Tel Aviv

Dr. Martin Kramer, Head, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University

#### **Canadian Embassy:**

Mrs. Sandra McCardell, Canadian Dialogue Fund, Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv

### **Summary:**

#### **Religion and State - A Palestinian Christian Perspective by Dr. Giries Khoury**

The topic on today's agenda is very sensitive and important. As a Christian, I cannot just talk about my faith without carefully considering the context. Judaism and Islam are

minorities in the state.

In Verse 1 of the New Testament (Mark 12,17) it is written that Jesus was given a coin and was asked what he intended to do with it. His answer was: give to Caesar what is for Caesar and to God what belongs to God. This is a political message. The Jews lived under the Roman Empire ruled by Caesar but they were also subject to God's rules. Jesus said: "Having faith in God does not mean that you have to believe in a political order or a particular state. God and faith are above space and time and politics. As a citizen however, you have political responsibilities." While the New Testament provides that God is God for all people with no exclusivism, one can read in the Old Testament that God is the God for the chosen people. Jesus discontinued this philosophy by preaching that God does not select but is for all people. He thus overcame the theocratic characteristic of the Old Testament. Jesus did not come to establish kingdoms or political systems. He stated: "My kingdom is not in this world." Jesus wanted to avoid ties between politics and faith; he did not call for a theocratic state nor for revolting against the political state. He made a clear separation between the two spheres.

The first three centuries of church history were influenced by the Roman Empire which suppressed the church. The religious vision was opposed to the state vision. The former was characterized by a heavenly piety which made the Christians accept suppression and suffering because they believed that eventually their kingdom would come (Matthew 5).

After 1300 AD, the state and the church merged, with the latter being liberated after 300 years of oppression. The Roman Emperor became a Christian but the Roman mentality did not Christianize. The Emperor wanted both power and faith. He controlled the Church using the justification that he was a member of the Christian community. The second step was when the western Roman Empire perished and the church filled the political vacuum, marking the beginning of the conflict between the papacy and the state/emperor.

At present, we have some countries where Christianity is the official religion of the state but both church and state have their own responsibilities. The differences lie in the ways they are cooperating. The state is built on a political system, which is accepted by the church unless it suppresses faith. Christian parties have a negative implication for Christians because Christianity is a faith and not a political program.

Despite the separation between the faith and state, believers are still members of the state and agree with or reject the state's policy ('religion is from heaven, believers are from earth'). The problem is that religion is often misused and conflicts are being theologized, with the Bible and the Qur'an being exploited for political purposes or other human goals.

Palestinian Christians are a religious minority. I wish to see a Palestinian democratic system in which all religions are accepted and respected on an equal basis, and in which people of all faiths are granted their basic rights such as freedom, the right to criticize and to raise the voice. The Christian faith is a revolutionary one and this is why I believe in a Christian-Palestinian contextual liberation theology. Democracy does not mean minimizing the importance of faith. Christianity itself has been built on democratic principles and in a pluralistic context. Jesus gave the message that one is free to follow him but will not be forced to do so. In an Arabic-Islamic state on the other hand, an Arab Christian will not feel equal. Only a real separation between state and faith will allow the full and equal participation of all members of society regardless of their faith.

**Discussion:** Muslim-Christian relations in the Holy Land; Omar Ibn Al-Khattab Covenant in the past and today; Christian quota in the Palestinian elections; Christian dogma vs. Muslim culture; Palestinian Christians as a minority; Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world; Christian participation in the emerging Palestinian political system; future state's way of dealing with matters such as divorce and marriage, education, etc.

## Religion and State - An Israeli Perspective by Dr. Benny Neuberger

In an Israeli context, the topic should read *Religion-Nation-State*: most government crises in Israel have occurred due to religious issues and not political ones. The Israeli case is different from the Christian case because we are dealing with a one-religion nation. The word 'nation' in a Jewish context is always related to religion. There are three general observations to be made:

- The Israeli Declaration of Independence is very secular in its wording but does include religious phrases linking the people to the land.
- Religion is a unifying element in Israeli society and politics.
- In Israel, a phenomenon - known in sociology as civil religion - is very widespread: traditional religious symbols become symbols for people regardless of their religious origin. Hardly anyone knows the meaning of the Menorah, for example, but it is accepted as a symbol of Israel.

Five main groups can be identified within the Jewish population:

- *Secularists*, i.e., non-believers; only 'civil religion' in terms of holidays, Shabbat as the day off.
- *Liberals*, believe to some extent/might go to synagogue; believe that the state has to be secular while religion is part of the private sphere.
- *Traditionalists*, believe that the state should be separated from religion but against civil marriage and reform-Judaism; quite happy with the *status quo*.
- The *National-Religious* camp, wants a religious state; religious Zionists; ready to cooperate with government.
- *Ultra-Orthodox* (Haredim), anti-Zionist, believe that only the Messiah can found the Jewish state; reject the establishment of the state of Israel as an irreligious act.

At their time of founding, none of the religions was democratic. Liberalism and civil rights are therefore not part of the Jewish religious system. What we have in Judaism is freedom of religion (i.e., the freedom of worship for all religions) and freedom from religion (i.e., the freedom to be non-religious). The system of marriage and divorce is bound to Orthodox procedures, often violating individual rights, especially those of people with no religion.

The widespread acceptance of the *status quo* in Israel is mainly in order to avoid conflicts. All governments stress that they will maintain the *status quo*, the formula of which goes back to 1947 when certain promises were made in order to obtain the support of the religious camp for the establishment of an independent state. These "promises," the interpretation of which causes problems until today, included:

- the commitment to observe Shabbat as the day of rest;
- the commitment to follow Kashrut laws and to serve only kosher food in public;
- the exclusion of the possibility to introduce civic laws concerning marriage and divorce.

Among possible Israeli tactics to deal with such *status quo* problems are the following:

- to transfer the issue of conflict to the local public/respective municipality (allows for differentiation between secular and Orthodox neighborhoods);
- to transfer the issue to courts (ruling precedences, e.g., on whether TVs may be switched on on Shabbat or not);
- to transfer the issue into an informal debate within the coalition (trying to find a compromise).

The Israeli system is one of recognized religious communities, all of which have the right to autonomy regarding their own institutions and procedures for marriage and divorce. Institutions include: *Chief Rabbinate; religious courts; local Rabbinate and the religious councils; Ministry of Religious Affairs; schools (state school/religious-Zionist state school/*



## Religion and State - A Palestinian-Muslim Perspective by Sheikh Jamil Hamami

*Living conditions in the Arab Peninsula at the time when Islam appeared.*

Islam came to transform the marginalized Arab society that was mostly distinguished by the following features:

- *Ignorance:* some scholars interpret 'ignorance' as the opposite of knowledge, others as the opposite of tolerance.
- *Previous civilizations:* sculptured stones dating back to 1200 BC prove that civilizations existed in the Arab Peninsula at that time. The Al-Ghasasenah monarchy for example, established a semi-autonomous system protected by the Byzantians and under the Persians, the Al-Hira monarchy lived in Iraq. In these systems, the social life was closely linked to the political one.
- *The character of Al-Hijaz:* Al-Hijaz is distinguished by the fact that Al-Ka'ba was established in its most famous city: Mecca. Before Islam, Arabs traveled there to honor and glorify it by performing the *haj*. They visited the place where Ibrahim and his son Isma'el built the base [for the Ka'ba]. The existence of town and other councils, alliances and tribal customary law proves that a special system governed the life and relations of the people. Islam gave them the responsibility to spread the new religion, its doctrine, worship and system. The cohesion between these three pillars enhanced the society's stability, strength and solidity in facing difficulties, and spread the foundations of justice, security and stability in people's life.

*The Islamic Governing System's Foundations:*

The governing system in Islam is set up on solid foundations that leave room for action only within the space specified by the wise legislator (God). The source of all legislation is God. The *Mujtahid* (diligent) can judge on the basis of interpretation of the four *usul* and only within certain boundaries so that the judgment is not subject to human inclinations and moods. The most important foundations for governing in Islam are:

- *Freedom of religious belief:* everyone enjoys the freedom of thought, belief and behavior on the condition that it does not violate the freedom of others. Islam was possibly the first system to introduce the concept of freedom in society. Islam laid down freedom of the individual, freedom of religious belief and social and political freedoms 1200 years before human laws - dictated by the desires of their legislators - were written down. In the Holy Qur'an, God says: "There should be no compulsion in religion." Islam emerged in an environment of monotheistic religions; their believers were described as 'people of the book.'
- *Political freedom:* special attention was given to this freedom so as to allow the expression of ideas without fear and suppression.
- *Al-Shura (consultations):* consent and general acceptance with regard to certain issues are needed in order for the people to feel safe and justly treated. Islam legislated the principle of *Al-Shura* for guiding people's life like a basic law. It examines different ideas and viewpoints in order to be able to choose the best. As the Holy Qur'an tells the prophet: "and consult with them on the matter."
- *Justice and equality:* when Islam came people belonged to the classes of the masters or the classes of the slaves, who were obliged to serve the former without compensation. Islam introduced the concept of justice and equality regarding rights and duties - Muslims and non-Muslims alike - and put the principle of piety (i.e., commitment to God's rules) above everything else. Only then did the society of the Arab Peninsula stabilize. The absence of security in today's societies, as well as trust between the ruler and the ruled, is due to the fact that oppressive regimes are prevailing.

**Discussion:** minority issue; religiously determined places of conflict (*e.g. Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi*); Jewish *Halacha* and Islamic *Shari'a*; *Dawla Islamiyya* and *Dawla Yahudiyye*; constitutions and basic laws and their role vis-à-vis religious issues; Islamic political parties; Islamic state-building; religious legislation; Palestinian draft constitution.

## Religion and State - A Jordanian Perspective by Musa Shteivi

The more we witness a rise of Islam the more is the Arab-Islamic world challenged, especially against the background of a worldwide democratization process and pressure from within our states to initiate such a process following a long period of non-participation by citizens.

### *The Relationship Between State and Religion and Legitimacy:*

Religion has always been an important source of legitimacy for the Hashemite rulers in Jordan. The Hashemite dynasty traces back to the Prophet's family and due to this descentance the Hashemites claim to a certain degree the "divine" right to rule the country. The Jordanian monarchy did not get its legitimacy from the people but from this lineage. On the other hand, the Jordanian constitution was imposed through the Hashemite relation to the British and is, therefore, rather liberal. The government has taken a dual position. The incorporation of Islam into the state occurred due to its highly ideological nature and has repeatedly been used to counter other political trends.

### *State, Religion and Constitutionalism:*

As a constitutional monarchy, Jordan concentrates the power in its government with the King on top. The Jordanian constitution is largely liberal, guaranteeing equality for everyone in the eyes of the law, although Islam is the official religion. At the end of the 1980s, Jordan faced a socioeconomic and legitimacy crisis which led to the suspension of the constitution. This crisis led to the drafting of a feasible political program by a gathering of various people; the outcome was a covenant which states in Article 4 that Islam is the main source of legislation in Jordan. In brief, Jordan is heading in two directions: towards developing a modern legal system which governs the political (democratic), social and economic domains, and towards strengthening the *Sharia*, ruling over religious and related issues.

### *The State's Relation to Official, Religious and Islamic Movements:*

The state used religion for its own purposes. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, for example, is in the hands of the government. Thus, while the state is subservient with regard to the implementation of religious programs, it controls the religious sphere and its institutions. The Islamic movement, (i.e., Muslim Brotherhood), was the only group allowed to operate publicly, allowing it to become strong and efficient. It did not present itself as competitor to the state nor did it pose any threat, so the state supported it and used the movement to fight other threats such as communism (carrot-and-stick policy). When the Islamists won over 30% of the votes (1989), they began to act politically; consequently, the government began worrying and arrested several members of the Brotherhood. The peak of the Islamic rise was at a time when Jordan faced a serious economic crisis and during/after the Gulf War. Later, when political parties were legalized and the peace process began, the influence and strength of the Islamists gradually declined (currently 16 seats in the government).

### *The Presence of Religion within the State and the Society:*

The prominence of religion within the state's structures indicates the need for the state to be identified with religion. Examples: Ramadan (working hours and length of university/school classes, no sale of food, smoking, drinking and eating in public); places for prayer in schools, universities and other public institutions.

### *Restrictions on Religious Freedom in Jordan:*

Muslims are restricted from changing their religion; Muslim women cannot marry a non-Muslim; women inherit less than men (non-Muslims nothing); women cannot transfer



political power/influence. The state has enforced the move towards civil society and democracy, but oppression occurs, resulting in an "empty" democracy. The state is at the threshold of political modernity but does not dare to cross. The reason is that the state is unable to create legitimacy as long as it relies on religion, from which it is not yet ready to disengage itself.

**Discussion:** Constitutions/PLO National Covenant of 1964; Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and its role in the 1989 elections; the question of Jerusalem and the city's religious significance; Hashemite family and its history; King Hussein's legitimacy; religious nature of Israel and Jordan; prospects of the peace process.

#### **WORKSHOP FOUR: Economics and Demography**

*18-19 April 1996, PASSIA, Jerusalem*

##### **The Palestinian Team:**

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Ms. Ailie Saunders, Head, Middle East Program, Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies (RUSI), London  
HE Richard Dalton, British Consul General, Jerusalem

#### **Summary:**

##### **Economics and Demography - A Jordanian Perspective by Hani Hourani**

##### *General observations:*

Economic and demographic factors in Jordan have a reciprocal relationship and it is difficult to separate one from the other. Jordan's socioeconomic development has always been and still is influenced by regional conditions and is affected by the consequences of regional disputes, be it the Arab-Israeli conflict in general or particular events such as the Gulf War.

##### *Population and demography:*

Jordan's total population was 4,139,458 in 1994 - among them 1,193,339 Palestinians refugees registered with UNRWA. This implies a seven-fold increase since 1952 and an average annual growth rate of 4.7% (increased in 1991 with the return of expatriates from the Gulf). The average family consists of 6.2 persons. While in 1979, 50% of the population were 15 years old or younger, in 1994, only 41.1% fell into this category. The sex ratio is 100 females to each 109 males. 38% of the population live in the Amman district, followed by Irbid (18.2%) and Zarqa (15.4%). 92.4% of the population are Jordanian citizens while 7.6% are non-Jordanians. Illiteracy rates dropped from 48.2% (1979) to 20.6% (1994) among females, and from 18.9% to 9.8% among males. The rate of holders of secondary school certificates rose from 19.1% to 37.2% among males, and from 10.2% to 31.8% among females. 7.4% of the population are university graduates while 9% hold college degrees. 50.3% of the population over 18 years of age

are economically active (83.9%= males). The labor force (1994) was estimated at 949,000 people, among them 795,000 males. 9.7% of the population changed their residence within the country, moving outside their place of birth.

*Economy:*

Jordan's economy is affected by regional developments, immigration patterns and the internal distribution of the population (manpower concentrated in central Jordan). Historically, Jordan has been influenced by two main factors: its small economy and lack of natural resources (limited by its small population, low per-capita-income and internal productivity capacity, which have made it dependent on foreign aid and imported resources), and the influence of its geopolitical position. The government is the largest employer (employing an estimated 50% of the work force).

All this led to the expansion of imports and limitations of exports of Jordanian origin and an increase in government spending while no remarkable domestic revenues were available. While remittances from expatriates working abroad and, domestically, revenues from the tourism sector help balance the balance of trade and the balance of payments, Jordan relies on foreign loans and aid to offset its budget deficit. Jordan's spending on consumption exceeded the GDP considerably and investment depended on external financing. State development projects were mainly financed with foreign loans which eventually led to Jordan's inability to service its foreign debts, which stood at US\$11 billion in 1988. This led to negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reschedule the debts and to apply a structural adjustment program, which is still in force. In terms of labor, Jordan faces high unemployment rates, an absence of skilled workers, many of whom work in the Gulf, and an imbalance in its sectoral and professional distribution to the disadvantage of the commodity-producing sector.

Jordan's economy has achieved considerable growth, but mainly due to external funding and foreign aid, and without dealing with the underlying structural problems. Reforms are urgently needed, especially in the post-peace treaty era when competitiveness is becoming more important. Jordan has to reduce the economic role of the state while the private sector should be encouraged and government funds should be reallocated for infrastructural projects. Jordan has to create an attractive climate for investment. However, Jordan cannot be seen separated from its geopolitical context: its future will be affected to a great extent by the developments on the Israeli-Syria-Lebanon track, the PLO-Israeli final status negotiations, and the developments within the wider region.

**Discussion:** Jordan's GDP and prospects; impact of the peace process on the economy; the Gulf area and its meaning for Jordan; Jordan and the EU-Mediterranean partnership program; competitiveness in the region; Israel-Palestine-Jordan future economic links; priorities and opportunity costs for Jordan; underlying political structures; Jordan's population policy; refugee issue; population growth and policies; Jordanian expectations of peace dividends; possibility of Palestinian investment and capital flow into the West Bank and Gaza from Jordan; Palestinian-Jordanian confederation; regional integration.

## **Economics and Demography - A Palestinian Perspective** **by Dr. Osama Hamad**

The Palestinian economic capacity for job creation has traditionally been low and has led to huge migration rates. Emigration from 1982-90 was a relief for the employment market while now, there is negative immigration due to returnees and the coming young generation. Following the Gulf war, the availability of jobs in the Gulf and inside Israel decreased considerably, which means that the economy is now under extreme pressure to absorb the growing labor force.

*Long-term Development Prospects:*

A lasting and acceptable political solution will solve many problems and is the only basis for any real development of the Palestinian economy. Then, the economy will rely on experience, money and human capital from the Diaspora. What the inside lacks is qual-



tions. Changes in this regard will depend on future trade arrangements and labor laws. As for high-tech industries, our education system cannot provide the necessary skills and qualifications. Here, too, a strong linkage to the Diaspora will be crucial. As for future trade cooperation, total independence from Israeli interference is decisive, and this includes the need for our own port and airport. As for capital creation, there are still limits. Most banks have only (re)opened in the past two or three years and the banking sector is still in the making; banks are hardly used other than to deposit money or obtain loans. The main resource base for the Palestinian economy remains the Diaspora, but it needs incentives and a healthy investment environment, including free mobility of capital, an infrastructure for funds systems and legal regulations regarding investment and other economic activities. Government intervention needs to be kept to a minimum.

#### *Short-term Prospects:*

In the short-term perspective the main obstacle for development is political uncertainty. In addition, Israeli measures such as closures impose harsh restrictions on any development and make it impossible to deliver. Regarding many imports, Palestinians are bound to Israeli trade agreements and cannot compete with their Jordanian counterparts. While we have to import our leather from Italy for example, Jordan purchases it in South East Asia where the prices are 20-30% cheaper. Another problem is our linkage to the Israeli wage structure, which makes our workers too expensive. Because of credit risks, loans are still unavailable to the poorer members of society. There is a lot of potential for progress, especially regarding housing-related lending, but it will depend on external support. Furthermore, private sector initiatives need to be encouraged; incentives could be given by introducing investment insurance schemes or export insurance programs, limiting the risks of those willing to invest. Shortcomings of the agreements with Israel also hinder our development (e.g., the Paris Agreement provides that some US\$200 million of collected tariffs on imports go to Israel, not to the Palestinians). Israel has the right to veto on issues such as the Palestinian currency, and there is a pressing need to establish a Central Bank if we are to solve our liquidity problems. Lastly, we urgently need access to international markets.

**Discussion:** Investment structure and legal regulations in the Palestinian Territories; problems regarding transparency and monopolies; Palestinian competitiveness by sectors; free trade arrangements; taxes and revenues; Palestinians in the Israeli labor market - future prospects; Israeli intentions regarding Palestinian development.

## **Economics and Demography - An Israeli Perspective** *by Dr. Paul Rivlin*

Since 1990, the Israeli economy has grown rapidly, due to several reasons: There has been increased immigration from the former Soviet Union which has subsequently increased the demand for and the supply of labor. The peace process improved Israel's image and increased confidence in the region. This enabled Israel to import capital on a large scale and on favorable terms, which helped the effort to balance the deficit and finance the investment boom by supplier credits and loans; with the end of the Arab secondary boycott, foreign firms and banks began business with Israel. The burden of the defense budget was finally reduced, releasing resources for civilian uses and investment. The main growth occurred in the trade and service sector (by 12%), industry (7.5%) and construction (7%).

Nevertheless, the Israeli economy also faces problems. The balance of payments has deteriorated due to several factors, including: a high growth of private consumption; an unchanged Shekel-Dollar exchange rate which led to a real revaluation of the Shekel, making exports to the US less competitive and reducing the relative price of US imports in Israel; and slow growth in productivity.

Recent Israeli economic and demographic trends include:



- a gradual move towards lower government spending as a share of GDP;
- increased internationalization of the economy (opening up of formerly closed markets, new trade agreements and increasing foreign investment);
- increased level of spending on civilian research and development;
- a population growth that is faster than that of the EU states;
- the immigrant population constitutes some 12% of the total population or 15% of the Jewish population;
- Russian immigrants have a smaller average size than the average native-born Israeli family;
- since 1960, the Jewish population has grown more slowly than the minority population so that its share of the total population has declined continuously ever since.

**Discussion:** Relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel; foreign investment; expected changes in trade relations; protectionism vs. free trade; Israeli-Palestinian economic ties; internal migration; right of return for Palestinians/returnees impact on the economy.

#### **WORKSHOP FIVE: State-Building, Identity, Pluralism and Participation**

*1 July 1996, RUSI, London*

##### **The Palestinian Team:**

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Ms. Ailie Saunders, RUSI, London  
Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Director, RUSI, London  
Jane Armstrong, Ministry of Defense, London  
Bassam Asfour, Jordanian Information Bureau, London  
Douglas Davis, The Jerusalem Post, London Office  
Christopher Dreyfuss, RUSI  
Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)  
Valerie Grove, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)  
Dr. John King, BBC Arabic Service  
Awad Mansour, King's College, London  
Jonathan Rynhold, London School of Economics  
Greg Shapland, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

#### **Summary:**

##### **Opening Remarks (1) by Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold**

Based on the presumption that there are still many obstacles that could prevent the peace process from reaching the conclusions broadly aspired to, not least the decades of conflict which still live in the minds of the people involved, three institutes - one Palestinian, one Jordanian and one Israeli - consulted together and decided that a significant contribution can be made to resolving differences and promoting understanding by sharing their knowledge and views through a program of workshops, each addressing a particular subject in an academic manner. RUSI's role within this framework was

just began and many obstacles and considerable mistrust still exist. I would like to emphasize, however, how important it is to keep such a dialogue valid and to continue such important projects.

## **Opening Remarks (2)** **by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi**

The idea of the project evolved against the background that the Middle East is undergoing a transformation, based on several agreements signed by the players at the heart of the process (Palestine, Jordan and Israel), but a real process of achieving durable peace among the people is far from being reached. Mutual misunderstandings and mistrust still prevail in each of the societies involved, partly because the knowledge accumulated on each of these independently, regarding their separate identities, histories and relationship to others in the region, too often remain the exclusive preserve of each country. The basic objective was to construct a forum for dialogue and analytical approach to the issues which affect each with an emphasis on domestic political developments. This academic endeavor gathers specialists on each of the chosen issues to present their respective views on an equal footing.

## **State-Building, Identity, Pluralism and Participation in Palestine** **by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi**

The formation of a Palestinian identity goes back to the periods of Ottomanization and Arabization. With the opposition to the British mandate and the emergence of the first anti-Zionist movements, a new chapter in Arab unity began, based on the common desire for sovereignty and independence. Palestinian-Arab unity emerged against this background for the sake of their common cause.

From today's perspective, the irony is that some decades ago autonomy for the Jews in part of Palestine was discussed, while now Oslo provides for autonomy for Palestinians in part of Palestine.

The Palestinians formed all kinds of institutions, organizations and Muslim-Christian societies in Jerusalem, Haifa, Nablus and elsewhere on Palestinian soil, many of which were devoted to working against the Zionist penetration and for Palestinian rights and aspirations. At the same time, the Palestinian national movement was divided along the line of other Arab states which were utilized as potential allies or supporters, especially with regard to the Nashashibi-Husseini rivalry. This division had a negative impact on the Palestinian national movement. While the political elite had no desire to fight and to give up their privileges and the middle class/peasants were divided along the religious dimension, it was the guerrillas that actually fought the battle.

Following recognition of Palestine as the core problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, in 1964, of the PLO as the embodiment of the Palestinian national movement, marking the turning point towards "Palestinization", hundreds of grass roots organizations, clubs, women's groups and centers dealing with all kinds of issues were created, building the foundation of what today is called "civil society" as well as for a Palestinian democratic society and its future state.

The period between 1969-82 was characterized by the strategy of steadfastness. During this time, the Palestinians witnessed arrests, land confiscation, humiliation and all kinds of harassment brought about by the occupiers, but despite all obstacles, they tried to live normally and to keep their institutions functional. The main aim of this period was to maintain the *status quo* while waiting for the PLO leadership, on which all hope was focused, to make the next move.

With the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987, things changed and the *status quo* was challenged; national pride replaced the fear. This change was mirrored by the civil



society in the making; the inside eventually convinced the outside of a two-state solution through negotiations, endorsed by the PNC in Algiers in 1988.

With the beginning of the negotiations, another leadership crisis emerged. The inside, the people of the Intifada, convinced the PLO to overcome the humiliation and to join the Madrid conference. At the same time, the inside developed its own ideas - a nightmare for the outside, which reacted by opening several secret channels of negotiations, one of which was Oslo.

The Palestinians now face various challenges with regard to their institution-building process and statehood. Among these are: the development of a democratic system; public support for the elected PLC and national aspirations; and the need to convince Israel of the importance of real peace in the region.

At the same time, the Palestinians have to deal with outstanding issues, including: Jerusalem; the right of return; settlements; and relations with Jordan.

**Discussion:** minimum demands of the Palestinians; the Intifada agenda; Israeli elections; Netanyahu's scenarios; Arab summit and its meaning.

## **State-Building, Identity, Pluralism and Participation in Israel** *by Dr. David Vital*

The independent State of Israel was up and running on the 15 May 1948 - precisely on schedule and in a form which it has retained to quite a remarkable extent and without interruption ever since. There was no orderly transfer of power from the imperial authority to the emerging state. Palestine, a political unit unknown before the British arrived, was simply evacuated and, upon evacuation, dissolved. The historically relevant questions of Israeli state-building are (1) how was it possible for a functioning state to promptly emerge and (2) how was it that modern Israel turned out to be from the first an enduring parliamentary democracy?

The Jewish people had no king, no prince, no established council of elders, no aristocracy, no clans and clan leadership, no bishops, and no method for agreeing on and implementing issues of common interest. The main characteristic of the Jews was that they constituted a coherent social entity, though linguistically, culturally, religiously, and historically distinct. In their communal affairs, they benefited from their experience in running their own affairs and conducting their own public business on a basis that excluded the participation of the sovereign power, enabling them to maintain their separate national cultural, religious and social identity.

Internal autonomy depended on a moral hold over the community; Jewish leadership was traditionally not aristocratic or hereditary or military but drawn from two sources: the rabbis and men of material substance. It was an oligarchy and not necessarily popular but perceived as legitimate. Traditionally, the society was accustomed to being bound by law - the Law of God - which also held it together as a coherent social body. It was therefore inherently conservative and communal leadership had to be consensual and democratic in the sense of "follow the majority/mainstream." Leaders needed to present themselves as servants of their community. The two central operative principles that led Jewish society were that social action must be free and voluntary, and that leaders were answerable to those they led and subject to public criticism.

For all these reasons, parliamentary democracy came naturally to the Jews as the sole form of government that was conceivably acceptable to them. The great deviation from it was the Zionist movement that initially formed only a small fraction of the Jewish people worldwide. A small executive committee, the elected "Smaller Actions Committee" presided over by Herzl, was authorized to handle the affairs of the movement. This "parliament," the Congress of Zionists, and an intermediate, smaller body, the Greater Actions Committee, built the skeleton of government. A range of

mapai - in coalition with other parties - had the dominant presence in all relevant institutions (e.g., the Histadrut, Va'ad Le'umi, Jewish Agency) and was the basis on which David Ben Gurion converted the *Yishuv* into a fully autonomous nation.

Sir Harold MacMichael, High Commissioner (1938-1944) who was to implement the White Paper of 1939 judged according to what would be best for Britain in the Middle East. He did not doubt that any Jewish state in Palestine would be viable. His wisdom was very much that of the man on the spot; like the Royal Commissioners seven years earlier, he knew what he was talking about.

**Discussion:** 1947 Partition Plan; Jewish Agency as predecessor of the parliament; Zionist movement; Jewish immigration and the transition from pre-state to state; multi-ethnicity in Israeli society and nationalism.

## **State-Building, Identity, Pluralism and Participation in Jordan** **by Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh**

The process of Jordanian state-building fits very much into the pattern of state-building in the Third World in general. Jordan lacked two important "ingredients": (1) an economic surplus; and (2) an elite other than the Hashemite dynasty stemming from the Hijaz. Both were temporarily provided by the British authorities. The state was developed from outside which had a monopoly on the government and its entire bureaucracy from the beginning.

It was people like Majali, Al-Fayez, and Arra who during the early years demanded that power be given to the "sons of the land" and were subsequently promoted. Along with this, the exclusion of non-Jordanians in relevant positions within the state bureaucracy began. The next step was the attempt to Jordanize the Palestinian population of Jordan but what was intended to be an integration process turned into a series of conflicts and clashes, not least over political positions.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the relations between Jordanians and Palestinians were satisfactory but this changed with the War of 1967. The emergence and rise of Fatah, then led from Gaza, brought a lot of unrest into the country and resulted in the exclusion of Palestinians from positions of power and heightened discrimination.

Today, we can speak to a large extent of integration. The relations between Palestinians and Jordanians could have improved during the Gulf crisis but this unique opportunity was missed. As for the future, I don't see a confederation with the Palestinians in the near future, although we will continue to have a say on the West Bank.

In the political spectrum we are currently witnessing the main party losing ground. The Islamist movement is more sound than in other Arab states; it is imbedded in the middle class and not so much a protest movement as one that promotes its Islamic ideas and believes. A major problem in Jordan is tribalism and strong communal relations. From the Jordanian point of view, the Arab-Israeli conflict has formally come to an end and no major protest has occurred. Political activism, as well as participation and mobilization is less fruitful than was the case in the 1960s, and more difficult to implement. The sense of belonging to a large community still plays a big role and elections are clearly run along tribal lines and other clan linkages that are mainly based on patterns of land distribution. Political parties exist but not as formal institutions as in the West. At some time, tribal links will become democratic in terms of voting patterns, but the long-term impact of such a change on the Jordanian civil society is unclear.

**Discussion:** state-building; demographic features; Palestinian-Jordanian cleavages; Abdallah and Hussein; balance of power in Jordan; Islamists; tribalism; identities; three-state scenarios (Palestine, Jordan, Israel); recent dissatisfaction and unrest; opposition.



**WORKSHOP SIX: Palestine, Jordan and Israel in the Middle East**  
*2 July 1996 - RUSI, London*

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Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Director, RUSI, London  
Jane Armstrong, Ministry of Defense, London  
Bassam Asfour, Jordanian Information Bureau, London  
Douglas Davis, The Jerusalem Post, London Office  
Christopher Dreyfuss, RUSI  
Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)  
Valerie Grove, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)  
Dr. John King, BBC Arabic Service  
Awad Mansour, King's College, London  
Dr. Joel Peters, Reading University  
Sqn Ldr Balaam, Ministry of Defense  
Ya'akov Hadas-Handelsman, Israeli Embassy, London

**Summary:**

**Jordan in the Middle East**  
**by Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh**

From the beginning, Jordan's foreign policy was determined by three factors:

- Its geopolitical significance as a buffer zone between Israel and Iraq, as well as its potential role as dumping ground for refugees from Palestine, and its status as an entity separating Syria from the Peninsula and a bridgehead from Egypt to Iraq.
- The lack of natural resources that made it always dependent on external support.
- Its establishment as a counter power regarding the search for an Arab order (since 1920, Jordan has been pro-West and anti-communist and has played a major role in Arab summits and the formulating of common Arab resolutions).

The combination of all these factors had an effect on domestic issues, alliances, politics and the critical space between state and society, including civil society and opposition.

Jordan could not afford to stay away from the Madrid Peace Conference; the people drew scenarios on possible outcomes but no one knew where it would lead to. Jordan insisted that the talks resume in Washington in order to stress the non-normalization with Israel, symbolized through the geographic distance, and to lobby the US administration and public opinion.

The news of the breakthrough in Oslo led to anxiety and fear of what might happen next. During the negotiations, Jordan did not have its own program but shared the Palestinian agenda. The peace treaty with Israel was seen as the King's own deal, designed to get rid of his headaches and to end the fear of threats from outside. Beyond this he did not care what others thought. The people expected at least economic benefits and are disappointed that nothing has significantly changed.

The King is not interested in playing a functional role on the West Bank; he compromised on Jerusalem, he accepted Egypt's leadership role, and he managed to present Jordan as the only Arab state able to deal with Labor and Likud. The Arab states somehow accepted Jordan's role as a bridgehead between Israel and the Arab world but his approaches towards the Gulf, Qatar, Bahrain, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia could be



## **Palestine in the Middle East** *by Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi*

Since 1948, three basic elements guided Palestinian decision-making: Palestinian nationalism; the Palestinian perception of the regional balance of powers; and the sociopolitical structure in Palestine.

Palestinian priorities have changed during the past decades. The most important change occurred in the mid-1970s when the PLO accepted the notion of Palestinian independence in a state in the West Bank and Gaza. Today, Palestinian objectives are as follows: independence/and independent state; establishment of an open, stable and democratic political system embracing all segments of society; economic prosperity; and good relations with regional neighbors.

In seeking to achieve their goals, the Palestinians perceive the following threats:

- threats to Palestinian existence within a state;
- threats to the integrity of the Palestinian Territories;
- threats to the right of return to the Palestinian state;
- security-related threats;
- threats to national identity (due to geographic separation);
- the threat of outside intervention;
- internal threats (e.g., instability; polarization within the society; rivalries among security services; changing attitudes towards the peace process; discontent with the political and economic developments, and an increasingly authoritarian leadership).

Palestine could very possible contribute to the region by:

- increasing security and stability by minimizing the potential for conflict;
- contributing to political stability, mutual recognition and "normalization";
- facilitating political and sociocultural relationships and economic cooperation.

The Palestinian future role in the region will depend on three main factors:

- The nature of the future entity (a sovereign state, self-rule entity or a confederation); of the political system (democratic or authoritarian) and of the players/elite.
- The nature of regional power structures, alliances, and role of outside powers.
- The nature of regional challenges in terms of security (armament, war, terrorism), political stability (Islamic fundamentalism, political participation, liberalization, elite rivalries), and economic prosperity.

**Discussion:** settlements as security threat; growing radicalism; Jerusalem; national identity; citizenship; sovereignty.

## **Israel's Place in the Region** *by Dr. Asher Susser*

Historical events and the evolution of corporate identities determined the three entities Jordan, Israel and Palestine, which are all products of the struggle for Palestine. As Jordan's policy evolved so Israel was compelled to recognize Palestinian nationalism; the "Jordan option" dissipated and Israel, in coming to terms with the Palestinian national identity, had to redefine itself accordingly. From Camp David (1978) onwards Israel gravitated towards the acceptance of some form of disengagement from the West Bank and Gaza in favor of autonomy or statehood for the Palestinians.

The Oslo Accords and Israel's withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and Gaza diminished the notion of Greater Eretz Yisrael. Polls in the 1980s have already shown that a majority of Jewish Israelis prefer the preservation of their state over the Greater Eretz Yisrael concept. The Oslo process paves the way for a Palestinian state or entity of

any form and changes the internal balance within the triangle of Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians. The less integrated the Palestinian Territories are with Israel, economically and politically, the more likely is the development of political and economic links with Jordan, also given the Palestinian population there. However, despite their cultural and social affinity both sides will do their utmost to preserve their separate identities. As Israel does not share such cultural, linguistic and religious affinity, it is unlikely that future bonds with Israel would ever be as close.

Israelis are deeply divided on policy issues and the nature/identity of the state, basically on the definition of Israel as a "Jewish State" or the "State of the Jewish People." The Arab-Israeli conflict is carried out on two fronts: between Israel and the Arab states, and intercommunally, between Israel and the Palestinians. The former is more a military one and directed by the balance of power. The latter has also a military aspect but is primarily a demographic struggle of which side has more people. Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories was not due to high military expenses but due to the realization that demographically, and politically, the occupation has become an undesirable burden.

Any "normalization" of the Arab world with Israel occurs due to pragmatism and the regional balance of power rather than due to ideological transformations. Israel is not yet accepted as part of the family of Middle East nations. The Arabs view peace with Israel as an admission of historical defeat, also regarding cultural and civilization conflicts, with Israel as an outpost of the West that has imposed itself on the region. Thus, Israel is not a "normal" state in the region, but a monument to the Arab-Muslim failure to cope with Western-style modernity.

Israel is a mixture of Western, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean influences. Decades of Arab boycott left Israel with little choice but to orient itself to Europe, the US and the Far East, which makes economic integration with the Arab world now unlikely.

**Discussion:** "normalization"; ideological transformation; Arab-Israeli conflict vs. European conflicts and the Cold War; Arab perception of defeat.

## **WORKSHOP SEVEN: Government and Civil Society**

*3 November 1996, PASSIA, Jerusalem*

### **The Palestinian Team:**

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA, Jerusalem  
Dr. Salim Tamari, Director, Institute for Jerusalem Studies, Jerusalem  
Dr. Bernard Sabella, Professor of Sociology, Bethlehem University

### **The Jordanian Team:**

Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman  
Khawlah Ali Sbetah, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman  
Dr. Sabri Rbeihat, Sociologist, University of Philadelphia, Jordan

### **The Israeli Team:**

Dr. Asher Susser, Senior Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies  
Dr. Gad Barzilai, Senior Lecturer, Political Science, Tel Aviv University  
Dr. Yossi Shein, Chair, Political Science, Tel Aviv University

### **Others/Guests:**

Dr. Rex Brynen, Associate Professor, McGill University/ICAS, Montreal  
Ms. Ailie Saunders, RUSI, London  
HE David Berger, Canadian Ambassador, Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv  
David Viveash, Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv  
Dr. Joel Peters, University of Reading, Visiting Fellow, Truman Institute  
Haj Abed Abu Diab, Jerusalem Electricity Co.  
Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Director, Islamic Cultural and Scientific Society, Jerusalem  
Dr. Yossi Alpher, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv  
Mr. Faisal Hussein, Orient House, Jerusalem



We all face the challenges and problems of the ongoing peace process. For Jordan, Palestine and Israel it is important to reach a real understanding as the base for a genuine agreement on which to build for the future and to contain the peace process. This has to involve the issue of Jerusalem as Jerusalem is the key to peace - or war. Israel's policies towards Jerusalem are a threat to both the Palestinians and the peace process.

Jerusalem was built to be the Palestinian people's capital. All important hospitals and the main institutions and service providers are here. The current isolation of Jerusalem is threefold - the siege on the city, the prevention of its development (through restrictive permit systems and tax regulations etc.) and the detachment from the international community - and does not serve peace.

The same goes for the evacuation of Palestinian Jerusalemites through economic obstacles and discriminatory ID card policies. Israel has always tried to create and maintain a demographic majority in Jerusalem by building Jewish-only settlements on confiscated Palestinian land and preventing Palestinians from using their land for their own purposes.

## **Government and Civil Society in Jordan** **by Dr. Sabri Rbeihat**

Jordanian civil society is mainly related to urban areas/cities and the degree of democracy and effectiveness of the government. To examine civil society the following political theories may be drawn on: *Theory of Democratic Systems*; *Elite Theory*; *Pluralist Theory*; and *Hyper Theory*.

The Jordanian government is based on a tribal society and the concept of a political, military ruled state that began to evolve in 1920. Democratization has begun but there have been no real efforts. The society has not experienced democracy; the principle of equality and of information and the level of participation are the parameters which should be used to measure the degree of democracy.

"Civil society" embraces all organizations that fill the vacuum between the family and the state. The first political party ("Independent Party") emerged in 1922 but lasted only four years. From 1921 to 1948, ten political parties emerged, but with no democratic substance, program or agenda. After 1948, the political spectrum widened with more parties and movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Communists, Ba'ath, Tahrir and the National Socialist Party. With the 1970 events and the banishment of the PLO from Jordan, the Jordanian identity began to develop. This situation lasted until 1988, when the King made his first moves towards democracy. After the ban on political parties was lifted, new political organizations emerged.

Professional associations have existed since 1944 when Jordanian law provided a legal framework. The government felt threatened by them as many were highly politicized and involved graduates returning from abroad with new ideas and approaches. Therefore, they were denied a real mandate. The Jordanian society suffers from this until today, especially as everyone is obliged to be part of a professional association, none of which are real civil society organizations as they lack the voluntary nature.

The legitimacy of Jordan's political regime is still determined by religion - the ruling family are descendants of the Prophet Mohammed - and tribalism, which always helped contain and preserve the government, while hindering progress and modernity within the society. The frequent changes in the cabinet do not allow for stability and for the mandates to be considered serious.

**Discussion:** role and function of civil society; voluntary vs. mandatory membership; space between government and society; Islamization; political parties and elites; tribalism in Jordan; state-building; social transformation.

## Government and Civil Society in Israel by Dr. Yossi Shein

Interrelations between civil society, political society and the state have undergone a critical evolution in Israel. Originally, there was a symbiotic coexistence between civil society and political society with both being subordinated to state power. This attitude has declined; an example is that today, military officials are less appreciated in Israeli society than stock market brokers.

*Civil society vs. State* - ideally, the state is the umbrella under which civil society acts and interacts. The state should be there to create a body of solidarity.

*Civil society vs. political society* - civil society is the arena of "polities" where self-organized groups function relatively independent from the state, trying to promote the interests of a certain constituency; political society is the sphere where polity unfolds and develops. Indicators are elections, the existence of parties, legislators and laws etc. Both spheres are usually interrelated, but civil society can emerge and develop without parallel developments in the political society (e.g., the case of China).

Israel's early years were determined by the post-war experience, the notion of survival and new hegemonies, including civil and political societies. The main forces within society were almost identical with the state officials in power. Political society was rather marginalized, at least while Mapai was the sole party with a say. Despite the waves of immigrants and the rise of the Orthodox as a player in the power game, ethnic divisions were suppressed by the prevailing patronage system. After 1967, political society and the state were no longer symbiotic but split, mainly due to issues related to the occupation and to economic liberalization efforts.

Today, Israel is culturally divided into the secular segment of the society and the Orthodox community. The latter is powerful through its demographic development and has emerged as a major challenge to the state. The Orthodox have succeeded in creating their own realm, with self-run schools and special regulations. Fundamentalism still exists in Israel: when the state fails to deliver, a new, often extreme force is given room to emerge and gain power (e.g., Shas in Israel, Hamas in Gaza,).

**Discussion:** religious parties in Israel vs. Islamic movement in Palestine; *Haredi* (Ultra-Orthodox); political parties as mediators for civil society; secularity vs. religiosity; Diaspora, linkage to Israel and identities; role of women.

### WORKSHOP EIGHT: Political Trends and the New Elites

4 November 1996, PASSIA, Jerusalem

#### The Palestinian Team:

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA, Jerusalem  
Dr. Salim Tamari, Director, Institute for Jerusalem Studies, Jerusalem  
Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Director, Islamic Cultural and Scientific Society, Jerusalem

#### The Jordanian Team:

Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman  
Dr. Ibrahim Othman, Professor of Sociology, University of Jordan, Amman  
Dr. Sabri Rbeihat, Sociologist, University of Philadelphia, Jordan

#### The Israeli Team:

Dr. Asher Susser, Senior Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies  
Dr. Gad Barzilai, Senior Lecturer, Political Science, Tel Aviv University  
Dr. Yossi Shein, Chair, Political Science, Tel Aviv University

#### Others/Guests:

Dr. Rex Brynen, Associate Professor, Political Science, McGill University/ICAS, Montreal  
Ms. Ailie Saunders, RUSI, London  
Dr. Joel Peters, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Reading  
Ms. Kirsty Wright, Consultant, Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv



Generally, the fragmentation and cantonization of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem limit and constrain the integration of the whole society and hence the ability of the Palestinian political elite to effectively standardize and enforce its power and influence across the three territories. Historically, the Palestinian elite was based on religious affiliation with the *Fath*, with holy places, with religious personalities or associations. For centuries, families with such association, "notables," used their privileged status to gain advantages and powers in socioeconomic, political, and other areas. After 1948, Jordan integrated many of them into its bureaucracy but their position was weakened due to the leadership's failure in 1948, due to the shift in the center of power from the West to the East Bank, and because they were seen as self-contained and not interested in serving the society.

With the emergence of the PLO, political commitment and involvement became important aspects for influence and power. Revolutionary ideology of liberating Palestine replaced the old basis for status, privilege and elitism. The PLO sought to be the major or only center of power and was not interested in competing with forces inside the occupied territories. The inside adopted the passive strategy of "steadfastness" and non-cooperation with Israeli authorities. Any perceived threat to the PLO's role (e.g., the Autonomy Plan of the late 1970s), was answered with the establishment of bodies such as the National Guidance Committee (1978), to consolidate the center-periphery relationship. The local elite was not able to become a national leadership mainly due to the loyalty of the majority of the Palestinians inside to the PLO and due to the Israeli policies of fragmentation and cantonization of the Palestinian Territories. The local elite could deliver only at the local level, Oslo being a good example: while the "local" delegation was negotiating in Washington, the PLO decision-makers conducted secret talks.

The institutionalization of the PNA changed the role of grass-root organizations and political groups; they are no longer mobilizing the masses to confront occupation but are expected to coordinate with the PNA. The PLO has adopted the policy of co-optation of members of family elites; they mutually need each other to legitimize their privileged positions and prestige and build the foundation for an elite-based leadership. A recent poll showed that influential groups can be divided into a number of "elites" (by ranking): academic, security, government, political, industrial-financial-commercial, religious, local-municipal, tourist, real estate and traditional-family. Also, the majority of Palestinians perceive themselves as middle class. Palestinian society tends to adopt policies that encourage the development of open systems of social structure, government accountability, economic development and institutionalization of power and influence.

**Discussion:** Dialogue among elites; inside-outside conflict; fragmentation of the political elite in Palestine; influence of economic factors on elitism and constituencies.

## **Political Trends and New Elites in Israel** *by Dr. Gad Barzilai*

The history of Israel's party system is divided into two periods:

- (1) The emergence of Mapai as the dominant socialist party (1932-1973), run by partisan leaders (e.g., David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, Levi Eshkol) and controlling most of the financial and political bodies in the *Yishuv*, and a military force. Since 1932 Mapai has won the Jewish Agency, Histadrut, and the National Committee elections; it could supply jobs, land and immigration licenses to its constituencies. Its main political rival, the Revisionist movement, was no real counter-elite. After 1948, Mapai established the IDF and the security services, ensuring its control over them. The successors of Ben-Gurion, who was in charge at the time, have greatly benefited from this apparatus.
- (2) The evaporation of dominance in the partisan system, and the emergence of polarization (1974-1996). With Eshkol's rise to power in 1963, the party's prestige declined.

He lacked the military image and was, in 1967, forced to enlarge the ruling coalition. With the joining of Begin's right wing Gahal, Mapai lost its unique partisan system and the exclusive sources of popular support, which were the main cause of the evaporation of Mapai's hegemony. Since 1974, due to the two wars and the occupation, political leaders' military/security experience became more relevant. While in earlier years Mapai enjoyed the support of the public majority and most parties, after 1974, polarization and ideological fragmentation made a *national* leadership almost impossible.

Extra-parliamentary bodies such as Gush Emunim (1974) and Peace Now (1978) mirrored a change in the political fabric. Both were able to mobilize the public, enjoyed the support of larger parties (Likud/Labor) and had an impact on the public agenda as well as on the media. Their activists rose to leadership positions in political parties. Dedi Zucker and Mordechai Bar'On (Peace Now) became major political figures in Ratz; Hanan Ben-Porat (Gush Emunim) in Ha'Mafdal.

The new election law (1996) weakened the effectiveness of the parliament and its elite in supervising the government; political leaders enjoy more executive power outside the legislature, bureaucracy and the military establishment. The large political parties are also weakened while religious and ethnic parties gained more electoral weight. The Haredi parties - a unique type of political elite, based on communal constituencies and religious affiliation - benefited from the new system's split-voting (e.g. vote for Netanyahu and for a religious party). Arab parties do not depend on Jewish parties and can express autonomous aspirations. Their elite was effective in gathering the various groups into two coalitions: Hadash (traditional post-communist Palestinianization) and the United Arab list (cultural autonomy for Israeli-Arabs).

The Israeli society has become more Americanized; the Middle Class is stronger than ever before, the economic elite is more powerful, and individualistic traits are more important. Israel is a nationalistic society, with strong elements of racism and militarism.

**Discussion:** Difference between civil society, the Middle Class, elites and leaders; parties and constituencies; racial, ethnic and gender divisions in Israel; Ashkenasi vs. Sephardim elites; comparison: Palestinian and Israeli pre-state situation/Ben Gurion and Arafat.

## **Political Trends and New Elites in Jordan**

**by Dr. Ibrahim Othman**

Two factors have influenced Jordan's policies since the time of Prince Abdallah, namely Jordan's geopolitically significant location, and the lack of natural resources which made Jordan dependent on foreign aid.

In its early years, Jordan's political structure and politics were determined by a society of nomads and tribes and the Ottoman bureaucracy.

Political trends are almost exclusively directed by the Hashemites and the King himself. Political parties emerged (1950-60s) but with no clear agenda. The traditional elites - loyal to the Royal family - overpowered the political parties and ruled in all aspects, including the economy. Only the Muslim Brotherhood was to some extent allowed to gain ground as a counter-force to communist groups. Now, its activities are restricted by the government. Today's political parties have no real influence and people do not trust them. The King and the Crown Prince are the only decision-makers. The elite surrounding them has no public support, does not represent any group interests or constituency, and is fully dependent on the royal family.

The Palestinian elite in Jordan is split into two groups both of which depend on the King's/army's backing: (1) those Jordanized and loyal to the Royal family, and (2) those who gained influence and certain power due to their economic status.

**Discussion:** "bread riots"; stratification in Jordan; role/participation of women and the academia; the marginalized South of Jordan.





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# PUTTING PASSIA ON-LINE

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## Introduction

**W**ith more than 40 million users throughout the world and the number of subscribers increasing daily, the Internet is a powerful tool that Palestinians cannot afford to ignore. PASSIA, as a Palestinian academic and research institute that strives to be as professional and efficient as possible in its efforts to present information, data, facts and analysis related to Palestine to a national and international audience, decided in early 1996 to utilize the new tool to disseminate its material, activities and analyses to a broader international audience, and thus, to promote a better understanding of Palestinian aspirations, issues and concerns.

## PASSIA's Homepage

**W**ith the kind support of the Canadian Dialogue Fund in Tel Aviv, PASSIA was able to purchase the needed equipment and to establish its homepage on the Internet:

[www.passia.org](http://www.passia.org)

The homepage, which is constantly being updated with regard to recent PASSIA activities and publications, aims at providing the rapidly growing international on-line researcher community with access to PASSIA publications, information about PASSIA's goals and projects, unbiased analyses on various Palestinian issues of concern, and the proceeding of PASSIA meetings and roundtable discussions on a wide range of topics. Thus far, PASSIA's homepage contains the following categories that have been fed with extensive material:

- ◆ Recent Events
- ◆ Recent Publications
- ◆ Administration
- ◆ Meetings
- ◆ Conferences
- ◆ PASSIA Publications
- ◆ Seminars
- ◆ Jerusalem

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# APPENDICES

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## I. PASSIA Administration

**P**ASSIA employs all its staff on a contractual basis whether full or part time. The current team handles the execution of all PASSIA projects, with other researchers commissioned for specific tasks related to these projects.

**Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi - Head of PASSIA**

**Kainat Dweik (1988- ) - Administrative Director**

BA Social Work, American University of Beirut; social worker for ten years; rehabilitation officer in the West Bank and Gaza for six years; born and living in Jerusalem.

**Deniz Altayli (1993- ) - Program Director**

MA Sociology (with Economics and Political Science), Heidelberg University, Germany; living and working in Jerusalem since 1993; PASSIA project coordination.

**Dr. Said Zeedani (1993- ) - Academic Director (part time)**

Professor of Philosophy, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Birzeit University.

**Nada Awad (1990- ) - Secretary**

Professional Arabic and English typist; Tawjihi from Dar Al-Fatah Al-Laji'a School, Jerusalem, 1988; YWCA secretarial diploma, 1989; born and living in Jerusalem.

**Awad Mansour (1996) - Researcher**

MA, War Studies, King's College, London; born and living in Jerusalem.

**Iyad Attoun (1996- ) - Administrative Assistant**

Born and living in Jerusalem.

**Mohammed Attoun (1996- ) - Computer Specialist**

Software/hardware/network maintenance; homepage design (Internet); born and living in Jerusalem.

**Khamis Ghosheh (1992-1996) - Administrative Assistant**

Tawjihi from Ibrahimiyah College, Jerusalem, 1963; BA Business Administration, Beirut University, 1968; general manager of a Jerusalem pharmacy; advertisement representative for medical companies; freelance advertiser for local and international companies; born and living in Jerusalem.

**Talal Natsheh (1987- ) - Accountant**

Registered with Palestinian Accountants Association; Diploma from Beirut University, 1970; born and living in Jerusalem.

**Wa'el Sa'adi (1992- ) - Auditor (CPA)**

Diploma from Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

**Mark Rosenshield (May-August 1996) - Intern**

BA International Relations, Pomona College, Claremont, CA; Student towards an MA in International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC



**Dr. Kamal Abdul Fattah**

Professor of Geography, Birzeit University; author of various publications on the geography of Palestine.

**Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi** - Chairman

Political scientist; historian; columnist; author; founder and member of various Palestinian institutions; head and founder of PASSIA.

**Dr. Adnan Musallam** - Secretary

Associate Professor of History, Bethlehem University; member of Al-Liqa' Center for Religious and Heritage Studies in the Holy Land, Bethlehem.

**Dr. Sari Nusseibeh**

Professor of Philosophy; political analyst; author and columnist; President of Al-Quds University, Jerusalem.

**Dr. Bernard Sabella** - Vice-President

Sociologist; demographer; professor, Bethlehem University; columnist and author of various studies.

**Ms. Diana Safieh** - Treasurer

Administrator/senior manageress of a private Palestinian travel company, Jerusalem.

**Dr. Said Zeedani**

Professor of Philosophy, Dean of Faculty of Arts, Birzeit University.

### III. Financial Support for PASSIA Projects

Each year, PASSIA's Academic and Program Committees jointly prepare proposals for its projects, based on the policy guidelines of the Board of Trustees. PASSIA projects for 1996 and the financial support given towards each are listed below. PASSIA takes this opportunity to acknowledge with gratitude the contributions of the organizations and institutions mentioned.

1. **Research Studies Program**  
Supported by the *Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES)*, Jerusalem.
2. **PASSIA Meetings Program**  
Partly financed by *The Rockefeller Foundation*, New York; partly by income generated from local sales of PASSIA publications.
3. **Seminar - Training and Education on International Affairs**  
Supported by the *Ford Foundation*, Cairo.
4. **PASSIA Diary 1996**  
Supported by the *Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES)*, Jerusalem.
5. **Joint Project 1995/6: Palestine-Jordan-Israel: Building a Base for Common Scholarship and Understanding in the New Era of the Middle East**  
Supported by the *Dialogue Fund*, *Canadian Embassy*, Tel Aviv.
6. **Program on Jerusalem**  
Financed by income generated from local sales of PASSIA publications.  
*Seminar on Dr. Kamel Al-Assali* supported by the *Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES)*, Jerusalem.
7. **Putting PASSIA on the Internet**  
Supported by the *Dialogue Fund*, *Canadian Embassy*, Tel Aviv.
8. **Specialist periodicals and library archives**  
Financed by income generated from local sales of PASSIA publications.

## IV. Networking Efforts

PASSIA is a member of the following networks and associations:

### **Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO)**

The PNGO Network aims to promote coordination and cooperation among Palestinian NGOs and to advocate their right to exist and function without restrictions. The PNGO is active in advancing democratic values and in strengthening the role of the civil society in Palestine.

### **Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (Euro-MeSCo)**

The Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo) was established in 1994 (PASSIA was a founding member) with the aim to provide Mediterranean countries with a forum for debating international issues, politics and security from a regional point of view. In principle, network members deal with international relations and security, carry out policy-oriented research, enjoy a domestically and internationally recognized national reputation, and have a mostly non-governmental character.

During the most recent MeSCo Annual Conference (7-8 June 1996, Sesimbra, Portugal) it was decided to expand the scope of MeSCo by including foreign policy institutes from non-Mediterranean countries. The main objectives of Euro-MeSCo are to promote dialogue and the exchange of information between its members; to support their institution-building and research capacities, and to foster cooperation between the civil societies in the member countries.

### **The Association of Palestinian Policy and Research Institutions**

In 1996, five Palestinian institutes (PASSIA, Jerusalem; CPRS, Nablus; Center for Jerusalem Studies, Jerusalem; JMCC, Jerusalem; and Muwaten, Ramallah) established the *Association of Palestinian Policy and Research Institutions* as an umbrella organization in order to coordinate their activities, to strengthen their capacities, to create a centralized data base for their respective resources, and to enhance research studies in various fields of Palestinian policy.

### **The Arab Research Network**

A broader effort to bring together Palestinian and other Arab institutions was launched in a meeting in Beirut held on 2-3 August 1996, attended by representatives from the following centers:

- Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), Beirut
- Lebanese Association for Educational Sciences, Beirut
- Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo
- Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, Cairo
- The Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, Amman
- Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Center, Amman
- Center for Palestine Research Studies (CPRS), Nablus
- Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), Jerusalem
- Ford Foundation, Cairo

The meeting was held to discuss the attending centers' past experiences and current projects, and to explore ways to improve the coordination and cooperation between research centers in the Arab Mashriq, as well as means to enhance training research



PASSIA publications attempt to be academically substantiated and of practical relevance, and often discuss controversial or rarely addressed subjects. They allow the expression of a diverse range of perspectives and are primarily aimed at people interested in the Palestine Question. PASSIA publications are classified as follows: Research Studies, Jerusalem, Information Papers, Reports (Annual and Seminar Reports), and PASSIA Diary:

## I. Research Studies *(in chronological order)*

### **The Jordanian Disengagement: Causes and Effects**

No. 7

by **Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi**

*September 1988 (English Pp. 20, and Arabic, Pp. 28), 2nd edition December 1996*

The Jordanian disengagement provoked much discussion and this PASSIA lecture outlines the causes and effects of that move. In particular, it examines the procedures of the disengagement, Jordan's motives, Palestinian, Arab, Israeli and international factors, the effects of the disengagement on the region, and the relationship between Jordan and the PLO.

### **Economic Aspects of the Intifada**

No. 8

by **Dr. Andrew Rigby**

*September 1988 (English, Pp. 28, and Arabic, Pp. 19)*

**Out of Print**

This study examines the nature of the economic struggle as one of the spheres of civilian-based resistance (*Intifada*) to the Israeli occupation. The booklet deals with the subject of strikes, business and commerce, taxes, collective economic punishment, household economy and external funding.

### **The Historical Evolution of the Armenian Question and the Conflict Over**

No. 9

**"Nagorno Karabagh-Arstakh"**

by **Dr. Manuel S. Hassassian**

*December 1988 (English, Pp. 59, and Arabic, Pp. 38); 2nd edition January 1990*

The author provides a critical overview of the historical evolution and origins of the Armenian question: the Armenian revolutionary movement, Armenian nationalists and the Young Turks, the Armenian genocide and exodus. Further discussed are the Soviet Republic of Armenia, the nationality problem in the USSR, the origins of boundary feuds, the question of the geographic enclave "Nagorno Karabagh," and the recent revival of the Karabagh issue.

### **Economic and Social Conditions During the Intifada**

No. 11

by **Dr. Hazem Shunnar**

*January 1989 (Arabic, Pp. 84.); 2nd edition May 1989.*

Written one year into the Intifada, this study details the economic and social circumstances of life in the Palestinian Territories and their role in the politicization and mobilization of the people in their struggle against occupation. Issues addressed include the Israeli policy of "economic assimilation"; forms of Palestinian resistance; external factors; and the effect of the Intifada on the Palestinian national economy and socioeconomic problems.

### **The Nation and the Homeland in the Islamic and Christian Thoughts in the Middle Ages**

No. 13

by **Dr. Ulrich Haarmann**

*April 1989 (Arabic, Pp. 18)*

A comparative reading of the understanding of the "nation" and the "homeland" in Christian Germany and Europe and the Islamic Arab East is the subject of this lecture. A further element concentrates on the terms used at this time, taken from the Latin and the ancient Egyptian; how they were explained by the intellectuals from the two areas, and the differences and similarities in the expressions and meanings. In bringing the issue up to the present, the lecturer discusses the modern national movements in Europe and the Arab world and their religious elements.

### **Towards a Viable Islamic Economy: Conceptual Approaches in the Eighties in Retrospect**

No. 14

by **Dr. Dieter Weiss**

*May 1989 (English, Pp. 149, and Arabic, Pp. 11)*

In looking at areas outside of traditional conceptions of economics, this lecture examines the vast discussion among Islamic authors about interest-free banking within a system of international banking following conventional roles and an Islamic economic history which often circumvented the ban on interest, and provides models used in various countries.

### **The European Community and the International Conference for Peace in the Middle East**

No. 15

by **Dr. Nayef Abu-Khalaf**

*May 1989 (English, Pp. 56, and Arabic, Pp. 35)*

**Out of Print**

This study discusses the European Community, the development of the idea for an international peace conference on the Middle East and the role of the European Community in convening such a conference..

**Israeli Planning and House Demolishing Policy in the West Bank** **No. 16**

by **Rasem M. Khameyseh**

*May 1989 (Arabic, Pp. 79); December 1989 (English, Pp. 82)*

This study discusses the Israeli planning policy in the occupied West Bank at the regional, district and local levels. It examines the changes in this policy, the implementation of "Israeli Planning" and the impact of this policy (including house demolitions, the prevention of construction following the natural growth trend) on Palestinian society. Well-documented, with 18 maps of proposed road networks, skeletal maps and settlement plans, this study is essential in illustrating the legal and administrative changes that were undertaken by Israel to minimize the Arab presence in the West Bank.

**The Intifada: Causes and Factors of Continuity** **No. 18**

by **Dr. Ziad Abu-Amr**

*June 1989 (English, Pp. 31, and Arabic, Pp. 43); 2nd edition June 1994*

**Out of Print**

This study focuses on the first year and a half of the Intifada and examines the continuation of the uprising against the Israeli occupation. In disproving the Israeli claims that an external power was behind the Intifada, Abu-Amr discusses the root and immediate causes and catalysts for the outbreak of the uprising. He considers the organization of Palestinian society, the Unified National Leadership, the PLO, national figures and institutions, the discovery of potential and mass creativity, the media and press, and finally reviews Israeli measures against the Intifada.

**The Intifada: The Struggle Over Education** **No. 19**

by **Dr. Andrew Rigby**

*July 1989 (English, Pp. 27, and Arabic, Pp. 21)*

**Out of Print**

The author discusses the struggle over education in the West Bank and Palestinian responses to Israeli attempts to "outlaw" all forms of educational activity in schools and universities in the West Bank.

**The Intifada and the Arab Press** **No. 21**

by **Ali Khalili**

*September 1989 (Arabic, Pp. 45)*

Khalili, journalist and editor, discusses the experience of the Palestinian press and their relations with the Israeli authorities, in particular the military censorship. He further examines the role and philosophy of the press and their methods of work, and means of expression which became part of the journalistic language during the first years of the Intifada.

**Creating the Palestinian State - A Strategy for Peace** **No. 22**

by **Dr. Jerome Segal** (*PASSIA Translation into Arabic*)

*September 1989 (Arabic, Pp. 156)*

This book is a proposal for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict based on the two-state solution. Segal directs his strategy proposal primarily towards the Palestinians/PLO but takes into consideration that they operate within a network of constraints, influences and other actors. Putting the creation of a Palestinian state - without prior Israeli agreement - as a starting point and, at the same time, as the heart of the proposed strategy, Segal prescribes steps for reaching the post-conflict situation. His plan for action for achieving peace is built on the following main strategy components: a unilateral Palestinian Declaration of Independence and Statehood, coupled with the formation of a provisional government that replaces the PLO; the launching of a peace initiative; steps to build the inner sinews of the new state; and a campaign to achieve the withdrawal of the Israeli army from occupied Palestinian territory.

**Palestinian-Saudi Relations (1936-1939)** **No. 23**

by **Dr. Taysir Jbara**

*October 1989 (Arabic, Pp. 119)*

This study examines Palestinian-Saudi relations at a critical time in the history of the two countries. It discusses the Palestinian strike of 1936, the Palestinian cause and Saudi position after 1936 and events surrounding the London Roundtable Conference of 1939.

**Studies in the Arabic Library** **No. 26**

by **Dr. Mohammed Jawad Al-Nuri** and **Ali Khalil Hamad**

*January 1990 (Arabic, Pp. 429)*

This study discusses classical Arabic literature in depth, specifically focusing on an analysis of poetry, prose and translations from the pre-Islamic period and the first five centuries of Islam. In a thorough analysis of over 30 different pieces of literature, the authors provide exemplary text, and background information on each piece and its author, as well as an explanation as to its significance as a literary composition.

**Palestine: Factionalism in the National Movement (1919-1939)** **No. 27**

by **Dr. Manuel S. Hassassian**

*February 1990 (English, Pp. 147)*

**Out of Print**

This study examines the internal struggle among leading Palestinian families for the attainment of power and leadership of the Arab national movement in Palestine. It discusses the rise of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism; the development of



Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian poet, intellectual, educator, journalist and literary critic or the contemporary Islamic movement in the Arab world, is the subject of this study. By examining the stage in Qutb's life which has received the least amount of attention from writers, the author seeks to understand the transformation in Qutb's world-view (*Weltanschauung*) in the 1940s and to discuss the factors that led to the emergence of Qutb as an Islamist.

**Najati Sidqi (1905-1979) - Life and Works**

**No. 30**

by **Ibrahim Mohammed Abu-Hashhash**

May 1990 (Arabic, Pp. 240)

Najati Sidqi was an outstanding figure in the literary culture of Palestine in the first half of the century. This study uses Sidqi's unpublished diaries to reveal the literary character of this author, translator and critic, providing a survey of the different aspects of his literary activities. The appendix contains classifications of Sidqi's published works, writings that were prepared for broadcasting purposes and some of his translations and short stories.

**Palestinians in Israel and the Intifada**

**No. 32**

by **Dr. Muhsen Yousef**

August 1990 (Arabic, Pp. 110)

This important study examines the situation of Palestinians in Israel and their participation in the Intifada. The first part of the book discusses the history and changes taking place in this population in terms of demographic, economic and educational developments as well as political parties and alliances. The participation of Palestinians in the Intifada is the subject of part two and is examined according to "legal" and "illegal" activities as seen from the Israeli perspective. Part three discusses the factors which limited the Intifada activities of Palestinians in Israel.

**Ghassan Kanafani: A Study of his Novels and Short Stories**

**No. 35**

by **Fayha Abdul Hadi**

August 1990 (Arabic, Pp. 247)

Ghassan Kanafani was an important Palestinian author, intellectual, and activist who was assassinated by the Israelis in Lebanon in 1972. This study discusses various dimensions of his literary production and career.

**Introduction to Criminology - "A Sociological Study"**

**No. 44**

by **Dr. Mahmoud Aqel**

August 1991 (Arabic, Pp. 155)

This study discusses criminology as a sociological discipline, the methods of research used in criminological studies, explanatory factors of criminal phenomena, theories explaining criminal behavior as a product of society, other factors related to crime, and models of criminal behavior.

**The Intifada: The Struggle between the Israeli Occupation and the Palestinians from the Perspective of Criminology**

**No. 45**

by **Dr. Suhail Hassanen**

September 1991 (Arabic, Pp. 158)

The author has a Ph.D. in criminology, an area of knowledge which is very effectively used to give this study a unique perspective on Israeli occupation policies and actions. The book provides background on the Intifada related to the study of criminology and discusses the Intifada as portrayed by the dominant culture of the occupation, military law and the myth of security, the practices of the occupation and crime, the police and the Intifada in Jerusalem. The study examines the past, present and future, providing a concise assessment of criminological aspects in Palestinian society.

**The Eighteenth of August - Boris "Bonaparte"**

**No. 46**

by **Dr. Azmi Bishara**

November 1991 (Arabic, Pp. 28)

Bishara tries to compare the attempted *coup d'état* in the Soviet Union, which took place on 18 August 1991, with a similar rebellion led by Bonaparte in the first half of the 19th century when the French bourgeoisie controlled the political authority. The failed *coup d'état* in the Soviet Union was one of the rare historical events where a superpower faced a rebellion and where the whole political system fell apart. The paper covers the 1991 events in the Soviet Union, the rise of Boris Yeltzin to power, and the election on 12 June after the storm in Moscow. Also included is an outlook on the shaky future of the Perestroika. It is argued that the overthrow had not only failed because it lacked the backing of a personality like Trotzki, but also because it had been too hasty in referring to itself as a *coup d'état*.

**Ibrahim in the Torah, Bible and Qur'an**

**No. 47**

by **Dr. Abd Al-Sattar Kassim**

November 1991 (Arabic, Pp. 72); 2nd edition July 1994.

The significance of the prophet Ibrahim as he appears in the Jewish, Christian and Muslim doctrines is the subject of this study. The author also discusses the political implications of these doctrines and how the concept of "the promised land" affects issues of history and nationality.

## Appendices: PASSIA Publications

- Palestinian Reflections and Opinions** No. 52  
by **Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Dr. Mohammed Jadallah, and Dr. Riad Malki**  
*March 1992 (Arabic, Pp. 92)*  
**Out of Print**
- This compilation of articles by three leading Palestinian figures was first published in *Al-Fajr* (Jerusalem) in January, February and March 1992, under the title "*Palestinian Reflections and Opinions*." The authors took turns each week expressing their points of view in articles under the following titles: "*Between the 'Bilaterals' in Washington and the 'Multilaterals' in Moscow*"; "*Moscow: What Next?*"; "*Municipal Councils and Elections*"; "*Development in What Direction?*"; "*Democracy and the Palestinians*"; and "*The Washington Negotiations - the Fourth Round*."
- Conflict Resolutions: Assumptions Behind the Approach** No. 53  
by **J. Kristen Urban**  
*October 1992 (English, Pp. 32); 2nd edition November 1996*
- This paper examines some of the assumptions of the "contingency theory" approach to conflict resolution as it has framed the various attempts at peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. The discussion in this essay focuses on problematical issues deriving from the general approach to conflict resolution.
- The Palestinian Islamic Movement and the New World Order** No. 54  
by **Dr. Iyad Al-Barghouthi**  
*December 1992 (Arabic, Pp. 166)*  
**Out of Print**
- This study examines current Islamic movements in the Palestinian Territories (most notably the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Liberation Party, and the Islamic Jihad) and their current activities, positions and relations with other organizations. Specific chapters discuss the Islamic movements' reactions to the New World Order and the Gulf Crisis, and the position and relations of the Palestinian Islamists toward the Islamic world in general and the Middle East peace negotiations.
- Ein Beit Al-Ma' Refugee Camp: A Sociological Study** No. 56  
by **Dr. Mahmoud Aqel**  
*December 1992 (Arabic, Pp. 124)*
- Ein Beit Al-Ma', a refugee camp near Nablus, is the site of this case study on Palestinian refugees. The author details life in the Ein Beit Al-Ma' refugee camp by covering issues such as population and housing, education, health care, water, electricity and sewage, economic and professional status and the impact of the Intifada. The reasons for and results of the Palestinian exodus in 1948 from historic Palestine are included in a review of relevant literature on refugees.
- Emerging Trends in Palestinian Strategic Thinking and Practice** No. 57  
by **Dr. Ziad Abu-Amr**  
*December 1992 (English, Pp. 48, and Arabic, Pp. 32)*  
**Out of Print**
- Focusing on recent changes in political thinking and practice in the Palestinian Territories, this research study proposes and analyses seven principle trends: from ideological purity to pragmatism; from violent to non-violent forms of struggle; the growing prominence of Islam among political forces; the diminishing status of the PLO; the relative empowerment of the local political leadership; the revival of Jordan's political role; and a retreat from broader social change.
- Progress and Retrogression in Arab Democratization** No. 58  
by **Larbi Sadiki**  
*December 1992 (English, Pp. 47)*
- Sadiki surveys progress made in Arab democratization and setbacks which have occurred through retrogression and discusses Arab political liberalization, patterns of retrogression and practical manifestations of this in Arab political life.
- Half the People: Women, History and the Palestinian Intifada** No. 59  
by **Maria Holt**  
*December 1992. (English, Pp. 84)*  
**Out of Print**
- This study provides an historical overview of women in Palestinian society and an analysis of the experience of women as related to the Intifada. It illustrates how women both benefited and were profoundly disadvantaged by the events of the past few years. Chapter titles include "*Women and the Intifada*"; "*Formal Organization*"; "*Women and Democracy*"; "*Paradoxes and Contradictions*"; "*Opportunities: Women and Work*"; "*Effects of Islamic Resurgence*"; "*Palestinian Women Detainees*"; "*Conflicting Israeli Influences*"; and "*Women, Culture and Identity*."
- The Law of the Land: Settlements and Land Issues under Israeli Military Occupation** No. 63  
by **Raja Shehadeh**  
*July 1993 (English, Pp. 135)*
- This book is a collection of essays written by lawyer Raja Shehadeh between 1979 and 1992. The essays are arranged under the following titles: "*The Land Law of Palestine: An Analysis of the Definition of State Lands*"; "*The Legal System of the Israeli Settlements in the West Bank*"; "*The Changing Juridical Status of Palestinian Areas under Occupation*"; "*Restrictions on the Use of Land by Palestinians*"; "*The Operation of de facto Annexation*"; "*The Legislative Stages of the Israeli Military Occupation*"; and "*Burning the Land Records: Unofficial Illegality*."
- The Palestinian Economy - A Bibliography** No. 70  
by **PASSIA Research Staff**



and housing; finances and banking; trade, economic relations and regional cooperation; settlement; and education, training and human resources. Anyone needing information on the economic aspects, or their effect, on any area of Palestinian life will find this bibliography indispensable.

### **Palestinian Refugees**

by **Najeh Jarrar**

May 1994 (Arabic, Pp. 128)

**No. 71**

Opening with a historical description of refugees in the 20th century and of UN efforts and institutions for their protection, this study places the Palestinian refugee situation in a world context. It then focuses on Palestinian refugees and the international and local causes of their particular crisis, detailing the viewpoints of Palestinians, Israelis and international law toward them. A case study of the living conditions in refugee camps, the ties of residents to their original homes, their economic situation, political orientation and its effect on the peace process, is addressed in some detail. The study concludes with an examination of various projects, both contemporary and historic, to solve the Palestinian refugee problem and provides a vision of the future for Palestinian refugees in light of recent political changes.

### **From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas in Palestinian Society**

by **Dr. Hisham H. Ahmed**

May 1994 (English, Pp. 172)

**No. 73**

**Out of Print**

This study provides a detailed investigation of the factors which led to the birth and growth of the Islamic Resistance Movement - Hamas. In addition to covering historical, social and economic components, it also takes into account the wider regional and global influences on the emergence of the Hamas movement. Making extensive use of some fascinating interviews with a variety of Hamas members and activists, the author illustrates the political program of the movement and its relationship to other forces within the Palestinian political arena as well as to Israel, Arab states and the international community. An investigation of recent events in the region and the subsequent reaction from Hamas leaders suggests possible directions that the Hamas movement may take in the future and the probable effect of this on Palestinian political life. Included is the full text of the covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement.

### **Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Future State of Palestine**

(with a Case Study on Women's Rights)

by **Adrien K. Wing**

July 1994 (English, Pp. 84); 2nd edition forthcoming

**No. 74**

This study deals with the factors which affect democratization and need to be considered when formulating a Palestinian Basic Law to function as an interim constitution. Issues discussed include pluralism, factionalism, the attitudes of the "Intifada" generation, the difficulties in the transition from underground movements to open democratic activities, and the hierarchical society with its family and group loyalties. The study also examines prospects for the Palestinian self-government, the institution-building process and implications for the implementation and enforcement of new laws. The final chapter is devoted to a case study of constitutional and human rights, focusing on women and their status within society.

### **The Declaration of Principles and the Legal System in the West Bank**

by **Raja Shehadeh**

September 1994 (English, Pp. 72 and Arabic, Pp. 77)

**No. 75**

This paper addresses questions of legislation and the relationship between lawyers, judges and their organizations in the current transitional phase. It examines how the Palestinian legal structure will look throughout this time and what form it will take under a final arrangement. Particularly investigated is the manner in which the Palestinian judicial system is likely to evolve, considering the influences of preceding legislators such as the Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians, the Egyptians and the Israelis. Other legal issues discussed relate to the process of democratization in Palestinian society.

### **Elections and the Palestinian Political System**

by **Dr. Ali Al-Jirbawi**

September 1994 (Arabic, Pp. 44)

**No. 76**

This study shows the importance of elections and the presence of the PNA in part of the homeland. The author suggests that the PNA should develop its presence and its institutions towards the Palestinian objectives, the ultimate goal of which is a Palestinian state, and discusses the difficulties that will arise from turning the transitional PNA into a permanent one. The different secular and religious factions and their differing interests in and reactions to the elections are also examined. The demographic reality of the Palestinians as a nation is addressed - one third being in the homeland while the rest is in the Diaspora - as are the different laws by which the "inside" Palestinians are governed. In the final chapter, the author puts forward his own ideas on a future political system and the elected council which should govern it.

### **The West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Future Political and Administrative Links**

by **Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi**

October 1994 (Arabic, Pp. 161)

**No. 77**

This study looks at the different histories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the consequent divisions that these have caused between the two regions. The need for dealing with these divisions in the transitional phase is emphasized and several options for the future linkage of the two areas are offered. The paper addresses how federal relationship in the Palestinian Territories could ensure their integrity and safety as a single unit and how the two areas may be represented in national bodies. Considerable attention is also given to the limitations regarding the transitional phase that are inherent in the DoP, and which will hinder attempts at securing cohesion between the two areas.

**Palestinian Education - The Future Challenge**

**No. 80**

by **Dr. Andrew Rigby**

*March 1995 (English, Pp. 53, and Arabic Pp. 57)*

This study is a useful sketch of the Palestinian education system. It examines the impact of the Intifada on schools, teachers and students and attempts to assess the likelihood of this system succeeding in teaching the civic virtues necessary to democracy. The author identifies several areas which the PNA must address: overcrowding is rife while resources and materials are inadequate and outdated; the Israeli-censored Jordanian and Egyptian curricula must be replaced by a Palestinian one; the quality of teaching staff must be improved, requiring special training; libraries and laboratories are scarce; and there is a lack of remedial learning programs for children who missed large amounts of study due to the Intifada or who are disabled. The author concludes that the education system within the emergent Palestinian entity can be expected to develop a democratic-pluralistic system and culture.

**Jerusalem Women's Organizations During the British Mandate, 1920s-1930s**

**No. 81**

By **Ellen Fleischmann**

*March 1995 (English, Pp. 49, and Arabic, Pp. 49)*

Based on the Arab press of the day, British government documents, interviews, memoirs and pamphlets, the author shows that the civil sector under the British Mandate opened employment opportunities for educated women, who mainly came from the upper class, and then began to emerge into public life, working, volunteering, and becoming politically active. The paper describes the background, emergence and political activities of the Palestinian women's organizations during this time, concluding that these women activists were neither feminists nor suffragists but were fiercely nationalistic, struggling for the survival of a Palestinian society threatened by Zionism.

**The Israeli Economy: Structure and Transformation, 1985-1995**

**No. 84**

by **Dr. Jamil Hilal**

*August 1995 (Arabic, Pp. 135)*

Hilal outlines the basic aspects, infrastructure and the evolution of the Israeli economy against the background of the relation between the Israeli state and the society, the militarization of the Israeli economy and strategic-economic relations with the US. The paper also discusses the likely effects of the end of the Arab boycott on the Israeli economy as well as the interplay of political stability and economic development in the region. Economic prospects, investment opportunities and needed economic reforms are also examined.

**One Year Into Self-Government: Perceptions of the Palestinian Political Elite**

**No. 85**

by **Helena Lindholm-Schulz**

*September 1995 (English, Pp. 118)*

This study is the product of interviews with prominent Palestinian activists conducted during 1994 and 1995. The author aims at evaluating and comparing the differing attitudes of the nationalist mainstream, the secular opposition, the Islamic movements, and the camp of the independents and reformists towards the Oslo and Cairo agreements. Analyzed are the various groups' level of acceptance of the agreements, their assessment of the PNA's performance, and their opinion about Israeli intentions. The findings illustrate the dilemma of contemporary Palestinian nationalism: the need to achieve a balance between the outcome of the agreements, the leftists' and the Islamists' claims, and the demands of the civil society for participation and democratization.

**Non-Governmental Organizations and Freedom of Association:**

**No. 87**

**Palestine and Egypt - A Comparative Analysis**

by **Dr. Denis J. Sullivan**

*December 1995 (English, Pp. 86)*

This study of the regulation of NGOs in Egypt and Palestine is based on the thesis that the way in which the PNA deals with the NGOs now indicates the underlying philosophy of the coming regime. Sullivan demonstrates that in both the Egyptian and Palestinian cases, the political authorities seem more keen to regulate NGO activities than to support their efforts to develop civil society and the economy. The process of the formulation of the PNA draft law on NGO legislation is outlined, as is the reaction and protest campaign of the NGO community against this law (both documented in the appendix). The paper also includes an analysis of the Egyptian Law of Association and a comprehensive bibliography.

**Women in Contemporary Palestine: Between Old Conflicts and New Realities**

**No. 91**

by **Maria Holt**

*May 1996 (Arabic, pp. 117 and English, pp. 102)*

This book is a concise but comprehensive overview of the position of women in Palestinian society and their role in the national movement. The first two chapters provide a historical overview of women's involvement in the national movement from the British Mandate era to the present day and examine issues such as the women's role as symbols of moral purity and honor; the conflict between social change and cultural conservation in relation to women's domain, and the importance of different forms of cultural assertion. The book highlights many of the contradictions and dilemmas of women's participation in the national movement, and thus serves as a thought-provoking introduction to the current debates about women's status and their role and contribution to the national movement.

**Constitutionalism and Palestinian Constitutional Development**

**No. 93**

by **Dr. Gregory S. Mahler**

*June 1996, (English, pp. 92)*

This study attempts to assess the prospects of a constitutional government arising in Palestine. It examines the



founding of the PLO in 1964 through the present. The primary evidence cited is from surveys conducted among Palestinians with regard to their ideas about democracy generally, and especially their views of the January 1996 elections. Mahler shows how the revisions of the constitution have mirrored the increasing sophistication of Palestinians and their increasing attention to making sure that the constitution will protect citizens' rights and limit the power of the government. The annex contains the texts of most of the investigated Middle Eastern countries' constitutions.

## II. Jerusalem *(in chronological order)*

### **Jerusalem - the Effects of Israel's Annexation of Jerusalem on the Rights and Position of its Arab Population**

No. 37

by **Osama Halabi**

*September 1990 (Arabic, Pp. 99)*

This important research study by lawyer Osama Halabi covers a variety of aspects of Israel's annexation of Jerusalem, including its legality under international law and Israel's position in this regard. Other chapters include a well-documented discussion of the legal situation of Jerusalem residents after annexation, the effect of the annexation on the rights and duties of Arab Jerusalemites and the role of Jerusalem in the Intifada.

### **The Conflict over Jerusalem: Some Palestinian Responses to Concepts of Dispute Resolution**

No. 41

by **Dr. Cecilia Albin**

*December 1990 (English, Pp. 40, and Arabic, Pp. 38); 2nd ed. July 1992; 3rd ed. December 1996*

Jerusalem's historical, religious and political significance to many peoples and three faiths as well as its own ethnic diversity, have made it a city fraught with a unique mixture of conflicts. This paper is the result of two lectures given at PASSIA during 1990. It examines claims and concerns regarding Jerusalem, and gives an analysis of the positions, interests, needs, strategies and options which arise when negotiating over Jerusalem as an indivisible entity.

### **Jerusalem and US Foreign Policy**

No. 49

*December 1991 (Arabic, Pp. 68)*

The paper deals with the following issues: the importance of Jerusalem to the three religions, Jerusalem under Ottoman rule, the appearance of political Zionism, and Jerusalem under the British Mandate. In the modern context, it discusses US policy towards Jerusalem before 1948; US and UN policy towards Jerusalem between 1948 and 1950; the US, Arab and Israeli positions toward Jerusalem; Israeli settlements; and the Jerusalem policies of US presidents Reagan and Bush.

### **Jerusalem and United Nations Resolutions**

No. 50

*December 1991 (English, Pp. 46)*

*Out of Print*

This paper deals with UN policy towards Jerusalem. It lists, discusses and historically reviews all UN resolutions on Jerusalem, starting with Resolution 181 of 1948 (on partition) up to the Security Council Reaction to the Massacre at Al-Haram Al-Sharif on 8 October 1990. The book concludes that no significant action has been taken to implement UN policies and to change the present status of Jerusalem according to international resolutions.

### **The Conservation of Jerusalem**

No. 62

by **Khaled A. Khatib**

*June 1993 (English, Pp. 142)*

This study, unlike the vast majority of books on Jerusalem, focuses not only on the conservation of the important religious monuments in the Muslim Quarter, but also on the living conditions and problems experienced by those living in that most neglected area of the Old City. Chapters deal with social structure and geography, undesirable features of residence, and maintenance and restoration work. A case study of the Chain Gate Road and a look at the future possibilities for improvement are also included and contribute to making this a seminal Palestinian work.

### **The Jerusalem Arab Municipality**

No. 68

by **Osama Halabi**

*December 1993 (Arabic, Pp. 95)*

This study by lawyer Osama Halabi offers a comprehensive historical picture on the role of the Jerusalem Arab Municipality from its foundation in 1863 until the Israeli Likud party victory in the 1993 elections. The author discusses laws and precedents, clarifying the authority, duties and responsibilities of the Municipality in the Ottoman period and under the British Mandate and reviews council appointments, elections and compositions. Halabi then examines the implications of a divided city (1948-1967) in the light of international law, with regard to the debate on the internationalization of Jerusalem, and in terms of two municipalities, before turning to the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 and the ultimate dissolution of the Jerusalem Arab Municipality. Halabi discusses the loss of land and property, arrests campaigns, Israeli efforts to make Palestinians leave the city, and the work of Teddy Kollek, mayor of West Jerusalem. Finally, Halabi reviews the subject of re-establishing the Arab Municipality and discusses the current Palestinian thinking and planning about the future of the city.

### **Jerusalem Women's Organizations During the British Mandate, 1920s-1930s**

No. 81

by **Ellen Fleischmann**

*March 1995 (English, Pp. 49, and Arabic, Pp. 49)*

 see **Research Studies**

**Jerusalem: Palestinian Dynamics of Resistance and Urban Change, 1967-94** No. 82

by **Anne Latendresse**

April 1995 (English, Pp. 61, and Arabic, Pp. 64)

Against the background of theories of urban movements, transformation of cities and local development, the author discusses the role of the Palestinian community in determining the structure of Jerusalem since 1967. The paper examines Palestinian efforts to survive as a distinct society and their strategies of resistance to Israeli attempts to "Judaize" the city. It concludes that Palestinian priorities were inadequately defined and conceived with regard to Jerusalem and that the Palestinian leadership must develop a unified strategy to counteract Israeli measures and actions in the city.

**Jerusalem - Religious Aspects** No. 88

by **Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, Dr. Bernard Sabella, and Dr. Yitzhak Reiter**

(with an Introduction by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi)

December 1995 (English, Pp. 68, and Arabic, Pp. 89)

This book contains four papers originally presented at a symposium on religious aspects of the question of Jerusalem (Milan, 1994). Nusseibeh's first paper deals with Jerusalem's significance to Islam in the past and present, while his second paper attempts to describe the political future of the city and what a final solution will have to entail, including development needs and boundaries. Sabella's paper looks at the issue of Jerusalem from a Christian point of view, including Christian population, emigration, customs, and relations with Muslims. Reiter outlines a personal view of the city's historical and national significance for Jews. He stresses the centrality of the issue to the Jewish people with reference to Biblical, Talmudic and Midrash sources. The papers include suggestions on what a future solution will have to entail and present encouraging evidence that inter-faith and Palestinian-Israeli dialogue can take place on the issue of Jerusalem.

**The Struggle for Jerusalem** No. 92

by **Dr. Sami F. Musallam**

May 1996, (Arabic, Pp. 170 and English, Pp. 132)

This study examines the conflict between Jordan, Israel and the PLO as well as within the Palestinian camp over the issue of Jerusalem since Oslo. Musallam outlines the circumstances that now surround the issue of Jerusalem, such as continued Israeli settlement construction and the isolation of Jerusalem from the West Bank. Against this background, he details the vicissitudes of the struggle as the Jordanians, Israelis and Palestinians have jockeyed to gain sovereignty and control over the city. One chapter deals with Chairman Arafat's famous speech in South Africa in which he called for a Jihad for Jerusalem. Another chapter recounts the Israelis' failure to deliver one of three letters that had been understood as a *sine qua non* for the PLO to sign the DoP. The way in which the Israeli government attacks Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem is described in detail, as are the tensions that arose between the Palestinians and the Jordanians following the Israeli-Jordanian Washington Declaration and peace treaty. In the last chapter, Musallam gives some practical suggestions about the requirements for reaching a peaceful and fair solution on the issue of Jerusalem.

**The Jerusalemite Scholar Dr. Kamel Al-Assali and the Question of Jerusalem** No. 94

by many authors

June 1996 (Arabic, Pp. 475)

☞ see **Reports - Seminar Reports**

**The Judaization of Jerusalem - Israeli Policies Since 1967** No. 96

by **Allison Hodgkins**

December 1996, (English, Pp. 88)

This study shows that successive Israeli governments have set out with all determination to implement the Jewish vision of Jerusalem as the "eternal, undivided capital of the Jewish state." With the latest Israeli measures in East Jerusalem, the opening of the Hasmonean tunnel, the closing down of Palestinian institutions and the decision to start the construction of a new settlement, the book is more acute than ever. It gives a thorough analysis of Israeli politics on Jerusalem, its goals, mechanisms and effects, supported with many empirical facts as well as interviews with Israeli and Palestinian officials and activists. Hodgkins analyzes the evolution of Israeli policy on Jerusalem under the successive governments from Eshkol to Netanyahu on the national and municipal levels. One chapter deals with the destruction of Jerusalem's geographic identity through the means of land control, land confiscation, the blocking of Palestinian development and settlement construction. Another chapter covers the mechanisms of establishing demographic superiority by encouraging Jewish immigration and attacking Palestinian residency rights. The last chapter analyses the purpose and practice of legitimizing Israeli sovereignty over the city. The appendix includes maps, statistics and documents.

**Documents on Jerusalem** No. 97

by **PASSIA Research Staff**

December 1996, (English Pp. 360)

This compilation of documents, statements and other resources is intended to provide for researchers and anyone else interested in the issue of Jerusalem a comprehensive resource work of the different attitudes towards Jerusalem as they have evolved throughout history. The aim is to give an overview of the general positions of the different parties involved; therefore, the full texts or extracts related to the issue of Jerusalem of more than 340 statements, documents and resolutions concerning the question of Jerusalem are arranged by their source of origin (e.g. Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Palestinian, Israeli, Arab, US, UN, and European positions). The document section is preceded by an introduction (by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, head of PASSIA) that offers a brief overview of the status and historical evolution of the Jerusalem question. The book also includes an index, listing all documentary entries in chronological order, i.e., by the date of their original appearance. The document section is followed by a comprehensive chronology of Jerusalem's history from ancient times until today. The last two sections provide a selected bibliography on the topic of Jerusalem and a few maps.



**Notes on Palestinian-Israeli meetings in the 1980s**  
by **Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi**  
June 1987 (English, Pp. 22, and Arabic, Pp. 17); 2nd edition May 1988; 3rd edition February 1991

Documentation of meetings held between 1967-1987 between Palestinians from the Palestinian Territories and Israelis illustrating the changing nature of their discourse. Discussed are meetings of significance, the participants - Palestinians from different geographical areas, universities, municipal councils and religious and family groups and Israeli military and other officials, academics and the media - and examines the general trends in these meetings. Points of agreement and disagreement are noted as are Palestinian and Israeli positions and the positive and negative results of these meetings.

**Modern Arabic Literature Translated into German**

by **Dr. Stephan Wield**

March 1988 (Arabic, Pp. 11)

No. 4

Out of Print

This lecture investigates the issues facing the translation of modern Arabic novels, short stories, and poetry into German.

**Swedish Foreign Policy and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict**

by **Beatrice Zeidler-Blomberg**

April 1988 (English, Pp. 19, and Arabic, Pp. 10)

No. 5

Out of Print

This booklet provides a brief background of Sweden - history, demography, and geography - and then concentrates on Swedish foreign policy in the Middle East. Swedish perceptions of Israel and Palestine are considered as are Swedish government policies towards Israel and the PLO, including an analysis of the policy shifts of the 1980s.

**Closing Down the Palestinian Information Office in Washington DC - A Documentation**

Prepared by **Maha Shehadeh** and **Basma Al-Saman**

June 1988. (Arabic, Pp. 47 + Pp. 11 of English documents)

No. 6

Out of Print

This file documents the US Government decision to close the PLO offices in Washington and the UN in 1987, the background of US-PLO relations and the principle motives behind the closure. The positions and points of view of various Palestinian, Arab, Israeli, American and world groups and individuals are included.

**Nahaleen in the Intifada**

by **Ziad Mahmoud Abu Saleh**

June 1989 (Arabic, Pp. 156)

No. 17

This book documents the Israeli army attack on the village of Nahaleen, near Bethlehem, on 13 April 1989, in which five people were killed. It includes eyewitness accounts, articles from the local press and world reaction to the events.

**Reflections on American-Palestinian Dialogue**

by **Dr. William B. Quandt**

August 1989 (English, Pp. 26, and Arabic, Pp. 28)

No. 20

This paper resulted from a lecture given at a time when US-PLO dialogue had just begun, and details the history of US-PLO relations under Carter and Reagan. It also discusses the change in US policy and thinking and the reasons for this change, analyzing issues such as the Intifada, the Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank and US-Soviet relations.

**Islam in the Federal Republic of Germany**

by **Dr. Rotraud Wojtowysch-Wielandt**

November 1989 (Arabic, Pp. 24)

No. 24

This lecture focuses on two different stages of Muslim immigration to Germany. The first stage was at the end of the 19th century as a result of the wars between Europe and the Ottomans. It examines issues of integration into Western society and retaining traditions and symbols of the home society. The second stage was after the World War II which witnessed a rise in the number of Muslims living in Germany for a number of reasons, both social and political. Many came to work, study, or as entrepreneurs. The author also discusses the relations that have developed between the Muslim immigrants on different levels with German society.

**About the French Revolution and the Artist Jean Louis David**

by **Karim Dabbah**

February 1990 (Arabic, Pp. 24)

No. 28

The lecturer discusses the French Revolution, the storming of the Bastille Prison in 1798 in Paris, and the essential event of the revolution which took place under the slogans of freedom, brotherhood and equality. At the same time, the rise of a new artistic movement in French cultural life was part of the ideas and people of the revolution. Focusing on the French painter Jean Louis David and his work, the development of his style and the subject matter of his paintings, the lecture interprets the history, events and life in Parisian society during the French Revolution.

**The Transfer of Soviet Jews to Israel During "Perestroika"**

by **Dr. Azmi Bishara**

June 1990 (Arabic, Pp. 35)

No. 31

A general discussion of the immigration of Soviet Jews opens this lecture which delves into the issues of Soviet Jewish immigration and US-USSR relations, Soviet policies, Palestinians and aspects of the tie between the immigration and the Israeli economy.

*Appendices: PASSIA Publications*

- The Palestinian Component in Jordan's 1989 Parliamentary Elections** No. 33  
by **Schirin H. Fathi**  
*August 1990 (English, Pp. 36, and Arabic Pp. 27); 2nd edition August 1995*  
This paper focuses on the Palestinian issue in Jordan's parliamentary elections, depicting the underlying facts that led to the decision to hold elections and their timing. The paper discusses the importance of the Palestinian issue as an integral component of the election process.
- The Graffiti of the Intifada: A Brief Survey** No. 34  
by **Paul Steinberg** and **A. M. Oliver**  
*July 1990 (English, Pp. 56; Arabic, Pp. 16, with 19 b/w photographs); 2nd edition May 1994* **Out of Print**  
This informative paper examines the rarely addressed subject of graffiti and its pivotal role in communication during the Intifada. It analyzes different types of graffiti, interprets the use of different symbols and remarks on whether their intention was to warn, to convey political messages or to be simply commemorative.
- Nineteen Eighty Four (1984)** No. 36  
by **George Orwell** (*Translated into Arabic by Rashida Al-Masri*)  
*August 1990 (Arabic, Pp. 309)*  
This book is the translation of the famous book of English novelist George Orwell. First published in 1949, the book drew a dark picture of a dehumanizing totalitarian society. The decision to translate this piece of world literature into Arabic and thus, to make it available for Arabic readers, came due to its worldwide fame and the growing actuality of the future scenarios it suggests.
- Germany: Information Paper** No. 39  
*December 1990 (English, Pp. 60); (Arabic, Pp. 68)*  
This paper offers information about the history of Germany, events surrounding unification, the political parties and government, the states within Germany, and issues such as the military, education, religion, tourism, economy and the labor force. It also discusses specific issues such as relations between Germany and the Middle East, the country's technical cooperation with the West Bank and Gaza, and German private voluntary organizations and other institutes in the Palestinian Territories.
- West Bank and Gaza Information Paper** No. 40  
*December 1990 (English)* **Out of Print**  
This information paper describes historical, demographic, geographic, socio-economic, political and cultural facts about the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It also includes statistical information and lucid commentary.
- German Unification and the European Unity** No. 42  
by **Dr. Wolf D. Gruner**  
*January 1991 (English, Pp. 40, and Arabic, Pp. 27)*  
This lecture concentrates on the problem of unifying Germany, Europe, the single European Market in 1992, and the implications of the process of European integration for Germany as a whole.
- Israel on the Eve of an Election Year: Some Preliminary Reflections** No. 48  
by **Professor Naomi Chazan**  
*November 1991 (English, Pp. 68)*  
Prof. Naomi Chazan, Chairperson of the Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, discusses the issues behind the 1992 Israeli elections, the parties' and candidates' preparations for elections, the issues and dynamics behind the preparations as well as trends and implications for the coming year. The discussion between Palestinians and Israelis which ensued following the Chazan's lecture is also published in this book.
- Occupied Palestinian Territory** No. 64  
by **PASSIA Research Staff**  
*July 1993 (English, Pp. 129 + 7 maps)* **Out of Print**  
This paper details a staggering amount of historical, demographic, geographic, socioeconomic, political and cultural facts about the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It also includes up-to-date statistical information, maps and lucid commentary.
- The Australian Press and Palestine** No. 65  
by **Dr. Henk Overberg**  
*July 1993 (English, Pp. 26)*  
Australian perceptions of the Palestine issue are the basis for this paper which discusses how the Australian press perceived such issues as institutionalized Israeli responses to the Intifada, the polarization of Israeli politics, Israeli transience versus Arab moderation and restricted media access.
- Dutch Development Policy Towards the Middle East** No. 72  
by **Tom de Quaasteniet**  
*May 1994 (English, Pp. 62, and Arabic, Pp. 65)*



**The Israeli Disengagement Plan 1995****No. 83**by **Jawad Ja'abari***July 1995 (Arabic, Pp. 188)*

This paper attempts to shed light on Israeli aims to partition the West Bank between Palestinian inhabitants and Jewish settlements and describes the unilateral separation as advocated by the late Yitzhak Rabin. The disengagement plan is analyzed historically (as envisaged by Israeli generals) and as reflected in the contemporary Hebrew press. The author also discusses the issue of redrawing boundaries, security aspects and likely effects on the economy of both entities.

**VI. PASSIA Reports** *(in chronological order)***Seminar Reports****Notes on Palestinian-German Seminar****No. 2***October 1987 (English, Pp. 9, and Arabic, Pp. 10)***Out of Print**

This pamphlet documents the first PASSIA Seminar held in October of 1987 on Palestinian-German relations. It discusses the timing of the seminar, the complications of the subject, and gives a summary of the papers and evaluation of the seminar.

**Seminar on the Federal Republic of Germany, the Palestinians and the Middle East****No. 3**by **Dr. Helga Baumgarten***October 1987 (English, Pp. 35, and Arabic, Pp. 21)***Out of Print**

This paper was presented at the PASSIA Seminar on German-Palestinian relations and lays down a framework for analysis of German foreign policy in the 1980s. Background taken into consideration includes the history of the Third Reich, Adenauer's foreign policy (1950s-60s), the policies of the Social Democratic Party (1969-81), the blending of German and EEC foreign policy, EEC decisions following the October War in 1973, and the oil crisis of the 1970s.

**Seminar: Palestinian Assessments of the Gulf War and its Aftermath****No. 43***April 1991 (English, Pp. 171), (Arabic, Pp. 178); 2nd edition June 1991***Out of Print**

This book contains the papers delivered at a PASSIA seminar on various dimensions of the Gulf War. The academic orientation of the articles is a critical self-examination as well as an objective assessment of the developments taking place in the region and the Palestinian Territories. Articles are by Dr. Salim Tamari (*The Next Phase: Problems of Transition*); George Giacaman (*What Next for the Palestinians?*); Samir Huleileh (*The Gulf Crisis and the Palestinian Economy: New Tasks and Challenges*); Ibrahim Shaban (*The Legal Dimension: The Impact of the Gulf Crisis on the Palestinian Cause*); Helga Baumgarten (*The PLO's Political Program and the Gulf Crisis*); Bernard Sabella (*Post-Gulf War Prospects: Assessing the Positions*); and Mahdi Abdul Hadi (*Post-Gulf-War Assessment: A Palestinian Perspective*).

**PASSIA Seminar: Diplomacy and Protocol****No. 60***December 1992 (English, Pp. 117)*

The first report on a PASSIA *Training and Education in International Affairs* seminar covers the seminar preparation period, summaries of the lectures, the writing assignments, a project assessment and notes on lecturers and participants.

**PASSIA Seminar: Strategic Studies****No. 66***July 1993 (English, Pp. 112)*

*Strategic Studies* was the subject addressed in PASSIA's second seminar to train Palestinian graduates in the field of international affairs. The report contains the proceedings of the seminar including summaries of all lectures. The appendices document the course material, assignments and notes on the visiting lecturers and participants.

**PASSIA Seminar: The European Union****No. 89***March 1996 (English, Pp. 177)*

The 1995 PASSIA seminar on *The European Union* formed part of PASSIA's annual program on *Training and Education in International Affairs*. The seminar aimed at educating Palestinian graduates about the EU, its member states, its institutions, the single market, and common policies with focus on the EU's position vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. The seminar was followed by a field trip to European countries and the EU Commission in Brussels for six of the participants with the aim of enabling them to deepen their knowledge, establish contacts and gain first hand experience. The report contains the proceedings of the seminar including summaries of all lectures, workshops and discussions, statistical and other background information on all EU member states, and a description of the field trip to Europe, including summaries about meetings held and topics discussed. The appendix includes a reading list, notes on the lecturers and participants, EU documents relevant to the Middle East in general and the Palestine Question in particular, and a map.

**PASSIA Seminar: The Late Jerusalemite Scholar Dr. Kamel Al-Assali and the Question of Jerusalem** **No. 94**  
*June 1996, (Arabic, pp. 475)*

In recognition of the importance of Dr. Kamel Al-Assali's work and his contribution to the Palestinian library through studies, translation and documentation, PASSIA held a seminar reviewing his work and achievements. The proceedings of the seminar provide a comprehensive reading of Assali's writings and studies on Palestinian history, heritage and culture, in particular with relation to the question of Jerusalem. Several researchers and scholars contributed to this book, dealing with a specific topic, including "The Demography of Jerusalem at the End of the 11th Century"; "The Current Geographic status quo in Jerusalem"; "The Current Demographic status quo in Jerusalem"; "Analytical Study of the Historical Resources in the Work of Dr. Kamel Al-Assali"; "Dr. Kamel Al-Assali as Librarian, 1968-82"; "Documents and Records of the Jerusalem Shari'a Court in the Work of Kamel Al-Assali"; "The Life and Work of Dr. Kamel Al-Assali"; "The Heritage of Beit Al-Maqdis in the Writings of Dr. Kamel Al-Assali"; "Ornamentation on Ummayyad Buildings in Jerusalem"; "The Political Face of Jerusalem in the Early Decades of Islam", and "Jerusalem and a Political Solution."

**PASSIA Seminar: The Foreign Policies of Arab States** **No. 98**  
*Forthcoming (English)*

*The Foreign Policies of Arab States* was the subject addressed in PASSIA's 1996 seminar on *Training and Education in International Affairs*. The goal was to provide the participants with the ability to understand and analyze the process of foreign policy formulation in general and to examine the actual policy positions of leading Arab states with roles to play in the Middle East peace process. The report contains the proceedings of the seminar including summaries of all lectures and discussions, course material, assignments and notes on the visiting lecturers and participants.

## PASSIA Annual Reports

**1992 (Pp. 65) No. 61** **1994 (Pp. 152) No. 79**  
**1993 (Pp. 108) No. 69** **1995 (Pp. 98) No. 90**

In 1992, PASSIA decided to 'go public' by publishing a review of its work - the idea of which was prompted by the increasing local and international interest in PASSIA. Since then, the Annual Report has been published every year, covering all activities undertaken by PASSIA in the previous year, including reviews of PASSIA publications, summaries of PASSIA meetings, lectures and seminars, and an outline of new and ongoing projects.

## V. PASSIA Diaries

**Diary 1989 (No. 10)** **Diary 1990 (No. 25)** **Diary 1991 (No. 38)** **Diary 1992 (No. 51)**  
**Diary 1993 (No. 55)** **Diary 1994 (No. 67)** **Diary 1995 (No. 78)** **Diary 1996 (No. 86)**

**Currently available: PASSIA Diary 1997** **No. 95**  
*November 1996 (English, Pp. 272)*

Each year, PASSIA publishes its diary, which contains not only all the standard attributes of a diary (day by day planner, calendars, address and note space, important dates), but also a comprehensive directory listing the names and addresses of Palestinian and foreign institutions operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, such as *Academic and Research Centers, Associations and Unions, Diplomatic Missions, NGOs, Media, Human Rights Centers, Women's Organizations, Educational Institutes*, and organizations of the *Health, Economy and Services* sectors. Other chapters detail Palestinian history, geography, population, education, economy, the refugee issue, the Israeli occupation, settlements, water, the PLO/PNA, and the question of Jerusalem, and contain historical chronologies, documents and resolutions related to the Palestinian Question, and a collection of maps illustrating aspects and stages of the Palestine-Israel conflict.

# PASSIA

*Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs*  
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