

*PASSIA SEMINAR*

# *STRATEGIC STUDIES*

PASSIA

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

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**Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs**

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We thank most warmly the guest lecturers from the United Kingdom: Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Head of the Regional Security Programme at the Royal United Services Institute for defence Studies in London and Valerie Yorke, Middle East Editor at the Economist Intelligence Unit, London. The Palestinian Professors: Dr. Khalil Shikaki, assistant Professor in the department of Political Science at Al Najah National University in Nablus and Dr. Ibrahim Abu Lughod, Professor and vice President for Academic Affairs at Bir Zeit University. Dr. Yezid Sayigh and Dr. Ahmed Khalidi for their support and work in preparing the seminar and organising the curriculum for the lecture programme. Mrs. Kainat Dweik for her invaluable administration work and Nada Awad of PASSIA who typed this report.

Last but not least our thanks go to the Palestinian participants whose complete commitment, often in difficult circumstances, to the demands of the course is highly appreciated.

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## INTRODUCTION

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PASSIA's seminar on Strategic Studies, 1993, is the second of three courses arranged by PASSIA in the academic year 1992-93. In October 1992, the first course was conducted in cooperation with Swedish diplomats on the subject of Diplomacy and Protocol. The third is to be held in September 1993 on the subject of the European Community and the Middle East. PASSIA seminars are supported financially by the Ford Foundation.

These courses aim to train young Palestinian graduates in the field of diplomacy and international affairs. They are part of PASSIA's endeavour to meet the need of our community for formal education, training and practical experience in these areas. PASSIA invites experts and professionals from outside the Occupied Territories to join Palestinian academics in educating and training young Palestinian graduates.

PASSIA hopes that this Seminar, held at this crucial period in our history, will enable Palestinians to continue the process of state-building and to enhance our relations and better understanding with the international community.

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## PREPARATION PERIOD

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PASSIA consulted with British and Palestinian scholars in the field of Strategic Studies to share the implementation of the seminar. During December and January, PASSIA prepared reading material for the course. PASSIA advertised the proposed seminar in the local press, *Al Quds* and *Al Fajr* English, and through national institutions such as universities and research centres. PASSIA received 40 applications from all over the Occupied Territories.

### I. PASSIA Committee

PASSIA formed a Committee specifically for this course of the seminar. Its members are: Yezid Sayigh, Ahmed Khalidi, Ibrahim Abu Lughod, Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Khalil Shikaki and Alison Brown. The Committee invited all applicants to individual interviews at PASSIA between 18 and 20 March 1993. Of the 30 applicants who attended for interview, the Committee selected 15 to participate in the seminar.

The Committee recommended that PASSIA hold another seminar in Arabic. PASSIA will invite to participate in this the majority of those not selected for the April 1993 course.

### II. Reading Period

On March 30 PASSIA distributed reading materials to participants to read in advance until the beginning of the seminar on 19 April. This consisted of selected items from the full list of reference materials for the seminar prepared by the lecturers and Palestinian experts in the field.

### III. Lecture Programme

In the two weeks 19 April to 30 April, two specialists visiting from Britain and two from the West Bank gave a series of lectures and other educational exercises. They were Rosemary Hollis, Valerie Yorke, Khalil Shikaki and Ibrahim Abu Lughod.

During the ten day course, both the British Consul General and PASSIA hosted evening receptions for all participants and representatives of local institutions and the diplomatic corps in Jerusalem.

#### **V. Writing Assignments**

During May and June 1993, participants were required to write two essays, one in Arabic and one in English, on topics studied during the seminar.

#### **VI. Publication**

In July 1993, PASSIA undertook to publish a full report on the seminar, including notes of the lectures and details of seminar activities.



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## OPENING REMARKS

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### A. Address by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi - President of PASSIA

I want to welcome you all to this PASSIA seminar. We are at part two which is titled Strategic Studies. You are all by now familiar with the work of PASSIA, especially after your month of reading preparation for this course. My talk this morning will cover three elements: welcoming remarks, a short briefing on the Palestinian political agenda of today, and some comments on one topic on the agenda, the issue of borders.

To begin, I would like to thank David MacLennan, the British Consul General, for attending the opening session of this seminar as well as for inviting you all and Palestinian colleagues and professors for a special reception at the British Consular offices in Sheikh Jarrah. I believe that his presence here conveys two things. One is a recognition of the importance of this exercise and its timing and the other is support for PASSIA's endeavours in this field. We are very grateful and on behalf of PASSIA I thank him and hope to further develop this relationship.

I would also like to thank, on behalf of PASSIA, the three participating scholars: Rosemary Hollis from RUSI, Valerie Yorke from the Economist Intelligence Unit, and Khalil Shikaki from Najah University. The three of them worked closely with Yezid Sayigh and Ahmed Khalidi in London in planning the topics for this seminar and in preparing the reading list. They have laid the first cornerstone of such seminars in Jerusalem. We are all learning from this endeavour and we hope to continue to develop even better seminars with them personally and with the organizations they represent.

Professor Trevor Taylor, the Head of the International Security Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London, was also scheduled to attend. He participated in the London meeting to arrange the reading list. But unfortunately on March 30th he wrote to me saying that it has "become steadily

the three scholars here who devised the program, according to whom I took on the responsibility of carrying it out. We maintain a good relationship with Chatham House and we hope that in the future they will be able to meet their commitments in a timely fashion.

### **Current Political Situation:**

The second part of my talk today is on current political developments. I believe that since Madrid the peace process has developed to reach the following stations:

1. After the seventh round of talks we ended up with two documents. One is the Israeli plan entitled "Autonomy" and the other is the Palestinian "PISGA" (Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority). The whole discussion now is focused on looking for the common denominator between the two documents and how to come together with a joint position on how to transfer "authority" to the Palestinians during a transitional phase lasting between three and five years. This is supposed to be linked to a commitment for a final stage where the whole Palestinian community of six million people (two million in the Occupied Territories and four million in the diaspora) will exercise self-determination over their homeland.

2. The second station is the multilateral talks. We are participating with many other countries on five major issues. These are the economy, water, environment, disarmament and security, and human rights. We are facing many challenges in presenting the Palestinian understanding, interests, positions, and needs in these areas. We are also facing challenges in coping with other tracks: the Arab-Israeli track in the region through the bi-lateral talks, and the European-Israeli track in the multilateral talks. We are in need of doubling our efforts and should recruit many people, members and friends of the Palestinian family, to assist us in this process. It is through these efforts that we are gaining legitimacy, recognition, and understanding of our hardships.

3. The third station is in the domestic arena. We need here to go beyond the stage of building consensus among the various political factions, independent groups, and the silent majority of the Palestinian family, of just watering down the secular oppositional cry to withdraw from the peace talks and developing dialogue with the Islamist groups. We need to go beyond these efforts and move into preparing ourselves for exercising national authority on the ground in the transitional phase which really began in Madrid in 1990. We already have a lot of the structure and consensus in place for this kind of movement. We have a delegation with a mandate from the leadership in Tunis. We have higher councils established on a professional basis which cover fields such as education, housing, industry, planning, and in the future will cover health and other issues. Between these councils we have 37 technical committees working as think tanks to provide the delegation and high councils with three main agendas.

- a. Quick surveys in each field (electricity, education, health, economy, finance, land, social welfare, trade, tourism, refugees)
- b. Future scenarios for these areas from a Palestinian national perspective.
- c. How to close the gap between the two in practice with specific steps according to a time table with a particular budget.

At the same time though, we have major institutions which have been crippled (like the municipalities) and also declining institutions (like universities) and divided and scattered institutions (like the chamber of commerce).

Having said this, there is a need for a national system and a central authority to govern the society not by by-laws and police but by agreement on a national program in phases and a division of labor that includes all members of the Palestinian house. We need to implement our plans with loyalty to one thing: the land.

### **The Question of Borders:**

The third part of my talk today is on the question of borders. As a quick introduction to what you will be addressing in the seminar I want to make a few statements.

In discussing borders, we need to take into consideration the three sides of the triangle. One side of the triangle is the Palestinian people (the six million - two in the Occupied Territories, four in the diaspora). The other side is the people's rights (aggregate rights: those of self-determination, homeland, statehood, etc.) The base is the land, and here I mean all Palestinian land from the Mediterranean Sea to the River Jordan. We lost the first battle for this after the popular revolt of 1936 and the Peel Commission Plan of 1937 for partition which didn't materialize. Our second defeat was after the partition plan of 1947 which we refused and could not stop by establishing immediately a Palestinian state. We accepted a temporary conditional arrangement through Arabizing our conflict with the Zionists and becoming part of Jordan on the West Bank and part of Egypt in the Gaza Strip. The third setback was the 1967 June war which established borders now known as the "green line." The fourth strike against us is Israel's talk about reshaping the "green line" according to new development and the establishment of colonies in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel has already reshaped the line by redrawing the boundaries of Jerusalem. It annexed East Jerusalem in 1967 and at the same time it expanded the area twelve fold to include parts of the West Bank.

When we speak today of the question of borders for the transitional phase we should take into consideration that there has been semi-internationally recognized boundaries since the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. This is when the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided into French and British administrative spheres. If we are to negotiate for newly recognized boundaries this should be taken into account as well as security issues.

are discussing, what united units. We need to do this before we set a political arrangement and not vice versa.

Another issue that is important to keep in mind is that it's true that the Palestinian demand for an independent state has been consistently confirmed and yet as we talk about phasing and transitions we must insist that a recognized sovereign territory is the substantive base of our national authority. The light at the end of the tunnel in the transitional phase must remain independent statehood. This is why there needs to be a linkage between the transitional and final stages.

The fact that there is a lot of talk about a possible Palestinian/Jordanian confederation today does not mean that we should postpone or avoid drawing borders between the three parties (Israel, Palestine, and Jordan). The relationship between the borders is a priority for the Palestinian and Jordanian people even if it is not for the Israelis. We must also affirm that there cannot be an Israeli presence on the eastern borders. In a state of stability, peace, and a comprehensive settlement there should be freedom of movement across the borders (movement of people and goods), free trade zones, and de-militarized areas [transparency, openness, interchange, early warning system, inspection, hot-line agreement, exchange of information, all these are to be considered].

In conclusion, the Palestinian national authority in the transitional period should and must exercise its authority in a recognized, mutually accepted area. The boundaries of the "green line" of 1967 are a starting point. I don't see our national authority exercising authority on the moon. Our moon is to be recognized as the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as the capital.



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## SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

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
Social activity was an important element of the course programme. Not only were participants encouraged to mix and exchange ideas during breaks between the seminar, but both PASSIA and the British Consulate arranged receptions wherein the participants had the opportunity to meet various leading Palestinian academics and activists, and diplomats in Jerusalem.

Participants proved keen discussants during the seminar breaks for which refreshments were provided by PASSIA. Interaction among themselves and between them and the visiting lecturers was vigorous and friendly. PASSIA encouraged discussion between candidates not only in the context of the course topics but also because this was a rare opportunity for Palestinian graduates from all over the Occupied Territories to meet and establish links. These are the leaders of tomorrow and it is vital that they both exploit educational and training opportunities such as offered by PASSIA's Seminar Programme, and establish contacts for future consultation and coordination among themselves.

To further this end, PASSIA provided all participants with a daily luncheon at its premises and to a buffet reception at PASSIA with the visiting lecturers, and some Palestinian leading figures.

H.E. David MacLennan kindly arranged a reception courtesy of the British Consulate in Sheikh Jarrah.

Finally, PASSIA arranged a reception at the National Palace Hotel to which all British and Palestinian participants were invited along with representatives of the diplomatic corps based in Jerusalem and several Palestinian academics and heads of Palestinian institutions. Participants were thus able to meet Consuls General in an informal setting and to learn something of and establish links with different Palestinian




















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## SUMMARY OF LECTURES

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### ***Sovereignty, self determination, power, national security & use of force***

***Lecturer: Dr. Khalil Shikaki***

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#### **I. Introduction**

1. An overview of subject: International system, world order, and use of force.
2. The normative vs. the analytical analysis.
3. What is "politics"?

#### **II. Power**

1. Definition of power :
  - \* (A) forces (B) to do (X).
  - \* Examples: relationship involving "power"; others not involving "power".
2. Sources of power: violence, loyalty, love, knowledge, belief, economic factors.
3. Nature of power :
  - \* Why do we submit to pressure sometimes, refuse to do so at other times.
  - \* The *subjective* nature of power (How we perceive it).
4. Components of a "power relationship" :
  - \* Conflict of interest.
  - \* (B) does not want to obey (A), but it does.
  - \* (A) has the means of coercion and brute force.
  - \* (B) knows that.

#### **III. The System of Nation-States : Anarchy**

1. Westphalia - 1648 : ended role of pope, emperor and created a system of independent "states".
2. Anarchy or the absence of central authority : the implications.
  - \* self-help system (stag hunt analogy).
  - \* all must obtain means of physical security. *What is security.*
  - \* short-term considerations dominate politics.
  - \* concern about *relative* position (i.e. position in regard to other states and actors).
  - \* all are in strategic interdependence, no one state has complete control over its own fate.
  - \* can states afford to be moral when it comes to security considerations? What sources of morality?
3. How anarchy affects role of force in International Politics
  - \* force and foreign policy.
  - \* different facets of force: military is still most important.
  - \* short term considerations and power ratios.
  - \* strategic interdependence and playing according to the rules of the "dirtiest" who might also be the "mightiest"; or according to the rules of the "mightiest" who might also be the "dirtiest".
4. Uses of military force in anarchy :
  - \* Military force plays a central role in international politics, even if it is not used often.
  - \* It is the ultimate recourse.
  - \* The political usefulness of military force.
  - \* The covert and overt communication of military threats.
  - \* Conclusion: force and politics are connected.

#### **IV. The System of Nation-States: Nationalism**

1. What is nationalism :
  - \* it is a state of mind.
  - \* people see themselves as a community.
  - \* foundations: language and culture, race, religion, geography, political institutions, etc ....
  - \* role of territory: one territory or more, divided or undivided, a territory may have many nations.
2. Nationalism and self-determination :
  - \* from tribes to city states: the development of patriotism (Athens).
  - \* Middle Ages: the feudal domain and the divided loyalties.
  - \* Role of religion since Middle ages.
  - \* Age of commerce & development of central "authority" and expansion of territorial units, building new loyalty.
  - \* The consolidation of the power of kings.
  - \* Erosion of the power of "church".
  - \* Protestantism.
  - \* Secularism.

- \* loyalty to fatherland (popular sovereignty and self-determination).
- \* The French Revolution & "nation in arms", Napoleon.
- \* Others: John Milton, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, etc ....
- \* American Revolution.
- \* Industrial Revolution and imperialism.
- \* Colonialism and self-determination.

## V. Expansion of Force in International System

1. The rationalization and centralization of force.
  - \* force to become an instrument of policy.
  - \* the "state" lacked effective control over force.
  - \* 18th century changes : Europe confronting Louis XIV, more effective control over military establishment, improved discipline, formulation of military codes, large standing armies.
  - \* constraints: political, social, and technical constraints on the use of force.
  - \* the national utilization of material, human, and administrative resources to build a superior standing army.
  - \* conscription, intensive tactical training, efficient artillery barrages, skillful generalship.
  - \* example : British strategy of capitalizing upon its military superiority which was based on efficient use of resources (human and natural); concentrate on naval power and merchant marine and keeping away from military adventures on the continent (play role of balancer in Europe).
2. The popularization of force :
  - \* role of popular nationalism.
  - \* Napoleon and the "nation in arms".
  - \* mobilization of masses.
  - \* mobilization of *talents* (esp. scientific talents).
3. The professionalization of force :
  - \* a new management of force during *peace* time.
  - \* under the systemic direction of professionals.
  - \* building a class of specialists in military organization of planning.
  - \* formulating strategies, doctrines and tactics.
  - \* purpose is to maximize military efficiency, during peace time, in order to win war.
4. Force and role of Technology :
  - \* gunpowder, rifle, firing mechanism, range and accuracy, etc ....
  - \* mass production.
  - \* railroads, telegraph, steamships ....
  - \* technology and military doctrine (Mahan and role of battleships in foreign policy; airpower and Douhet - command of air is a prerequisite to victory, emphasis on first strike and strategic bombing.
  - \* total mobilization of scientific talents led to new weapons : airplane, the tank, poison gas, submarines.



5. **Conclusion** : Nuclear weapons and the use of force : How did nuclear weapons change views regarding the utility of military force.

## ***Nuclear Deterrence and balance of power***

***Lecturer: Dr. Khalil Shikaki***

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### **I. Introduction :**

1. The setting : the primacy of force in Anarchy.
2. Methods of persuasion :
  - \* do nothing.
  - \* logical arguments.
  - \* emotional arguments.
  - \* bargaining.
  - \* deny/seize (or brute force).
  - \* deter/compel (or coercion).

### **II. Deterrence and Defense :**

1. What are the traditional objectives of military power: protect life + influence others' behavior.
2. How does brute force accomplish this?
  - \* deny opponent his objective.
  - \* alleviate one's own war damage.
3. How does coercion achieve this?
  - \* through the threat of retaliation, one seeks to prevent the opponent from doing something, or to persuade him to do (undo, or stop doing) something.
  - \* focuses upon affecting enemy's will by creating the anticipation of grave and unacceptable costs.
4. Punishment & denial : Examples from history.
5. Costs & benefits calculations :
  - \* deterrence poses prospect of costs and risks outweighing opponent's prospective gain.
  - \* defense focuses on reducing one's own prospective costs and risks.
  - \* defense and deterrence are functions of one's cost-gain expectations.
  - \* deterrence aims at maximizing one's own costs.
6. Targets :
  - \* Deterrence: threat of retaliation is directed at the enemy's population and industries.
  - \* Defense: threat is directed against enemy's military force.
7. Compellence.
  - \* the active or "offensive" use of coercion.

first move, in whose initiative is put to the test".

- \* threats that impose certain risk if the enemy does not comply with one's demands.
- \* deterrence is easier to enforce.
- \* compellence is difficult to enforce because it demands that opponent *do* something.

### III. Deterrence, Missiles and Nuclear Weapons

1. Long range bombers and missiles :
  - \* make it possible to separate functions of punishment from that of denial.
  - \* "certainty" of punishment is less questionable.
2. Nuclear Explosions :
  - \* dramatically increase war damage : examples.
  - \* dramatically increase costs of war.
  - \* reduce miscalculation, "certainty" of punishment is less questionable.
  - \* to hurt and coerce, you need not win military battles first.
  - \* values at risk are human, cultural, spiritual, etc ....
  - \* restructure people's concepts regarding use of force in international politics?
  - \* Does it *automatically* produce deterrence.

### IV. Assumptions and Implications of Deterrence : A Critique

1. Theory is deductive; no empirical research and little empirical evidence.
2. Pays little attention to goals of policies; it ignores underlying motives; seeks to maintain "status quo".
3. Its rationality assumptions & question of decision-making, how we behave under stress, other decision-making models, etc .....
4. Deterrence, nuclear weapons and the causes of war: does nuclear deterrence change the structure of the state-system (anarchy)? costs of war, simplify calculation, etc.

### V. A Military Strategy of Deterrence (implications of a pure model) :

1. Possession of mutual assured destruction capability is necessary and sufficient for deterrence of total and limited wars.
2. Targets are cities and industries. Counterforce targeting is counter productive and causes instability.
3. Damage limitation measures cause crisis instability and lead to arms race instability.
4. Quantitative advantages are meaningless.

## ***Foreign and defence policy, military strategy and military doctrine*** ***Lecturer: Dr. Rosemary Hollis***

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### **Strategic and Security Studies: The Western Tradition**

In approaching the subject of foreign and security policy-making, Western analysts/planners have certain assumptions about the 'way the world works' in the backs of their minds, which influence their assumptions about human behaviour, the nature and functions of the state, its objectives, and the relationship of means to ends.

### **International Political Economy - Three Alternative Models**

#### **(1) The Liberal Model**

Separates politics and economics;  
Assumption of automatic logic of the market, which is scientific and neutral;  
Primary object to benefit well-being of individuals;  
Individuals behave rationally: maximise benefits given the costs; and relate means to ends;  
Progress is linear, gradual and continuous.

#### **(2) The Nationalist/Mercantilist Model**

Subordination of economic activities to the goal of state-building;  
Primacy of interests of state;  
Importance of national security and power (guns **and** butter);  
Military force dictates global politics;  
International competition is for wealth and power;  
Conflict, not cooperation is normal;  
Gains and losses are relative, not mutual: zero-sum approach.

#### **(3) The Marxist Model**

Could be evolutionary or revolutionary;  
Dialectical approach to reality, which is dynamic and conflictual;  
Historical materialism;  
Economic laws drive development of capitalism;  
Capitalism, the most productive system to date, will collapse because of: law of disproportionality, law of concentration, law of falling rate of profit.  
Commitment to socialism for present purposes, the focus will be on a view of the

making, and, by extension, military strategy and doctrine.

## **The Realist and Neo-Realist Approaches to International Relations**

Distinction between levels of analysis: international system (systemic level); states (previously empires); groups within states; individuals.

Broadly, anarchy predominates at the systemic level, since there is no international body capable of enforcing law on all states.

States are unitary, *rational actors*, engaged in a struggle for power, which dictates the necessity for governments to devise foreign and defence policies accordingly.

### **Realists agree on the:**

- \* need for the *units* (usually states) to calculate forces;
- \* decisive role of force among the ingredients of power;
- \* permanence of national ambitions and threats to survival;
- \* imperative of the balance of power;
- \* impossibility of an 'ethics of law' and of peace through law;
- \* wisdom of an 'ethics of responsibility' instead of conviction;
- \* importance of geopolitical factors in the definition of states' goals;
- \* preponderant role of states among all the *actors* on the world stage;
- \* possibility of conceptualising politics as 'the intelligence of a personified state', rather than the intelligence of a class, ideology, or complex and bureaucratic process.

### **Neo-Realists Have Refined the Model by:**

Questioning the rationality of states/actors;

Introducing the notion that actors have perceptions and perspectives that are subjective and not universal; they act within limited and limiting preconceptions, conceptual frameworks and institutional routines.

These developments have called into question the validity of the whole realist approach by refuting the idea that states/actors behave rationally, in some objective and immutable sense.

This undermines as well as adds to deterrence theory, by the way.

However:

The importance of the model of realism remains fundamental as a conceptual framework for Western decision-making and analysis.

### **Policy-Making**

In general, Western analysts still describe the policies and objectives of states as though they are coherent single units. In fact, it is now well-understood that policies are the aggregation of actions and motives of a number of players and factors

operating within and between states.

### **Decision-Making Theory; Three Models:**

Analysts think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models (*analytic paradigms*) that have significant consequences for the content of their thought.

Most analysts explain (and predict) the behavior of national governments in terms of various forms of one basic conceptual model, known as the *Rational Policy, Model (Model I)*.

Two 'alternative' conceptual models suggest a more useful explanation and predictor of policy-makers decisions. These have been labeled the *Organisational Process Model (Model II)* and the *Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III)*.

#### **I. Rational Policy Model**

State or government as unitary, *rational actor*.

Action as *rational choice*:

goals and objectives identified (national security, etc.)

available options discerned in context of international market place;

consequences assessed in terms of outcomes, costs and benefits;

choice is made on basis of net valuation.

Illustration: nuclear deterrence strategy.

#### **II. Organizational Process Model**

Government actions not rational choices but *outputs* of large organisations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.

Organisations (foreign ministry, transport ministry, armed forces and units thereof) operate according to *standard operating procedures* and *programmes*. [Training to automatically take orders in armed forces; profit factor in business.]

Government options are dictated by available organizational resources, including the armed forces and how they operate [mobilisation procedures.]

Factors involved: corporatism [competing for budget allocations]; sequential attention to problems/goals; feeding information upwards as part of standard operating procedure, which is resistant to speedy action/change; existing repertoire of programmes [for capturing a military objective]; uncertainty avoidance [informal agreements with other organisations, preparing for scenarios]; relationship (interface) between government leaders and organisations—decentralisation vs. control.

Leaders receive only such information/assistance as an organisation is capable of providing, given its piece of the picture.

#### **III. Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm**

(who have separate and unequal power over different pieces of the picture and separable objectives in various subgames).

Individuals become players in national security policy-making by virtue of their positions in the administration, and, 'where you stand depends on where you sit.' [Secretary of State answerable to several constituencies, which defines what he/she can and cannot do, yet he/she is personality with his/her own 'baggage' and background].

Individuals thus respond in accordance with own personalities; position; parochial priorities and perceptions; interests, stakes and power; timing and pressure.

*Foreign and defence policy* is simultaneously an 'organisational output' and the outcome of political bargaining, with the country concerned.

Yet, there is a preference in the West to describe such policies as the result of states behaving as rational actors.

As a result, there is an expectation that all should speak the language of policy goals, threat assessments, available options, alternative scenarios and rational choice, when discussing foreign and defence policy.

### **Military Strategy and Doctrine**

The same applies to military strategy and doctrine as to foreign and defence policy. They can be analysed as culture specific, bound by history and precedent, the product of organisational processes or bureaucratic politics. Alternatively, they can be approached as an objective science, in line with the realist approach to international affairs and the rational actor model of policy-making.

Western military analysts frequently refer back to Karl von **Clausewitz**, the 19th century Prussian military strategist, as their benchmark. According to Clausewitz: War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale; it is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.

If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, namely, the sum of available means [number and technology] and the strength of the will [to fight/motives].....From the character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to the designs of the other, and act accordingly.

...the political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made.

...war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.....the political view is the object, war is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.

War in early modern times, notably in 17th and 18th centuries, tended to be a limited affair, involving set-piece battles between armies on the battlefield. The Napoleonic Wars put an end to that, by introducing 'the nation at war'. The twentieth century witnessed two World Wars, but the fundamental change came specifically with the advent of nuclear weapons. This made **total war**, at least between the two most heavily armed nuclear superpowers, essentially unthinkable, because the level of destruction involved would be such as to render the original objectives irrelevant.

Since World War II, therefore, a separate field of military strategy, **deterrence theory** has developed. Meantime, strategies and doctrines for fighting **limited wars** have also been refined and developed.

[See checklist for concepts and terminology]

As the 21st century approaches, however, the power of so-called conventional technology, for fighting non-nuclear or **conventional wars**, has become so destructive as to render even this type of conflict counterproductive or irrational, **unless** the amount of force used is limited.




# The Evolution of the International Arms Market and Controls

## Defining the Patterns and Trends in Arms Sales


Regional Distribution and Market Shares. (Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament).

### Regional Shares of the World Arms Import Market, 1979 and 1989



Middle East Arms Import Market, 1989

World Arms Export Shares, 1989






Changes Over Time: (Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).

### Arms Imports by Region, 1979-89

Billions of constant 1989 dollars (ratio scale)



### Share of World Arms Exports (in percent)

	Soviet Union	United States	SU & US	Other Developed	Developing
1989	43.1%	24.7%	67.8%	22.5%	9.7%
1988	40.6	27.8	68.4	20.5	11.1
1987	38.8	24.5	63.3	26.8	9.9
1986	42.0	18.1	60.1	32.0	7.9
1985	35.1	22.8	57.9	32.9	9.1
1984	35.6	19.4	55.0	31.0	13.9
1983	38.8	23.2	62.0	29.2	8.9
1982	38.5	19.0	57.5	29.6	12.9
1981	40.2	19.3	59.5	33.2	7.3

1. More importers, exporters and producers.  
Principally accounted for by:
  - (a) arrival of LDCs in the market;
  - (b) amount of money involved;
 But:
2. Leveling-off of the growth in weapons' trade in mid/late 1980s.  
Because of economic and political developments such as:
  - (a) reduction in available cash—end of oil/petro-dollar boom; Third World debt crisis;
  - (b) increased costs of more technologically advanced systems;
  - (c) decline in direct military aid/assistance;
  - (d) costs of providing infrastructure to underpin arms use;
  - (e) fluctuations in the number of conflicts and, principally, end of the Cold War.

All the above evident in the Middle East.

### **Phases in the Development of the International Arms Trade**

[From: Edward Laurance, *The International Arms Trade* ( New York: Lexington, 1992)]

#### **I. The Inter War Period 1930-40:**

laissez-faire;

predominance of private companies; market predominance of Western Europe and US – a function of their wealth and development;

no grant aid – private credit finance – arms transfers not used as political/foreign policy tool;

market philosophy predominant.

#### **II. Post World War Two 1946-66:**

trade a function of bi-polar, ideological competition;

advanced weaponry consumed by home markets of superpowers – trade primarily in surplus old stocks ('off-the-shelf');

principal suppliers national governments – dominance of superpowers;

recipients mainly rebuilding countries of developed world and newly independent developing countries/client states;

arms transfers primarily an instrument of foreign policy – not driven by profit motive; grant aid predominant;

control intrinsic to the system (e.g. the Trilateral Agreement).

#### **III. Into the Oil Boom Years 1966-80**

trade a function of the shift of superpower conflict to context of the Third World; more suppliers – competitors across Western Europe, after their economic/post-War

recovery – though superpowers predominant;  
more buyers – more independent states, more petro-dollars;  
costs of higher technology → incentive to export for profit, to retain home production lines;  
principal suppliers are national governments, but multi-national companies emerging;  
cash and credit as primary modes of payment;  
Third World producers entering market;  
proliferation – trade increases 400%;  
multiplicity of suppliers = end of control through superpower blocs, while Cold War still forbids multilateral control;  
arms sales as political bargaining tool; acquisitions for prestige; buyers demand their *right* to buy arms.

#### **IV. End of the Cold War 1980-92**

levelling off/decline in size of arms market;  
increased pressure to sell;  
commercial incentives take over from foreign policy goals for suppliers;  
second tier producers active, but subsequently squeezed;  
buyers interested in arms for security needs, not prestige – developing states become capable of threatening developed states;  
proliferation of missile technology;  
introduction of MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime);  
Middle East conflicts sustain biggest regional market.

[Note: COCOM = Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls; includes all NATO members (except Iceland) plus Japan and Australia].

#### **Important Characteristics of the Contemporary Arms Trade**

- \* Internationalisation of industrial, and hence arms, production – economies of scale; labour and R&D considerations; costs of high tech production too great for multiple companies to stay alive;
- \* Blurring of lines between civilian and military technology – the issue of ‘dual use’ technologies;
- \* Growth in the number of ‘off-set’ deals;
- \* Re-emergence of illegal traders/traffic – related to the money/drugs trail;
- \* Contraction of government involvement in industry in the developed world (privatisation trend);
- \* Availability of surplus arms from the Cold War and old conflicts (e.g. Afghanistan);
- \* Problems of tracking, let alone controlling, arms/technology transfers.

Need to examine impact/implications for armies/military establishments as well as national arsenals.

### **Impact/Implications at Three Levels:**

1. Domestic politics and economies of each state.  
Role of the military in society/economy – some examples:  
Israel's 'citizen army': regular 176,000, reserves 430,000, out of total population of 4m;  
Egypt's regular army 435,000, with 691,000 reserves, out of total population of 58m;  
Syria's regular army 390,000, with upwards of 142,000 reserves, out of a total population of 11.2m;  
Saudi Arabia, approximately 110,000 in forces (including National Guard), out of a total population of around 8m.  
Service in forces represent jobs; military budget important to local industry, but also a significant slice of national budget.
2. Military confrontation between states.  
Arms/armies wanted for deterrence; for fighting wars and winning advantages in war; yet also  
Account for levels of destruction in war;  
Militarisation and arms races may fuel likelihood of war.
3. International setting.  
Principal suppliers to Middle East are permanent members of the UNSC (90% of sales), with US in the lead;  
All these countries want export sales (for reasons discussed above);  
Supplying arms gives supplier countries a stake in the region, cements their relations with some governments, while endangering their relations with others.

### **Need to Define Aims of Arms Control**

To reduce probability of war, or its destructiveness? – may be too vague to enforce.

To protect whom from what?

To protect Middle Eastern states from each other?

To shield industrialised world from the LDCs?

To protect industrialised (nuclear) powers from each other?

Which weapons to be controlled?

### **Alternative Approaches**

(1) supplier constraint – control by imposition;

(2) consumer constraint – by mutual agreement between regional states.

## **Supplier Constraint**

### Pros:

Changed atmosphere since the Gulf War – revulsion Western military to confronting own weapons systems in the War;

End of Cold War constraints;

Changed economic environment, suppliers less likely to be able to afford competitive industries.

### Cons:

Drive for exports for national interest;

Impossibilities of monitoring some transfers;

Demands of universal compliance;

Institutionalises superiority of industrialised countries;

Drive to re-cycle petro-dollars.

## **Consumer Constraint**

### Pros:

Military/geographical ratio changes with new technology – new thinking on 'strategic depth';

High tech expensive, no assurance of deterrence or victory;

Absence of superpower balance/constraining effect;

Limitations of anti-missile defences, vulnerability of civilians;

Impossibility of keeping pace with the economic costs;

Mutual interest – peace process.

### Cons:

Lack of peace/trust;

Absence of political relations, which may make CBMs more difficult;

Evidence of Iraq's deceptive tactics;

Imbalances: Israeli nuclear power vs. greater Arab/Iranian numbers;

Some governments' failure to/fear of addressing internal problems if remove external threats and reduce military budgets and establishments.

Evaluation of the pros and cons.



## **I. Introductory Remarks**

- 1) The inevitability of the spread of technology / hardware / material needed for the making of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
- 2) Israeli nuclear monopoly and its impact on the strategic environment.
  - \* Restructure Arab motives?
  - \* Reinforce Arab motives?
  - \* Manipulate threats to change Arab military strategy (1973 war).
  - \* Effects on Israel's goals and objectives: make Israelis more "dovish" or more "hawkish"?
  - \* Incentives for the Arabs to seek the "equalizer": the chemical-biological weapon.
  - \* The Arabs may seek the nuclear bomb.
- 3) The Israeli nuclear monopoly and the efficacy of an Israeli deterrent threat.
  - \* Threats to survival of the state.
  - \* Threats to Israeli control over occupied territories.
  - \* "Bomb in basement" VS. a declaratory nuclear posture.

## **II. The Requirements for an "effective" mutual nuclear deterrence or "mutual assured destruction - MAD": Acquiring nuclear weapons and delivery systems.**

### **1. Israeli nuclear bomb :**

- \* Dimona: production of plutonium used in the making of nuclear weapons.
- \* Other means of acquiring nuclear material usable for the making of bombs.
- \* Number of Israeli 20 kt nuclear bombs: 100-200? different reports.
- \* Any doubts: are the bombs "ready" or are they in the "basement"? Have nuclear forces ever been put on "alert"?

### **2. Arab Nuclear Capabilities :**

- \* Review of past attempts to obtain the nuclear capability : Nasir in the 1960s, Qaddafi, Iraq.
- \* Egyptian current plans.
- \* Iraq: Osirak - 1981 - Israeli Strike.
  - The Iraqi indigenous efforts in the pre-Gulf War of 1991.
  - What stage did the Iraqis reach.
  - How much of Iraq's capabilities have been destroyed?
  - Can the Iraqis rebuild their nuclear capabilities?

3. **Problems that may arise and prevent the Arabs from acquiring nuclear capabilities**

- \* Nuclear power plants VS. research plants.
- \* The separation of plutonium.
- \* Restrictions on technology transfer.
- \* Israeli preemptive strikes.
- \* Western intervention.
- \* Funding problems.
- \* Local fears of nuclear radiation.

4. **Arab & Israeli delivery systems :**

- \* opponents *must* know that you can deliver nuclear bombs on their targets in such quantities so as to be able to cause a certain amount of death and destruction.
- \* What percentage of death and destruction do you want to inflict.
- \* Targets are cities and industries (military targets are excluded for this stage of the argument).
- \* Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq (examples) of countries and their delivery systems:
- \* Air force:  
Mig-21, Mig-23, Mig-25, Mig-29, Mirage 2000, phantom, Kfir, F-15, F-16, etc.
- \* Missiles: SCUD and its variants, Jericho and its variants.
- \* Ranges, payloads, & accuracies involved.
- \* Number of targets in Israel & Arab countries (Egypt as an example).
- \* Number of nuclear warheads needed by both sides.
- \* Effects of nuclear explosion: blast, heat, radiation, fallout, elector magnetic pulse-EMP.
- \* Kinds of explosions: airbursts, ground bursts, others.
- \* What is psi?
- \* An Arab country needs 12 nuclear bombs with 20 kt yield each in order to destroy most of Tel Aviv, W. Jerusalem, and Haifa.
- \* Israel needs 12 nuclear bombs with 20 kt yield each in order to destroy most of Cairo, Giza, and Alexandria.

**III. The Requirements for a "stable" mutual nuclear deterrence: the ability of the two sides to absorb a nuclear first strike and then be able to retaliate by striking at opponent's cities and industries with nuclear warheads; or the issue of the *invulnerability* of the nuclear forces.**

1. Must emphasize that this is "mutual deterrence". We are excluding the other option, "defense", at this stage of the argument. In a situation where "defense" strategies dominate, "stability" is unattainable.
2. The steps involved:
  - \* Have invulnerable forces that are able to withstand an attack. Remaining forces should be enough to carry out pre-designated missions.
  - \* Must have the ability to command, control, and communicate with the forces.

\* Must still, after being attacked, have the capability to reach and penetrate hostile territory and destroy your specific targets.

3. Means of making your forces invulnerable.
  - \* Redundancy: increase the numbers of your forces and delivery systems.
  - \* Protection: harden, hide, or distribute your forces and keep some on alert status (Building silos for missiles is a must).
  - \* Build an early warning system; you may also adopt a "launch-on-warning" strategy.

**IV. The Requirements for a "credible" mutual nuclear deterrence: the ability to formulate a nuclear threat and communicate it to opponent; and then the reception of the threat by the opponent; and his belief of the seriousness of the threat; and his fear of the punishment promised by the threat.**

1. **Formulation of a credible threat.**
  - \* Threats & Commitments.
  - \* Costs and stakes.
  - \* Defining vital interests worth the risk of a nuclear war.
2. **Communicating a threat.**
  - \* How to communicate "*proof*" that you are serious about threat (question of his perception of your intent).
  - \* How to communicate the certainty of retaliation.
  - \* How to deal with miscommunication & misperception.
3. **Reception of threat.**
  - \* What are the aggressor's perception of the calculations of the "defender"?
  - \* What "record" does the "defender" have?
  - \* Symmetry and asymmetry in values and stakes.
  - \* balance of interests.

**V. Conclusion : Arab & Israeli views regarding nuclear deterrence & other strategies.**





## ***Strategic Studies and Crisis Management: Past and Future-***

(Video on Cuban Missile Crisis 1962)

**Lecturer: Valerie Yorke**

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### **1. Realism and Crisis Management**

*Political realism* forms philosophical backdrop for contemporary strategic thought (although now subject to growing criticism and undergoing refinement). *States* are the *actors*; they act *rationally* to protect selves and accumulate power principally through the *use or manipulation* of military force. Since there is no supranational body to maintain order between states, the *international arena* is *inherently conflictual* and characterised by *anarchy*.

Realist approach had its "golden age" mid-1950 to mid-1960s. While *cold war pattern* of international politics provided model for development of strategic concepts: nuclear deterrence, arms control, limited war, flexible response and *crisis management* - all ideas designed to cope with bipolar world and hostile superpower relationship e.g. deterrence theory concentrated on strategic balance between USSR and USA; and techniques of *crisis management* developed to deal with superpower confrontation etc.

Traditional western-centric strategic studies approach is concerned with promoting *peace and security*, thus deterrence is the theory that peace and security can be promoted by threatening enemies with unacceptable retaliatory damage; *crisis management is the theory that security can be promoted by developing techniques for handling international crises*. In the however, crisis management (avoiding War) may next weight as in concept.

In international society where war is an instrument for change, promoting peace and security is a means to support *the status quo*.

### **2. Why is the Study of Crisis management important ?**

- \* In age of weapons of mass destruction; management of crises between major powers is as important as study of use of military force.
- \* Development of certain techniques of crisis management has been an imaginative and necessary response to danger of nuclear war.
- \* Peacefully resolved crises have implications - result not necessarily conducive to future stability.
- \* Strategists / policy makers learn from past crises.
- \* Crises will continue as major feature of inter-state / inter group relations they will be different / more complex.

"Crises perform a surrogate function in the nuclear age - they take the place of war in the resolution of conflict, between great powers at least, when war has become too costly and risky". (Glenn Snyder)

### **3. The policy maker's task/dilemma : Crisis management in the nuclear age**

"The major problem in the nuclear age is how to manage affairs skillfully enough to

Deterrence, limited war and crisis management are all concepts that help the policy-maker resolve his problem.

- \* Policy makers want to cooperate in order to find a solution and prevent nuclear war, but may *differ* over solution to be adopted.
- \* If governments regard objectives as sufficiently important, they will run **risks** to achieve them, but will try to avoid escalation of hostilities.

Therefore crisis management is concerned with the procedure for controlling and regulating a crisis and with ensuring it is resolved on a satisfactory basis with vital interests secured.

The aims in crisis management are to "coerce prudently" and to "accommodate cheaply".

Policy maker's dilemma aggravated because (1) some of the most attractive bargaining moves will also be the most dangerous from point of view of control e.g. delegation of decisions to front line commanders; (2) possibility of loss of control over events.

#### **4. FILM : "Avoiding Armageddon"**

*In watching the film participants should try and identify:*

The elements of *risk* and *danger* in crisis management :

1. Dangers inherent in coercive bargaining (misjudgments? misperceptions).
2. Dangers intrinsic to crisis, but not intended by parties.
3. Dangers arising from defects in decision-making process (organizational? bureaucratic ?)

The elements of *control* in crisis management:

In seeking to promote interests the major powers will try and avoid war, says the realist school.

1. Restrictions on the bargaining process? (Consider: calculations, stakes, balance of interests, inducements, techniques).
2. Efforts to ensure events remain under control?

Crisis management reflects a mix of:

ruthlessness / moderation.  
determination / prudence.  
recklessness / caution.  
intransigence / accommodation.

#### **5. Crises in the Future**

Superpower behavior in the Cuban Missile crisis suggests that there may be preconditions for successful crisis management (fear of war, understanding of limits of tolerance, rationality, asymmetry of interests between participants).

But there is no reason to believe such superpower behavior will be replicated in more complex international environment.

#### **FILM: "Europe on the Brink"**

In what way is the international arena more complex?

# **Strategy and Game Theory**

## **Lecturer : Dr. Khalil Shikaki**

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### **I. Understanding Strategy**

- 1) definition.
  - \* How one mobilizes resources to achieve goals.
  - \* Other meanings.
  - \* Abstract and deductive, not an empirical study of how decisions are made.
  - \* Examples: a Strategy for an individual, for an organization, for a state.
- 2) Strategy and goals and objectives
  - \* Strategy presumes goals and objectives.
  - \* Goals tell us where we are going, they should be clear, related to values and general and specific environment (realistic), and susceptible to evaluation.
  - \* Objectives are derived from goals; short term goals to be achieved within specific periods culminating, in the long term, in the achievement of goals.

### **II. Building Strategies, Policies and Plans:**

- 1) Goal formulation :
  - \* considers values, and environment (threats, opportunities, and challenges).
  - \* usually set by leaders with vision, conceptual skills, and long term perspectives.
- 2) Strategy formulation
  - \* considers internal strength and weaknesses.
  - \* considers environment.
  - \* usually developed by strategists who are able to relate resources to goals, build teams and mediate conflict.
- 3) Implementation of Strategy :
  - \* Policy formulation: guidelines for delegation of authority; policy specifies limits and guides decision-making.
  - \* Institution building: structures that performs tasks specified by strategy.
  - \* Develop plans that specifies actual steps to be undertaken.
  - \* Execution of plans.
  - \* Implementation phase requires knowledge of techniques and methods, processing of information, and analytical ability.

### **III. Game Theory**

- 1) What is Game theory :
  - \* Study of rational decision-making.
  - \* Making choices based on expectation/prediction of behavior of others.

\* Examples.

3) The Prisoners' dilemma

\* The story.

\* The game matrix.

\* Simulation.

\* Lesson: individual rationality produces collective irrationality.

\* Techniques for changing the order of preferences.

4) The Stag Hunt

\* The story.

\* The game matrix.

\* Simulation.

\* Lesson: goals and intentions vs outcomes.

\* Techniques for balancing short-term and long-term goals.

5) The Chicken game :

\* The story.

\* The game matrix.

\* Simulation.

\* Lessons: uses of rationality and irrationality in bargaining, role of stakes and interests; balance between stakes and risks.

\* Techniques for improving one's bargaining position.

6) Using game theory in the process of strategy formulation.

\* Examples.



## **Strategy and System Analysis (writing options papers)**

**Lecturer : Dr. Khalil Shikaki**

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### **I. Role of System analysis in formation of strategy**

1. Strategy and prediction of future.
2. Strategy and uncertainty.
3. Complex problems of choice.
4. Helps strategy find the best balance between risks, objectives and costs.

### **II. What is it ?**

1. Systemic examination of options and alternatives; seeks to find best course of action by examining costs, effectiveness and risks of alternative strategies; design new strategies; helps you understand and predict strategies of opponents.
2. The application of scientific methods and techniques; and building criteria for rational and cost-effective choice.

### **III. Components**

1. definition of problem you want to resolve and objective you want to accomplish. Clarify, define and limit problem.
2. formulation of alternative, methods, techniques (or strategies) you can use to achieve objective and resolve problem.
3. search for relevant costs (data) of each alternative strategy.
4. build a model/framework showing relationships of interdependence between objectives, strategies, environment and resources. Explore consequences of model for each strategy using game theory or simulation if relevant.
5. define a criterion relating objectives and costs and resources for choosing the optimal alternative (or the preferred strategy).

### **IV. Examples :**

Security for the Palestinians.

1. What functions
2. What force composition
3. What interdependent factors to consider
4. Treatment of uncertainty
5. Minimize risks vs. maximize gains
6. Suggest a "dominant" alternative strategy
7. Or buy "insurance"
8. Treatment of reaction of others (game theory and simulation)
9. Treatment of phases and timing
10. Criteria: determine priorities and seek alternatives that maximize chances of success; be fully aware of goals and objectives

**The Purpose of Paper**

You need to provide President Yasir Arafat (or your decision maker) with a balanced presentation in the form of several options, at least three, but no more than five. "Facts" should be accurate and clearly stated. You need to provide a sound basis for your reasoning, so give sufficient detail when needed. Incisive analysis should be your goal. The whole paper should not exceed ten pages in length.

**The Structure of the Paper**

**I. Define the Issue for decision: ..... (1) page**

- 1. In few sentences succinctly state the issue.
- 2. Define the nature of the problem at hand.  
State clearly what policy decision is being requested of the decision maker.

**II. List the essential factors ..... (2) pages**

- 1. Provide a brief summary of background information, such as events, issues or problems leading up to decision.
- 2. Clearly state the nature of Palestinian interests.  
What are the Palestinian policy objectives?
- 3. Has there been any previous discussion of preferred strategies?  
Has there been any policy guidelines to be followed in similar situations.

**III. The Options ..... (6) pages**

- 1. Summarize in one paragraph in broad terms all the choices that will be reviewed.
- 2. State each option using neutral terms. In doing so, discuss
  - a. potential reaction of other countries or actors to each option;
  - b. the potential domestic impact (how would the man in the street, the opposition, your friends, etc .... react);
  - c. long term and short term implications for the overall Palestinian interests and goals.
- 3. Now summarize all options and arguments in a pro and con checklist format of subparagraphs.

**IV. Conclusion ..... (1) page**

- 1. Clearly state your preferred option and the rationale for its selection.
- 2. Conclude with the same list of options, one line each, and provide space next to each option stating (Approve —) and (Disapprove —) for Arafat's decision.

## ***Strategic Studies and the Regional System: introduction and themes*** **Lecturer: Valerie Yorke**

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### **1. What is strategy?**

The popular impression is that it is about:

- \* The mobilization of resources to achieve goals i.e. about means not ends.
- \* The way in which military power is used by governments in pursuit of their interests.
- \* The planning and fighting of wars.

"Strategy is about the employment of battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of war". (Clausewitz).

But it is also about much more than war. It is concerned with:

- \* The ways in which military power may be used to achieve political objectives (i.e. waging war is only one way in which military power can be used to implement political goals).
- \* The purposeful use of military power in peacetime. "It is the art of applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy" (Liddell Hart).  
Therefore Strategic Studies becomes more than the study of war.

Then, with the development of *nuclear weapons*,

- \* Strategic doctrine's task was to find ways to avoid war and to find less catastrophic alternatives than nuclear war. As preserving military stability became vital, strategic studies became a form of "nuclear accountancy".
- \* Robert Osgood put the use of force into the context of foreign policy-making: "Military strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic and psychological instruments of power to support foreign policy effectively by overt and covert means".
- \* Raymond Aron went further in connecting politics and strategic studies. "Strategic thought draws its inspirations each century from the problems which events themselves pose". Thus strategic thought and international politics became intertwined. Aron's thinking represented a breakthrough since it recognized the importance of the changing political environment for strategic thinking.

- \* Strategic studies are as old as the nation state and have origins in the 1648 Westphalia Treaty that instituted the present state system.
- \* The conceptual framework for strategic studies has been the ideas of realism in which *states* are the *actors*; states act rationally to protect selves and accumulate power principally through the use or manipulation of *military force*. The manner in which they act is characterised by *anarchy* since there is no supranational body to maintain order.
- \* Critics say this conceptual system is incomplete/misleading.
  1. It is state centric rather than multicentric.
  2. It emphasizes preservation of territorial integrity etc. rather than other non-military objectives.
  3. It separates internal politics (order) from international politics (disorder).
  4. It has "black boxed" the state i.e. it ignores internal dynamics and state-society relations.
- \* Thus the realist paradigm has transformed the pattern of the European state to the status of a universal model. *But third world states are different.*

### 3. Broader definition of Strategic Studies required to take account of :

1. post Cold War environment
2. full range of threats to basic interests / values of Third World states and societies

John Chipman's approach sets out a new agenda for the strategist (SEE HANDOUT) which appears partly to recognise the need to open the "black box" of the state in order to understand its internal dynamic.

1. The need is To understand the evolving international system.
  - a. Domestic and international security (Refugees, resources, arms flows).
  - b. Rise of nationalism / pull of integration.
  - c. International political geography.
  - d. The US and international system.
2. All these developments affect the capacity of individual states to implement changes at home and abroad and the context of strategic behaviour of states and groups. They therefore have Consequences for strategic behaviour.

- \* How has the legal context for international intervention been changed?
- \* How will states tailor their military forces?
- \* What will be the determining factors?
- \* Militarization or arms control?



3. These security problems demonstrate the pressing need for conflicts to be managed. No formulas exist, yet it is necessary to have certain principles in mind if strategic action is to be taken in favour of *just* and *durable* stability. When the shape of international politics shifts, then the strategic analyst should provide policymakers with conceptual tools.

Number of topics might be put on the strategic analyst's agenda.

Let us consider two: Self determination and Revolution - Economics and Security.

5. *Another attempt to broaden the definition of strategic studies might include examination of the properties of the state (Third World) and how these create non-traditional sources of conflict.*

Consider

1. *internal fragility* and vulnerabilities of the contemporary Arab state.

- \* Legitimacy of the state.
- \* Imposition of alien state structure on (forged) nation. National identity issues;
- \* Low level of institutionalization;

all aggravated by:

- \* Development deficit (gap between capacity of state and demands of society).

2. *external vulnerabilities* and the pressures and threats these generate.

The Arab states are concerned with multi-dimensional security concerns.

Therefore the need is to build on and refine the Realist paradigm rather than discard it.

## GROUP EXERCISE

*Imagine* you are the Research Committee of Palestine's Institute for Strategic Studies. The institute is independent of PLO finance and has been created in the first year of the state's independence.

*Taking into account* the wider definition of strategic studies (outlined in my remarks, in John Chipman's definition, and embracing the idea of the multidimensionality of security concerns (external and internal to the state) outline your first major project.

Your project should have an overall theme, containing within it scope for undertaking of 4 separate but related projects by your first 4 research associates.

*You are concerned with*

1) The multidimensional nature of threats to the basic interests/values of Arab states and *societies*. (Palestine and other Arab states); how these affect relations between states, sources of conflict in the region and the susceptibility of the region to outside intervention

strategic studies as to why the analysis of sources of tension and conflict within the state should be given more attention.

3) Your focus is on the interconnectedness between internal sources of conflict and regional security/insecurity.

Your research project will benefit from the wide-ranging expertise of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and in the Diaspora and need not be exclusively Palestine oriented.

Outline your project under the following heads:

1. Title .....
2. Focus ..... (what the project is interested in and why).
3. Scope ..... (how the study will cover the topic-consideration of legal, moral, political contexts etc.).
4. Outreach .... (what readership the project is intended for, why this readership will be interested and what impact the project might have on policymakers).

Suggestions for projects :

Self-determination and Revolution (comparative study of Palestinians and Kurds).



## ***The Place of the Middle East in the International System*** ***Lecturer : Dr. Rosemary Hollis***

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### **Levels of Analysis**

Draw a line between :

- (1) domestic )
- (2) inter-state/intra-regional ) affairs
- (3) international/global )

1. At **domestic level**, range of factors affecting stability/security include:  
population growth and unemployment; scarcity/access to resources; civil-military relations and law enforcement; defence budgeting; political representation; inter-ethnic and secular-religious divides.
2. At level of **inter-state relations** conflicts derive from:  
antagonisms between rich and poor; effects of labour migrations; vulnerability of trade routes and financial links; competition for water resources; border disputes; cross-border ethnic, family and religious ties; ideological/religious divisions.
3. At level of **international relations**, between regional and external powers:  
external powers preoccupied with protection their interests – access to oil and communication routes; defence sales and training agreements; political alliances; possible spill-over to Europe of instability in Middle East.

Regional powers regard involvement of external powers favourably when it serves their interests, but otherwise resentful.

Not all are agreed on the legitimacy of the prevailing international and regional order, or indeed, the legitimacy of some regimes.

### **The Cold War International System**

Division East/West between two superpowers and military alliances (Warsaw Pact and NATO).

Division North/South between most developed/industrialised economies and poorer, less developed/industrialised economies.

UN immobilised by divisions.

Nuclear superpower stand-off; prepared for war in Central Europe.

Ideological antagonism; competition for resources/consumption.

Proliferation of so-called proxy wars in 'South'; causes local, but protagonists both armed and restrained by superpowers.

Geostrategic importance and natural resources of region make it of interest to both superpowers/blocks;  
Both superpowers engaged in countering each other in region;  
Division of Middle East into two key sectors ....

### **The Gulf:**

Soviet interests: security of southern borders, access to warm water, control of oil, countering influence of the US/West there.

US/Western interests: containment and monitoring of Soviet Union, access to oil and communication routes, markets, local influence.

Pax Britannica —> US 'twin pillar' policy —> fall of Shah —> playing-off Iraq vs. Iran + building up GCC.

By mid-1980s, increasing convergence of US/Soviet interests.

### **The Arab-Israeli Sector:**

US and Soviets seeking access/influence/containment of each other;

US increasingly influenced by domestic lobby.

1948 Soviets and US supported independence of Israel; Trilateral Pact (US, UK, France— the main arms supplies) contained arms build-up, until ....

1950s Nasser came to power in Egypt, gained Czech (Soviet) arms, France supplied Israel; US intervened to end Suez War, but then came 1967 June/Six Day War:

Soviets severed relations with Israel and backed Arabs; US became main supporter of Israel.

1973 October/Yom Kippur War: superpowers on nuclear alert, intervened on either side; Arab 'oil weapon' demonstrated; US shaped ceasefire timing and arrangements.

Egypt joined US/Western camp —> Camp David Accords, bank-rolled by US —> Egypt and Israel became largest recipients of US foreign aid.

US pledged to maintain Israel's 'technological edge';

Soviets aided Syria's quest for 'strategic parity'.

1982-3 Israeli invasion of Lebanon; US intervened eventually, partly in reaction to Soviets, but US subsequently 'burned' and left Lebanon; meanwhile, Soviets informed Syria that could not keep pace militarily with Israel.

Peace efforts by US based on Camp David/1982 Reagan Plan; Soviets sought UN-sponsored international conference and worked to unify Arab position.

1987 Intifada —> 1988 Jordan disengages from West Bank; PLO opts for 'two-state solution'; US-PLO dialogue;

Signs of increasing convergence between US/Soviet positions, but hardline Israeli government resists moves and opposes Soviet involvement.

### **Transformation of the International and Regional System**

End of the Cold War/nuclear spectre;

Dismantling of Warsaw Pact; end of primary function of NATO;

Soviet Union abandons communism, turns towards capitalism, seeks help and hence cooperation with the US.

### **The Gulf Crisis:**

Soviets cooperate with US use of the UN Security Council to marshal international/military response;

Soviets seek peaceful solution, but US predominates.

Soviet Union disintegrates.

### **US/Western Gulf War Aims (pointer to interests)**

1. Re-capture and liberation of Kuwait;
2. Restoration of Kuwaiti Al Sabah government to the emirate;
3. Military defeat of Iraq;
4. Destruction of Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and programmes;
5. Reduction of Iraq's conventional military capability, to the point at which it would not be able to threaten its neighbours;
6. Humiliation of, and if possible, without sending ground forces to apprehend him, the ousting of Saddam Hussein;
7. Return of coalition PoWs and third country detainees from Iraq;
8. Return of Kuwaiti property confiscated by Iraq and payment of compensation for damage done to Kuwait.
9. Preservation of the 'territorial integrity' of Iraq; and, more broadly ...
10. Restoration/preservation of all the pre-crisis sovereign states of the Gulf, with Iraq substantially disarmed, and under continuing surveillance, and new arrangements for Western defence guarantees to the GCC states; and thus ...
11. Ensure continued access to Gulf oil, at predictable prices; plus ...
12. Prevent the outbreak of a general Middle East war, linking the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli sector.

### **Continuing Western Interests in the Middle East**

Access to oil on satisfactory/'friendly' terms;

Access to communication routes;

Access to markets, especially for defence equipment and training packages;

Maintenance of financial connections and investment flows;

Protection of own nationals and allies;

Prevention of attacks on Western assets/people, in the region and at home;

Prevention of spill-over to Europe of regional problems, such as refugees, drug and gun-running operations.

### **Legacies of the Crisis/International Transformation**

Transformation of international power balance:

Russia weak and preoccupied on domestic front;

Central Asia opened up; turmoil in Afghanistan;

Turkey assuming new importance.

Europe preoccupied with adaptation to the changes, plus EC agendas and war in the Balkans.

US preoccupied with domestic ills;

Cutting defence budget and withdrawing from foreign commitments.

Transformation in the Far East, post-war and famine in Africa

Iraq's power diminished and country debilitated;  
Iran more powerful by default, but constrained by economic difficulties;  
GCC resurgent, but dependent on Western protection;  
Israel more powerful by default, but embroiled with Palestinian nationalism;  
Egypt and the Maghreb struggling with challenge from Islamic militants.

Meanwhile:

US presence in the Gulf more prominent and no end in sight to its commitments there;

Arms sales to the region proceeding regardless of other considerations;

Prospects of the Arab-Israeli peace process dependent on commitment, positions and fates of both local and external powers.

The link between external powers and regional governments as strong as ever, but latter increasingly facing domestic challenges and low-level conflicts, which aggravated rather than ameliorated by foreign links.



## ***Regional system: local actors and the Palestinians***

### ***Lecturer : Valerie Yorke***

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#### **1. The Strategic Analyst and the Arab system of order**

The analyst is concerned with the social, political, and economic forces which may permit or constrain, inspire or compel the use of military force and how the use of force/decision to desist from its application affects regional security. The analyst must therefore look at regional systems of order and assess the interplay between domestic and regional settings and the resulting consequences for regional security.

This means that the analyst is now concerned with building on the realist school's conceptual framework which has been found to be inadequate. He will be concerned with history, culture, state-society relations (opening the "black box" of the state) which contribute to the generation of conflict and other sources of insecurity at the interstate and local levels in the region.

The analyst will then be in a better position to provide the policymakers with the conceptual tools to be applied in formulating policy.

#### **2. Defining the Arab system of order**

Distinguish between the Arab system of order and broader concept of regional strategic system. What is the difference?

##### **Defining the Arab order :**

Idea of single Arab nation is often rejected in the West as creation of ideology; Arabs talk of its "decline", its end, its ebbing potency. But elements of an order exist. Common elements predominate over inter-Arab variations (Sayigh).

- \* Large parts of Arab world united for centuries under Islamic and Ottoman rule with permeability between regions/sub-regions.
- \* Quasi commonality of language, culture, religion, political history generate common identity/kinship ties so that larger Arab identity has rivalled individual national identities (1950s, 1960s). Now Islamic identity rivals/fusing with Arab nationalism.
- \* High level of interconnectedness at society and state levels each impinging on the environment of which it is part
  - 1) Physical / geographic proximity.
  - 2) Extensive transportation links.
  - 3) Societal links (e.g. Palestinian migration).
  - 4) Transnational flow of ideas historically strong resulting from similarity of language etc.
  - 5) Strong political links at state and societal level developed through social

League (1945) implying aspiration to behave as a community of states with shared values and norms.

### 3. Domestic features of Arab states

- \* Relatively young states, fragmented successors of British and French colonial rule lacking legitimacy in the eyes of populations and neighbours "(Yorke)".
- \* Proper boundaries unresolved therefore entity undefined.
- \* Rulers do not command full allegiance of subjects and lack legitimacy.
- \* Process of state building has been stunted by supra and subnational loyalties and membership of political community is unresolved.
- \* Political, social and economic forces critically affect internal stability.  
Consequences of interplay between Arab and domestic settings :
  - \* States have survived intact despite problems posed by permeability
    - 1) They have developed sense of history, origin, identity.
    - 2) Enough political, social economic interests have been created to ensure citizens feel they belong.
  - \* But linkage between domestic and external insecurities obsesses leadership with result that
    - 1) Future dispositions of leadership and shape of policies is uncertain, thus exciting security fears.
    - 2) Behaviours of states has implications for others with result they become vulnerable and opportunistic with regard to regional patterns.

"Systemic conditions provide a set of opportunities or more commonly serve as a set of constraints, permitting states a certain range of possible action". (Noble).

### 4. Bases and Patterns of Arab politics and conflict behaviour

Bases of Arab politics are determined by a number of factors including:

- \* Military and economic capabilities.
- \* Instruments of political warfare; which have been widely used by Arab governments.  
**1955 - 1965 Unbalanced one power regional system dominated by Egypt**
- \* Military capabilities of most states limited and deployment of force as instrument of coercion constrained (Israel, Western powers).
- \* Economic capabilities relatively unimportant.
- \* Intensity of ideological cleavages confronts states with difficulties in justifying existence and rulers with their legitimacy.
- \* Insecure governments pursue rigid policies.
  - weak governments (Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia) seek to avoid antagonising stronger Arab states.
  - Relatively stronger and radical states tend to be more assertive.
- \* The most stable state in political terms - Nasser's Egypt - is the most assertive.



**Pattern of inter-Arab relations is dominated by:**

- \* Mutual lack of recognition (legitimacy of governments, borders and states under challenge).  
Leads to       1) political subversion and military intervention.  
                  2) pressure for mergers and unity.

**Post 1971 : Towards an Arab Consensus**

- \* At inter state level 1967 Arab defeat initiates trend towards more pragmatic relations between states which seek to cultivate working relationships.
- \* At Arab-Israeli level, the 1967 war demonstrated the reality of the Arab-Israeli balance of power - generating wide acceptance by Arab states of UNSCR 242, the condition which would later underpin Arab moves towards acceptance of the Israeli state.
- \* Radical Arab nationalism is discredited and widespread popular acceptance of the political borders of the state and acquiescence in the regional state system.
- \* State-oriented nationalisms start to develop.

**Pattern of inter-Arab relations is dominated by :**

- \* Khartoum Summit which reconciles former rivals.
- \* Shared interest of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in recovering lost land.
- \* and the interest of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in developing working ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf as they become dependent on extracting financial assistance from and exporting skilled manpower to these oil states.
- \* Commitment to the regional order is greater than the upheaval caused by, for example, the emergence of the PLO and competitive support by Arab regimes for the Palestinians movement and efforts to control it.
- \* Such was the Arab consensus that the 1973 war was launched against Israel with Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq participating; Other token Arab contingents plus Arab oil embargo.

In the early 1970s inter-state relations are characterised by the diffusion of power and greater flexibility in policy as pragmatic relations develop between states. Egypt drops hegemonical ambitions and Syria and Saudi Arabia establish spheres of influence. A loose moderate coalition develops headed by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. But failure of coalition to press Israel into peace settlement undermines its influence.

**Post 1979 : Politics of fragmentation**

The Arab consensus is challenged by a multiplicity of regional and domestic issues:  
At the regional level:

- \* The 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which represented the culmination of Sadat's withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab-Israel conflict, upsets the regional balance and required responses by governments to cope with sense of insecurity

Compounding inter Arab relations was the economic recession which eroded working relations between rich and poor states of Islamic and Arab worlds and turned the rich/poor gap into a serious source of popular discontent.

At the domestic level :

- \* The economic recession (reduced levels of aid, remittances, export revenues) put pressure on Arab regimes and their ability to maintain extensive public sectors/instrument of cooption.
- \* Popular disillusion spread on account of the failure of Arab government to deliver peace with Israel or satisfy economic demands.
- \* The impact of the economic crisis eroded "the political compact" on which Arab rulers had based their rule - whereby population refrains from demands for political participation in return for material benefits.
- \* The contradiction between the centralization of power and the popular demand for democratization was revealed as were the unstable foundations on which rulers had built their states.

The combination of these regional and domestic factors resulted in :

- \* The weakening of Arab governments and the diversion of attention from unifying themes of Palestine problem and Arab-Israel conflict.
- \* Growing domestic criticism of the nature of ruling elites and the economic and political structures on which they have based their powers.
- \* The formulation of foreign policy according to perceptions of ruling elites on how to protect regimes and states.

**At a time of regional challenge the Pattern of Arab relations is dominated by:**

- \* Shifting political alignments motivated by growing domestic insecurity, divergent preoccupations, and struggle among leading states to fill vacuum left by Egypt
- \* Arab-Israel conflict: confrontation states divided (Egypt, PLO/Syria, Jordan/Syria, Jordan/PLO).
- \* Iran-Iraq war: divergent approaches (GCC/Egypt/Jordan + Iraq) (Syria, Libya + Iran).
- \* Emergence of sub-groupings.
- \* Balance of weakness in inter-Arab relations.

## 5. INTER GROUP DEBATE

1. The group will be divided into two teams in order to discuss the topic identified below.
2. Rapporteurs will be appointed to report back in succinct terms their team's answers to the two questions posed.
3. Reports should indicate where there is a consensus. Divergent views should also be stated, but briefly.
4. Participants should use neutral language. You should imagine that you are a

strategic analyst providing a brief for the Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Ruritania.

**Topic: The end of the Cold War and regional interaction**

1. Why has the end of superpower rivalry encouraged some observers to hope for an era of peace and stability in the Middle East?
2. Argue that the reverse is true, that is that the end of superpower rivalry will have a destabilizing impact on the region.

You will need to include consideration of the following issues in your answers:

- \* Superpower rivalry and deterrence.
  - did it fuel/restrain regional conflict?
  - did it encourage/frustrate regional cooperation?
- \* New players and arenas of tension impinging on the Arab system (Turkey, Israel, Iran).
- \* The future US role :  
Under what circumstances could a US role be conducive to regional security/a destabilizing influence?  
(Consider US attitudes towards Israel, Iraq, Iran, Gulf security and arms supplies).

**6. GROUP SEMINAR**

**Topic: The Role of a "Non State" actor: the PLO**

1. Foreign policy and strategic analysts are moving away from the realist school's state centric paradigm according to which they have traditionally excluded non-state actors from their studies.  
However, the PLO, a "non-state" actor, is clearly an important local actor in the Arab system Discuss.
2. What problems does the PLO as a "non-state" actor experience in its participation in the Arab and international systems?
3. The PLO interacts most frequently with the Arab system. Despite its recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians by the Arab World, a majority of PLO interactions with the Arab states have been conflictual. Why?
4. Give examples of cooperative interaction between the PLO and Arab World.
5. Give reasons for the growing influence of the PLO as a "non-state" actor :
  - 1) Since the Intifada.
  - 2) Since July 1988 - King Hussein's announcement of end of legal and administrativeties.
  - 3) PLO's Declaration of Independence.
  - 4) Since the end of Gulf War - if you agree this is the case.

## **1. National Security and the Arab states**

Concept of National Security is linked to the emergence of modern European nation-state system. Security studies have limited focus to externally generated military or power threats to certain core interests (independence, territorial integrity) of the state.

But, National Security concept raises questions when applied to the Arab world (and Third World generally).

There are a range of interests whose infringements might be a matter of national security:

- \* State interests (core interest in traditional sense).
- \* Societal interests (physical revival of people/national unity/national well being etc).
- \* Regime interests (survival or maintenance of system of government).

All 3 interests can be invoked individually/collectively in name of national security, while invocation of National Security can also disguise differences between regime and state/society interests etc.

## **2. Three dimensions of National Security which interact**

1. Domestic.
2. Global.
3. Regional.

## **3. National Security and the Developmental Perspective**

### **External**

1. Military or power political.
2. Transnational political pressures.
3. Economic pressures.
4. Cultural pressures threatening values/way of life.

### **Internal conditions**

1. Political: 3 interrelated areas
  - 1) Social fragmentation.
  - 2) Low institutionalisation and weak legitimacy.
  - 3) Economic dangers : Gap between growing population and available resources.

Internal political dangers can be mutually reinforcing

- 1) Sources of danger weaken states/make them vulnerable to external pressures.

2) Security threats directed at regimes may challenge existence of state.

#### **4. Post Gulf War (Kuwait Crisis) : Issues of National Security**

By the late 1980s Arab security concerns appeared to shift from military and power issues to economic and internal security concerns. But the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent coalition response pushed military and power issues back to the forefront.

##### 1) Military and power security

- \* imbalance of power/more balanced power structure.
- \* use of military force/vulnerabilities/military capabilities.
- \* subregional imbalances/building spheres of influence.
- \* non Arab actors (Iran, Israel).
- \* major power interests/relationships.

##### 2) Political security

- \* transnational political threats fuelled by regional disparities; Israeli intransigence; unresolved Palestinian issue; regional state system shows lack of resilience.
- \* unresolved political forces as above remain latent and could re-appear making regimes feel vulnerable.
- \* demands for political accountability, participation.

##### 3) Economic security

- \* role of financial inducements, economic sanctions.
- \* oil sector & impact on non-oil states.
- \* inter-Arab cooperation?
- \* regional imbalances.

#### **5. DISCUSSION**

##### **Jordan : National Security priorities**

- (1) Economic/interdependence etc.
- (2) Demographic.
- (3) Transjordanians/Palestinians/Throne.
- (4) Palestinians/West Bank.
- (5) Democratization/Islam.



## **Preparation**

### **Procedure**

The participants will be told:

What the objective of the simulation is

Who they are in the simulation (members of different teams may be given specific roles)

What the policy orientation of the group or state actor is (They will be given a short brief of the orientation, plus economic and military information relating to the state or group in question).

The different teams will also be given varying information on the crisis.

### **Aim of Game**

The game is intended to operationalise the strategic concept of crisis prevention i.e. how do you prevent a deteriorating situation from becoming worse. It will be structured so that the participants learn and experience something about how decisionmakers have to operate under pressure. The game session is intended to follow a lecture on decisionmaking and defining national security. The intention is that the participants should get a feel of:

- The difficulty of assessing policy options and organising priorities to protect the security interests of the state (alignments; resources; integrity of state) when rulers are subject to the pull of public opinion and the preferences of constituencies at home; when their capacity to implement change at home may be circumscribed by regional and transnational forces or by requirements of international law etc. Here I would wish the participants to appreciate that national security involves minimizing or reducing threats to the state or group, as well as protecting it against actual threats, and exploiting opportunities to increase or maximise security. The effort to protect and promote the national security of an individual state necessitates the use of the variety of military, political and economic instruments available e.g. the mobilisation or movement of military units, the building of tacit and informal alignments, the concluding of agreements, the seeking of guarantees, maximising gains and minimising vulnerabilities through diplomatic activity, resource diplomacy etc. or conversely undermining the chances of a neighbour doing the same at one's expense.

- The difficulties of the above under pre crisis conditions and of engaging in preventive diplomacy: difficulties relating to decisionmaking under pressure of time; in the absence of full details but with the media ever present; under influence of friends and vulnerable to enemies; in the presence of a group whose members may have divergent views.

- The difficulties of doing both the above in the Middle East where some rulers are unashamedly pursuing interests related to regime survival whilst invoking the

security of the state and abandoning even a semblance of inter Arab solidarity.

- The need to weigh up the influence and future role of states peripheral to the region and the importance of maintaining economic and political links with them as well as with international actors (USA, EC, IMF, etc.).

## **Role Playing**

Participants will represent state actors and in the case of Iraq - subgroupings of Kurds, Shia, and a representative of the new transitional regime.

They will therefore be required to imagine themselves as other actors with a grounding in different foreign policy orientations and calculations. They will learn to think in an alien way, dealing with the problems of a country or group with which they do not necessarily have any sympathy.

## **Practical Skills**

The participants should get a feel of the importance of acquiring practical skills as well as an opportunity to exercise those they already have:

1. Political decisionmaking is about compromise, not about articulating and achieving maximalist goals. If you live as a frustrated nationalist, you can claim the moon. The decisionmaker on the other hand has to learn that to achieve one objective he may have to sacrifice two. However when rhetoric is strong, rulers in the Middle East are under pressure not to betray a given ideal or goal.
2. The need is to assess alternative options and their consequences and make choices under time pressure and within the context of limited resources.
3. Decisionmakers have to try and make the best of a weak/strong hand with the military, political and economic resources at their disposal:
  - making use of procrastination, bluff, threats, concessions and reassurances.
  - taking risks and exploiting opportunities as and when they arrive.

A clear tension exists between pursuing individual state interests (with a short term gain) and the wider collective (Arab or coalition) interest which might pay off only in the longer term. Decisionmakers are inclined to think that they will be able to compensate for any disadvantages of such a course of action over time or that they will be able to restructure collective interests.

THE REFEREE/GUIDE I will play the role of guide - making announcements (Arab League decisions, UN Resolutions, OPEC announcements providing press coverage of meetings between heads of states, press leaks and incidents and sometimes making available specific information to an individual player. I will also play the role of Israel

## THE SIMULATION

A triumvirate of three military generals head a transitional regime in Baghdad following the death of Saddam Hussein. The three generals, who are Sunni and Baathist, appear to be loyal to each other. They are Iraqi nationalists first and foremost. During years of professional cooperation they had become alienated from Saddam Hussein as a result of his having led the country into two costly wars. They have links with the opposition outside the country as well as with Syria. At the outset they can count on the loyalty of the airforce and the majority of the army officer corps.

On assuming power the military regime makes clear that its priority is to ensure as smooth a transition of power as possible, speedily to restore law and order and to prevent Iraq's enemies from taking advantage of domestic unrest. Despite the announcement of a state of emergency, the change of regime is accompanied by the inevitable outbreak of violence in cities throughout the country as old scores are settled. Hundreds of Baath Party and security service personnel are killed. Some army units in the south defect. Thousands in fear of their lives flee to Jordan and Syria.

In an attempt to broaden its support base and consolidate its authority. The triumvirate invites the Iraq National Congress (INC) to share power. Following discussions amongst Kurds, Shias and Sunnis the INC agrees to take part in a military civilian ruling National Council and its leaders move to Baghdad.

The National Council has a difficult time of it as it tries to respond to the competing pulls of its Sunni, Kurdish, and Shia constituencies, which are themselves divided over what policy directions the National Council should take and suspicious as to where power really lies. Nor can the Council's military members ignore the strong support in the armed forces for a nationalist position, which rules out humiliating capitulation to Western pressure. Over a six month period the National Council makes a number of statements outlining broad policy objectives. The ambiguity of the statements reflects the fragile political balance in Iraq, as the National Council plays a careful hand seeking both to appeal to the variety of domestic constituencies and to encourage the international community to lift economic sanctions. The National Council's statements outline its intention to bring about a stable coherent Iraq; its commitment to respect for human rights including the right of minorities to live in safety within a united Iraq, its intention to fulfil all the necessary conditions to bring about lifting of UN sanctions, and Iraq's immediate recognition of the state of Kuwait - though no mention is made of the UN determined border. These policy statements are insufficient to bring about the lifting of UN sanctions.



The situation in Iraq deteriorates. Rioting breaks out in Baghdad as popular expectations for a gradual improvement in economic conditions remain disappointed and food shortages become acute. Economic activity is dramatically reduced as ordinary Iraqis stop going to work. Opposition elements, excluded from power, perpetrate a series of bomb attacks. Fighting in Basra marks the start of new uprising in the south in which Iranians are reportedly involved. Some Kurdish groups in the north, sensing that some of their demands will be ignored by the National Council, trigger interfactional fighting. All this results in the slaughter of tens of hundreds. It becomes clear that the National Council is losing its grip, the loyalty of the army is uncertain. Iraq is apparently heading for anarchy.

### ***Crisis Prevention***

The Arab world, Iran, Turkey and the international community view the situation with mounting concern. Despite the National Council's moderate policy statements and image, six months have passed and Iraq's compliance with the UN Resolutions had not been achieved. What are the new Iraqi regime's intentions? The border question with Kuwait remains unresolved.

Although Arab, Turkish and Iranian officials visiting the country had come away with the impression that the National Council would gradually assert its authority, the fast deteriorating security situation in Iraq now gives serious cause for concern. The potential for the fragmentation of Iraq is clearly evident.

The Arab world is determined that their interest lies in the integrity of Iraq - but does it lie with this particular regime? Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia all have a strategic stake in seeing that the country remains intact. A separate Kurdistan would diminish Arab resources and might encourage Turkish intervention. A Shia state, if it worked, in the South would boost Iran's influence in the region and prove an attraction to Shia minorities in the Gulf. If such a state did not work, it would become source of instability throughout the region. The National Council, showing signs of weakness, could become susceptible to influence from Iran Turkey and the West. Meanwhile, the Arab states have their own reasons for wanting to acquire influence with the new National Council in Baghdad. Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, like Iran, all have their own people in Baghdad through whom they hope to achieve this goal.

Confronted with the potential crisis that a breakup of Iraq would represent, the regional states all have an interest in engaging in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to reverse the disintegrative course on which Iraq is apparently set. For the local actors national security interests dictate that the territorial integrity of Iraq should be maintained. At the same time each is determined to maximise its own national security benefits and opportunities and reduce its vulnerabilities, whilst minimising the danger of neighbouring or rival states exploiting the situation at their expense. Developments in Iraq will have resource implications for all its neighbours.

to what form of intervention, if any, might be appropriate and how the crisis will affect the Middle East power balance, the peace process, the oil market and the Islamic movement in the region.

In their respective capitals, the Iranian, Turkish, Syrian, Jordanian, Egyptian, Saudi and Kuwaiti governments are discussing how they can prevent a crisis from developing and what kinds of diplomatic moves should be made. The PLO appears active too. Each actor has to strike a balance in its policy making between a number of sometimes competing ambitions and objectives which exert divergent pulls and present conflicting policy options. Process they have their own specific internal and local preoccupations. Their priorities and political agendas are not the same. Against this background contingency planning reflecting military, political and economic aspects and national security as well as regime interests is undertaken. Each government is aware that its policy response towards the situation in Iraq will affect the wider regional environment of which it is part, the policies of its neighbours, and the network of alignments in place. Nothing less than the existing balance of regional relations is at stake as well as relations with outside powers.....

## ***The Actors***

### **Iran's orientation towards Iraq's new National Council**

Iran welcomes the formation of the National Council in Iraq, which would appear to be a positive step for the Iraqi people, provided the Council pursues friendly relations with Iran. However, Iranian goodwill will be contingent on the National Council's commitment to a unified Iraq. Iran opposes the creation of a separate Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Such a development would fuel the aspirations of Kurds in Iran.

Tehran expects the new regime in Baghdad to move towards a speedy implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 598 and in particular the clauses concerning compensation. This would enable a peace treaty between Iraq and Iran to be signed. Given its other foreign policy concerns and economic difficulties, stable relations with Iraq would be a positive development.

Iran is concerned about the Shias of Iraq and would like the National Council to initiate moves towards the implementation of majority rule, which would give a central role to the Shias in the running of the country. In the short term Iran would like to obtain guarantees from the National Council that repression of the Shias in the south of Iraq will end. This would enable up to half a million Iraqi refugees now living in Iran and posing a considerable financial burden on Iran's cash strapped economy to return to their homes.

Publicly, the Iranians adhere to a policy of non interference vis a vis Iraq. Privately they would like to see the Shia clergy have a say in the drafting of the new Iraqi constitution enshrining Shiite theology for the state. Shia influence would help ensure that Shiite religious centres are respected and open for Shias throughout the region to visit. They oppose too strong a role for the Kurds in the new government.

### ***Regional concerns***

While Tehran wants to see an end to Iraq's military ambitions in the Gulf, it would like to see Iraq represented in Gulf security arrangements in order to anul all remaining prospects for the 6 + 2 arrangement in the Gulf.

Tehran is watching Turkey carefully. Although Tehran is unwilling to intervene in Iraq on account of economic constraints and political preoccupations, it does not want Turkey or any other regional power to gain advantage at its expense. It is therefore keen to use the instrument of diplomacy to help the Iraqi National Council stand on its own feet, and its powers of persuasion to discourage other regional powers from manipulating the internal politics of Iraq or seeking to promote their political candidates to seize power. Tehran is also concerned about the prospect of the lifting of UN sanctions and the reentry of Iraq into the oil market. It hopes it will be able to find ways to cooperate with Iraq to ensure that Iraq's production increases only gradually once sanctions are lifted.

### **The Iraq National Congress' orientation towards its participation in the new National Council**

The INC has accepted the invitation of the new transitional regime in Iraq to join the ruling National Council and has moved its headquarters to Baghdad. This brings some immediate relief to the problems facing the military leadership since the INC has extensive support and contact at least among the Kurds. The prospect of fighting between the government forces and the Kurd is contained, at least for the time being. Inevitably, however, tension develops within the INC component of the National Council - comprising Kurds, Shias, and some Sunni intellectuals - once it assumes responsibilities in Baghdad. The official INC policy favours free elections and a multi party system. The Kurdish component publicly plays a low key approach but its private agenda is to se the implementation of the INC's official line on the Kurds - federalist relationship for the Kurds, at least until after elections in Iraq as a whole. The Shia line is less clear. They have some reservations on this federalism issue not least because they would like to acquire more influence in the government in Baghdad for the Shia community. In return for influence at the centre, the Shias would acquiesce in a Sunni President. The Shias comprise the majority in Iraq.

The Kurdish national movement like other revolutionary movements comprise a mainstream and extremist fringes. The mainstream wants the support of a civil

keeping its constituency secure and without falling under the influence of the outside governments supporting it.

The new National Council is eager to reassure the West that it intends to develop friendly relations with Western countries. Furthermore it makes clear that it intends to fulfil the conditions necessary to lead to the lifting of sanctions: recognition of Kuwait; respect for human rights; compliance with UN Security Council resolution 687 and 688, including the complete dismantlement of nuclear and chemical weapons. The National Council also extends its verbal support to the Middle East peace process. Despite private reassurances from INC leaders, Mahsoud Barzani, Hassan Naquib and Said Mohamed Bahralulum, the National Council fails to fulfil these conditions: it fails to agree to the UN's demarcation of the Kuwait Iraq border, or to return the Hawk missile equipment or private property of Kuwaitis. The problem for the National Council is its inability to reach a satisfactory compromise between its component parts. Most importantly it fears losing the support of influential nationalist elements of the armed forces if it capitulates too quickly to the demands of international law which is perceived to be biased to the West.

As a result the National Council is fully aware that it is losing the confidence of Western powers. The Kurdish component of the INC has strong links with the West and tries to explain the dilemma to its outside supporters.

The new ruling National Council has to take into consideration the regional position of the Saudis and the Syrians and to cooperate with them. It knows that Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran will look at each other jealously to see which country will have most influence. The Saudis are particularly important because of Riyadh's links with the USA, which continues to be the major player in the region. The Syrians have close links with the military leaders in Baghdad and oppose too strong a Kurdish influence in Iraq and want secular trends to prevail. Meanwhile the need to clear the way to exporting oil through Turkey dictates an improvement in relations with Turkey, which is asking for guarantees regarding trade, and the treatment of Kurds and Turkomans. Moreover Turkish-US relations cannot be overlooked.

### **Turkey's orientation towards Iraq's new National Council**

Ankara welcomes the instalment of the new National Council in Baghdad and look forward to a new phase of good neighbourly relations with Iraq. In its first statement on the matter the Turkish government underscored the importance it attaches to the maintenance of the integrity of Iraq and to border security. The statement expressed the hope the infiltration by the Kurdish PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) across the Iraq Turkish border will be stopped. Ankara has long been nervous of the potential fragmentation of Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish free area in northern Iraq because of the problem of its own Kurds. Ankara privately fears, however, that once Baghdad has control over northern Iraq and the border with

Turkey, there would be a potential for central Iraqi government encouragement of Kurdish action across the Turkish border should Iraqi Turkish relations deteriorate.

Turkey privately fears the emergence of a pro Iranian regime. Turkey has no strong links to the National Council, but fears that Iran may be in a position to influence the Council through its Shia component. In any case Iran has influence in Najaf and Kerbala. Ankara therefore welcomes the Kurds' participation in the regime. Against this background and given its pro coalition stance during the war against Saddam's Iraq, Ankara was concerned to receive a declaration of goodwill from the Iraqi National Council when it assumed power. Such a declaration was duly received, but Ankara harbours residual concerns, particularly given the National Council's inability/unwillingness to fulfil the conditions for the lifting of UN sanctions.

Ankara favours the speedy lifting of UN sanctions and has said so publicly. Turkey has paid a high economic price as a result of UN sanctions due to the loss of trade in both directions, in particular the interruption of oil flows through the pipeline and the loss of transit fees worth some \$250m per year. It has been forced over the past couple of years to buy oil on the open market - mainly from Saudi Arabia. As the security situation in Iraq deteriorates, Ankara becomes particularly concerned regarding the potential for Iranian interference in Iraq. The Turkish government also knows that Iraq could create problems for Turkey as a member of NATO. There is a potential for an alliance between Turkey and Kurdish groups, and the latter would happily agree. Turkey is also concerned about the continued flow of oil but knows that any intervention in Iraq to guarantee the flow of oil would be opposed by Iran. Turkey could use economic leverage i.e. close the pipeline to press Iraq's National Council to pursue a policy favourable to Turkey in northern Iraq, but this would again place Ankara in a position of animosity with Baghdad. It would also expose Ankara to accusations from Iran that it was working as a surrogate for Western interests in Iraq.

Turkey is concerned about Syria's intentions, given the links between President Assad's regime and the military generals in power in Baghdad. Privately it makes quite clear to Damascus that Syria's continued control of the PKK will be taken as a litmus test of Damascus's intentions towards Turkey. Turkey has considerable economic leverage (not least: water) in its relations with Syria - Politically, the Turks can press Syria through the USA (It was the US Administration that persuaded Damascus to close PKK bases in Lebanon).

### **Syria's orientation towards the new Iraqi National Council**

The collapse of Iraq would be an uncomfortable precedent for Syria which has its own ethnic and religious divisions. Syria like Turkey and Iran welcomed the formation of the National Council in Baghdad and reiterated its commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity. Undoubtedly Syria's interests have been served by the departure of Saddam's regime. The fact that the military command in Baghdad has not operationalised

Indications that the new regime intended to pursue a more moderate line carried some advantages for Syria, but also some implicit dangers. While Damascus welcomed Baghdad's support for the Middle East peace process, it also privately feared that the new regime, supported by the West as a counter to Iran, might offer King Hussein undue influence over affairs in Iraq. King Hussein's long term ambition to win back Iraq for the Hashemites is no secret. Too close a link between Jordan and the Iraqi regime would therefore be a source of concern.

On the other hand the collapse of Iraq would be an uncomfortable precedent for Syria, which has its own ethnic and religious divisions, and a great loss for the Arab world in its need to counter Israel and Iran in the regional power balance. In the event of a regional power vacuum developing in Iraq as a result of the growing anarchy and weak government Syria could find itself in competition by proxy with Iran and Turkey for influence in Iraq. Such an involvement would be unwelcome by Damascus given its experience with Lebanon and the danger of over extending its capabilities.

Syria therefore needs to ensure that Iraq remains territorially intact. Its preference is for the military to be the dominant factor in the National Council. With its own agenda in mind - namely friendly and improving relations with the West, good relations with Saudi Arabia on account of the economic advantage it brings, and a key role in the peace process on the grounds that this helps Syria to reshape the new Middle East order, Syria wants to be seen as a responsible player in the unfolding crisis. Assad therefore favours Syria taking a lead in the preventive diplomacy aimed at forestalling the disintegration of Iraq. Syria can provide a link both between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and between Iran, with which it enjoys good relations, and Turkey. The bottom line for Syria is that the situation should not allow Israel to launch a surprise attack on its territory or take advantage of the peace talks; should not enable King Hussein to expand his sphere of influence; or lead to circumstances in which Turkey exerts resource leverage (cuts off water supplies) against Syria. Privately, President appreciates that despite the enormous danger there is scope here for Syria to make further gains through playing a responsible role.

### **The orientation of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait towards Iraq's new National Council**

The public position of these countries was to welcome the formation of the new National Council. At the outset they said that they looked forward to a period of friendly relations with the new regime once the UN Security Council Resolutions had been fulfilled and UN sanctions had been lifted. Both countries called for the immediate recognition of Kuwait's borders. The Saudi interest lies in a unified Iraq and the Saudis appreciated that a continuation of the sanctions threatened the unity of Iraq. Saudi Arabia, like other regional powers, stated publicly in the first weeks of

the new government that it hoped all regional states would refrain from intervening in Iraq's internal affairs.

Privately, these countries would have preferred to have seen a contained post Saddam Baathist than the apparently moderate regime that emerged in the form of the National Council. A moderate internationally respectable Iraq threatened to pose a problem in terms of both opening the way for Iraq - supported by the West as a counter against Iran - to become a regional power to be reckoned with once again and in terms of its reentry into the oil market. This threatened to end the favourable position in which Saudi and Kuwait found themselves at the of the Kuwait crisis to the extent that the region was currently dominated by the US and its GCC allies at the cost of dividing the region into friends and enemies with Iraq and Iran defined as the latter.

As the situation deteriorates in Iraq and the internal power balance appears more uncertain, Riyadh sets out its priorities. First, it is imperative that Iraq remains intact. The emergence of a separate Shia state in southern Iraq with support from Iran would pose a definite threat to the conservative, dominantly Sunni monarchies of the Gulf. However, while the maintenance of a united Iraq remains crucial, Saudi Arabia also has an interest in ensuring that the Shia do not acquire undue influence in the running of Iraq. This would open up the possibility of the Shiite southern area of Iraq becoming more assertive, which would in turn have a demonstrative/spillover effect on the Shias, who make up much of the population in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia where the oil is located. Another danger is that the growing anarchy in Iraq might result in the Iraqi regime becoming more overtly Arab nationalist, and thereby a challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling families of the Gulf with their close ties with the West.

As Iraq heads towards disintegration and the potential for Shia influence grows, Saudi Arabia assesses what influence it can bring to bear. Close ties with the USA must be preserved, although Riyadh is fully aware how these have fuelled support for Islamic fundamentalists in the kingdom. Good relations with Baathist Syria could come in useful in the coming rounds of diplomacy. The Saudi monarchy is convinced that King Hussein intends to gain advantages for the Hashemites in Iraq.

## **Kuwait**

While Kuwait welcomes Iraq's recognition of Kuwait, it remains concerned that the new regime in Baghdad has not recognised the border decided by the UN Boundary Demarcation Commission, has not returned the captured Hawk missile equipment, or the private property of Kuwaitis. These were conditions set out in the UN Security Council Ceasefire Resolution (SCR 687).

Its main concern at this point is that Saudi Arabia should not consolidate ties with the new regime when the policy of Iraq's National Council towards Kuwait remains ambiguous

Jordan like all Arab states welcomed the formation of the new National Council. In a speech from the throne the king also called for speedy fulfillment of UN resolutions on the part of Iraq so that UN sanctions against the country could be lifted as soon as possible. The National Council, he hoped, would move towards the implementation of political reforms as soon as circumstances permitted. He drew attention to Jordan's respect for the ties binding the Arab world together and to his kingdom's long support for Iraq during the war against Iran.

Jordan has an obvious interest in the maintenance of Iraq intact. Iraq forms its strategic and economic hinterland, a buffer against Iran and a balance for Jordan vis a vis Syria. Its position during the war against the anti Iraq international coalition, which was read by the Iraqi opposition as a pro Saddam stance did not sit well with the opposition, but fences have been mended to some extent since. The INC had sent two delegations to Amman before the formation of the National Council. The best outcome for Jordan's monarchy would be a broad governing coalition with a Sunni component. This would be more likely to win support amongst Jordanians.

The growing instability in Iraq is of deep concern to Jordan. Quite apart from the danger of disintegration, there is the need for oil - Jordan has been receiving 60,000 b/d with the tacit approval of the UN Sanctions Committee. The violence in Iraq could lead to supply interruptions at any time, despite the bravery of Jordanian and Iraqi truck drivers. Jordan would like to continue the concessionary arrangement whereby it had received oil at the rate of \$8/b from Iraq. The Saudis show no sign of supplying an alternative flow, but King Hussein is determined that he will not alter his policies to suit the Saudis. He intends to press ahead with his political reforms - but it could be difficult to hold the November general election. The violence in the country could lead to interruptions at any time. Meanwhile insecurity in Iraq has triggered another influx of refugees from Iraq, precisely when Jordan had hoped that the change in government would lead to the return of Iraqis living in Jordan to their country.

As during the Kuwait crisis, the international community is slow to realise Jordan's plight. With international attention focused on Iraq, Jordan's economy is severely overstretched. The Jordanian people wait to see how the West will twist this crisis to their advantage - indeed even suspect that the US lies behind what appears to be the inevitable collapse of a major Arab power.

The idea of the extension of Hashemite influence over Iraq, even some form of Jordanian-Iraqi unity, had been much talked about in the year preceding the National Council's inauguration, but short term difficulties appear now to preoccupy king and country. Privately the King knows that Jordan could gain from this crisis - as it did in 1949 when it acquired the West Bank - or lose as it did in 1967 when it lost the West Bank to Israel. Besides King Hussein has not forgotten the Hashemites



historical ties to Iraq. However, the priority for the moment is the security of Jordan on the East Bank and the security of the monarchy.

### **Egypt's orientation towards Iraq's new National Council**

Egypt has played an important diplomatic role in the runup to the appointment of the new National Council. President Mubarak had always made clear that the break up of Iraq would be very dangerous and Egypt was one of the first countries to welcome the formation of the National Council.

*"All of us would suffer. It would be very dangerous for us all for the whole area, including Europe. You may not realise it now. You would have three countries creating problems. What I shall be discussing with President Clinton is ways of helping the people of Iraq". Financial Times March 30, 1993.*

Egypt wants the sanctions against Iraq to be lifted as soon as possible. This would be the best way to keep Iraq intact, not least because of the danger of Iran making gains in the south and the boost this would give to Islamic fundamentalism in his own country. Quite apart from the humanitarian question, Egypt has until two years ago benefitted from the remittances sent home by thousands of Egyptian workers in Iraq. Egypt therefore has a clear financial interests in seeing the reconstruction of Iraq take place as soon as possible. What Egypt wants is the rehabilitation of Iraq's oil industry, the infusion of capital for projects requiring mass labour. Against this background President Mubarak will be seeking to play a high profile diplomatic role that might at a later stage help qualify Egyptians for preferential treatment in the reconstruction phase. He is well placed in many respects. Egypt provides the links between North Africa and the Fertile Crescent; a channel to international organizations. Arab League meetings generally take place in Cairo. One possibility is to offer good offices to mediate between UN Secretary General and new regime.

### **The Palestinian orientation to the new Iraqi National Council**

Yassir Arafat and the PLO can do very little in the deteriorating situation. The Organisation has its own problems related to the peace process and the growing influence of Hamas. But the diversion of international attention to the Iraq crisis has taken the pressure off Israel and the other Middle East parties and there is a real danger that the peace talks now come to a halt - a development which would play into the hands of Hamas.

Arafat is likely to offer his good offices. But the new regime in Iraq has an interest in seeing sanctions lifted. It is unlikely to get involved with Arafat or associate Iraq with the PLO's position if this is thought likely to create tensions with Washington.

## The Key Players:

### Gulf Powers:

Iran, Iraq, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states

### Regional Powers:

Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, India

### External Powers:

US, allied Western powers (Britain, France), Russia.

## Strengths and Vulnerabilities of Gulf Powers:

[Refer to fact sheets for statistics]

### Geography;

Population, age distribution, skills, education, loyalties, ethnic/nationality mix;

Oil reserves/installations/output;

Oil wealth;

Agricultural and industrial assets;

Armed forces; make-up, equipment, training;

Government/bureaucratic efficiency;

Potential threats: communications routes, economic dependencies, neighbours' intentions/capabilities.

## Conclusion:

Rough balance/match between Iraq and Iran;

Imbalance among members of GCC and between them and Iraq, Iran or both;

Gulf powers combined outweigh neighbours;

Iran or Iraq could probably stand up to/deter individual neighbours;

All Gulf states potentially vulnerable to external power of magnitude of US – though latter would need access (eg Saudi Arabia to confront Iraq) to go to war with any one of them.

## Optional Configurations for Regional Balance:

Collective Security Pact(s) linking:

1. Gulf states (Iraq, Iran, GCC) in mutual protection against all external threats;
2. Northern Tier (Islamic) states (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan), as already linked in the Economic Cooperation Organisations (ECO), expanded in 1992 to include Central Asian states; balanced by ... Southern Tier (Arab) states (Iraq and GCC);
3. Six-plus-Two (GCC, Egypt and Syria) as formulated in Damascus Declaration; countering Iraq and Iran;

or a combination of the above.

Achievement of all options complicated by presence of US, providing protection for some (GCC) and posing threat to others (Iraq, Iran).

With or without the US, under present governments, there seems insufficient trust between the players for them to forge collective security pacts of one sort or another.

### **Contending Theories of Gulf (and National) Security:**

#### **The View from Tehran:**

Withdrawal of foreign powers, particularly US;

Implementation of UNSC Resolution 598 (ending Iran-Iraq War);

Preservation of territorial integrity of Iraq (i.e. no Kurdish state);

Respect for sovereignty of all Gulf states;

Collective security pact linking GCC and Iran, and, eventually Iraq, with no involvement of other Arab states (notably Egypt);

Cooperation on Gulf oil production and pricing.

Thus, freedom from fear of encirclement or isolation for Iran, plus a measure of regional predominance.

#### **The View from Baghdad:**

Restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty over the whole country;

Preservation of the territorial integrity and national cohesion of Iraq;

Containment of Iran;

Acknowledgement by the GCC states of their indebtedness to Iraq for protecting them from Iran;

Recognition for Iraq's leading role in the Arab nationalist cause;

Friendly relations with the US and other external powers, but non-interference by them in Iraq's military and sovereign affairs;

Cooperation on Gulf oil production and pricing;

Ultimately, 'return' of Kuwait to Iraq.

Thus, in the short term, Iraq's survival in tact and thereafter, its reemergence as 'the cornerstone of Gulf security' and leading defender of the Arab nationalist cause.

#### **The View from Riyadh:**

A change of orientation, if not government, in Iraq and Iran;

Preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq;

Emergence of a 'live and let live' understanding between Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia;

Curtailment of reliance on and presence of US/Western powers in the GCC;

Predominance for Saudi Arabia in the GCC/Arabian Peninsula;

Enhancement of independent Saudi (and GCC) defence arrangements;

Protection of oil markets and Saudi influence in OPEC.

thereby eliminating the need for elaborate security arrangements, freeing the Kingdom to pursue its own affairs at its own pace and in its own way.

### **The View from Kuwait:**

Containment of Iraq, Iran and possibly Saudi Arabia too;

Preferably a favourable change of government in Iraq;

The best protection that money can buy for Kuwait, with the least interference in its affairs;

A favourable position for Kuwait in OPEC.

The overriding consideration for Kuwait is thus its own survival.

### **The View from Washington:**

Ideally, a change of government in Iraq and Iran to produce more friendly and cooperative regimes;

Containment of both Iraq and Iran;

Prevention of 'destabilising' civil war or fragmentation in Iraq;

A greater level of defence capability in the GCC, possibly with wider Arab cooperation;

Access to bases and prepositioned equipment in the Gulf for US rapid deployment forces;

Prevention of NBC weapons and long range missile proliferation;

Predictable and favourable oil production and pricing arrangements in the Gulf.

The US thus seeks continued access to the Gulf, its oil and markets, with least possible hazard or costly engagements for Washington.

### **The Problem**

National aspirations and security interests of each of the players are incompatible, unless and until they develop greater mutual trust.

Note tendency of all regional governments to define national and regional security in terms of their own survival/enhancement.

Also, the tendency to attribute regional insecurity to the nature of other regimes.

This reveals interplay between domestic, regional and international relations.

### **Focus on Saudi Arabia's National Security Concerns**

Enormous land mass means unlikely to be overrun, but oil-rich eastern seaboard vulnerable to Iraqi, or Iranian, attack.

Saudi armed forces/defences insufficient to protect the kingdom from either, as revealed in Gulf crisis/war.

Following conclusion Gulf War, **US sought a new defence agreement** with Saudi, to provide for future contingencies, bases, prepositioning etc.

Saudi government resisted, since US supply installations, under US guard, would amount to bases on Saudi soil.

In the end, US settled on enhancement of 15-year old military training agreement as framework for expanded strategic cooperation, defence procurement and training arrangements.

**Plans to expand the Saudi armed forces** for independent defence proving difficult to realise.

Combined strength of armed forces, National Guard and tribal levies, some 110,000. Population approximately 8m (15m including rest of GCC).

Iran's population 60m, regular armed forces 500,000, full mobilisation strength over 1m.

Iraq's population 18m, regular armed forces 380,000, full mobilisation strength over 1m.

Therefore Saudi cannot hope to match neighbours.

Even plans to double size of armed forces presents difficulties: recruit foreigners? introduce conscription and end careful selection of recruits?

Hoping to make up for quantity with quality technology:

But this requires integration, training, technical support, suitable infrastructure, reliance on suppliers for all these and spares.

Meantime, government under **criticism for heavy expenditure on arms and heavy reliance on foreign allies;**

Needs to buy to ensure foreign assistance.

Needs to change political arrangements at home to assuage criticism, build consensus – yet plans for reform also criticised.

## **Checklist of Terminology**

Armour; AFV; MBT

Aircraft; Fighter; Bomber; MRCA

Arms Control; SALT; START; MBFR; INF; Forty Nations Conference on Arms Control  
Arms Race

Atomic; Hydrogen; Neutron; Fusion; Fission; Yield

Atomic Energy Commission; IAEA

Base; Forward B.; Basing Mode; Silos

Battlefield; B. Weapons

Biological, Bacteriological Weapons

Blitzkrieg

Blockade

Burden Sharing

Chemical Weapons; Chemical Warfare Convention  
Circular Error Probable  
Civil Defence  
Containment  
Collateral Damage; Damage Limitation  
Collective Security  
Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence  
Conventional Forces/Weapons  
Cruise Missiles; GLCMs; SLCMs  
Defence; Layered; Point; Forward; in Depth  
Delivery Vehicles  
Deployment  
Detente  
Deterrence; Balance (of Terror); Extended Deterrence; Assured; Denial; Independent  
Deterrent  
Destruction; MAD; Early Warning  
Disarmament  
Doctrine  
Emerging Technology; Precision Guidance; Real Time Info; Electronic Warfare  
Escalation  
Fall-Out  
First Use/No First Use  
Flexible  
Force Formations/Structure; Divisions/Brigades, etc.; Volunteer/Conscription  
Force Multipliers; Force Correlation; Force/Counter-Force; Force Projection;  
Concentration  
Game Theory; Minimax  
General Staff  
Hot Line  
Infantry; AFV  
Infrastructure  
Interdiction  
Limited War  
Logistics  
Maginot Mentality  
Megatons  
Morale  
Multilateral Force (MLF)  
Neutrality  
Nuclear; Theatre Nuclear Forces; INF; Threshold; Umbrella  
Operational Level  
Order of Battle  
Parity  
Payload

Polarity; Multi-polar; Bipolar  
Proliferation; Non-Proliferation  
Psychological Warfare  
Radar  
Readiness  
Rules of War  
Salami Tactics  
Smart Weapons  
SDI/Star Wars  
SIOP  
SIGINT  
Strategic Superiority; Launch on Warning;  
Strategic Air Command  
Strategic Weapons; BM; ABM; BMD; ICBM; IRBM; MARV; MIRV; MX; SLBM  
Strategy; Global Strategy; Maritime Strategy  
Strike/Counter-Strike; First/Second; Pre-emptive, Surgical; Selective  
Tactics  
Target, Hard/Soft  
Threat Assessment  
Total War  
Trigger; Tripwire  
Unconventional Warfare  
Value/Counter-Value  
Verification; NTMs  
Warfare; Attrition; Manoeuvre; Target Acquisition  
Weapon System; Platforms  
Window of Vulnerability \ Zero Option, Double Zero Option



## **Strategic Balance Assessments**

Factors to be considered:

1. Geography/terrain/air space/sea lanes – relative strategic depth – a three dimensional concept.  
Distribution of targets/population/installations/manoeuverability.  
Compare Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria;  
Compare Israel pre-1967, post-1967, post 1980 (Sinai) post 1983 (Lebanon) – attendant losses (West Bank, Golan Heights) and gains (Sinai, Lebanon) for Arabs.  
Compare Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, vis a vis Iraq.
2. Time Factor – surprise, advance warning, early warning, real time. Implications for mobilisation, given ...
3. Force levels and structures – counting the numbers, regulars vs. reserves, readiness, skills, training, morale, motivation, capacity to take casualties.
4. Inventories of arms, numbers, capabilities, ranges, integration, spares, infrastructure, industrial base (replacement capacity).
5. Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) – the link between all of the above.
6. Threat assessments – potential enemy intentions (and alliances) as well as capability.

Note the mix of factors, including economics, politics, sociology, as well as 'hard data' like technology, simple numbers, and geography.

## **Military Doctrines**

Based on the above considerations, the key principles influencing **Israel's** military doctrine are:

- \* Few Against Many – Israelis outnumbered by the Arabs (Iranians).
- \* A War of Survival – existence of the state at stake.
- \* Strategy of Attrition – absolute defeat of Arabs impossible.
- \* Geographic Pressures – lack of strategic depth.
- \* Time Factor – need for mobilisation of reserves/people's army.

They must deal 'with the strategic reality that 90% of Israel's population, some 90% of its industrial infrastructure, two of its three main ports, its entire oil refining capacity, and almost all its airports, are situated on a narrow strip of land along the coast less than 10 minutes flying time from Damascus. Moreover, 85% of the Israel



Defence Forces' (IDF) ground units are manned by reservists, requiring 48 hours for mobilisation, during which active duty military forces have to cope with enemy threats.' [Goodman and Carus, *The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 48.]

Resulting Doctrine – offence, speed, 'technological edge', adaptability, minimal casualties; 'a defensive strategy, executed offensively'.

That is: deter attack, but if this seems set to fail, strike preemptively, and if attacked first, move onto the offensive, thereby taking the battle to enemy territory, rather than fighting it on (limited and vulnerable) home ground.

[Note Ariel Levite's critique of the doctrine, which made sense when first devised in the pre-1967 context, but has become so ingrained that the forces always opt for attack – sometimes incurring unnecessary casualties – to the neglect of defence.]

Meanwhile:

**Arab** politico-strategic doctrine has evolved as follows:

1950s and 1960s – Nasserite and Baathist call for a supranational Arab entity (integrated political union) to enable full mobilisation of Arab moral and material resource transforming Arab quantitative superiority into qualitative superiority as well. [Egyptian-Syrian political union of 1958-61] to enable full mobilisation of Arab moral and material resources.

Post-1967 – call for revolutionary transformation and armed struggle, to restructure Arab society, to enable it to present a viable strategic challenge to Israel and its allies. [Palestinian national movement].

Mid-1970s – instead of Arab unity or transformation, call for functional cooperation between coexisting regimes. [Egyptian-Syrian cooperation in 1973 war; echoed recently in principles of Damascus Declaration].

Post-1973 – Sadat's theory of decoupling Israel from the US, by politico-diplomatic means, to redress the major source of imbalance in the strategic confrontation between the Arabs and Israel.

**Syria** did not, however, adopt the last doctrine. Instead, under Asad, Syria developed a 'Doctrine of Strategic Parity'.

The principles:

- \* Patience – the time is not ripe for the military defeat of Israel, given its technological edge and Arab disunity, but this situation can be changed over time.
- \* Military Buildup – enhancement of the Syrian armed forces will enable it to narrow the gap with Israel in key respects, such as air-to-air and air-to-ground operations and C3I.
- \* Pursuit of Interim Objectives – limited military engagements may be fought to win some territory and/or political bargaining chips.

significant gains from employment of its military force.

- \* Deterrence – development of sufficient capability to inflict such serious damage/casualties on Israel (with missile attacks deep into the country, for example) that Israel will be deterred from directly attacking Syria.

The components of the Syrian doctrine:

arms build-up and expansion of forces;  
alliance with the Soviets;  
exploitation of Lebanon;  
attention to the home front (politics and economics);  
building Arab unity/cooperation.

[Note Khalidi and Agha's critique of the Syrian doctrine for its dependence on the Soviet alliance, which could never match the US alliance with Israel].

### **The Doctrines Compared**

Note how Syria's doctrine is a mix of political, ideological as well as military-technological components, designed to find ways to match Israel's technological edge by indirect means.

Exploitation of each other's weaknesses:

Israel has noted Syria's tendency to prepare for engagement carefully and then seek to execute its prepared (probably Soviet) plan. Therefore, Israeli forces aim to seize the initiative (go on the attack, disrupt the opposing forces) and oblige the enemy to abandon its plan.

Maximum use of flexibility and initiative.

Syria has noted Israel's fear of high casualties, not matched in the Syrian armed forces (and presumably civilian population). To exploit this weakness, Syrian doctrine aims for a quick first strike, followed by a protracted war of attrition, and air/missile strikes on Israeli population centres (countervalue) as a deterrent.

Maximum use of countervalue force and staying power.

### **Assimilating the Lessons of War**

Successive Arab-Israeli wars have been the testing ground for technology, strategy and tactics.

The broad lessons:

Arab forces unable to marshal sufficient force to totally defeat Israel;

Israel unable to totally overrun/crush the Arabs;

Following the outbreak of war, external powers are likely to intervene and influence the outcome thereafter.

Some specific lessons:

1967 – Israeli control of the air gave it crucial advantage on the ground, though Israeli forward defence/attack strategy worked so well, that Israelis became complacent by 1973;

1973 – Egyptian air defences protected ground assault in initial stages; Arabs capable of effective use of deception and surprise and fighting for limited objectives;

1982 – Syria's Soviet-supplied air defence system completely inadequate in face of Israeli capabilities and technology; Israel suffered sufficient casualties on the ground to be wary of costs of future engagements.

Conclusions drawn:

Jordan has opted for a totally defensive strategy;

Egypt has opted for a politico-diplomatic rather than military strategy;

Syria has opted for a mixed strategy of strategic parity;

Israel is determined to maintain its technological edge.

## **New Technologies**

As witnessed in the Gulf War, new technologies have transformed the battlefield.

An illustration:

'It is no longer meaningful to speak of individual weapons. Weapons have become part of integrated platforms that include sensors, remote target designation, computers, countermeasures [jamming, decoys], and the like. As a result, effectiveness has become dependent on a wide array of supporting devices that have no independent destructive capabilities.' [Goodman and Carus, p. 156].

Integration is possible through battle management, that is C3I.

'This makes it possible for an individual commander to have at his disposal a data-gathering system that acquires and distributes massive amounts of information obtained from a multiplicity of sources. Thus, the commander of an artillery unit may be able to attack enemy units based on [real time] information acquired by artillery locating radars, ground-surveillance radars, signals-intelligence systems, and cameras mounted on mini-RPVs [remotely piloted vehicles], none of which may be under his direct control. Similar battle management systems are under development for virtually every branch of the armed forces, if they are not already in service.' [Ibid]

Acquisition and effective use of the new technologies requires:

Sources of supply and funding;

A developed high-tech infrastructure (including in the civilian sector and industry generally);

Skilled and suitably trained personnel;

Constant upgrading, adaptation and innovation (including adaptation of software).

The Israelis are currently ahead in these areas – to catch up the Arabs must make changes across the board, in the civilian economy, education system and so on, as well as in the military. Even then, they will be obliged to buy off-shelf (if they can find it) technology and equipment, and to seek operational expertise in these areas.

Israel's bomb in the basement is ostensibly its ultimate deterrent, in the event that its survival is threatened.

Arguments for and against making this capability public.

Meanwhile:

Arabs have been seeking to counter Israeli nuclear capability with chemical weapons and missiles (countervalue).

Some countries seeking their own nuclear capabilities.

Application of deterrence (strategic theory) arguments to the Middle East.

Relationship between non-conventional and conventional weapons, especially in light of new technologies.


### **Confidence Building measures (CBMs)**

Note:

Golan Heights Disengagement Agreement, 31 May 1974, supervised by a UN force, separates Israel and Syria with a no-man's zone and area of limited forces. In an area within 10km of each side of the border each country can station only 2 brigades with 6,000 men, 75 tanks, and 36 artillery pieces (122mm or equivalent) in the zone. In the second zone, incorporating the area that is 10 to 20km from the border, total forces are limited to 450 tanks and 162 artillery pieces (with a range of no more than 20km). No surface-to-air missiles are allowed within 25km of the border.

Under the Camp David agreement, the size of Egyptian forces permanently in the Sinai is limited, as well as the amount of infrastructure that can be built there. Geographic constraints basically confine the Egyptian military to the western third of the Sinai.

These provide a pointer to how further arrangements could be devised. The new technologies will affect the dimensions, both raising the dangers and providing new solutions.



## **Simulation**

**Lecturer: Rosemary Hollis**

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Sample instruction sheets distributed to each of 14 players ...  
ATTACHED IS SOME INFORMATION FOR YOUR REFERENCE.  
THE SIMULATION IS DIVIDED INTO 4 PARTS OR ROUNDS, EACH LASTING 40 MINUTES.

**YOU ARE : the Minister of Defence of Saudi Arabia.**  
**YOUR NUMBER IS : 1**

### **ROUND 1**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Seminar Room.  
THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Defence Ministers from regional states (nos. 1,4,7) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).

THE MEETING IS : a summit of defence ministers.

YOUR TASK IS: to define shared threats, goals and objectives and to plan a joint strategy for mutual defence.

### **ROUND 2**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Seminar Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : various Saudi ministers (nos. 1,2,3) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).

THE MEETING IS : a Saudi cabinet meeting.

YOUR TASK IS : to define national interests, goals and objectives and to plan a strategy to reach these, and reconcile this with regional cooperation plans. You may also conclude arms purchasing agreements.

At the end of this round, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to

### **ROUND 3**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Seminar Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Defence Ministers from regional states (nos. 1,4,7) + UAE Finance Minister (no. 6) to advise and arms dealer (no. 14).

THE MEETING IS : an emergency meeting of regional defence ministers.

YOUR TASK IS : To co-ordinate a response to the crisis announced at the end of round 2. (Spying, recruitment of agents, infiltration allowed if you wish).

### **ROUND 4**

police).

**YOUR NUMBER IS : 2**

**ROUND 1**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN :** Inner Office.

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE :** Interior Ministers of regional states (nos. 2,5,8) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).

**THE MEETING IS :** a summit of interior ministers.

**YOUR TASK IS:** to define shared threats, goals and objectives and to plan a joint strategy for mutual security.

**ROUND 2**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN :** Seminar Room.

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE :** various Saudi ministers (nos. 1,2,3) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).

**THE MEETING IS :** a Saudi Cabinet meeting.

**YOUR TASK IS :** to define national interests, goals and objectives and to plan a strategy to reach these, and reconcile this with regional cooperation plans. You may also conclude arms purchasing agreements. At the end of this round, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to

**ROUND 3**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN :** Administration Office.

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE :** Interior Ministers from regional states (nos. 2,5,8) + Saudi Finance Minister (no. 3) to advise.

**THE MEETING IS :** an emergency meeting of regional interior ministers.

**YOUR TASK IS :** to co-ordinate a response to the crisis announced at the end of round 2. (Spying, recruitment of agents, infiltration allowed if you wish).

**ROUND 4**

**Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.**

**YOU ARE: the Minister of Finance (and economic development) of Saudi Arabia.**

**YOUR NUMBER IS : 3**

**ROUND 1**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Computer Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Finance Ministers from regional states (nos. 3,6,9) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).

THE MEETING IS : a summit of finance ministers.

YOUR TASK IS: to define shared problems, goals and objectives and to plan a joint strategy for economic cooperation and development.

**ROUND 2**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Seminar Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : various Saudi ministers (nos. 1,2,3) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).

THE MEETING IS : a Saudi Cabinet Meeting.

YOUR TASK IS : to define national interests, goals and objectives and to plan a strategy to reach these, and to reconcile this with regional cooperation plans. You may also conclude arms purchasing agreements.

At the end of this round, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to

**ROUND 3**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Administration Office.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Interior Ministers from regional states (nos. 2,5,8), with you in attendance as adviser.

THE MEETING IS : an emergency meeting of regional interior ministers.

YOUR TASK IS : to co-ordinate a response to the crisis announced at the end of round 2. (Spying, recruitment of agents, infiltration allowed if you wish).

**ROUND 4**

Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.

**YOUR NUMBER IS : 4**

**ROUND 1**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Seminar Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Defence Ministers from regional states (nos. 1,4,7) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).

THE MEETING IS : a summit of defence ministers.

YOUR TASK IS: to define shared threats goals and objectives and to plan a joint strategy for mutual defence.

**ROUND 2**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Administration Office.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : various UAE ministers (nos. 4,5,6) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (13,14).

THE MEETING IS : a UAE cabinet meeting.

YOUR TASK IS : to define national interests, goals and objectives and to plan a strategy to reach these, and reconcile this with regional cooperation plans. You may also conclude arms purchasing agreements.

At the end of this round, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to

**ROUND 3**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Seminar Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Defence Ministers from regional states (nos. 1,4,7) + UAE Finance Minister (no. 6) to advise and arms dealer (no. 14).

THE MEETING IS : an emergency meeting of regional defence ministers.

YOUR TASK IS : To co-ordinate a response to the crisis announced at the end of round 2. (Spying, recruitment of agents, infiltration allowed if you wish).

**ROUND 4**

Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.



**YOU ARE : the Interior Minister of the U.A.E. (in charge of internal security and police).**

**YOUR NUMBER IS : 5**

**ROUND 1**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Inner Office.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Interior Ministers of regional states (nos. 2,5,8) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).**

**THE MEETING IS : a summit of interior ministers.**

**YOUR TASK IS: to define shared threats, goals and objectives and to plan a joint strategy from mutual security.**

**ROUND 2**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Administration Office.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : various UAE ministers (nos. 4,5,6) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (13,14).**

**THE MEETING IS : a UAE cabinet meeting.**

**YOUR TASK IS : to define national interests, goals and objectives and to plan a strategy to reach these, and reconcile this with regional cooperation plans. You may also conclude arms purchasing agreements.**

**At the end of this round, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to**

**ROUND 3**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Administration Office.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Interior Ministers from regional states (nos. 2,5,8) + Saudi Finance Minister (no. 3) to advise.**

**THE MEETING IS : an emergency meeting of regional interior ministers.**

**YOUR TASK IS : to co-ordinate a response to the crisis announced at the end of round 2. (Spying, recruitment of agents, infiltration allowed if you wish).**

**ROUND 4**

**Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.**

**YOUR NUMBER IS : 6**

**ROUND 1**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Computer Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Finance Ministers from regional states (nos. 3,6,9) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).

THE MEETING IS : a summit of finance ministers.

YOUR TASK IS: to define shared problems, goals and objectives and to plan a joint strategy for economic cooperation and development.

**ROUND 2**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Administration Office.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : various UAE ministers (nos. 4,5,6) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (13,14).

THE MEETING IS : a UAE cabinet meeting.

YOUR TASK IS : to define national interests, goals and objectives and to plan a strategy to reach these, and reconcile this with regional cooperation plans. You may also conclude arms purchasing agreements.

At the end of this round, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to

**ROUND 3**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Seminar Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Defence Ministers from regional states (nos. 1,4,7) + you, in attendance to advise and arms salesman (no. 14).

THE MEETING IS : an emergency meeting of regional defence ministers.

YOUR TASK IS : To co-ordinate a response to the crisis announced at the end of round 2. (Spying, recruitment of agents, infiltration allowed if you wish).

**ROUND 4**

Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.

**YOU ARE : the Minister of Defence of Oman.**

**YOUR NUMBER IS : 7**

**ROUND 1**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Seminar Room.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Defence Ministers from regional states (nos. 1,4,7) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).**

**THE MEETING IS : a summit of defence ministers.**

**YOUR TASK IS: to define shared threats, goals and objectives and to plan a joint strategy from mutual defence.**

**ROUND 2**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Inner Office.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : various Omani Ministers (nos. 7,8,9) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (13,14).**

**THE MEETING IS : an Omani cabinet meeting.**

**YOUR TASK IS : to define national interests, goals and objectives and to plan a strategy to reach these, and reconcile this with regional cooperation plans. You may also conclude arms purchasing agreements.**

**At the end of this round, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to**

**ROUND 3**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Seminar Room.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Defence Ministers from regional states (nos. 1,4,7) + UAE Finance Minister (no. 6) to advise and arms dealer (no. 14).**

**THE MEETING IS : an emergency meeting of regional defence ministers.**

**YOUR TASK IS : to co-ordinate a response to the crisis announced at the end of round 2. (Spying, recruitment of agents, infiltration allowed if you wish).**

**ROUND 4**

**Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.**

**YOUR NUMBER IS : 8**

**ROUND 1**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Inner Office.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Interior Ministers of regional states (nos. 2,5,8) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).**

**THE MEETING IS : a summit of interior ministers.**

**YOUR TASK IS: to define shared threats, goals and objectives and to plan a joint strategy for mutual security.**

**ROUND 2**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Inner Office.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : various Omani Ministers (nos. 7,8,9) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).**

**THE MEETING IS : an Omani cabinet meeting.**

**YOUR TASK IS : to define national interests, goals and objectives and to plan a strategy to reach these, and reconcile this with regional cooperation plans. You may also conclude arms purchasing agreements.**

**At the end of this round, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to**

**ROUND 3**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Administration Office.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Interior Ministers from regional states (nos. 2,5,8) + Saudi Finance Minister (no. 3) to advise.**

**THE MEETING IS : an emergency meeting of regional interior ministers.**

**YOUR TASK IS : to co-ordinate a response to the crisis announced at the end of round 2. (Spying, recruitment of agents, infiltration allowed if you wish).**

**ROUND 4**

**Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.**

**YOU ARE : the Minister of Finance (and economic development) of Oman.**

**YOUR NUMBER IS : 9**

**ROUND 1**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Computer Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Finance Ministers from regional states (nos. 3,6,9) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).

THE MEETING IS : a summit of finance ministers.

YOUR TASK IS: to define shared problems, goals and objectives and to plan a joint strategy for economic cooperation and development.

**ROUND 2**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Inner Office.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : various Omani Ministers (nos. 7,8,9) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (13,14).

THE MEETING IS : an Omani cabinet meeting.

YOUR TASK IS : to define national interests, goals and objectives and to plan a strategy to reach these, and reconcile this with regional cooperation plans. You may also conclude arms purchasing agreements.

At the end of this round, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to

**ROUND 3**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Computer Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Islamic activists and leaders, plus arms salesman (no. 13) and yourself, as a defector to the Islamic revolutionary cause.

THE MEETING IS : a convention of regional Islamic activists.

YOUR TASK IS : to define strategy for consolidating and protecting the Islamic victory (as announced after round 2) in the face of gathering opposition.

**ROUND 4**

Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.

revolution.

**YOUR NUMBER IS : 10**

**ROUND 1**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Administration Office.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Islamic activist leaders from Iran, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (nos. 10,11,12) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).

THE MEETING IS : a secret gathering of Islamic activists.

YOUR TASK IS: to define shared goals and objectives and to plan a strategy for spreading Islamic revolution in the Arabian Peninsula states.

**ROUND 2**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Computer Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Islamic activists and leaders (10,11,12) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).

THE MEETING IS : to build on first victory (details to be supplied by coordinator).

YOUR TASK IS : to plan next step to advance the Islamic revolution (Spying, recruitment of agents, infiltration allowed if you wish).

At the end of this round, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to

**ROUND 3**

YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Computer Room.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Islamic activists and leaders (nos. 10,11,12) plus arms salesman (no. 13) and defector from a Gulf government.

THE MEETING IS : a convention of regional Islamic activists.

YOUR TASK IS : to plan a strategy for consolidating and protecting the victory realised in round 2, in the face of gathering opposition.

**ROUND 4**

Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.

**YOU ARE : the leader of a radical, anti-government, Islamic movement in Saudi Arabia.**

**YOUR NUMBER IS : 12**

**ROUND 1**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Administration Office.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Islamic activist leaders from Iran, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (nos. 10,11,12) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13, 14).**

**THE MEETING IS : a secret gathering of Islamic activists.**

**YOUR TASK IS: to define shared goals and objectives and to plan a strategy for spreading Islamic revolution in the Arabian Peninsula states.**

**ROUND 2**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Computer Room.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Islamic activists and leaders (10,11,12) plus, if they wish, arms dealers (nos. 13,14).**

**THE MEETING IS : to build on first victory (details to be supplied by co-ordinator).**

**YOUR TASK IS : to plan next step to advance the Islamic revolution. (Spying, recruitment of agents, infiltration allowed, if you wish).**

**At the end of this round, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to**

**ROUND 3**

**YOU GO TO THE MEETING IN : Computer Room.**

**THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MEETING ARE : Islamic activists and leaders (10,11,12) plus arms dealer (no. 13) and defector from a Gulf government.**

**THE MEETING IS : a convention of regional Islamic leaders and activists.**

**YOUR TASK IS : to plan a strategy for consolidating and protecting the victory realised in round 2, in the face of mounting opposition.**

**ROUND 4**

**Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.**

**ROUND 1**

Go to any of the following meetings, to introduce yourself and observe.

In the Seminar Room the defence ministers of regional states are discussing mutual defence concerns.

In Inner Office the interior minister of regional states are discussing shared internal security interests.

In the Computer Room the finance ministers of regional states are discussing economic cooperation.

In the Administration Office Islamic activists are discussing strategies for Islamic revolution in the Arabian Peninsula states.

Your task is : to observe any/all of the meetings, define your market objectives and strategy for defence sales.

**ROUND 2**

Go to any of the following meetings to offer defence deals to the participants.

The cabinet of Saudi Arabia is meeting in the Seminar Room.

The cabinet of the UAE is meeting in the Administration Office.

The cabinet of Oman is meeting in Inner Office.

The Islamic activists are meeting in the Computer Room.

Your task is : to secure one or more defence deals.

At the end of Round 2, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to Round3.

**ROUND 3**

You go to the meeting in : Computer Room.

The participants in this meeting are : Islamic activists and a defector from one Gulf state.

Their task is : to plan a strategy for consolidating and protecting the victory realised in round two, in the face of mounting opposition.

Your task is to offer assistance in the form of arms supplies.

**ROUND 4**

Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.



**YOU ARE : an international arms dealer from the US.**

**YOUR NUMBER IS : 14**

**ROUND 1**

Go to any of the following meetings, to introduce yourself and observe.

In the Seminar Room the defence ministers of regional states are discussing mutual defence concerns.

In the Inner Office the interior ministers of regional states are discussing shared internal security interests.

In the Computer Room the finance ministers of regional states are discussing economic cooperation.

In the Administration Office Islamic activists are discussing strategies for Islamic revolution in the Arabian Peninsula states.

Your task is : to observe any/all of the meetings, define your market objectives and strategy for defence sales.

**ROUND 2**

Go to any of the following meetings to offer defence deals to the participants.

The cabinet of Saudi Arabia is meeting in the Seminar Room.

The cabinet of the UAE is meeting in the Administration Office.

The cabinet of Oman is meeting in the Office.

The Islamic activists are meeting in the Computer Room.

Your task is : to secure one or more defence deals.

At the end of Round 2, go to the Seminar Room for an announcement, then proceed to Round3.

**ROUND 3**

You go to the meeting in : Seminar Room.

The participants in this meeting are : Defence Ministers from regional states (nos. 1,4,7); plus the UAE

Finance Minister to advise, and yourself.

Their task is : to coordinate a response to the crisis announced at the end of round 2.

Your task is to offer assistance in the form of arms supplies.

**ROUND 4**

Go to the Seminar Room for concluding discussion.

## Arms Races and the Arab world

1. Perceptions, external threats/action reaction.
  2. Personal ambition/local preoccupations.
  3. Militarization for internal reasons with Palestine as the excuse.
- \* Major powers and politics towards region e.g. US tacit acceptance of Israel's nuclear and ballistic missile programme; support for military preponderance/qualitative edge;
  - \* Regional arms races: Arab-Israel conflict, inter-Arab state rivalries; reintroduction of Turkey into regional balance;
  - \* Local ruling elites: external vulnerabilities; definition of foreign policy goals, priorities (Syria; Iraq etc); search for role and local allies has encouraged emphasis on military security and defence rather than regional economic cooperation.
  - \* Local ruling elites: internal security considerations and militarization.

## Disutility of force ?

- (1) Has the **rationale** for acquiring arms changed, at least in the Arab-Israel sub-system?  
(does the rationale still exist, has it become diluted, has it changed).
- (2) Could **alternative options** to counter Israel be more successful?
- (3) Has participation in arms races become counterproductive? Would expenditure on "butter" not "guns" buy some of the internal security/stability rulers need?

## 1. Change in Rationale? Some Propositions:

### A. *Change in strategic military environment*

Soviet Union's collapse/defeat of Iraq/peace process may together provide components for a resolution of the military dimension of the Arab-Israel conflict.

- (i) Neutralisation of Egypt / defeat of Iraq / preponderance of power in Israel's favour (Handout: military data).  
Full weight of Israeli military power can be directed against sole remaining front line Arab state, Syria.  
Military dimension of Arab-Israeli conflict reduced to Syrian-Israeli equation (notwithstanding perceived potential of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria).

- (ii) Syria has a deterrent defensive capability against Israel, but limited military options. (Demise of USSR has removed strategic ally/vital constraint against Israeli freedom of action; containment of Iraq has removed strategic depth/effective second front against Israel).
- (iii) US committed to Israel's technological edge/permanent imbalance in Israel's favour. Arabs have no counterbalancing ally and are subject to growing international pressures for control of arms flows into area, specifically to Syria, Libya, Iran).
- (iv) Gulf war :
  - a. raised prospect of fundamental change in pattern of conflict/military competition.
  - b. demonstrated futility of massive financial and human investment by Arab governments in armies and weapons inventories that could be easily defeated by technologically and logistically superior western forces or western-supplied high tech weaponry, say, to Israel.
- (v) Hizballah / Hamas guerrilla warfare activities do not threaten Israel's basic security

## Result

- \* Arab military option as direct means of leverage against Israel has been substantially downgraded; and seems beyond recovery in foreseeable future.
  - \* Arab military capability to initiate offensive action, coerce, punish has been reduced to Syria's residual capacity which is itself subject to Israel's superiority and retaliatory power/constrained by international context.
- B. *As peace talks progress, the utility of force as an instrument of national policy becomes less significant.*
- (1) Local parties become locked into system of tradeoffs from which it will become difficult to disengage/to challenge via military option.  
therefore (ii) over time, constraints on the use of military force may reduce incentives, raise costs, limit military freedom of action, specifically Israel and Syria so that the function of force as an instrument of national policy may become subject to significant revision by Israel and Arab states.

## Result

- \* Political economic pay offs and military stability could mean utility of force for either side will be subject to broader constraints and diminishing comparative

continuation of peace talks and substantive progress.

## (2) ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS TO COUNTER ISRAEL?

**Past approach :** reversing the military imbalance has been a central strategic concern for Arabs since late 1940s on account of threat that Israel's qualitative military edge, underwritten by US, has posed to Arab states individually and collectively.

- \* "Strength through unity" (Nasserism, Baathism etc).
- \* Syria's quest for "strategic parity".
- \* Saddam Hussein's failed attempt at mutual strategic deterrence.

**Evolving approach : Post 1967 - 1993:** Since 1967 Arabs have also noted that the reality of the military balance requires a different approach, providing impetus for peaceful resolution. This trend has been boosted by failure of past alternative approach.

If the military imbalance is irreversible :

- \* could imbalance be met (from Arab viewpoint) through the structure of the peace process and eventual peace settlement?
- \* The Arabs would be unable to initiate a war against Israel, but the opposite would also hold true.
- \* Palestinian notion of "parity" (Khalidi) would be built into an internationally endorsed peace settlement.
- \* Worst case scenarios/contingencies would be contained by the peace settlement and related security regime and guarantees.
- \* Security arrangements will place serious obstacles to any challenge to the post settlement order.

*"The post settlement regional security structure should create a nominal parity based on the mutual incapacity to wage war as well as an mutually binding commitments to preserve the peace". (Khalidi).*

## (3) Has Participation in Arms Races Become Counterproductive?

A. *Weapons procurement has not bought security :*

- \* Continuing military imbalance (external vulnerabilities, insecure leaderships, wars of opportunity/wars of vulnerability).
- \* Growing internal instability. Weapons procurement carries an opportunity cost. Regimes which have satisfied military/shored up internal security have bankrupted countries in process; slowed down development, and thus indirectly fuelled sources of economic and social instability. (Look at handout on Economic data).
- \* Israel also has opportunity cost to pay. With limited resources, difficult to bear cost of "qualitative edge".

B. *The last few years show that military spending has declined. Will this trend continue? What will be the internal economic and political/international factors (structural adjustment programmes, reductions in aid, oil prices etc) working for a redistribution of expenditure? Will regimes acquire greater legitimacy/popularity through less military expenditure? Are they already embarked on this course? Are we witnessing a temporary phenomenon conditioned by tight economic circumstances? Will the trend be reversed?*

C. *Guns or Butter ? Incentive for arms control and CBMs*

\* Factors to take into account :

- (1) changing geostrategic environment.
- (2) declining oil revenues.
- (3) absence of sustained economic growth.
- (4) rising population / educated unemployed.
- (5) rising price of providing for national defence / arms race.
- (6) debt crisis.

\* Despite these constraints, arms race lurches on :

- (1) US policy torn between desire to limit weapons proliferation / need to support friends / preparedness to intervene to protect rival interests.
- (2) Suppliers eager to sell; high tech weaponry has sharpened appetite of recipients.
- (3) In absence of peace settlement, fears continue to grow.

\* But economic & social cost of weapons procurement too high.

\* Israel needs to invest for growth.

\* Jordan needs to raise income perhead.

\* President Assad needs civil development.

In all 3 countries pressing reasons to divert from military to civilian development.

#### 4. Possible Openings for Arms Control

(a) **Problem** of arms control in Middle East :

- (1) Definition of Middle East; combinations of countries; (Iran : acquisition of nuclear capability? Pakistan : nuclear devices? Turkey / Algeria : ambitions?)
- (2) Spread of missile technology.
- (3) Difficulties in identifying stores of chemical weapons.
- (4) High degree of suspicion makes acquiescence in exchanging information in the conventional arena difficult (offensive forces, logistical support etc) until there is a peace settlement.
- (5) Arms control initiatives to ban or limit major items unable to succeed before peace.

(b) The need is to build on existing components of arms control/CBMs during

(1986 : the Hindawi affair

September 1989 : missile production facility blown up in Iraq).

\* **Red lines** : informal agreements on deployment and use of forces.

e.g 1) Syrian & Israel in Lebanon.

Israel agreed to Syrian ground forces in Lebanon in certain geographic areas.

2) Jordan and Israel: (a) Jordan's east and northern, b) Jordan Valley borders.

Tacit understandings benefit both countries. Form of deterrence for Israel.

For Jordan agreement bolsters national sovereignty and protection against Iraqi and Syrian intervention.

3) US-Saudi understanding that Saudi will not deploy advanced warplanes at Tarbuk.

### **Deployment limitations**

\* 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement.

\* 1979 Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty.

These two arrangements provide models for further limitations in future.

### **Some novel proposals**

\* Arms for debt swap (Sadowski) This has been taken up by Jordanians.  
Constraint: shortage of capital to finance debt burden of poorest countries.

\* Jordan could make a public declaration that it will not allow foreign forces on its soil.

## APPENDICIES

### Course Programme - April 1993

#### MONDAY 19 APRIL

*(Note: there will be a break of half an hour for refreshments at approximately half way through each morning and afternoon session.)*

- 8:30-9:00 Registration, group photographs
- 9:00-10:30 *Welcome, opening remarks*  
**Speakers: Ibrahim Abu Lughod, Mahdi Abdul Hadi**
- 11:00-13:00 *Sovereignty, self determination, power, national security & use of force*  
**Lecturer: Khalil Shikaki**
- 13:00-15:00 Lunch break
- 15:00-18:00 *Deterrence and balance of power*  
**Lecturer: Khalil Shikaki**
- 18:00-20:00 *Buffet Reception* hosted by PASSIA at the National Palace Hotel

#### TUESDAY 20 APRIL

- 9:00-13:00 *Foreign and defence policy, military strategy and military doctrine*  
**Lecturer: Rosemary Hollis**
- 13:00-15:00 Lunch break
- 15:00-18:00 *Disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures*  
**Lecturer: Rosemary Hollis**

#### WEDNESDAY 21 APRIL

- 9:00-13:00 *Nuclear proliferation: conceptual and technical discussion in a Middle Eastern context*  
**Lecturer: Khalil Shiqaqi**
- 13:00-15:00 Lunch break
- 15:00-18:00 *Europe on the Brink: Video and discussion*  
**Lecturer: Valerie Yorke**
- 18:00-20:00 *Reception* hosted by British Consulate General, Sheikh Jarrah, Jerusalem

9:00-13:00 *Game theory and strategy*  
**Lecturer: Khalil Shikaki**  
13:00-15:00 Lunch break  
15:00-18:00 *Examples and experiments*  
**Lecturer: Khalil Shikaki**

**FRIDAY 23 APRIL**

9:00-13:00 *Systems analysis and strategy* and writing options papers  
**Lecturer: Khalil Shikaki**

**WEEKEND**

PASSIA premises are open to participants during the weekend (9:00-15:00) for access to reference materials and the library and for discussion of the first week's programme.

**MONDAY 26 APRIL**

9:00-13:00 *Strategic Studies and the Regional System: introduction and themes*  
**Lecturer: Valerie Yorke**  
13:00-15:00 Lunch break  
15:00-18:00 *The Regional System: external environment and players*  
**Lecturer: Rosemary Hollis**

**TUESDAY 27 APRIL**

9:00-13:00 *Regional system: local actors and the Palestinians*  
**Lecturer: Valerie Yorke**  
13:00-15:00 Lunch break  
15:00-18:00 *Decision-making and defining national security: local actors*  
**Lecturer: Valerie Yorke**  
18:00-20:00 *Simulation exercise preparation*  
**Lecturer: Valerie Yorke**

**WEDNESDAY 28 APRIL**

9:00-13:00 *Defining national security: the Gulf*  
**Lecturer: Rosemary Hollis**  
13:00-15:00 Lunch break  
15:00-18:00 *Defining national security: policy-makers predicament (simulation)*  
**Lecturer: Valerie Yorke**



**THURSDAY 29 APRIL**

- 9:00-13:00      *Arab and Israeli military doctrines and strategies*  
**Lecturer: Rosemary Hollis**
- 13:00-14:00      Lunch break
- 14:00-17:00      *Simulation*  
**Lecturer: Rosemary Hollis**
- 17:30-20:00      *Palestinian security concerns: ideas for discussion* -  
Roundtable discussion

**FRIDAY 30 APRIL**

- 9:00-13:00      *Arms race, arms control and CBMs in the Middle East*  
**Lecturer: Rosemary Hollis**
- 13:00-15:00      Lunch break
- 15:00-18:00      *Arms race, arms control and the Peace Process*  
**Lecturer: Valerie Yorke**
- 18:00-20:00      **Concluding discussion**

### **Monday 19**

- Halpern, M.H. and Scheffer D.J. with Small, P.L., *Self-Determination in the New World Order*, Introduction, chp. 1.
- Watson, Adam, *The Evolution of International Society* Routledge. Ch. 18. "The Age of Reason and of Balance".
- Art, Robert J. and Waltz, Kenneth N., eds., 1983. *The Use of Force* Ch. "International Politics and Foreign Policy".

### **Tuesday 20**

- Hollis, Rosemary, 1993. *Whatever Happened to the Damascus Declaration? Evolving Security Structures in the Gulf*. Monograph Series, Dept of International Politics, University College of Wales,

### **Wednesday 21**

- Jervis, Robert, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", in Robert Art and Robert Jervis, 1985. *International Politics*.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1981. *The Strategy of Conflict* pp. 3-80.

### **Thursday 22**

- Shikaki, Khalil, 1991. "Palestinian Security Requirements and the Political Settlement" Tampa: World and Islam Studies Enterprise.
- Shikaki, Khalil, 1985. "The Nuclearization Debates: The Cases of Israel and Egypt" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XIV No. 4.

### **Monday 26**

- Amirahadi, Hooshang and Entessar, Nader, *Reconstruction and Regional Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf*, Rontledge. pp. 193-212.
- Strange, Susan, 1988. *States and Markets* London: Pinter, chs. 2 and 3.
- Hunter, Robert E., 1990. "The United States Role in the Middle East", *Current History*, v. 89 No. 544.
- Reich, Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H., "The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration After the Gulf War", in RUSI & Brassey's, *Defence Yearbook 1992*.
- Robins, Philip, 1992. "Turkey and the Eastern Arab World" in Gerd Nonneman, ed., *The Middle East and Europe* Federal Trust.

### **Tuesday 27**

- Selim, Mohamed E., "The Survival of a Nonstate Actor: The Foreign Policy of the Palestine Liberation Organization" in Korani and Dessouqui, op cit, pp. 276-286.
- Ajami, Fouad, 1979 "The End Of Pan-Arabism" *Foreign Affairs* Winter 1978/79.
- Gerges, Fawaz A., 1991 "Regional Security After The Gulf Crisis: The American Role" *Journal of Palestine Studies* XX, no. 4. pp. 55-68.
- Sayigh Yezid, 1991 "The Gulf crisis: why the Arab regional order failed", *International Affairs* 67,
- Yorke, Valerie, 1988 *Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel*. London: Gower. Introduction, pp. xi-xvii, 239-283, 331-362.
- Hermann, Charles F., 1982. "Defining National Security", in Reichart & Sturm, eds., *American Defence Policy* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
- Hillal Dessouki, Ali E., "The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt" in Korani and Dessouqui, op cit., pp. 171-185.
- Hinnebusch, Raymond A., "The Foreign Policy of Syria" in Korani and Dessouqui, op cit. pp. 319-409.

### **Wednesday 28**

Burrow, Sir Bernard, Moberly, Sir John, and Nonneman, Gerd, 1992. "Towards a Security Community in the Gulf", in Gerd Nonneman, ed., *The Middle East and Europe* London: Federal Trust.

Peterson, J.E., 1992. "The Future of Gulf Security After the Kuwait War", RUSI and Brassey's *Defence Yearbook 1992*.

### **Thursday 29**

Khalidi, Ahmed S. and Agha, Hussein, 1991. "The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity", in H. Saunders and J. Kipper, eds., *The Middle East in Global Perspective*, Westview Press.

### **Friday 30**

Cordesman, Anthony, 1991. *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East* London: Brassey's, pp. 167-172.

Kemp, Geoffrey, ed., 1991. *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., Chs. 7, 8.

Platt A. and Kemp G., 1992. *Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East*. United States Institute for Peace. ch.1.

Sadowski, Yahya, 1993. *Scuds or Butter? Brookings*, Ch. 5 "Threats to Arms Control".

Boutros Ghali, 1992. *Agenda for Peace*. New York: UN

### **Recommended Reading**

Ahrari, M.E. 1992. "Iran, GCC and the Security Dimensions in the Persian Gulf".

Bennets, A. Leroy, 1988. *International Organisations*, ch. 7 "Collective Security And Its Alternatives".

Darilek, Richard E. and Kemp, Geoffrey, 1992. "Prospects for Confidence - and Security-Building Measures in the Middle East", in *Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East*, ed. A. Platt, United States Institute for Peace, Washington D.C.

Diab M.Z., 1992 "A Proposed Security Regime for an Arab-Israeli Settlement", in Steven Spiegel, ed. *The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace*, Rienner.

Ehteshami, Anonshiravan, 1992. "Wheels within Wheels: Iran's foreign policy towards the Arab world" in Amirahmadi and Entessar, eds. *Reconstruction and Regional Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf*.

Hollis, Rosemary, 1992. *Seeds of Conflict in the Middle East*. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies.

Kennedy, Paul, "Preparing for the 21st Century: Winners and Losers", *The New York Review*

Korany, Bahgat & Hillal Dessouki, Ali E., 1991. *The Foreign Policies of Arab States, The Challenge of Change*, Westview Press

Levite, Ariel, 1991. *Offense and Defense in Israeli Doctrine*, Westview.

McInnes, Colin, "Nuclear Strategy" in C. McInnes and G.D. Sheffield, *Warfare in the Twentieth Century*.

Nacht, Michael, 1982. "American Security Interests Around the World", in Reichart & Sturm, eds., *American Defence Policy*.

Sadowski, Yahya; Sayigh, Yezid; Steinbruner, John, 1992. "Iran's Nomads After the Revolution" *Middle East Report* July/August.

Sayigh, Yezid, 1989 "Struggle within, struggle without: the transformation of PLO politics since 1982", *International Affairs*.

Sayigh, Yezid, 1991. "The Arab Regional System and the Gulf Crisis" in J. Gittings, ed., *Beyond the Gulf War* Catholic Institute for International Relations.

Schiff, Ze'ev and Khalidi, Walid, 1991. *The Saladin Syndrome: lessons from the Gulf War* Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Snyder, Glenn, 1983. Deterrence and Defense in the Use of Force, eds. Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, New York: London, second edition, pp. 123-141.  
Taylor, P. and Groom, A., 1991. *The United Nations and the Gulf War 1990-91: Back to the Future?* London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

## Reference Books at PASSIA

Atkeson, Edward B., 1992. *A Military Assessment of the Middle East 1991-96* Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.  
Bennett, A. LeRoy, 1988. *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, fourth edition. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.  
Brodie, Bernard, 1973. *War And Politics*, MacMillan Publishing Co. New York.  
*Technology and Strategy: Future Trends*, 1989, edited by Shai Feldman, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv. Univ. Westview Press.  
Freedman, Lawrence, 1983. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, St. Martin's Press, New York.  
*Arms Control in the Middle East*, 1990, edited by Dore Gold, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv Univ. Westview Press.  
Hardy, Roger, 1992. *Arabia after the Storm: Internal stability of the Gulf Arab states* Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.  
Herby, Peter, 1992. *The Chemical Weapons Convention and Arms Control in the Middle East*: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.  
Jervis, Robert, 1989. *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft And the Prospect of Armageddon*, Cornell Univ. Press. Ithaca and London.  
*International Politics; Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision-Making*. 1985, edited by Robert Art and Robert Jervis, Harper Collins Publishers.  
Kahan, Jerome H., 1975. *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy*, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.  
*The Nuclear Almanac: Confronting the Atom in War and Peace*, 1984, M.I.T. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Massachusetts.  
*Strategic Defenses Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures and Arms Control*, 1986. Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress. Washington D.C., Princeton Univ. Press.  
*The Effects of Nuclear War*, 1979. Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress.  
Ray, James Lee, 1992. *Global Politics*, fifth edition, Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston.  
Riggs, Robert E. and Plano, Jack C., 1988. *The United Nations International Organization and World Politics*, Brooks/Cole Publishing Co. Pacific Grove, California.  
Schelling, Thomas C., 1966 *Arms and Influence*, Yale Univ. Press. 1960, *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard Univ. Press.  
Schroaer, Dietrich, 1984. *Science Technology And The Nuclear Arms Race*, John Wiley and Son Press. New York.  
Spector, Leonard S. with Smith, Jacqueline R., 1990. *Nuclear Ambitions The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990*, Carnegie Endowment. Westview Press.



# Writing Assignments

## Suggested topics for essay papers:

- 1) Recent trends in the international arms market : do they undermine or enhance the prospects for arms control in the Middle East.
- 2) Compare and contrast Arab and Israeli military doctrines in recent years.
- 3) Collective security and the Middle East : problems and possibilities.
- 4) Arms control, CBMs, and the Arab-Israeli peace process.
- 5) National security in the Arab World: Political Islam and the Process of democratization.
- 6) Arms procurement and national security: guns or butter argument.
- 7) Arms procurement and national security : the dependency argument.
- 8) Nuclear Proliferation and Arms control in the Middle East.
- 9) Develop a Palestinian strategy that deals with one of the following issues:
  - a) geographical separation of West Bank and Gaza during PISGA.
  - b) Settlers and law and order during PISGA.
  - c) Jerusalem during PISGA.
- 10) Write an options paper on any topic of your choosing.
- 11) Sovereignty and stability and the Arab system.
- 12) Self determination and the Palestinians.
- 13) Israel and the Gulf War: missiles, new technologies and national security.
- 14) Iran-Iraq War: talk about deterrence and the war of the cities.
- 15) The Gulf War and the future of the Arab system.

**Dr. Rosemary Hollis** is a Research Fellow and Head of the Regional Security Programme at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies in London, where the focus of her work is regional security issues in the Middle East. Previously, she was lecturer in Political Science at George Washington University, where she gained her doctorate. Her thesis, an analysis and case study of Britain's adaption to decline, examined the evolution of Britain's relations with selected Arab Gulf states from 1965 to 1985. She holds an M.A. in War Studies from King's College, London, and has conducted research in Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Her publications and presentations to military, academic and business audiences, have focused on Middle East security issues. Her most recent publications include:

*The Soviets, Their Successors and the Middle East* Macmillan 1993 (Editor); "Whatever Happened to the Damascus Declaration? Evolving Security Structures in the Gulf Monograph Series, Dept. of International Politics, University College of Wales, 1993; "What Price Renewed Conflict in the Middle East?" *RUSI Journal* Oct. 1992.

**Valerie Yorke** has been Middle East Editor at the Economist Intelligence Unit, London, since 1990. She is a writer and broadcaster on Middle East affairs and is a frequent visitor to the Middle East. Her recent work has focused on domestic politics in Jordan. Her previous posts and experience include: Research Associate, International Institute for Strategic Studies; Research Associate, Royal Institute of International Affairs; author and project organiser for the World Security Trust project on Middle East Peace and Security Guarantees; Research Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Her publications include: "Imagining a Palestinian State: an International Security Plan" *International Affairs* 66, Jan. 1990; *Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel* IISS London, 1988; "Domestic Politics and Prospects for an Arab Israeli Peace" *Journal of Palestine Studies* XVII No.4, 1988; *European Interests and Gulf Oil* (with L. Turner) RIIA, 1986; "Japan's Resource Diplomacy" *International Affairs* 57/3, 1981; *The Gulf in the 1980s* RIIA, 1980; "Palestinian Self-determination and Israel's Security: *Journal of Palestine Studies* VIII No.3 1979.

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**DR. KHALIL SHIKAKI** has been Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at An-Najah National University in Nablus since 1986. He is Research Fellow at the World and Islam Studies Enterprise in Tampa, Florida, and has been Visiting Professor at the University of South Florida, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee and Visiting Scholar at Columbia University. He gained his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, New York, and M.A. in Political Science from the American University of Beirut. His areas of specialisation are International Relations, Security Studies and Middle East Politics. His most recent published monographs and articles include *The Arab and Palestinian Future after the Gulf War* (Tampa: World and Islam Studies Enterprise, 1991), and "Palestinian and Israeli Peace Negotiations: Where To?" *Qira'at Siyasiyyah* 2/1, 1992. He has lectured widely in the United States.

**DR. MAHDI ABDUL HADI** President and Founder of PASSIA; Ph.D. Bradford University (thesis: *Roots of Jordanian-Palestinian Relations 1900-1951*); B.A. in Law, Damascus University; formerly Editor of *Al Fajr*, General Secretary of Council for Higher Education in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; founder of the Arab Thought Forum; Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1984-85 and at Salzburg International Seminar 1987; Special Adviser to the Ministry of Occupied Land Affairs, Amman, 1985-86; author of several publications on the Palestine question. Member of the Palestinian delegation in the multilateral talks on Refugees in the Middle East peace process, member of various Palestinian institutions and the National Committee on Jerusalem.

**MS. ALISON BROWN** Seminar Co-ordinator and Rapporteur. LL.B., M.Sc. Legal Studies (Edin.), Senior Researcher at PASSIA; Human Rights Documentalist, specialising in land/settlement issues and the question of Jerusalem, based in Jerusalem, 1990-93; editor of several studies on development issues; previously community advice worker and researcher on socio-legal issues in Scotland.



