

The Palestine Question in Maps

1878 - 2014

*Edited by
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi*

PASSIA
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, Jerusalem

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Tel: (02) 626 4426 Fax: (02) 628 2819

E-mail: passia@passia.org

Website: www.passia.org

PO Box 19545, Jerusalem

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List of Abbreviations

AHC	Arab Higher Committee
CBS	[Israeli] Central Bureau of Statistics
CPRS	Center for Policy Research and Studies (Nablus)
DM	Defense Minister / Ministry
DoP	Declaration of Principles
FM	Foreign Minister / Ministry
FMEP	Foundation for Middle East Peace (Washington)
FRD	Further Redeployment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
JA	Jewish Agency
JCA	Jewish Colonization Association
JNF	Jewish National Fund
JSC	Joint Security Council
lit.	literally
MAN	Movement of Arab Nationalism
mcm	million cubic meters
MK	Member of Knesset
MO	Military Order
NIS	New Israeli Shekel
OETA	[British] Occupied Enemy Territories Administration
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
PA	Palestinian Authority
PALDIS – LDC	Palestinian Land Development Information System of the Land Defense General Committee
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PCC	Palestine Conciliation Commission
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PM	Prime Minister
PNC	Palestine National Council
PWA	Palestinian Water Authority
RC	Refugee Camp
RR	Registered Refugee(s) (with UNRWA)
TIPH	Town Planning Scheme
UN	United Nations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
US	United States
WBGS	West Bank and Gaza Strip
WJM	West Jerusalem Municipality
WWI / WWII	World War I / II
WZO	World Zionist Organization

Introduction

The accurate and responsible presentation of the Palestine Question, both in its current context and throughout the course of history, has long been a chief goal of PASSIA. With an extensive catalogue of in-depth works on crucial aspects and periods of Palestinian history to its name, PASSIA has also sought to create suitably concise publications presenting the core issues and the Palestinian narrative in a comprehensive, yet comprehensible format. *The Palestine Question in Maps, 1878-2002*, represented an important addition to this aspect of PASSIA's work.

PASSIA is proud to be able to say that this book became a viable reference for researchers, scholars and students. However, while still on high demand the book has been out of print for several years now and required updating. The PASSIA team took on this task - adding maps and background information on maps that evolved over the past decade (i.e., covering the period since 2002) – and is now proud to present a second edition of *The Palestine Question in Maps*, this time covering the period from 1878 to 2014.

Including over 70 color maps, this research study is hoped to provide a guide to the Palestine Question from the Ottoman period through to the present day. In addressing the unfolding geographic and demographic complexities of the period in review, the book sheds light on the real territorial dimensions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, its causes, and the numerous schemes posited over time for shaping a resolution and an accepted end to the conflict. Dissemination and explanation of clear and reliable maps has always been rare and a frequently baffling array of speculations has all too often led to confusion rather than comprehension, both abroad and in Palestinian society. By compiling and reviewing the most important historical and contemporary maps, this book offers researchers, readers and concerned individuals the opportunity to understand the geographic implications and political motivations guiding the political and military aspects of the Palestine Question for over a hundred years.

A first series of maps follows the path of modern Palestinian history in chronological order, focusing on key demographic themes and political milestones, as well as identifying the various proposals posited for the resolution of the Palestine Question (Chapters 1-4). Jerusalem itself is of such intrinsic importance to Palestinian history and to the resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict, that a separate section is devoted, in detail, to its changing circumstances (Chapter 5). Core issues, such as water and refugees, are also addressed within a separate chapter (Chapter 6).

The text accompanying the maps is hoped to present a concise and clear overview of the historical, political and socio-economic circumstances providing the backdrop for the individual maps and illustrating their place within the broader frame of Palestinian history. Complete with reliable statistics, detailed references and notes, the text serves to illuminate the factors defining the territorial dimensions portrayed within the maps.

At its most fundamental level, the Palestine Question is a question of a land and its people, as well as their rights, identity and passage through time. For this reason, placing an accurate account of Palestinian history squarely within its territorial dimensions is not only advantageous for those seeking a deeper understanding of that history, but is an important step in repossessing a history that has so often been distorted, denied and dislocated from its rightful context and placed within alien and imposed schemes so as to confuse, deny, and replace that history for the purposes of another.

As a part of PASSIA's ongoing documentation of Palestinian history, this work is intended to present the history of the Palestine Question in a responsible, accessible and compelling way so that it may be easily understood by readers today and properly preserved for future generations.

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

*Head of PASSIA
August 2014*

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1878–1948

From Ottoman Palestine to the War of 1948

(Maps 1-15)

OTTOMAN PALESTINE, 1878

The population of Ottoman Palestine in 1878, totaling 440,850, was made up of several ethnic groups and members of various denominations of the three monotheistic faiths. Each of these had maintained a presence of varying size in the area for well over ten centuries.¹

Some 386,320 Muslim Palestinian Arabs represented the overwhelming majority (88%) in a land, which had been under uninterrupted Muslim rule since 1187.² This population included both Sunni (the vast majority) and Shi'ite communities, as well as members of the Druze sect. The overwhelming majority of the population was rural, with agriculture as the principal source of income and the center of traditional life.

There were 40,588 (9%) Christian Palestinian Arabs, belonging to the Greek Orthodox (63%) and Roman Catholic (24%), as well as the Armenian, Greek Catholic and Protestant denominations. Communities - many of which had roots going back to the dawn of Christianity - were generally, though not exclusively, urban, residing in Nazareth, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Haifa and Jaffa in significant numbers.³


Some 13,942 Jews (3%) lived in predominantly urban communities, with centers in Safed and Jerusalem as well as Hebron and Tiberias. Their economy was almost entirely dependent on remittances from Jewish communities abroad.⁴

In addition to these three principle sectors, there were approximately 200 members of the ancient Samaritan community living on the edge of Nablus and a small number of Gypsies, who were a mixture of Christian and Muslim converts.

The existing Jewish population, prior to the advent of political Zionism, consisted primarily of Orthodox Jews without a nationalist agenda. Nonetheless, by 1878 pre-Zionist trends were already evincing a changed attitude towards the land of Palestine. Various European financiers, notably Moses Montefiore of London, were quietly negotiating with Ottoman officials in an effort to purchase land and establish settlements. Additionally, members of the established community sought a more 'production' oriented lifestyle, removed from their dependency on the community leaders' distribution of foreign remittances. Thus, in 1878, led by Joel Salomon (who had, in 1869, established the first Jewish settlement outside Jerusalem's Old City walls), 26 Jerusalem families purchased a tract of land some 9 km from Jaffa, on the banks of Al-Aujah River (now the Yarkon).⁵

Naming the site "Petah Tikva" (Portal of Hope) the colonists set about cultivating the plot, which was part of the grazing land of the Arab village of Al-Abbasiyya, causing friction not due to their presence on the land so much as their lack of familiarity with established rural ways - particularly with regard to boundaries and the custom of loose-grazing. However, the initial colonists at "Petah Tikva" were to fail and return to Jerusalem in their second year, defeated by malaria, their lack of agricultural knowledge and, eventually, a flood. A second, more successful settlement was established near the site in 1882 and is now a large town.

The Population of Ottoman Palestine in 1878



MAP 1



Map: adapted from *Before Their Diaspora*, Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington D.C., 1984

ARAB TOWNS AND JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN PALESTINE, 1881-1914

Between 1882 and 1914, an average of 2,000-3,000 Jews entered Palestine every year in what was the largest influx in over 400 years. Many eventually left, especially in the first portion of this period, though the majority remained and the total Jewish population in Palestine by the end of the period has been put at some 60-63,000. The period in question straddles the first and second *aliyoth* or Jewish immigration waves, which were combined with the beginnings of organized Zionist land acquisition and colonization in Palestine.¹

By the early 1880s Russian proto-Zionist movements were actively promoting the idea of Jewish colonization in Palestine. These movements were not driven by religious conceptions, but rather by ideals of secular reform rooted in the currents of socialist populism in Europe. Their efforts, coterminous with an increase in the number of Russian Jews fleeing Tsarist repression, brought about the first *aliyah* (1882-1903), during which at least 25,000 Jews arrived in Palestine. Though later Zionist historians would claim otherwise, the majority was without nationalist ideals and instead fled rising discrimination at home. Only 5% of those arriving in this period participated in forming the early Zionist colonies, the first of which was Rishon L'Zion (First to Zion) - founded in 1882 on land belonging to Arab villagers from 'Eyun Qara.²

The ineffectual and unpopular colonial enterprises of the young Zionists soon came to the attention of wealthy French Jewish philanthropist Baron Edmond de Rothschild, who invested enormous amounts of money in the new colonies, oversaw the provision of experts in plantation development and training and finally came to subsidize nearly the whole program. In 1900, following the rise of the World Zionist Organization (WZO), Rothschild transferred his plantations to the Jewish Colonization Agency (JCA), which he proceeded to generously finance. By then, 22 plantation-colonies were operating.³

From 1905-1914, the second mass immigration took place. This time, with the Zionist platform nearly ten years old and its requirement for land acquisition and the demographic domination of Palestine official, the emphasis on colonization was more pronounced: "[i]t is necessary, first of all, that all, or at least most, of *Eretz Israel's* lands will be the property of the Jewish people."⁴ It was this second wave of immigrants that established the political leadership of the new Jewish community, founded its first kibbutz and politicized its relationship with the pre-existing Jewish community and the Palestinian Arabs. By 1914, at least 11,000 Jews were working on 47 rural plantations and cooperatives supervised and subsidized by the WZO, its supporters or affiliate bodies.⁵

Zionist land acquisition throughout this period occurred at the cost of the Palestinian *fellahin*, who found themselves, as hired cultivators or tenant farmers under the Ottoman system, dispossessed of their livelihoods and often forced into plantation labor or unfamiliar and underpaid employment. Ottoman regulations limiting land sales were bypassed through bribery or intermediaries, as Jewish financiers as well as the JCA spent vast sums in this respect. Palestinian occupants willingly sold less than 10% of all the land acquired by the Zionists in this early period, while sales by Turkish Ottoman notables living elsewhere in the Empire accounted for the majority of the Zionists' acquisitions.⁶

In the first six months of 1914, Zionist immigration reached a peak, with the arrival of over 6,000 Jews in Palestine. Around the same period, a Jewish exodus from economically fragile and politically volatile Europe saw up to 2.5 million Jews emigrate – the majority to the US.⁷ These figures confirmed the lack of popular Jewish support for the Zionist program. Nonetheless, even the early Zionist endeavors had already upset the demographic, economic and political balance in Palestine and incidents of violence and tension were steadily rising, as the collision course that Zionist colonialism had set against the indigenous Palestinians, their land and their own rising nationalism, became daily more apparent.

MAP 2



THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT, 1916

WWI ultimately pitched the Russians, British and French against an alliance of Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman armies in a struggle which lasted four years and resulted in shocking losses on all sides. It also led to the partial redrawing of the map of Europe and signaled the final demise of the Ottoman Empire. British and French schemes for the post-WWI future of the Middle East were characterized by the two sides' competing long-term strategic interests as well as by their wartime alliance against the Ottomans. Both sides recognized in the ascendance of an organized Arab nationalist movement an opportunity to galvanize local forces and bring about an effective revolt against the Ottomans. They also saw an alliance with accommodating and yet legitimate Arab leaders as essential to maintaining their regional interests in a post-Ottoman era.

The Hussein-MacMahon correspondence (1915-16), conducted between the British Government, through Sir Henry MacMahon, and the Hashemite leader Sharif Hussein Ibn Ali of Mecca, saw Britain confer upon Hussein legitimacy as the political leader of the Arab people. The British vowed to, "recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions demanded by the Sharif..."¹ In return, Hussein committed his Arab forces to revolt against the Ottomans in accordance with British plans and together with their forces.

However, even as the Arabs prepared for the promised revolt (begun in June 1916) the British and French were conducting the secret negotiations that led to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Ignoring their pledges, the British - represented by the orientalist Sir Mark Sykes - sought to consolidate their control of a land 'bridge' stretching from Iraq and the Persian Gulf, to the Mediterranean via Palestine. The French - represented by their Beirut Consul General Charles Picot - opposed granting Britain such powerful leverage in the region without themselves retaining commensurate influence.

The compromise formula reached by the two rivals, and endorsed by their mutual ally Russia, whereby Palestine would be 'shared' according to spheres of influence and a 'condominium' arrangement, with both parties respecting each other's vital assets and interests therein, was never to eventuate. Six months after Sharif Hussein led the Arab Revolt, as part of which he declared Arab independence from Ottoman rule, British forces took control of southern Palestine and proceeded towards Jerusalem. British Prime Minister Lloyd George declared, "the French will have to accept our protectorate; we shall be there by conquest and shall remain."² By December 1917 Jerusalem was in British hands and both the Hussein-MacMahon correspondence and the Sykes-Picot agreement were in tatters.

In the meantime, the British had stepped up their contact with the Zionist leadership, pledging their support for a Jewish national home in Palestine in November 1917 (the Balfour Declaration).³ The betrayal felt by the Palestinians, along with much of the Arab World, the reemergence of the bitter power rivalry between France and Britain in the post-war years, and the gains afforded the Zionist movement under British policy, were to become the defining factors in regional tensions between 1918 and 1920.

The clash of British and French interests initially disrupted the nascent Palestinian national movement, with the appeal of union within a 'Greater Syria' - under French influence (1918-20) - seeming the most practical and immediate means of achieving liberation and thwarting Britain's pro-Zionist policies. However, many within the Palestinian leadership had emerged from the bitter experience of betrayal with a strong suspicion of both British and French intentions. Their fears were confirmed when, in 1920, French forces took Damascus, expelling Syria's leadership and placing the nation under their direct rule. With British military rule over Palestine and French rule over Syria, any remaining hope that either of the two powers considered Arab independence favorably evaporated. The third Palestinian Arab Conference, meeting in Haifa in 1920, called for the "independence of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon - each alone."⁴

MAP 3



THE BEGINNING OF THE BRITISH MANDATE, 1920

In April 1920, the Supreme Council of the League of Nations, in a decision reached at the San Remo Conference, awarded to Britain the control of an uninterrupted territorial swathe running from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, being administrative control over Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia (Iraq). Mandate Palestine was to be ruled by a civil administration - replacing the military one in place since 1917 - headed by a High Commissioner and based in Jerusalem. Though the terms of the Mandate were not formalized for three years, the military administration was terminated in 1920. The British Mandate was to last from July 1920 until May 1948.¹

The establishment of the Mandate came at a time when British approval of the Zionist program of establishing in Palestine a Jewish national home was becoming apparent. Figures compiled by the British military administration in 1918 pointed to a Jewish population in Palestine of 58,728 - less than 10% of the total. Zionist immigration following the establishment of the military administration had not increased markedly, but with the creation of the Mandate, whose first High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, was a Jew and a great supporter of the Zionist platform, Zionist diplomatic efforts were immediately rewarded.² One of Samuel's first acts was the approval of 16,500 Jewish immigration certificates; the local Zionist leadership reported to WZO head Chaim Weizmann, that the Mandate was being, "enthusiastically welcomed" by the community.³ In 1920, Jewish immigration in fact rose by an unprecedented 450%, leading many Zionists to believe the British Mandate was to be simply an instrument for the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration.⁴ Despite these important steps in empowering the Zionist movement, few European Jews were attracted to the program and even when the Zionist immigration reached these peaks, the vast majority of emigrating Jews made their way to the US. Of every 1,000 Jews in the world, only four made their way to Palestine during these immigration waves, impressing upon the WZO the imperative of expanding their political program abroad.⁵

Since 1914, the WZO had adopted the stricture of so-called, "pure Jewish settlement" in its colonization efforts and strove to dispense with any reliance on non-Jewish labor or expertise. The concept of 'Jewish labor on Jewish land,' became a motto of the period and was expressed in London when the Interim Zionist Conference passed the July 1920 resolution to use its influence and funds, "as a means for making the land of Palestine the common property of the Jewish people [and]... to safeguard Jewish labor."⁶

In this atmosphere of growing Jewish exclusivity and increasing immigration, the *Histadrut* was founded (December 1920). Committed to the WZO's labor policy, the *Histadrut* set out to unite and expand the colonial and production forces of the Zionists, while building a "pure Jewish" administrative system in Palestine.⁷ At its first session it also resolved "to accept responsibility for setting up a country-wide clandestine and independent defense organization."⁸

In the face of a confident and rapidly growing local Zionist movement in Palestine, the Palestinian leadership assembled numerous delegations and repeatedly petitioned both the local British administration and London, demanding that Britain live up to its commitments, slow immigration and examine the future of Palestine according to its demography and history. Their efforts were largely in vain. Leaders who raised their voices in opposition to British pro-Zionist policy were often removed from office, and the British prevented the Palestinian National Congress (the national movement's newly formed council) from holding its second conference, fearing it might awaken the dissent of the 'street.'⁹

Zionist land acquisition, guided geographically by the availability of pliant or 'bribeable' Ottoman landlords, focused on the arable northern and coastal regions. There, Palestinian tenant farmers were dispossessed of their livelihoods to make way for an expanding series of settlements as the WZO and its agencies sought to create the largest contiguous stretch of Jewish ownership possible. By 1921, with over 600,000 dunums of land already consumed by 71 Jewish colonies, immigration quotas continued to rise, as did tensions.¹⁰

MAP 4



PALESTINE UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE

The decision to award Britain the Mandate for Palestine in 1920 was guided by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, drawn up at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference following WW1. There, the establishing Covenant of the League of Nations stated, in Article 22, that “certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.”¹

The announcement made in 1920 at the San Remo Conference allotted the Mandate for Palestine to Britain, but it was not until 1923, after the League of Nations approved and ratified its terms, that the Mandate officially came into full force. Drawing up the terms of the Mandate, Britain drew on the Balfour Declaration and the government’s position, “in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”² Article IV of the Mandate document invited the Zionist Organization to, “take steps in consultation with his Britannic Majesty’s Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.” Other articles committed Britain to facilitating and encouraging Zionist settlement and land acquisition.³ The final draft of the Mandate was drawn up in 1922. That same year, the first full British census was conducted in Palestine, revealing the Jewish population to be 11.4% of the total. Of these, at least 32.2% had immigrated since the British took power in 1918.⁴

Winston Churchill’s June 1922 White Paper on Palestine officially divided the territory of the original Mandate (which had potentially conjoined Transjordan and Palestine), and thereby confined the terms of the Mandate to the territory of Palestine. With the approval of the League of Nations in September 1922, Britain thus formalized the territorial boundaries of Transjordan and Palestine, limiting its approval for the establishment of a Jewish national home to Palestine. Soon after, in April 1923, Britain recognized the Hashemite Amir Abdullah as the legitimate ruler of the autonomous Emirate of Transjordan.

Following the 1920 San Remo announcement, Palestinian leaders presented their case before the British government, in an effort to reverse the draft clauses of the Mandate relating to the Jewish national home, but again in vain. With the US Congress formally endorsing British pro-Zionist policies and the content of the Balfour Declaration on 21 September 1922, the Palestinians found themselves yet further distanced from decision-making processes.⁵ Domestic political activities were relentlessly thwarted by the British, who were not afraid to employ force and severe punishments in their drive to smother the many popular protests, strikes and boycotts initiated by the Palestinian National Congress and the national political parties.

By virtue of Article IV of the Mandate, the Jewish Agency (JA) was formed in Palestine with the express purpose of facilitating the foundation of the Jewish national home in Palestine. The JA was to act as the unofficial Jewish government in Mandate Palestine and as such was tied closely with the British administration; its first head was Frederick Kisch, a British colonel and Zionist. Kisch encouraged his Zionist colleagues to learn from his British compatriots and sponsors in order to facilitate their development of an independent administrative system in Palestine. The Zionist camp was, though, split over the exclusion of Transjordan from the terms of the Mandate. The WZO leadership was content to quietly seek Amir Abdullah’s recognition of a Jewish state in Palestine, in exchange for the dropping of Zionist demands to settle east of the Jordan. Others, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky of Poland, rejected any compromise and insisted on the forcible and accelerated colonization of both Palestine and Transjordan.

MAP 5



THE DEMOGRAPHY OF PALESTINE, 1931

In 1931, the British conducted their second census of Mandate Palestine. Today considered one of the most accurate of the period, the enumerations shed light on a number of important characteristics and developing trends.


Some 759,712 Muslims made up 73% of the total counted population - put at 1,035,821 - while 174,610 Jews represented 16.9% and 91,398 Christians 8.6% of the total. Comparison with the 1922 census revealed a growing urbanization within the Muslim population, though on the whole they remained predominantly rural. Christians too were seen to be moving in significant numbers toward the urban centers of Jaffa and Haifa, but had long been more urban than the Muslim sector. The impact of Zionist colonial activities evinced an increase in Jewish agriculturalists, though the Jewish community remained on the whole distinctly urban.¹

Agricultural production reflected the dominance of the 63% of Muslims employed in the agricultural sector, with between 86% and 97% of every variety of agricultural crop being produced by Arab farmers.² Muslims (predominantly - being 88% of the rural population) and Christians (to a lesser extent) cultivated over four million dunums of cereal crops, 120,000 dunums of watermelons, nearly 600,000 dunums of olives and 293,000 dunums of vegetables, along with vineyards, banana plantations and tobacco fields as well as rearing nearly a million head of livestock.³


While the Muslims dominated the rural agricultural sector, Christians could be seen to have followed an opposite trend, with over 60% employed in industry, commerce, the liberal professions or public service.⁴ The overriding shift towards urbanization within the total Arab population amounted to a 47% Arab population growth in urban areas since 1922, as opposed to a 32% growth rate rurally.⁵

The Jewish population had more than doubled since 1922. In all, a full 58% of the 1931 population was born outside Palestine - the majority of these (80,347) in Europe. Over 74,000 had not taken up citizenship and remained foreign nationals. European education and the comparative prosperity of the community was reflected in the 72% literacy rate; markedly higher than the 48% and 10% rates recorded for the Christian and Muslim communities respectively.⁶ Two thirds of the urban Jewish population were found in the cities of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Tel Aviv.⁷ Despite being only 16.9% of the total population, Jews made up 33% of the urban population.

The demographic and economic trends indicated in the census were to increase in momentum in coming years, bringing lasting changes in societal structure. By 1931, British policy had led to significant increases in capital investment in certain sectors, creating the beginnings of a new urban elite in Palestinian society. Modern infrastructure was being built apace, while financial pressures imposed on landowners by accelerating Zionist activities were rapidly undermining traditional hierarchies. Rural tenant farmers could already be identified as the primary losers in what was to be an era of economic redistribution.⁸ In 1929, Sir John Hope Simpson, heading a commission of inquiry into issues of immigration, land and settlement, noted, "no occupancy right exists in favor of the Arab tenant in Palestine," and expressed his belief that, with over a million dunums of Palestinian rural land already acquired by the Zionists, "there is no room for a single additional settlement if the standard of life of the Arab *fellaheen* is to remain at its present level."⁹



MAP 6



THE PEEL COMMISSION PARTITION PROPOSAL, 1937

The 1929 Hope Simpson Commission of Inquiry had explicitly pointed to the incapacity of the economy and demography of Palestine to be further destabilized by Zionist immigration and settlement. Its recommendations were echoed by those of the 1930 Shaw Commission of Inquiry, named after Sir Walter Shaw, sent to investigate incidents of violence, which had peaked in a series of localized uprisings in 1929. The Shaw Commission stated that, “[a] continuation, or still more an acceleration, of a process which results in the creation of a large discontented and landless class is fraught with serious danger to the country.” The Commission urged the British government to urgently assess its immigration policy and to address the “meaning of the passages in the Mandate which purported to safeguard the interests of the non-Jewish communities.” The British ‘Passfield’ White Paper of October 1930 adopted these findings and ordered most land transfers frozen, while limiting immigration. However, Prime Minister MacDonald, under pressure from Zionist leaders, revoked these clauses in February 1931 with the so-called ‘Black-Letter’, wherein he issued his personal assurances to WZO head Weizmann, going so far as to praise “the constructive work done by the Jewish people in Palestine [and their]... beneficial effects on the development and well-being of the country as a whole.”¹

Unsurprisingly, the Palestinians were becoming increasingly frustrated with British policy, as the likelihood of their achieving their right to self-determination under the Mandate appeared to evaporate. In October 1933 nationwide strikes and demonstrations against Zionism and British collusion were met with force, leaving at least 12 Palestinians dead and fuelling outrage at Britain’s strong-arm tactics.


By 1936, seven years after the Hope Simpson Commission, the Jewish population had risen by more than a further 150%, an additional 62 settlements had been created and nearly 1.5 million dunums of Palestinian land was the property of the Zionists.² The Zionists saw the settlements as “[t]he guardians of Zionist land,” and recognized early on that “patterns of settlement would to a great extent determine the [future Jewish] country’s borders.”³ JA Executive Chairman, David Ben-Gurion, called the settlers, “the army of Zionist fulfillment.”⁴ In mid-April 1936, a series of Arab-Jewish clashes in the Jaffa area proved the inevitable trigger, as Palestinian National Committees sprang up across the country in support of a call for a general strike issued by the Palestinian representative leadership, the Arab Higher Committee (AHC). The AHC was banned soon after by the British, but despite the arrest of its leaders and the nationwide imposition of curfews, the uprising surged and from April 1936 until October the Arab Revolt swept Mandate Palestine.⁵

The extent of the revolt and its support throughout the region worried the British, who requisitioned additional troops in September to put down the uprising.⁶ Fearing domestic instability and under pressure from their British benefactor, regional Arab leaders eventually provided the necessary mediation to bring about a lull in the uprising, while Britain again dispatched an investigative commission.

Arriving in November 1936, the Palestine Royal Commission, headed by Lord Peel, set out to assess the feasibility and future of the Mandate. Published in July 1937, the Peel Commission’s report concluded that, “the Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced by a Treaty System...” The proposed treaty envisioned a partition of Palestine, with Jerusalem and Bethlehem retained under a separate Mandate, reaching to the port at Jaffa. The part allotted the Palestinians was to be united with Transjordan and the resulting Jewish state made to pay a subsidy to the Arab state, to which Palestinians within the area allotted the Jewish state would be compelled to move. The Peel Plan, with its twin premises of partition and ‘population transfer’, was to become the point of reference for most future schemes to solve the Palestine Question.

The Palestinians flatly rejected the notion of a Zionist state on nearly 33% of Palestine and the dispossession of hundreds of thousands that this would entail.⁷ Encouraged by the legitimization it granted their program, but not content with the scale of conquest, the Zionist leadership accepted ‘in principle’ but rejected ‘in detail’ the partition plan, while Jabotinsky’s Revisionist movement rejected the idea outright and by September 1937 had commenced a violent campaign against Palestinians and the British, marking the resumption of violence and resurgence of the Arab Revolt.⁸

MAP 7



THE WOODHEAD COMMISSION PARTITION PROPOSALS, 1938

With the Zionists unwilling to accept even 33% of Palestine as sufficient and the Palestinians refusing absolutely to endorse a plan calling for their expulsion and mass 'transfer' from that portion, the British were clearly unable to adopt the Peel proposal as it stood. However, the need to resolve the crisis was becoming ever more urgent with the renewal of the Arab Revolt and escalating confrontations. In acknowledgement of the WZO's August 1937 resolution to accept the principle of partition, though not the Peel boundaries, and to work for its implementation on a more 'generous' basis, the British undertook to examine the notion further.

Thus, the Technical Commission of Inquiry headed by Sir John Woodhead (and referred to as the Partition, or Woodhead, Commission) was sent to Palestine in April 1938, with the purpose of "ascertaining facts [and]... considering in detail the practical possibilities of a scheme of partition." Britain attempted to allay Palestinian concerns by declaring they had "not accepted the [Peel] Commission's proposals for the compulsory transfer..."¹


But Palestinians remained doubtful that the Zionists were prepared to accept a state of any size on a basis of coexistence. Immediately following the Peel Plan, the WZO had formed the "Population Transfer Committee."² Even while the Woodhead Commission was in Palestine the JA Executive held a series of meetings in Jerusalem, discussing in detail the issue of transfer. JA Exec. Chairman, David Ben-Gurion declared his support for "compulsory transfer," and the Agency noted, "...regarding the transfer of individuals, we are always doing this. But the question will be the transfer of a much greater quantity."³ Also coinciding with the Commission's visit was a series of bombing attacks in Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa, carried out by the Zionist *Irgun* militia, as part of a campaign that would claim nearly 600 Palestinian lives by the end of the year.⁴ By the late 1930s, the British army and Zionist militias were all but operating in unison vis-à-vis the Arab Revolt. Special units, dominated by *Haganah* recruits and headed by British Zionists had earned a grisly reputation for 'preemptive' attacks on villages in the Galilee area; their cadre included the future elite of Israel's armed forces.⁵

The Woodhead Commission took as the starting point of its inquiry the Peel Plan (Plan A), but examined at least three partition possibilities in all. The Zionists themselves drew up a plan calling for a large Jewish state while splitting a small Palestinian state into two cantons. While the Palestinian leadership refused to participate officially in the negotiation of what they saw as their own dispossession, Amir Abdullah of Transjordan again sought union with Palestine and submitted his plan for a "United Arab Kingdom."⁶ The Woodhead Commission's findings amounted to a forceful rejection of the feasibility and equity of any partition. The Commission was bound by its terms of reference to identify territorial concentrations of Jewish demography and so posited, with much reservation, a plan affording what it deemed the "least objectionable" means of creating a Jewish state in Palestine (Plan C), while illustrating by way of another (Plan B) the only viable means of bringing together all the scattered Jewish landholdings of the Galilee.

Attaching a "Note of Reservations" to the final report, Commission member Thomas Reid emphatically pointed to the "absence of equity," "absence of security" and "absence of consent" inherent in adopting any partition plan and concluded that even were Plan C adopted, "it would not and could not be implemented." In recognition of the rise in Zionist circles of the 'transfer' doctrine, his reservations called for "the abandonment of all schemes for carving up the country by artificial boundaries, of plans for its dismemberment and the logical sequel thereto, removal of Arabs from their homes and occupations to make room for Jews."⁷

With the 'principle of partition' thus dismissed, the British had little choice but to shelve the Peel formula. The government called for a general conference to discuss Jewish immigration and land acquisitions to be convened in London (The London St. James Conference in February 1939) with the participation of Jewish, Palestinian and other Arab representatives.

MAP 8



PALESTINIAN AND ZIONIST LANDOWNERSHIP BY SUB-DISTRICT, 1945

Land acquisition and immigration were the two overarching aims of the Zionist movement from its inception and they defined the nature of Mandate Palestine as well as Jewish-Arab relations more than any other factor.¹


When the British came to power in 1918, 2% of Palestine's 6,500,000 acres were owned by Jews. By 1944, the Jewish population had risen from 8% of the total to 31% and the WZO's actual land holdings had tripled.² The acquisition of land was entrusted to the JA in 1929 and was carried out systematically in accordance with a goal of securing the maximum contiguous area of exclusively Jewish agricultural land possible. Early acquisitions in the lower Galilee area, made through the aggressive methods of Zionist land dealer Joshua Chankin, were expanded upon throughout the 1920s and 1930s, creating the largest cultivable area of Jewish ownership in Palestine: the so-called Jezreel Valley.³ Again, it was the tenant farmers and small holders who fell victim, while the landowners frequently resided abroad and stood to make enormous sums in a period of economic decline in agriculture and yet phenomenal rises in land value.⁴ Sustaining and expanding the Zionist agricultural settlements was a WZO imperative; thus, the JA and JNF were obliged to finance the farms, whose actual production value was negligible and unviable.⁵

Between 1920 and 1945, the Mandate Land Registry recorded 584,191 transactions as Zionist holdings rose to 1.7 million dunums.⁶ A British "Employment Committee" established in 1944 noted that at least 47,000 Arabs had left the agricultural workforce in the preceding five-year period and by 1946, the Mandate reported that "the Jews [hold] over 15% of the cultivable area of Palestine."⁷ Already by 1931, the extent of the dispossession caused by the Zionists, particularly in the northern agricultural belt, had forced the British to establish a "Development Commission" charged with registering "landless Arabs" and preparing a "scheme for their resettlement."⁸ The unpopular resettlement project was soon abandoned though, and even when British attempts were made in the early 1940s to limit the pace and scale of the Zionists' impact - these were next to futile. Repeatedly, land transfer regulations were circumvented or revoked. One commentator has characterized the role of the British in the period as that of "an umpire trying in vain to implant new regulations into the land transfer game that, as time wore on, became increasingly complex, devious and uncontrollable."⁹


The Palestinians remained, in spite of the enormous pressures and massive losses, dominant in the agricultural sector throughout Palestine and the overwhelming majority of both large and small owners managed to hold onto their land. As the map indicates, in none of the 16 sub-districts of the Mandate did the Zionists own a majority of the land and in half of them Jewish ownership remained negligible (5% or less). Nonetheless, the speed and apparent ease with which the Zionists had gained a strong territorial foothold in the agricultural heart of rural Palestine stood as testimony to Britain's failure to fulfill many of the terms of its Mandate.

The Mandate document had supposedly committed Britain to ensure that "[n]o discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language."¹⁰ In 1944, the British Labour Party adopted a resolution on Palestine in favor of "the transfer of the population," deciding it best that "the Arabs be encouraged to move out as the Jews move in."¹¹ The following July, Clement Attlee led the Labour party to victory in the British general election.

Zionist Agricultural Colonization 1882–1944¹²



MAP 9



THE MORRISON-GRADY PARTITIONED TRUSTEESHIP PLAN, 1946

WWII left in its wake destruction on so massive a scale that it was to upset forever the global alliances and regional power strategies which preceded it. By the end of the war, some 60 million people had been killed, among them nearly six million European Jews, who had been systematically exterminated by the Nazis. Some 14 million 'displaced persons' were strewn across an economically shattered continent.¹

During the six years of the war, only a tiny number of Jews were rescued - efforts to help were weak, late and ineffectual. This was in part a result of the fact that news of the systematic killings took until 1941 to emerge and was even then not taken sufficiently seriously by the Allied Powers or the Zionists until 1942.² But even after news of the Holocaust reached them, responses were often detached and even cynical. In 1943, the Allied Powers convened a conference to discuss the issue, but neither Britain nor the US offered to open their doors to the Jewish refugees.³ The Zionists themselves failed to put aside their internal divisions and ideological concerns in time to react effectively.⁴


During the war approximately 50,000 Jewish refugees reached Palestine.⁵ At its end roughly one million remained destitute in Europe.⁶ The catastrophe demanded an immediate response from the victorious Great Powers, Britain and the US, and the plight of Europe's remaining Jews stood foremost in the eyes of the world. Nonetheless, the US and Britain refused to relax their immigration laws and no initiative was proffered for the resettling of Jewish refugees in Europe.⁷

A new power balance that solidified in the closing months of WWII saw the lines of the coming Cold War tentatively drawn. Both the US and Britain witnessed a change in leadership in 1945 and within months of the German surrender, British Prime Minister Attlee was seeking US involvement in the Palestine Question. Attlee, aware of his predecessors' failures in reaching a solution, knew rising pro-Zionist sentiment in the US and the crowded camps across Europe made the internationalization of the problem not only unavoidable, but also preferable. US involvement, ostensibly in favor of the Zionists, was quickened by a geopolitical race for influence that had already begun. The USSR's anti-Zionist policy was bound to result in Arab sympathy and the prospect of Soviet dominance in the oil-rich region was troubling to the US.⁸

In November 1945, an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was formed to examine the Jewish refugee problem. At US insistence, its terms of reference limited it to viewing resettlement in Palestine as the sole option. The Committee recommended issuing 100,000 immigration certificates immediately and removing all restrictions on land transfer in Palestine. No solution to the issue of sovereignty was found and instead the Committee suggested a long-term UN trusteeship.

The Arabs were horrified, while Britain deemed the plan unworkable in both the short and long-term. Three weeks later, British Deputy Prime Minister Herbert Morrison and US Ambassador Henry Grady began constructing an amended, alternative solution. The plan incorporated the Zionist-US demand for 100,000 immigrants immediately and the trusteeship premise, but envisioned a division of Jewish and Arab provinces, leaving open - they contended - the option of an eventual binational state or partition of Palestine. Zionist and US rejection consigned the plan to failure almost immediately and subsequent US public statements critical of Britain and supportive of the WZO signaled the end of the Anglo-American approach.

MAP 10



POPULATION OF PALESTINE BY SUB-DISTRICT, 1946


Failure to gain support for the Morrison-Grady Plan was to precipitate Britain's February 1947 submission of the Palestine Question to the UN. Though efforts were made to bring the Zionists and Palestinians together in London for talks, these were virtually doomed to failure and lasted less than two weeks before collapsing. US President Truman's overt statements of support for the Zionists, which included his endorsement of a JA proposal for a state on 60% of Palestine, left Britain effectively unable to negotiate with either party.¹ Meanwhile, since early 1944 the combined Zionist militias had waged a campaign against British forces and installations in Palestine. By mid-1946, British security forces were being shot, bombed or kidnapped on a nearly weekly basis. Hundreds of civilians were killed.² In a thinly veiled attack on the Zionist leaders, the Prime Minister (PM) declared, "[i]f our dreams for Zionism... and our labours for its future are to produce a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past."³

But the violence was to continue, orchestrated for the most part directly by the JA. In June 1946, the British, for the first time, arrested leading figures from within the JA and thereby closed the primary channel of Zionist-British coordination - one they had helped establish and worked with since 1923.⁴ The Mandate's contradictory terms of reference had forced Britain into an impossible position from the outset. Drawn up (in 1922) at a time when Jews made up a little over 11% of the total population, the Mandate promised the Zionists their 'national home', guaranteed the Palestinians protection of their civil and economic status and put the British administration in the consequently absurd position of seeing that, "no discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants."⁵ By 1946, all attempts at smothering the inevitable disintegration of their authority were failing.

Between 1920 and 1945, the British presided over the immigration of 393,887 Jews, who made up fully two-thirds of the total Jewish population by the end of 1945. Since the Mandate census of 1922, the Jewish population had increased by 700% and in 1946 made up nearly 32% of the total.⁶ Despite the phenomenal immigration and the existence of over 260 Zionist agricultural colonies, the Jewish population remained urban. Thus with some 38% of the Jerusalem sub-district's population being Jewish, their actual landholdings in the area amounted to only 2% and a mere 3% of their number were rural⁷ (see Maps 50 & 53). A similar pattern could be observed in the Jaffa sub-district, where the greatest population density by far was found (1,116.5 persons per km²). Of the 295,000 Jews in the sub-district, 59% lived in the city of Tel Aviv (less than 400 Palestinians lived in Tel Aviv). Haifa followed the pattern of the Jaffa sub-district, while only in the Beisan, Tiberias and Nazareth sub-districts of the lower Galilee was the Jewish population significantly rural (see Map 13). 29% of all Jews lived in Tel Aviv, more than were found in the entire rural sector of Palestine.⁸

The total population of Palestine in 1946 was put at 1,845,560. Of this number, 58% were Muslim Palestinians and 8% were Christian Palestinians. Muslims made up 79% of the rural population - that sector representing 52% of the total population - while Jews made up 50% of the urban population. The culmination of a long-standing demographic trend amongst the Christians saw 80% of their total number residing in urban centers.⁹ Only in the Jaffa sub-district did the Jewish population outnumber that of the Palestinians and elsewhere only three of the 16 sub-districts found Jews accounting for even a third of the population. The Arab population was found dominant in 15 sub-districts, while in terms of land holdings it remained so in all 16.¹⁰

MAP 11



THE UNGA PARTITION PLAN, 1947 – THE 1948 WAR & THE 1949 ARMISTICE LINES

In early 1947, Britain announced its submission of the Palestine problem to the UN; its representative told the UNGA in May, “[w]e have tried for years to solve the problem... we now bring it to the United Nations in the hope that it can succeed where we have not.”¹ At the same session, an 11-member Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was appointed to investigate the Palestine Question and prepare proposals for its solution. It was to be the 11th official committee of inquiry since 1919 and the 19th investigative body dispatched to the Mandate in 25 years.²

UNSCOP members arrived in Palestine in June 1947 and gathered information and testimonies until July, completing their report by late August. In September a so-called *Ad-Hoc* Committee was established to examine two proposals. The first plan called for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, with Jerusalem and its environs under an international *Corpus Separatum* administration. This plan had the majority backing of the UNSCOP members, while a second plan, similar to the Morrison-Grady scheme (see Map 10), was supported by a minority. The *Ad-Hoc* Committee drew conflicting conclusions in its examination of the majority plan. In real terms, the proposal granted the Zionists a state in 56.47% of Palestine, leaving the Palestinians with 42.88% and creating an international zone of around 0.65%.³ In the proposed Jewish state the population was put at 905,000 - 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Palestinian Arabs. However, the *Ad-Hoc* Committee’s discovery of an ‘oversight’ with regard to the Bedouin population added 105,000 Arabs to the demography, placing the Jews in a minority and yet submitting over half a million indigenous Arabs to minority status.⁴ In the Arab state, only 10,000 Jews would remain among 725,000 Arabs, while in the Jerusalem zone there would be some 100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs⁵ (see Map 52). The plan gave the Zionists all or a part of 10 of the 16 sub-districts, in nine of which Jews were a minority. One report of the *Ad-Hoc* Committee noted that the proposal allotted the Beersheba district to the Jewish state, remarking “[i]t is surprising that the majority of an international committee such as [UNSCOP] should have recommended the transfer of a completely Arab territory and population to the control of the Jews, who form less than 1% of the population, against the wishes and interests of the Arabs, who form 99% of the population.”⁶

The majority (partition) proposal was nonetheless adopted by the UNGA on 29 November 1947, with Resolution 181.⁷ The injustice of partition has been summarized by Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi as follows: “They [the Palestinians] failed to see why it was *not* fair for the Jews to be a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it was fair for almost half of the Palestinian population - the indigenous majority on its ancestral soil - to be converted overnight into a minority under alien rule.”⁸ Every represented regional state voted against the plan, Britain abstained.⁹ Resolution 181 stipulated a two-month interim period following British withdrawal, wherein a UN Palestine Commission would transfer authority. This was never to happen.


The day after UN Resolution 181 was passed, the *Haganah* called up all Jews between 17 and 25. The next week the assault on Jaffa (an Arab enclave in the partition plan) commenced.¹⁰ In the six months before Britain abandoned Palestine (14 May 1948), 380,000 Palestinians were forced from their homes, and at Deir Yassin (part of the proposed *Corpus Separatum*), the first of a series of massacres was perpetrated.¹¹ British support, both in terms of training and equipment, for the powerful Zionist forces contrasted sharply with the absolute prevention of Palestinian militarization during the Mandate period. As a result, when war finally broke out there was only one army in Palestine and the indigenous population was left heavily dependent on regional intervention; this marked by ulterior and competing motives. When Britain quit the Mandate, Zionist forces were already in control of some 70% of Palestine.¹² By the end of the war they would occupy nearly 78% of Palestine, incl. half of all the territory allotted the smaller Arab state in the partition plan.¹³ Transjordan would be in control of the remainder of eastern Palestine - the West Bank - and Egypt would control the Gaza Strip.¹⁴

By November 1948, the UNSC was able to initiate the process of demarcating a permanent armistice. Israel signed an agreement with Egypt in February 1949,¹⁵ with Lebanon in March, with Jordan in April and with Syria in July. The armistice agreements allowed for four demilitarized zones and four ‘no-man’s land’ areas (in Jerusalem and near Latrun Monastery).

International efforts to build permanent peace treaties between Israel and the Arab states were short-lived and ended in failure. The April 1949 Lausanne Conference, where delegates from Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Arab Higher Committee met under the auspices of the UN’s Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), collapsed when Israel quit in mid-summer. Israel’s position was simple: Delegate Abba Eban wrote Ben-Gurion, “There’s no need to run after peace. The armistice is enough for us. If we pursue peace, the Arabs will demand a price of us - borders or refugees or both. Let us wait a few years.”¹⁶

MAP 12

UNGA Partition Plan, 1947



Armistice Lines, 1949



LAND OWNERSHIP IN PALESTINE, 1948

The UN Partition Plan denied the demographic facts in Palestine no more than it did the ownership of land. The Mandate authorities had furnished UNSCOP with statistics showing Jewish land ownership to reach no more than 39% in any one sub-district and remain far less in all others (see Map 11).¹ In December 1947, Jewish landholdings totaled 1,734 km², or 6.6% of the total territory.² The majority of the remainder was in Palestinian ownership, either communal or private, while state lands and nature reserves were not extensive in the area allotted the Jewish state in the plan. The exception was the Beersheba district, where 85% of the area was state land.³

As illustrated on previous pages (see Map 11), Palestinians were, up until 1947, a mostly agricultural, rural people. Landownership was the foundation of the predominant culture and economy. Some 60-62% of the labor force in 1947 were *fellahin* living in the countryside.⁴ Their knowledge and expertise, in contrast to that of the Jewish population, was tied definitively to the land they lived and worked on for generations.


Long before 1948, the Zionists had confronted the question of land ownership and the obstacle it posed to achieving the desired territorial and demographic supremacy in Palestine. 10 years prior to the war, Menachem Ussishkin, head of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and a veteran proponent of the 'transfer' doctrine, had addressed the discrepancy between the mass-settlement policy of the WZO and the meager landholdings of the JA. He told the Agency, "[w]e must remove from here 60,000 Arab families in order to release land for the Jews."⁵ With the outbreak of hostilities following the 1947 UN vote, Ben-Gurion announced: "The war will give us the land. The concepts of 'ours' and 'not ours' are peace concepts, and in war they lose their whole meaning."⁶

The refugees who were forced from Palestine in the 20 months following Resolution 181 left behind all they could not carry. It is impossible to calculate the extent of the land losses with any accuracy, but in terms of cultivated land, records show they left at least 40,000 dunums of vineyards, nearly 100,000 dunums of citrus groves and more than 80% of Mandate Palestine's 4.3 million dunums of field crops. Some 95% of what became Israel's olive groves were Palestinian owned in 1948. At the end of the Mandate, Palestinians had *cultivated* some 5,484,700 dunums. At the end of the war, the *entire* land area left under Arab rule amounted to only 5,948,320. Of Israel's 20,371,680 dunums, only 7.23% had been Jewish property before the war.⁷

Having decided that "there could be no speaking of a return of Arabs," the new Israeli government set about consolidating its long-sought grasp on Palestinian land.⁸ Mid-way through the war, a Ministerial Committee for Abandoned [Arab] Property was formed to distribute and administer the new gains. The first act of the 'provisional' government of Israel was the abolition of all restrictions on land transfers.⁹ After the war, Israel passed two key laws which 'legalized' (in domestic terms) their illegal (in international terms) war booty. The Absentees Property Law and the Development Authority Law gave the government and the JNF exclusive rights over virtually all Palestinian land in the new Jewish state.¹⁰ Even that minority of Palestinians which had remained within the boundaries of Israel was dispossessed by virtue of this legislation and the military orders which accompanied it. The amount of land expropriated from this minor source in 1948 alone exceeded all Jewish pre-1948 landholdings.¹¹

Uprooting the Palestinians from their land and taking possession thereof had - in one form or another - been the overarching goal of Zionism for 50 years. Between 1947 and 1949, this goal was mostly achieved - and the state of Israel was established.

MAP 13



POPULATION MOVEMENTS, 1948-1951

By 1949, 90% of all Palestinians who had resided within the area, which became Israel had been uprooted from their homes. Some 750,000 Palestinians were dispossessed and rendered refugees - most were forced to flee to areas under Jordanian or Egyptian control, to Syria or Lebanon. In the ensuing 2½ years, 684,000 Jews entered Israel, more than doubling the pre-war Jewish population.¹

For the first six months of the war (Dec. 1947-May 1948), the British remained ultimately responsible for law and order in Palestine. During the same period, the JA's *Haganah*, with whom Britain had a "gentleman's agreement," was transformed from a powerful militia, comprising a single brigade, into a formidable army with 10 brigades, artillery units, armored vehicles and a small air force. Within this period more than half of the war's total refugees were created, yet, while the British authorities described the *Haganah's* attacks on civilians as "an offence to civilization," they did nothing to intervene.²


Historical debate was long focused on the 'official' as opposed to 'opportunist' position of the Zionist leadership with regard to expulsion of the Palestinian population during the war. However, with the declassification of vital documents in the 1980s, the intention - both pre-1947 and during the war itself - to expel large numbers of Palestinians has become largely irrefutable.³

Initially it was the wealthier professionals of the urban centers who fled, leaving behind their homes and possessions in the hope of later returning. The December 1947 attack on Jaffa, followed by the razing of entire suburbs, was described by the Zionists as "a lesson to the rural communities."⁴ By March 1948, attacks on villages in the coastal plain led to a mass-exodus from the countryside. With news of the first massacres and mass expulsions - beginning with that at Deir Yassin on 9 April - the flight accelerated, as villagers sought refuge in the mountainous hinterland or neighboring Arab states. Following British withdrawal, the Zionists, already in control of much of the territory of the post-war state, increased their efforts to remove the remaining Palestinian population. On 9 July 1948, Israeli forces broke the first truce of the war. Over the next four days they expelled some 33,000 Palestinians from Lydda and Ramleh, after massacring hundreds in one of the most infamous and brutal 'operations' of the war.⁵ There, 'Operation Dani', led by Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin, exemplified a pattern of intimidation and expulsion, which was repeated throughout the area falling under Israeli control until well after the armistice talks had begun. Israel's large-scale military expulsions ended only in the summer of 1950, with the removal to Gaza of 2,500 Palestinians who had remained in or fled to Al-Majdal.⁶ Approximately 150,000 Palestinians remained within the area of the Jewish state following the war, concentrated in the Nazareth area and the 'Little Triangle' - comprised of the villages and lands surrounding the three Palestinian towns of Umm Al-Fahm, Al-Khadeira and Kufr Qara' - bordering the northern West Bank. Many were 'internally displaced' refugees, denied return to their homes. From 1948 until 1966 they were to be ruled under Israeli 'Emergency Regulations,' drastically limiting their civil rights.⁷

On 11 December 1948, the UNGA passed Resolution 194, affirming the Palestinian refugees' right to return and to compensation. A year later, with Israel rejecting any responsibility for the de-population of Palestine, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was founded, to provide destitute refugees with humanitarian aid and shelter. By 1950, 914,221 refugees were registered with UNRWA and over the coming years 58 camps were established throughout the region.⁸

Meanwhile, Israel wasted no time in settling a huge wave of immigrants on Palestinian land and in Palestinian homes. Less than 15% of these immigrants were refugees of the 'Displaced Persons' camps in Europe. The remainder was encouraged to come as part of the new Jewish state's drive to "gather in the exiles" and "redeem the land."⁹ Between 1948 and 1953, 350 of 370 new Jewish settlements were established on the property of refugees. In the cities, a third of all the period's immigrants were settled in property belonging to Palestinians. By 1954 a full third of Israel's population was living on or in refugee property.¹⁰

MAP 14



LAND OWNERSHIP IN PALESTINE AND THE UN PARTITION PLAN - PALESTINIAN DEPOPULATED AND DESTROYED VILLAGES, 1948-1949

The expulsion of the Palestinians from their homes and homeland was carried out in accordance with operational plans drawn up by the *Haganah*, and in compliance with orders issued from the highest echelons of the Zionist leadership.¹ Thus, rather than crimes committed by individuals, the massacres, rapes, looting and destruction, which characterized the de-population of Palestine, were components of a designed military strategy developed and implemented by the leaders of the emerging Jewish state.²

One of the systematically pursued objectives of this strategy was the eradication of all traces of the pre-1947 Palestinian presence. Of the nearly 600 purely Palestinian villages and towns overrun by the Zionists during the war, over 400 were subsequently completely destroyed or rendered permanently uninhabitable.³ At the outset of the war, the purpose of leveling the villages was the creation of panic, fear and flight. But as the 'transfer' picked up pace, the Zionists shifted their focus to the consolidation of their conquest. In early June 1948, the 'Transfer Committee' prepared a memorandum entitled, "*Retroactive Transfer, A Scheme for the Solution of the Arab Question in the State of Israel.*" The document, endorsed by Israel's Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, outlined means of "[p]reventing the Arabs from returning to their places," and listed as the foremost method of achieving this goal, the, "[d]estruction of villages as much as possible..." along with "[s]ettlement of Jews in a number of villages and towns so that no 'vacuum' is created."⁴

From the summer of 1948, the 'Transfer Committee' set about the task of identifying villages to be destroyed and those to be settled by Jews for strategic reasons. Only 121 sites were spared destruction.⁵ Meanwhile, in the urban Palestinian neighborhoods, the Committee hurried to settle Jews in those Palestinian homes which had not been destroyed. 73,000 rooms and 7,800 shops or small industries were thus seized in what had been the 'Arab Quarters' of Palestine's mixed towns.⁶


The destruction of Palestinian villages continued unabated throughout all the war's cease-fires and persisted into the 1950s.⁷ During the five years that followed the end of the war, Israel recorded some 1,000 'border infiltrations' every month, as Palestinian refugees tried to return to their homes and sought out missing family members.⁸ By then, Israel's razing of remaining villages was driven by the desire to erase from the landscape all signs of its Palestinian identity. By removing the most vivid reminders of the Palestinian people - their homes, places of worship etc. - the Israelis hoped to counter any calls for the implementation of the Palestinian refugees' right to return and present their own sudden domination of the territory as something seemingly 'organic' and without contradiction.⁹ They also sought to conceal evidence of their own atrocities.

Chaim Weizmann, veteran Zionist leader and Israel's first president, would later refer to the elimination of the Palestinians, their communities and homes as, "a miraculous clearing of the land; the miraculous simplification of Israel's task."¹⁰


At the time of the UN Partition Plan (29 November 1947), there were 279 Jewish settlements in Palestine. By August 1949, an additional 133 settlements had been established - nearly all on Palestinian land and many upon or within the Palestinian villages the 'Transfer Committee' had reserved for the purpose of Jewish settlement. By 1987, some 190 Israeli towns, kibbutzim and moshavs existed on the land of depopulated and destroyed Palestinian villages.¹¹

MAP 15

Landownership in Palestine and the UN Partition Plan, 1947



Palestinian Villages Depopulated in 1948 and Razed by Israel



NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE - MAPS 1-15

MAP 1

¹ Population figures according to Ottoman records, as reproduced in Justin McCarthy's *Population of Palestine*. It should be noted that the Ottoman "census" was not inclusive of non-citizens and so excluded an unknown number of foreign missionary Christians, as well as a number of non-citizen residents of other faiths. McCarthy is highly critical of the Ottoman system of registration and attributes to the enumerations significant errors of undercounting - pointing out that the system of military conscription encouraged families to conceal the true number of their children. Nonetheless, McCarthy's reproductions employ statistical methods of correction which render the figures the most accurate available. McCarthy, Justin, *The Population of Palestine*, Columbia University Press, 1990, p.10 & pp. 2-44.

² The ousting of the Crusaders from Jerusalem by Salah Eddin Al-Ayyubi in 1187 signaled the demise of the Crusader Kingdom and brought about a period of religious tolerance and stability which not only saw Palestine returned to Muslim rule but brought about a return of small numbers of Jewish pietists. The Crusaders did maintain a presence in the cities of Acre and Caesarea for a number of years but were eventually forced out.

³ Percentages reflect the numbers recorded in 1886. McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, p. 12.

⁴ By far the largest Jewish community in 1878 was that of Safed, in the Ottoman Sanjak [administrative division] of Acre (in the northern portion of the Galilee). While without particular Biblical significance, Safed gained its place among the four Jewish "Holy Cities" in Palestine - along with Jerusalem, Tiberias and Hebron - by virtue of the presence there, since the expulsion from Spain in 1492, of the most productive and significant Jewish community of mystical pietists. Historians trace the authorship of the Kabbala to 16th Century Safed and the major seat of Jewish mystical learning remained in Safed well into the 19th Century. At no time was the religious Jewish community in Safed occupied by nationalist aspirations and the advent of the Zionist movement in Palestine signaled the departure of the last of the pietists. See Jacobs, Louis, *The Jewish Religion - A Companion*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 438.

⁵ The system of remittances and their distribution by Rabbinic authorities (known as Chalukkah) compelled the Jewish community to adhere to the judgments of their leaders to such an extent that parents who allowed their children to enroll in a secular trade school in 1856 were threatened with excommunication. Following the Crimean War, which had seen the blockade of Ottoman Palestine and hence the estrangement of the Jewish community from the European financial lifeline upon which it depended, opposition to dependence on the Chalukkah led Joel Moshe Salomon and six of his friends to purchase land in 1869 beyond the walls of Jerusalem (Nachlat Shiv'a - lit.: 'Plot of the Seven'). The Jerusalem neighborhood now known as Mea Shearim (100 Gates) was settled for the same reasons by pious Jews in 1875. The subsequent decision by Salomon to seek land and engage in its cultivation on a financially productive scale was made in the face of intense opposition on the part of the Rabbinical authorities, who feared - among other things - losing their remittances if a transformation of the production status of the Jewish community became known to their benefactors abroad. The eventual settlement at Petah Tikva was considered "heresy" by the Jewish leadership in Palestine and its produce was not permitted for sale amongst the Jewish community. Sachar, Howard, *A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1981, p. 24-26.

MAP 2

¹ The figure of 60-63,000 is far lower than that almost invariably reproduced in historical works on the period, but is accurate. The Jewish population of Ottoman Palestine in 1914 is most frequently put at some 80,000. However, that figure is taken from British statistics of 1914, themselves taken from the statistics of Arthur Ruppin - an official of the WZO whose numbers are incompatible with Ottoman counts and present a series of problems when set against the accurately calculated post-WWI figure of less than 60,000 Jews (based on immigration and birth rate data collected in the 1922 British census). The contention that some 25,000 Jews left Palestine during the war years is itself incompatible with regional migration statistics and poses other questions as to their eventual post-war location. (A problem Vladimir Jabotinsky would later address by contending that the Ottomans starved 25,000 Jews to death during the war.) Again relying on a detailed analysis and correction of various statistical sources, McCarthy offers a figure of between 60-63,000. McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, pp. 17-24.

² The remaining 95% settled in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Hebron. Sachar, *A History of Israel...* p. 27.

³ *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1* [Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Jerusalem, 1946], Reprinted - Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991, p. 372.

⁴ So wrote the leading Zionist figure Menachem Ussishkin in 1904. Ussishkin has been described as a "bully of a man, who concentrated on land purchasing missions in Palestine." Sachar, *A History of Israel...* p. 62.

⁵ *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 372

⁶ Ottoman notables living outside the country were responsible for over half of the period's land sales to Zionists. Shafir, Gershon, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1882-1914*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 41.

⁷ The figure of 2.5 million: Segev, Tom, *One Palestine, Complete - Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate*, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1999, pp. 224-228. Porath cites a figure of 2 million. Porath, Yehoshua, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 1918-1929*, London: Frank Cass, 1974, pp. 17-18. Both writers point to the

rising nationalism and parallel increase in Anti Semitism in Eastern Europe as contributive factors alongside the economic decline, in compelling Jews to emigrate.

MAP 3

¹ Extract from a letter from Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein, dated 24th October 1915.

PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History - A Twentieth Century Chronology*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2001, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 24. In addition to Britain's success in securing a 'bridge' of control between Iraq, domination of Palestine reinforced their control over Egypt and the vital Suez Canal.

³ The Balfour Declaration was issued to Zionist leader and chemist Dr. Chaim Weizmann in the form of a letter by Lord Balfour. It contained a pledge to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. At first the Declaration was issued only as a 'token of gratitude' to the chemist for his invention of an important method of creating much-needed acetone (used in the manufacture of artillery shells) from maize at the height of the war. Weizmann's important military research was conducted under the auspices of the British admiralty and Ministry of Munitions at a time when future Foreign Minister, Arthur James Balfour was the 'First Lord' of the admiralty and future Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, was the Minister of Munitions. Both men considered the chemist's contribution to the war effort worthy of reward - hence the Balfour Declaration. For the full text of the Declaration see Map 5, note 2. Segev, *One Palestine...*, pp. 33-57.

⁴ Pipes, Daniel, *Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition*, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 58.

MAP 4

¹ The Mandate's terms were not drafted by Britain until 1922 and then were only ratified by the League of Nations in 1923, when they formally came into force. However, the period between Britain's 1917-18 conquest of Palestine and 1920, during which the country was governed by the Occupied Enemy Territories Administration (OETA), came to an end in March 1920 with the arrival of the first High Commissioner, Samuel. Thus, it is possible to date the Mandate from the termination of the OETA.

² McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, pp. 25-32.

³ Letter sent by the head of the Political Department of the WZO in Palestine to Chaim Weizmann. Caplan, Neil, *Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question 1917-1925*, London: Frank Cass, 1978, p. 66, see also p. 73.

⁴ Herbert Samuel was not an official member of the WZO, but had himself presented the first British proposal for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. His memorandum suggesting the "...restoring [of] the Hebrew people to the land which was to be their inheritance," through the immigration of 3-4 million Jews to Palestine was discussed by the British cabinet in January 1915. Segev, *One Palestine...*, pp. 33-36.

Samuel's appointment as the first High Commissioner was on account of his being a Zionist rather than having had any previous colonial administrative experience. He was greeted in Jaffa with a speech delivered in Hebrew by Meir Dizengoff, chairman of the Tel Aviv municipal council. Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 148.

Jewish immigration into Palestine in 1919 amounted to little over 1,800. In 1920 8,223 Jews arrived and in the first three years of Samuel's term of office at least 27,000 arrived. McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, p. 26.

⁵ Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 225.

⁶ Extracts from the proceedings of the July 1920 Zionist Conference. Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins...* p. 197.

⁷ The concept of "Pure Jewish Labor" was adopted by the WZO at least by 1914. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

⁸ Caplan, *Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question*, p. 76.

⁹ Thus, Musa Qassem Al-Husseini was removed from his post as mayor of Jerusalem in 1920. Though the second Palestinian National Congress was thwarted, the third, meeting in Haifa in December 1920, saw the election of the Executive Committee that would lead it for the following 15 years, with Musa Qassem Al-Husseini at its head. PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, pp. 29-30.

¹⁰ *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 372.

MAP 5

¹ The Covenant of the League of Nations was signed on 28 June 1919 at Versailles. Article 22 states as its guiding premise "to those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that *the well being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization...*" [Emphasis added]. *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 2.

A Mandate, in theory, was a development along the lines of a 'Protectorate,' with the main difference only its being conferred and endorsed by a third party or parties, rather than *de facto* achieved through force and declaration by the 'Protector.' In granting the Mandate for Palestine to Britain, the League of Nations accepted formal responsibility for ensuring Britain's compliance with the terms of the Mandate that it ratified in 1922. Ostensibly, Britain's Mandate for

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Palestine took the form of a civil administration, responsible for the development and maintenance of all public services, including the provision of judiciary, security and taxation services. In reality things were rather more complex, as the terms of the Mandate defined and limited Britain's role in all of these fields, while the commitment to the Zionist cause rendered much of the Mandate document impracticable. The Colonial Office in London, headed by the Colonial Secretary, was the principal office authorizing expenditures and legal matters, while the local High Commissioner's powers were limited.

² Terms of the Mandate as reproduced in *Survey of Palestine (Ibid., pp. 3-14)*. The Balfour Declaration, issued in November 1917 by British Foreign Secretary Sir Arthur James Balfour, shortly after British troops began their advance from Gaza to Jerusalem, became the cornerstone of British-Zionist negotiations with regard to the status of occupied Palestine. Drafted when the Jewish community made up a little under 7% of the total population in Palestine, the letter, directed to unofficial WZO head, Chaim Weizmann, read as follows:

The Balfour Declaration

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

'His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Abdul Hadi, Mahdi (ed.), *Documents on Palestine Vol. 1*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997, p. 21.

³ Articles 6, 7 and 11 of the Mandate as reproduced in *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, pp. 3-14.

⁴ Population: McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, pp. 65-95; on British immigration figures see Porath, *The Emergence... pp. 17-18*.

⁵ The US Congress endorsed the Balfour Declaration with Public Resolution No. 73 of the 2nd Session of the 67th Congress on 21 September 1922. PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 34.

MAP 6

¹ McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, p. 31.

² Khalidi, Walid, *Before Their Diaspora*, Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984, pp. 125-131; McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, p. 166.

³ Porath, *The Emergence... p. 19*; Khalidi, Walid, *Before Their Diaspora*, pp. 125-131.

⁴ Porath, *The Emergence... p. 19*.

⁵ *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 159.

⁶ Porath, *The Emergence... p. 20*.

⁷ *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 158. McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, p. 159 & p. 166.

⁸ Zionist immigration into Palestine's urban centers over the 1920s had threatened the demographic balance of mixed towns, despite the relative growth in the Palestinian urban sector. Haifa, for example, had – at the beginning of the 1920s – been populated by roughly 18,000 Palestinian Arabs and 6,000 Jews; by the end of the decade 24,000 Arabs and 16,000 Jews were resident in the city. Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 231.

⁹ Hope Simpson Report quoted in Migdal, Joel, "The Effects of Regime Policies on Social Cohesion and Fragmentation", in Migdal, Joel (ed.), *Palestinian Society and Politics*, Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 22; see also: Abdul Hadi (ed.), *Documents on Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 61.

MAP 7

¹ Abdul Hadi (ed.), *Documents on Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 71.

² Populations & settlements: McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, p. 224 & p. 219.

Land acquisition: *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 376 & notes.

³ Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 249.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.255 (quoting Ben-Gurion's memoirs.)

⁵ The Arab Higher Committee was formally established in April 1936, with Haj Amin Al-Husseini elected its President on the 25th of that month. Its members were: Jamal Husseini, Hussein Fakhri Al-Khalidi, Yaqoub Al-Ghossein, Fuad Saba, Ragheb Nashashibi, Ahmed Hilmi Abed Baqi, Ahmed Latif Saleh, Alfred Rock and Awni Abdul Hadi - all of whom would remain at the forefront of the Palestinian national movement throughout the Mandate period and beyond.

⁶ On 22 September 1936 additional troops were requisitioned. Palestinian historian Abdelaziz Ayyad attributes a part of the urgency of the regional leaders in exerting efforts alongside and on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee to gain a cessation of the Revolt to this news. Yehoshua Porath attributes lasting significance in terms of the development of

the pan-Arab movement to the support for the Palestinian Arab Revolt throughout the region, but also notes the economic necessity for the Palestinians to 'deescalate' the revolt due to the vital citrus harvest season and the dire state of the rural economy. Ayyad acknowledges the role though of the many Muslim Youth and other less pan-Arab groups in mobilizing support, finance and volunteers at the same time. In all, Porath's assertion that the period represented a formative moment in the development of the Palestinian cause in the face of Zionism as a bedrock of Arab solidarity is born out by most commentators, Ayyad included. Yoav Gelber, among others, points out the many recurring elements of secretive collusion and twin-channel maneuvering which characterized the political strategies of the regional governments at the time, attributing to the period formative patterns of betrayal and manipulation that have persisted throughout the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Ayyad, Abdelaziz, *Arab Nationalism and the Palestinians 1850-1939*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1999, p. 161; Porath, Yehoshua, *In Search of Arab Unity 1930-1945*, London: Frank Cass, 1986, p. 162; Gelber, Yoav, *Jewish-Transjordanian Relations 1921-1948*, London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 83-103.

⁷ Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, pp. 189-193.

⁸ PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, pp. 57-58. Ben-Gurion accepted the proposal after judging its shortcomings vis-à-vis Zionist territorial ambitions to be outweighed by the immense value of a non-Zionist plan which endorsed the concept of "forced transfer." He wrote of the Peel Plan in his diary: "This will give us something we never had, even when we were under our own authority, neither in the period of the First Temple nor in the period of the Second Temple... forced transfer." Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 403.

MAP 8

¹ Terms of Reference of the Technical Commission of Inquiry, as reproduced in *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 44.

² The Population Transfer Committee was established in early November 1937 as an 'advisory committee' following the approval by the 20th Zionist Congress of the principles embodied in the Peel Partition Plan. Yosef Weitz, director of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) Land Department became its first architect, though the plans he drew on had been part of the Zionist's strategic vision for many years. On 21 November, Weitz presented his plan, remarking that "the transfer of Arab population from the area of the Jewish state does not serve only one aim - to diminish the Arab population. It also serves a second, no less important, aim which is to evacuate land presently held and cultivated by the Arabs and thus release it for the Jewish inhabitants." His plan prioritized the eviction of three principal sectors of the Palestinian rural community: tenant farmers; landless villagers working as agricultural laborers or in other economic sectors; and farmers who owned less than three dunums per capita. By transferring these three "categories" as well as 10-15,000 Bedouin, Weitz calculated the Arab Palestinian population in the specified area would be reduced by one third. It was a process he envisioned being completed within a 2-3-year period. Masalha, Nur, "Expulsion of the Palestinians - The Concept of 'Transfer'" in *Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992, pp. 25-37 & pp. 93-96.

³ PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 58. David Ben-Gurion would later tell the Jewish Agency (JA) Executive, "I do not reject transfer from a moral point of view, nor do I reject it politically, if there is a chance for it... but it must not be a Jewish proposal... If we propose it, the Arabs will reject it..." (David Ben-Gurion to the JA Executive, 20 June 1944.) Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 114.

⁴ Jabotinsky's Revisionists took responsibility for the string of nearly weekly bombings throughout 1938, which were aimed at British as well as Palestinian targets. At least 598 Palestinians were killed in 1938. In addition, 216 Britons were killed by the militia over the year. The Arab Revolt's armed bodies claimed lives too, but not on a scale comparable to that of the Revisionists. Despite this fact, of the 2,543 prisoners interned by the British during the year - 2,463 were Palestinian. On bombing attacks see Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, p. 194. On casualties and incarcerations see *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, pp. 46-7.

⁵ Both Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon were among the ca. 150 Jewish members of British military commander Orde Wingate's notorious 200-member 'Special Night Squads.' These squads terrorized the villagers of the Galilee and committed a number of well-documented massacres, after Wingate issued on the spot 'death sentences' to the male population for allegedly harboring rebels. Today's Israeli army has issued a book in which it is stated: "The teachings of Orde Charles Wingate, his character and leadership were a cornerstone for many of the Haganah's commanders, and his influence can be seen in the Israeli Defense Force's combat doctrine." Segev, *One Palestine...*, pp. 429-432. (And quoting *Lexicon of the Israeli Defense Force*, Tel Aviv: Minister of Defense, 1992.)

⁶ The terms of reference for the Technical Commission of Inquiry prevented it from formally taking Abdullah's proposal under consideration, as it did not represent a partition of Palestine per se. Gelber, *Jewish-Transjordanian Relations*, p. 133. The Zionists too were not invited to present a plan of their own and there is no evidence to suggest that the Commission examined their proposal formally.

⁷ Abdul Hadi (ed.), *Documents on Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 104.

MAP 9

¹ In Article 2 of the Mandate document of 1923 the British declared themselves "responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national

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home...” Article 6 included the commitment to “facilitate Jewish immigration,” as well as that to “encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land...” *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 5.

² Hadawi, Sami, *Bitter Harvest - Palestine 1914-1979*, New York: The Caravan Books, 1979, p. 44.

³ The JA’s ‘Constitution’ forbade it from transferring under any circumstances land from Jewish to Arab ownership. It also reinforced the WZO’s exclusivity of labor position, stipulating that “...it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed.” *Ibid.*, p. 45.

Joshua Chankin, aware of the rising pressure the emerging urban sector was placing on Palestinian agricultural smallholders, made loans to impoverished Palestinian farmers, whose land titles he took as collateral. When the farmers found themselves unable to repay the loans, Chankin turned over the land title to the JA. Chankin is credited with having ‘acquired’ a full third of all Zionist Mandate-period landholdings. Later Zionist historians credited Chankin with having “developed a special knack for doing business with the Arabs and Turks...” On Chankin’s techniques see: PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 18. Also, Stein, Kenneth, “Legal Protection and Circumvention of Rights for Cultivators in Mandatory Palestine”, in Migdal, J. (ed.), *Palestinian Society and Politics* (op. cit), pp. 258-260. Segev, *One Palestine...*, pp. 273-274. On Chankin’s “knack” see Sachar, *A History of Israel...* p. 78.

⁴ The single ‘Sursock Deal’ of 1921, involving the sale by the Beirut-based Sursock family of over 240,000 dunums, saw at least 688 tenant farmers and their families rendered destitute. Stein, “Legal Protection and Circumvention of Rights ...” pp. 258-260. See also, PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 32.

The 1945-46 *Survey of Palestine* noted the “spectacular rises” in land prices brought about by the pressures of Zionist purchases, particularly in the vicinity of existing Jewish settlements. *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 243.

⁵ Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 260.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 372 & p. 242.

⁷ Taquu, Rachel, “Peasants into Workmen: Internal Labor Migration and the Arab Village Community under the Mandate”, in Migdal, J. (ed.), *Palestinian Society and Politics* (op. cit), p. 265. Also, Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 45. Taquu notes that Zionist land policy was not the only force driving rural communities from their land. During the 1940s, the booming capital economy of the coastal region and a high wartime demand for labor drew a large number of agriculturalists into the wage labor market of the urban sector, thus loosening the important financial and residential tie between many rural Palestinians and their land. Taquu, “Peasants into Workmen...” pp. 261-5.

⁸ *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 243.

⁹ Stein, “Legal Protection and Circumvention of Rights ...” p. 236.

¹⁰ Article 15 of the Mandate, paragraph 1. *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 7.

¹¹ British Labour Party National Executive Report, of May 1944. PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 71.

¹² *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 372.

MAP 10

¹ Segev, Tom, *The Seventh Million - The Israelis and the Holocaust*, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1991, p. 123.

² The BBC broadcast one of the first unconfirmed reports of the extermination in December 1941. The Polish government, which was in exile at the time, reported to the US in mid-1942 on the use of gas chambers and incinerators. Polish Jewry was annihilated during the Holocaust. At least 2,800,000 Polish Jews were killed. Sachar, *A History of Israel...* p. 238 & p. 249. The Zionists apparently first came to learn of the death camps in June 1942. Segev, *The Seventh Million*, p. 73.

³ Sachar, *A History of Israel...* pp. 238-9.

⁴ In recognition of the scale of the disaster and their own limitations, the Zionist leadership at first resorted to attempts at saving those loyal to their agenda in Palestine. A memorandum issued by the JA’s ‘Rescue Committee’ in 1943 acknowledged that, “... if the efforts of the committee are likely, therefore, to lead to only the most minimal of results, we must at least achieve some political gain from them.” Segev, *The Seventh Million*, p. 98.

Ben-Gurion, prior to news of the concentration camps reaching him, had defined his priorities: “If I knew that it was possible to save all the children in Germany by transporting them to England, but only half of them by transporting them to Palestine, I would choose the second... Like every Jew, I am interested in saving every Jew wherever possible, but nothing takes precedence over saving the Hebrew nation in its land.” Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 394 (quoting Ben-Gurion’s memoirs.) Segev’s research, first published in 1991, draws on an unprecedented range of declassified documents, interviews and personal memos. Its treatment of the Zionist movement’s various leaders and bodies during the war and immediately after it shattered many Israeli perceptions concerning the behavior of the Zionist leadership with regard to the extermination of European Jewry. Segev catalogues the disturbingly detached and cynical reaction of Israel’s future leaders and, while acknowledging their relative powerlessness to rescue any great number of survivors, is ultimately highly critical of the Zionist response. He resolves that, “only a few survivors owed their lives to the efforts of the Zionist movement,” and blames this in part on the predominantly secular and overarchingly nationalist movement’s unwillingness to identify with the Jewish victims in Europe as anything more than lost potential settlers. Ben-Gurion himself remarked that, “[t]he disaster facing European Jewry is not directly my business.” *Ibid.*, pp. 96-98.

⁵ McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, p. 227.

⁶ Segev, *The Seventh Million*, p. 123.

⁷ British Foreign Minister Bevin did raise the issue of resettling the displaced surviving Jews in Europe and claimed to be disturbed by the idea of ‘emptying’ Europe of its remaining Jews after the Holocaust. His position was rejected by the US and caused the Zionists to label him and Anti-Semite.

⁸ For an overview of the factors shaping Anglo-British strategies at the time see: Rubin, Barry, *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947 - The Road to the Cold War*, London: Frank Cass, 1980, pp. 132-150. The US was particularly vocal in its expressions of solidarity with the Zionists during the post-war years. On its strategic interests in the region, it was far less so. Later Truman would write, “it was my feeling that it would be possible for us to watch out for the long-range interests of our country while at the same time helping...” Sachar, *A History of Israel...* p. 258.

MAP 11

¹ Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, p. 236.

² In June 1947, the British High Commissioner in Palestine issued a memorandum itemizing, among other things, the victims and incidents of Zionist actions against Palestinians as well as Britons and British interests. Abdul Hadi (ed.), *Documents on Palestine Vol. 1*, pp. 146-148.

³ Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 55.

⁴ On the significance of the July 1946 arrests: Gelber, *Jewish-Transjordanian Relations*, p. 204. For an overview of Britain’s ‘proof’ linking the JA with the attacks by the Zionist militias: Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 56-7.

⁵ Mandate Document, Article 15.

The incorporation of the Balfour Declaration in the Mandate Document created this impossible position. Mid-way though the Mandate period, High Commissioner Sir John Herbert Chancellor referred to the Balfour Declaration as a “colossal blunder,” which he believed had left room for only four options: expelling the Arabs; expelling the Jews; maintaining the Mandate by military force; or canceling the Declaration. Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 334. *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 7.

⁶ McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, p. 95, 220 & 227.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 163. *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 372.

⁸ McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, p. 69, 218 & 237 (and derived thereof).

⁹ By 1941, only nine entirely Christian villages remained in Palestine.

Miller, Ylana, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine 1920-1948*, University of Texas Press, 1985, p. 74.

¹⁰ McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine*, p. 69, 218 & 237 (and derived thereof). See Map. 13.

MAP 12

¹ Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 63.

³ Hadawi, Sami, *Palestine: Loss of a Heritage*, Texas, USA: The Naylor Co., 1963, p. 135.

⁴ Abdul Hadi (ed.), *Documents on Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 164.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ UNGA Resolution 181 was passed with 33 votes in favor, 13 against and 10 abstentions. Arab states eligible were - Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Syria. They were joined by Afghanistan, Cuba, Greece, India, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in opposing the resolution. The Zionist leadership accepted the plan as a ‘step’ towards achieving sovereignty over all of ‘Eretz Israel’. The Palestinians, who had boycotted the UNSCOP mission to Palestine in July 1947, rejected it.

⁸ Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, p. 306. The Jewish population of Palestine in 1947 was between 80-90% of European birth or extraction. Morris, Benny, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 16-17.

From the outset of the Mandate and the mass immigration waves that followed, the Zionist community had stuck firmly to its European identity, rejecting “native” inferiority. *Ha'aretz*, one of the earliest Hebrew papers declared: “We stand with Europe. Here in the East one thing is needed more than any other: European order and European government. This condition is more important than all the other conditions – even national rights.” (*Ha'aretz*, 28 March 1920.) Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 153.

⁹ In submitting the Palestine Question to the UN, Britain had stated that it would not take responsibility for the implementation of any ‘solution’ that was not accepted by both parties.

¹⁰ Long before the Partition Plan, the JA had stepped up its recruitment, training and arms purchases in anticipation of conflict. The 1946 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry put the *Haganah*’s strength at some 62,000 men - this figure exclusive of irregulars with the Revisionist *Irgun* (which would join forces with the *Haganah* by the end of 1947) and other militia outfits. The *Haganah* had informed the Anglo-American Committee as early as March 1946 that it was well aware of the inadequacies of the Arab forces - arguing that as, “the Jewish force is superior in organization, training planning and equipment... if you accept the Zionist solution but are unable or unwilling to enforce it, please do not interfere, and we ourselves will secure its implementation.” Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, p. 306.

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¹¹ 380,000 is the figure posited for the six months between December 1947 and May 1948 by Israeli historian Ilan Pappé, though Benny Morris estimates the figure for a similar period as being between 200,000 - 300,000. Pappé, Ilan, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951*, London: Tauris Books, 1994, p. 96; Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, p. 128.

¹² It is impossible to be certain of this figure, due to the pace of the ongoing offensive. The rough figure of 70% is derived from available records. Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, pp. 75-93.

¹³ One week after Britain left Palestine, the UNSC ordered a cease-fire, which held until early July - with notable exceptions - when fighting resumed. Another UNSC cease-fire was achieved later that month, which held until 14 October, when Israeli troops stormed the towns of Beersheba and Al-Auja. Again, the UNSC called for a cease-fire.

¹⁴ Following the 15 May 1948 declaration of Israel's independence, recognized immediately by the US, the Arab armies of Egypt, Syria and Transjordan - along with a small Iraqi expeditionary force - invaded Palestine in a late, poorly coordinated and dubiously motivated effort to prevent total devastation. There had been long-running negotiations between the Zionists and Amir Abdullah, who was prepared to recognize a Jewish state in return for Zionist aid with and their acceptance of his ambition of absorbing eastern Palestine. As a consequence, it was unclear until late in the war if the Transjordanian forces were fighting in partial collusion with the Israeli army. In any event, though Transjordanian troops engaged the Israelis on many occasions throughout the course of the war, barring one incident they refrained from any such engagement within the area allotted the Zionists in the Partition Plan. Yoav Gelber's study of declassified telephone taps and Zionist archives from the period is inconclusive on the exact order of Abdullah's priorities. He concludes that the purpose of the eventual mobilization of Abdullah's forces against the Israeli army "was not to push the Jews into the Mediterranean but to save the Palestinians from total destruction, a contingency that appeared imminent towards the end of the Mandate. Abdullah, of course had ulterior motive for his participation - the annexation of Arab Palestine to his kingdom." In July 1951, Palestinian Jerusalemite Shukri Esho assassinated Abdullah outside Al-Aqsa Mosque. Gelber, *Jewish-Transjordanian Relations*, pp. 265-283.

¹⁵ Two weeks after signing the agreement with Egypt, which excluded access to the Gulf of Aqaba from the territory allotted Israel, Israeli forces staged an assault on the village of Umm Rashrash, expelling its inhabitants and founding Eilat on the site.

¹⁶ Abba Eban quoted in: Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 240. Summing up the failure of the Lausanne Conference, US delegate to the talks, Mark Ethridge wrote: "Israel must accept responsibility. Commission members... have consistently pointed out to the Israeli Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and delegation that the key to peace is some Israeli concession on refugees." *Ibid.*, p. 241.

Ben-Gurion waxed lyrical on the issue of borders as the negotiations floundered: "As for setting the borders - it's an open-ended matter. In the Bible as well as in history there are all kinds of definitions of the country's borders - so there's no real limit... The world has always been this way. Only the terms have changed. If they should find a way of reaching other stars, well then, perhaps the whole earth will no longer suffice..." Ben-Gurion speaking in late 1949, quoted in: Segev, *1949*, p. 6.

MAP 13

¹ Abdul Hadi, (ed.), *Documents on Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 165.

² Abufarha, Nasser, *Land Ownership in Palestine/Israel*, Al-Awda Document, see for example: http://www.landpedia.org/landdoc/Analytical_materials/BP_LAND.pdf [accessed 1.03.2014].

³ Jews owned less than 1% of the land in the Beersheba district; the remainder was in Palestinian ownership. Abdul Hadi (ed.), *Documents on Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 165.

Many Palestinian villages owned land collectively, divided according to *hamulah* (clan) lines and family size/status. Since the late 1930s small purchases, influenced by the rising capital economy of the Mandate increased, creating a large number of smallholders in rural areas, but collective ownership and tenant farming remained dominant. Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine*, pp. 82-3; Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵ Masalha, Nur, *Expulsion of the Palestinians*, p. 82.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁷ Statistics: Shehadeh, Raja, *The Law of the Land - Settlements and Land Issues Under Israeli Military Occupation*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1993, p. 62; Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, p. 125 & p. 305; *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 103 (and derived thereof). Even as their forces advanced, the Israelis were taking advantage of their gains in cultivated Palestinian land. As spring arrived Palestinian crops were harvested by those who had taken possession of the land. By July 1948 Yitzhak Gvirtz was appointed to head an official department dedicated to this purpose. He reported that month that among his achievements he had "added 6-7,000 tons of grain to the Yishuv's [Jewish pre-state community] economy... [and] earned more than IL (Israeli Lira) 100,000 for the Treasury." Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, p. 172. Detailed British land records indicate that 95% of Mandate Palestine's land area classified as having "Good Quality Soil" and 65% of that with "Medium Quality Soil" lay in the area conquered by Israel. Hadawi, *Palestine: Loss of a Heritage*, p. 137.

⁸ Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, p. 152.

⁹ Lustick, Ian, *Arabs in the Jewish State - Israel's Control of a National Minority*, University of Texas Press, 1980, p. 44.

¹⁰ Israel passed the Absentee Property Law in 1950. Prior to that date, the properties of refugees and the internally displaced (later termed “present absentees”) was administered and transferred into government ownership via the so-called Custodian of Abandoned Property. The 1950 legislation created the Custodian of Absentee Property in its stead and defined an ‘absentee’ as any person who “was a legal owner of any property situated in the area of Israel”, who, “left his ordinary place of residence” or was at any time during the period 29 November 1947 [the UNGA Resolution 181 vote] and September 1948 in “a place in Palestine held at the time by forces which sought to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel or which fought against it after its establishment.” Thus, the definition could be applied to fully 90% of all Palestinians resident in the area which became Israel.

¹¹ Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, pp. 145-147. Israel’s war gains were not limited to the homes and lands they seized. Capital funds in Arab banks were requisitioned by the new Israeli Administration, and though exact figures are impossible to calculate the sums involved were certainly vast. In Haifa alone, 1.5 billion Palestine Pounds were seized. Segev, Tom, *1949, The First Israelis*, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1986 (1998 edition), p.73.

MAP 14

¹ Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 87. Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 44.

² The Partition Plan awarded the Zionists legitimacy and rendered their military actions against the British redundant. Thus, their attentions turned immediately to the parallel objectives of affirming their dominance over the Arab population in the area allotted them in the plan and expanding the limits of that area through creating a *de facto* situation on the ground. Their first military offensives were directed at areas, such as Jaffa and Jerusalem, which were excluded from the Jewish state in the partition plan. On the transformation of Haganah: Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 52. On refugees over specified period see *Ibid.*, p. 96; on British response to Haganah violence see Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, pp. 32-33; on early British collusion with Haganah see Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 381.

³ Palestinian eyewitness accounts, affidavits and the many detailed works of Palestinian and other historians had been consistently denied by Zionist historians up until the 1980s. Israeli historian Benny Morris was amongst the first to analyze declassified Zionist documents describing the expulsions and his work has since forced other Israeli historians to confront the issue more responsibly. Compelling and accurate Palestinian treatment of the 1947-1949 period has always pointed to the concerted and systematic nature of the ‘transfer.’

⁴ Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, pp. 32-33, p. 32.

⁵ The Arab population of Lydda-Ramleh in 1947 was 34,920. After the war 2,000 Palestinians remained. In the course of the de-population of these two towns, at least 400 civilians were murdered in cold blood. A further 300-400 died due to starvation, exhaustion and disease during the flight to Ramallah in the Jordanian-occupied area. The massacres and expulsions precipitated a localized mass-exodus from within the surrounding communities, with the total expulsions amounting to some 70,000. Ben-Gurion was not ashamed to take credit: “We decided to clean out Ramleh,” he said. Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 511. Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 49.

Accounts of ‘Operation Dani’ are given in: Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, pp. 204-211. Palumbo, Michael, *The Palestinian Catastrophe; The 1948 Expulsion of a People From Their Homeland*, London: Faber and Faber, 1987, pp. 126-138. Following the expulsions from Lydda-Ramleh, the army looted the area completely. According to the head of the army’s ‘Committee for Abandoned Property,’ 1,800 trucks worth of Palestinian property were taken out of the town. Segev, *1949*, p. 69.

⁶ An account of the expulsions from what became Ashqelon is given in: Morris, Benny, *1948 and After, Israel and the Palestinians*, UK: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 257.

⁷ These regulations, based on those imposed by the British Mandate in its effort to quash the 1936-39 Arab Revolt, not only prevented the Palestinians remaining in Israel from returning to their homes, but limited their freedom of movement, curtailed their right to property and placed them under military rule for the best part of 20 years. Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, pp. 11-52; Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, pp. 144-155.

⁸ UNRWA Camps established as follows: West Bank and Jordan - 25; Lebanon - 16; Syria - 9; Gaza Strip - 8. Palestinian Refugee Camps and Populations - UNRWA 1958, reproduced in Morris, Benny, *1948 and After*, pp. 220-221.

⁹ The Chairman of the Zionist Executive declared: “Even Jews who don’t wish to leave [their homes for Israel] must be forced to come...” Segev, *1949*, p. 110.

¹⁰ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 44 & p. 63; Hadawi, *Palestine: Loss of a Heritage*, p. 51. Segev, *1949*, pp. 74-90.

MAP 15

¹ The Haganah’s Plan Dalet (or Plan D) - which guided the initial stages of the war and provided the framework for subsequent military plans - has been described by Benny Morris as, “a strategic-ideological anchor for expulsions...” Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, p. 63. Following the massacre at Lydda and Ramleh (see Map 14 & note 5), Yitzhak Rabin asked Ben-Gurion what should be done with the Palestinians, whereupon Israel’s first Prime Minister ordered him to expel them. Rabin’s account of events was excised from his autobiography by the

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Israeli censor, but was published by the *New York Times* in 1979. See Palumbo, *The Palestinian Catastrophe*, pp. 127-128.

² Irrefutable evidence of Israeli war crimes during and after the war is plentiful. Israel's own early political leadership discussed at length in correspondence and recorded meetings the instances of massacre, looting and rape. In addition, UN observers made detailed reports of such atrocities. At the time, there were those within the Zionist middle-ranking leadership who were uncomfortable with the atrocities committed during the war and demanded explanations, but they were generally brushed aside. Aharon Cizling, Israel's first Minister of Agriculture, addressed the first Israeli Cabinet: "... now Jews too have behaved like Nazis and my entire being has been shaken... Obviously we have to conceal these actions from the public, and I agree that we should not even reveal that we're investigating them. But they must be investigated..." Segev, *1949*, p. 26.

³ Calculating these figures poses a number of problems and cannot be done with absolute certainty. According to British records, the area conquered by the Zionists contained 469 purely Palestinian villages and nine purely Palestinian towns (totaling, therefore, 505). However, these figures do not account for purely Palestinian suburbs in mixed towns (such as Haifa and Jerusalem) overrun and demolished during or after the war; nor do they include the small 'hamlets' of the Bedouins in the Beersheba district. Dr. Salman Abu Sitta's more comprehensive count of *de-populated* 'localities,' including suburbs and Bedouin sites, reveals a total of 531 locations. Walid Khalidi, meanwhile, has published an encyclopedia identifying 418 *destroyed or depopulated* villages. In any respect, the number of Palestinian villages left physically intact within the borders of Israel following the war has been put at 121. Thus, assuming the figure of 121 correct, and subtracting that from the total of 505 listed by the British, a figure of at least 384 destroyed *villages and towns* can be safely posited. Going further to include smaller 'localities' and 'habitations' increases the figures, showing 598 individual sites to be occupied during the war and 472 of these subsequently destroyed. Saleh, Abdul Jawad & Mustafa, Walid, *Palestine: The Collective Deconstruction of Palestinian Villages and Zionist Colonization, 1882-1982*, Jerusalem Center for Development Studies - London, (published in Amman), 1987, pp. 30-31; Hadawi, *Palestine: Loss of a Heritage*, p. 138; Abu Sitta, *The Palestinian Nakba, 1948: The Register of Depopulated Localities in Palestine*, London: The Palestine Return Center, 1998; Khalidi, Walid, *All That Remains – The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*, Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992; Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 48.

Overall, approximately 75% of all occupied sites were destroyed - 96% of all villages in the Jaffa sub-district were destroyed, as were 95% in Beisan, 90% in Safad and 90% in Tiberias. Saleh, Abdul Jawad & Mustafa, Walid, *Palestine: The Collective Deconstruction of Palestinian Villages...*, p. 31.

⁴ Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, pp. 136-137.

⁵ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 48.

⁶ Flapan, Simcha, *The Birth of Israel, Myth and Realities*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1987, p. 107.

⁷ Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, pp. 155-169.

⁸ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 40.

⁹ Ian Lustick has summarized the post-war motivation for destroying or resettling (with Jews) Palestinian villages as follows: "The Israeli leadership anticipated that the buildings and lands of the refugees, if left deserted, would reinforce pressures for the return of their owners." *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹⁰ Masalha, Nur, *Expulsion of the Palestinians*, p. 175.

¹¹ Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, p. 181. See also pp. xviii-xx.

In 1969, Moshe Dayan referred to the eradication of Palestinian villages saying: "Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of these Arab villages, and I do not blame you because geography books no longer exist; not only do the books no longer exist, the Arab villages are not there either. Nahlal arose in the place of Mahlul; Kibbutz Gvat in the place of Jibta; Kibbutz Sarid in the place of Huneifs; and Kefar Yeheshu'a in the place of Tal al-Shuman. There is not a single place built in this country that did not have a former Arab population." Moshe Dayan's address to the Haifa Technion, quoted in *Ha'aretz*, 4 April 1969.

2

1949–1991

From Jordanian/Egyptian Rule in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip to
the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference

(Maps 16-26)

THE SUEZ WAR, 1956

In the period from 1949-1956, the UNSC and the Mixed Armistice Commission (charged with monitoring the compliance of all parties to the armistice agreements reached in 1949) condemned Israel for a series of brutal attacks on civilian 'targets' across the armistice lines. At Qibya (1953), Khan Younis (1955) and Qalqilya (1956), Israel committed massacres of the like not seen since the war.¹

Israeli actions troubled the US and Britain, as the Cold War gained momentum and regional tensions rose. Britain's pacts with Jordan and Iraq, along with US fear of Soviet penetration, left little room for the emergence of a strong Arab leader, who might jeopardize their interests and challenge Israel's intransigence. Gamal Abdel Nasser's rise to power in Egypt between 1952 and 1955 was the turning point. Britain and France controlled the Suez Canal by virtue of an 80-year Universal Suez Canal Company concession - a remnant of Britain's colonial arrangements that meant control of oil resources and shipping - it was Britain's prize in the region. At the same time it stood as a stark reminder of the territorial and economic limitations of Arab independence.

Nasser struck a popular regional chord with his uncompromising stance against subservience to the Great Powers and his condemnations of Israel. Calls for Arab unity and, eventually, his procurement of an arms deal with the Soviet bloc, angered Britain, France and the US. Each had refused to supply arms and then made loans for the construction of Egypt's huge Aswan Dam project conditional on it surrendering its economy to the World Bank. Nasser's resort to the Soviets brought the Cold War to the region in force. Israel told the 'West' it would invade Egypt before the Soviet arms arrived if a solution was not found. France rushed to supply Israel with arms and vehicles while Britain counseled its regional allies.

On 26 July 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, pledging to compensate Anglo-French shareholders and declaring his intention to use canal profits to finance the Aswan Dam.² British Prime Minister Anthony Eden told his cabinet, "...we shall never have a better pretext for intervention against him than we have as a result of his seizure of the Suez Canal."³ With the US cautious and much of the non-aligned world supportive of Nasser's stance, Israel, France and Britain colluded in secrecy.

On 29 October, in accordance with a prearranged pact (the Sevres Pact), Israel struck across the virtually undefended Sinai. The first victims were not, though, in Egypt. Back in Israel, 43 Palestinian civilians were killed in cold blood in yet another massacre, as Israel clamped down a fresh curfew on its Arab minority.⁴ After bombing Cairo and annihilating Egyptian air defenses, an Anglo-French force landed at Port Said, 15 minutes after a UN deadline for the cessation of hostilities expired.⁵ With French naval support, Israel consolidated its conquest of the Gaza Strip (3 November) and Sinai (5 November), and by the morning of 7 November, the war was over. Britain and France held the canal; Israel held the entire Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.

For Israel, the Sinai represented the Straits of Tiran through which Egypt had blockaded Israel's access to shipping channels. A new port was under construction at Eilat, and Israel wanted to ensure access via the Gulf of Aqaba. Thus, when worldwide criticism and US fear of regional instability eventuated in pressure from Washington for the aggressors to yield their conquests, Israel insisted on safe-passage guarantees from America. Britain and France left the Suez in late December 1956. Israel quit the Sinai and Gaza in March 1957, as the UN deployed an Emergency Force (UNEF) to secure the area. UNEF remained alongside the Egyptian authorities in Gaza until the 1967 War.⁶

The repercussions of the Suez War were enormous. Effectively, Britain's day in the region was over and the US stepped in as the major player. In 1958, Britain's regime in Iraq was dismissed in a military coup, and by the summer, US troops were deploying in Lebanon.⁷ Nasser's defiance won him huge popularity through the Arab World and beyond, securing his status as 'leader of the Arab people' for the coming decade. The rise of Arab unity and pride fuelled emerging Palestinian national movements, with the nuclei of the first liberation movements established between 1957-1958.

MAP 16



THE PALESTINIAN DIASPORA, 1958

Ten years on from the depopulation of Palestine, over one million Palestinian refugees were registered with UNRWA. 387,665 of these were residing in the 58 camps then run by the Agency, while the remainder depended on UNRWA for aid.¹ A further, unknown number of refugees were not registered due to the limited terms of UNRWA's mandate.² UNRWA was formally established in late 1949 and began operations in May 1950. By then the need for a coordinated international program aimed at alleviating the suffering of the dispossessed was acute. In December 1948, Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion had rejected UN Resolution 194 calling for the swift return of Palestinian refugees and restitution of their property, declaring, "...we will take everything... [w]e will not allow the Arabs back."³ Three months earlier, Chief UN Mediator in Palestine Count Folke Bernadotte's assessment that, "...no settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee to return to the home from which he has been dislodged," had resulted in his assassination by members of the Israeli military.⁴

The scale of the refugee problem threatened the region with economic disaster. Initial 1947-48 waves of refugees had tripled the population of the Gaza Strip, doubled that of the West Bank and put unmanageable stress on the underdeveloped and poor neighboring states of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.⁵ UNRWA came equipped with a mandate to provide refugees with shelter and educational, health and food programs throughout the affected region and as such became the key public service provider for well over half of all the Palestinian people.⁶ The task was immense and in 1951 some 87% of refugee camp residents remained in tents. Regional crises, especially Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip (November 1956-March 1957), made UNRWA's work no easier and the lives of the refugees yet harder.⁷ The task was further complicated by budget limitations and a high refugee growth rate, which peaked at 10% in 1958.⁸ Camps struggled to provide even minimal shelter and sanitation services, with the overwhelming majority of residents without running water, sewage networks or proper housing.

By 1958, 70% of Gaza's population were registered Palestinian refugees. Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in 1950 meant that some 75% of the Hashemite Kingdom's population was Palestinian, 36% of whom were registered refugees. In Syria and Lebanon the figures were lower, at 2.5% and 8% respectively.⁹ Speaking before the UNGA in 1958, Arab delegate in charge of Palestinian affairs, Ahmed Shuqri, described the refugees' rights, incl. that to return to their homes, as "natural, inherent and self-existing... not bestowed by the UN, let alone Israel. They cannot be denied... consent or no consent, these rights are imprescriptible, irresistible and indivisible."

The reemergence of the Palestinian national movement in the late 1950s found immediate and enthusiastic support in the refugee community. Refugees in the camps of Jordan, Gaza, Syria and Lebanon rapidly took the lead in organizing propaganda, training and guerilla incursions as the 'rebirth' of Palestinian resistance took shape. Yasser Arafat and companions formally launched the Fateh movement in 1958 and by mid-1959 its first newspaper, *Our Palestine - The Call of Life* was published in Lebanon.¹⁰

UNRWA Registered Refugees (RRs) – Inside and Outside Refugee Camps (RCs), 1958

Jordan (25 Camps)				Gaza Strip - 8 Camps		Lebanon - 16 Camps		Syria - 9 Camps	
West Bank		East Bank							
Askar	2,917	Aida	1,027	Deir Al-Balah	7,559	Mar Elias	449	Khan Esheh	3,746
Balata	5,695	Beit Jibrin (Azzeh)	1,118	Al-Maghazi	7,545	Burj Al-Barajneh	3,464	Alliance	3,432
Camp No. 1	2,368	Fawwar	5,156	Khan Younis	19,761	Shatila	1,792	Khan Dannoun	1,516
Far'a	5,965	Arroub	6,938	Nuseirat	14,701	Jisr Al-Basha	1,356	Neirab	5,163
Nur Shams	3,408			Bureij	11,220	Dekwaneh	1,310	Khan Abu Bakr	279
Tulkarm	6,370			Rafah	32,008	Debayeh	1,905	Quarantine	308
Jenin	6,305	Jabal Hussein	10,019	Shati (Beach) Camp	19,043	Mieh Mieh	1,842	Homs City	3,576
Aqabat Jaber	31,608	Amman New Camp	7,603	Jabalia	22,308	Ein Al-Hilweh	10,650	Hama	1,656
Nuweimeh	7,301	Zarqa	6,446			Nabatiyyeh	2,718	Dera'a	1,297
Ein Sultan	17,339	Irbid	7,692			Rashidiyyeh	2,638		
Ama'ri	2,453	Al-Karameh	23,664			Al-Buss	3,413		
Deir Ammar	2,272					Burj Ash-Shamali	4,151		
Jalazoun	4,544					Nahr Al-Bared	6,980		
Qalandia	2,681					Beddawi	3,129		
Mu'askar	5,043					Wavell	2,418		
						Gouraud	3,071		
Total RRs Living in UNRWA Camps:			181,261	134,145		51,286		20,973	
RRs Living Outside UNRWA RCs:			386,109	103,823		75,199		85,026	
Total Registered Refugees:			567,370	237,968		126,485		105,999	
Total RRs Living in UNRWA Camps in Region:				387,665					
Total RRs Living Outside UNRWA Camps in Region:				650,157					
Total RRs in UNRWA Mandate Region:				1,037,822					

Source: UNRWA, 1958

MAP 17



THE NEAR EAST AFTER THE JUNE 1967 WAR

The Six-Day War of June 1967 produced what has been described as “a territorial earthquake” in the Middle East, with the ca. 20,000 km² Jewish State taking control of an area of 90,000 km² seemingly overnight.¹ The Egyptian Sinai, Syrian Golan Heights, Jordanian-held West Bank and Egyptian-held Gaza Strip were conquered by a vastly superior Israeli force in a humiliating defeat for Arab nationalism that shook the region and redefined the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Publicly, Israel would always maintain that the war was an act of defense against Syrian border aggressions and Nasser's deployment of Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Privately, the leading figures - Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin - admitted that the war was an opportunistic, haphazard act of aggressive expansion.² In the years leading up to the war, Israel had been engaged in a minor war of attrition along its eastern border, as Palestinian guerillas infiltrated and attacked Israeli targets. Generally, Israel saw King Hussein's Jordan as a potential accomplice in controlling the Palestinians and preferred to direct its 'preemptive' and retaliatory strikes at Syria and Egypt. Nasser's pan-Arab popularity and the two states' Soviet weaponry troubled Israel, while the US supported Israel as a strategic means of challenging Soviet allies and regional Arab nationalism.³

In early 1967, Israel commenced a concerted drive to escalate tensions on the Syrian border. According to Dayan, “[i]t went this way: we would send a tractor to plow someplace... in the demilitarized zone, and knew in advance that the Syrians would start to shoot. If they didn't shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance further, until in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot. And then we would use artillery and later the air force... that's how it was.”⁴ One such incident, in April 1967, culminated in Israeli jets over flying Damascus to shoot down six Syrian planes. A month later, Rabin, in a newspaper interview, threatened to conquer Damascus. Nasser, the acknowledged leader of the Arab World, found himself obliged to make a show of strength and to act on Egypt's defense pact with Syria. After deploying troops in the Sinai, he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.

The US informed Israel it saw no sign of any imminent Arab invasion, but that in any event Israel would “whip the hell out of them,” and pledged to replenish Israeli armaments in a post-war scenario.⁵ Israel acted on 5 June, attacking Egypt's air force on the ground and annihilating it in two hours. When Syrian and Jordanian forces engaged from the east, their air forces met a similar fate. Some 400 planes were destroyed in a single day. In the five subsequent days, Dayan and Rabin transformed an original operational plan limited to securing the Straits of Tiran and effecting 'minor border adjustments' on the eastern front, into one of huge assaults and lightening territorial conquest. The attack on the Sinai was well planned, but the occupation of the entire West Bank and Golan Heights had not been anticipated.⁶ The West Bank was 'grabbed' as soon as intelligence reports revealed that King Hussein had ordered his troops back across the Jordan. The Golan was captured last and without even the pretence of military justification. Dayan bypassed the Chief of Staff to order the Golan offensive on the penultimate day of the war, hours after Syria had requested a cease-fire. Dayan would later call his adventurism a failure of duty. Prime Minister Eshkol called him a “vile man.”⁷

The war Israel had initiated with Egypt led their armies against Jordan and Syria and brought them massive, unexpected gains on all fronts. Prime Minister Eshkol proclaimed “a new political reality in the Mideast.”⁸ Following the cessation of hostilities on 10 June, the UNSC called on Israel to comply with the 4th Geneva Convention and to allow the “return of those inhabitants who have fled...”⁹ Israel did neither.¹⁰ During the war, Israel had again employed its 1948 tactic of razing entire Palestinian villages to the ground (in the Latrun area). Some 300,000 Palestinians had been added to the refugee Diaspora by the end of the war. Another 1.3 million Palestinians found themselves under Israeli military occupation, divided into two areas – the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.¹¹

MAP 18



THE ALLON PLAN, JUNE 1967

As the 1967 War drew to a close, Israel's 'unity government' and its military strategists were forced to formulate an approach to the control of their vast new conquests. Early on it was held that the Sinai and Golan Heights might be eventually returned in exchange for treaties with Egypt and Syria. Israel, in contrast to near unanimous world opinion, did not, however, recognize Jordanian or Egyptian rights over the West Bank or Gaza Strip, claiming to have 'liberated' these areas from 'illegal occupation'. But the demographic aspect of absorbing the indigenous Palestinian population into the Jewish State ruled out annexing these areas outright to Israel.¹ In contrast, the conquest of Jerusalem was instantly deemed irreversible and, by 28 June, the Knesset had amended its laws and placed the entire city and expanded municipal area under Israeli sovereignty, later annexing the 70-km² area. Here the demographic problem was considered a price worth paying, though subsequent Israeli policy would aim at ridding Jerusalem of its Palestinian population (see Maps 50, 51, 56 & 61).

Thus, in the days following the Israeli occupation, frantic and often conflicting plans for the future of the occupied territories were drawn up in each of these areas: Jerusalem; the Golan; Sinai; the Gaza Strip; and the West Bank. While no single plan was ever officially sanctioned, the Allon Plan, drawn up by Labor Minister Yigal Allon, was the scheme most acceptable to the military and was the first to be presented before the cabinet - in late July, barely six weeks after the cease-fire.² In deference to the government's early aim of preserving its territorial options in the Sinai and Golan, the Allon Plan initially focused on the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). Inevitably, the plan evolved and expanded according to the divergent views and levels of influence of other cabinet figures, but was nonetheless to remain Israel's loose master plan for the OPT for nearly a decade.

Once the decision to retain control over the OPT had been made, the systematic installation of civilian and military colonies on Palestinian land as a means of developing and reinforcing that control commenced. The Allon Plan provided the initial boundaries and priorities for this settlement drive.³ Allon, with his assistant Dani Agmon, planned a broad corridor of paramilitary and civilian sites along the Jordan Valley, to run down the western shore of the Dead Sea in an even broader belt, reaching west to Hebron. This created a settled strip from the Israeli town of Arad (in the northeastern Negev), north to Beit Shean (Beisan) in Israel's southern Galilee. The corridor between Israel's coastal plain and unilaterally annexed Jerusalem was broadened extensively, creating a wide settlement zone between Ramallah and Bethlehem. Allon tentatively planned for Gaza's refugees - ca. 75% of the Gaza population - to be transferred to the two militarily administered cantons created on the West Bank, followed by the annexation and settlement of the Gaza Strip, though this never eventuated.⁴

By remaining unofficial and vaguely worded, the Allon Plan bridged the gap between the government's need to appear moderate to the international community and its desire to maintain the option of 'stretching' settlement boundaries in the future. Indeed, only weeks after the initial plan, Allon submitted a supplementary plan for extensive settlement in the Golan.⁵ Some months later, Allon amended his plan to include a corridor linking Ramallah with Jordan and a 'highway' connecting the north and south Palestinian cantons from Bethlehem to Ramallah. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's separate proposal for military installations along the mountain ridges within the envisioned Palestinian cantons was also incorporated in the plan. By 1971, settlements were also being built in the Sinai Peninsula, as the Allon Plan was stretched yet further.

In 1976, Prime Minister Rabin and Defense Minister Peres eventually made the decision to break with Allon's settlement 'lines' and pursue settlement deep in the northern canton (i.e., in the Ramallah, Salfit and Qalqilya areas).⁶ By then, the rise of ideological messianic settlement bodies and extensive unauthorized settlement activity throughout the OPT had made strict adherence to the Allon Plan a political liability, if not an impossibility. The Allon Plan's erosion - not least at the hands of its author, who had headed the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee - was confirmed by Rabin, but its guiding principles were only finally cast off with the 1977 Likud victory. The Likud came to power having adopted a pro-settlement platform highly critical of the Allon Plan limitations and having pledged their support for the initiation of unfettered settlement programs throughout the OPT. Prime Minister Begin appointed Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon head of 'Allon's' Settlement Committee (see Map 24).

MAP 19



THE PLO, 1965–1971

By the early 1960s, a new generation of Palestinians had emerged, incensed by the injustices inflicted upon them and frustrated by the failings of the Arab states amongst which they were dispersed. Fear of Israeli retaliation and domestic agitation prevented the Arab governments from fostering the independence of the Palestinian political movements they formed, such as Fateh.¹ Instead, in 1964, the Arab League formed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Ostensibly under Nasser's patronage, the PLO - headed by Palestinian Ahmed Shuqairi - professed an aim of, "organizing the Palestinian people and enabling them to play their role in the liberation of their country," but initially remained subservient to the established Arab leaders.²

In late 1964, Yasser Arafat's Fateh movement took the initiative and launched its first guerilla attack on Israel. The next year, Fateh ran 39 such operations and began recruiting volunteers from the refugee camps.³ After the 1967 War and the defeat of the Arab armies, many saw the ongoing Palestinian efforts as the only sign of Arab resistance and more volunteers joined as numerous other groups were formed.⁴ Israel's destruction of West Bank and Gaza networks following the war left Jordan as the main base for guerilla forces, which accrued a degree of virtual autonomy in a number of border villages.

Some 78 guerilla attacks were launched across the Jordan River in as many days in early 1968, prompting a massive Israeli retaliation on 21 March⁵ when 15,000 Israeli troops participated in the attack on Karameh.⁶ Anticipating the offensive, Arafat ordered his 250 Fateh fighters to resist alongside 80 other guerillas and a division of the Jordanian army. The guerillas lost 116 men, the Jordanians 61, but at Karameh (which means 'dignity' or 'honor') a vast Israeli force met real resistance: 28 soldiers were killed and a legend was born. In the 48 hours following the battle, 5,000 recruits enlisted with Fateh. Other movements were also inundated with volunteers and Yasser Arafat achieved near mythical status.⁷ He rode a wave of popular endorsement to wrest control of the PLO in early 1969 and late that year was being seen not only as the leader of the resistance but, in many instances, of the Palestinian people.

By 1970, PLO forces were operating their own police, courts, trade unions, media and armed forces throughout the Jordanian refugee camps and beyond.⁸ As an umbrella organization whose constituent parts ranged from revolutionary Marxists to separatist nationalists, the PLO was at once broad-based and fractious. The tactics of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) had, by 1969, drawn the armed conflict firmly into the international arena, yet the same year Fateh was holding secret talks with Israel in Paris.⁹ The presence of armed, often unruly, autonomous Palestinian forces posed a serious challenge to the Hashemite regime.¹⁰ Then, in September 1970, the PFLP landed three hijacked airliners in an airfield near Amman, released the passengers and, after making their case before the assembled international media, blew up the aircraft.¹¹ Humiliated by the display of his impotence, King Hussein felt forced to finally impose his authority on the militias.

The next day, 16 September, the Jordanian army began its offensive, declaring martial law and using artillery on PLO strongholds and camps. The 'Black September' civil war lasted until 27 September, leaving over 3,000 dead and many camps and cities, incl. Amman, devastated.¹² Syrian military intervention to aid the PLO raised regional stakes and Cold War concerns, eventuating in Nasser's mediation of an urgent cease-fire agreement in Cairo.¹³ The War of 1970 reduced the PLO's presence to the 'Ajlun and Jerash strongholds, from which - in July 1971 - Hussein finally ousted them, leaving a further 3,000 Palestinians dead.¹⁴

Arafat and his fighters fled to Lebanon, where the PLO set up its next headquarters. The 'honeymoon' in Jordan had been brought to an end and Lebanon stood to become the next theater of conflict, as Israel stepped up efforts to eliminate a Palestinian national movement that had proved itself highly capable and had also exhibited its potential to divide as much as unite the Arab World.

MAP 20



THE OCTOBER WAR, 1973

The October War of 1973 ended in a virtual 'draw', yet saw Israel's perceived invincibility shattered. As such, the war brought political and social turmoil to Israel and restored much of the strategic maneuverability the Arab states had lost in 1967. Since President Nasser's death in September 1970, his successor Anwar Sadat, had responded to domestic and regional doubts about his credibility and the role of post-1967 Egypt by seeking a way out of the prevailing stalemate with Israel. Sadat came to power after a 17-month war of attrition (1969-70) waged along the closed Suez Canal had already pitched US-client Israel against Soviet-aligned Egypt in a struggle, which ended inconclusively and increased Arab malcontent with the *status quo*.

Hafez Al-Assad's 1970 rise to power in Syria, like Sadat's in Egypt, prompted awkward questions about the aims and worth of Arab solidarity in the face of Israel's intransigent occupation. Both leaders sought a way to extract themselves with honor from the humiliating legacy of 1967.¹ Meanwhile, in Israel, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Dayan led a distinctly 'hawkish' Labor government, wherein even Foreign Minister Eban complained of his colleagues' "...exaggerated vision of the role of war in international politics."²

With the Vietnam War raging, the US, guided by the so-called Nixon Doctrine, was set on limited containment of the Arab-Israeli Cold War theater, opting to keep the sides engaged in "protracted and inconclusive negotiations," through low-level channels. By late 1971, Nixon's National Security Council head Henry Kissinger was pleased to see, "the stalemate for which I had striven by design."³ Sadat repeatedly sought a diplomatic breakthrough, presenting UN Secretary-General Jarring and US Secretary of State Rogers with a number of unprecedented concessions and formulations. Breaking with all prior stipulations, in 1971 he declared his willingness to accept a token Israeli withdrawal from the Suez zone as part of an interim deal, in a significant move the US later regretted having missed.⁴ In any event, Israel, operating under an inflated belief in its own might and Arab impotence, either rejected or ignored Sadat's initiatives, and came under no US pressure to acknowledge them. Turning instead to the OPT, in 1973 Israel prepared a new hard-line plan for expanded colonization in the Palestinian territories (the Galili Document). Defense Minister Dayan proclaimed, "[a] new State of Israel, with broad frontiers, strong and solid, with the authority of the Israel Government extended from the Jordan to the Suez Canal."⁵

Sadat's dramatic 1972 expulsion of some 15,000 Soviet personnel had loosened the Cold War restraints on military action and placed the strategist in unfettered command of Egypt's Soviet weaponry. On 6 October 1973, he acted; Syria and Egypt launched a coordinated offensive against the Israeli forces occupying the Golan and Sinai on Yom Kippur - the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. The surprise was total, and initial Arab gains impressive, but after nearly three weeks and two separate cease-fires (Syria-Israel on 22 October, Egypt-Israel on 26 October), neither Israeli nor Arab armies had achieved a territorial victory.

Some 2,838 Israelis and 8,528 Arabs had paid with their lives, but the deadlock was broken.⁶ UNSC Resolution 338, ordering the cease-fire of 22 October, invoked UNSC Resolution 242 of 1967, with its demand for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with International Law. UN troops were deployed to enforce the cease-fires; Israel was forced back from the Suez, which reopened under Egyptian control; and the US was finally forced into active, high-level shuttle diplomacy between Cairo, Damascus and Israel.⁷


The October War brought down the Israeli government amid national crisis and laid the foundations for the first substantive Arab-Israeli peace talks. It also placed the US in the fateful position of Middle East mediator and reinvigorated the struggle to resist Israel's expansionism - a goal which suddenly appeared eminently more possible.⁸

MAP 21

The Syrian Front at the Cease-Fire of 22 October 1973



The Egyptian Front at the Cease-Fire of 26 October 1973



- Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967
- Occupied Egyptian territory regained during the October War and held at its end
- Additional Arab territories captured by Israel during the October War and held at its end
- Suez Canal

THE PALESTINIANS INSIDE ISRAEL, 1977

The Palestinians who remained in the area, which became Israel in 1948 found themselves instantly transformed into an ethnic minority under military rule, stripped of all pre-state economic and political structure and with their identity denied by the Jewish State. At the close of the war ca. 90,000 Palestinians remained in the central and western Galilee, ca. 31,000 in the area known as the 'Little Triangle' (bordering the north-western tip of the West Bank) and ca. 13,000 in the Negev. A further 10-12,000 were residing in the previously 'mixed' cities of Akko, Haifa and Jaffa. With the exception of the Galilee's Nazareth (16,800) and Um Al- Fahm in the 'Little Triangle' (5,000) the remaining Palestinian localities were small hamlets or villages. About 70% of the Arab community were Muslim, 21% Christian and 9% Druze.¹

The existence of a 12.5% 'non-Jewish' minority was immediately conceived of by the leaders of the Jewish State as a threat - both in terms of the Zionist imperative of an ethnically exclusive nation and in terms of the Palestinians' 'suspect loyalties' given the state of regional conflict.² Four days after Israel's 15 May 1948 declaration of independence, the provisional government issued the 'Defense Emergency Regulations', invoking repressive British Mandate laws employed to crush the 1936-39 Revolt. These regulations paved the way for the creation of a dual, or two-tier, legal administration that placed the Palestinians under military rule until 1966. Among the first directives issued to the military governors was that to evacuate "semi-abandoned villages."³


The military government was not merely an instrument of physical control, but was used to systematically erode and counter any efforts by the Palestinians to improve upon their fragmented and isolated status - both as a community and vis-à-vis Jewish government and society. Some 170 military orders were issued, limiting the Palestinians' basic rights to property, travel, political activity and freedom of speech.⁴ Israel's Arab Affairs Advisor described the Palestinians in Israel as, "sworn and everlasting enemies," and the military commanders agreed: "they must be checked, patrolled and supervised."⁵

Israel's perception of the Palestinians as a 'demographic threat' fueled a drive to settle and control areas of 'non-Jewish' character. By 1966, when the military government was abolished, 35 post-1948 exclusively Jewish settlements had been established in the Galilee and over 100 in the Negev area.⁶ Many more were planned. Meanwhile, some 100 Palestinian villages were not even recognized by Israel, which 'zoned' them in 'non-residential' areas and has persistently denied them the most fundamental infrastructure and development. 'Re-zoning' later meant that Jewish towns were erected on the land of unrecognized villages, where they enjoy national development priority status.⁷

Within four decades of the 1948 War at least 80% of the Palestinian minority's land would be expropriated by the state. By the mid-1970s, 533,800 Palestinians made up 15.3% of Israel's population, yet only four of the 120 members of Knesset were 'non-Jews', the adult illiteracy rate among Palestinian women was nearly 60% and under 3% of higher education students were Palestinian.⁸ Persistent discrimination, both legal and *de facto*, the near total loss of landholdings, and the strengthening of their Palestinian identity following the 1967 War, hastened the emergence of an organized 'civic struggle' for rights and equality.⁹

In 1976, with Israel declaring its commitment to "populate the Galilee [with Jews]," so as to, "protect national land," and expropriation accelerating, a general strike was called. On 30 March 1976, dozens of committees and emerging political bodies led a popular protest rally against expropriation in the Galilee. When Israeli forces attempted to impose a curfew to quell the protests, clashes erupted, in the course of which six Palestinians were killed. 'Land Day' has thereafter been observed annually to commemorate and further the struggle of the oppressed Palestinian minority against dispossession, discrimination and marginalization.

MAP 22



THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, 1978-1979

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's 1977 shock visit to Israel, where he addressed the Knesset, kick-started a momentous diplomatic process that led to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. The Camp David Accords of 1978-79 saw Egypt regain the Sinai and Israel achieve the Arab recognition it desired. It also resulted in Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League and, in 1981, Sadat's assassination.

By 1977, the gains of the 1973 War had lost their worth in Egypt, where economic decline, coupled with the debilitating cost of maintaining a standing army, presented a fresh threat to the regime's credibility. A 1974 Sinai Disengagement Agreement, brokered by the US, had seen a realignment of Israeli and Egyptian forces to the east of the Suez Canal zone and, after leading to the 1975 'Sinai II' accord, created a UN buffer between them. However, the agreements were in truth US-Israel 'engagement' accords, with the US pledging \$4 billion annually over three years to Israel in exchange for a stabilization of the canal and lowering of regional tension. As such, the agreement fell far short of a peace treaty and in itself offered no prospect for an agreed Israeli withdrawal or even negotiations toward that end.¹

The Arab League's 1974 endorsement of the PLO's as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" had thwarted Israeli ambitions of achieving a separate peace deal with Jordan and placed a Palestinian leadership Israel refused to recognize central to the attainment of the 'comprehensive' peace, upon which the Arab states insisted. Sadat's initial peace formulations were guided by this 'comprehensive' doctrine, calling for multilateral talks aimed not only at Israel's withdrawal from Sinai, but at its full implementation of UNSC Resolution 242. But Israel's utter rejection of PLO involvement or discussion on the sovereignty of the OPT left Sadat isolated and the 1978 bilateral talks, held under US auspices, paid only lip-service to the Palestinians. Israeli Prime Minister Begin, recognizing Sadat's fear of appearing to 'sell out' the Palestinians and Arab unity for his own gain, eventually acceded to a watered-down framework for partial Palestinian autonomy in the OPT, but kept its definition vague and free of real commitment.²

The weak autonomy plan, unacceptable to the PLO and Arab states, provided Begin with the opportunity to combine normalization and mutual recognition with Israel's largest 'confrontation' state with an unstated international acknowledgement of *de facto* Israeli sovereignty over an expanded Israel, i.e., incl. the OPT. It was this factor, along with the gains of dividing the Arab World and diluting the pressure it could place on the UN or US, which allowed Begin's 'hawkish' Likud government to accept a three-year staged withdrawal from the Sinai in exchange for peace.³ The final treaty was signed in March 1979. Four days later, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League. The Palestinian National Council (PNC) called the treaty, "a conspiracy which should be rejected and resisted by all means."⁴ The PLO saw the autonomy idea for what it was: a sop to the Palestinians that the Israelis had no plan to implement.⁵

Not only was the autonomy plan never begun, but the domestic repercussions of Israel's evacuation of its 17 illegal Sinai settlements (with a population of over 5,000) brought about a 'compensatory' buttressing of illegal colonization in the OPT.⁶ Settlement in Sinai had begun in 1967, but had only become a formal component of the extended Allon Plan in the early 1970s. The Labor governments of Meir and Rabin had pursued a plan to settle a thin strip along the eastern Sinai reaching Sharm Esh-Sheikh, while creating a settlement 'buffer' between Gaza and Egypt in the northeast of the peninsula. Thousands of indigenous Egyptian Bedouins were expelled from the target areas.⁷ Begin had encouraged and expanded the program even during the Camp David process - he planned to retire to the Sinai.⁸

The struggle waged against evacuation by the expansionist and settler lobby - both in the government and the activist movements - was bitter and sometimes violent. On 22 April 1982, Sinai's 'urban center' Yammit was forcibly evacuated by Israeli troops and the Sinai withdrawal completed, on time, by 25 April. Only Taba, a 1.2-km² patch west of Eilat, was retained by Israel, but the Sinai evacuation galvanized the settlement movements, spurring greatly increased activity in the OPT.⁹

The Camp David accords, with their OPT autonomy component, laid the groundwork for future diplomatic initiatives - incl. the failed Oslo process - and ushered in a new era of US-Arab relations, with Egypt at the fore of American regional defense plans.¹⁰ But Egypt's recognition of Israel also cost it the leadership of the Arab World and Sadat his life. Peace with Egypt had consolidated Israel's hold on Palestinian territory and freed it to focus on eradicating the newly developing PLO mini-state in Lebanon.¹¹

MAP 23



ISRAELI SETTLEMENT MASTER PLANS, 1976-1991

With the 1977 Likud election victory, Ariel Sharon became Chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee and hence responsible for drawing up guidelines for Israel's colonization in the territories occupied in 1967. He immediately sought to merge the Likud vision of unfettered settlement with existing master plans.¹

The Wachman, or 'Double-Backbone Plan', unofficially approved by Prime Minister Rabin in 1976, provided Sharon with an overall long-term vision of mass settlement. Like Allon, Wachman called for settlement primarily in sparsely populated areas. The plan aimed at maximizing Jewish demography throughout the eastern OPT, the Sinai and the Golan, while encircling - rather than settling - the major Palestinian population centers. It offered a strictly secular, pragmatic outline for securing the Jordan Rift border, the Golan Heights, the Gaza-Sinai area and the Gulf of Aqaba/Sharm Esh-Sheikh coastline. Wachman's geo-strategic vision aimed at settling 2.5 million Jews in the Golan Heights-Sharm Esh-Sheikh line, aided by long-term development, immigration and housing investment. However, the plan failed to address the national-religious imperatives of those already settling in the heart of the OPT.

When Wachman refused Sharon an amended plan incorporating 'Judea, Samaria and Gaza,' Sharon turned to Matityahu Drobles, head of the WZO's Land Settlement Department and a Gush Emunim loyalist, transforming existing bureaucracy to allow separate planning in the OPT.² The Drobles Plan 'nationalized' a scheme drawn up by the messianic settler lobby Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), which Sharon had endorsed in 1977. Drobles expanded the scope of the original plan by drawing together all existing settlements and 57 new ones into blocs controlling arterial routes, ridges and water sources, breaking up Palestinian demographic continuity. Cities were encapsulated, while settlement control over west-east corridors to the Jordan Rift paralyzed Palestinian communication in a design meant to rule out forever any type of OPT autonomy.³


Though the Gush-Drobles plan broke any remaining taboos on the location of settlements, its radical ideological basis failed to provide the practical necessities for its fulfillment. The messianic settler movement could only offer limited human resources to the project and Israel needed mass settlement if its colonization was to be sustained. Sharon set out to transform the scheme into one affording 'quality of life' settlements with immediate territorial unity and overall contiguity with Israel's coastal plain. His 1981 plan remained loyal to the Gush-Drobles vision but split the Palestinian territories into three cantons and, while leaving the way open for ideological settlement deep in the populous heart of the OPT, encouraged more substantial suburban settlement in blocs. At the time of the plan, West Bank settlers outside East Jerusalem numbered only 16,000 (with 800-900 in Gaza).⁴ By exploiting the growing demand for cheap suburban housing, Sharon aimed at settling an additional 80,000 Jews in the OPT within five years. The plan was coupled with extraordinary investment in infrastructure and services. Within two years, the settler population had nearly doubled and government expenditure on the enterprise had reached \$1.5 billion. Settlements, access roads and military camps consumed 41.6% of all West Bank land and 32% of the Gaza Strip.⁵ Sharon's plan remained the loose Likud blueprint through the 1980s, guiding expropriation, settlement and investment in the OPT. By March 1991, of the OPT's 185,000 settlers, roughly 100,000 were living in the areas his plan targeted, the remainder in East Jerusalem.⁶

Approved by the Knesset in May 1991, the 'Seven Stars' plan served the dual purpose of binding the central West Bank settlements to an industrialized belt of new development towns, while eroding the demography and geography of the Green Line.⁷ The 'star settlements' were established on or just beyond the Green Line, targeting the 'Little Triangle' area, where the highest concentration of Arab-Israelis lived. With a projected population of 390,000 Jews, the plan aimed at reversing the demography of the border strip from its 1991 status - 71.5% Arab-Israeli and 28.5% Jewish - to 36% and 64% respectively by 2005.⁸ A new highway, Route 6, was begun to link the 'stars', beginning with Modi'in in the south and ending with Harish in the north, along with 14 industrial zones and numerous new towns, creating a north-south strip separating Arab-Israeli villages from one another, their land and the OPT. Mass confiscations were made to facilitate the plan, which brought high-level infrastructure closer to the suburban OPT settlements and shattered the socio-economic fiber of Arab-Israeli communities in the area.


The 'Seven Star' plan reflected the extent to which Israel's entire national development program, with settlement at its heart, had been put to the service of destroying forever any possibility of Palestinian territorial or demographic contiguity. Though all master plans were based on long-term projections and underwent changes in implementation, their geo-political impact was immediate and long-term. Master plans were aimed not merely at delimiting areas of Jewish settlement, but at maximizing the confinement of Palestinian development, severing communication lines and robbing the indigenous population of its natural resources.

MAP 24


The Wachman Plan, 1976




The Gush-Drobes Plan, 1978



The Sharon Plan, 1981



The 'Seven Stars' Plan, 1991



LEBANON, 1982

After establishing its new headquarters in Lebanon, the PLO set about forging alliances with local forces and rearming its units. Once again a Palestinian 'mini-state' emerged, with its own welfare, commercial and other administrative functions.¹

By 1975, Israeli counter-offensives against guerillas in the south had caused the dislocation of thousands of Lebanese civilians. Insecurities among the Christian Maronite leaders, who recognized a challenge to their status in the PLO para-state's alliances with local Muslims, were exacerbating sectarian tensions. A bitter and complex civil war erupted in April 1975, lasting 18 months and leaving at least 20,000 dead, most of them civilians.² Towards the end of the war, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin initiated an alliance with the PLO's main adversaries, the Maronite Phalange, a large militia with ideological roots in Nazism. By the end of the war, Israel had also created a 'proxy' force in southern Lebanon, headed by Sa'ad Haddad.³ From late 1976, the PLO and Haddad's forces vied inconclusively for control of the southern sector. Israel retaliated for a March 1978 PLO raid on Israel by invading the south, killing some 2,000 and displacing 250,000 civilians.⁴ Thereafter, unprovoked Israeli offensives in the south and bombing raids on Beirut persisted, despite US pressure applied in July 1981.⁵

In December 1981, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon presented the Israeli cabinet and the US with his 'Big Plan' to "wipe them [the PLO] out completely in Lebanon." Begin's cabinet was concerned but endorsed a version of the plan. US envoy Philip Habib was shocked though, and told Sharon: "[Y]ou can't go around invading countries like that, spreading destruction and killing civilians!" But US Secretary of State Haig ceded tentatively, provided the assault followed "internationally recognized provocation."⁶


The failed assassination of Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to the UK, carried out by anti-PLO Abu Nidal forces on 3 June, eventually provided Israel with the pretext it needed. On 6 June, a massive Israeli force invaded Lebanon. Within a week Defense Minister Sharon had broken every assurance he had offered the US and his own Prime Minister, and rather than holding a 40-km 'buffer' in the south (the declared operational objective), the Israeli army was laying siege to Beirut. A 11 June US-sponsored cease-fire was brushed aside, as Sharon ordered his troops and their Phalange allies into the capital's residential quarters. Last minute US threats of intervention stalled the advance and allowed US envoy Habib to negotiate an evacuation of the PLO forces holding out in the capital. After a two-month siege, the PLO agreed to 'evacuation without surrender' in return for US guarantees for a multinational protection force to ensure the safety of Beirut's Palestinian civilians.

On 21 August, the US 6th Fleet escorted the first contingent of PLO forces out to sea, bound for Tunis via Greece. On 30 August, Arafat left Beirut after an 11-year stay. In all, some 8,500 PLO cadre left by sea and a further 2,500 by land (to Syria, Yemen and Iraq).⁷ The Israelis, with US assistance, had in the meantime successfully installed their Phalange ally, Bashir Gemayal, as president on 23 August. His assassination three weeks later fouled Israel's long-term Lebanon strategy, calling for a pliant Christian buffer-state ruled by a military client, and led to the most horrific incident of the war.⁸

Prior to evacuation, the PLO had demanded, and been given, "the assurances of the United States as regards safety and security... for the [refugee] camps in Beirut."⁹ But following PLO withdrawal, the US-led multinational force charged with this undertaking was inexplicably pulled out well ahead of the agreed schedule, leaving the Palestinians at the mercy of Israel and its Phalange allies. On 16 September, Israel sealed the Sabra and Shatila RCs, positioned tanks around their entrances and ordered their Haddad forces as well as the Phalange militia to "purify the area," in an operation approved by Defense Minister Sharon himself.¹⁰ Up to 3,000 men, women and children were then mutilated, raped and murdered in a 42-hour massacre presided over by the Israeli army, whose flares lit up the camps during the night hours.¹¹ Though Israel would later shift responsibility for the atrocities onto its allies, US officials noted at the time that regardless of Israel's functional involvement in the killings, it was "...in absolute control of the area and therefore responsible."¹²

Israel's 'Peace for Galilee' operation cost it 446 lives. At the very least, 21,000 Palestinians and Lebanese were killed during the fighting (and many more died later as a result of their injuries or unexploded ordinance). Some 84% of the dead were Arab civilians; 600,000 Lebanese and Palestinians were rendered homeless. On 17 May 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed a cease-fire agreement and ended the war, but Israel was to remain - with its militia - in southern Lebanon for another 17 years.¹³

MAP 25



THE 1991 MADRID PEACE CONFERENCE & ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

On 15 November 1988, the PNC - meeting in Algiers - adopted a resolution accepting the principle of a two-state-solution to the Palestine-Israel conflict. Fulfilling long-standing US preconditions for recognition, the Palestinian leadership-in-exile acknowledged Israel's right to exist and - in December - renounced all forms of terrorism, while unconditionally accepting UNSC Res.s 242 and 338.¹ In doing so it gave up any claim to the 78% of Mandate Palestine conquered and depopulated in the 1947-1948 War and limited its demands to the 22% of Palestine made up of the OPT. The outgoing Reagan Administration responded by immediately opening dialogue with the PLO in Tunis. While encouraged by the Palestinian position, the US was disturbed by the daily news footage of "savage Israeli beatings of Palestinian youngsters," which it knew could easily ignite regional radicalism.² The UN had described Israel's strong-hand measures against the *Intifada* as, "a grave subject of concern for the international community," and in May 1989, Secretary of State Baker urged Israel to "lay aside the unrealistic vision of Greater Israel ... forswear annexation, stop settlement activity [and]... reach out to the Palestinians as neighbors who deserve political rights."³

Reviving the stillborn Camp David 'autonomy' framework, the Bush Administration placed unprecedented pressure on Israel's extreme-right government. Prime Minister Shamir had come to power in 1988, pledging, "not [to] give land in return for peace," and "to strengthen settlement, to broaden and develop it."⁴ His government, which included advocates of mass-expulsion of 'non-Jews', snubbed all US pressure and infuriated Baker: "I can only say; 'take this number: 202 456 1414 [the White House switchboard]. When you're serious about peace, call us."⁵ In October 1990, Israeli forces massacred 21 Muslim worshippers at Al-Haram Ash-Sharif in Jerusalem, incurring worldwide and UNSC condemnation. But despite the increased pressure, Israel rejected US demands that it engage in talks with freely chosen Palestinian representatives and instead pursued its increasingly brutal attempt to suppress the popular uprising.

The PLO's misguided attempt to elevate international engagement by demanding 'linkage' between the occupation of Palestine and Iraq's 1990-1991 occupation of Kuwait cost it the diplomatic advantage it had gained as a result of Israel's belligerence. In the wake of the Gulf War, the US was able to limit the enhumbed PLO's role in proposed talks and thus increase its pressure on Israel. By assuring Prime Minister Shamir that no PLO representatives would be involved and then threatening to withhold a \$10 billion loan guarantee by which Israel planned to absorb Russian immigrants - partly through settlement construction - the US finally coaxed the Israelis to talks.

The Madrid Middle East Peace Talks convened on 30 October 1991 under the guidance of US Secretary of State Baker and with the symbolic co-sponsorship of the Soviet Union. The basis of the talks was UNSC Res.s 242 and 338, embodying the formula of land-for-peace. Due to stubborn Israeli insistence and the PLO's Gulf War error, the non-PLO Palestinian delegates were further limited to non-Jerusalemites from inside the OPT. Gaza physician Haidar Abdel Shafi led the Palestinian delegation, telling the assembled that, "[m]utuality and reciprocity must replace domination and hostility for genuine reconciliation and coexistence under international legality."⁶

Madrid saw Israelis and Palestinian leaders enter formal peace talks for the first time. The powerful symbolism of the event was matched by a concerted US drive for Israeli acceptance of the land-for-peace formula, and set in motion a series of multilateral and bilateral talks. Shamir proved unequal to the historic role assigned him and returned from Madrid to inaugurate yet another new settlement in the OPT. Shunned by his right-wing allies, Shamir lost the 1992 elections as he tried to excuse his attendance at Madrid: "I would have continued talks for 10 years and by that time we would have half a million people in Judea, Samaria and Gaza [the OPT]," he promised.⁷

By 1991, more than 150 settlements had been established throughout the OPT. With Palestinian building barred in 68% of the OPT, the incoming Rabin government prepared to spend 20% of its national housing budget on settlements. Of the 220,000 settlers, 120,000 were living in East Jerusalem, where three new sites had been started in 1991 alone.⁸ As US brokers prepared to build on the land-for-peace formula, the new Labor government stepped up Israel's campaign to create intractable facts on the ground. Armed with a new master plan (N[atational] M[aster] P[lan] #31) aimed at adding 140,000 settlers over five years, Prime Minister Rabin announced, "[w]e are in control of the territory and we will not move one inch."⁹

MAP 26



NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO - MAPS 16-26

MAP 16

¹ In the Qibya incident of 14-15 October 1953, Israel's 'Unit 101,' led by Ariel Sharon, crossed into the Jordanian-controlled West Bank and attacked three Palestinian villages: Qibya, Shuqba and Budrus. Operating under orders to cause "destruction and maximum killing," Unit 101 dynamited Qibya, leveling a mosque, school, shops and homes, slaughtering livestock, and massacring over 50 civilians. Even Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett was stunned noting that a 'reprisal' "of this magnitude has never been carried out before." In Khan Younis, on 20 February 1955, the same unit attacked Egyptian posts and a water pumping station, leaving 40 dead. In Qalqilya, on 10 October 1956, 75 Palestinians were killed. Sharett quoted in: PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, pp. 102. On massacres and casualties: Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, pp. 114-6. Also, Kyle, Keith, *Suez*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991, p. 34 & p. 64.

² The Universal Suez Canal Company had previously paid a token 3% of annual profits to the Egyptian Treasury. For Nasser, refusal of the US, Britain and France to grant the arms deals he had requested, coupled with their rejection of his appeals for a loan for the Aswan Dam construction, justified the nationalization of the canal. Kyle, Keith, *Suez*, p. 119.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

⁴ Having declared a curfew on all Palestinians in Israel at the outset of the offensive, Israel sent forces to the village of Kufr Qassem, some 20 km north of Tel Aviv. Finding Palestinians returning from work unaware of the 5 pm curfew, a patrol massacred 43 civilians, including women and children.

⁵ Britain, France and Israel had made a pact at Sevres, France, detailing the course of the offensive. Israel was to attack through the Sinai, whereupon the Anglo-French alliance would condemn the attack, call for a ceasefire and issue an ultimatum for Nasser to hand over the canal to 'international' protectors, rather than allow a regional war. The Sevres Pact allowed Israel to remain up to 10 miles from the Canal Zone and occupy the entire Sinai Peninsula. Nasser rejected the 12-hour ultimatum, as expected, and the bombing of Cairo commenced on 31 October. US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles described the collusion as, "about as crude and brutal as anything." In all, some 268 Egyptian fighter planes were destroyed on the ground in the first stage of the offensive. Dulles quoted in: *Ibid.*, p. 361.

⁶ Mass graves of bound male Palestinian civilians, all shot in the back of the head, were found in Khan Younis following the Israeli withdrawal. PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 109. According to UNRWA, at least 400 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces during the occupation of the Gaza Strip.

UNRWA, *The Long Journey, Palestinian Refugees and UNRWA - 45 Years - A Photographic Essay*, Vienna: UN, 1995, p. 8.

The UN reported that in Sinai, "As the Israelis withdrew... they began a systematic destruction of the surfaced roads, the railway and what few buildings there were." UNTSO Chief General Burns, quoted in: Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 221.

⁷ Suez was a turning point globally. French colonies and protectorates in Africa and Asia fell in subsequent years, while American influence jostled with Soviet influence, as the Non-Aligned Movement picked up the pieces and attempted to protect the fragile semi-independent stance of its members. All were factors on the global stage precipitated by the Suez crisis.

MAP 17

¹ Statistics according to UNRWA, as reproduced in: Morris, Benny, *1948 and After*, pp. 220-221.

² UNRWA's mandate limited it to classifying as a refugee only those dispossessed Palestinians whose place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, and who had lost *both* home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1947-48 War. Registration must have been made with the Agency prior to July 1952. Thus, an undetermined number of refugees who lost their homes and livelihood in the war but who were residing elsewhere in the specified period exists, as does a number - estimated at 50,000 - of so-called 'late-comers', who missed the 1952 deadline, as well as those whose 'means of livelihood' was not lost with their home in the course of the war. It is impossible to know how many Palestinians fall in this 'unregistered refugee' category, but by 2001 (when the *registered* refugee population reached 3.7 million) it was estimated that 48% of all Palestinian refugees were actually *unregistered*. See UNRWA and *Palestinian Refugees, 1950-2000*, Gaza: UNRWA Headquarters, 2000, p. 23, and PASSIA, *Palestinian Refugees - Special Bulletin*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2001.

³ UNGA Resolution 194 was passed on 11 December 1948. Ben-Gurion's statement was made on 18 December. Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, p. 186.

⁴ Bernadotte was killed the day after this statement was made. Members of the *Lehi* carried out the attack. No one was ever charged with the murder of the high-ranking UN official, but years later it was revealed that future Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had participated in ordering the assassination. Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 121; Shlaim, Avi, *The Iron Wall - Israel and the Arab World*, London: Penguin Books, 2000, p. 37; Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 162-3.

⁵ UNRWA, *The Long Journey*, p. 7.

⁶ In 1948 ca. 150,000 Palestinians had remained in what became Israel, ca. 320,000 Palestinians were pre-1948 residents of the West Bank; pre-1948 Gaza residents amounted to less than 100,000. Thus, at the end of the war, some

570,000 Palestinians were non-refugees, while in 1950 UNRWA registered at least 914,221 refugees. PASSIA, *Palestinian Refugees - Special Bulletin*; UNRWA, *The Long Journey*, p. 7.

⁷ According to UNRWA officials, during Israel's 1956-57 occupation, "almost 400 Gazans [sic] were killed. UNRWA supply lines were cut, curfews were imposed, Agency services were disrupted and food supplies were looted." *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁸ UNRWA, *UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees, 1950-2000*, p. 11 & p. 24.

⁹ Morris, Benny, *1948 and After*, pp. 220-221.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

MAP 18

¹ Masalha, Nur, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians - The Politics of Expansion*, London: Pluto Press, 2000, p. 15.

² Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 234-250; Watzal, Ludwig, *Peace Enemies - The Past and Present Conflict Between Israel and Palestine*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1999, pp. 23-24. Menachem Begin would later summarize Israel's position as follows: "In June 1967 we had another opportunity. The concentration of Egyptian troops in the Sinai was not evidence of Nasser's readiness to attack us. We have to be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him." *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 228-234.

⁴ Dayan's admissions were only published - with the permission of his daughter - in 1997, 16 years after his death. Dayan estimated that over 80% of all instances on the Syrian border leading up to the war were instigated this way. *Ibid.*, p. 235.

⁵ President Johnson to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban on 23 May 1967, quoted in: *Ibid.*, p. 240.

As a result of the withdrawal agreements following the Suez War, the US was technically responsible for guaranteeing Israel's right of passage through the Straits of Tiran - the *casus belli* Israel presented for its attack. But with the US engaged on one Cold War front already with Vietnam, the administration was unwilling to open another front. Instead, they gave Israel the green light to go alone.

⁶ General Mordechai Hod, Commander of the Israeli Air Force later acknowledged that, "[s]ixteen years' planning went into those initial 80 minutes... we lived the plan, we slept the plan, we ate the plan. Constantly we perfected it." Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, pp. 227-229.

In contrast, the opportunities taken up in the West Bank and Golan were either capitalized upon as the war proceeded or 'created' during the adventurism the war inspired in its generals.

⁷ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 248-249. Historian Avi Shlaim's, explanation of the unraveling expansionism of the war and the territorial greed of its main Israeli protagonists is simple: "appetite comes with eating." The aggressive expansion into the Golan may have been a mistake for Israel. The USSR - who had supported Syria's call for a cease-fire, along with almost all the Soviet bloc states, immediately severed their ties with Israel and in subsequent years, Soviet regional policy toward Israel hardened considerably.

⁸ Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 229.

⁹ This was UNSC Resolution 237 of 14 June. UNSC Resolution 242, calling on Israel to withdraw from [the] "territories occupied in the recent conflict" was not passed until 22 November 1967.

¹⁰ The 4th Geneva Convention and Hague Convention lay down stipulations for the behavior of a "belligerent occupant" in times of war or belligerent occupation. Israel's refusal to recognize the Jordanians or Egyptians as the former rulers of the West Bank and Gaza Strip led it to deny the applicability of the status of "belligerent occupant" - declaring itself rather a "liberator" of illegally held land.

¹¹ PASSIA, *Palestinian Refugees - Special Bulletin*; Harris, William, *Taking Root - Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, the Golan and Gaza-Sinai, 1967-1980*, Published Academic Thesis, University of Otago, New Zealand, 1980, p. 16.

MAP 19

¹ The pre-June 1967 population of the West Bank, excluding Jerusalem, amounted to over 800,000 Palestinians, that of the Gaza Strip to 400,000. Unlike the protracted ethnic cleansing that accompanied and followed the 1948-49 war, Israel's unplanned and haphazard advances in the Six-Day-War had not depopulated these areas. Only in the Golan Heights and Jordan Valley had the majority of the population been put to flight. Harris, *Taking Root*, p. 16.

Faced with the prospect of upsetting Israel's demographic imperatives in exchange for achieving much of its territorial imperatives, Prime Minister Eshkol joked to Golda Meir, "The dowry pleases you, but the bride does not." Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 255.

² Yigal Allon was a leading spokesman for the Labor Party (later Deputy Prime Minister, 1968-1977), chairman of its kibbutz settlement body and rival of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. In 1948, he had served as the commander of the southern front in the Labor-affiliated *Palmach* shock troops and had pushed Ben-Gurion for permission to expand the conquest to the Jordan River, insisting this be Israel's 'defendable border'. Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians*, pp. 8-9. Israeli historian Avi Shlaim contends that during the build up to the 1967 War, Allon and Dayan "were the most fervent advocates of military action." Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 241.

A number of plans were drawn up for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where Israel's long-standing territorial aspirations and non-recognition of pre-1967 foreign sovereignty fostered a broad consensus in support of retaining control, if not sovereignty, perpetually. Foremost among the architects of these plans were Yigal Allon, Defense Minister Moshe

Dayan and General Rehavam Ze'evi, each of whom held varying notions regarding the extent of potential military and civilian settlement in the conquered territory and who, together, were to influence subsequent strategy in this regard for 10-15 years. Ze'evi's plan actually preceded that of Allon, and he would claim that Allon 'stole' his idea. Later, ideological settlement movements would credit Ze'evi with having laid the framework for their more comprehensive settlement master plans. Demant, Peter, *Ploughshares into Swords - Israeli Settlement Policy in the Occupied Territories, 1967-1977*, Published Academic Thesis, Amsterdam University, 1988, pp. 134-142.

³ Israel's 1967 leadership (military and political) knew the extent to which the role of settlements had defined and legitimized pre-state partition proposals, as well as the military role these sites had played in the 1948-49 War. Commenting on the role of settlements in the creation of Israel, Benny Morris concludes: "[s]ettlements ultimately meant sovereignty. Each new settlement or cluster of settlements staked out the Jewish claim to a new area." Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, p. 179.

Observing the same phenomenon, Peter Demant suggests that, "settlements may be said to have fathered the state of Israel." Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, p. 84; Also, Segev, *One Palestine*, p. 249.

⁴ Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, p. 134.

⁵ Allon later asserted that the need to settle the Golan Heights had been clear to him from the outset. His reason for hesitancy can be ascribed to the initial position in favor of relinquishing land for peace with Syria and Egypt, which the government was presenting to the US. This position, likely never more than a bluff, evaporated rapidly, and was carefully not expressed to the Syrians or Egyptians - who would likely have rejected it in any case. The Golan Heights represented a militarily strategic prize and simultaneously granted Israel unfettered control over the vital surface waters feeding the Sea of Galilee. The water issue was to become the prime mover in accelerating the settlement of the area and to remain the ultimate factor preventing any negotiated withdrawal (see Map 65). Harris, *Taking Root*, p. 183; Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 253-260.

In practical terms settlement in the Golan presented serious advantages to the government. Some 93% of the area's population had been dispossessed in the war and the depopulated Heights represented a strategic opportunity the military were anxious to secure. In fact, the first post-war settlement - Merom Golan - was unofficially established in the Golan in August 1967; within a year there were nine Golan sites officially established by the Jewish Agency and its affiliate arms. Harris, *Taking Root*, p. 16; Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, p. 151.

⁶ Peres and Rabin, under mounting pressure from Gush Emunim and the Likud bloc, endorsed a plan to settle in a west-east lateral running from Elkana (in Salfit Governorate), through the West Bank to meet the main Ramallah-Nablus highway. This would later become the so-called "Shomron [Samaria] Bloc", the largest settlement cluster outside Jerusalem, with Ariel at its heart. However, both Rabin and Peres would be ousted by Begin's Likud in 1977, which proceeded to oversee and expand upon the plan.

MAP 20

¹ The dispersal of the Palestinian refugees placed the emergence of an independent unifying leadership very much at the mercy of the Arab states, who were themselves engaged in intense and competitive ideological struggles throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In Nasser's post-Suez-War Egypt, for example, embryonic guerilla movements - once encouraged by the regime - were suddenly seen as a threat to Nasser's standing with the UNEF, deployed in the Gaza Strip. This, combined with Nasser's popularity, paralyzed the first Palestinian resistance units and caused some to flee Egypt, including the young Yasser Arafat, who had studied there. O'Neill, Bard, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political - Military Analysis*, Colorado: Westview Press (in cooperation with the National Defense University), 1978, pp. 4-6.

² Extract from the report of the First Arab Summit, Cairo, January 1964. Cobban, Helena, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 28-29.

³ Fateh operated its guerilla activities under the name *Al-'Asifa* (The Storm). The first attack was on 31 December 1964. The following day Fateh issued a communiqué stating, "... *Al-'Asifa* forces have been launched forth to reiterate to the enemy and the world at large that this people did not die and that armed revolution is the road to return and victory." Fateh (New Years Day) communiqué, quoted in: Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 196. For number of Fateh attacks see: Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, p. 33.

According to Arafat biographer Said Aburish, following the first attacks, "the young men of the refugee camps flocked to join Fateh." Aburish, Said K., *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator*, London: Bloomsbury, 1998, p. 55.

⁴ Palestinian historian Yezid Sayigh sees the 1967 defeat as a turning point in the political conceptions of the Palestinians: "The defeat shattered the faith of Palestinians in the 'progressive nationalist' Arab governments and prompted a decisive turn among them towards a more explicitly particularistic, nationalist form of patriotism." Sayigh, Yezid, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993*, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 147.

The shift to separatist nationalism was reflected in the transformations undergone by previously hard-line pan-Arab movements, such as the MAN (Movement for Arab Nationalism), led by George Habbash. In December 1967, MAN announced the formation of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, p. 41.

⁵ Sayigh credits the resistance bodies with 42 attacks in January and February, and 36 in the first three weeks of March. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, p. 147.

⁶ Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, p. 42.

⁷ Statistics on forces and casualties: Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, p. 178. Statistics on recruitment: Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, p. 42.

The heroism of the battle of Karameh propelled Arafat and Fateh into the spotlight well before either amounted to a serious political or military entity. Said Aburish writes of the incident: “To a world tiring of Israeli victories and sled-gehammer tactics, the two easy, memorable names [Arafat & Fateh] became a symbol which transcended the realities of what had happened in a small, dusty town in the middle of nowhere.” Aburish, *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator*, p. 84.

By the end of the year Arafat had appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine and Fateh had opened a ‘Permanent Representative Office’ in Paris. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁸ In June 1969, Golda Meir told Britain’s *Sunday Times*, “It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist.” Prime Minister Golda Meir quoted in: Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 195. Her comments looked increasingly absurd, as - according to the Israeli army - between 1968-1970 Palestinian raids across the Jordan claimed over 500 Israeli lives, averaging over 20 a month. Some 2,432 Palestinian guerilla attacks were launched across the Jordan in 1969 alone. O’Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine*, pp. 237-242.

⁹ In 1968-69 the PFLP carried out attacks or hijackings in Athens, Zurich, London, The Hague, Brussels and Bonn, as well as throughout the Middle East. Fateh’s Nabil Sha’ath met with Lora Elia of Israel’s ruling Labor Party in late 1969. Aburish, *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator*, p. 97.

¹⁰ Jordan’s large proportion of Palestinians exacerbated tensions and threatened anarchy on a number of occasions. In at least one instance, vital Jordanian diplomatic opportunities were ‘sabotaged’ by PLO groups who opposed them: In April 1970, US Under Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco was due to arrive in Amman as part of a US plan to stabilize the 1969-1970 Egypt-Israel war of attrition. The meeting would likely have seen Hussein sounded out on the Rogers Plan, and as such was opposed by the PLO. PFLP activists, along with other ‘leftist’ guerillas, infiltrated the US embassy compound and Sisco canceled his visit. Meanwhile, forces stepped up their attacks on the Jordan-Israel border area to disrupt the US initiative further. Such humiliations were recurrent and enraged the Jordanian leadership. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, p. 251.

¹¹ Two planes were landed at the airstrip on 6 September, a third on 9 September. The passengers, including a Rabbi and a number of American-Israeli civilians, were apparently treated well and the PFLP activists even made efforts to ‘educate’ them regarding Palestinian history and their struggle. Aburish, *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator*, pp. 108-109.

¹² The exact casualties are not clear. Up to 5,000 people may have died. The Jordanian army lost 600 men, the Palestinians lost between 910-960 armed personnel and the remaining ca. 1,500 casualties were civilians, mostly Palestinians from the Amman battles. In addition, some 600 Syrian casualties are estimated. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, p. 267.

¹³ Nasser brokered the cease-fire over two days. A few hours after concluding the arrangement, he suffered a cardiac arrest and died.

¹⁴ Aburish, *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator*, p. 115.

MAP 21

¹ Coming to power in the shadow of the immensely popular and charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sadat was under greater scrutiny from the start. Fouad Ajami has noted that until the 1973 War, this left Sadat, “...paralyzed; he needed his own great act if his Egypt was to come into being.” Ajami, Fouad, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967*, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 95.

Soon after coming to power, Assad flew to Cairo for talks with Sadat and, in April 1971, Sadat, Assad and Mu’ammar Qadhafi of Libya announced their states’ ‘federation.’ In subsequent meetings the three leaders reiterated their intention to “liberate the occupied territories.” PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, pp. 136-137.

² Abba Eban quoted in: Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 293.

³ Kissinger, Henry, *White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979, p. 1285 & p. 1289.

Kissinger claims he aimed “...to produce a stalemate until Moscow urged [Arab] compromise or until, even better, some moderate Arab regime decided that the route to progress was through Washington.” But this is likely an exaggeration afforded by hindsight, and Kissinger’s hostility towards Secretary of State William Rogers, who was persistently pursuing both Israeli and Egyptian concessions from 1969 (with the first ‘Rogers Plan’), seems the more likely reason for his dismissal of all progress on the Egyptian track. Kissinger’s recollections are peppered with dubious criticisms of Rogers, leading Palestinian writer Said Aburish to conclude that, “only the selfish politicking of Henry Kissinger,” prevented Sadat from making peace through the offices of Rogers. Aburish, *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator*, p. 128.

⁴ The US later regretted their failure to recognize the importance of Sadat’s overtures: “Our perception of the significance of Sadat’s moves then was unfortunately beclouded...” Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1280. Kissinger later confessed that US policy had been “...handicapped by my underestimation of the Egyptian President.” *Ibid.*, p. 1296.

⁵ Dayan speaking in April 1973, quoted in: Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 316.

When Israel was, on one occasion, pressured to respond to Sadat's position, the 'counter-plan' drafted by Meir and Dayan apparently disgusted Kissinger: "If that is your proposal, I don't want to have anything to do with it.... I won't touch it! It indicates your fundamental misconception of both the basic problem and your standing." *Ibid.*, p. 305.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

⁷ Not least of the factors prompting US action was the decision of the oil-producing Arab nations on 17 October to cut production by 5% until Israel agreed to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines. This was followed, on 20 October, by a Saudi cut of 10% and an embargo on oil sales to the US after Nixon requested a \$2.2 billion aid package be granted to Israel. The Saudi embargo was only lifted after the US-brokered Israel-Egypt Disengagement Agreement was signed in March 1974. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, p. 319.

⁸ The effect of the 1973 War on Israel's religious, political and social spheres is of immense importance. A commission of inquiry placed blame on the military for not anticipating the Arab offensive, but popular outrage forced Defense Minister Dayan and Prime Minister Meir out of office in April 1974. Rabin became Labor leader and Prime Minister. In many ways, the 'defeat' was seen as one of the Labor Party, and thus by extension, of the traditional Israeli political establishment, including its founding ideological mainstream. Within three years, the Revisionist (Likud) bloc - led by Menachem Begin - would easily oust the Labor leadership. At the same time, the ascendance of radical Jewish messianic settler movements bent on "redeeming the whole land of Eretz Israel" (such as Gush Emunim) came about. Israel's glorified military was, for the first time, criticized harshly. Israeli journalist Ze'ev Schiff wrote that the war, "...shook Israel from its foundations to the very summit. A deep lack of confidence suddenly replaced the exaggerated arrogance." Schiff, Ze'ev, *October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 1973*, Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects Ltd., 1974, p. 299.

Following the war, Israel and Egypt were proactively steered towards signing the January 1974 Disengagement Agreement by the US. A similar agreement was reached with Syria in May 1974. The Egyptian track developed into the Israel-Egypt interim agreements of 1974-75, brokered by Kissinger.

MAP 22

¹ Some 25% of the estimated total of 150,000 were so-called 'internal refugees', barred from returning to their lands. Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 49.

With very rare exceptions, the Israelis referred to the Palestinians as "non-Jews" or simply "Arabs," rather than Palestinians, making statistical divisions between non-Palestinian Christians, Muslims, Bahai or Druze and the Palestinian community proper almost impossible. This was in part an effort to undermine the national identity of the Palestinian community in Israel and in part to obfuscate the exiled Palestinian refugees' efforts to pressure the international community to acknowledge and honor their rights. In 2002, Israel's State Comptroller's Report put the Arab-Israeli population at 1.2 million, of which 81.5% were Muslim, 9.4% Christian and 8.8% Druze. State Comptroller's Report, quoted in Arab Association for Human Rights, *Weekly Press Review*, No. 76, 8 May 2002, see www.arabhra.org [accessed 1.03.2014].

² Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 49.

³ Segev, 1949, p. 49.

⁴ Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, pp.123-143.

⁵ Uri Lubrani was Arab Affairs Advisor from 1960-1963. The second remark was made by the military governor of the Little Triangle in 1958. Lubrani, speaking in 1961, went on: "Were there no Arab students perhaps it would be better. If they would remain hewers of wood perhaps it would be easier to control them." *Ibid.*, pp. 67-8.

⁶ Schölch, Alexander, "Preface and Introduction", in Schölch, Alexander (ed.), *Palestinians Over the Green Line - Studies on the Relations Between Palestinians on Both Sides of the 1949 Armistice Line Since 1967*, London: Ithaca Press, 1983, p. 16.

⁷ Arab Association for Human Rights, see: www.arabhra.org [accessed 1.03.2014].

⁸ University student data: Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, *Legal Violations of Arab Minority Rights in Israel, A Report on Israel's Implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination*, Israel: Adalah, 1998, p. 79. For land expropriation data see Adalah, www.adalah.org [accessed 1.03.2014].

Literacy statistics: Burg, Avraham, "The Arabs of Israel: A Statistical Portrait", in Hareven, Alouph (ed.), *Every Sixth Israeli - Relations Between the Jewish Majority and the Arab Minority in Israel*, Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation, 1983, p. 17, p. 20 & p. 23.

Since Israel's illegal unilateral annexation of occupied East Jerusalem in 1967, Palestinian Jerusalemites have been categorized along with Palestinians inside Israel in the government's statistical reports, although their status is that of "resident" rather than citizen.

⁹ In 2002, the Israeli State Comptroller's Report showed unemployment in the "Arab sector" to be at least 35% higher than in the Jewish sector. The report showed 70% of all Arab [recognized] villages to lack complete sewage systems, 21% of Arab local councils to be unable to supply regular drinking water, and 88% of roads in Arab villages to lack sign posts. In regard to the 'Unrecognized Villages', the report focused on 70,000 Bedouin living in Negev unrecognized sites. There, the mortality rate was nearly three times that of the Jewish sector, under half of eligible children attended high school and the waiting list for basic medical services stood at one month. State Comptroller's Report,

quoted in Arab Association for Human Rights, *Weekly Press Review*, No. 76, 8 May 2002, see www.arabhra.org [accessed 1.03.2014].

In 2001, 25 years after the political fight for rights began in earnest, Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, presented the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance with a document entitled “Institutionalized Discrimination Against Palestinian Citizens of Israel,” detailing over 20 Israeli laws discriminating against Palestinians in Israel. See Adalah, www.adalah.org [accessed 1.03.2014].

In an earlier report (1998), Adalah noted that “the Arab minority is afforded no constitutional protection against discrimination” and that “the Supreme Court, since 1948, has dismissed all cases which deal with equal rights for Arab citizens of the state.” Adalah, *Legal Violations of Arab Minority Rights in Israel*, p. 11.

MAP 23

¹ The additional US aid to Israel granted as a ‘sweetener’ within the 1975 Sinai Disengagement Agreement amounted to a 200% increase in US annual aid to Israel, setting a precedent for US financial incentives for Israeli territorial re-deployments. See Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 338.

² Begin correctly calculated that once Sadat had been ostracized by the other ‘confrontation states’ and the PLO, he would soften on his stance over the form of the autonomy plan. Begin’s formulations were often absurd, driven by his ideological refusal to cede any territorial administration in the OPT to non-Jews. One component of the Begin autonomy plan was the notion of ‘personal autonomy’ as opposed to ‘territorial autonomy’ - the system ensured that Israeli citizens (settlers) would be permitted to purchase land, throughout the ‘autonomous’ areas. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 365.

US President Carter, who convened the Camp David talks, later noted that, “[f]rom Begin’s point of view, the peace agreement with Egypt was the significant act... references to the West Bank and Palestinians were to be finessed.” Carter, Jimmy, *The Blood of Abraham*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1985, p. 45.

³ Begin aide Eliahu Ben Elissar later wrote of Israel’s aims at Camp David: “Begin envisioned saving the Land of Israel for Israel. This meant, for him, that there would be only one sovereignty, Israeli sovereignty, existing between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River.” Ben Elissar, Eliahu, “Sadat’s Journey”, in Alterman, Jon (ed.), *Sadat and his Legacy: Egypt and the World 1977-1997*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998, p. 27.

⁴ Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, p. 103.

⁵ As the PLO’s Salah Khalaf put it: “...the Palestinians are not demanding this form of self-administration; I, for example, want an identity, a homeland, a flag... even if [it] were implemented, and I don’t believe it will be anyway, because the Israelis, and Begin in particular, are not in agreement with it, it would not solve the Palestinian problem.” Khalaf, interviewed in March 1979, in: *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁶ Harris, *Taking Root*, p. 145; Lustick, Ian, *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988, p. 59.

⁷ Moshe Dayan, Allon’s rival and the Labor Defense Minister who went on to become Begin’s Foreign Minister, was a leading architect of the Labor Party’s so-called ‘Oral Doctrine’, which elaborated on the Allon Plan. In it, were guidelines for Sinai settlement: “Freedom of navigation from Eilat southward will be assured by[...] control of the Straits [of Tiran] region, which will be connected to Israel by a territorial strip...” Extract from the ‘Oral Doctrine’ in: Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, p. 166.

Dayan went on to plan the town of Yammit, which he envisioned as a city of 230,000 people with a major shipping port. Responding to the Rogers Plan and UN Secretary-General Jarring’s 1970-71 endeavors to get Israel to enter talks based on UNSC Resolution 242, Dayan remarked; “While they talk bla-bla in the UN we’ll make settlements.” Dayan quoted in: *Ibid.*, p. 238.

⁸ Begin had planned to retire to the Neot Sinai settlement. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 374.

⁹ Quandt, William, *Peace Process - American Diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1993, p. 341. William Quandt suggests a total of 15,000 settlers were evacuated from Sinai. This figure is likely one presented him by the Israeli negotiators, with whom he was engaged at the time, and seems inflated. See Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords* & Harris, *Taking Root*, where totals of a little over 5,000 are calculated.

¹⁰ As part of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, the US committed \$3.5 billion in economic development to Egypt, along with a five-year \$1.5 billion arms package. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, p. 324.

¹¹ Carter, though apparently unaware of the ramifications of Israel’s separate peace with Egypt at the time he brokered the treaty, later realized that Camp David had, “removed Egypt’s considerable strength from the military equation of the Middle East and thus gave the Israelis renewed freedom to pursue their goals of fortifying and settling the occupied territories and removing perceived threats by preemptive military strikes against some of their neighbors.” Carter, *The Blood of Abraham*, p. 45.

William Quandt, a member of the National Security Council staff who participated at Camp David, also draws a direct connection between the Camp David Accords and the Lebanon invasion which followed their implementation: “...many Lebanese and Palestinians, as well as many Israelis, may have paid a high price for peace between Egypt and Israel.” Quandt, William, *Camp David - Peacemaking and Politics*, Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1986, p. 321.

MAP 24

¹ Sharon's long-standing alliance with the messianic, ultra-nationalist Gush Emunim (Block of Faithful) movement and his involvement in early unauthorized settlement bids promised a hard-line expansionist agenda. Prime Minister Begin had also been a strong supporter of the settlement activity of Gush Emunim and in the early stages of his government Gush leaders were frequent guests of the Prime Minister. When Begin made Sharon Minister of Agriculture rather than the Defense Minister (taken by Ezer Weizmann), Sharon turned to Gush leader Hanan Porat, asking him to petition Begin for a reshuffle. Porat and his Gush colleagues declined to assist, preferring Sharon as Minister of Agriculture and Head of the Settlement Committee. Porat also feared Sharon's military adventurism would undermine the quiet land-grab tactics of the young settlement movement. Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, p. 534.

Though much is, correctly, made of Sharon's personal input in the settlement program, the historic program drew religious, academic and grassroots support from across the political spectrum and Sharon alone lacked both the political tact and ideological credentials to bring together all the essential elements of the program. He was undoubtedly instrumental in passing plans through approval stages but was assisted in their creation by strategists such as Moshe Dayan and Rehavam Ze'evi; ideological settler leaders such as Ya'akov Aiges, Ezra Zohar and Avraham Shvut; and - vitally - political heavyweights, including Begin and Shamir.

² Sharon and the secular academic Avraham Wachman apparently fell out early on and Wachman would later claim that Sharon "stole the plan and then finished it off." Sharon had asked Wachman's permission to quote from his plan in a televised interview in order to bolster his military credentials with those of a respected and non-ideological academic. Wachman refused, but Sharon went ahead and quoted him anyway. In any event, by the time Sharon had developed his first Likud settlement plan it differed substantially from the Wachman concept. Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, pp. 534-538.

³ The Drobles Plan was formalized as the Camp David 'autonomy' talks began. Regarding the plan, Drobles said, "...State land [sic.] and uncultivated land must be seized immediately in order to settle the areas between the concentrations of the minority population [meaning the Palestinians] and around them, with the objective of reducing to the minimum the possibility for the development of another Arab state in these regions. It would be difficult for the minority [Palestinian] population to form territorial continuity and political unity when it is fragmented by Jewish settlements." Drobles quoted in: Benvenisti, Meron, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies*, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984, p. 52.

The original Gush Emunim plan (drafted by Aiges and Zohar in 1976-77) had demanded 60 rather than the eventual 57 sites, otherwise the Drobles Plan was basically identical. Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, p. 448.

⁴ Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies*, p. 49 & p. 61.

⁵ This figure excludes sums spent in the East Jerusalem settlement program. Thus, between 1967 and 1983, the government of Israel invested around \$500,000 per settler in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem. Obviously the investment was long-term in many instances and paved the way for a far larger population. However, the Sharon Plan, like the Drobles Plan before it, projected a population in the target areas of 100,000. Therefore, even calculating based on the public expenditure already invested by 1983, each of these predicted 100,000 settlers would have cost the government over \$150,000 in up-front investment, not including military and 'hidden' costs such as those channeled through the WZO or JA. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-58.

Planned and existing settlements, their roads, military camps and industrial zones and the expropriations made in connection with them by 1983 would provide the basis for all following settlement activity. In Gaza, 1983 plans envisioned a future population of up to 8,000 settlers. 1982 figures put the Gaza Palestinian population at 476,300. Thus, the expropriations theoretically reduced relative land use in the Strip to 0.52 dunums per Palestinian, while awarding the projected 8,000 settlers with 14.25 dunums per person. In effect, the disparity was far more severe, as the 8,000 figure was not reached even by the end of the century - though expropriations increased - and the Palestinian population had by then more than doubled. *Ibid.*, p. 2 & pp. 19-21 (and derived thereof).

⁶ Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP), *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories*, Washington DC: FMEP, March 1991, pp. 1-5. An additional 35,000 settlers were living in the Golan Heights.

⁷ Sharon, who was then Housing Minister in the Shamir government, authored the plan, though its basic premise of mass-Judaization along the Green Line dated from at least the mid-80s. The pretext for implementing the plan, which was approved rapidly, was the influx of Soviet Jews, whom - the planners claimed - would be settled en masse in the new cities. This was not the case however. In 2002, an investigative report into government misuse of public funds found that the city of Harish - the northernmost of the 'stars', in the Wadi 'Ara area - was virtually uninhabited despite minimum government expenditure of NIS 300 million in the original development. Vast areas of land were expropriated for the Harish site, where up to 35,000 Jews were to settle, yet in 2002, according to the head of the Harish local council, "nobody wants to come here... of their own will." Reported by *HaShavu'a*, Israel Channel 2, 6 May 2002.

⁸ Adiv, Assaf, & Schwartz, Michal, *Sharon's Star Wars: Israel's Seven Star Settlement Plan*, Jerusalem: Hanitzotz - A-Sharara Publishing House, 1992, p. 4.

MAP 25

¹ According to Rashid Khalidi, by the mid-1970s the PLO ran “a vigorous para-state, with a growing bureaucracy administering the affairs of Palestinians everywhere, and with a budget bigger than that of many small sovereign states.” Khalidi, Rashid, *Under Siege: PLO Decision-making During the 1982 War*, Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 29; also, Aburish, *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator*, p. 146.

² Some 14,000 civilians were killed during the civil war, 9,000-11,000 of these by the Christian Maronite rightist militias and Syrian forces. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, pp. 408-409.

In the Palestinian Tel Az-Za’atar RC, 1,500 residents were massacred in one day (12 August 1976), prompting PLO head Arafat to call on the Arab heads of state to convene an emergency summit. Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, pp. 73-74.

³ Rabin’s alliance with the Christian Maronite Phalange echoed much earlier schemes contemplated by his mentors Ben-Gurion and Dayan. During the 1948 War and in the years following it, Ben-Gurion repeatedly put forward a nearly identical proposal: “The Muslim rule in Lebanon is artificial and easily undermined. A Christian state ought to be set up, whose southern border would be the Litani River. Then we’ll form an alliance with it.” Moshe Dayan approved, believing, “...all we need to do is to find a Christian Lebanese officer, perhaps no higher than a captain, and win him over or buy him with money, so that he would declare himself the savior of the Maronite population. Then the Israeli army would enter Lebanon, occupy the territory in question and establish a Christian government which would form an alliance with Israel.” Segev, 1949, p. 10.

⁴ Chomsky, Noam, *The Fateful Triangle - The United States, Israel and the Palestinians*, Boston: South End Press, 1983, p. 192.

⁵ Israeli ‘retaliation’ was largely planned to escalate and create incidents rather than respond to them. UNIFIL, the UN body brought in to monitor the south following Israel’s 1978 invasion, issued a report covering the period between mid-March and end of August 1979; it detailed 148 Israeli initiated attacks, wherein an estimated 19,000 artillery or mortar rounds were fired. The same report detailed only 10 PLO initiated attacks in the area. Khalidi, *Under Siege*, p. 195.

For the period June 1981-June 1982 (when Israel invaded), the UN Secretary-General charged the PLO forces with 47 incidents in the border area, while Israel and its Haddad forces were charged with 218. For the period August 1981-May 1982, the report counted 2,096 Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace and 652 violations of Lebanese territorial waters. Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, p. 112.

⁶ Sharon quoted in: Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 401. Philip Habib quoted in: *Ibid.*; Haig quoted in: Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 340.

Sharon’s ‘Big Plan’, as Shlaim surmises, “...was intended to transform the situation not only in Lebanon but in the whole Middle East. The destruction of the PLO would break the backbone of Palestinian nationalism and facilitate the absorption of the West Bank into Israel. The resulting influx of Palestinians from Lebanon and the West Bank into Jordan would eventually sweep away the Hashemite monarchy and transform the East Bank into a Palestinian state.... Jordan’s conversion into a Palestinian state would end international pressures on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank.” Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 396.

In terms of the “breaking the backbone” component of the strategy chosen by Sharon and his colleagues, a further mid-term analysis of the plan was offered at the time by one of Israel’s most respected scholars on Arab affairs, Yehoshua Porath. He wrote that, “[t]he government’s plan is that the stricken PLO, lacking a logistic and territorial base, will return to its earlier terrorism [sic]: it will carry out bombings throughout the world, hijack airplanes, and murder many Israelis. In this way, the PLO will lose part of the political legitimacy that it has gained... undercutting the danger that elements will develop among the Palestinians that might become a legitimate negotiating partner for future political accommodations.” Porath in *Ha’aretz* 25 June 1982, quoted in: Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle*, p. 201.

⁷ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 413.

⁸ The Israeli plan, dating back to Rabin’s first dealings with the Phalange, was for a client administration in Lebanon to follow their occupation and sign a peace treaty thereafter. To this end, Israel did its best to prevent the non-Phalange delegates from reaching the election point, while facilitating the access of large numbers of Gemayal loyalists. *Ibid.*, pp. 413-414.

The US role is more opaque, but it appears Habib was charged with ensuring the pro-West Gemayal take control and that he placed appropriate pressure on the Lebanese to achieve this end. Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 344.

⁹ Khalidi, *Under Siege*, p. 177.

¹⁰ James Pringle of Newsweek, quoted in: Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle*, p. 367.

Upon hearing that the operation had been started with IDF coordination, Sharon told his Beirut sector commander, “Congratulations. ‘Our friends’ operation is approved.” Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, p. 129.

¹¹ The death toll of the Sabra and Shatilla massacre is unknown. Israeli officials including Sharon, conceded a minimal figure of some 800, while an Israeli journalist - one of the first into the camps after the massacre - put the figure at around 3,000 or 3,500. The Palestinian Red Crescent recorded more than 2,000 dead, while an international commission later put the number at 2,750. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 416; Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, p. 539; The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, *Facts and Figures About the Palestinians; Information Paper #1*, Washington DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1992, p. 15.

An account of the massacre and of Israeli involvement/connivance, including eyewitness and Israeli military testimony, is given in: Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle*, pp. 362-405.

The Palestine Question in Maps

¹² US Special Envoy Moris Draper in a statement to Israel's Foreign Ministry as the Sabra and Shatilla massacre was being perpetrated, quoted in: *Ibid.*, p. 368.

¹³ *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 December 1982. (Erroneous figures for massacre corrected in line with Palestinian Red Crescent figure of 2,000). Article reproduced in: *The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon - Press Profile (Vol. 1)*, New York: Claremont Research and Publications, 1983. For homeless figures see The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, *Facts and Figures About the Palestinians*, p. 15.

MAP 26

¹ The 12-15 November 1988 PNC session culminated in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence. Kissinger had laid down the US preconditions for dialogue with the PLO in 1975. Arafat reiterated and clarified the PLO's unconditional acceptance of *all* the relevant UNGA and UNSC resolutions after his address at a special session of the UNGA held in Geneva following US refusal to allow the PLO leader an entry visa to address the UNGA at its New York headquarters. Arafat's 14 December renunciation of terrorism in all its forms included the renunciation of "state terrorism," and was met the same day by a US lift on the 13-year ban on PLO talks. Quandt, *Peace Process*, pp. 370-375.

² *Ibid.*, p. 364.

³ UN Secretary-General de Cuellar speaking in January 1989; PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 226; American Secretary of State James Baker addressing AIPAC, May 1989; Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 469.

⁴ Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir had abstained in the cabinet votes pertaining to the ratification of the 1978-9 Camp David Accords. *Ibid.*, p. 465; FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, March 1991, p. 1.

⁵ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 470

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 488.

⁷ Shamir to *Ma'ariv* reporters after losing the 1992 election. PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 252.

⁸ The US State Department issued a report entitled "Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories" in March 1991, indicated that there were "200 'settlement locales' in occupied territory." FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, May 1991, p. 6. These included 35 sites in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, July 1991, p. 5.

The same year, Israel's CBS recorded 141 settlements in the WBGS – excluding East Jerusalem. In East Jerusalem 13 settlement 'neighborhoods' had been established by 1991. FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, January 1991, p. 6; B'Tselem (The Israeli Information Center For Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) released data in early 1991 showing that 68% of the WBGS was 'off-limits' to Palestinians. FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, March 1991, p. 5.

Population given is valid for March 1991. *Ibid.*, p. 1. For settlements established in East Jerusalem in 1991 see Hodgkins, Allison, *The Judaization of Jerusalem - Israeli Policies Since 1967*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1996, p. 77.

⁹ PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 253.

3

1993–2002

From the Oslo Process to the
Reinvasion of the Palestinian Territories

(Maps 27-38)

GAZA-JERICHO (OSLO I) AGREEMENT, CAIRO, 4 MAY 1994

(NB: For this and the following maps see the Oslo-period redeployment table, p. 87)

The PLO's recognition of Israel and acceptance of UNSC Resolution 242 at the 19th PNC in Algiers (12-15 November 1988) saw it relinquish claims to 78% of historic Palestine (pre-1967 Israel). By late 1992, one year on from the Madrid conference, lack of progress in bilateral talks was fuelling doubts about the wisdom of this huge concession and stood to undermine PLO credibility. With the initial and official Washington negotiation track (operating since Madrid) locked in disagreement and the new Clinton administration taking a pro-Israel position, the talks begun at Madrid entered 1993 with little sign of hope.¹

Secret informal talks begun in Oslo in January 1993 between Israeli academics and the PLO, represented by Ahmed Qreia (Abu 'Ala), Hassan Asfour and Maher Al-Kurd were, meanwhile, making more progress. In the face of the stalled official track, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin formalized the secret Oslo channel in May 1993. Both teams attempted to 'improve' upon the 1979 Camp David autonomy framework in accordance with their own appraisal of that plan. What emerged, after six months of wrangling, was an exchange of letters of mutual recognition between PLO head Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and the subsequent signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DoP) in September 1993.²


Despite the enthusiasm behind the perceived breakthrough, which culminated in the White House handshake between Arafat and Rabin on 13 September 1993, the DoP was an ambiguous document. Steering clear of the essential and difficult core issues (settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, borders and natural resources), the agreement paid near exclusive attention to Israeli 'security' demands and proposed economic 'cooperation.' Nonetheless, the DoP stipulated a five-year interim timetable leading to a final status and termination of the conflict. The nature of this final status was unspecified though, and made no explicit mention of Palestinian independent statehood.

Implementation of the DoP was negotiated in an entirely different atmosphere to that of the Oslo talks. Israel replaced most of its Foreign Minister officials with a team of military strategists and proceeded to whittle away at the initial withdrawals discussed in Oslo. The 'Gaza-First' concept - which predated Oslo - had been expanded at PLO insistence to afford the Palestinians a 'foothold' in the West Bank and so became the 'Gaza-Jericho' plan.³ But Oslo's vagueness left the Israelis ample room to impose limitations on even this, while the PLO's need to detract from criticism of the DoP by manifesting a presence on 'liberated' Palestinian soil left them all but powerless to object.⁴ Meanwhile, the co-sponsors of the DoP were notably silent and refrained from high-profile engagement during the crucial first stages of the peace process, leaving Israel a free hand. On 4 May 1994, in Cairo, Rabin and Arafat signed the Gaza-Jericho (or Oslo I) Accord. On 12 May, the first Palestinian police crossed the Jordan to take up posts in Jericho. On 1 July 1994, amidst enormous celebrations across the OPT, Arafat returned to Palestine after almost 30 years in exile, arriving in Gaza to head the new Palestinian Authority (PA).

As a first stage, the Gaza-Jericho deal offered little promise of eventual statehood and drew criticism from across the Palestinian political spectrum. The Israelis had severely limited their withdrawal from Gaza, retaining all settlements, connecting roads and a broad 'security' strip while redeploying from the populated areas. In all, the 'withdrawal' from Gaza saw the Israelis retain and, by virtue of the accord, partially legitimize their presence in some 40% of the strip.⁵ At Jericho, Israel began work on a bypass road to link the surrounding settlements into a retaining perimeter ensuring the small pocket under PA control would remain isolated from other Palestinian sites and with no access to the border crossing with Jordan. The two redeployments placed the Palestinians in control of desperately underdeveloped populated areas while denying them access to essential resources or any jurisdiction over integral outlying territories. A provision in the agreement for so-called "safe passage" between Gaza and the West Bank was not implemented.

Human rights groups and democracy activists were disturbed by concessions the PLO had made in the name of Israeli 'security,' detecting the makings of an authoritarian regime. Indeed, the accord included a provision whereby all but 70 of the 1,000 Israeli military orders issued in Gaza since 1967 were to remain in place during the transitional phase.⁶ Powers pertaining to water, land use, zoning and development remained subject to Israeli veto, and economic integration leaned heavily in Israel's favor. But while the controversial agreement came under intense criticism - in Israel as well - Oslo I finally released over a million Palestinians from the immediate ordeal of Israeli occupation after 27 years.⁷

MAP 27



- Planned safe passage routes
- Israeli settlements
- "Yellow areas": Israel responsible for security; PA responsible for civil affairs except in settlements
- Military installation area
- Palestinian Autonomous Area
- Towns
- Security perimeter

INTERIM (OSLO II) AGREEMENT, TABA, 28 SEPTEMBER 1995

Following Oslo I, Palestinian-Israeli negotiations over extending the PA's powers and its presence in the West Bank proceeded on both the official and secret tracks. Israel's refusal to offer assurances in terms of the eventual target of the Oslo process hardened during this period, as the Palestinians grew increasingly disappointed. Despite the DoP's timetable, which called for final status talks to commence no later than September 1996, Rabin declared, "no dates are sacred," and, telling Arafat, "this is your test," made all further redeployments conditional on the PA's adoption of an Israeli 'anti-terror policy' demanding totalitarian measures.¹

With a new team, including some 30 army officers from settlements, the Israelis presented the Palestinians with a series of potential second-phase maps.² Guided by the government's commitment to the settlement program, the maps were drafted to accommodate the movement of settlers and the growth of settlements, while limiting PA areas to main population centers.³ During 1995, Israel pursued its settlement strategy to this end, building a network of bypass roads in anticipation of redeployment. By the end of 1995, 400 km of bypass roads were in place, absorbing 16,000 dunums of Palestinian land.⁴ The DoP had contained a commitment not to prejudice the outcome of the final status talks through effecting changes on the ground, yet by September 1995, a total of 166,534 dunums had been confiscated since the DoP signing, an average of over 220 dunums per day.⁵

Palestinian public opinion in favor of the peace process was in decline, as the Israeli closure of the Gaza Strip forced 28.4% of the labor force out of work - one of the highest rates in the world.⁶ As the 1 July target date for Israel's next withdrawals passed unmet, Palestinian negotiators charged that the Israelis had "turned from occupiers into warders controlling our movements."⁷ The PA's achievements remained mostly symbolic; the first Palestinian passports and stamps had been issued, plans for an international airport unveiled, and a TV station had begun broadcasting. In mid-August, with the Palestinians refusing to accept the minimal offers made by Israel's security teams, Israeli chief negotiator Uri Savir summoned the US to, "act as a lever."⁸

Despite their suspicion that the Interim (or Oslo II) Agreement was merely an Israeli ploy to "legitimize the status quo with minute changes on the ground," the PA was eventually pressed to accept the Israeli map with only minor modifications.⁹ Oslo II, signed in Taba on 28 September 1995, divided the West Bank into three 'zones' of control. In six West Bank cities (in addition to Jericho) the PA gained civil and internal security control (Area A); in ca. 420 villages the PA was made responsible for civil affairs, while Israel retained security control (Area B); in the remaining territory (Area C) Israel retained its exclusive control. Oslo II postponed redeployment from the city of Hebron, where 450 settlers 'obliged' Israel to maintain its military rule over 120,000 Palestinians. In all, Area A amounted to just under 2% of the West Bank, Area B 26% and Area C made up the remaining 72%.

Though in the Oslo II Agreement a map was employed and initial redeployments agreed in advance, its three further redeployments, negotiated in the subsequent Wye River and Sharm Esh-Sheikh Agreements were signed in the absence of a map and were based on percentages alone. Israel's unilateral and unrecognized annexation of East Jerusalem, its exclusion from the area of the West Bank of the territorial waters of the Dead Sea and the 1949-1967 no-man's land areas reduced the total from which its percentages were calculated by 316 km², or 5.6% of the actual West Bank. Thus, Israel claimed the Oslo II map gave the Palestinians an Area A amounting to 3% of the West Bank, while the actual total was nearer 2%. The following, percentage-based redeployments were likewise smaller in scale than Israel would claim and than the figures signed upon. The confusion is compounded by the fact that in the Wye and Sharm Esh-Sheikh agreements, the incorrect Israeli figures are integral to official documentation and so are reproduced in most sources, Israeli, Palestinian and international. The PA did not accept this erosion of the total West Bank area but was left with little choice but to defer it to final status talks.¹⁰

In real terms, Israel retained overall security control for the whole OPT and while awarding the PA a tiny fraction of the territory, obliged it to administer nearly the entire population. Further redeployments in the West Bank began on 10 October with the withdrawal from Salfit and were completed by 27 December, when Arafat entered 'liberated' Ramallah. Oslo II came six months later than scheduled and left the Palestinians in an "archipelago of enclaves," ringed by bypass roads and expanding settlements.¹¹

The agreement also made way for the long-delayed election of an 88-member Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), on 22 January 1996. Hebron was slated for Israeli partial redeployment within six months and Israel committed itself to further redeployments in three six-monthly installments over 18 months, starting no later than November 1996. These three further redeployments were unspecified in size but together to result in Israel's total withdrawal from the OPT with the exception of 'settlement and security' areas. Among Israel's numerous violations of the DoP and subsequent agreements was its failure to fulfill its Oslo I commitment to provide the vital "safe passage" between Gaza and the West Bank. Nonetheless, final status talks were scheduled to commence in May 1996 and be concluded by May 1999.

MAP 28



HEBRON PROTOCOL, 15 JANUARY 1997

Fierce opposition to Oslo found Israel's mainstream political 'hawks' (led by the Likud) sharing a rejectionist agenda with a range of fanatical movements. The right termed Rabin's role in the peace process a betrayal and, in November 1995, a Tel Aviv law student shot the Prime Minister dead.¹ As acting Prime Minister, Peres tried to temper his own association with Oslo. In January 1996, he ordered the assassination of Hamas activist Yahya Ayyash and in April launched an attack on Lebanon, striking a UN shelter at Qana, killing over 100 civilians. His brutal and counterproductive efforts left Israel facing international condemnation and a string of suicide attacks; they also saw the Arab-Israeli electorate turn its back on the Labor Party in the subsequent elections.


On 29 May 1996, Likud leader Netanyahu was narrowly elected Prime Minister, ending the four-year political exile of Israel's chief expansionists and casting doubt over the future of the peace process. The 28 March 1996 deadline set for Israel's partial withdrawal from Hebron had been postponed until June by Peres, but the new government dismissed even this date, calling Oslo redeployments, "a conceptual mistake made by the previous government."² Hebron's exclusion from 1995 redeployments was on account of some 450 radical messianic settlers, whose presence in the center of the Old City and ongoing seizure of Palestinian properties had long been a cause of friction. In February 1994, settler Baruch Goldstein had massacred 29 Palestinian worshippers in the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque. The Shamgar Commission of Inquiry noted the army's role in the event and the Israeli public rejected the racist fanaticism of the settlers, yet the government resolved to blame and punish the Palestinian population: The mosque, closed to Muslims since the massacre, was divided to create a Jewish-only chamber and intensified military measures were imposed on the Palestinians so as to, "make it unnecessary for the Jews to carry weapons inside the tomb."³

Netanyahu called the settlers, "the real pioneers of our day [who] deserve support and appreciation."⁴ His victory brought Oslo to a standstill and only under US and UN pressure did he consent to even meet Arafat. Then, in late September 1996, he ordered the so-called Hasmonean Tunnel running beneath Jerusalem's Al-Haram Ash-Sharif opened and sparked the clashes his security advisers had predicted. At least 80 Palestinians were killed in three days.⁵ The same month, Israel completed preparation of its 'Field of Thorns' operational plan for retaking PA territories. In October, President Clinton summoned King Hussein of Jordan, Arafat and Netanyahu to an emergency summit in an attempt to save the Oslo process.⁶ US assurances, and financial incentives, along with regional and domestic pressures triggered by a halt in the Oslo-linked process of 'normalization' with certain Arab states, eventually drew Netanyahu to the negotiating table.

Guided by the provisions of the 1995 Oslo II Agreement, the resulting Hebron Protocol, signed on 15 January 1997, split the city into two zones: Palestinian - H1 (80% of the city) and Israeli - H2 (20%), which extended continued Israeli occupation to 20,000 Palestinians and the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque under the pretext of 'securing' the city's five tiny settlement clusters. Ominously, the protocol saw the future of a city of 120,000 Palestinians defined by the illegal presence of 450 armed extremists.⁷ In exchange for this watered-down implementation of a long-overdue Israeli commitment, the PA was forced to accept Israel's retreat from all its other prior agreements and place the size and timing of further redeployments at Israel's discretion. Though Arafat obtained a non-binding 'Note for the Record' from the US promising unspecified redeployments within 15 months, Netanyahu had succeeded in arresting the process set in motion by the DoP. What little hope of 'reciprocity' and 'mutuality' that survived the Rabin era was extinguished with the Hebron Protocol, leaving the peace process dependent on Israeli unilateralism and international intervention.⁸

After concluding the agreement, Netanyahu told the Knesset his government had "inherited a difficult agreement," that was now "changed completely." Pledging to "use the time interval in the agreement to achieve our goals," Netanyahu ruled out any future Palestinian state and vowed to "maintain the unity of Jerusalem" and "insist on the right of Jews to settle in their land." Six weeks later, Israel approved the vast new E1 settlement plan for East Jerusalem, commenced work on the controversial Har Homa settlement project on Jabal Abu Ghneim and unveiled a \$16-million settlement 'reinforcement' program⁹ (see Map 61).

MAP 29



WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, 23 OCTOBER 1998

Following Israel's partial redeployment from Hebron, the PA was in control of 413 km² of the OPT - 2% of the West Bank and ca. 60% of the Gaza Strip. Area B, where the PA had civil responsibility under Israeli security control, amounted to 1,340 km² of the West Bank (26%). In the remaining 72% of the West Bank and ca. 40% of the Gaza Strip, Israel's occupation remained in full force. The PA thus found itself responsible for nearly 90% of the OPT's population, while deprived of enforceable authority in virtually all the territory.¹ The three further redeployments provided for in the 1995 Oslo II agreement remained unscheduled.

The Hebron Protocol had placed further negotiations outside the preexisting Oslo framework, allowing Israel to redefine its commitments and decide on additional ones unilaterally. Netanyahu took advantage of this situation to dismiss interim redeployments in favor of a one-step final status deal defined by Israeli 'security' and settlement aims and denying Palestinian statehood. Israel's declared position left no room for bilateral progress and US envoy Dennis Ross could only hope that, "the peace process is alive, because there is no alternative..."² Delayed prisoner releases and Israel's refusal to open the "safe passage" or allow the Gaza air and sea ports to open cast doubt on this hope. During 1997 and most of 1998, constant settlement activity and intermittent clashes took the place of the frozen peace process. A wave of house demolitions, evictions and expropriations in Jerusalem exemplified Israel's race to foreclose any future status through facts on the ground.

Meanwhile, the PA's dismal gains thus far had obliged it to invest the lion's share of its finances and efforts in political rather than economic or social institutions. The resulting authoritarian regime, compelled by its agreements to punish and prevent all opposition to the failing Oslo process, gradually found itself unable to compete with the more extensive welfare services provided by its opponents. Without territorial gains, the PA would soon find itself unable to face its constituents.

After 18 months, US assurances drew Israel to the table. Pressed on all sides, the PA that faced Netanyahu at the Wye River Summit in October 1998 was forced to again renegotiate further redeployments - this time from an even weaker position. For Israel, the Wye River Memorandum, concluded on 23 October 1998, was a coup. Foreign Minister Sharon described it as, "the best agreement possible." Israel agreed to withdraw from an unspecified further 13% of the West Bank, transferring 12% from Area C to Area B and a mere 1% (58 km²) from Area C to Area A. In addition, Israel was to transfer 14.2% from Area B to Area A. The third redeployment was then to be 'discussed' by a committee, but the US assured Israel it could "decide what solutions will be satisfactory," and "implement rather than negotiate [them]." Netanyahu announced that the third redeployment would not exceed 1%.³ The first two transfers - to be made in three stages - would leave the PA with 17.2% of the West Bank, along with civil responsibility in 23.8% (Area B), while Israel would retain total control in 59%.

In exchange for this long-delayed and 're-phased' redeployment, the PA was obliged to accept a security 'work plan.' The CIA was brought in to monitor PA adherence to this plan, which included the arrest of suspects according to an Israeli list and the "outlawing of wings of organizations" (this potentially including nearly all non-PA welfare and private-sector institutions).⁴ Israel made its redeployments contingent on its satisfaction with the PA's performance and Netanyahu advised his supporters that this would free them from having to implement their side of the agreement.⁵ Human rights groups saw in the agreement "the foundations of a CIA-state."⁶

The Wye Memorandum was signed in the absence of a map, leaving Israel free to impose its territorial strategy upon the redeployments. Foreign Minister Sharon addressed the settlers after Wye as follows: "[T]ake over more and more hills, the time is coming when what we take will be ours." Within three months, 17 new outposts were erected and work had begun on 15 new bypass roads.⁷ Israel transferred 2% of the West Bank from Area C to B and 7.1% from B to A on 20 November 1998. The new Area A portions were around Jenin. Four days later the Gaza airport was allowed to open. Then, in a final effort to regain his extreme-right support, Netanyahu suspended the process and, despite US State Department assurances of PA compliance, issued five new conditions to the PA.⁸ This blocked the redeployments after only one phase of the three-phase Wye program - itself only tackling two of the three due further redeployments according to the Oslo II framework. But the Likud's disservice to the peace process was matched by a disastrous economy and clumsy coalition brokering, and on 23 December 1998, the Knesset voted to dissolve itself, bringing the Netanyahu term to an end and halting Wye redeployments. The PA was left with 9.1% of the West Bank, with 20.9% in Area B and the remaining 70% under exclusive Israeli control.⁹

MAP 30



SHARM ESH-SHEIKH AGREEMENT, 4 SEPTEMBER 1999

The Wye River Memorandum transformed the first and second further redeployments of Oslo II into three phases, while placing the third at Israeli discretion. When Israel froze the Wye process, only one part of the three-phased two redeployments had been implemented. No discussion on the size or location of the third had begun.

Labor's new leader, General Ehud Barak won the May 1999 elections on a promise to withdraw from Lebanon, make peace with Syria and end the conflict with the Palestinians. Barak's effort to undermine the Palestinian 'bargaining position' by stepping up negotiations with Syria failed when it became clear that his Syria 'peace-plan' demanded the annexation of the Syrian shore of Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee). Though Barak would eventually withdraw unilaterally from Lebanon (in May 2000), the likelihood of his ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was all but ruled out by his pre-election pledges. The new Prime Minister's conditions came in the form of four 'Nos': No to a return to 1967 borders (as stipulated in UNSC Resolution 242); No to the return of refugees (UNGA Resolution 194, UNSC Resolution 242); No to any Palestinian sovereignty in East Jerusalem (UNSC. Resolution 242); No to dismantling Israel's illegal settlements (Geneva and Hague Conventions & UNSC Resolution 242).¹

Thus, while boldly declaring his desire to terminate the conflict, Barak vowed to perpetuate its chief causes. Having inherited 42 new settlement 'footholds' from the previous government, Barak was able to gain US recognition as a 'peace-maker' by dismantling 10 uninhabited sites and one other, leaving 31 in place and the settlers content. In the meantime, he left the Wye Memorandum 'on ice' and followed the Netanyahu ploy of pursuing a one-step final arrangement leading to "a Palestinian entity that is less than a state."²


Palestinian exasperation with Israeli prevarications and the increasingly poor performance of the PA had, by summer 1999, reached new heights. Opinion polls revealed a critical lack of trust in Israeli intentions and deep disappointment with the Oslo process.³ The original Oslo target date for reaching a final status agreement, May 4 1999, had passed with the PA in control of 9.1% of the West Bank and 60% of the Gaza Strip - being 12% of the entire OPT and a mere 2.8% of historic Palestine. As the second target date, 4 October 1999, approached, the PA announced plans to declare a state unilaterally, if Israel persisted in stalling.⁴

Palestinian insistence that overdue commitments be fulfilled led Barak to adopt his predecessor's path of renegotiating the renegotiated. On 4 September 1999, Arafat and Barak signed the "Sharm Esh-Sheikh Memorandum on [an] Implementation Timetable of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations." Echoing those before it, the Memorandum saw Israel spread the unimplemented second and third phase redeployments of Wye into three new stages. Hence, the outstanding single second redeployment of Oslo II was diluted once more, while the third overdue redeployment, as at Wye, remained unscheduled. Again, no map was agreed upon and Israeli decisions later ensured the PA was denied the contiguity it sought and gained only a 'thickening' of its enclaves.⁵

In line with the Wye percentages, the new schedule required Israel to transfer 11% of the West Bank from Area C to B and 7.1% from B to A. The plan called for final status talks to commence on 13 September 1999 and conclude by 13 September 2000. On 10 September, Israel transferred 7% from Area C to B. Three days later final status talks were ceremonially launched at Erez crossing, Gaza. Belatedly, on 6 January 2000, the second transfer, of 2% from Area B to A and 3% from C to B, was made. Then, on 21 March 2000, Israel transferred the third installment - 6.1% from Area B to A and 1% from C to B. No progress was made with the third redeployment, by then nearly three years late.⁶

With the transfers, the PA came to control 17.2% of the West Bank (Area A) and hold civil responsibility in 23.8% (Area B), while Israel retained exclusive control over 59% (Area C). Nearly seven years on from the DoP, and long after the original five-year interim period had elapsed, 82.8% of the West Bank and 40% of the Gaza Strip remained firmly under Israeli military control.⁷ This was to become the ultimate jurisdictional extent of the Oslo-period redeployments; the sum total of Israeli withdrawals and the territorial achievement of the Palestinian national movement after a struggle of more than 50 years. It was also to be short-lived. Barak's commitment to the settlement program was beyond question; a \$370 million program for new army bases and bypass roads in the OPT was underway. In 2000 Barak would oversee more building in settlements than in West Jerusalem, Haifa and Tel Aviv combined.⁸

MAP 31



PROTOCOL CONCERNING SAFE PASSAGE BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP, 5 OCTOBER 1999

The need for a “safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area” was laid down as early as the 1993 Declaration of Principles (Annex II, Article 3.7). It was meant to provide for and guarantee the “territorial continuity” stipulated in all the Oslo Accords. The route of the ‘safe passage’ and its operational modalities were negotiated and agreed upon in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of 1994 (Annex I, Article 9¹), to guarantee the Palestinians unimpeded freedom of movement between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Prior to the consent of the Israeli side on safe passage, near total restriction of movement of Palestinian residents between the two Palestinian-ruled areas formed a considerable barrier to the development of the Palestinian economy, particularly with regard to domestic trade. Also, many Palestinian families were torn apart for long periods of time as it was hardly possible for Palestinians to obtain Israeli travel permits allowing movement between the two entities.

Article X of Annex I to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995 (the “Oslo II Agreement”) outlined the details for the ‘safe passage’, which was to be open for “persons and transportation during daylight hours (from sunrise to sunset) or as otherwise agreed by the JSC, but in any event not less than 10 hours a day.”² Designated crossing points in Gaza were Erez (for persons and vehicles) and Karni (goods only), and in the West Bank Tarkumiya and Mevo Horon. Travelers had to carry Israeli-issued ‘safe passage’ cards (drivers additionally a vehicle ‘safe passage’ permit), whereby Palestinians with permits to enter Israel were able to use those as ‘safe passage’ cards. People that were denied entry into Israel or that did not have prior permits, could use the ‘safe passage’ by means of shuttle buses that operated 7 hours a day, for two days a week and were escorted by the Israel Police. Persons using the ‘safe passage’ through Israel were subject to Israeli law, and Israel reserved the right to halt the operation of the passage or modify its arrangements for security or safety reasons.³

While Israeli representatives initially agreed that the ‘safe passage’ routes would be opened in 1995 following the conclusion of the Oslo II Agreement, Israel actually refused to open them until the autumn of 1999. It was the Sharm Esh-Sheikh Agreement signed in Egypt in September 1999 by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PA President Yasser Arafat (see previous map) that eventually paved the way for the negotiations on finalizing transit procedures. Several rounds of talks surrounding security issues followed and further delayed the opening of the passage which had been scheduled for 1 October 1999.⁴

PA President Yasser Arafat finally accepted the terms of a *compromise* agreement on the southern route (Prime Minister Ehud Barak had approved it earlier)⁵, according to which Palestinians would apply via the PA Civil Affairs Ministry which would then pass on the list of travelers to Israel for “approval”.⁶ If approval was given, the Palestinians would “receive their passes from an Israeli office ‘in the presence of a plainclothes Palestinian police officer.’”⁷ Israel pledged not to use the passage as a ‘trap’ to arrest travelling Palestinians, but it was obvious that Israel would not uphold the 1995 Oslo II clause stating that Palestinian would be able to travel through the ‘safe passage’ “without interference from Israeli authorities.”⁸ Consequently, many observers at the time complained that under these arrangements, the Palestinians were not actually granted the “right” to move freely within their own country, for starters because sovereignty and security over the passage remained with Israel, whose politicians had already begun to discuss alternative routes which would better suit Israel’s goal of “separation” from the Palestinians.⁹

The “Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” was eventually signed on 5 October 1999 by Palestinian Civil Affairs Minister Jamil Tarifi on behalf of the PLO, and Israeli Public Security Minister, Shlomo Ben Ami on behalf of Israel.¹⁰ However, disagreements over how to operate the land link and where in the Gaza Strip to locate a joint office further delayed its opening until 18 October, when the passage from Erez checkpoint to Tarkumiya near Hebron finally opened.¹¹ The northern route was supposed to become operational by January 2000 pending agreement of both sides on its exit point in the West Bank. However, the protocol was never implemented in full and the ‘safe passage’ between Gaza and Hebron operated for less than a year until it was closed on 8 October 2000.¹²

During the later talks at Camp David (2000) and Taba (2001) the ‘safe passage’ was presented as compensation for the Palestinians for not receiving 100% of the West Bank territory. According to the suggestions of then US President Clinton, the Palestinians were supposed to receive 95%-99% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip plus the ‘safe passage’.¹³ The 2003 Geneva Initiative proposed that the Palestinians receive territory equivalent to 100% of the West Bank and Gaza as well as a ‘safe passage’ to Gaza.¹⁴ In the November 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, the PA and Israel agreed once more to re-establish a ‘safe passage’¹⁵ but the agreement was never implemented. As of 2014, the commitments under the Oslo agreements, as well as various subsequent rounds of talks, to open of a northern and a southern ‘safe passage’ route for Palestinians have not been met.

MAP 32



GRAPH – OVERVIEW OF THE OSLO PROCESS

The Oslo Process, based on the land-for-peace formula established at the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, was formally launched in September 1993. In 1994, the PLO and Israel signed the initial redeployment agreement of this process and the two parties began negotiating an Interim Agreement (Oslo II, see Map 28) according to an agreed timetable calling for a transitional phase of territorial and administrative power transferal to end no later than October 1997. At this date, a final status arrangement, being a termination of the Palestine-Israel conflict, was to be negotiated and implemented by May 1999. The Interim Agreement, signed in 1995, gave the PA a 2%-foothold in the West Bank and prescribed three transitional Israeli redeployments from the OPT, to accumulate in a full withdrawal from all areas of the Gaza Strip and West Bank other than those deemed vital security and settlement locations, which were to be negotiated within the ensuing final status talks.

In September 1999, after six years of Israeli prevarication and renegotiation, the Sharm Esh-Sheikh Agreement was signed, being the third renegotiation of the Interim Agreement and the last agreement signed before talks collapsed in 2000 and the destruction of the PA commenced. This last agreement came nearly two years after the date set for Israel to have completed its withdrawal from non-settlement/security areas, and at a time when the actual territory from which the Israeli military had withdrawn amounted to only 9.1% of the West Bank and 60% of the Gaza Strip.

The 1999 agreement, like those which preceded it, was never implemented in its entirety and when it too was halted unilaterally by the Israeli government, the area remaining under Israeli military occupation still totaled 82.8% of the West Bank and 40% of the Gaza Strip, while the PA, six years on from the DoP, had been afforded limited autonomy on merely 17.2% of the West Bank and 60% of the Gaza Strip. Some 12 months after this last, partially implemented agreement, the Israeli military began its assaults on that 17.2%, reoccupying them in their entirety 18 months later.

	Date of Redeployment		Accumulative Distribution of Territory*		
	Due	Implemented	PA Autonomous Rule	N/A	Exclusive Israeli Rule
Oslo I Agreement (Cairo or Gaza-Jericho Agreement) 4 May 1994	Forthwith	12/5/1994	Gaza Strip: 60%		Gaza Strip: 40% (15% settlement area + 25% security and access control areas)
Oslo II Agreement (Taba or Interim Agreement) 28 Sept. 1995			West Bank: 1%		West Bank: 99%
Initial IR edeployment	Forthwith	10/10-27/12/1995	Area A (PA Autonomous Rule)	Area B (PA Civil Responsibility)	Area C (Exclusive Israeli Rule)
Hebron Redeployment	Forthwith	10/10-27/12/1995	2%	26%	72%
1 st FRD	28/3/1996	UNIMPLEMENTED	-	-	-
2 nd FRD	10-11/1996	UNIMPLEMENTED	-	-	-
3 rd FRD	4/1997	UNIMPLEMENTED	-	-	-
	10/1997	UNIMPLEMENTED	-	-	-
FRDs: Scale of each individual FRD is not specified, but the 3 rd FRD should complete Israeli withdrawal from OPT, barring "settlement and security areas"					
Hebron Protocol 15 Jan. 1997 (Renegotiated Oslo II Hebron Redeployment; originally due 28/3/1996)	Forthwith	17/1/1997	2% (area of redeployment under 0.1%)	26%	72%
Wye River Memorandum 23 Oct. 1998 (Renegotiated Oslo II FRDs)					
Oslo II FRD No. 1 & Oslo II FRD No. 2 split into three	Re-Phased 1 st and 2 nd Oslo II FRDs	her three outstanding Oslo II FRDs within 15 months			→ UNIMPLEMENTED
Oslo II FRD No. 3	Phase 1	20/11/1998	9.1%	20.9% (actual redeployment is 0.2% short)	70%
	Phase 2	UNIMPLEMENTED	-	-	-
	Phase 3	UNIMPLEMENTED	-	-	-
Sharm Esh-Sheikh Agreement 4 Sept. 1999 (implementation timetable of outstanding commitments)	Re-Staged Wye River Phases 2 + 3				
Unimplemented Wye Phase 2 and 3	Sharm Esh-Sheikh 1	10/9/ 1999	9.1%	27.9%	63%
	Sharm Esh-Sheikh 2	15/11/ 1999	11.1%	28.9%	60%
	Sharm Esh-Sheikh 3	20/1/ 2000	17.2%	23.8%	59%
Oslo II FRD No. 3 (originally due 10/1997)	POSTPONED INDEFINITELY		-	-	-

* Percentages shown according to Israel's unilateral and incomplete definition of the West Bank's total area, see Map 28.

GAZA, 2000

Israel's chief legal adviser, Joel Singer, remarked during the negotiations that led to the 1994 Gaza-Jericho (Oslo I) Accord that, "the nature of the Palestinian formation will be neither independent nor sovereign - it will be vastly subordinate to the authority of the military government."¹ The Gaza Strip, six years after the Oslo I redeployments, stood as testimony to this fact. The PA controlled 210 km² (58%) of the Strip's 365 km². The remaining Israeli-controlled area was made up of some 19 settlements, three lateral settler access roads (and their perimeter areas), the southern Egyptian border region, the northern Erez checkpoint area, and a security perimeter alongside the eastern border's electric fence. In addition, Gaza's coastal (Mediterranean) border was limited by two security cordons, stretching 32 km out to sea at both the north and the south of the Strip, confining Palestinian fishing vessels to a 'Zone L' between the two.

The large Gush Katif settlement cluster in the south, with the tiny, isolated sites of Kfar Darom and Netzarim in the central area and the Elei Sinai-Dugit sites in the north, remained heavily protected by the Israeli army. Their access roads, under military guard and exclusive Israeli control, left Palestinian movement in the 45 km Strip dependent on Israeli acquiescence. The erection of military camps, fortifications and checkpoints on these lateral roads following the 1994 redeployments, coupled with the closure of the Gaza Strip - in place ever since 1994 - led to the phenomenon of the 'internal Gaza closure.' Not only was Gaza cut off from the West Bank and Israel, but at its discretion, Israel severed the connections between southern, central and northern Gaza for days on end.² Thousands of Gaza Palestinians, including numerous university students, remained stranded for months if not years in the West Bank, unable to move legally there and yet prevented from returning to their homes.

The closure of Gaza had a devastating effect on the economy, rendered highly dependent on day laborers in Israel and 'exports' to or via Israel by the decades of occupation. Between 1992 and 1996 the per-capita GNP dropped by 37% as a result of the closure. By mid-1996 unemployment affected 66% of the workforce.³ In 1998, the National Commission for Poverty Eradication listed 51% of southern Gazans, 39.5% of central Gazans and 31% of those in the north as living in poverty (on under \$2 per day). Two thirds of Gaza's poor were in a state of "absolute poverty," i.e., unable to meet basic nutritional needs.⁴

In 2000, UNRWA put the total Gaza Strip population at nearly 1,100,000, of which 78% were RRs, comprising the largest refugee population outside Jordan. Some 9% of this relied on "Special Hardship" assistance.⁵ Over half of Gaza's 844,622 RRs remained in one of the Strip's eight camps. In the largest of these, Jabalia, the population density was equivalent to 83,375 persons per km².⁶ Meanwhile, Gaza's mere 6,900 settlers provided the pretext for Israel's ongoing control of the Strip's arterial routes, subterranean water and scant land resources.⁷ Through the 1990s, the average Gaza settler had 699 times as much land as the average Palestinian refugee in Gaza. The settlements' control over aquifers had long reduced the quality and quantity of potable Gaza water, but settler consumption remained 16-30 times that of the Palestinian per capita rate (see Map 66). Palestinians in Gaza were obliged to pay at least four times the rate granted the settlers by Israel's water company, which retained its control over the flow.⁸

Following 1994, no further redeployments in Gaza were addressed in negotiations. Only in November 1998 did Israel partially fulfill its 1994 obligations and allow the Gaza airport to open - under Israeli security control. A year later, work was allowed to begin on the seaport. Gaza's extended isolation from the West Bank was a violation of Israel's Oslo I obligation to provide "safe passage" routes. One such route - the southern safe passage leading from Erez checkpoint to Tarqumiyya near Hebron - was opened on 18 October 1999, though its use was limited to a quota of Palestinians granted approval by Israeli security officials. Likewise, Israel retained exclusive control of the Egyptian border crossing points south of Rafah. The crossing points along the eastern Gaza Strip border were retained for settler access only, along with commercial goods, the transit of which was conducted by Israeli security and taxation agencies, leaving individual merchants and the wider Gaza economy at their 'mercy'.

The degree of control Israel retained over the fractured and isolated Gaza Strip in 2000 underscored its major Oslo achievement: while shedding the expensive, politically awkward and potentially dangerous burden of administering its inhabitants, Israel had ensured itself near absolute authority over their economy, movement, land and resources. Gaza, more than anywhere else, illustrated the role of the settlements in perpetuating this form of oppression.

MAP 33



WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, MARCH 2000

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) conducted its first census of the OPT in 1997. The total population of 2,895,683 was then made up of 1,873,476 Palestinians in the West Bank and 1,022,027 in the Gaza Strip. Projections based on a 3.7% annual growth rate in the West Bank and one of 4.1% in the Gaza Strip put the 2000 population at a minimum of 3,242,385 - 36% living in the Gaza Strip and 64% in the West Bank.¹ The high growth rate, more than three times that of the Jewish population in Israel, was reflected in the 47% of OPT Palestinians aged 0-14 in 2000. Some 1.3 million Palestinians (40% of the OPT total) were residing in the 16 major urban centers, 609,000 registered refugees (19%) remained in the 27 OPT UNRWA camps, and the remaining 1.34 million resided in ca. 800 rural townships, villages and hamlets. The largest city, Gaza, with a population of 343,904, dwarfed all other urban centers, only four of which counted over 100,000 inhabitants: Jerusalem – approx. 235,041; Hebron - 140,055; Nablus - 115,872; and Khan Younis - 105,095.²

Israeli redeployments implemented by March 2000 placed roughly 430,000 West Bank urban residents in Area A, under PA rule, but left the remaining 1.7 million West Bank residents either under Palestinian administration but Israeli security (Area B) or exclusive Israeli (Area C) control.³ Meanwhile, outside the OPT, the Palestinian Diaspora population had reached nearly 4.5 million and the number of Palestinians living in Israel totaled 1.09 million. These figures revealed the OPT population to be less than 50% of a global total of 8.7 million Palestinians, and the worldwide refugee population to be fully two-thirds of the Palestinian people.⁴


An estimated 97% of all OPT Palestinians in 2000 were Sunni Muslims, with the small Christian minority concentrated in Bethlehem (and surrounds), Jerusalem and Ramallah, as well as in some nine West Bank villages. Over half of the Christian community were Greek Orthodox, though at least eight other denominations were represented.⁵

The Palestinian economy in the post-Oslo I (1994) period had fluctuated dramatically as a result of Israel's closure policy. The failure of the PA to foster independent socio-economic structures and the poor performance of its main ministries contributed to a dismal GDP growth rate and increasing poverty levels. The economic protocols accompanying the Oslo agreements had increased Palestinian dependence on Israel, creating an economy heavily reliant on exports to or via Israel. Some 80% of the OPT's GDP relied on exports - 80% of these to Israel, while of trade within the OPT 58% was reliant on imported goods - again from or via Israel. This 'arrangement' left the PA relying on Israeli customs authorities for VAT reimbursements making up 63% of its annual revenue.⁶

In 2000, the World Bank estimated per-capita GDP to have fallen 10% on 1999 levels and reported that more than one in five Palestinians was living below the \$2-a-day poverty line.⁷ The situation was worst in Gaza, where closures forced 30% of households to use family savings and sell jewelry to subsist. Enforced separation between the West Bank and Gaza had brought about a 50% decline since 1994 in the number of Gaza students studying in West Bank universities and by 2000, nearly 6% of 10-17 year-old OPT children had entered the labor force.⁸

The promised economic benefits of the Oslo process had thus far been nearly completely one-sided, with Israel controlling a captive market and production force, as well as developing its economic normalization with regional Arab trading partners. During the same, extended interim period, Israel had achieved a 52.5% increase in settlement housing (excluding East Jerusalem), a near 100% increase in the number of settlers, and the establishment of at least 35 new settlement sites. Meanwhile, during the period 1994-2000, Israel demolished 887 Palestinian homes in the OPT. The Israeli budget for the year 2000 allocated NIS 120 million for additional settlement expansion, NIS 216 million for OPT 'land acquisition' and NIS 27 million for further bypass road construction.⁹

MAP 34



CAMP DAVID PROJECTION, JULY 2000

Final status talks did not begin in earnest until early 2000. May talks in Eilat were followed by meetings in Stockholm and then, in June, high-level talks convened in Washington. Thus, after seven years of renegotiating minor territorial transfers, a hasty dash was made for a final deal - now due by 13 September 2000. These talks finally broached the core issues of refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, water and borders.

Rather than implement the third Oslo II redeployment, Barak opted to pin his precarious political existence on presenting the Israeli public with a final agreement before his Knesset coalition abandoned him. The erosion of his 73-seat (out of 120) majority began in September 1999 and by July 2000, he headed a divided Knesset minority, facing no-confidence motions.¹ Thus, the likelihood of his securing the necessary Knesset majority to ratify any final deal negotiated with the PA was slim if existent and widespread Israeli public opposition to his policies cast a serious doubt over his credibility and that of his negotiating positions. Meanwhile, US President Clinton, hoping to crown his eight-year term (to end in January 2001) with a Middle East peace treaty, pressed the PA to drop its insistence on the overdue redeployment and joined Barak's race against the political clock.² Bent on achieving the breakthrough immediately, the US shunned Palestinian requests that progress be made in preparatory talks before any 'make-or-break' summit be held.

In announcing the 11 July 2000 convening of the Camp David Summit, Clinton promised the reluctant PA that, should the talks fail, "there will be no finger-pointing."³ A day before the summit, Barak lost a no-confidence motion in the Knesset and so arrived at Camp David set to face elections at home, which he would almost certainly lose without popular gains at the negotiating table.⁴ The summit lasted 14 days and ended without agreement. During the whole period, Barak met Arafat alone only once.


Palestinian suffering in the interim period had been tempered by the prospect of the eventual implementation of UNSC Resolution 242 and a just solution to the refugee problem, as outlined at the Madrid Conference and in the DoP. At Camp David, Israel finally confirmed its unwillingness to abide by - or even approach - these principles. Israel's 'best offer' soon transpired to be yet another annexation plan based on legitimizing its permanent sovereignty over 10-13.5% of the West Bank, and maintaining its settlement and security presence in a further 8.5-12% for an unspecified interim period.⁵ The remaining territory would be carved into at least three cantons, with settlement blocs, bypass roads and annexed Palestinian localities forming a barrier between the Nablus-Jenin area and Ramallah, and leaving Hebron and Bethlehem beyond an expanded Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty (see Map 59). The entire Jordan Rift would be retained for an unspecified 'interim' period and a corridor connecting the Hebron settlements would slice the Hebron canton in two from the south.⁶ Virtually all settlers were to remain and territorial provision was made for vast settlement expansion.

Israel refused to accept any responsibility for the refugee problem, suggesting an international fund be established to equally compensate both them and Jewish immigrants to Israel of the same period (thus perpetuating the 'population-swap' myth).⁷ Through the annexation of settlement blocs, Israel stood to legitimize its control over the major West Bank water resources; airspace was to remain in Israeli hands; the bifurcated Palestinian state was to be strictly demilitarized and Israel was to retain full control over all borders. In Jerusalem (see Map 59), Barak's 'offer' left the Palestinians with a cluster of sovereign pockets in the outer suburbs amidst a hugely expanded Israeli 'Greater Jerusalem.' The Old City, with its holy places, was to be under Israeli sovereignty and Palestinians granted "local safe-passage" to Al-Haram Ash-Sharif.⁸

In sum, nine years on from Madrid and the birth of the 'land-for-peace' process, Israel responded to the delayed crucial issues with an unequivocal, 'No' to refugees; 'No' to Jerusalem; 'No' to a return to 1967 borders; 'No' to removing illegal settlements; and 'No' to Palestinian rights over natural resources. The offer, clearly unacceptable as it stood, was offered as a 'now-or-never' maximum by an Israeli Prime Minister who lacked domestic credibility and had already reneged on his Sharm Esh-Sheikh commitments. For Arafat the offer represented, "less than a Bantustan," but the PA pleaded with Clinton to remain true to his "no finger-pointing" pledge and persuade Barak to consider the Camp David ideas a 'taboo-breaking' first in an ongoing process.⁹ But neither Clinton nor Barak stood to gain from inconclusive deals. As talks ended, on 25 July, Barak declared the Camp David positions "null and void," and Clinton, at Barak's request, not only openly blamed Arafat for the failure, but went on Israeli TV to praise Barak's 'vision and courage'. "In light of what has happened," Clinton promised to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.¹⁰

The Palestinians were deeply disappointed by the US-Israeli tactics and relieved that their leadership had withstood the pressure after succumbing so frequently in the past. Arafat came home to a hero's welcome, as Barak announced a "time-out" from the peace process.¹¹

MAP 35



TABA TALKS PROJECTION, JANUARY 2001

Though Barak had been granted an extraordinary US endorsement of his position at Camp David, and together the US and Israel had succeeded in pinning blame for the talks' failure on Arafat, the Prime Minister remained keen for a last minute breakthrough. Outnumbered in the Knesset and rejected by a growing majority of the Israeli public, Barak looked everywhere for support.¹ With bilateral talks ongoing (secretly and formally), he unveiled plans for a 'secular revolution' in August, hoping to woo leftist parties, while only days later announcing his plan to form a partnership with the Sharon-led Likud. Nothing materialized from these schemes however, and when Sharon's rival Netanyahu was cleared of corruption charges in late September the primary political struggle switched from that pitching Barak against the Knesset to a Likud leadership wrangle, with the victor set to oust the Labor Prime Minister after the Knesset summer recess.


Sharon reacted to Netanyahu's resurrected political status by arranging a trip to Al-Haram Ash-Sharif, in a move aimed at underscoring his standing as leader of the Israeli majority opposed to Palestinian rights in or around East Jerusalem.² The Islamic *Waqf* and the PA pleaded with the US to intervene and with Barak to halt the political provocation, but to no avail. On 28 September, Sharon entered the compound protected by some 1,000 riot police and soldiers. The Palestinian demonstrations all parties had anticipated were crushed with brutal force, sparking riots across the OPT. The next day, after Friday prayers, Israeli forces stormed the compound, killing four and injuring 220. In the three days following Sharon's visit over 30 Palestinians were killed and the 'Al-Aqsa' Intifada was born.³

Barak gave the army instructions to 'initiate' attacks on Palestinian leaders (targeted killings or assassinations) and to escalate its responses to demonstrations on 29 October, a day before the Knesset reconvened. This was part of a deal whereby his opponents granted him a one-month political 'safety net,' promising to block motions to dissolve the Knesset, and was followed instantly with Israel's first air strikes on PA targets.⁴ US, regional and EU concern brought the sides together at Sharm Esh-Sheikh in mid-October, but produced merely a lull in spiraling violence. At these talks the Mitchell Committee of Inquiry into the causes of violence was mandated, but on 21 November, with even the US accusing Israel of "excessive use of force," Barak delayed cooperation, claiming, "the timing is wrong."⁵ When Barak's one-month Knesset reprieve ended on 28 November, he lost five no-confidence motions and called elections. Then, on 10 December, he resigned as Prime Minister, reducing elections to a prime-ministerial run-off with Sharon while leaving the Knesset intact and preventing non-MK (therefore ineligible) Netanyahu from competing.⁶

In late December, Clinton summoned PA and Israeli negotiators to the US, where he presented them with his 'parameters' for a final status agreement. These were based on Israel's position at Camp David, reducing annexation from 10-13% to 4-6%, while remaining vague on Jerusalem and adopting Israel's refusal to accept refugees. Both teams eventually accepted the terms as a basis for new talks and met in Taba from 21-27 January 2001 for an intensive summit. The Taba talks, conducted against the backdrop of the ongoing Intifada by an outgoing and unpopular Prime Minister and a PA anticipating the arrival of a militarist pro-settler government, failed to bring about a deal. Even had they done so, Barak had lost the Cabinet, Knesset and public support needed to secure it. In essence, Israel's new 'best offer' was defined by the maximum (6%) annexation afforded within the 'Clinton Parameters.' Dropping its Camp David demand for interim Jordan Rift and Hebron corridors, and reducing the extent of annexation blocs, Israel drew up a map entailing the evacuation of some 90 settlements. Most were to remain however and, despite new formulas, East Jerusalem was still to be annexed, expanded and cut out of the Palestinian state. The 'land-swaps' broached at Camp David were developed, with Israel offering unpopulated Negev areas adjacent to Gaza and south of the West Bank as 'compensation' for its (larger) acquisitions.⁷

With no comprehensive agreement immediately within reach, talks ended with both sides citing progress and expressing a desire to develop the Taba ideas following Israeli elections. On 6 February 2001, having announced his own vision of a Palestinian state on no more than 42-43% of the West Bank, Ariel Sharon easily defeated Barak, who hurried to rescind his resignation and offer his services to the new Prime Minister. He was brushed aside in this bid by Labor's Shimon Peres, who joined Sharon as Foreign Minister, but Barak's rush to wed the victorious hard-liners confirmed the suspicions of those who saw Taba's improvement on Camp David as motivated solely by domestic political considerations and as such not amounting to a proposal made in good faith.⁸

MAP 36



THE SHARON PROPOSAL, SPRING 2001

US President Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Barak each made it clear that their respective successors, George Bush and Ariel Sharon, were free of prior negotiating positions and that Israel's new 'unity' government was under no obligation to proceed with pre-election final status talks. Himself a hard-line settler and principal architect of much of Israel's settlement program, Sharon had rejected withdrawal from the OPT during his election campaign and responded to the formula of land-for-peace with characteristic belligerence. Regarding any eventual evacuation of settlements, Sharon's position was simple: "[A]s long as there is no peace we are there. And if in the future, with God's help, there is peace, there will certainly be no reason for not being there."¹

Palestinian submission to Israeli settlement and land confiscation was, then, the primary prerequisite for the peace Sharon envisioned. Yet, the paradox between achieving real peace and pursuing settlement was far from lost on the new Prime Minister, who had earlier opined that, "[w]ere there not Jewish settlements today on the Golan Heights and Judea and Samaria, Israel would long ago have returned across the Green Line. If there is one source that prevented the agreement... and complicated... negotiations, it was [sic] only the Jewish settlements."²


By May 2001, more than 500 Palestinians had been killed since the start of the Intifada (September 2000) and over 14,000 injured. Israeli losses totaled 82, 18 of these civilians inside Israel.³ That month, the report of the US-led Mitchell Committee of Inquiry (mandated in October 2000 to investigate the causes of violence) was published, calling on Israel to, "freeze all settlement activity, including the 'natural growth,'" "lift closures," and, "ensure that security forces and settlers refrain from the destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees and other agricultural property." The report demanded coordinated PA actions to "apprehend and incarcerate terrorists," and urged both sides to return to and implement existing agreements.⁴

Sharon termed the call for a settlement freeze, "total madness," and demanded a two-month period of 'absolute quiet' from the Palestinians before considering any "concessions."⁵ The PA, on the other hand, accepted the Mitchell Committee's recommendations in their entirety and called in vain on the US to oversee its implementation in full. In the meantime, with the conflict escalating daily into a series of reinvasions of PA areas, Sharon outlined the "concessions" he had in mind. Rejecting any return to outstanding commitments or final status talks, he proposed merely, "a non-belligerency agreement, for a lengthy and indefinite period, in an agreement that does not have a timetable, but a table of expectations." His offer would, he suggested, "give them [the Palestinians] the necessary minimum," by providing up to a 2% transfer of Area C, creating small connecting corridors between some existing A and B Area pockets. In all, the plan would grant the PA some unspecified form of control over 43% of the West Bank and leave the Gaza Strip unchanged. In the remaining 57% of the West Bank, Israeli settlements would "safeguard the cradle of the Jewish people's birth and also provide strategic depth."⁶

It is doubtful whether Sharon's 43%-plan was ever more than a sop to those, internationally and locally, who found it easier to support his government's military policies when they were coupled with a declared long-term 'vision.' The Prime Minister himself was under no illusions as to the likelihood of ending the Intifada through legitimizing confiscation and settlement at the expense of Palestinian statehood. The uprising had, from the outset, been directed precisely against these persistent traits in Israeli policy. One month into the Intifada, Fateh's West Bank leader Marwan Barghouti had explained: "We were calm for seven years in order to give a chance to negotiations... But the Israelis used that time in order to... continue their policy of a *fait accompli* on the ground: the new settlements, the expropriations, the confiscation of land... Why should calm now be restored? So that they can resume the same policy?"⁷

With its patently unacceptable and highly contingent "concessions" presented, Israel proceeded with its stepped-up military assault on PA territories and Palestinian population centers. By October, one year into the Intifada, 700 Palestinians had been killed (145 of them children), 384 homes demolished, nearly 400,000 trees uprooted and 25 new settlement 'footholds' established.⁸ As all hope of returning to peace talks was swept away, Israel's Internal Security Minister Uzi Landau gave voice to the alternative vision of the government: "We must strike at them militarily and economically, at the prestige and authority and stability of the Palestinian Authority until it collapses."⁹

MAP 37



THE REINVASION OF THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, 2001-2002

As the Intifada entered its second year, Israel's overwhelming military supremacy was increasingly brought to bear upon the scattered and encircled Palestinian population centers. Israel took a series of concerted steps to deconstruct Palestinian political and economic structures: assassinating leaders; escalating incursions into PA areas; stepping up its air raids on infrastructure and urban residential areas; and conducting a diplomatic offensive aimed at undermining the Palestinian leadership. In the latter endeavor the Sharon-Peres partnership was particularly successful, with the all-important US refusing to even meet President Arafat and refraining from engagement aimed at ending the conflict. While US Secretary of State Powell told Sharon, "your restraint gives us hope," Sharon assured the world that, "[i]n this government we do not threaten, we act."¹ Pursuing a policy the ICRC termed "one of the worst human rights violations that one could possibly imagine," between September 2000 and the end of 2001, Israel executed some 66 prominent Palestinians, including peace activists, politicians and public figures.² By mid-summer 2002, 1,656 Palestinians had been killed and nearly 20,000 injured. Less than 20% of the dead belonged to the PA security forces.³


Some 35 years into the settlement program, Israel's web of seized land under exclusive Jewish control made up 41.9% of the West Bank. Comparing this figure to the 1.7% of actual built-up area occupied by settlements illustrates the pivotal role of the illegal program in defining the destiny of the indigenous population. The 2,345,900 dunums of West Bank land under Israeli settlement council jurisdiction already made a mockery of the 1,000,800 dunums (Area A) the Palestinians had achieved partial autonomy over after a 54-year struggle.⁴ By mid-2002, Israeli forces had retaken even this area and the last vestiges of the minimal Oslo land transfers were reduced to the disintegrating PA's control of 60% of the Gaza Strip. The destruction of homes, leveling of land, sealing of wells, and closure of villages, which characterized Israel's response to the Intifada, brought the social and economic situation in the OPT to near collapse. By February 2002, the agriculture sector alone had suffered Intifada-period losses of over \$500 million; some half-million trees had been uprooted and over 32,000 dunums of cultivated land razed.⁵ The scores of new military checkpoints imposed across the OPT petrified Palestinian lines of communication. By April 2002, figures showed 84.6% of the Gaza Strip and 57.8% of the West Bank population to be living in poverty.⁶

Having told US President Bush, "Arafat is our Bin Laden," the Israeli government launched its first full-scale re-invasion of PA territorial pockets in March.⁷ Over four weeks, the army occupied every West Bank town and city, systematically destroying PA infrastructure, financial institutions and ministries. The onslaught claimed some 500 lives and left the PA materially and politically bankrupt. The Israeli reaction to the Intifada, itself born of the frustrations and transgressions of the stalled peace process, came as the ultimate expression of its refusal to afford the Palestinians their right to self-determination in the 22% of historic Palestine comprised by the OPT. There, in the 12 months preceding the reinvasions, 40 new settlement sites were established.⁸

The US responded to Israel's first re-invasion and assault on the PA by declaring Sharon a "man of peace," and - in late May 2002 - announcing that the US Administration no longer believed the two-state solution discussed during earlier final status talks viable. Instead, it suggested Israel "introduce some kind of future" for the Palestinians.⁹ Prime Minister Sharon flew to Washington shortly after this State Department declaration and met with President Bush to lay out his vision of that 'future'. As he did so, the repercussions of Israel's excesses during its military campaign came to Israel in the form of a string of militant attacks on Israeli targets. Bush came swiftly to Sharon's side and, in a speech delivered in late June, gave the Israeli hard-line government a green light for the final destruction of the PA that took even its most 'hawkish' members by surprise. Calling upon Palestinians to 'elect' "a new and different Palestinian leadership," as a precondition for peace talks, while endorsing the Sharon-Peres government's actions thus far, the speech came as the clearest expression of US support for Israel's destruction of the elected Palestinian leadership and its bodies.¹⁰ It was followed within days by the total re-conquest of the West Bank, the hermetic closure of its individual village clusters and the imposition of curfews. Untold thousands of Palestinians were arrested, detained without trial and imprisoned in the reopened desert prison camps that earned notoriety in the first Intifada.

In July 2002, Israel began unilaterally implementing a series of 'border adjustments' along the Green Line and around Jerusalem, while ringing the enclosed Palestinian villages and towns with a security cordon of checkpoints and fences. Meanwhile, settlement outposts continued to proliferate and thicken, as areas of exclusion imposed upon Palestinian rural communities robbed them of access to their livelihoods and heritage for a critical third olive-harvesting season. As this book goes to print, drastic and long-term alterations are being imposed by force upon the land, resources, leadership and destinies of the Palestinian people. They are being imposed with a staggering degree of international complicity by an Israeli government of both 'left' and 'right-wing' parties, united in a shared agenda which offers the indigenous population of Palestine nothing more than endless military occupation, colonization and exploitation. The facing map offers only a glimpse at what is an unraveling process of devastation and cantonization unprecedented in the history of the Israeli occupation and set to redefine the future of the conflict.

MAP 38




Small Map - Historic Palestine

- Area under total Israeli control, 2002
- Area under Israeli-imposed curfew or/and siege, 2002

Main Map - The West Bank

- Militarily occupied West Bank, 2002
- Palestinian towns and villages sealed by Israeli forces
- Palestinian urban centers reoccupied, sealed and under curfew
- Main settlement blocs
- Outer closure belt containing cantons
- Principal settlement
- Built-up area of urban 'anchor' settlement



0 20 km

Map: adapted from a map by Jan de Jong indicating levels of closure at June 2002.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE - MAPS 27-38

MAP 27

¹ Prime Minister Rabin's expulsion of 416 Islamic activists in December 1992, ostensibly in response to a series of isolated stabbings in Jerusalem and elsewhere carried out by members of the Islamist political movements, disrupted the Washington bilateral talks and added to the suspicions of those opposing the process. Clinton's support for Israel contrasted sharply with the more even-handed strategies of Baker and Bush. In complete disregard for International Law and 26 years of US policy, Clinton became the only US President to accept Israel's claim that illegally annexed East Jerusalem and the remaining OPT were 'disputed' rather than 'occupied' territories. This vital shift in the official terminology adopted by the 'honest broker' contributed to the failure of the Washington track.

² Although both letters are dated 9 September 1993, Arafat signed on the 9th, while Rabin on the 10th. With this exchange, the PLO formalized its 1988 recognition of the State of Israel in its entirety, while Israel limited its recognition to an organization as representative of the Palestinian people, and not a state or state-like body, perpetuating its refusal to acknowledge explicitly any form of legitimate Palestinian statehood. The relationship between the DoP and the Camp David 'autonomy' framework has been expressed very differently by both PLO and Israeli negotiators; both originally claimed to have 'improved' upon the representation of their people's interests as laid out in the original plan.

³ In November 1992, one month before Rabin legalized official contact with the PLO, Peres communicated to Arafat his willingness to discuss a 'Gaza-First' plan through Egyptian President Mubarak. Arafat rejected the idea alone and demanded it be combined with a presence on the West Bank. Savir, Uri, *The Process - 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East*, New York: Vintage Books, 1999, p. 5.

⁴ On 25 February 1994, settler Baruch Goldstein massacred 29 Muslims at prayer in Hebron's Al-Ibrahimi Mosque. The PLO suspended talks on the Gaza-Jericho Accord and came under pressure from many top PLO and Palestinian civil society leaders (including the leaders of the Washington delegation) to force the Israelis to evacuate Hebron's settler community and place the settlement issue on the negotiating table. The combined pressures of donor countries, the US and Rabin's threat to cease negotiations forced the PLO back to the talks without any meaningful achievement, though the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH – an unarmed monitoring force) was formed. See Ashrawi, Hanan, *This Side of Peace*, New York: Touchstone Books, 1995, pp. 282-285.

⁵ Said, Edward, *The End of the Peace Process - Oslo and After*, London: Granta Books, 2000, p. 6.

⁶ Roy, Sara, *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development*, Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995 (Second Edition), p. 339.

⁷ Palestinian academic Edward Said was among the agreement's earliest and most outspoken critics, saying: "The PLO has the distinction of being the first national liberation movement in history to sign an agreement to keep an occupying power in place." Said, Edward, (interviewed) "Symbol Versus Substance: A Year After the Declaration of Principles," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 60-72, p. 62.

Other critics included veteran Israeli human rights activist Israel Shahak, who stated: "The agreement means Arafat is now annexed by the American-Israeli security system. In return he will get nothing except permission to be a local dictator." Meron Benvenisti, then head of B'Tselem, called Oslo I, "an Israeli victory and an abject Palestinian defeat." See Aburish, *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator*, p. 275.

MAP 28

¹Savir, *The Process*, p. 172 & p. 147.

²*Ibid.* p. 199.

³Israel's chief negotiator, Uri Savir, recalled that, "most of our efforts, struggles, and ultimately resources (bypass roads) were related to the security of the settlements and the movement of the settlers in the West Bank." *Ibid.* p. 189; also, pp. 172-177.

Yossi Beilin, Deputy Foreign Minister at the time of the Oslo II negotiations, responded in an interview with Israel's daily *Ma'ariv* to Likud accusations that his government had compromised the settlement program as follows: "The agreement was delayed for months in order to guarantee that all the settlements would remain intact and that the settlers would have maximum security. This entailed an immense financial investment. The situation in the settlements has never been better than in the situation created following the Oslo II Agreement." Yossi Beilin, quoted in *Ma'ariv*, 27 September 1995.

⁴ Land and Water Establishment (LAWE), *By-Pass Road Construction in the West Bank: The End of the Dream of Palestinian Sovereignty*, Jerusalem: LAWE, 1996, pp. 1-3. (NB: LAWE has in the meantime ceased to exist).

FM Shimon Peres was proud of the achievement, telling Abu 'Ala, "we're spending a billion shekels on new army bases and bypass roads for the settlers. We're serious people!" Savir, *The Process*, p. 197.

⁵ Land and Water Establishment (LAWE), *Fraud, Intimidation, Oppression: The Continued Theft of Palestinian Land*, Jerusalem: LAWE, 1995, p. 1. (NB: LAWE has in the meantime ceased to exist).

⁶ Roy, *The Gaza Strip*, p. 349. Between 1993 and 1996 unemployment nearly tripled in the WBGS, rising from an average of 11% to 29%. *Ibid.*

A public opinion poll conducted by the Nablus-based Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) in February 1995, one year after the Hebron massacre, recorded an 81.3% majority of Palestinians opposing the continuation of talks as long as settlement activity was ongoing. The figure was all the more revealing given the fact that in the immediate outrage following the massacre the same position gained only 55.5% support. Dabdoub, Leila, "Palestinian Public Opinion Polls and the Peace Process," *Palestine-Israel Journal* [Vol. I], No. 5 (Winter 1995), pp. 60-64, p. 61.

The 26% increase in those demanding an enforced settlement freeze as a precondition for talks can be better understood in the light of the extent of bypass road construction in the interim period as well as the ongoing agitation of the anti-Oslo settler communities and leaders. Following the DoP signing, Yesha, the Settler Council for Judea, Samaria and Gaza, established an armed militia called 'HaShomer' and prominent Rabbis (including the ex-Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren) came out with *Halachic* injunctions forbidding the evacuation of settlements. During 1995, 14 Palestinians were murdered by settlers in the OPT. PASSIA, *Annual Report - 1995*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1996, p. 4.

⁷ Savir, *The Process*, p. 166.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 205. Apparently US "leverage" included a threat to suspend \$100 million aid to the PA. Said, *The End of the Peace Process*, p. 17.

⁹ Palestinian negotiator Abu 'Ala described the agreement thus. Savir, *The Process*, p. 185.

¹⁰ Israel repeatedly excluded illegally expanded and annexed East Jerusalem, the territorial waters of the Dead Sea and a 71-km² area of 1949-1967 'no-mans-land' around Latrun, west of Jerusalem. This has had the obvious effect of lessening the real territorial transfers made in accordance with the signed agreements and producing two differing 'statistical maps'. Throughout this publication, the percentages indicated correspond to the *official* figures and are thus in line with a much-reduced total area, as defined by Israel. Any attempt to recalculate the figures according to a true West Bank area would cause confusion in that it would lead to contradictions with all official signed agreements and maps. See, Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ) & Land Research Center (LRC), "What the Withdrawal Percentages Mean," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 146-147.

¹¹ The description is Israeli peace activist Uri Avnery's. Avnery, Uri, "Is Oslo Dead?," *Palestine-Israel Journal*, [Vol. I], No. 5 (Winter 1995), pp.26-32, p. 30.

The 'cantonization' of the Palestinian population following Oslo II drew harsh criticism and confirmed the fears of those who had remained skeptical following the first withdrawal. A Palestinian human rights group summed up the effects of the redeployments as follows: "[S]trategic redeployment means that it is possible for the Israeli government to focus on the colonization of the OPT unhindered by the burden of managing a rebellious population." LAW - The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, *Apartheid, Bantustans, Cantons: The ABC of the Oslo Accords*, Jerusalem: LAW, (undated), p. 14 (NB: LAW has in the meantime ceased to exist).

Edward Said saw his opposition to the Oslo process vindicated: "What Palestinians have gotten is a series of municipal responsibilities in Bantustans controlled from the outside by Israel. What Israel has secured is official consent to Israeli occupation, which continues in a streamlined and more economical form." Said, *The End of the Peace Process*, p. 14.

MAP 29

¹ Rabin's failed attempt to maintain his 'hawkish' credentials included a series of draconian closures of the OPT and the 26 October 1995 assassination of Islamic Jihad leader Fathi Shiqaqi. None of these measures appeased his vitriolic opponents. They chose to ignore the 39% increase in settlers achieved in his term of office, the confiscation of nearly 5% of the West Bank during his tenure and his reiterated commitment to the settlement program. The Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace, *Special Bulletin: Israeli Colonization*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997, p. 4-5.

² Netanyahu, quoted in Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 574.

³ The Shamgar Commission published its report on 26 June 1994. Despite hearing testimony confirming standing regulations prohibiting soldiers from opening fire on settlers under any circumstances, the report absolved the army of all responsibility: "When a soldier appears on the scene [in this case a heavily guarded Mosque during Friday prayers] and sees a Jew aiming his weapon to fire, he usually cannot know on the spot - without any explanation - if the individual is shooting in response to something else, in defense against a terrorist attack..." In order to 'secure' the Palestinian worshippers in the future, it was recommended that Israeli security forces be placed *inside* the Muslim holy site. See "Report of Shamgar Commission of Inquiry into the Massacre at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron (extracts)," in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (Autumn 1994), pp. 143-145.

Following the massacre, the ruling Labor Party led the way in distancing itself from the Hebron extremists, adding to the domestic and international perception that the fanatical racist community had somehow appeared in Hebron of its own accord, or through some extra-legal and unsanctioned turn of events. This (mis)representation is widespread and wholly at odds with the well-recorded history of the Hebron settler community. In fact, settlement at Hebron was an 'optional' component of Labor settlement architect Yigal Allon's original 1967 plan. When radical settlers acted without the Labor government's official authorization and, in 1968, began "squatting" illegally in a city hotel, Allon was among the first Labor leaders to meet them. He arranged weapons, vehicles and provisions for them, while his government called upon their chief legal advisor to amend the standing regulations preventing any unauthorized Israeli civilian presence in urban Palestinian areas lasting over 48 hours. The offending military order was rewritten to accommodate the presence of the settlers - whom Labor Minister Allon had just armed - by none other than Meir Shamgar (then legal advisor, later Supreme Court judge and head of the Shamgar Commission). The Labor Party, then, went

to more trouble to legalize, arm and develop (eventually into the major urban site of Kiryat Arba) the Hebron settler community than they did to develop virtually any other early settlement. See, Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, pp. 153-159. Also, Harris, *Taking Root*, p. 40 & pp. 108-110.

⁴ Netanyahu, quoted in The Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace, *Special Bulletin: Israeli Colonization*, p. 6.

⁵ 15 Israeli soldiers were also killed in the 'Tunnel Uprising.' Rabbani, Mouin, "Rocks and Rockets: Oslo's Inevitable Conclusion," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 3 (Spring 2001), p. 68-81, p. 69.

⁶ Israel's 1994 peace treaty with Jordan, reached on the back of the DoP, was a source of controversy in the Hashemite Kingdom and gave Israel's retreat from the Oslo process increased regional significance. Hussein's need to preside over the 'normalization' of contacts with Israel in order to remain eligible for the peace treaty's vital US economic incentives could scarcely be reconciled with open Israeli rejection of negotiated agreements with the Palestinians, still less increased oppression in the OPT.

⁷ In the words of Hebron Mayor Mustafa Natsheh, "[i]t isn't just the principle of the thing that's so galling, but the fact that giving them a foothold in our midst by partitioning the town makes it possible for them to use Hebron as a precedent for staying in all their other settlements..." Natsheh, quoted in Said, *The End of the Peace Process*, p. 132.

⁸ By forcing the Palestinians to renegotiate the partial Hebron withdrawal provided for in the ratified Oslo II Accord, Israel and the US set a precedent for future delays, renegotiations and non-implementations, while legitimizing Israel's elevation of domestic party-political issues over internationally endorsed and binding treaties. In looking back over the Oslo process, analyst Mouin Rabbani has recognized the Hebron Protocol's place in, "a clear pattern in which Israel first refuses to implement its own commitments, then seeks and obtains their dilution in a new agreement, subsequently engages in systematic prevarication, and finally demands additional negotiations, leading to a yet further diluted agreement." Rabbani, "Rocks and Rockets", p. 71.

⁹ Netanyahu went on to tell the Knesset that before the Hebron Protocol, "nine months from today we might have found ourselves almost at [the 1967] borders... this situation - I say to both the opposition and the coalition - we have changed completely... [Now] we will conduct negotiations with the time, the ability and the freedom for political maneuver that we did not enjoy before." Netanyahu, Binyamin, "Statement to the Knesset on the Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron, 16 January 1997," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 141-143.

MAP 30

¹ Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ), *An Atlas of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza)*, Bethlehem: ARIJ, 2000, p. 25; FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, November-December 1998, p. 1.

² Dennis Ross, quoted in Watzal, *Peace Enemies*, p. 111.

³ Of the newly allotted Area B, a quarter was to be uninhabited desert and classified as a 'nature area' - off limits for Palestinian development. Extracts from the US 'Letters of Assurances' to Israel, 30 October 1998, quoted in *The [Israeli] Prime Minister's Report*, Vol. 2, No. 34, 3 November 1998.

⁴ One result of the impact of this 'anti-terror' policy was the closure of medical and educational centers operated by Islamic agencies and charities affiliated with the Islamic parties. Barely two weeks after the agreement was signed the Anaqa' Islamic Women's Society in Bethlehem, which ran a kindergarten and outpatient clinic, was closed in line with the Wye Memorandum - many others followed. See Roy, Sara, "De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (Spring 1999), pp. 64-82, p. 79.

⁵ See, Morris, Benny, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999*, UK: John Murray Ltd., 2000. Also, Aruri, Nasser, "The Wye Memorandum: Netanyahu's Oslo and Unreciprocal Reciprocity," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Winter 1999) p. 21-28, p. 21.

⁶ Watzal, *Peace Enemies*, p. 123.

⁷ Sharon, quoted in PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 358. Outposts and roads, as reported in FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, March-April 1999, p. 7. See also Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians*, pp. 100-103.

⁸ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 605.

⁹ FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, January-February 1999, p. 3. See Map 28.

MAP 31

¹ Barak also announced his opposition to any future Palestinian military presence. See Abdul Hadi, Mahdi, *Awakening Sleeping Horses and What Lies Ahead*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2000, pp. 1-4.

² Several of the remaining 31 sites were relocated in accordance with 'security' plans. See FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, November-December 1999, p. 5; also, PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, pp. 385-387; Barak, quoted on the Palestinian 'non-state entity' in FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, July-August 1999, p. 5.

³ A CPRS poll published in June 1999 showed 63% of Palestinians did not trust Israel's intentions with the peace process, while 54% were convinced that Barak would not implement the outstanding Wye River Memorandum commitments. PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 382.

⁴ The original May 1999 date was stipulated in the DoP timetable. The signing of Oslo II in 1995 saw this date pushed forward to October 1999.

⁵ Amnesty International put the number of isolated Palestinian Area B or A enclaves at 227; 88% of these being no more than 2 km². Amnesty International, quoted in Roy, *The Gaza Strip*, p. 340.

⁶ The Oslo II timetable required Israel to complete the three further redeployments by October 1997.

⁷ See Map 28.

⁸ FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, September-October 1999, p. 9. See also, PSC Information Paper on Illegal Israeli Settlements, www.palestinecampaign.org [accessed 1.03.2014].

MAP 32

¹ As well as the corresponding Map No. 3 attached to the Agreement.

² See also the corresponding Map No. 6 attached to the Agreement.

³ For the full text of the safe passage stipulation see <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20israeli-palestinian%20interim%20agreement%20-%20annex%20i.aspx#article10> [accessed 1.03.2014].

⁴ Usher, Graham, "Neither safe nor free," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, Issue No. 450 (7-13 October 1999), at <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/450/fr2.htm> [accessed 05.04.2014].

⁵ "Mideast Peace Connection," CBS, 4 October 1999, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mideast-peace-connection/> [accessed 1.03.2014].

⁶ Usher, Graham, "Neither safe nor free."

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Annex I, Article VIII.

⁹ Usher, Graham, "Neither safe nor free."

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Sontag, Deborah, "Link Opens West Bank to Gaza's Job Hunters," *The New York Times*, 26 October 1999.

¹² "Israel's Violations of the Oslo Agreements," *PLO Negotiations Affairs Department*, at http://www.robot.scl.net/content/NAD/negotiations/neg_violations/index.php [accessed 05.04.2014].

¹³ PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, "Summary - Negotiation and the peace process," 2001, <http://nad-plo.org/print.php?id=76>; see also "The Unsafe Road - A Special Report on the Safe Passage," PCHR, 9 December 1999, <http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/Reports/English/08dec.htm> [accessed 1.03.2014].

¹⁴ Palestine would exist of roughly 97% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip plus some Israeli territory acquired in 'land swaps' to make up for the remaining 3% of Palestinian land lost to Israel settlements. Kardahji, Nick, *The Geneva Accords: Plan or Pretense?*, PASSIA, 2004, p. 19.

¹⁵ "Agreed documents on Movement and Access from and to Gaza," UNESCO, 15 November 2005, at <http://www.unesco.org/Documents/Key/AMA.pdf> [accessed 05.04.2014].

MAP 33

¹ Joel Singer, quoted in Watzal, *Peace Enemies*, p. 69.

² Rabin ordered the Gaza Strip closed in March 1994. In the following years the closure was relaxed and tightened to varying extents. In the period 1993-1996, a state of total closure was imposed for approximately one third of each year. The closure policy not only sent unemployment figures soaring, but also created a state of uncertainty in the Gaza production sector, which depends on West Bank and Israeli markets and includes a large perishable agricultural component. Roy, *The Gaza Strip*, pp. 333-350.

³ *Ibid.* p. 334.

⁴ Roy, Sara, "De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (Spring 1999), pp. 64-82, p. 76.

⁵ PASSIA, *Special Bulletin on Palestinian Refugees*, pp. 3-4.

⁶ This figure is over 1,000 times the rate inside Israel. Roy, *The Gaza Strip*, p. 15.

⁷ The exact number of residents living in the Gaza settlements is hard to calculate, as many housing units are empty. However, official Israel figures put the total population at 6,971 in mid-2001, while unofficial settler figures remained slightly lower - around 6,500.

⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 162-178.

MAP 34

¹ Unless otherwise specified, West Bank figures are here inclusive of East Jerusalem. The 2000 projection is generally considered an underestimation as the high growth rate fluctuated during the three-years in question, eventually reaching 5.4% in Gaza. See, *PASSIA Diaries 1999-2002*, Jerusalem: PASSIA (various years). Also, PCBS, <http://www.pcbs.gov.ps> [accessed 1.03.2014].

² The 0-14 age bracket accounted for over 50% of Gaza Strip residents in 2000. Age distributions and town-city sizes based on PCBS 2001 projections from 1997 census data, reproduced in PASSIA, *Diary 2002*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2001, p. 263. RC populations are from UNRWA, quoted in PASSIA, *Palestinian Refugees - Special Bulletin*, pp. 3-4.

The PALDIS-LDC Database (Palestinian Land Development Information System of the Palestinian Land Defense Committee) lists some 800 Palestinian localities in the West Bank and Gaza, including hamlets and minor Bedouin encampments. Higher figures can be reached if additional 'seasonal' Bedouin encampments are included and *de facto* RC 'neighborhoods' (particularly in the southern Gaza Strip) are counted separately.

³ Exact figures for the Palestinian population in each of the three 'zones' are either unreliable or unavailable. Although the vast majority of West Bank Palestinians were resident in Area B, and much of the Area C territory was either uninhabited or agricultural and sparsely populated hinterland, repeated Israeli claims that the Palestinian population in Area A and B amounted to some 98% are fictitious as they deny the existence of the entire East Jerusalem area and its near quarter million Palestinians and ignore the continuing occupation of Israeli-controlled Hebron (H2). [Very] Roughly, 90% of all West Bank Palestinians were under some form of limited Palestinian autonomy by 2000, though the vast majority of them remained under Israeli security control (i.e., in Area B) and most of these found either their village land or its immediate surrounds in Area C. In addition, the nature of the 'enclaves' of limited autonomy meant that while a large majority actually *slept* in Area B or A, an equally large majority were obliged to pass through or enter Area C to reach the most basic services, including schools, hospitals, ministries, post offices and markets.

⁴ Calculating the refugee population, including those resident in the OPT, as well as the estimated number of unregistered refugees. Outside the OPT, the largest concentration of Palestinians was in Jordan - 2,434,130, with sizable communities in Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the US and the Gulf States. See PASSIA, *Special Bulletin on Palestinian Refugees*, p. 2 & p. 7.

⁵ Other Christian denominations included (in order of size): Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Protestant, Armenian, Syriac, Coptic, Maronite, and Ethiopian. In Gaza, the tiny Greek Orthodox community made up less than 0.25% of the population. The OPT Christian population was not representative of worldwide Palestinian figures though, wherein Christians made up 10% of the total population in 2000.

⁶ Import-Export figures based on UNSCO report of Spring 2000, quoted in B'Tselem, *Civilians Under Siege: Restrictions on Movement as Collective Punishment*, Jerusalem: B'Tselem, January 2001 (Information Sheet), p. 11. VAT reimbursement figures based on UNSCO report of November 2000, quoted in Hammami, Rema, & Tamari, Salim, "The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning?" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 5-25, p. 16.

⁷ PCBS calculations for 2000 listed some 64% of OPT Palestinians below a family-based poverty line of NIS 1,622 (ca. \$400 in early 2000) per month for a family of two adults and four children. In terms of *relative* poverty, rates are not available for the period. See The World Bank (extracts from a report of the West Bank and Gaza Office), "Targeting the Poor in the West Bank and Gaza," *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (2001), pp. 88-91. Also: B'Tselem, *Civilians Under Siege*, p. 15.

⁸ Roy, *The Gaza Strip*, pp. 362-363.

⁹ Though only three of the new settlement sites in the OPT (excluding East Jerusalem) were government initiated, the 42 unofficial sites were encouraged to develop, with the exception of 11. See, Peace Now, "Facts on the Ground Since the Oslo Agreement, September 1993," *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol. VII, No. 3-4 (2000), pp. 147-152, pp. 147-148; also: PASSIA, *Settlements and the Final Status Talks - Special Bulletin*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2001, p. 7. Also: Peace Now October 1999 report, quoted in PASSIA, *Diary 2000*, p. 255.

MAP 35

¹ Barak's lack of political experience and widely acknowledged tactlessness rather than his positions vis-à-vis the peace process were to blame for the largest desertions from his camp. His initial coalition drew on seven parties, ranging in ideology from the settler-affiliated National Religious Party (NRP) to the predominantly secular and 'dovish' Meretz Party. The first defection was made by United Torah Judaism (5 seats) in response to Barak's refusal to cancel the transportation of an electric turbine on the Sabbath. Next, squabbles between the religious Shas Party and Meretz over education funds cost him another 10 seats (Meretz); and when Shas (17 seats) subsequently quit over the same issue, he was left heading a minority of 41. See, Barr, Patricia, *Not a Referendum on Peace*, Peace Now Information Paper, January 2001, www.peacenow.org [accessed 1.03.2014].

² The President's wife, Hilary Clinton, was at the same time preparing for local elections in New York.

According to one source, Clinton referred to the thrust for a comprehensive (and historic) peace deal as his "personal journey of atonement," in reference to his tarnished image in the wake of impeachment hearings relating to the Monica Lewinsky scandal (February 1999). Quandt, William, "Clinton and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Limits of Incrementalism," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 26-40, p. 28.

³ Clinton to Arafat, quoted in Malley, Robert & Hussein Agha, "Camp David: Tragedy of Errors," *New York Review of Books*, 9 August 2001, reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXXI, No.1 (Autumn 2001), pp. 62-75, p. 68.

⁴ Barak had been forced to call for early elections prior to his departure. This had the effect of reducing the final status talks to a matter of make-or-break domestic Israeli politics, with Barak's career hinging on his ability to produce a result that Israel's Sharon-led 'hawks' would not exploit to trounce him in the elections. As negotiator Yossi Beilin later admit-

ted, “none of us was ready... there was no safety net.” Beilin, Yossi, (and others in roundtable discussion), “Taking Stock: Looking at the Past, Searching for the Future,” *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (2001), pp. 25-42, p. 25.

⁵ Contrary to Israeli-US claims at the time (later dropped) the Israeli offer was unspecific on most issues, including percentages of annexation. Again, the reduction of the West Bank total area by some 5.4% distorted figures and again no one official map was drawn up. See FMEP, *Crossroads of Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Relations Face an Uncertain Future* - Special Report, Washington DC: FMEP, 2000. Also: Hanieh, Akram, “The Camp David Papers,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 75-97, p. 82.

⁶ Talk of compensatory ‘land-swaps’ following Camp David was misleading. At Camp David, Israel made a *maximum* offer of giving the Palestinians an equivalent of 1% of (their reduced) West Bank land in an unspecified area and of unspecified quality. The formula of ‘land-swaps’ did not play a significant part at Camp David, but was broached in more detail at Taba in January 2001. Klug, Tony, “The Infernal Scapegoat,” *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (2001), pp. 7-15, p. 9.

⁷ The international fund Israel suggested - and Clinton later endorsed - would have involved international money, but not Israel's, and would have compensated Palestinian refugees and ‘Jewish refugees’ (i.e., Jewish immigrants to Israel from the Arab World - whom Clinton later referred to as “refugees in their own land.”) Conditional on Palestinian acceptance of the absolution of Israeli responsibility or legal obligation, Barak agreed to play a part in a “humanitarian” program by screening candidates for possible “family reunification” in Israel - up to a maximum of 2% of all refugees. (This is a maximum figure. Israel, again without committing itself to specifics, agreed to the potential ‘absorption’ of refugees at the rate of a maximum of 10,000 per year and for a ten-year period only. Thus, of the five million refugees in 2000 - 3.7 million of whom were registered with UNRWA - Israel would accept only 2%.) Hanieh, *The Camp David Papers*, p. 82; PASSIA, *Special Bulletin on Palestinian Refugees*, p. 2.

Clinton, justifying the compensation fund on Israeli TV, 28 July 2001, quoted in “Peace Monitor,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (Autumn 2000), pp. 116-135, p. 121.

⁸ FMEP, *Crossroads of Conflict*, p. 7.

⁹ Nabil Sha’ath asked Clinton at the end of the summit, “Please do not put on a sad face and tell the world it failed. Please say we broke down taboos, dealt with the heart of the matter and will continue.”

Sha’ath, quoted in Sontag, Deborah, “Quest for Middle East Peace: How and Why it Failed,” *New York Times*, 26 July 2001, reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (Autumn 2001), pp. 75-85, pp. 82-3.

¹⁰ “Peace Monitor,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (Autumn 2000), pp. 116-135, pp. 120-121.

¹¹ The pressure tactics of Camp David have been surmised by British academic Tony Klug: “In effect, the most powerful country in the world teamed up with the most powerful country in the region to induce one of the weakest non-states anywhere to accept a sequence of half-baked proposals, with a threat of sanctions if they did not comply.” Klug, “The Infernal Scapegoat,” p. 9; Barak, quoted in FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, November-December 2000, p. 2.

MAP 36

¹ A Palestinian-Israeli public opinion poll was conducted following the Camp David talks, with the respective publics polled by The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace in Jerusalem. The detailed polls showed less than 25% of Israelis to support the Prime Minister's Camp David position, with roughly 60% accusing Barak of making “too much of a compromise” on virtually every negotiating point. In contrast, nearly 70% of Palestinians supported the PA's rejection of the Camp David offer and many were highly critical of the concessions reportedly contemplated by negotiators during talks, especially regarding the refugee issue. See Israeli-Palestinian Joint Public Opinion Poll # (1), 28-30 July 2000. See: <http://truman.huji.ac.il/poll-dec2001.htm>.

² A ‘special regime’ outlined at Camp David, whereby the Palestinians would gain access under Israeli sovereignty to the Old City and the holy sites, including Al-Haram Ash-Sharif, was supported by only 24.4% of polled Israelis, despite the fact that the arrangement placed the site under Israeli sovereignty and guaranteed the sovereignty of Israel over all East Jerusalem settlements. *Ibid.*

³ Casualties by 1 October 2000, as reported in “Peace Monitor,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (Autumn 2000), pp. 116-135, p. 129.

⁴ The deal was signed with the Shas Party (17 seats), but was broader in effect due to that party's pledge to block anti-Barak votes over the month. Thus, Shas rallied other Barak opponents around their agreement, unofficially expanding the arrangement to the National Religious Party, United Torah Judaism and members of the Likud.

⁵ Barak's move to delay the commission came one day after the US State Department's statement on Israel's use of force (20 November 2000). Both quoted in “Peace Monitor,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXX, No.1 (Autumn 2000), pp. 116-135, p. 123.

The increased efforts of the US, despite Clinton's imminent exit, came in the wake of an attack by militants on a US naval vessel in Yemen. The attack, unconnected with the Intifada and allegedly carried out by Saudi Al-Qaida operatives, came as a reminder of the Palestine-Israel conflict's potential for causing wider international fall out.

⁶ Had Barak allowed the Knesset to go ahead with plans to dissolve itself and proceeded with general elections, Netanyahu would have been eligible to compete with Sharon for the Likud leadership and run for the Prime Minister post. By limiting the election to a prime-ministerial referendum, Barak left Netanyahu unable to compete, as non-MKs are

ineligible for Prime Minister candidacy outside a general election. The calculation by Barak was influenced by the certain knowledge that his Labor/One Israel Party would be punished in a general election and though Sharon was clearly ahead in popularity polls, Netanyahu made an even more formidable opponent. Netanyahu tried in vain to persuade the Knesset to undermine Barak and Sharon by dissolving itself regardless, but with Sharon's interest in remaining the sole Likud contender and the majority of MKs anxious to retain their seats, he was forced to step aside.

⁷ The land-swap territories offered the PA 2-4% in exchange for 6%. However, as noted in previous maps, the percentages here are misleading; Israel, as at Camp David and Sharm Esh-Sheikh, reduced the total West Bank land area by 5.4%. In terms of the Taba map this calculation *doubled* the real area of annexation to Israel and rather than the trumpeted 94% of the West Bank, the PA was in truth offered a state on 88.6% of the West Bank as occupied in 1967. (See Map 28.) Further to this quantitative difference, the quality of the land on offer in the land-swap (the Halutza Negev sands and arid Negev areas bordering the south Hebron area) was incomparable with that being annexed - the bulk of Salfit Governorate (the West Bank's single most important underground water source), expanded East Jerusalem and the Gush Etzion settlement bloc area.

⁸ Barak's initial response to his landslide defeat was his public resignation from the Labor Party leadership and political life. When Sharon subsequently invited Labor to join him in a national unity government, Barak decided his resignation was as yet 'informal' and made a bid to join the coalition-building process. When Peres out-maneuvered him he reverted to his previous position. The whole embarrassing episode took place in a matter of days and was soon forgotten in the shadow of mounting violence and domestic Israeli inter-party bargaining, leaving external commentators with the utterly false impression that Barak had lost a 'referendum on peace' and retired from political life in dismay. Barak subsequently joined the chorus of 'hawkish' Israeli leaders to compare Yasser Arafat with Saddam Hussein, Bin Laden et al. as the Intifada persisted, only partially succeeding thereby in a ploy to disguise his atrocious mismanagement of the negotiations and "excessive use of force" in meeting Palestinian demonstrations in the first six months of the Intifada, not to mention his 'generosity' compared to that of his elected successor.

MAP 37

¹ Sharon quoted in *Ha'aretz*, 12 April 2001, reproduced in FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, May-June 2001, p. 3.

² Sharon, quoted in *Davar* (Israeli daily), 14 July 1995, reproduced in *ibid*.

³ Of the other Israeli losses, 36 were soldiers and 28 were settlers. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (Autumn 2001), pp. 103-125, p. 103.

⁴ See summarized text of Mitchell Committee report in *PASSIA Diary 2002*, p. 292.

⁵ Sharon quoted in *Sharon-Peres Symbolize Achievements of Zionism*, 23 May 2001, see: www.palestinecampaign.org [accessed 1.03.2014]. Also, "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (Autumn 2001), pp. 103-125, p. 104.

⁶ Sharon quoted in *Ha'aretz*, 12 April 2001, reproduced in FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, May-June 2001, p. 3.

⁷ Quoted in *Le Monde*, 26 October 2000, reproduced in FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, March-April 2001, p. 3.

⁸ During the same period, 173 Israeli soldiers and civilians were killed. *PASSIA Diary 2002*, pp. 260-261 & p. 268. (Citing LAW, Peace Now, PCHR-Gaza, and B'Tselem statistics.)

⁹ In making this September 2001 address at a dinner held in honor of the Hebron settler community, Landau drew on the Bible to describe the Palestinians: "There is nothing good about them, they are all just wounds and bruises and putrefying sores" [Isaiah 1:6]. Quoted by *Arutz Shev'a* (settler radio station), 2 September 2001, reproduced in FMEP, *Report on Israeli Settlement*, September-October 2001, p. 16.

MAP 38

¹ Powell quoted in *Ha'aretz*, "Sharon, US Work Out Settlement Freeze Deal," 6 June 2001. Sharon quoted in *Ha'aretz*, April 2001, reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 4 (Summer 2001), pp. 157-160, p. 158.

² Gen. Dir. of the ICRC, Paul Grossrieder, speaking in November 2001, quoted in *PASSIA, Chronology Archive, 2000-2001*.

Among the victims of Israel's policy of assassination was the peace activist and high-ranking Fateh politician Dr. Thabet Thabet, killed leaving his Tulkarem home on 31 December 2000. In August 2001, Israeli Apache helicopter gunships assassinated PFLP Secretary-General Mustafa Zabri (Abu Ali Mustafa) as he worked in his Ramallah office. Numerous other high to mid-level political leaders (with no known involvement in military activities) were targeted alongside those responsible for military operations and logistics.

³ Death toll and injuries to 19 July 2002, according to the Palestinian Red Crescent Society tabulations at the time. Detailed tabulations on age and civilian or other status of casualties are available from B'Tselem: www.btselem.org [accessed 1.03.2014].

⁴ Combined, the municipal planning areas (i.e., authorized building zones) of Israel's ca. 230 West Bank settlements allow for the 2002 settler population of ca. 400,000 to easily quadruple, while additional settlement land reserves near two million dunums (over a third of the West Bank). Settlement jurisdictional areas as calculated in *Land Grab: Is-*

rael's Settlement Policy in the West Bank, Jerusalem: B'Tselem, May 2002, p.100. West Bank settlements and settlers (excluding paramilitary or partially militarized sites), PALDIS Database, May 2002.

⁵ ARIJ-LRC, *An Assessment of the Israeli Practices on the Palestinian Agricultural Sector: September 29 2000 - February 28 2002*, Web-based report: www.poica.org [accessed 1.03.2014].

⁶ This PCBS data is calculated according to a family-based poverty line of NIS 1,651 per month (ca. \$340), rather than a per-capita rate. PCBS April 2002 data, cited in Defense for Children International - Palestine Section, *More Than Two Thirds of Palestinian Children Living on Less Than \$1.90/Day*, Press Release, May 2002, www.dci-pal.org [accessed 1.03.2014].

⁷ Sharon speaking on 12 September 2001, quoted in PASSIA *Chronology Archive*, 2000-2001.

⁸ During the first 12 months of the unity government, 41 purely civilian settlement 'footholds' were established along with two civilian-military sites and a further two sites reestablished on previously evacuated sites. (PALDIS Database, May 2002) In late June, Defense Minister Ben-Eliezer noisily proclaimed his intention to dismantle 20 settlement outposts in the West Bank in a bid to deflect internal Labor Party criticism of his leadership by 'proving' his capability to operate independently of the Likud, whose support for the outposts has long been total. The day before the Labor Party conference, 11 shipping containers were relocated voluntarily by settlers, after their leadership had met with the DM. The façade lasted less than 48 hours however, before the settler leadership publicized the 'fakery' of the dismantlement and admitted they had reached an agreement whereby so-called 'dummy' outposts (uninhabited shipping containers placed tactically on hills near actual outposts) were simply moved around before the assembled media, while the DM, in return, pledged to expedite the granting of permits for the outposts themselves. See PALDIS-LDC, *Ideological Settlement in the West Bank: Areas of Exclusion Enforced upon the Palestinian Population*, June 2002, pp. 6-8. Also: *Ha'aretz*, "MK Hendel Confirms Outpost Fakery," 2 July 2002.

⁹ US President Bush quoted in *Ha'aretz*, "Bush: Sharon 'Man of Peace,' IDF Meets Pullout Timetable," 19 April 2002; State Department Officials quoted in *Ha'aretz*, "US Sending Mixed Signals on Arafat," 20 May 2002.

¹⁰ President Bush, speaking on 24 June 2002, quoted in PASSIA, *Chronology Archive*, 2002.

Tzachi HaNegbi, Likud Party Secretary, welcomed Bush's speech, telling Israeli reporters that the US President should be rewarded with a "gold membership card to the Likud Central Committee." Tzachi HaNegbi, speaking on 25 June 2002, to the *Viewpoint* current affairs program, Israel Channel 1 TV.

The Palestine Question in Maps

4

2003–2014

From the Road Map to the Kerry Mission

(Maps 39-49)

ISRAEL'S SEPARATION BARRIER, 2002

The idea of physically separating Israelis and Palestinians is not a product of the 21st Century but can be traced back to the British government's Peel Commission report in 1937 which proposed the partition of Mandate Palestine and population transfers in order to accommodate Jewish immigrants in Palestine and to end the conflict between the Zionist movement and the Palestinian people (see Map 7). Over the subsequent decades, physical separation was never realized because of Zionist convictions that the Jews have "a historical claim" to all of Palestine. Palestinians rejected partition on the grounds that it would only lead to a greater loss of their homeland. Late Yitzhak Rabin, who served as prime minister from 1974 until 1977 and later from 1992 until his assassination in 1995, has been referred to as 'the intellectual father' of the current separation barrier.¹ The first step towards this physical separation came in 1993 when Israel imposed the military closure of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by erecting checkpoints and preventing Palestinians from entering Israel and Jerusalem. In 1994, Rabin's government built the Gaza Strip barrier and one year later, Rabin formed a special commission to discuss further plans for separation of Israelis and Palestinians, yet his assassination in 1995 prevented the realization of his vision of a West Bank wall.


With the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000, demands for an accelerated implementation of a unilateral separation plan, which had been considered by Israeli governments since 1996, became louder. One month later, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak approved the decision to establish an array of barriers and other hindrances to systematically control the entry of people from the West Bank to Israel. After the electoral defeat of Barak in January 2001, the Sharon Government adopted the project and eventually mapped out a route for a separation barrier that runs deep into the West Bank in order to "to prevent the penetration of terrorists from the area of Judea and Samaria into Israel."² On 23 June 2002, Israel's Cabinet Decision No. 2077 approved the first phase of a continuous barrier east of the Green Line and around Jerusalem, as well as a 20 km buffer zone west of the Jordan River and the continued presence of Israeli military forces in the West Bank.³ The decision stated that the barrier "is a security measure" that "does not represent a political or other border" and that the PM and MD would decide on the exact and final route.⁴

The first section of the barrier, extending 175 km from the northern West Bank area near Salem village to the Elkana settlement southeast of Qalqilya, also included a 22 km segment in the north and south of Jerusalem. The second phase of construction extended the barrier to Tayassir village in the north-east of the West Bank and marked the beginning of the separation of the Jordan Valley from the rest of the West Bank. Subsequently, barrier segments around municipal Jerusalem and stretching southwards from the Elkana settlement were approved.

The barrier, including a 30-100-meter wide 'buffer zone', has taken on a number of forms. It consists of eight-meter high structures of solid concrete lined with watchtowers and patrol roads in some areas, and a series of fences, some of which are electric, as well as trenches, barbed wire and sensors in others.

International condemnation of the separation barrier has been widespread. The UNGA passed several resolutions condemning the barrier and demanding "that Israel stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, which is in departure of the Armistice Line of 1949 and is in contradiction to relevant provisions of international law."⁵ The UNGA also warned that the construction of the barrier involved "the confiscation and destruction of Palestinian land and resources, the disruption of the lives of thousands of protected civilians and the de facto annexation of large areas of territory" and that the project had a "devastating impact [...] on the Palestinian civilian population and on the prospects for solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and establishing peace in the region."⁶ The International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion in 2004, saying that the barrier violates international law and impedes the Palestinian right to self-rule as it goes far beyond what is permissible for an occupying power under international humanitarian law. The Court ruled that Israel must "cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around Jerusalem", which could become tantamount to an annexation of Palestinian land, and must return seized property as well as compensate Palestinians for damages suffered.⁷ Likewise, the European Commission has repeatedly voiced that it considers the barrier illegal and has urged the Israeli government to remove it from occupied Palestinian land.

MAP 39



THE ROAD MAP, 2003

At the Arab League summit in Beirut in March 2002, Saudi Arabia put forward the Arab Peace Initiative which, among other things, promised Israel full recognition and normalization of relations with all 22 Arab states in exchange for an end to the occupation, Israel's withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the acceptance of the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian State on the occupied Palestinian territories with East Jerusalem as its capital as well as a "just" and "agreed upon" solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.¹ The Sharon government chose not to respond officially to the Arab peace offer and essentially ignored it for years.


On 24 June 2002, US President Bush outlined his vision of peace in the Middle East, calling for the creation of "a viable, credible Palestinian state" to live "side by side in peace and security" with Israel.² However, the precise borders and the degree of sovereignty of the Palestinian state were to remain provisional until a final settlement was reached. Moreover, Bush vowed not to support any Palestinian state until the Palestinian people had elected new leaders "not compromised by terror"; had established "new political and economic institutions, based on democracy, market economics and action against terrorism" and had made new security arrangements with their neighbors.³ While these conditions were criticized by many as undue interference in Palestinian affairs, Palestinian Cabinet Secretary Ahmed Abdel Rahman labeled Bush's speech a "historic change in the American stand", since it marked the first time that a US administration seemed to recognize that "the only solution for this conflict is to end the occupation and to have a state to live in peace beside Israel."⁴

In the months following Bush's speech, the US government worked together with its partners in the Middle East Quartet (the EU, UN and Russia)⁵ on a proposal to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. This new, internationally oriented US approach to the peace process was widely regarded as both a response to the intense violence and bloodshed between Israelis and Palestinians since the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 and "a bid for international support in the run-up to war in Iraq".⁶ After various initial delays⁷, the Quartet finally issued its Road Map for Peace in 2003 (in full: "Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict"), setting out guidelines supposed to culminate in a two-state solution within three years.⁸ The Road Map marked the first time since the 1947 UN Partition Plan that "the international community succeeded in articulating a single, unified, and comprehensive vision for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, which included the creation of an independent Palestinian state" on 22% of historic Palestine.⁹ The Road Map, which was based on Bush's June 2002 speech and influenced by the Arab Peace Initiative, set out three phases. The first phase was designed to end Palestinian-Israeli violence, freeze Israeli settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements), dismantle outposts, strengthen and reform the Palestinian government, and ease the harsh conditions created by the Israeli security crackdown since 2001 on the 3.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The second phase would lead to the creation of a provisional Palestinian state with temporary borders whereas final negotiations on the permanent borders of a Palestinian state, the refugee issue and the status of Jerusalem would be held in a third and final phase, culminating in international recognition for both states, Palestine and Israel, by 2005.

Since the Road Map was not the outcome of negotiations between the parties to the conflict, neither the Israeli government nor the Palestinians were in fact persuaded that it would ever be fully implemented. Uzi Landau, then Likud minister responsible for the secret service and strategic relations with the US, went as far as saying that the Road Map was "a huge prize for terror" and "a map to national disaster."¹⁰ Israel demanded that Israeli obligations be contingent upon Palestinians meeting all of theirs first and that decisive Palestinian steps against violence as well as a change in Palestinian leadership were preconditions for any political progress. Moreover, it complained that the Road Map did not require the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a 'Jewish' state and that it offered insufficient security guarantees. Finally, the Israeli government insisted that the US, rather than the Middle East Quartet, would monitor the parties' compliance with their obligations and essentially demanded veto power over any decision to advance to the next phase.¹¹ Most Palestinians considered the Road Map an improvement over Oslo, which had not explicitly mentioned an independent Palestinian state as an objective. The Road Map, however, also reminded them of the gradual, sequential approach of the failed Oslo agreements, leading them to doubt that it would ever get beyond the first phase.¹²

By July 2003, the only thing the Israeli and Palestinian officials could agree on was that the Road Map, and some would argue the Middle East Quartet itself, was dead. The Israeli government blamed the Palestinians for failing to rein in the "suicide bombers" and gunmen of Hamas and other extremist groups; according to the Palestinians, Israel was not committed to ending its settlement expansion and continued to create facts on the ground by constructing a separation barrier on Palestinian land, hence actively undermining a viable two-state solution. Moreover, while the Palestinians had accepted the Road Map because it specified obligations for both sides and enjoyed international support, they soon believed that the Road Map - with 14 Israeli reservations attached to it¹³ - would be used solely as leverage against the Palestinians, while leading nowhere. As of 2014, the Road Map still serves as a point of reference in negotiations, although it has become increasingly irrelevant.

MAP 40



THE GENEVA INITIATIVE AND ACCORD, 2003

In October of 2003, just months after the Road Map for Peace had been declared a lost cause by Israeli and Palestinian officials alike, its spirit was revived in the form of an independently developed back-channel effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that became known as the Geneva Initiative¹, or alternatively, the Geneva Accord.² Incorporating ideas from the Road Map as well as the 2000 Clinton Parameters, the 2001 Taba talks and the Bush speech of June 2002, the Geneva Initiative of 2003 was a model permanent status agreement negotiated between key participants in previous rounds of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, such as former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin and then PA Minister of Culture and Information Yasser Abded Rabbo, as well as intellectuals whose objective was to provide "realistic and achievable solutions on all issues [and] a detailed blueprint of Israeli-Palestinian peace."³ In fact, the Geneva Initiative involved a reversal of the gradualist approaches to resolving the conflict which had previously failed, for example at Oslo. Hence, instead of discussing transitional arrangements in the absence of a mutually accepted end goal, the negotiators involved in the Geneva Initiative "agreed on the basic details of the final product (mutual sovereignty, and delineated boundaries) and then began to look for the mechanisms to implement it."⁴


The Geneva Accord that has resulted from this process echoes the Clinton Parameters in stipulating mutual recognition of the Israeli and Palestinian right to two separate states, the removal of Jewish settlements, a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem and the demilitarization of the Palestinian state. The Geneva Initiative envisages a Palestinian state in 97% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with land swaps on a one-to-one basis to compensate for the annexation of some Israeli settlement blocs in the West Bank.⁵ The Accord further states that the projected border must be recognized by the parties as "the permanent, secure and recognized international boundary between them".⁶ In order to ensure territorial contiguity of the Palestinian territories, a 'safe passage corridor', connecting the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, will be under Israeli sovereignty but permanently open and administered by Palestinians. According to the drafters of the Geneva Initiative, the total number of Palestinian refugees allowed into Israel will be at the sovereign discretion of Israel. Thus, in exchange for Israel's return to the 1967 borders, the Palestinians will have to *de facto* relinquish their right of return. While the Clinton Parameters contained a clause saying that "Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 War,"⁷ the Geneva document does not dwell on the responsibility for the refugee crisis. Serving as both Israel's and Palestine's capital, Jerusalem is to be partitioned according to the principle of Israeli control over Jewish neighborhoods and Palestinian control over Arab neighborhoods. Consequently, Palestinians would have sovereignty over but Jews full access to the Al-Haram Ash-Sharif ("Temple Mount" for Jews) site, on which the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock are located.⁸

Although the Geneva Initiative was the product of unofficial, back-channel efforts, it received ample international attention and was soon endorsed by various prominent individuals such as then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, former US Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton as well as the late Nobel Peace Prize winner and former South African President Nelson Mandela.⁹ Furthermore, 58 former presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers and other global leaders issued a joint statement expressing their strong support for the Geneva Initiative. Among the signatories were former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former President of the European Commission Jacques Delors, Nobel Peace Prize winner and former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez and Nobel Peace Prize Winner and former South African President F.W. de Klerk.¹⁰ The Middle East Quartet also welcomed the plan although it did not endorse its specific contents.¹¹

With regard to the immediate official parties to the conflict, the initiative was met with furious disapproval by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, who represented it as a plot against his government.¹² And while Palestinian President Arafat initially called the Geneva Accord "a brave initiative that opens the door to hope" he ultimately did not endorse it officially.¹³ When it came to the Israeli and Palestinian public, there seemed to be "a great deal of variation of opinion within both communities and also a great deal of ignorance about the details of the Accord."¹⁴ For Palestinians, the most contentious provision in the Accord is the Israeli sovereignty over the resolution of the refugee problem, while Israeli criticism has been loudest with regard to the proposed Palestinian control over the Al-Haram Ash-Sharif. However, the biggest flaw of the Geneva Accord might not be its inclusion of these seemingly unacceptable provisions, but the fact that some of its clauses are potentially unworkable.¹⁵ This is especially the case with regard to the rigid border regime proposed for Jerusalem, which ignores the fact that Jerusalem "is a living, organic, integrated city whose population [...] continues to mix."¹⁶

Despite the flaws in the text and despite the fact that the Geneva Initiative never received official backing from Israeli and Palestinian officials, at least parts of the model permanent status agreement have become "widely, grudgingly accepted" among both camps and are still on the table in the current Kerry Peace Process.¹⁷

MAP 41



THE ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT PLAN, 2003-2005

In December 2003, only a few months after the publication of the Geneva Initiative, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon effectively "hijacked" the Geneva agenda by announcing his intention of unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and a small part of the northern West Bank while making clear that Israel would never give up Jerusalem and the remainder of the West Bank.¹


The Disengagement Plan² envisaged the evacuation of 8,692 settlers from 21 settlements in Gaza³ and 582 settlers from four settlements in the Jenin area of the West Bank area⁴ as well as all the permanent military installations in the designated areas. According to the official text, the Disengagement Plan was intended not just to further the Israeli security situation, but also to "improve the current reality" in which there was "no Palestinian partner with whom it is possible to make progress."⁵ With regard to the Gaza Strip, the disengagement would be permanent and would therefore mark the end of both Gaza's status as "occupied territory" as well as Israel's responsibility to the Palestinians living in Gaza. However, under the Disengagement Plan, Israel would continue to exercise control over Gaza's military, its sea and airspace, borders and border crossings and a wide range of administrative matters, including taxes and customs, the population registry and "the supply of electricity, fuel, gas, medicines, merchandise and water as well as the entry and exit of goods and people to and from the Strip."⁶ Furthermore, Israel reserved the right to respond to threats emerging from Gaza and the West Bank by undertaking military operations in those areas, including "preventive" actions.

Within Israel, the Disengagement Plan was heavily criticized by the settler movement and the political right who opposed the withdrawal from what they considered to be Jewish land. The members of PM Sharon's own Likud party even voted down the plan in a non-binding party referendum in May of 2004.⁷ Additional criticism came from left-wing Israelis who considered the disengagement to be "a means of railroading the peace process and instead focusing on the de facto establishment of borders in the West Bank via settlement and wall construction."⁸ Nevertheless, in June 2004 Sharon was able to secure Cabinet support for a revised version of the plan⁹, which was also approved by the Knesset in October of that year.¹⁰ Soon after the Knesset passed the 'Disengagement Plan Implementation Law' in February of 2005, the Israeli Cabinet voted to implement the plan.¹¹ Apart from a few minor incidents, the actual pullout went smoothly, taking place between 15 August 2005, when Israel began removing settlers, and 23 August, when the pullout in the northern West Bank was completed. On 12 September 2005, the last troops withdrew from the Gaza Strip.¹²

The Disengagement Plan, which was presented at a time of growing international criticism of Israel over the construction of the Separation Barrier; a weak Israeli economy under the Second Intifada as well as a growing number of military and civilian casualties due to the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians that continued to "[increase] the costs of keeping an extensive military presence in the Gaza Strip"¹³; brought PM Sharon an important "PR success" for Israel. As early as April 2004, then US President Bush had already given his blessing in a letter exchange with PM Sharon, labeling the Disengagement Plan "a bold and historic initiative that can make an important contribution to peace."¹⁴ Furthermore, the letter gave Israel a sweeping commitment and guarantees its existence as a Jewish state, by "promising" that Palestinian refugees will not return to the state of Israel.¹⁵ Similarly, the Middle East Quartet praised the Disengagement Plan as a potential "step towards achieving the two-state vision" in line with the 2003 Road Map, although it did stress that the parties to the conflict should refrain from "unilateral actions".¹⁶ Astonishingly enough, the Quartet failed to see that the Disengagement Plan itself constituted a unilateral move that deliberately intended to sideline the 2003 Road Map and indefinitely postpone the Quartet's vision of a Palestinian state. As Dov Weissglas, then senior advisor to Prime Minister Sharon, explained, the Disengagement Plan aimed at "freezing the peace process. [...] When you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem."¹⁷ Likewise, PM Sharon presented the Disengagement Plan in an interview as "a blow to the Palestinians, in that it will force them to give up on their aspirations [to statehood] for many years to come."¹⁸ In fact, the Disengagement Plan managed to win Israel international support "for expanding settlements in the West Bank in exchange for "dumping" Gaza and to jeopardize the possibility of a viable Palestinian state."¹⁹

At first, many Palestinians, including President Mahmoud Abbas, were positive about the Disengagement Plan, hoping that it might result in new opportunities to revitalize the Palestinian economy in Gaza and the West Bank.²⁰ However, the Palestinians soon found out that the implementation of the Disengagement Plan did not improve the situation. Instead, Palestinian citizens continued to be withheld various human rights, including "the right to freedom of movement, family life, health, education, and work."²¹ Moreover, with Israel no longer prepared to recognize its responsibility over the Palestinians living in Gaza, the latter became "effectively locked in a prison" where they were "worse off by all metrics: physically, emotionally and economically."²²

MAP 42



AGREED DOCUMENTS ON MOVEMENT AND ACCESS FROM AND TO GAZA, 2005


Shortly before the implementation of the Disengagement Plan in the summer of 2005, the Middle East Quartet Special Envoy for Disengagement James Wolfensohn announced that a number of conditions needed to be met in order for the disengagement to be "an economic success for the Palestinians" as well as a security success for Israel.¹ Four of these conditions² concerned the movement of persons and cargo, with Wolfensohn stressing the need for "smoothly functioning border points between Gaza and Israel and [...] with Egypt"; the "free movement of goods and people between Gaza and the West Bank"; a further easing of the "system of closures and movement restrictions in the West Bank" and "a land and a sea port [...] to give Gaza and the West Bank direct access to third countries."³ In November 2005, about two months after the Israeli disengagement, Wolfensohn pursued the realization of these conditions by joining forces with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana to facilitate talks between the PA and Israel aimed at "hammering out practical arrangements to gain the benefits of [the Israeli disengagement] and improve conditions in the rest of the Palestinian territories."⁴ The negotiations resulted in the PA and Israel signing two related agreements on 15 November, namely the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) and the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing (APRC).⁵

Echoing Wolfensohn's conditions, the AMA and APRC were meant to facilitate "the movement of people and goods within the Palestinian Territories" as well as the opening of "an international crossing on the Gaza-Egypt border [the Rafah crossing] that will put the Palestinians in control of the entry and exit of people."⁶ The AMA outlined the six main provisions on which agreement had been reached.⁷ First, the PA would gain control over the movement and access from and to Gaza through the international Rafah crossing on the Gaza-Egypt border. The target date for the opening of Rafah was 25 November 2005. Second, Israel would gradually increase the operating capacity of other crossings for goods and persons between Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. In particular, it would allow more export trucks from Gaza to pass through the Gaza-Israel Karni crossing point and would, on an urgent basis, "permit the export of all agricultural products from Gaza during [the] 2005 harvest season."⁸ Third, Israel would allow the movement of people and goods between Gaza and the West Bank by means of, respectively, bus and truck convoys. Fourth, the US and Israel would cooperate to make sure that the obstacles to the movement of persons and goods within the West Bank would be minimized by the end of the year. Fifth, the Palestinians were allowed to start the construction of a seaport at Gaza. Finally, the parties would continue discussions considering the "security arrangements, construction and operation" of a future Palestinian airport.⁹ The APRC specified which arrangements were agreed upon with regard to the establishment and operation of the international crossing at Rafah. In addition to outlining Israeli-Palestinian cooperation on the security and customs procedures at Rafah, the APRC assigned the EU the role of third party, responsible for assisting the PA in operating the crossing as well as evaluating the PA's performance after 12 months and subsequently making recommendations for future arrangements between all the parties involved. For this purpose, the Council of the EU established the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) in November 2005.¹⁰

Although the AMA and APRC promised "to promote peaceful economic development and improve the humanitarian situation" in the Palestinian territories and Israel, little came of it.¹¹ In fact, when the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published a first year evaluation of the implementation of the agreements in November 2006, it concluded that "there has been no peaceful economic development [...] but rather a deterioration in the humanitarian situation and an increase in violence overall."¹² With regard to the Rafah crossing, progress was initially very promising, since the target for the opening was met and the crossing operated virtually every day between 25 November 2005 and 25 June 2006. However, from then until the publication of the evaluation report, Israel closed the crossing on about 86% of the days, citing security reasons. Similarly, despite some initial progress, Israel did not hold its promise of increasing the operating capacity of the crossings between Gaza and Israel, but actually restricted the already limited movement of goods and persons from and to Gaza further. The Karni crossing, for example, was closed for over half of the year in 2006, while it had been open for more than 80% of days in 2004 and 2005. Moreover, less than 4% of the 2005 Gaza harvest was exported. The AMA failed to improve the movement of people between Gaza Strip and the West Bank as well. The respective deadlines for bus and truck convoys were not met, nor was any progress made afterwards, leading the UN OCHA to conclude that travel between the Palestinian areas remained "virtually impossible."¹³ Movement within the West Bank also got worse in the first year after the signing of AMA and APRC. Instead of the projected decrease in the number of obstacles, there was a 44% increase.¹⁴ Furthermore, construction of a seaport at Gaza did not start, while the discussions considering an airport at Gaza were abandoned.

After Hamas' electoral victory in 2006, Israel imposed a political and economic blockade on Gaza, thereby effectively freezing the AMA.¹⁵ Following Hamas' hostile takeover of Gaza in the summer 2007, Israel tightened the Gaza blockade,¹⁶ while EU BAM Rafah suspended its operations at the crossing point.¹⁷ Since then, the provisions in the AMA and APRC have been completely neglected by Israel, while the economic and humanitarian crisis in "the world's largest open-air prison" has only deepened.¹⁸

MAP 43



Adapted from a map by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (<http://www.ochaopt.org>)

REVISED ROUTE OF THE ISRAELI SEPARATION BARRIER, 2006

After various Israeli government decisions to revise the route of the separation barrier in the West Bank¹ the Israeli cabinet approved a more or less final route in April 2006.² In its decision, the Israeli government followed the Israeli High Court of Justice which, while rejecting the claim by Palestinians and Israeli human rights organizations that the separation barrier was built for political rather than security reasons, had ruled on several occasions that the balance between security and humanitarian considerations was disproportionate, demanding the route be altered in order to cause less harm to the Palestinian population.³ In its rulings, Israel's High Court had ignored the issue of the illegality of the Israeli settlements, which primarily dictated the convoluted route of the barrier. Thus, while neglecting international condemnation of the barrier as a violation of international law⁴, the High Court had preferred to focus on tests of proportionality, leading it to demand changes in the route in a few places without preventing construction of the barrier deep inside the West Bank and the severe damage, expropriation and restriction of movement inflicted on the Palestinian population as a result thereof.


Based on the official map of the new route⁵ the Israeli "security fence" would be – upon completion – over 700 km long, more than twice the length of the 1949 Armistice Line (the Green Line), which is only 315 km long.⁶ At least 80% of the separation barrier would thus not follow the Green Line, but instead be built inside the West Bank, i.e., on Palestinian land. Furthermore, the construction of the barrier along this route, combined with planned Israeli settlement expansion, would lead to the *de facto* annexation of about 45.5% of the West Bank by Israel.⁷ This includes some 9.0% of the West Bank falling outside the separation barrier, with settlements inside the barrier accounting for an additional 8.0% and the Jordan Valley, which would be almost exclusively controlled by Israeli settlements, making up another 28.5% of the West Bank.

If the barrier were to be completed according to the 2006 route, about 60,500 Palestinians in 42 West Bank villages and towns would end up living "in areas between the barrier and the Green Line or in closed areas" while an additional 124,300 Palestinians in 28 villages would be "located on the east side, but surrounded by the barrier on three sides and controlled on the fourth with an associated physical closure."⁸ In addition, the barrier would "separate or isolate over 230,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites from the rest of the West Bank" as well as "further separate over 2 million Palestinians living on the 'eastern' side of the Wall from East Jerusalem."⁹ Furthermore, the construction of the barrier along the designated route would have grave humanitarian consequences for Palestinians in and outside the West Bank, since it would fragment their communities and effectively cut them off from social support networks, specialized medical care as well as from numerous schools, universities, workplaces and holy sites.¹⁰ The separation barrier also brings economic hardship to many Palestinians, such as farmers who are partly or completely restricted from reaching their own land in order to harvest their crops or look after their animals.¹¹ Moreover, Palestinians farmers and business owners on either side of the separation barrier face many difficulties in reaching consumers on the other side of it. Lastly, an Israeli separation barrier along the 2006 route would "divest Palestinians of their water rights", a consequence that is "especially apparent with regard to the Ariel and Kedumim 'fingers' near Qalqilya, which stretch 22 km into the northern West Bank, covering only 2.2% of the occupied West Bank, but some of its most valuable water resources."¹²

While Israel has consistently claimed that the separation is a security measure, this argument has been undermined by the fact that its route will not necessarily benefit the Israeli security situation since it will be "much more difficult and expensive to patrol" than the Green Line.¹³ Even before the announcement of the new route in 2006, various government officials had already associated the barrier with the future borders of Israel, thereby suggesting that security concerns were not the main reason for its route.¹⁴ Consequently, Palestinians feared that its real aim was the establishment of a new border to replace the Green Line, which would consolidate the Israeli acquisition of large parts of Palestinian land on the West Bank. The revised 2006 route did little to alleviate these fears, since it merely seemed to "[reinforce] Israel's race to create facts on the ground that further complicate efforts toward the creation of a viable Palestinian state."¹⁵

As of 2014, the projected total length of the separation barrier is about 712 km, 85% of which runs inside the West Bank.¹⁶ While the international community has repeatedly demanded that Israel "immediately cease the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, dismantle forthwith the structure situated therein, repeal or render ineffective all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, and make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall," Israeli has so far refused to comply.¹⁷ As a result, 62% of the barrier has already been completed, with an additional 10% currently under construction and the final 28% planned for construction in the near future.¹⁸

MAP 44



THE SETTLERS' PLAN FOR PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY, 2006

In May 2006, the Israeli settler movement put forward its own detailed political-territorial plan for Palestinian autonomy which envisaged the extension of Israeli sovereignty over large parts of the West Bank and the establishment of two independent, semi-autonomous Palestinian administrations, one in the West Bank which would be linked to Jordan and one in Gaza with links to Egypt.¹ The "Peace in the Land" plan had been developed by a number of prominent settlers in consultation with the YESHA Council² and aimed to tackle three problems identified by the settler movement: the "security problem", the "problem of ruling a foreign people" and finally the "demographic problem." According to the drafters of the plan, none of these problems could be adequately addressed through the development of a Palestinian state made up of the West Bank and Gaza because such a Palestinian state could never be viable. The main reason for this was the location of "Israeli Jerusalem" and the Ma'ale Adumim settlement bloc in the West Bank, which would compel Israel to limit the sovereignty of the Palestinian state and to exercise "control over its arms, aviation, and use of water resources, as well as its foreign relations and military."³


As an alternative to the supposedly non-viable two-state solution based on the pre-1967 borders, the settlers proposed a "realistic political plan" based on a number of principles. First of all, the Jewish people were said to have a historical and biblical right to Israel, a right that had allegedly been confirmed by international law. Secondly, because the Jewish people were themselves short of land, Israel could not be expected to provide the territory for a future Palestinian state on its own. Instead, a regional solution had to be sought in which both Jordan and Egypt also contributed land for the Palestinian state. Thirdly, in order to deal with the "demographic problem", Israel had to annex a part of the Palestinian population without seriously undermining the demographic makeup of the "Jewish state." Fourthly, as a solution to the "problem of ruling a foreign people", the Palestinians would have to be divided up into three categories. A first category would consist of Palestinians that "will become citizens of Israel in every aspect"; a second category of Palestinians that "will be citizens of the independent autonomous Palestinian authority [...] linked to Jordan" and a third category that "will be citizens of the independent authority of Gaza and northern Sinai that will [...] be linked politically to Egypt."⁴ The final two principles of the settler plan dealt with the "security problem" by reestablishing the Jordan Valley as an Israeli security zone in order to counter threats from the east as well as by extending Israeli control over other parts of the West Bank with the aim of fighting terrorism and establishing "defensible borders".

The "Peace in the Land" plan envisaged the extension of Israeli sovereignty over 60% of the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley, 'western Samaria', 'western Binyamin', the Gush Etzion settlement bloc and south Mount Hebron. In order to achieve this, a new plan for settlement expansion would be developed. In addition, Israel would annex about 300,000 Palestinians living in those areas by granting them full Israeli citizenship in a staged process that could take many years. The settlers considered the consequential increase of Israel's Arab population too small to pose a threat to the "Jewish character" of Israel. For the remaining 40% of the West Bank, the settlers envisioned the establishment of a "contiguous transport system" and an independent Palestinian administration to manage their affairs in the areas of education, health, community and economy. However, Israel would not only retain the right to intervene in Palestinian affairs for security reasons, but also have full control over all security matters, all natural resources and infrastructure and even the freedom of movement in the entire West Bank. Furthermore, the "contiguous Palestinian region" would not be allowed to involve into an independent Palestinian state. Instead, on the long run, it would become part of Jordan, with its Palestinians citizens becoming "citizens of Jordan, residents of Israel, living under their own independent administration."⁵ Since the "contiguous transport system" would only apply to parts of the West Bank, but not to Gaza Strip, a safe passage route between the two Palestinian territories would not be established. Instead, Gaza would be linked with Egypt, which would have to donate some land in the Sinai to the Palestinians with the aim of alleviating the economic and humanitarian crisis in the densely populated Gaza Strip. Similar to the provision for the West Bank, Gaza would be allowed a limited form of self-government, with "the final status of the independent administration in the expanded Gaza Strip" to be "determined in negotiations between the Palestinians in Egypt"⁶

The settlers' plan also outlined an alternative solution to the Palestinian refugee question, which would involve the allocation of part of the northern Sinai to Palestinian refugees, who would then be encouraged to move to this desert area, or to Jordan or another Arab state.

In effect, the Israeli settler movement proposed to create "peace in the land" by expanding the Israeli annexation of Palestinian land, denying Palestinians the right to self-determination and renouncing Israeli responsibility for the Palestinian refugees, thereby forcing the Arab states to solve the refugee question. While certain elements of the plan (such as the proposed settlement expansion) do concur with past and present Israeli policies, the plan was never endorsed by Israel, let alone any of the other parties to the conflict.

MAP 45



THE GAZA STRIP, 2006-2009

On 25 January 2006, about a decade after the landslide Fatah victory in the first Palestinian parliamentary elections, the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, won a surprising, but overwhelming victory in the second PLC elections, acquiring 74 of the 132 parliamentary seats, leaving the previously ruling Fatah faction with only 45 seats.¹ EU observers concluded that the elections were conducted in a fair and democratic manner and even praised them as a model for elections in the wider Arab world.² While Hamas initially sought to form a unity government with Fatah, the latter refused to cooperate, after which Hamas formed a majority government in March 2006 under leadership of PM Ismail Haniyeh.³ However, this government was immediately and widely boycotted by the international community for refusing to meet three "conditions:" renouncing terrorism, recognizing the right of Israel to exist, and accepting all agreements previously signed by the PLO.⁴ Hamas, which emerged in late 1987 during the first Palestinian uprising as an offshoot of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and which has been designated as a terrorist organization by the US, Israel, the EU and various other international actors, only went as far as omitting its call for the destruction of Israel from its election manifesto, calling instead for the establishment of an "independent state whose capital is Jerusalem." As a result, international sanctions were imposed upon the Palestinians; foreign aid to the PA was suspended and Israel stopped the transfer of Palestinian taxes, leading to a severe liquidity crisis and an unprecedented deterioration of the local economy, especially in Gaza. Officials from Fatah and Hamas began criticizing each other, and the tensions between the two factions that had existed ever since the creation of Hamas, began to boil over into violence.⁵

In June 2006 a fragile truce between Israel and Hamas broke down.⁶ A period of violent exchanges commenced, which escalated at the end of the month after Palestinian militants attacked an Israeli military base near the border with Egypt, taking one Israeli soldier captive. Israel retaliated by launching two large-scale military operations ("Operation Summer Rains" and "Operation Autumn Clouds") in Gaza between the end of June and the end of November of 2006 in which over 400 Palestinians were killed, more than half of which were civilians, including about 90 children.⁷ Meanwhile, internecine fighting between Hamas and Fatah led to dozens of additional deaths, until a hasty truce was brokered by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Meeting in Mecca in February 2007, the leaders of Fatah and Hamas signed an agreement to stop the clashes and form a national unity government, with Haniyeh staying on as PM. This was presented to the PLC on 17 March 2007, but violence soon flared up again with dozens of street battles, kidnappings, and property seizures. Dubbed the "Battle of Gaza", the fighting in June led to Hamas prevailing in Gaza and securing control of the Strip. In the aftermath, President Abbas dissolved the national unity government and appointed a provisional "caretaker" government under Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, although he had no power to affect Hamas's hold on the Gaza Strip.⁸

After Hamas' takeover, the increasing isolation of the Gaza Strip was completed by means of a full blockade, with Israel effectively sealing off the territory with the help of Egypt and the support of the US, rarely allowing persons or goods to enter or leave Gaza.⁹ In September 2007, the Israeli government declared the entire Gaza Strip a "hostile entity", citing the threats posed by Hamas rule and continued Palestinian rocket attacks. Additional restrictions on Gaza followed, including the complete closure of all border crossings, disruption of power supplies and fuel shipments, increased monitoring of funds, a cessation of visits to prisoners, and the allowing of only essential food and medicine to be brought into Gaza.¹⁰

Hostilities between Israel and Hamas continued in early 2008, culminating in yet another Israeli military operation in Gaza ("Operation Hot Winter") from late February until early March, resulting in the deaths of about 120 Palestinians, over half of which had not been involved in the fighting, such as the more than 20 children killed.¹¹ The following months saw a decline in violence and Israel and Hamas agreed to an Egyptian-brokered six-month ceasefire in June.¹² After the ceasefire expired, hostilities resumed and on 27 December Israel launched the devastating "Operation Cast Lead" which involved a "full-scale military assault on Hamas in the Gaza Strip" ending with unilateral ceasefires after three weeks.¹³ The offensive, which Israel had been preparing for six months¹⁴, claimed the lives of around 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis.¹⁵ About two-thirds of the Palestinian casualties were civilians, among which were over 300 children. Operation Cast Lead was widely condemned by the international community, with the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict concluding that the Israeli operation was "premised on a deliberate policy of disproportionate force aimed not at the enemy but at the 'supporting infrastructure' [which] in practice [...] appears to have meant the civilian population."¹⁶

Between 2006 and 2009, the Gaza blockade together with the Israeli military operations in Gaza greatly exacerbated the already poor living-conditions in the overpopulated Strip, leading to a severe economic and humanitarian crisis. The crippling restrictions on imports and exports, cash flow and access to land and sea in combination with the destruction of homes, factories and infrastructure by the Israeli military caused over a hundred thousand Gazans to lose their jobs and lead to growing food insecurity and a vast deterioration of the water and sanitation infrastructure as well as the health and educational systems in Gaza.¹⁷

MAP 46



Gaza Strip Crossing Points:

Erez:	Open six days for international aid workers, medical and humanitarian cases.
Nahal Oz:	Partially open on five days a week for limited types of fuel.
Karni:	Closed since 11 June 2007. Grain conveyor belt operational three days a week. Cement lane completely closed since 29 October 2008.
Sufa:	According to the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) no longer a crossing point (last open on 12 September 2008).
Kerem Shalom:	Open six days a week for limited movement of authorized goods.
Rafah:	Open on ad hoc basis.

THE ANNAPOLIS CONFERENCE AND THE OLMERT PEACE PLAN, 2007-2008


In December 2006, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas conducted the first of what was to become an extended series of meetings over the next two years aimed at reviving the peace process and working towards an agreement based on the 2003 Road Map.¹ A few months later, the Arab League re-adopted the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, calling on Israel to accept the regional solution to the conflict.² Olmert's initial reaction was positive, but he eventually abandoned the regional track in favor of a continuation of bilateral negotiations with the PA in preparation for the upcoming Annapolis Conference of November 2007.³

US President Bush had announced the Annapolis Conference in a speech in July 2007, about a month after Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip.⁴ After denouncing the Hamas takeover, Bush had pledged to take "a series of steps to strengthen the forces of moderation and peace among the Palestinian people," which involved providing financial assistance to the PA; strengthening the US commitment to get the Israelis and Palestinians to resolve their issues as well as to help the Palestinians establish an institutional framework for a future Palestinian state.⁵ In taking these steps, the US would cooperate with the other members of the Middle East Quartet and its recently instated representative, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Furthermore, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was to chair an international conference in which representatives from Israel, the PA and a number other relevant countries and international organizations would participate.

In preparation for the conference, Olmert, Abbas and various other Israeli and Palestinian representatives held a series of meetings to draft a 'Declaration of Principles' regarding the core issues of the conflict.⁶ While Abbas tried to obtain tangible concessions from the Israelis as proof to the Palestinian public that negotiations were the best way to achieve peace, Olmert was hesitant to make any concrete promises that could hurt the domestic popularity of his government. Unsurprisingly, the parties failed to come up with the envisioned declaration. In the end, all Bush could present to the representatives of over 50 countries and international organizations⁷ attending the Annapolis Conference on 27 November 2007, was a vague "Joint Understanding",⁸ in which Olmert and Abbas expressed their intention to start a new round of bilateral negotiations aimed at reaching a final status agreement before the end of 2008⁹ and to start implementing their obligations under the 2003 Road Map at once, with the US monitoring their progress.

In the wake of the conference bilateral negotiations continued, but progress on reaching an agreement was slow, not the least because the efforts of the negotiators were undermined by a number of external factors. These included the escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas, which had boycotted the Annapolis Conference¹⁰, culminating in the devastating Israeli military operation "Hot Winter" in 2008 (see Map 46); increased Israeli settlement activity marking a failure of Israel to implement its obligations under the Road Map¹¹; and finally the weakening domestic position of the Olmert government.¹² On 16 September 2008, Olmert presented Abbas with a comprehensive plan covering the contentious issues of security, Jerusalem, refugees and borders.¹³ On security, the plan outlined a number of principles that both sides had more or less come to agree on, including the "non-militarization" of Palestine, which would be allowed a police force but no national army or air force; the permanent deployment of an international military force (probably NATO) in the Jordan Valley and Israeli access to the Palestinian airspace and – if necessary for security purposes – Palestinian territory. With regard to Jerusalem, it envisioned Israeli sovereignty in Israeli neighborhoods and Palestinian sovereignty in Arab neighborhoods, so that both Israel and Palestine could have a capital in the city. Furthermore, the Old City of Jerusalem and a number of surrounding areas would be recognized as a "Holy Basin" and be placed under international "custody" with Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the US and Israel collectively governing the area. While Abbas accepted this arrangement in principle, he disagreed with Olmert's definition of the Holy Basin.¹⁴ When it came to refugees, Olmert was prepared to recognize the suffering of – but not Israel's responsibility for – the Palestinian refugees and proposed the establishment of an international fund to pay Palestinian refugees for the loss of property they suffered in the 1948 War and if relevant, for their relocation to Palestine or a third country.¹⁵ In addition, about 5,000 Palestinian refugees (out of five million) would be allowed into Israel on humanitarian grounds. While Abbas accepted the compensation scheme, he objected to Israel taking in a mere 0.1% of Palestinian refugees. Finally, concerning borders the Olmert Peace Plan projected the Israeli annexation of between 6.3% and 8.8% of Palestinian territory, with land swaps compensating for 5.4% to 5.8%.¹⁶ Furthermore, a safe passage tunnel connecting the West Bank and Gaza would be established and a number of small settlements removed while some of the largest ones, including the Ariel settlement between Ramallah and Nablus, were to stay in place. This was unacceptable to Abbas, who had made it clear that he could allow over 60% of the settlers to remain in place, as long as the Ariel settlement, which formed a significant obstacle to Palestinian development, was removed. Although the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams had thus – against all odds – managed to make significant progress on reaching an agreement on some of the core issues of the conflict, there were still substantial differences that Olmert's plan did not take into account. As a result, Abbas could not accept the entirety of the Olmert Peace Plan, which was presented to him as "Israel's best offer."¹⁷ After Abbas refused to accept it, negotiations broke down, bringing the Annapolis process to a dissatisfying end.¹⁸

MAP 47



THE GAZA STRIP TODAY (2014)

In May 2010, an international coalition of political and human rights activists opposing the Gaza blockade - a cooperative effort by the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) - sailed a six-vessel flotilla to the Gaza Strip, thereby violating the naval blockade Israel had imposed on the Strip since January 2009 on top of the general cordon around the territory that had been in place since 2007.¹ According to the UN Fact-Finding Mission the flotilla's aims "were threefold: (a) to draw international public attention to the situation in the Gaza Strip and the effect the blockade; (b) to break the blockade; and (c) to deliver humanitarian assistance and supplies to Gaza."² The latter point was of particular importance for the participants.

After the flotilla ignored an order by the Israeli Navy to change its course and head for the Israeli port of Ashdod,³ Israel deployed Naval Special Forces which raided the ships, killing nine activists and wounding over 50 others on one of them, the M.V. *Mavi Marmara*.⁴ Although subsequent investigative reports by national and international panels into the Gaza flotilla raid differed in their judgment regarding the legality of the Gaza blockade, there was near universal agreement on the fact the Israeli forces had used excessive force during the raid.⁵ This incident led to a serious deterioration in Israeli-Turkish relations. Mounting international criticism of the Gaza blockade in the wake of the flotilla raid induced Israel and Egypt to ease the access restrictions on the Gaza Strip in June 2010 and from December 2010 also the export restrictions. However, these relaxations were too limited to bring about a significant improvement of the economic and humanitarian situation in Gaza.⁶


Meanwhile, hostilities between Israel and Gaza continued over the course of 2010 and 2011, with both sides occasionally carrying out cross-border attacks, resulting in dozens of Palestinian deaths as well as a number of Israeli fatalities.⁷ After a number of violent incidents near the Gaza-Israeli border in the second half of 2012, Israel launched "Operation Pillar of Defense" on 14 November of that year, attacking over 1,500 targets in the Gaza Strip.⁸ The operation, which continued until Israel and Hamas concluded a ceasefire on 21 November, left over 170 Palestinians dead, about 100 of them civilians, including dozens of children.⁹ By contrast, six Israelis, including four civilians, lost their lives. According to the UN OHCHR, both the Israeli army and the Palestinian armed groups violated international law during the time span of "Pillar of Defense."¹⁰ As part of the terms of the Egypt-brokered ceasefire, both Israel and Egypt eased some of its access restrictions on Gaza.¹¹ Since the 2012 ceasefire there have been no major episodes of hostilities between Israel and Gaza and 2013 actually saw the lowest number of Palestinian conflict-related deaths in Gaza since 1999, although cross-border attacks and casualties as a consequence thereof increased significantly in the first months of 2014.¹²

Despite the improved security situation, the humanitarian and economic crisis in the Gaza Strip has continued to deepen, especially since July 2013¹³, when Egypt's military overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood President Morsi in Cairo and imposed the "toughest border restrictions on the Hamas-run Gaza Strip in years, sealing smuggling tunnels, blocking most passenger traffic and causing millions of dollars in economic losses."¹⁴ The tightening of the Gaza blockade by Egypt has led to a sharp increase in food prices as well as unemployment in the Gaza Strip, while the very limited operation of the Rafah border crossing has severely restricted the Gazans' access to health care in Egypt.¹⁵

Furthermore, since the closing of the smuggling tunnels, which were used in part to bring Egyptian fuel into Gaza, there has been a chronic shortage of fuel in the Gaza Strip, causing its Power Plant to operate at about half of its capacity and even shutting down completely on a number of occasions.¹⁶ As a consequence of this fuel and electricity crisis in Gaza the supply of running water been very limited, with over 30% of Gazan households receiving water only once every four days for a mere 6 to 8 hours. In addition to this, water desalination units have been operating at below half of their capacity, a large number of medical machines has been out of order in hospitals, solid waste collection and management services are struggling to keep up with demand and over 140,000 dunums of farmland used for food production are at risk of drought because the wells used to water the land require electricity to operate.¹⁷

In addition, the Gazan economy continues to suffer from Israel's refusal to lift the blockade.¹⁸ While there was a slight increase in the number of truckloads entering Gaza from Israel in 2013 compared to 2012, the number of export trucks allowed into Israel declined significantly.¹⁹ As a result of the Israeli-imposed siege, living conditions in Gaza remain detrimental as of 2014, and the future of the 1.6 million Gazan people seems – in light of the ever worsening economic and humanitarian crisis - very bleak, with the number of food insecure households, amounting to 57% in 2012, expected to spike this year.²⁰

MAP 48



THE WEST BANK TODAY (2014)


In June 2009, the recently inaugurated Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu declared his support for a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside Israel if the Palestinians recognized Israel as the Jewish homeland.¹ Three months later, US President Obama met with Netanyahu and PA President Abbas, calling on them to revive the peace process.² While both leaders stated they wanted negotiations to resume, this did not happen until a year later. Perhaps emboldened by his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize win,³ President Obama set the deadline for the conclusion of a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace deal at only one year after the beginning of the talks in September 2010.⁴ However, the negotiations collapsed within a month when the Palestinian leadership put a halt to the talks because Israel refused to extend a partial West Bank settlement freeze it had initiated 10 months earlier.⁵ In October Netanyahu announced that Israel would only extend the freeze if the Palestinians recognized Israel as the state of the Jewish people, something the PA had made clear it was not willing to do. Unsurprisingly Abbas refused, the negotiation table remained empty, and settlement construction continued.⁶

When Fatah and Hamas reached an agreement to form a Palestinian national unity government in April 2011⁷, Prime Minister Netanyahu condemned the reconciliatory move, stating that the PA would have to choose between making peace with Israel and making peace with Hamas, since the Hamas goal of destroying Israel made these two objectives incompatible.⁸ Abbas insisted that Palestinian unity was an important condition for reaching a two-state solution and announced that if the impasse in negotiations continued, the PA would submit a request for international recognition of the State of Palestine to the UNGA after the one-year Obama deadline passed.⁹ When negotiations did not resume, Abbas applied for full Palestinian membership of the UN in September.¹⁰ After the bid failed and the peace process remained on halt over the next year¹¹, the PA applied for, and was granted, the status of "non-member observer state" on 29 November 2012.¹²

After President Obama's first trip to Israel in March 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry stayed behind to revive the peace process.¹³ By July, Kerry had convinced both sides to resume negotiations with the aim of reaching a final status agreement within nine months.¹⁴ The negotiations were in part made possible by a Palestinian pledge to halt its campaign for international recognition of the state of Palestine¹⁵, as well as an Israeli agreement to the phased release of 104 long-term Palestinian prisoners.¹⁶ Substantial talks began on 14 August.¹⁷ In January 2014, following months of talks without any sign that the parties were getting closer to a peace deal, John Kerry pushed both sides to first agree on a common "framework" for final status talks.¹⁸ In late March, Israel refused to release the last 26 Palestinian prisoners, stating the PA should first agree to an extension of the peace talks beyond the April 29 deadline.¹⁹ In response, Abbas signed Palestine up to 15 international conventions.²⁰ Israel then approved the construction of over 700 settlements in East Jerusalem and imposed economic sanctions against the PA.²¹ While it was obvious that the Kerry peace process was dead by this time, negotiations were officially still ongoing until Israel suspended them on 24 April, one day after Fatah and Hamas signed an agreement to form a unity government.²² Israel stated it would not negotiate with Hamas, a "terrorist organization that calls for the destruction of Israel."²³ Although President Abbas subsequently declared that any Palestinian unity government would recognize Israel, denounce violence and accept all previous agreements between Israel and the PA, Israel did not change its position.²⁴

While the Obama administration has publicly blamed both sides for the failure of the peace talks, various US officials – including Kerry – have identified Israel's continuing settlement expansion as the major spoiler in the peace process.²⁵ During the nine months of talks, Israel had issued tenders for almost 5,000 settlement housing units in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and promoted plans for close to 9,000 additional units,²⁶ while it demolished over 500 Palestinian structures.²⁷ These actions are part of a broader trend of Israeli colonization of the West Bank and East Jerusalem through the establishment of "outposts" on Palestinian land and the subsequent construction of settlements on that land, combined with the simultaneous destruction of Palestinian homes and buildings.²⁸ From 2009 to 2013, Israel started construction on close to 7,500 settlement units in the West Bank.²⁹ While the number of construction starts dropped significantly from 2009 to 2010, it increased again over the next years and more than doubled to over 2,500 in 2013, marking the highest yearly total in over a decade. In East Jerusalem, settlement expansion has also continued, with the number of issued tenders skyrocketing from 2012 onwards and reaching a record high of over 2,500 during the nine months of the Kerry peace talks.³⁰ Unsurprisingly, the settler population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has grown considerably over the years, from close to 300,000 at the time of the Oslo Accords to 560,000 as of 2014.³¹ Furthermore, between 2009 and 2013 over 2,500 Palestinian structures were demolished in Area C and East Jerusalem, displacing over 4,300 Palestinian residents.³² The yearly totals were highest in 2013, with over 660 demolitions and over 1,100 displacements recorded. To make things worse, tension has been rising in the West Bank, especially since 2013, which saw the highest yearly total of Palestinian injuries from conflict-related violence since 2005³³ and more Palestinian deaths than the two previous years combined.³⁴ With the peace talks at a dead end since the collapse of the Kerry process and Israel's creeping colonization picking up speed, the chances of a viable two-state solution ever becoming a reality now seem slimmer than ever.

MAP 49



NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR - MAPS 39-49

MAP 39

¹ Makovsky, David, "How to Build a Fence," *Foreign Affairs*, 83 no.3 (March/April 2004).

² Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs, Decision No. 64/B dated 14 April 2002. See for example B'Tselem, *Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank*, 2002, p. 7, at https://www.btselem.org/download/201210_arrested_development_eng.pdf [accessed 24.03.2014].

³ PASSIA, *Diary 2003*, p. 320.

⁴ Government Decision 2077 of 23 June 2002. See for example Hinnerk Gölnitz, "International Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Barrier by Israel in the West Bank," 2005, p. 17, at http://www.publiclaw.uct.ac.za/usr/public/_law/LLMPapers/goelnitz.pdf [accessed 24.03.2014].

⁵ See UNGA Resolution A/RES/ES-10/13 (21 October 2003). On 8 December 2003, the UNGA adopted Resolution ES-10/14, embodying a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences arising from Israel's construction of a barrier separating part of the West Bank from Israel. The text of the request reads: "What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem (...)" The Assembly was meeting in its tenth resumed emergency special session on the question of Palestine. The recorded vote in the Assembly, which consists of all 191 UN member states, was 90 in favor, to 8 against, with 74 abstentions. Nineteen member states did not vote. See UNGA Resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 (8 December 2003).

⁶ See UNGA Resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 (8 December 2003).

⁷ International Court of Justice, "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory," Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, at <http://www.icjij.org/docket/?p1=3&p2=4&k=5a&case=131&code=mwp&p3=4> [accessed 11.06.2013]. In its Resolution A/RES/ES-10/15 (20 July 2004), the UNGA referred to the Court ruling and demanded "that Israel, the occupying Power, comply with its legal obligations as mentioned in the advisory opinion".

MAP 40

¹ "Text: The Arab Peace Plan of 2002," BBC News, 22 March 2005, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1844214.stm [accessed 04.07.2013].

² Speech by George W. Bush on Israel and a Palestine state, 24 June 2002, published by *The Guardian*, 25 June 2002, at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jun/25/israel.usa> [accessed 18.03.2014].

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ BBC News, "World reaction to Bush speech," 25 June 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2066437.stm [accessed 19.04.2014].

⁵ The Middle East Quartet is a panel comprised of the Foreign Ministers of the US and Russia and senior representatives from the UN and EU. It was formed in Madrid during former US Secretary of State Powell's visit to Europe and the Middle East shortly after President Bush called for Israel to "withdraw" immediately from recently reoccupied Palestinian territories on 4 April 2002. The Quartet's mandate was to organize a Middle East conference later that year, which never materialized, and to design a road map to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement based on the phased formula enunciated in the Mitchell Report, including the establishment of a Palestinian state. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was appointed the Quartet's Special Envoy in June 2007.

⁶ "The Road Map" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXXII, no. 4 (Summer 2003), 83-99, at <http://www.palestine-studies.org/files/pdf/jps/5601.pdf> [accessed 19-03-2014].

⁷ While the finalization of the Road Map was originally scheduled to take place at a Quartet meeting on 20 December 2002, the US delayed it several times, first citing Israeli objections and later expressing the desire to await both Israeli and PA elections and government formations, as well as the end of the Iraq war. See "The Road Map" *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXXII, no. 4 (Summer 2003), 83-99, at <http://www.palestine-studies.org/files/pdf/jps/5601.pdf> [accessed 19-03-2014].

⁸ Sharon Otterman, "Middle East: The Road Map to Peace," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 7 February 2005, at <http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-road-map-peace/p7738> [accessed 04.07.2013].

⁹ Khaled Elgindy, "The Middle East Quartet: Post Mortem," *Brookings Institution*, Analysis Paper 25 (February 2012), p. 9.

¹⁰ Uzi Landau, "A Map to National Disaster," *Haaretz*, 8 April 2003, at <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/a-map-to-national-disaster-1.13573> [accessed 04.07.2013].

¹¹ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Response to the Road Map," 25 May 2003, at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/mfadocuments/pages/israel%20response%20to%20the%20roadmap%2025-may-2003.aspx> [accessed 04.07.2013].

¹² International Crisis Group, "A Middle East Road Map to Where?" *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXXII no. 4 (Summer 2003), 83-87, at <http://www.palestine-studies.org/files/pdf/jps/5601.pdf> [accessed 03.07.2013].

¹³ For the full text of the 14 Israeli reservations attached to the Road Map see *Haaretz*, "Israel's road map reservations," 27 May 2003, at <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-s-road-map-reservations-1.8935> [accessed 18.03.2014].

MAP 41

¹ Harms, Gregory & Ferry, Todd M., *The Palestine-Israel conflict: a basic introduction*, 3rd Edition, London: Pluto Press, 2012.

² The inclusion of "Geneva" in the name of the Initiative was meant as a tribute to the Swiss Foreign Ministry, which provided funding and support for it. While the Geneva Accord was published in October of 2003, the plan was officially launched with a high-profile signing ceremony held in Geneva on 1 December 2003. See "The Geneva Accord," *Haaretz*, 14 October 2003, at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/the-geneva-accord-1.102684> [accessed 02.04.2014]. See also Minnis, Glenn, "Arafat OK With Peace Plan Launch" *CBS News*, 1 December 2003, at <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/arafat-ok-with-peace-plan-launch/> [accessed 02.04.2014].

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¹⁴ While Olmert included the Mount of Olives, the City of David archaeological site and part of the Palestinian Silwan neighborhood in his definition of the "Holy Basin," Abbas wanted the Holy Basin to refer only to the Old City, so that the people living in the Silwan and the At-Tur (Mount of Olives) neighborhoods could become part of a future Palestinian state. See Avishai, B. "A plan for peace that still could be," *The New York Times*.

¹⁵ The refugee scheme under discussion here had been discussed in earlier rounds of talks, such as the 2001 Taba Talks, and included the following provisions: "refugees could immigrate to Palestine or stay in the states in which they now lived (especially Jordan), or go to a third country. In exceptional cases, refugees could go to Israel. In all events, they would be compensated and their relocation paid for." Avishai, B. "A plan for Peace that still could be," *The New York Times*.

¹⁶ The percentage of Palestinian land annexed and compensated in the Olmert Peace Plan differs depending on which source is used. While Avishai reports Israeli annexation of 6.4% of Palestinian and compensation for 5.8%, Sheridan mentions only 6.3% annexation. The Foundation for Middle East Peace states that the Israeli annexation amounted to 6.8% according to Israeli calculations and as much as 8.8% according to Palestinian calculations, while compensation was provided for 5.5% according to Israeli calculations and 5.4% if Palestinian calculations are adopted. See Avishai, B. "A plan for Peace that still could be," *The New York Times*; Sheridan, G. "Ehud Olmert still dreams of peace," *The Australian*; and Foundation for Middle East Peace, "Map: Olmert's Final Status Map," *Report on Israeli Settlement in*

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¹⁷ Schiff, A. "The 'Annapolis Process': a chronology of failure," p. 671. Abbas later commented on his decision to reject Olmert's Peace Plan by saying that "No responsible leader could agree to a peace that further erodes this tiny territory and strips away even more of its natural resources, historic sites and beautiful landscapes. And no responsible leader will accept a 'peace plan' that repackages the occupation and makes it permanent." Abbas, M. "Israel and Palestine Can Still Achieve Peace," *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 September 2008, at <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122178624406455063> [accessed 12.05.2014].

¹⁸ In practice, negotiations ended on 16 September 2008 because Abbas neglected to respond to Olmert about his offer, because he doubted whether it was useful to continue talks with an Israeli Prime Minister that had already announced

his resignation and was being investigated for charges of corruption in Israel. Also, Abbas wanted to await the installment of the new Obama Administration in the US, from which he hoped to get a better deal. It was not until Israel launched "Operation Cast Lead" in Gaza in January 2009 that the bilateral talks were officially suspended. A month later, the Obama administration tried to revive the talks, but failed. The new Israeli government that came into power under Prime Minister Netanyahu a month later abandoned the Olmert Peace Plan. See Avishai, B. "A plan for Peace that still could be", *The New York Times*; Schiff, A. "The 'Annapolis Process': a chronology of failure."; and "Olmert: Right-wing U.S. cash derailed Israeli peace plan," *CNN*, 5 May 2012, at <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/05/world/meast/israel-olmert-us/> [accessed 12.05.2014].

MAP 48

¹ For an elaborate discussion of the events leading up to and following the formation of the flotilla, see Migdalovitz, C. "Israel's Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath," *Congressional Research Service*, 23 June 2010, at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41275.pdf> [accessed 15.05.2014]; Palmer, G., Uribe, A., Itzhar, J. C. & Sanberk, S. O. "Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident" (Palmer Report), UN, September 2011, at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014]; and "Report of the international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of ships carrying humanitarian assistance" (UN HRC Fact-Finding Mission Report), UN OHCHR, 27 September 2010, at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/15session/A.HRC.15.21_en.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014].

² UN HRC Fact-Finding Mission Report, p. 19.

³ Israeli officials offered to inspect the ships' cargo at the port of Ashdod and afterwards deliver the approved goods to Gaza over land, under supervision of representatives of the flotilla. Israel had operated this way with regard to a number of other supply ships sent to Gaza by activists in previous years. See Migdalovitz, C. "Israel's Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath," *Congressional Research Service*, p. 2.

⁴ Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (Palmer Report), September 2011, at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf [accessed 21.06.2013].

⁵ For example, the UN HRC Fact-Finding Mission called the blockade illegal because it was "inflicting disproportionate damage upon the civilian population in the Gaza Strip" (UN HRC Fact-Finding Mission Report, p. 13). It furthermore argued that Israel used excessive violence during the raid, since "lethal force was employed by the Israeli soldiers in a widespread and arbitrary manner which caused an unnecessarily large number of persons to be killed or seriously injured," while "less extreme means could have been employed" (UN HRC Fact-Finding Mission Report, p. 36). Even though the Palmer Report designated the blockade as legal, stating that it was "a legitimate security measure in order to prevent weapons from entering Gaza by sea" and that "its implementation complied with the requirements of international law," it also concluded that "Israel's decision to board the vessels with such substantial force [...] was excessive and unreasonable" (Palmer Report, p. 4).

⁶ See Migdalovitz, C. "Israel's Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath," *Congressional Research Service*. See also "Easing the Blockade: Assessing the Humanitarian Impact on the Population of the Gaza Strip," UN OCHA oPt, March 2011, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_special_easing_the_blockade_2011_03_english.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014].

⁷ See "The Humanitarian Monitor: December 2010," UN OCHA oPt, 19 January 2011, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2011_01_19_english.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014] and "The Humanitarian Monitor: December 2011," UN OCHA oPt, 19 January 2012, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2012_01_19_english.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014].

⁸ See "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of Human Rights Council resolutions S-9/1 and S-12/1," UN OHCHR, 6 March 2013, at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.35.Add.1_AV.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014]. See also B'Tselem, "Human Rights Violations during Operation Pillar of Defense: 14-21 November 2012," May 2013, at http://www.btselem.org/download/201305_pillar_of_defense_operation_eng.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014].

⁹ The estimates of the number of fatalities resulting from 'Operation Pillar of Defense' vary per source, both with regard to the number of casualties and the percentage of civilian casualties. The numbers reported here are based on the UN OHCHR's Report on the operation and are based on a number of Palestinian and Israeli sources. See "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of Human Rights Council resolutions S-9/1 and S-12/1," UN OHCHR, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹¹ See "The Monthly Humanitarian Monitor: October-November 2012," UN OCHA oPt, 18 December 2012, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2012_12_18_english.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014] and "Humanitarian Monitor Monthly Report: December 2012," UN OCHA oPt, 28 January 2013, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2013_01_28_english.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014].

¹² See "Fragmented lives: Humanitarian Overview 2013," UN OCHA oPt, 7 April 2014, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_annual_review_2014.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014]; "Humanitarian Monitor Monthly Report: January 2014," UN OCHA oPt, 19 February 2014, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2014_02_19_english.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014]; "Humanitarian Monitor Monthly Report: February 2014," UN OCHA oPt, 19 March 2014, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2014_03_19_english.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014]; and "Humanitarian Monitor Monthly Report: March 2014," UN OCHA oPt, 29 April 2014, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2014_04_29_english.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014].

¹³ "Fragmented lives: Humanitarian Overview 2013," UN OCHA oPt.

¹⁴ Barzak, I. & M. Daraghmeah "Egypt imposes toughest Gaza restrictions in years," *USA Today*, 24 July 2013, at <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/07/24/egypt-toughens-gaza-restrictions/2584275/> [accessed 15.05.2014].

¹⁵ See "Humanitarian Monitor Monthly Report: January 2014," UN OCHA oPt. See also "Fragmented lives: Humanitarian Overview 2013," UN OCHA oPt.

¹⁶ "The Humanitarian Impact of Gaza's Electricity and Fuel Crisis," UN OCHA oPt, 28 March 2014, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_electricity_factSheet_march_2014_english.pdf [accessed 15.05.2014].

¹⁷ Ibid.; see also "Humanitarian Monitor Monthly Report: March 2014," UN OCHA oPt.

¹⁸ When Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated that he would agree to reconciliation with Israel if it would consider lifting the blockade on Gaza in February 2014, the Israeli Netanyahu government replied that this was "out of the question". See Ravik, B. "Lifting Gaza blockade 'out of the question,' senior Israeli officials say," *Haaretz*, 12 February 2014, at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.573871> [accessed 15.05.2014].

¹⁹ "Fragmented lives: Humanitarian Overview 2013," UN OCHA oPt.

²⁰ "Humanitarian Monitor Monthly Report: February 2014," UN OCHA oPt.

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¹ Kershner, I. "Netanyahu Backs Palestinian State, With Caveats," *The New York Times*, 14 June 2009, at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/world/middleeast/15mideast.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [accessed 20.05.2014].

² "US urges Middle East peace push," *Al Jazeera*, 23 September 2009, at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2009/09/2009922161318347929.html> [accessed 20.05.2014].

³ "The Nobel Peace Prize 2009," *The Nobel Prize*, at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/ [accessed 20.05.2014].

⁴ McGreal, C. "Obama warns Middle East leaders 'chance may not come again soon,'" *The Guardian*, at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/02/middle-east-peace-talks-israel-palestine> [accessed 20.05.2014].

⁵ See "Abbas: Peace talks won't continue 'a single day' if settlement freeze ends," *Haaretz*, 20 September 2010, at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/abbas-peace-talks-won-t-continue-a-single-day-if-settlement-freeze-ends-1.314813> [accessed 20.05.2014]. See also "Israeli prime minister urges Palestinians to continue talks," *CNN*, 3 October 2010, at <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/10/02/mideast.talks.palestinians/> [accessed 20.05.2014].

⁶ "Netanyahu offers settlement freeze in return for recognition as Jewish state, Palestinians say no," *Haaretz*, 11 October 2010, at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/netanyahu-offers-settlement-freeze-in-return-for-recognition-as-jewish-state-palestinians-say-no-1.318447> [accessed 20.05.2014].

⁷ Despite the agreement, the proposed Palestinian national unity government was never formed and the strife between Fatah and Hamas continued. For an elaborate discussion of the Fatah-Hamas conflict and subsequent reconciliation process, see "Fatah & Hamas and the issue of reconciliation," PASSIA, December 2013.

⁸ "Fatah, Hamas reach unity agreement," *USA Today*, 27 April 2011, at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-04-27-hamas-fatah-treaty_n.htm [accessed 20.05.2014].

⁹ Abbas, M. "The Long Overdue Palestinian State," *The New York Times*, 16 May 2011, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/opinion/17abbas.html> [accessed 20.05.2014].

¹⁰ Mitchell, C. "P.A. Submits Statehood Application to the UN," *CBN News*, 23 September 2011, at <https://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/insideisrael/2011/September/Full-Steam-Ahead-PA-Set-to-Submit-Statehood-Bid/> [accessed 20.05.2014].

¹¹ In January 2012 Jordan tried to get both sides back to the negotiating table, but the attempt failed. Three months later the PA sent a letter to Prime Minister Netanyahu, reiterating that the Palestinians wanted negotiations to resume, but not before Israel froze its settlement construction and accepted the 1967 Armistice Line as the borders of a future Palestinian state. Netanyahu replied with a letter in which he repeated his support for the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state as long as the Palestinians recognized Israel as a Jewish state. The letter marked the first time that an Israeli leader supported a two-state solution in an official document. However, Netanyahu did not respond to the PA's request for a settlement freeze and recognition of the pre-1967 borders. Consequently, the letter exchange did not alter the position of the two sides, and the impasse in negotiations continued. See Bronner, E. "Palestinians Restate Demands to Netanyahu," *The New York Times*, 17 April 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/world/middle-east/palestinians-deliver-letter-on-peace-talks-to-netanyahu.html?_r=0 [accessed 20.05.2014]. See also Ravid, B. "Netanyahu to Abbas: Israeli unity cabinet is a new opportunity for Mideast peace," *Haaretz*, 14 May 2012, at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.573871> [accessed 20.05.2014].

www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-to-abbas-israeli-unity-cabinet-is-a-new-opportunity-for-mideast-peace-1.430224 [accessed 20.05.2014].

¹² For an overview and discussion of both the PA bids for UN membership, see PASSIA (2012). *The Road to Palestinian Statehood: A Review of a People's Struggle for National Independence*. Jerusalem: PASSIA.

¹³ For a timeline of the most important events in what has become known as the Kerry Peace Process see Tait, R. "Israel peace talks: Timeline of failure," *The Telegraph*, 25 April 2014, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/10787184/Israel-peace-talks-Timeline-of-failure.html> [accessed 20.05.2014].

¹⁴ See Kerry, J. "Press Availability in Amman, Jordan," UNISPAL, 19 July 2013, at <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/1D44713A467AA23C85257BB0004BA71E> [accessed 20.05.2014]. See also Gordon, M. "Kerry Says Goal Is Mideast Peace Deal Within 9 Months," *The New York Times*, 30 July 2013, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/world/middleeast/kerry-says-goal-is-mideast-peace-deal-within-9-months.html> [accessed 20.05.2014].

¹⁵ Harris, E. "Kerry Tries To Get Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks Back On Track," *NPR*, 6 November 2013, at <http://www.npr.org/2013/11/06/243537892/kerry-tries-to-get-israel-palestine-peace-talks-back-on-track> [accessed 20.05.2014].

¹⁶ These prisoners should have already been released under the 1999 Sharm Esh-Sheikh Agreement. See Sherwood, H. "Israel-Palestinian peace talks: Netanyahu forces through release of 104 prisoners," 29 July 2013, at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/28/israel-approves-release-palestinian-prisoners> [accessed 20.05.2014]. See also Toameh, K. "PA welcomes Israeli decision to free Palestinian prisoners, vows to work for release of all inmates," *The Jerusalem Post*, 28 July 2013, at <http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/PA-welcomes-Israeli-decision-to-free-Palestinian-prisoners-vows-to-work-for-release-of-all-inmates-321310> [accessed 20.05.2014].

¹⁷ The negotiations began after Israel had released the first batch of 26 Palestinian prisoners. See "Israel-Palestinian peace talks resume," *Al Jazeera*, 15 August 2013, at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381422595257277.html> [accessed 20.05.2014].

¹⁸ "Kerry seeks 'framework' for Israeli-Palestinian peace," *BBC*, 1 January 2014, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25566439> [accessed 20.05.2014].

¹⁹ "Israel shuns Palestinian prisoner deal," *Al Jazeera*, 28 March 2014, at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/israel-shuns-palestinian-prisoner-deal-20143289541954307.html> [accessed 20.05.2014].

²⁰ Abbas's move to join these conventions was seen by observers as a symbolic gesture, since all of the conventions dealt with social and/or human rights issues and did not provide the PA with substantial leverage over Israel, as for example signing up for the International Criminal Court would have done, since that would have allowed Palestinians to contest Israel's occupation of the West Bank. See Rudoren, R., M. R. Gordon & M. Landler, "Abbas Takes Defiant Step, and Mideast Talks Falter," *The New York Times*, 1 April 2014, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/world/middleeast/jonathan-pollard.html> [accessed 20.05.2014].

²¹ See Hasson, N & Ravid, B. "While Kerry tries to clinch deal, Israel issues 700 tenders beyond Green Line," *Haaretz*, 1 April 2014, at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.583200> [accessed 20.05.2014]. See also "Israel imposes tax sanction on Palestinian Authority," *BBC*, 11 April 2014, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26982166> [accessed 20.05.2014].

²² If it is formed, the Palestinian national unity government would mark the end of the seven-year rift between the two biggest Palestinian factions. See Black, I., Beaumont, P. & Roberts, D. "Israel suspends peace talks with Palestinians after Fatah-Hamas deal," *The Guardian*, 24 April 2014, at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/middle-east-israel-halts-peace-talks-palestinians> [accessed 20.05.2014].

²³ Black, I., Beaumont, P. & Roberts, D. "Israel suspends peace talks with Palestinians after Fatah-Hamas deal," *The Guardian*.

²⁴ See Newman, M. "New PA government to recognize Israel, Abbas reportedly says," *The Times of Israel*, 24 April 2014, at <http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-to-recognize-israel-under-deal-abbas-reportedly-says> [accessed 20.05.2014]. See also Browning, N. "Palestinian unity government will recognize Israel: Abbas," *Reuters*, 26 April 2014, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/26/us-palestinian-abbas-talks-idUSBREA3P08820140426> [accessed 20.05.2014].

²⁵ See Landler, M. "Mideast Frustration, the Sequel," *The New York Times*, 8 April 2014, at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/world/middleeast/israeli-settlement-plan-derailed-peace-talks-kerry-says.html?_r=0 [accessed 20.05.2014].

See also Landler, M. "Mideast Peace Effort Pauses to Let Failure Sink In," *The New York Times*, 15 May 2014, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/16/world/mideast-peace-effort-pauses-to-let-failure-sink-in.html> [accessed 20.05.2014].

²⁶ Peace Now, "9 Months of Talks, 9 Months of Settlement Development," 29 April 2014, at <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/9Months> [accessed 20.05.2014].

²⁷ "PLO: Israel demolished over 500 Palestinian structures during talks," *Ma'an News Agency*, 29 April 2014, at <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=693796> [accessed 20.05.2014].

²⁸ See for example "The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlement Policies," UN OCHA oPt, 7 December 2012, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settlements_FactSheet_December_2012_english.pdf. See also "Fragmented lives: Humanitarian Overview 2013," UN OCHA oPt, 7 April 2014, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_annual_review_2014.pdf [accessed 20.05.2014].

²⁹ Foundation for Middle East Peace, "The Land of Israel is One Settlement Bloc," *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (March-April 2014) at <http://www.fmep.org/reports/archive/vol-24/vol-24/PDF> [accessed 20.05.2014].

³⁰ See *Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2013, pp. 61-150. See also Peace Now, "9 Months of Talks, 9 Months of Settlement Development."

³¹ Foundation for Middle East Peace, "The Land of Israel is One Settlement Bloc."

³² See "The Humanitarian Monitor: December 2010," UN OCHA oPt, 19 January 2011, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2011_01_19_english.pdf [accessed 20.05.2014]; "The Humanitarian Monitor: December 2011," UN OCHA oPt, 19 January 2012, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2012_01_19_english.pdf [accessed 20.05.2014] and "Humanitarian Monitor Monthly Report: March 2014," UN OCHA oPt, 29 April 2014, at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2014_04_29_english.pdf [accessed 20.05.2014].

³³ "Fragmented lives: Humanitarian Overview 2013," UN OCHA oPt.

³⁴ "Humanitarian Monitor Monthly Report: March 2014," UN OCHA oPt.

The Palestine Question in Maps

5

Jerusalem

(Maps 50-63)

THE OLD CITY, 1944 & 1966

Archaeological findings point to settlement upon and around the site of Jerusalem's Old City dating from ca. 4000 BCE. The major portion of the walls standing around the city today date from 1542, when their construction was ordered by Ottoman Sultan Suleiman 'the Magnificent'. When Britain declared Jerusalem the administrative capital of Mandate Palestine in 1917, 22,247 souls resided within the city walls.¹ That year, the 900 dunum (0.9 km²) Old City, the center of religious and economic life, was made the subject of a British decree aimed at maintaining, "in accordance with existing customs," freedom of worship for members all religious faiths. In 1918, the British passed an order banning any unauthorized structural alterations, "in the city of Jerusalem or its environs within a radius of 2,500 m from the Damascus Gate."²



Thus, throughout the Mandate period, the Old City, with its principal holy places - Al-Haram Ash-Sharif, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, and the disputed Al-Buraq Ash-Sharif (the 'Wailing Wall' - see Glossary) - remained for the most part physically unaltered.³ British plans for Jerusalem focused on urban and industrial development to the west of the Old City. By 1947, 98% of Jerusalem's Jews resided in that area, most of them leasing land from Palestinian owners or the Waqf.⁴ Jewish Mandate-period population growth in the western suburbs amounted to 293%, while the Jewish population in the Old City halved. Over the same period, the number of Palestinians in the Old City, where several distinct 'sub-communities' lived in the Armenian, Christian and Muslim Quarters, grew by 200%.⁵ British figures for 1944 put the population of the Old City at 36,000; Muslims and Christians, in roughly equal proportion, numbered 33,600, while 2,400 Jews lived in a small area between the Armenian and Mughrabi Quarters.⁶ About 99.4% of the Old City was owned by Islamic and Christian endowments or Palestinians, while 0.6% was in Jewish ownership.⁷

During the 1947-48 War, Zionist forces were given orders to seize, expel and then settle Jewish residents in Jerusalem's "defeated and evacuated quarters." The ensuing 'transfer' of up to 80,000 Palestinians from their homes in Jerusalem's western villages and suburbs created a refugee crisis of its own within the Old City, where 30,000 'New City' residents took shelter.⁸ There, Transjordanian and Palestinian forces repelled two major Israeli assaults and succeeded in holding the walled city. The 1,300 Jewish residents who had not fled west during the fighting were evacuated by the UN on 22 May 1948.⁹ The few houses belonging to Jews were then leased from Jordan by UNRWA, which, together with the ICRC, administered the resettling of refugees in these and the (more numerous) *Waqf* properties.¹⁰ In the aftermath of the war, the Old City population dropped sharply, as many residents had been dispossessed of their livelihood and land beyond the walls and sought new opportunities in Amman, where development was more focused or other family members had taken refuge during and after the war.¹¹

In June 1967, the Israeli army occupied the Old City, along with the rest of the West Bank. Israel pledged to "safeguard the city's integrity and to live in it with others in unity."¹² However, the first Friday following its conquest, Israel ordered prayer at Al-Haram Ash-Sharif halted - the first such instance in nearly 800 years.¹³ The following day, 10 June, 650 residents of the 14th Century Mughrabi Quarter were expelled beyond the city limits and their homes bulldozed to make way for a plaza in front of the Wailing Wall. In 1968, in the face of condemnation and UN demands that it, "rescind all measures already taken and desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem," Israel proceeded to demolish another 1,048 flats, 437 workshops, four schools and two mosques, forcing over 6,000 Palestinians from the city and establishing today's Jewish Quarter.¹⁴ The Jewish Quarter, hailed by Israel as a 'return' to the Old City, consumed 116 dunums of the Old City - more than 23 times the total area in pre-1948 Jewish ownership.¹⁵

The population of the Old City in 1967 was put at 23,675, a figure revealing a steep decline since Mandate times. Most of the population loss was the result of socio-economic factors stemming from the 1947-48 War and migration to the East Bank in the years that followed. Others had fled the fighting in 1967 - for the West Bank hinterland or east across the Jordan - and were to be prevented from returning. By the end of 1968, Israel's mass ejections from the Old City had further reduced the Palestinian population by more than 25%.¹⁶

MAP 50



MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES OF JERUSALEM, 1947-2000

At the close of the Mandate, Jerusalem's municipal area was 19.2 km². Following the partition, Israel's (West) Jerusalem Municipality (WJM) expanded its 16.26 km² share of this area to the west. The resulting West Jerusalem area totaled 38 km² and incorporated most of the developing Jewish suburbs and many of the depopulated Palestinian villages in the surrounding hills. In the east, the Arab Municipality, in 1952, extended East Jerusalem's 2.2 km² area to the surrounding villages and suburbs to total an area of 6 km².¹ Other plans to expand Jordanian-ruled East Jerusalem's boundaries to the northern suburbs, where the most intense urban development was centered, were never implemented² (see Map 54).

After the 1967 War, Israel redefined Jerusalem's municipal limits dramatically before absorbing the entire expanded area within the State of Israel, in total disregard for international opinion and in flagrant violation of international laws prohibiting the acquisition of territory by force. Official annexation followed 13 years later, on 30 July 1980, when the Knesset formalized the illegally expanded municipal limits and declared the entire area inseparable from the state of Israel. The new municipal limits carved an additional 64 km² out of the West Bank, being the lands of 28 Palestinian villages and large portions of the municipal areas of Ramallah, Al-Bireh and Bethlehem.³ However, in drawing these lines, an Israeli committee carefully limited the inclusion of Palestinian built-up areas so as to reduce the demographic weight of the 'non-Jews' absorbed in the city.⁴ The new boundaries were guided by the desire to control the key defensive hilltops, communication lines and valleys, and by the decision, "not to include too many Arab residents in the annexed area, and to include open areas for the development of Jewish neighborhoods [settlements]."⁵

The hugely expanded area – being a ten-fold increase on East Jerusalem's pre-1967 size – incorporated merely 22,000 additional Palestinians. A further 44,000 resided in the 10% of the annexed area that lay within pre-1967 East Jerusalem municipal borders.⁶ The expansion, formally approved by Israel's Cabinet on 26 July 1967, and by the Knesset two days later, brought the entire (East and West) Jerusalem municipal area to a total of 108 km². Following the expulsions from the Old City (see Map 50), the population ratio in this area stood at 74.2% Jewish: 25.8% Palestinian.⁷ A total of 266,300 people lived within the city limits.⁸

Faced with a high growth rate in the Palestinian population, and the priority of maintaining a substantial majority in the city, Israel's Jerusalem policy focused on the rapid construction of settlements in the annexed east and the absorption of a maximum number of Jewish migrants and immigrants in the city. Between 1967 and 1985, 10 large urban settlements were established on confiscated land in occupied East Jerusalem.⁹ By 1983, over 50,000 Jews were living in East Jerusalem settlements and by 1985, the Jewish population in Jerusalem had reached 328,000.¹⁰ Nonetheless, high Palestinian population growth countered the demography of the settlers and the 1985 Jewish-Arab ratio even evinced a slight decline in the Jewish relative majority (71.6%:28.4%).¹¹


In 1985, and again in 1993, the municipal boundaries were redrawn with the sole purpose of controlling this demographic trend. This time the city stretched westward – by 0.5 km² in 1985 and by 17.9 km² in 1993 – bringing Jerusalem's municipal area to its current 126.4 km² area. About 51% of this area is made up of annexed Palestinian West Bank land beyond the pre-1967 East Jerusalem municipal boundaries, 5% is made up of the original East Jerusalem municipal area, 30% corresponds to the pre-1967 West Jerusalem area, and the remaining 14% has been annexed to the west since 1985.

Through much of the 1980s, Jewish growth rates in the city were in fact negative, and in the 1990s they rarely exceeded 1.3% annually, while the Palestinian growth rate has consistently been around three times this figure.¹² By expanding the city west to incorporate Jewish satellite suburbs, Israel was able to only partially slow the inevitable natural erosion of its demographic majority. By 1998, of the city's 633,700 inhabitants, 68.4% were Jewish and 31.6% Palestinian; the Jewish growth rate stood at 1% per annum, the Palestinian rate at 3.5%.¹³ This natural factor, more than any other, has spurred Israel's massive settlement program in East Jerusalem and guided its discriminatory policies aimed at encouraging, if not forcing, Palestinians from the city.

MAP 51



Municipal Area of Jerusalem Since 1967 (in thousand dunums)



JERUSALEM AND THE *CORPUS SEPARATUM* PROPOSED IN 1947

Mandate-period schemes for the partition of Palestine, beginning with that of the 1937 Peel Plan (see Map 7), isolated Jerusalem from the proposed Jewish and Arab states. They did so in recognition of the impracticable nature of any equitable partition of the city and out of a desire to prevent Jerusalem (and Bethlehem to its south) being drawn into the eventual arena of violent conflict; something the planners believed likely if not inevitable.

Lord Peel's proposal envisioned a permanent British Mandate over Jerusalem and Bethlehem, connected to the coast at Jaffa by way of wide corridor incorporating most of the Palestinian villages in the west of the Jerusalem district along with those in the Ramleh district. The British were to guarantee access to the two cities' holy sites and protect and preserve these under the supervision of the League of Nations. The Peel Commission evoked the original Palestine Mandate document when it spoke of British rule over Jerusalem as "a sacred trust of civilization," but made no clear provision for the involvement therein of the Palestinian and Jewish residents in running their own affairs: "This trust does not belong to the people of Palestine alone, but to the multitudes of people in other lands for whom one or both of these places [Jerusalem and Bethlehem] is sacred."¹


Subsequent partition plans, throughout the Mandate years, adopted the Peel formula for 'internationalization' (albeit under a British regime), altering only the territorial definitions of the proposed Jerusalem Mandate area (see Maps 7 & 8). In the meantime, Britain struggled to contend with the administrative running of the capital. Jewish-Arab tensions, exacerbated by Britain's 1937 arrest and expulsion of Jerusalem mayor Hussein Fakhri Al-Khalidi, rendered the municipality ineffective and frequently threatened to spark serious strife in the city.² In 1945, Sir William Fitzgerald, head of Palestine's High Court Judges, drafted a plan for a new municipal mechanism - the so-called 'Borough-Plan'. This allowed for the preservation of the city's unity but suggested separate Arab and Jewish councils be created with a degree of autonomy over respective boroughs. An 11-member British-run administrative council would oversee the elected councils and monitor issues pertaining to shared spheres and holy sites. Fitzgerald held that Jerusalem was indivisible *per se* but nonetheless presented an outline map for sectoral subdivision along the lines of "an administrative county."³ The Jewish borough was to be situated to the northwest of the Old City, while the Arab borough ran north to south with the Old City at its center.

With the referral of the Palestine Question to the UN, the premise of retaining British rule over the city was dropped, but the guiding principles of access to, and protection of, holy sites gained their most solid expression. The November 1947 UNGA Partition Plan (Res. 181) called for the creation of a 258 km² *Corpus Separatum* under the supervision of a UN Trusteeship Council. Dispensing with the corridor to the coast, the proposed enclave stood to include Bethlehem as well as 17 large Palestinian villages and two main Jewish settlements. Within the *Corpus Separatum* area an estimated 105,000 Palestinians and 100,000 Jews were to elect separate semi-autonomous municipalities, while the UN was to ensure the area's demilitarized and neutral status. A UN-appointed governor was to supervise the creation of an international police force and remain responsible for foreign affairs and access to the holy sites. Unlike previous schemes, the plan provided for a plebiscite after 10 years, whereupon the Trusteeship Council would review the situation and issue further recommendations - potentially including partition of the city.⁴

The *Corpus Separatum* plan, along with the Partition Plan as a whole, was no sooner ratified than it was consigned to failure. Violent attacks and counter-attacks on villages within the proposed enclave as well as upon Jerusalem neighborhoods began immediately following the UN vote. On 1 April 1948, Zionist militias stepped up their combined offensives against the villages to the west of the city. On 9 April, at Deir Yassin, a massacre was committed. In all, 39 villages were depopulated around Jerusalem. An estimated 10,000 homes and properties were seized in the city itself, their inhabitants and owners expelled to the east. Only on 15 May did Transjordanian forces enter from the east and prevent the fall of the entire capital.⁵

By the time the British, charged with maintaining order and protecting the civilian population, left Palestine (14 May 1948), nearly 85% of municipal Jerusalem had been seized and the process of expelling its remaining Palestinian inhabitants was in its final stages.⁶ Already, by February 1948 - barely six weeks after the UNGA approved the *Corpus Separatum* plan - JA Executive Chairman Ben-Gurion could declare: "From your entry into Jerusalem, though Lifta [a Palestinian village], Romeima [a Palestinian suburb]... there are no Arabs. One hundred percent Jews... in the west one sees not a single Arab; I do not assume that this will change."⁷

MAP 52



PARTITIONED JERUSALEM, 1948-1967

Two months after the Jordanian Arab Legion entered the eastern portion of the city, Israeli forces failed in a final bid to storm the Old City and fighting stabilized along a frontline bisecting the heart of Jerusalem. In late November 1948, Moshe Dayan – commander of the Israeli forces in the Jerusalem area – and his Jordanian counterpart Abdullah At-Tal signed a “complete and sincere cease-fire.”¹

The crudely drawn map accompanying the cease-fire and demarcating the two sides’ respective positions in the city was later described as a “cartographic monstrosity.”² It was never intended as the ultimate word on the division of Jerusalem, but when Israel and Transjordan signed the Rhodes Armistice Agreement in April 1949 it was made the sole point of reference and so defined the partition of Jerusalem until 1967.

The thick lines drawn by the two commanders had the unanticipated effect of creating an unclear and arbitrary no-man’s-land of between 60-80 m in width running north to south through the city. Some 125 homes were stranded in this ambiguous and unmarked ca. 850-dunum zone, surrounded by 55 fortified positions.³ A single crossing-point, at the Mandelbaum Gate, allowed UN Truce Supervision (UNTSO) staff to monitor the two sides’ compliance with the armistice. The provisions of the armistice included access for a biweekly convoy of supplies and staff from West Jerusalem to the demilitarized enclave that Israel had retained around the Hadassah Hospital and Hebrew University on Mount Scopus in East Jerusalem. UNTSO, along with other UN bodies, established headquarters in the old British Government House to the south of the city, creating there an additional no-man’s-land area. The no-man’s-land strip was eventually fenced on each side in 1962, amid confusion and competition over the exact location of the lines. In all, the dividing area represented 4.4% of pre-1948 municipal Jerusalem. To the east, Jordanian control extended to 11.48% of the municipal area, while Israel controlled 84.12%.⁴


Retention of its exclusive access to the Mount Scopus enclave meant Israel kept possession of virtually all of its pre-war holdings in the Jordanian-held area – totaling 116 dunums.⁵ In contrast, the loss of Palestinian land-holdings in the western (Israeli) section was total and vast. There, Palestinian pre-war ownership amounted to 5,544 dunums, or 33.7% of the West Jerusalem area. Religious endowments and public ownership made up 36.3% of the area, while pre-1948 Jewish ownership accounted for the remaining 30%.⁶ In the city as a whole (East and West), Palestinian Christians and Muslims had, before 1948, owned an estimated 11,190 dunums. By 1949, Palestinian private land ownership was reduced to 2,283 dunums.⁷

As in Palestine’s other conquered towns and cities, once the initial mass looting and military requisitions abated, West Jerusalem’s rich property spoils were divided officiously by the ‘Custodian of Abandoned Property’ and its successor, the ‘Custodian of Absentee Property.’⁸ Government officials and senior ministers were given ‘first pick’ of the elegant and luxurious Palestinian homes of the Talbiyeh, Bak’a and ‘German Colony’ suburbs. The new Israeli Absorption Ministry meanwhile dispatched immigrants to possess the ‘lesser’ homes along the front-line areas and in the peripheral suburbs and villages. Between September 1948 and August 1949, at least 16,000 Jews moved into Palestinian Jerusalemite homes.⁹ In the village of Deir Yassin, where over 100 men, women and children had been butchered in the most notorious massacre of the war, an ‘immigrant camp’ was inaugurated. Polish, Rumanian and Slovakian Jews settled upon the village land and took possession of the homes of the dead and the refugees; the site was renamed Givat Shaul Bet.¹⁰

Accurately quantifying Palestinian financial losses in Jerusalem has proven difficult and produced numerous conflicting estimates.¹¹ In losing the west of the city, and its outlying villages, the Palestinians lost that part of Jerusalem where Mandate-period development had been focused and investment most high. The west, home to Jerusalem’s wealthier historic families and new urban elite, had bridged the gap between the preserved Old City and its less developed environs and the growing industrialization of the country’s economy. In this regard, Jerusalemite Ruhi Al-Khatib, who was appointed mayor of Arab East Jerusalem in 1957, would recall, “[o]ur heritage from the Mandate Government in this [eastern] part of Jerusalem was a distressed city of shaking buildings, a paralyzed commerce and industry, devoid of any financial resources.”¹²

By the end of 1949, Ben Gurion had moved the Israeli Prime Minister’s office from Tel Aviv to West Jerusalem, declaring the city, “an organic and inseparable part of the State of Israel.” In the east, King Abdullah of Jordan had resolved that, “Jerusalem is in our hands and will remain in our hands.”¹³ But such declarations of sovereignty over Jerusalem went against the position maintained by the UN and the international community. In November 1949, the UNGA reaffirmed its support for a *Corpus Separatum* solution for the city, while the UK and US each issued statements acknowledging the current divisions, but only, “pending a final determination of the status of the area.”¹⁴ The partition of the city was to stand until the Israeli invasion of June 1967.

MAP 53



THE KENDALL TOWN SCHEME, 1966

The small, partially depopulated and under-developed area making up Arab East Jerusalem following the 1948-49 War and partition of the city provided virtually no prospects for growth. Socio-economic factors drawing the Palestinian population east to Amman and its surrounds in search of better opportunities combined with the near-total absence of Mandate-period development in the Palestinian neighborhoods ringing the Old City, left the Jordanian-ruled city in dire need of a planning scheme to revitalize the city. However, such a plan was not to be endorsed by the Jordanian government until 1966, when the erosion of the economic fiber of the city had already become critical.


British planner Henry Kendall had worked in the city under the Mandate, drawing up, in 1944, a comprehensive plan for the city which envisioned reasonably equitable development to both the east and west of the Old City. His 1944 plan provided for modernization along industrial and urban lines based on the arterial routes leading west towards the coastal plain as well as those running north-south to serve the Palestinian markets and towns of what would become the West Bank. The 1944 plan was not implemented and with the outbreak of the 1947-49 War, its vision of a united and integrated development city ceased to be relevant.

In 1964, Kendall drew up a scheme to relieve a cramped and debilitated Arab East Jerusalem. Adopted by the Jordanian government only in 1966, the plan acknowledged the need to extend the city's boundaries to incorporate the developing neighborhoods and villages lying along the Ramallah/Nablus-bound (northern) and Bethlehem/Hebron-bound (southern) routes, as well as to the villages to the immediate east of the city, through which the highway linking the city with Amman ran. The Kendall Town Plan posited a single urban development scheme for the population centers lying between Bethlehem and Ramallah, with the Old City and existing municipal area at its center. Industrial and commercial areas were foreseen, distributed so as to provide for economic growth while not impinging on the Old City, its environs or the existing lands sustaining the agricultural economy of outlying villages.

Some 30,000 additional residential units were planned, while substantial areas within and around the city were to be reserved for later growth or protected as parkland or nature reserves.¹ By placing within the city limits the airport to the north, as well as a ring of industrial zones, the Kendall Plan not only stood to boost the flagging economic life of the city, but to return it to its rightful and historic status as the socio-economic hub of Palestinian life. Direct and immediate development was extended to the limits of the city so as to place the towns of Bethlehem and Ramallah within the remit of anticipated growth. In this sense, the scheme took up the challenge of recreating an integrated and cohesive Palestinian development base for the whole West Bank. Indeed, while the plan incorporated the existing centrality of the Amman link to the east, it simultaneously presented a distinctly Palestinian view of Jerusalem's future, acknowledging the importance of communication lines to the Jordanian capital, while drawing the outlying West Bank economy and infrastructure back into harmony with the Palestinian capital's development.

The Kendall Plan was adopted by the Jordanian government on the eve of the Israeli invasion and occupation of the city and entire West Bank and as such was robbed of its currency almost immediately. With the unilateral and illegal expansion of the conquered city in 1967, Israel pressed a diametrically opposed vision of the city upon the Palestinian inhabitants and those of the surrounding villages, robbing them of the prospects enshrined in the 1966 Plan and instead pursuing an expropriation and settlement program, which would drastically compound the unsustainable conditions Kendall sought to rectify.

MAP 54



JERUSALEM AFTER THE 1967 WAR

The British Mandate for Palestine, with its capital in Jerusalem, was guided by the terms of the 1919 Versailles Treaty, and as such constituted, in legal terms, a 'protectorate' rather than a sovereign construct or a belligerent occupation (see Map 5). Thus, when Israeli forces occupied the entire West Bank and Gaza in June 1967, East Jerusalem came under a truly belligerent foreign occupation for the first time since the crusader kingdoms of the 12th Century. The subsequent decisions of the Israeli Knesset to illegally expand the municipal area of the conquered city and thereafter annex it to the sovereignty of Israel led to drastic alterations in the city, its surrounding villages and the integrated towns lying beyond it in the West Bank.

Israel's immediate excesses in the occupied Old City left thousands of Palestinians homeless, entire historic quarters in rubble and holy sites under enforced closure, compelling international leaders and religious figures to speak out in horror (see Map 50).¹ At the same time, the Knesset commissioned a committee to redraw the municipal limits of the city. This process, conducted under the supervision of Gen. Rehav'am Ze'evi, a later proponent of the forced expulsion from Israel and the OPT of all non-Jews, was guided by two overarching imperatives. On the one hand, military strategists sought to extend the city's reach to control the valleys, routes and hilltops comprising the defensive points to the east and north, and including the Qalandia airport at the northernmost limit. On the other hand, the ethnic exclusivity upon which the Jewish state depended proscribed the inclusion within this area of a large number of non-Jews. Israel's race to redraw the city and invert its long-standing demography was spurred on by an anxiety, in the end unfounded, that the international community would act to protect the city and its holy sites, potentially stalling Israeli plans at a point when the demographic facts would give the lie to Israeli claims over the city.

On 28 June 1967, the Knesset amended its 1950 Basic Law on Jerusalem, which proclaimed the city the capital of Israel, expanding its remit to a 70 km² expanded area defined by the Ze'evi committee and conjoining this with the 38 km² area of West Jerusalem, to create a 108 km² municipal Jerusalem.² The following day, Israel dismissed the Arab Jerusalem Municipality.³ The new Jerusalem limits carefully skirted the built-up villages and neighborhoods included in the East Jerusalem Kendall Town Plan of 1966 (see Map 54), while incorporating the lands alone of 28 villages and large stretches of the municipal areas of Bethlehem and Ramallah. Limiting the non-Jewish population in this area while seizing their land saw Israel create an East Jerusalem of more than 1,000% the area of that which preceded the occupation, while increasing its non-Jewish population by less than 50% (see Map 51).

After the expansion, Israel ordered a census of the city, registering only the 66,000 Palestinians present within the new area at that time and arbitrarily excluding an estimated 27,000 Palestinians; who had fled the war and were awaiting the opportunity to return home or were living abroad at the time of the census.⁴ The census was the sole registration procedure offered the non-Jewish population and left those absent at the time, as well as spouses and children of Jerusalemites, dependent on a procedure of 'family reunification' operated by the Israeli Minister of Interior for registration. The ID cards issued to Jerusalem's Palestinians identified them as residents of the city, but not as citizens of the state, thereby classifying them as 'foreigners' within their own city and depriving them of the basic civil liberties enjoyed by Jewish residents of the city, including those settlers occupying the new projects being founded upon their expropriated land.

With the approval by the Knesset of the expanded Jerusalem boundaries, land confiscation and settlement planning in the east commenced apace as Israel sought to create a de facto Judaization of the entire city, forcing its non-Jews into the militarily administered West Bank hinterland through the adoption of draconian restrictions on Palestinian movement, building, and commerce (see Maps 51 & 56). In the three years following the occupation, over 18,000 dunums of Palestinian land were confiscated for the creation of settlements around the city.⁵ When an ad hoc Palestinian National Guidance Committee was established in August 1967, with the aim of independently organizing Palestinian civil life in the city, Israel responded by exiling its head, Sheikh Abdul Hamid As-Sayeh, in a bid to deny voice to non-compliant Palestinian leaders that foreshadowed a consistent Israeli policy aimed at eroding all Palestinian political activity in the city.⁶

Though Israel's actions and accompanying legislation created a de facto annexation of the expanded municipal area of Jerusalem almost immediately, it was not until July 1980 that the Knesset formalized this status, adopting a further amendment to the Basic Law on Jerusalem to declare the entire illegally and unilaterally expanded area the 'eternal and undivided' capital of the Jewish state. Being a flagrant violation of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as well as a blunt dismissal of numerous UNSC and UNGA demands for a cessation and reversion of its discriminatory policies in the city, the 1980 annexation was condemned by the UNSC immediately, with a Resolution declaring, "that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and, in particular, the recent 'Basic Law' on Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith."⁷

MAP 55



ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND PALESTINIAN NEIGHBORHOODS IN EAST JERUSALEM, 2000

Calculating the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem with any exactitude poses a number of difficulties. The root of this problem is the discriminatory policies enforced by the Israeli Minister of Interior since 1967.

After conquering East Jerusalem, Israel conducted a census wherein roughly 66,000 Palestinians were registered as residents of the city.¹ Those who had vacated the city during the 1967 War or were abroad at the time – altogether over 25,000 Jerusalemites – were arbitrarily denied registration.² Adapting its ‘Law of Entry Into Israel’ of 1952, Israel then limited the right to live in the city to those officially registered in 1967 and their descendents, issuing blue Jerusalem ID cards to these individuals, classifying them as ‘permanent residents’ (i.e., foreigners afforded residency). Palestinians who live outside the city for longer than seven years, regardless of the purpose, as well as those who fail to prove that their “center of life” is within the municipal boundaries, stand to have their residency rights revoked. Those unregistered Palestinians who marry registered East Jerusalemites or choose to return to the East Jerusalem area after the revocation of their residency, must petition the Minister of Interior for “family reunification.” The Ministry is not obliged to offer any explanation of its decisions in these instances.³ Between 1967-2001, Israel revoked the residency rights of 6,444 Palestinian Jerusalemites.⁴

As a result of such draconian policies, Palestinians are generally wary of approaching the Israeli Minister of Interior in total transparency, rendering Israel population data for the Palestinians in the city subject to error. In 2000, official Israeli projections put the figure at 208,700 – being 31.7% of the total. The PCBS – which has been denied access to conduct its own survey in the city – estimated a far higher figure of 238,561, which includes an unknown number of Palestinians holding Jerusalem ID cards but residing in the West Bank.⁵ The severity of Israel’s limitations on Palestinian development and construction (see Map 61) meant, by 2000, average Palestinian housing density was at least double that of the Jewish population in the city, and 30% of Palestinians were living in density equivalent to three people per room.⁶

Meanwhile, since 1967, Israel’s East Jerusalem settlements, at the fore of national development planning, have grown into vast, heavily subsidized, urban townships, ringing the city and sprawling over the expropriated lands of its Palestinian residents. From 1967-2000, 75-80% of all Jerusalem’s Jewish population growth occurred in this 10-point ‘inner ring’ of urban settlements. The ‘inner ring’ is itself the link between West Jerusalem and the ‘outer ring’ of settlements (see Map 57). It serves to bind the West territorially and demographically to the occupied East of the city. The 10 main sites underpinning the program – as shown in the map – are themselves made up of connected individual settlement ‘neighborhoods’. These large centers, described by Israel’s city planners as the Jerusalem’s “new ramparts,” are in addition to the smaller-scale settlements, which proliferate in and around the Old City.⁷

The ‘inner ring’ sites were established in stages. Between 1968-1973, Israel used a 1943 Public Purposes and Land Ordinance to expropriate most of the necessary land for the entire program and established the first sites: French Hill/Ramat Eshkol (1968); Atarot (1970); Gilo (1971); Neve Ya’acov (1972); East Talpiot (1973); and Ramot (1973).⁸ In 1985, Israel added Pisgat Ze’ev, on 4,400 dunums of Beit Hanina and Hizma village land. Then, in 1991, Givat HaMatos and Har Homa were founded (though work on the latter was delayed until 1997), followed in 1994 by Rekhes Shu’fat. In total, over 23,300 dunums of East Jerusalem land was expropriated for the express purpose of constructing these 10 anchor sites of the ‘inner ring’.⁹ The land loss impinged hugely on the prospects of 12 large Palestinian neighborhoods and three outlying West Bank villages, effectively ruling out their own development entirely.

By investing heavily in overpass and bypass roads to link these sites, Israel has afforded the settlements uninterrupted communication lines with each other and West Jerusalem. Passage from Har Homa in the south through to Neve Ya’acov in the northeast can be made in a matter of minutes and without any point of contact with the non-Jewish residents of the city or their underdeveloped infrastructure. In contrast, Palestinian movement within and through the city is hindered greatly by the absence of appropriate routes and the harassment inherent in the two-tier system of administrative and security control under which the settlements oblige them to live.¹⁰ In 2001, the population of the ‘inner ring’ settlements reached the 200,000 mark, meaning half of all Israeli OPT settlers were residing in illegally annexed and expanded Arab East Jerusalem.¹¹

MAP 56



ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND PALESTINIAN NEIGHBORHOODS IN METROPOLITAN JERUSALEM, 2000

The 'inner ring' settlements, and those of the 'outer ring' lying beyond the city's perimeter not only shore up Palestinian growth almost completely, but function as a bridge between the militarily administered West Bank hinterland and Israel. Beyond the city limits, the 'outer ring's' industrial zones, bypass network and vast expropriated land reserves stretch north, south and east – deep into the West Bank.

Consolidation of the 'outer ring' – anchored by the sites of Givat Ze'ev, Ma'ale Adumim and the Etzion Bloc – has been a development priority of all Israeli governments since the early 1980s.¹ These urban centers have been expanded greatly since that time, to become the service-delivery hubs upon which the smaller and otherwise less accessible sites deeper in the West Bank depend. The 'satellite' sites directly serviced by the 'outer ring's' infrastructure reach from the eastern hills overlooking the Jordan Valley (Mitzpe Yericho), north to the hill line beyond Ramallah (Bet El), and south beyond Bethlehem's southern borders (Efrata and the Etzion sites). Israel considers this expanse to be the 'Jerusalem Metropolitan area.'

Combined, the 'inner ring' (municipal) settlements and those of the 'outer ring' now house well over 250,000 settlers, meaning more Israelis live in these sites than do in West Jerusalem.² This demographic swing to the east and the parallel advances in industrial facilities, make the settlement network in and to the east of the city, Jewish Jerusalem's primary growth area and hence the optimal point of contact for the other West Bank settlements lying beyond. The 'outer circle' currently boasts three large industrial parks and a web of communication lines bringing at least 15 distant sites into close proximity with what is highest priority Israeli development zone.


In 1994, Prime Minister Rabin invited an Inter-Ministerial Committee to create a formal planning strategy for this wider area. The following year a Metropolitan Master Plan was unveiled, charting a long-term vision spreading over a 440-km² area, made up mostly of West Bank lands beyond the city.³ This plan, though later challenged and in itself only new in terms of its formal status, has paved the way for subsequent expansionism along the lines of a 'Greater Jerusalem' area, and opened the floodgates for settlement activity in the area in question (see Map 58).

Constraints placed by this metropolitan settlement network have suffocated Palestinian villages beyond the city's municipal borders in all directions by severing their contact with much of the remainder of the West Bank and robbing them of their scant land resources. To the north, the city of Ramallah has been bound along its eastern side by a corridor of fast-developing settlements leading through Kokhav Ya'acov, Psagot and Bet El, to Ofra, which in turn now serves as metropolitan Jerusalem's settlement 'gateway' to the northern West Bank sites. In the south, Bethlehem has been flanked by two major bypass arteries linking the 'inner ring' to its north with the Etzion bloc and with the small sites of the southern Bethlehem area. The eastern hills have been nearly totally depopulated of their non-Jewish population, including the Jahalin Bedouins, whose forceful expulsion from their homes around the expanding Ma'ale Adumim site began in the early 1980s. The Jahalin – originally expelled from Israel's Negev region in the mid-1950s, have since been relocated (in 1997) to a site 500 m away from Israel's municipal garbage dump, where they remain deprived of even the most basic sanitary services, as Ma'ale Adumim consumes their lost grazing pastures.⁴ The cleared eastern metropolitan area now runs from the municipal border all the way to the Jordan Valley.

The benefits given the outlying remote settlements of the central and northern West Bank by this metropolitan development are vital to their own growth and expansion. Sites far north of Ramallah or south of Bethlehem, now boast short journey times to high-capacity medical, educational and economic services, via the latest in government-sponsored bypass highways. Absorption programs aimed at attracting immigrants or Israeli migrants to some of the most remote West Bank settlements, which were previously limited to a small ideological pool of radical messianic Zionists, can now be seen to offer prospective settlers "housing solutions at reasonable prices... short distances from the big cities..."⁵

Again, the situation is inverted with regard to the Palestinians, whose denial of access to Jerusalem, including its holy sites, is extended to cover an enormous area of the West Bank and places their movement both towards and around the city's municipal area at the discretion of the Israeli forces manning the myriad checkpoints and blockades that reinforce the metropolitan settlement web. Palestinian travel between the West Bank's northern and southern segments is now either circuitous and time consuming or altogether impossible, while settlers may move rapidly and freely through and around the entire area. Among the long-term effects of this isolation of Jerusalem from the remainder of the West Bank and the asphyxiation of its outlying villages has been the collapse of Jerusalem as the economic center of Palestine (a role since played by Ramallah).

MAP 57



ARAB EAST JERUSALEM WITHIN 'GREATER' JERUSALEM, 2000

As noted, the current 126 km² of municipal Jerusalem do not represent Israel's complete vision of the city but rather an 'interim' stage in the long-term goal of achieving so-called 'Greater Jerusalem.' The concept was broached by the original 1967 WJM, which set itself the target of creating "the largest Jewish city in the world... both in terms of population and in giving a permanent Jewish character to the whole city."¹ The idea calls for a greatly expanded and annexed city area containing a maximum of Jews and a minimum of Palestinians. It found expression in the original 1967 Allon Plan (see Map 19), which advocated the creation of a broad annexed strip, "from the north of the traffic axis between Jerusalem and the Dead Sea [today's Adumim area], to be connected with... the Latrun region [between West Jerusalem and Tel Aviv]." This broad definition was given more solidity in the 1973 Labor settlement guidelines of Israel Galili, who prescribed "increasing the population of Jerusalem and its industrial development... beyond the area defined by Administrative Order No. 1 [municipal Jerusalem]." Galili's document resolved that "attempts will be made to acquire supplementary... lands to the east and south of the city."²


In keeping with much of Israel's early settlement planning, these fundamental policy documents avoided specifics in their recommendations so as to grant the politicians and military strategists flexibility. Suitable sites were simply selected by the Defense Minister and Settlement Committee and the task of creating 'Greater Jerusalem' begun on the ground. Only in 1983 did the Israeli government define the preliminary boundaries of 'Greater Jerusalem' in any detail.³ That plan stretched beyond Ramallah to the north, reached Jericho in the east, Bet Shemesh and Latrun to the west and Bethlehem in the south. The huge mapped area served as the guide for developing the long-term Jewish majority considered the prerequisite for ultimate annexation of 'Greater Jerusalem' to Israel. Between 1983-1992, 71% of all OPT settlement construction occurred in this area.⁴

In 1993, a new team of government planners and economists was charged by Prime Minister Rabin with redefining 'Greater Jerusalem' - a move made in response to the perceived challenge to Israel's Jerusalem aims posed by the emerging peace talks. The plan revised and reduced the original area to one of approximately 260 km², leaving Bethlehem and Ramallah beyond its limits but otherwise loosely following the east-west delineations offered in the previous plan. Approval of the 1993 'Greater Jerusalem' scheme was again coupled with heavy investment towards securing Jewish dominance therein. A new settlement 'neighborhood' of 1,950 units was immediately authorized to strengthen the Ma'ale Adumim site and a series of roads and tunnels planned to link this site with Givat Ze'ev in the northwest (this second project crystallized within the E1 Development Plan - see Map 61).⁵ In the south, a \$42 million bypass route of tunnels and bridges, linking the 'inner ring' settlements of Gilo and East Talpiot with the 14 Etzion Bloc settlements was started.⁶ The estimated area of the 1993 Labor government's vision of 'Greater Jerusalem' is that shown on the map opposite. If this area is taken to define 'Greater Jerusalem,' Israel may have succeeded in creating its Jewish majority, if not definitively, even by 1992 - when 445,800 Jews and ca. 400,000 Palestinians were estimated resident in the area.⁷

In 1997, Netanyahu's Likud government turned to the 'Greater Jerusalem' plan with zeal, in part to regain the endorsement of those hard-line supporters critical of its handling of the January 1997 Hebron Protocol (see Map 29). A month after the partial redeployment in Hebron, Netanyahu declared, "the battle in Jerusalem has begun," as land clearing was commenced on the delayed Har Homa settlement site.⁸ As part of a wider plan for annexing 60% of the West Bank, he presented the government with a new version of 'Greater Jerusalem.' The new plan envisioned a return to the 1983 maximal lines, reaching settlements beyond the 1993 limits, such as Bet El and Psagot to the northeast of Ramallah.⁹ As well as creating expanded future annexation lines, the plan created - initially in secret - an 'umbrella municipality' for the 'Greater Jerusalem' area, charged with, "the integration of the settlements to the east, north and south, especially regarding planning and construction."¹⁰ In effect, the 'umbrella' plan was only a scheme for streamlining existing planning mechanisms, which had long been guided by similar objectives. However, the attempt to render *de jure* a *de facto* union of Israel's military occupation authorities with its municipal authorities created upset and UNSC condemnation, forcing the Israeli authorities to sink the 'umbrella' beneath a renewed and tightened veil of silence.¹¹ Nonetheless, by mid-1998 manifestations of its realization were clear. A new 'metropolitan' industrial zone was approved by the WJM beside Az-Za'im village, west of the vast E1 Plan, but beyond the municipal limits; new master plans for the settlements of Neve Ya'acov (within the municipality) and Adam (beyond the municipality) showed massive future growth aimed at uniting the two sites fully.¹²

By 2002, over 76,000 settlers lived in the loosely defined 'Greater Jerusalem' area lying beyond the municipal boundaries of East Jerusalem. About 10,000 of these had settled there since 1998.¹³ Plans currently exist to double the number of housing units in the area.¹⁴ When Ehud Barak took office in 1999, it was to this latest version of 'Greater Jerusalem' that he referred his negotiators. The 1997 extended 'Greater Jerusalem' was thus adopted as Israel's definition of the city for the purpose of the final status talks with the Palestinians.

MAP 58



PROJECTION OF THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL FOR JERUSALEM'S FINAL STATUS AT CAMP DAVID, JULY 2000

Just prior to entering the Camp David final status talks of July 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Barak reiterated his government's position on Jerusalem, saying: "Jerusalem will not be divided, we will protect the Holiness of Israel."¹ By insisting on negotiating in line with Netanyahu's latest 'Greater Jerusalem' vision, Barak extended Israel's claims beyond unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem and deep into the West Bank hinterland, endowing distant settlements beyond Ramallah, Jericho and Bethlehem with the "Holiness of Israel." The tactic was in part a vehicle for cutting the heart out of the West Bank under the guise of claims to an "undivided eternal capital."² In this sense, it served to camouflage Israel's most vulgar attempt at expansionism amid the complexities of the isolated and postponed Jerusalem negotiations. But insistence on negotiating a newly redrawn and greatly expanded 'Jerusalem' also allowed Israel to obfuscate its bid to legitimize total sovereignty over the city by placing Palestinian towns deep in the West Bank within the imaginary bounds of the city and then 'generously' ceding them to the Palestinians as though they were a part of the occupied city.

In actuality, the maps relating Israel's proposals at Camp David placed virtually the entire area of pre-1967 Arab East Jerusalem under exclusive Israeli sovereignty and compelled the Palestinians to negotiate sovereignty over villages and towns on the periphery of the municipal area. With Palestinian objection to the annexation of Bet El or Mitzpe Yericho (see map) portrayed as an attack on the "Holiness of Israel," Barak's negotiating team was easily able to label fundamental Palestinian demands for sovereignty over the Old City and Al-Haram Ash-Sharif, obstinate and impossible "dreaming."³ The US endorsed Israel's opening positions on the city and during the negotiations more than once 'repackaged' them to present as their own, prompting the Palestinians to cry foul a number of times.⁴


Having succeeded in redefining the city, Israel went on to redefine 'sovereignty.' Again gaining US endorsement, Barak's team proposed the Palestinians be granted "administrative control" in East Jerusalem neighborhoods near and around the Old City. This was followed by an 'offer' of "local safe passage" to Al-Haram Ash-Sharif and talk of a "special regime" to operate within the Old City.⁵ The principal holy site itself was then subjected to a series of US-Israeli scenarios, drawing on notions of "vertical sovereignty," "residual sovereignty," municipal, and "custodial" autonomy...⁶ Each of these permutations was presented as an expression of Israel's historic generosity; each denied absolutely any true form of Palestinian sovereignty over the holy sites, the Old City, or the neighborhoods surrounding it; each legitimized Israeli sovereignty over occupied and expanded East Jerusalem.

The US repeatedly praised the "particular courage, wisdom and understanding" of these concoctions and thereby reinforced Israel's contention that it had presented its ultimate concession on the city and in doing so had satisfied the expectations of Oslo's 'honest brokers.'⁷ In fact, Israel's 'generosity' on Jerusalem came at a price; Barak demanded his 'concessions' be repaid with Palestinian acceptance of Israel's right to erect a synagogue within the Haram Ash-Sharif – the sanctuary of Islam's third holiest site. Preposterous though the idea was, it was presented at a stage when the talks already seemed doomed and was delivered in all seriousness. The US immediately internalized Israel's demand and pushed the Palestinian negotiators to accept it, assuring them they could always "limit the number of Jews who pray..."⁸

Palestinian rejection of the proposal – which was never developed into a comprehensive and detailed formula – was not only due to Israeli insistence on sovereignty over the Old City and Al-Haram Ash-Sharif. The proposal on Jerusalem transformed an enormous illegal settlement program to the east, north and south of the occupied city into a recognized sovereign Israeli barrier, bisecting the West Bank at its historic heart (see Map 35). Within this area, Palestinian villages – such as Jaba and Az-Za'im – were to be forever encapsulated by Israel's settlements, while those afforded contiguity with the Palestinian state were to be divested of much of their land and their access to the city itself. The myriad 'administrative' and 'regime' sectors proposed in lieu of granting Palestinian sovereignty in the city paved the way for Israel to impose further social, legal and cultural sub-divisions upon the Palestinian people.

In sum, the Jerusalem proposal made at Camp David gave the Palestinians an unviable series of isolated population clusters, while denying them any substantial sovereignty in the city itself and creating an Israeli sovereign bloc from Jericho to Ramallah and Bethlehem, with occupied Arab East Jerusalem at its heart.⁹ Israel's ability to present such a proposal, to term it a concession, and even to be praised for doing so, rested entirely upon its 33 years of condemned illegal settlement activity within and around the city. Warm endorsement of Israel's offer by the US and much of the international community rewarded the concerted settlement activities of successive Israeli governments and reinforced Israel's conviction that through the creation of facts on the ground it could not only thwart Palestinian aspirations and deny Palestinian rights, but be saluted for doing so.

MAP 59



THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM, 2014

The creation of an extended Jewish Quarter within Jerusalem's walled Old City occurred at the expense of over 6,500 Palestinian residents, who were summarily expelled from it between June 1967 and April 1968 (see Map 50).¹ The artificially imposed Quarter was constructed on the ruins of demolished Palestinian properties with little regard for the Old City's predominantly Mamluk-era (13th-15th Century) architecture. As a result, the modern apartment complexes, parking lots, tourist observation platforms and boutiques of the Jewish Quarter clash with the aesthetics of the historic Muslim, Armenian and Christian Quarters. Like all Israeli settlements in occupied East Jerusalem, the Jewish Quarter is linked directly to West Jerusalem infrastructure and services, with the Nabi Daoud and Al-Magharbeh Gates serving as Jewish public transport terminals as well as checkpoints.² Within the city walls, the Jewish Quarter's 'borders' are not marked by checkpoints except in the eastern portion, which abuts the 'Wailing Wall' (Al-Buraq Ash-Sharif). Here stringent security checks limit Palestinian access to or through the disputed holy place and the site of the demolished Mughrabi Quarter.

Beyond the limits of the expanded Quarter, settlers belonging to some of Israel's more extreme racist movements have, since the mid-1970s, seized and occupied dozens of Palestinian properties.³ In doing so they have received the support – both in terms of legal 'creativity' and financial sponsorship – of successive Israeli governments and the WJM. Both, the current mayor of Jerusalem, Nir Barkat, and Prime Minister Netanyahu have been long-standing proponents of property seizures in and around the Old City, while former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had himself 'obtained' a property deep in the Muslim Quarter.⁴ As of 2014, over 1,000 Jewish settlers live in the Muslim, Christian and Armenian Quarters, with the greatest concentration in the area of the Muslim Quarter adjacent to Al-Haram Ash-Sharif.⁵

In 2013, 3,329 Jews lived in the Old City, comprising a little over 8% of the total population - 39,865 - within the walls.⁶ The 30,328 Muslims (76%) represented the overwhelming majority, while Christians accounted for the remaining 16% (6,208), including 4,577 Christians of Palestinian origin and 1,631 Armenians.⁷


Of the four quarters, the Muslim Quarter is by far the largest, covering 480 out of the total 900 dunums that make up the Old City. In comparison, the Christian Quarter covers 192 dunums, the Armenian 126 dunums, and the Jewish Quarter's slight expansion since the 1967-1968 expropriations leaves it covering 122 dunums. Calculating the housing density of the Muslim Quarter after excluding the 135 dunums of Al-Haram Ash-Sharif, reveals the largest Quarter to be one of the most densely populated places on earth, with a rate of about 88 persons per dunum. As of 2014, the average rate for the four Quarters combined stands at 50.8 people per dunum (without the Al-Haram Ash-Sharif), while the rate in the modern Jewish Quarter is nearly half this, at 27.3 people per dunum. The rates in the Christian and Armenian Quarters are even lower, respectively, 23.8 and 12.9 people per dunum.⁸







Quarter	Population	Area (dunums)	Persons per dunum	
Muslim	30,328	480 ¹	63.2	¹ Including the 135 dunums of Al-Haram Ash-Sharif compound. If this area is not counted, the population density in the Muslim Quarter rises to 88.8! ² Excluding over 1,000 settlers occupying houses in the Muslim and Christian Quarters. ³ Including the Al-Haram Ash-Sharif compound. If this area is excluded, the average population density rises to 50.8.
Christian	4,577	192	23.8	
Armenian	1,631	126	12.9	
Jewish	3,329 ²	122	27.3	
Total	39,865	920	43.33³	

Source: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem 2013*; previous editions.

The Old City houses some 25 mosques, 65 churches and 20 synagogues.⁹ However, a survey conducted by Jewish, Muslim and Christian scholars in 2000, produced a catalogue of as much as 326 holy places within or just beyond the Old City walls, being places of worship, religious academies, monasteries, hostels, tombs and retreats. Of these, 108 are considered primarily sacred to Muslims, 154 to Christians and 64 to Jews.¹⁰ Israel's pursuit of settlement within the walled city and its denial of free Palestinian access to the city of Jerusalem as a whole, and the Old City in particular, has increasingly limited the freedom of non-Jews to enjoy their basic right to worship. Policies preventing Palestinian access to holy sites in the Old City – including during the holy month of Ramadan or for Christmas and Easter services – are in absolute contravention of International Law. Since 1981, the Old City has been listed by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site. In 1999, UNESCO adopted a resolution demanding international investigation into Israeli violations of the Geneva and Hague Conventions in regard to Israel's discriminatory policies pertaining to access and worship within the city.¹¹ Notwithstanding this, Israel began to fit the Old City's non-Jewish Quarters with up to 500 closed-circuit security cameras. Ostensibly for the 'protection' of the extremist settler groups living in these quarters, the installation of the monitoring system in the densely populated city, has only underscored the ethnic inequality inherent in Israel's expansionist occupation of the ancient city and gives the lie to Israeli claims of a 'unified' Jerusalem.

MAP 60



	Area expropriated for the reconstitution of an extended Jewish Quarter, 1968		Structurally damaged building
	Properties taken over by Israeli settlers		Existing Israeli Tunnel
	Major religious and public buildings		Planned / Under Construction Israeli Tunnel

THE E-1 DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Realization of Israel's vision of a 'united' Jerusalem with comprehensive Jewish territorial and demographic preponderance from west to east hinges on its success in divesting the occupied east of its Palestinians and in increasing the settlement population within and around the municipal area. Taking possession of, or exercising control over, the essential resource of the city – its land – is Israel's most important tool in redesigning the city's ethnic makeup to suit its purposes.

Beyond the city's municipal limits, Israel has founded a circle of large urban 'city-settlements' to encapsulate the annexed East and stretch its potential boundaries. These sites, connected by bypass roads and linked to industrial zones, form Israel's 'outer ring' of Jerusalem settlements, and provide the infrastructural support for the settlements lying deeper in the West Bank – around Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jericho.

Among them is the Ma'ale Adumim settlement, the borders of which were expanded in 1994 to include the E-1 area¹: a narrow undeveloped land corridor that runs east of Jerusalem and is part of the West Bank (Area C). The area is bordered by the settlements of French Hill (to the west), Kedar (south), Ma'ale Adumim (east), and Almon (north), and the Palestinian town of Abu Dis to the southwest. Here, Israel envisions the E-1 Plan, a large new Israeli neighborhood (Mevasseret Adumim) involving about 12,000 dunums of land, a significant part of which is privately owned by Palestinians.² So far, all successive Israeli governments have supported the plan to create Israeli urban contiguity between Ma'ale Adumim and Jerusalem but have also refrained from implementing any major construction – in accordance with an understanding with the US Administration that the fate of the area would be determined within the framework of the peace process, and due to international pressure.


While the E-1 Plan was, for the time being, removed from the agenda for political reasons, a project by the Ministry of Industry and Trade for a metropolitan employment and business center serving both Ma'ale Adumim and the Jerusalem municipality on 1,350 dunums in the north-west section of E-1, was approved in 2002 but has yet to be implemented.³ In mid-2004, the Sharon Administration commenced infrastructural work such as clearing roads.⁴ Another plan for the construction of the new 'Judea and Samaria District Police' headquarters on 180 dunums was approved in 2005 and completed in 2008.⁵ It is widely seen as a strategic step in claiming the area for further Jewish development.

Since then, the E-1 plan regularly makes headlines but so far no Israeli government has dared to give it a final go ahead, mainly due to international pressure to refrain from it. In response to UNGA Resolution 67/19 of 29 November 2012, upgrading Palestine to non-member observer state status in the UN, Israel announced that it was resuming planning and zoning work in E-1 area, which was protested by several EU governments.⁶

With E-1, Israel unveiled a scheme to unite the West Bank's largest and most central settlement (Ma'ale Adumim) with its East Jerusalem 'inner ring' sites by means of a residential, industrial and 'recreational' development project. The E-1 Plan foresees between 3,500-15,000 housing units, the already completed police headquarters of the 'Judea and Samaria district', a large industrial zone, an expansive tourism infrastructure, including several hotels, and commercial areas, as well as roads, a garbage dump and a cemetery.

Israel claims that the E-1 plan is strategically important for its national security interests, especially with regard to Jerusalem and the Ma'ale Adumim settlement, as well as for the natural growth of the latter. Palestinians – backed by the UN, US and EU – vehemently oppose the plan, saying that if implemented, it would cut the West Bank in two, grab the last area of open land available for Palestinian development, and make the establishment of a Palestinian state with territorial contiguity as well as an agreement on permanent borders practically impossible.

MAP 61



THE JERUSALEM MASTER PLAN

The first version of the current Jerusalem Master Plan 2000 was commissioned in 1999 and announced to the public on 13 September 2004 by then mayor of Jerusalem Uri Lupolianski as the United Jerusalem Town Planning Scheme (TPS 2000),¹ which would serve as a mandatory map for land use and a blueprint for other municipal planning purposes up to 2020.² The Master Plan was the first planning framework that included the municipal land of both East and West Jerusalem and treated the city as one urban unit under Israeli sovereignty. For over a decade, dozens of architects had worked to draw up the plan, meant to replace the one in effect since 1959 - Master Plan 62, which applies only to the west of the city.³

As with all planning in Jerusalem, the premise of the new plan was demographically motivated. One of its stated objectives was "preserving the Jewish majority in the city of Jerusalem while providing a response to the needs of the Arab minority residing in the city".⁴ Among its underlying presumptions is a city population made up of 70% Jews and 30% Palestinians and an anticipated population by 2020 of 950,000 (Palestinians: 38%, Israelis: 62%), despite some predictions that forecast Jewish and Arab populations of equal size in the city by 2030.⁵ The plan expressed concern that "the continued relative growth of the Arab population in Jerusalem can diminish the proportion of the Jewish population in the future" and suggested "massive governmental intervention"⁶ to counter the current trend.

While expansion of the total area of municipal Jerusalem (at present 126,000 dunums) is foreseen only westwards, accompanying measures will involve further confiscation of Palestinian land, hamper Palestinian development, further fragment and isolate Palestinian suburbs from each other as well as from the West Bank, and weaken the possibility of East Jerusalem becoming the capital for the future Palestinian state.

The plan's initial target date was 2020, but in a May 2009 update 2030 was set as the new goal. The master plan does not take demographic projections into consideration and vastly underestimates the construction needs of Jerusalem's Arab population. It describes only 13,500 new residential units for Palestinians, which according to recent studies is way below the estimated housing demands of 70,000-90,000 residential units for the Arab population - expected to reach between 400,000 and 500,000 by 2030.⁷ In addition, the vast majority of housing and development plans for East Jerusalem are foreseen in the outlying northern (Beit Hanina) and southern neighborhoods (Jabal Mukabber/Arab As-Sawahreh), while restricting development within the area of central/historic Jerusalem (the Holy Basin), where Israeli development is accelerated.


The master plan fails to propose any new industrial, commercial, service or development areas in East Jerusalem and plans to eradicate the Wadi Al-Joz industrial area and designate a large track of land between Jabal Mukabber and Ath-Thori as "a nature reserve", thus precluding future development of these areas. The plan's implications for Arab East Jerusalem have also been criticized for the following provisions:

- The neighborhood plans are small and concentrate on the peripheral northern and southern Palestinian neighborhoods, widely ignoring Palestinian land ownership in central East Jerusalem.
- The areas designated for planning and building are small and restricted to an area where construction has already taken place.
- A large area is designated as open landscape, which is not in line with the needs of an urban residential area.
- In most of the plans, no more than two floors are allowed, severely restricting building rights.
- The lack of roads prevents the laying of statutory infrastructure and hence, the development of the plots.
- Spaces for public buildings are scarce and inadequate and almost uniquely for educational purposes.
- In many cases, only general outline plans have been prepared, for which building permits cannot be issued.

The 2004 plan allocated some 11.8 km² for new development of Jerusalem neighborhoods (only 2.3 km² in Palestinian neighborhoods). The plan was ratified in 2007 by the Jerusalem Municipality's Planning and Construction Committee and handed over to the District Committee on 30 April 2007, which began a series of intense discussions on 8 May 2007. On 7 October 2008, the plan was deposited for public review; comments by Committee members and newly-elected West Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat were discussed in May 2009, resulting in the District Committee ordering several changes.⁸ The updated version, drafted by a 31-member steering committee of planners, geographers and architects⁹ is also referred to as Master Plan 2030 as the target date was extended by 10 years. After 2009, there were no further discussions on the plan.¹⁰ The plan has not been approved and validated to date and has no statutory standing.

The Jerusalem Master Plan is "the manifestation of the Israeli occupation authorities' political aspirations for Jerusalem through urban planning" and ignores Palestinian planning needs while consolidating "the Jewish population's unlawful presence within occupied East Jerusalem."¹¹

MAP 62



JERUSALEM TODAY (2014)

After the Camp David Summit of mid-2000 failed to produce a final status agreement, partly due to continuing disagreement between the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators on the status of Jerusalem (see Map 59), US President Clinton outlined his position on the Jerusalem issue in his December 2000 'Parameters.'¹ Clinton proposed an open and undivided city with assured freedom of access and worship for all, application of the principle of "what is Arab should be Palestinian" and "what is Jewish should be Israeli," and that sovereignty over the Haram Ash-Sharif/Temple Mount be treated symbolically.² However, the subsequent January 2001 Taba talks also failed to bring about progress, and while the Clinton Parameters for Jerusalem were worked out into more detail during the 2007 Annapolis process with the introduction of an international custody scheme for Jerusalem's "holy basin," the failure of both sides to find a common definition of the "holy basin" meant that the issue of Jerusalem was still as far from a solution as ever (see Map 47). During the latest rounds of peace talks (2013/14) under supervision of US Secretary of State Kerry the issue of Jerusalem was discussed once again, but to no avail.³

In July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion to the UN General Assembly regarding the construction of the wall in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (see Map 39).⁴ It reiterated that East Jerusalem remains occupied territory, with the majority opinion of the court concluding that the route of the wall "gives expression, *in loco*, to the illegal measures taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem and the settlements, as deplored by the Security Council," and therefore violates international law.⁵ Nevertheless, construction has since then continued unabated and as of 2014, the projected route for the barrier in the Jerusalem area measures some 168 km, of which only 3% lie on the Green Line.⁶


On 13 September 2004, then mayor of Jerusalem Uri Lupolianski announced the United Jerusalem Town Planning Scheme, known as the Master Plan 2000,⁷ which treated the city as one urban unit under Israeli sovereignty (see Map 62). In line with the Plan's demographic aims and despite international condemnation,⁸ the Israeli settlement construction in East Jerusalem is ongoing,⁹ with a record high of over 2,500 new tenders approved during the Kerry peace process (see Map 49).¹⁰ East Jerusalem is dotted with settlement projects and the settler population continues to grow steadily: while there were a little over 170,000 settlers in 2000, by 2010, their number had increased by over 15% to almost 200,000.¹¹ Recent estimates suggest that settlers in Jerusalem make up some 38% of the city's total Jewish population.¹²

As of 2014, about 24,500 dunums of the total 70,500 dunums of East Jerusalem land have been confiscated for settlement construction, while only 9,180 dunums of it (or about 13%) have been zoned for Palestinian construction.¹³ Furthermore, Israel has been pursuing discriminatory policies that make it extremely difficult for Palestinians to acquire building permits due to high fees, long delays (up to ten years) and requirements for proving land ownership which are almost impossible to meet.¹⁴ Consequently, between 2005 and 2009 only 13% of Jerusalem housing units granted building permits were in Palestinian neighborhoods.¹⁵ This leaves Palestinians with two options: leaving the city or building without permission, the municipality and the Interior Ministry encourage the former by exercising a policy of housing demolition, targeting the unauthorized construction of Palestinians. As a result of this, over 500 Palestinian houses have been demolished since 2004, rendering more than 2,000 people homeless, including about 1,100 minors.¹⁶

The inequality between Palestinian East Jerusalem housing and services and those provided the West and the Israeli settlements is stark and well documented. About 90% of the municipality's 4.7 billion budget in 2011 was allocated for West Jerusalem and settlements, only 10% was spent on Palestinian residents who make up over 36% of the city's population.¹⁷ Almost 90% of the city's sewage pipes, roads, and sidewalks are in West Jerusalem, as are about 1,000 public parks and 37 swimming pools – as opposed to only 45 parks and 3 pools in East Jerusalem. East Jerusalem has only two libraries and 33 sports facilities, while West Jerusalem has 26 and 564 respectively.¹⁸ Poverty is on the rise among East Jerusalem residents: it increased from 64% in 2006 to 79.5% in 2011 (and from 73% to over 85% for children). The comparative numbers for Israelis were - in 2010 - 30.8% of Jewish families and 45.1% of Jewish children.¹⁹ With building all but barred and services pointedly inadequate, Israel hopes to encourage migration out of the city. Its additional policy of Jerusalem ID card revocation is one of the methods through which it is able to render that departure permanent (see Map 56). As of 2014, 14,200 ID cards had been revoked from Palestinian residents since 1967 (if their dependent children are taken into account, the number of those stripped off their residency rights – and with it of social and health benefits – increases to over 86,000).²⁰

Other ongoing Israel policies include the expropriation of private Palestinian land and property; construction of the separation barrier;²¹ implementation of a closure regime; and development of a transportation system that ignores the planning interests of Palestinian residents.²² These measures involve further land confiscation, hamper Palestinian development, fragment and isolate Palestinian suburbs from each other as well as from the West Bank, and further weaken the possibility of East Jerusalem becoming the capital for the future Palestinian state.²³

MAP 63



NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE - MAPS 50-63

MAP 50

¹ PASSIA, *Diary 2002*, p. 301. Population estimates: Mustafa, Walid, *Jerusalem: Population and Urbanization From 1850-2000*, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, 2000, p. 8.

² Religious freedom was guaranteed in the "Allenby Declaration", delivered by Lord Allenby upon Britain's December 1917 conquest of the city. The order, passed in April 1918, was one of the first acts of the city's first Military Governor, Ronald Storrs. Benvenisti, Meron, *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*, University of California Press, 1996, p. 99. See also PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 25.

³ The historic status of Al-Buraq Ash-Sharif as a Muslim holy site belonging solely to the *Waqf* and being an integral part of Al-Haram Ash-Sharif was confirmed by the British in a White [policy] Paper of November 1928. This reaffirmed a situation unchallenged in centuries and came in the wake of Ottoman rulings to the same effect. In May 1931, the British issued an order once again confirming Muslim ownership of the site, including the paved area in front of the wall, but acknowledging that Jewish worshippers should enjoy access to the site. See, *Ibid.*, p. 40, p. 46.

⁴ Dumper, Michael, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 65.

⁵ Mustafa, *Jerusalem: Population and Urbanization*, p. 47.

⁶ Davis, Rochelle, "The Growth of the Western Communities, 1917-1948," in Tamari, Salim (ed.), *Jerusalem 1948: The Arab Neighborhoods and Their Fate in the War*, Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies & Badil Resource Center, 1999, pp. 32-66, p. 40. Figures pertaining to the entire 59.5 km² metropolitan Jerusalem area – as defined by the British – were put at 157,080: 97,000 Jews, 30,630 Muslims and 29,350 Christians.

⁷ Ju'beh, Nazmi, "Jewish Settlement in the Old City of Jerusalem After 1967," *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (2001), pp. 48-54, p. 49.

So insignificant was the ownership and population of the Jewish community within the Old City, the Jewish Agency itself produced a plan for dividing Jerusalem - along ambitious lines extremely generous to the Zionist cause - which made absolutely no claim to the Old City or any of its holy sites and instead endorsed its being handed over to Palestinian jurisdiction. The plan was authored in 1932, at a time when the Jewish population in the Old City was significantly larger than it would become following the urbanization trend brought on by immigration and development in the western sector of the city. See, Mustafa, *Jerusalem: Population and Urbanization*, p. 59 & p. 49.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 57; Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, p. 65; PASSIA, *Diary 2002*, p. 295; Davis, "The Growth of the Western Communities, 1917-1948," in Tamari, Salim (ed.), *Jerusalem 1948*, p. 52.

⁹ Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, p. 67; Mustafa, *Jerusalem: Population and Urbanization*, p. 58.

¹⁰ Throughout the Old City Jewish ownership accounted for 192 houses - 105 of these in the area that later became the post-1967 Jewish Quarter. Ju'beh, "Jewish Settlement in the Old City of Jerusalem After 1967," p. 49.

¹¹ The Old City's Christian population, like that of Jerusalem and indeed Palestine as a whole, never recovered in demographic strength following *An Nakba*. In what became East Jerusalem (including the Old City), Christians made up 38% of the population in 1948; by 1967 they were 15% of the total. Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, p. 69.

¹² Moshe Dayan, in this broadcast the day after Israel's conquest of the city, went so far as to "solemnly promise religious freedom and rights," adding, "[w]e came to Jerusalem not to possess ourselves of the Holy Places of others, or to interfere with the members of other faiths..." Three days later Israel commenced bulldozing Palestinian Old City homes and within a year had razed at least two Old City mosques to the ground. Moshe Dayan, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 162.

¹³ PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 121.

¹⁴ UNGA Resolution 2253 of July 1967, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 126. Of the ca. 700 stone buildings demolished in the 1968 creation of the Jewish Quarter, an absolute maximum of 105 had been in Jewish ownership prior to 1948. However, subtracting from that figure the small number of Jewish historical and religious buildings not demolished but preserved within the razed area and today still standing within the modern Jewish Quarter would obviously reduce this number slightly.

¹⁵ Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, pp. 175-176.

¹⁶ Mustafa, *Jerusalem: Population and Urbanization*, p. 68.

MAP 51

¹ Abu Sitta, "Notes on the Landowners Record of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine for Urban West Jerusalem in 1948," in Tamari, Salim (ed.), *Jerusalem 1948*, p. 241; Mustafa, *Jerusalem: Population and Urbanization*, p. 62.

² Between 1952 and 1967, some 7,000 housing units were built in Arab East Jerusalem. Of these, over half were located in the northern areas along the Jerusalem-Ramallah route, outside Arab East Jerusalem's municipal area; *ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

³ Benvenisti, *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*, p. 66.

⁴ The committee charged with redefining the Jerusalem municipal boundaries in 1967 was headed by Gen. Rehavam Ze'evi, future founder of Israel's Moledet Party, which calls for the forcible expulsion ('transfer') of non-Jews from the OPT and Israel.

⁵ Statement by the committee to the Israeli Cabinet, June 1967. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁶ LAW - The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, *The Demographic Imperative* (Jerusalem Unit Occasional Paper No. 1), Jerusalem: LAW, 2000, p. 6. (NB: LAW has in the meantime ceased to exist).

⁷ Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, p. 74.

⁸ LAW, *The Demographic Imperative*, p. 9. (NB: LAW has in the meantime ceased to exist).

⁹ In addition to these first 10 residential settlements, the industrial zone of Atarot was established in 1973. The first residential settlements outside the Old City were established in 1968 at 'Ramat Eshkol' and 'HaGiva HaTzarfatit' (French Hill).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² PASSIA, *Diary 2002*, p. 297 (citing Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook 2000 - The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies).

¹³ The Jewish growth rate in Jerusalem is not only far lower than that of the Palestinians, but also of the Jewish national average in Israel – put at 2.6% per annum in 1998. *Ibid.*

MAP 52

¹ Excerpts from the report of the Peel Commission of Inquiry, 1937, quoted in Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, p. 30. Also, Benvenisti, *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*, p. 209.

² Britain's earlier attempts at denying the Palestinians a potent political voice in Jerusalem were more cautious. In 1935, they appointed Dr. Hussein Al-Khalidi mayor - a post never in Jerusalem's history held by a Jew - but then appointed two deputy mayors, Yaqoub Farraj and Daniel Auster, ostensibly representing the Christian and Jewish communities respectively. Khalidi's August 1937 expulsion to detention in the Seychelles came as part of a campaign to eliminate political figures supportive of the Arab Revolt, which began in 1936. As a member of the Arab Higher Committee, which in April 1936 had called for strikes against Jewish immigration and in support of the establishment of an Arab government in Palestine, Al-Khalidi was considered a leader of the revolt. His expulsion, and the detention of six other Palestinian council members left Jewish deputy mayor Auster heading a Jewish majority in the municipality and led to a walk-out by the remaining Palestinian council members. The British were forced to install their own six-man official body to keep the municipality operative.

³ Fitzgerald compared the envisioned "Jerusalem county" to that of London; Benvenisti, *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*, p. 210.

⁴ The main Jewish settlements outside the Jerusalem metropolitan area included in the plan were (Kiryat) Motsa to the west and Kibbutz Ramat Rachel to the south. In addition, the Jewish sites of Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University in the east of the city were included in the *Corpus Separatum*. Mustafa, *Jerusalem: Population and Urbanization*, pp. 52-53.

⁵ PASSIA, *Diary 2002*, p. 295.

⁶ Abu Sitta, Salman, "Notes on the Landowners Record of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine for Urban West Jerusalem in 1948," in Tamari, Salim (ed.), *Jerusalem 1948*, pp. 240-241.

⁷ Ben Gurion addressing the MAPAI (his political party) Central Council on 7 February 1948, quoted in Krystall, Nathan, "The Fall of the New City," in Tamari, Salim (ed.), *Jerusalem 1948*, pp. 102-103.

MAP 53

¹ Benvenisti, *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*, p. 56.

² *Ibid.*, p. 57.

³ Homes and military positions: *ibid.*, pp. 59-62. For the approximate area of no-man's-land strip see Abu Sitta, "Notes on the Landowners Record of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine for Urban West Jerusalem in 1948," in Tamari, Salim (ed.), *Jerusalem 1948*, p. 241.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Mustafa, *Jerusalem: Population and Urbanization*, p. 59.

⁶ Abu Sitta, "Notes on the Landowners Record of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine for Urban West Jerusalem in 1948," in Tamari, Salim (ed.), *Jerusalem 1948*, p. 241.

⁷ Davis, "The Growth of the Western Communities, 1917-1948," in Tamari, Salim (ed.), *Jerusalem 1948*, p. 40. Also, Mustafa, *Jerusalem: Population and Urbanization*, p. 59.

⁸ For a definition of these terms see: Map 13, note 10.

⁹ *Eviction from Jerusalem: Restitution and the Protection of Palestinian Rights*, Bethlehem: Badil, 1999, p. 9.

¹⁰ Segev, 1949, pp. 85-89.

¹¹ The 'Custodian of Absentee Property' calculated a figure of 9.25 million Palestine Pounds worth of property had been seized in West Jerusalem - 3.5 million of this in the form of homes and other 'immovable' properties. However, the looting that preceded the 'Custodian's' assessment should not be underestimated. The 'Custodian' complained: "The inspectors found most of the houses broken into, and rarely was there any furniture left... Clothes, household effects, jewelry, bedding... never reached the warehouses..." *Ibid.*, p. 71.

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¹² Ruhi Al-Khatib, quoted in Davis, “The Growth of the Western Communities, 1917-1948,” in Tamari, Salim (ed.), *Jerusalem 1948*, p. 52.

¹³ PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 92.

¹⁴ British policy statement of 1950. Pakistan was the only country in the world to recognize Jordanian sovereignty over East Jerusalem by 1950. No nation explicitly recognized Israel’s sovereignty over west Jerusalem. Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, p. 35.

MAP 54

¹ FMEP, *Greater Jerusalem – Special Report*, Washington DC: FMEP, Summer 1997, p. 2.

MAP 55

¹ On 7 June 1967, the Pope called upon Israel to accept pre-existing schemes calling for international protection of the city and its holy sites. The same day, Israeli forces confiscated the keys to Bab Al-Magharbeh (the western gate of the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound) – never to return them. On 14 June, Israeli forces placed the entire Palestinian population of the Old City under curfew and invited Jews to tour the ‘plaza’ before Al-Buraq Ash-Sharif (the Wailing Wall) formed by the demolition of the Mughrabi Quarter and expulsion of its residents four days earlier. PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 121.

² PASSIA, *Jerusalem – Special Bulletin*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2002.

³ PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 122.

⁴ Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, p. 74; Badil, *Eviction from Jerusalem: Restitution and the Protection of Palestinian Rights*, p. 28.

⁵ PASSIA, *Jerusalem – Special Bulletin*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2002.

⁶ PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 122.

⁷ UNSC Resolution 478, 20 August 1980.

MAP 56

¹ Badil, *Eviction from Jerusalem: Restitution and the Protection of Palestinian Rights*, p. 17.

² During the war, some 20,000 Palestinians fled the area that became annexed, enlarged East Jerusalem. Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, p. 74. A further 7,630 Palestinians of this area were abroad at the time of the census. Badil, *Eviction from Jerusalem: Restitution and the Protection of Palestinian Rights*, p. 28.

³ Children of Jerusalemite and non-Jerusalemite parents are only permitted residency rights in the cases where the father holds a valid blue ID. As a result there are an unknown but likely significant number of ‘unregistered’ children in the East Jerusalem area - children of Jerusalemite mothers and West Bank fathers. Policies such as these play an important part in Israel’s complimentary policy of creating maximum divisions between the socio-economic and cultural identities of Palestinians living in the militarily occupied Palestinian territories and those living in the annexed East Jerusalem area.

⁴ PASSIA, *Diary 2002*, p. 299.

⁵ Israeli Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 2000, quoted in *ibid*, p. 296. PCBS, *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook, 1999*, quoted in *ibid*. In 1997, Israeli officials estimated the number of registered Jerusalemite Palestinians living beyond the city limits to be between 50,000-80,000, or around a third of the total. Klein, Menachem, *Jerusalem: The Contested City*, London: Hurst & Co., 2001, p. 266.

⁶ Only 1.7% of Jerusalem’s Jewish population lived in this level of density. B’Tselem, *A Policy of Discrimination: Land Expropriation, Planning and Building in East Jerusalem*, Jerusalem: B’Tselem, January 1997, p. 10. & p.112. In terms of residential infrastructure, the discrimination was just as pronounced: in 2000, 650 km of sewage network served the Jewish population; 76 km served Palestinians. PASSIA, *Diary 2002*, p. 303 (citing *Al-Quds*, 1 June 2000).

⁷ The smaller settlement sites in the inner Jerusalem area include a site named Shimon HaTzadik (in Sheikh Jarrah); a 132 unit project in Ras Al-Amud; a Yeshiva complex in At-Tur (Mount of Olives); a series of forcibly seized Palestinian homes in Silwan; a new development being built in Jabal Mukabbir; numerous seized properties in the Christian and Muslim quarters of the Old City; and the 1968 Jewish Quarter of the Old City. Together these sites contain less than 4,500 settlers – 2,288 of these being in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, 1,700 in the other seized areas of the walled city and the remaining ca. 600 residing only ‘part-time’ in the other sites.

⁸ The ordinance allows Israel’s Finance Minister to issue expropriation orders relating to land/s deemed vital for ‘public purposes.’ Judgment as to what conforms to the definition of a ‘public purpose’ lies solely with the Finance Minister.

⁹ B’Tselem, *A Policy of Discrimination*, p. 56.

¹⁰ A Palestinian living in Kufr Aqab (see map), will be obliged to pass (provided he has a Jerusalem ID card) at least two and up to three checkpoints, where he is liable to searches, delay and unexplained refusal of passage, before reaching the Shu’fat area – distance of five km (see map). A journey all the way to Sur Baher, in the south of the city, could take

any amount of time and is fraught with obstacles. None of these obstacles mark the boundary between East and West Jerusalem, but are rather located around Palestinian neighborhoods, or take the form of ‘flying checkpoints’ manned by mobile ‘Border Police’ units and erected without notice at any point in the Palestinian portion of the city. Needless to add, the settlers are not subject to any checkpoints and enjoy an entirely separate network of high-speed roads.

¹¹ The total settler population, including the entire WBGS in December 2001, reached ca. 406,000. Of these, 6,900 were in the Gaza Strip, the remainder in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. PALDIS database, May 2002.

MAP 57

¹ Givat Ze’ev was established in 1982 – its population in December 2000 was 10,300; Ma’ale Adumim was established in 1975 – its population in December 2000 was 24,900; the Etzion Bloc numbers 14 individual sites, built since 1968, with a combined total population of just over 28,000 in 2000. PALDIS Database, 2002.

² *Ibid.*

³ LAW - The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, *Land & Settlement Policy in Jerusalem*, Jerusalem: LAW, 1999, p. 33. (NB: LAW has in the meantime ceased to exist).

⁴ Hodgkins, *Israeli Settlement Policy in Jerusalem*, p. 94.

⁵ *Ulpanei Klita Shomron* (Samaria Absorption Units) focus on drawing western immigrants to settle in the northern West Bank settlements. During the late 1990s they succeeded in totally populating the site of Sa Nur – arguably the most remote settlement in the West Bank, with promotional material such as this. Prior to their immigration absorption, Sa Nur was ‘staffed’ by ‘part-time’ settlers from the radical messianic settlement of Yitzhar. See *Ideological Settlement in the West Bank: Areas of Exclusion Enforced upon the Palestinian Population*, Information Paper, Ramallah: PALDIS-LDC, June 2002, p. 16.

MAP 58

¹ Municipal Council statement of August 1967, quoted in LAW, *Land & Settlement Policy in Jerusalem*, p. 13. (NB: LAW has in the meantime ceased to exist).

² Extracts from the Allon Plan (1967) and the Galili Document (1973), reproduced in Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, pp. 604-606 & p. 610.

³ A map of this earliest definition can be found in, Palestinian Human Rights Information Center (PHRIC), *Clever Concealment - Jewish Settlement in the Occupied Territories Under the Rabin Government: August 1992- September 1993*, Jerusalem: PHRIC, 1994, pp. 32-34.

⁴ LAW, *Land & Settlement Policy in Jerusalem*, p. 32 (NB: LAW has in the meantime ceased to exist).

⁵ PHRIC, *Clever Concealment - Jewish Settlement in the Occupied Territories Under the Rabin Government*, p. 32.

⁶ LAW, *Land & Settlement Policy in Jerusalem*, p. 32 (NB: LAW has in the meantime ceased to exist).

⁷ These calculations are based on an area comprising West and unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem along with an area within a 10-mile radius of the city center. Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, pp. 84-85.

⁸ Netanyahu to the Knesset, quoted in Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 581.

⁹ Netanyahu’s 60% annexation plan is thought to conform to that of Ariel Sharon (Map XCV) and was developed in the first half of 1997 in accordance with his and then Foreign Minister Sharon’s view of Israel’s vital security interests. However, no official map was presented at the time. Including the settlements to the east and north of Ramallah was specified in the government’s verbal description of the new ‘Greater Jerusalem’ area. Klein, *Jerusalem: The Contested City*, pp. 294-295.

¹⁰ *Ma’ariv*, 21 June 1998, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 295. Though the decision to create the new planning body was made in absolute secrecy in mid-February 1997, news of the “umbrella municipality” leaked eventually and its mandate was discussed in the Israeli press within a year.

¹¹ The US intervened on Israel’s behalf by threatening to block a UNSC Resolution condemning Israel over the ‘umbrella municipality’ scheme. However, the US agreed to and endorsed a lesser condemnation in the form of a ‘Consensus Statement,’ issued by the UNSC President in July 1998, which called the plan, “a serious and harmful development.” *Ibid.*, p. 297.

¹² Az-Za’im industrial zone would potentially link the northwestern E1 border with the municipal line. *Ibid.*

New master plans for Adam settlement show it expanding almost entirely in a westward direction, linking up with Neve Ya’acov’s westward expansion. Both plans have been updated or reaffirmed since the February 1997 ‘umbrella municipality’ decision was made. The areas involved will see Adam increase in size by over 500% on Ar-Ram, Al-Jaba and Hizma village land. PALDIS Database, June 2002.

¹³ The Israeli CBS puts the population in this area at the end of 1998 at 66,000. Reports based on CBS data, quoted in Klein, *Jerusalem: The Contested City*, p. 298. By the end of 2001, the CBS puts the population in this area at just over 76,000. *Ha’aretz*, “Settling for Less,” 23 January 2002.

¹⁴ Klein, *Jerusalem: The Contested City*, p. 298.

MAP 59

¹ Barak speaking in summer 2000, quoted in Baskin, Gershon, "The Jerusalem Problem: the Search for Solutions," *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (2001), pp. 6-11, p. 7.

² *Ibid.*

³ Israeli chief negotiator Shlomo Ben Ami, referring to Palestinian demands for a return to 1967 borders, 29 May 2000, quoted in PASSIA, *Chronology Archive, 2000-2001*.

⁴ In one such instance, Arafat reportedly rejected an 'American' proposal, telling the US team, "...these are not American ideas... I received [them]... unofficially from the Israelis hours before I received them from you!" Arafat to the US Camp David team, quoted in Hanieh, "The Camp David Papers," p. 80. President Clinton's 'Special Assistant for Arab-Israeli Affairs' during the Camp David talks, Robert Malley, later admitted that the US had presented Israeli ideas to the Palestinians as their own, through he suggested this occurred "often unwittingly." However, Malley himself stresses that throughout the talks Israel and the US operated according to a "no-surprise-rule" whereby both US and Israeli teams coordinated their proposals, making it difficult to conceive of the US formulating a proposal identical to an Israeli one "unwittingly." Malley, & Hussein, "Camp David: Tragedy of Errors," p. 73.

⁵ FMEP, *Crossroads of Conflict*, p. 7. Discussions concerning the Old City and the proposed regimes therein reportedly revolved around a division of administrative control whereby an Israeli 'regime' would control the Armenian and Jewish Quarters, leaving the Muslim and Christian Quarters under a Palestinian 'regime'; each with unspecified levels of civilian and religious responsibility, but ultimately under Israeli sovereign rule.

⁶ Hanieh, "The Camp David Papers," pp. 83-87.

⁷ President Clinton, speaking during a press conference held at the end of the Camp David summit, 25 July 2000, reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 1, p. 156.

⁸ Representatives of the US Camp David team to Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat, quoted in Hanieh, "The Camp David Papers," p. 96. See also, FMEP, *Crossroads of Conflict*, p. 7.

⁸ The presence in Jerusalem of the holy sites, most importantly Al-Haram Ash-Sharif and the Holy Sepulcher, and the centrality of the city in Arab and Muslim history makes Israel's aggressive intransigence a matter of great significance to the entire Muslim, Christian and Arab World. Palestinian rejection of Israeli annexation is in harmony with the positions expressed by the religious and political leadership of the Arab World. At the close of the Camp David talks, Arafat told President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak, "the Arab leader who would surrender Jerusalem is not born yet." Arafat, speaking in July 2001, quoted in PASSIA, *Chronology Archive, 2000-2001*.

MAP 60

¹ Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, pp. 175-176.

² Bab Nabi Daoud, or Zion Gate, is not the site of a permanent checkpoint but is manned as such during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan as well as during Friday prayers throughout much of the year. Bab Al-Magharbeh, or Dung Gate, is the site of Israel's principal checkpoint, limiting Palestinian access to or through the 'Wailing Wall Plaza' and serving as a staging post for military and police invasions of Al-Haram Ash-Sharif.

³ Ju'beh, "Jewish Settlement in the Old City of Jerusalem After 1967," p. 53. The movements involved in the aggressive seizure, settlement and expansion of sites within the Muslim, Christian and Armenian Quarters belong to the messianic-nationalist stream in Israeli politics and are tied to the Gush Emunim movement which has long dominated OPT settlement – both governmental and 'extra-legal' (see Map 24). The most active Old City settlement organizations are: Ateret Cohanim, Torat Cohanim, and The Young Israel Movement. Each of these are engaged in 'preparations' for the replacement of Al-Haram Ash-Sharif with a third Jewish Temple on its site and each of which receive high-level government support, in terms of both funds and legal protection/assistance. See Dumper, Michael, *The Politics of Sacred Space – The Old City of Jerusalem in the Middle East Conflict*, UK/US: Lynne Rienner Ltd., 2002, pp.45-71.

⁴ See Cheshin, Amir, *Municipal Policies in Jerusalem: An Account From Within*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1998, pp. 108-124.

⁵ *Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2013.

⁶ These numbers exclude the over 1,000 Jewish settlers living in the Muslim and Christian Quarters. *Ibid.* The population of the Jewish Quarter at the beginning of this century was put at 2,900. Of this number, ca. 70% were orthodox observant Jews, ca. 25% belonged to the religious-nationalist stream prominent in other settlements, while a mere ca. 5% were secular Israelis. Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies data, cited in *Ha'aretz*, "The Bubbling Volcano of Teeming Old Jerusalem," 9 May 2002.

⁷ *Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2013.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Reiter, Yitzhak, Eordegian, Marlen & Marwan Abu Khalaf, "A Compendium of Holy Places," in Ma'oz, Moshe & Nusseibeh, Sari (eds.), *Jerusalem: Points of Friction and Beyond*, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 114-164, pp. 155-164.

¹¹ PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 373.

MAP 61

¹ Ma'ale Adumim's current built-up area is some 7 km², but its municipal plan covers a total area of 55 km², stretching almost to the Dead Sea and including, to the north, the contested 12 km² E-1 area. See P. Rekacewicz/D.Vidal, "Jerusalem: Whose very own and golden city?" *Monde Diplomatic*, February 2007. Accordingly, Israel's separation barrier was planned some 15 km into the West Bank in order to include the entire Adumim bloc on the "Israeli side."

² Most of the area was declared "state land" by Israel in the 1980s.

³ B'tselem, "The E1 plan and its implications for human rights in the West Bank," December 2012, http://www.btselem.org/settlements/20121202_e1_human_rights_ramifications.

⁴ This action was illegal since no specific town plan existed and thus no permits could be or were issued.

⁵ B'Tselem, "The E1 plan and its implications for human rights in the West Bank," December 2012, http://www.btselem.org/settlements/20121202_e1_human_rights_ramifications.

⁶ "Israel okays building of 3,000 units in J'lem, W. Bank," *Jerusalem Post*, 30 November 2012, <http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Israel-okays-building-of-3000-units-in-Jlem-W-Bank>.

MAP 62

¹ It is also referred to as Jerusalem Master Plan 2020 due to its target date at that time.

² According to its mission statement it is, *inter alia*, an inclusive plan aiming to develop the city of Jerusalem as a capital of Israel and as an Israeli metropolitan center. This chapter focuses on the effects of the plan regarding the Palestinian population in Jerusalem. A translation of the 2004 version can be found here: http://www.pcc-jer.org/arabic/Publication/jerusalem_master_plan/jerusalemplan_eng.html.

³ After 1959, only neighborhood or local outline plans have been drafted and approved. The current Jerusalem Master Plan is composed of successive master plan versions for urban planning in the West Jerusalem municipality that have been modified over the years but are all based on the statutory 'Plan Number 62' of 1959.

⁴ Jerusalem Local Master Plan 2000, Report No. 4, August 2004, p. 205.

⁵ E.g., Hebrew University demographer Sergio Della Pergola, who, *inter alia*, researched for the Master Plan 2000.

⁶ Jerusalem 2000 Local Outline Plan, Report No. 4, *The Proposed Plan and the Main Planning Policy Principles*, August 2004, p. 463; quoted in <http://eng.bimkom.org/Index.asp?ArticleID=148&CategoryID=146&Page=1>. Attempts at geographic and demographic manipulation are manifold and include construction of the separation barrier (which is ignored entirely in the Master Plan); the closure regime (leaving thousands of Palestinians outside the municipal borders); house demolition policies; a transportation system that ignores the planning interests of Palestinian residents; expropriation of private Palestinian land and property; the addition of 65,000 housing units to existing settlements by 2020; the establishment of additional Jewish settlements and numerous other Jewish public institutions.

⁷ Ir Amim, *Jerusalem Master Plan 2000 - General Analysis and Comments*, June 2010, <http://eng.ir-amim.org.il/Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/master.pdf>.

⁸ Translated excerpts from the original Hebrew petition, submitted by Bimkom and ACRI to the Jerusalem District Court on 21 April 2013 against the Chairman of the District Planning and Building Jerusalem, the District Planning and Building Jerusalem District, the Local Planning and Building Jerusalem, and the Minister of the Interior, arguing that the controversial Jerusalem Master Plan 2000 – which was never passed into law – is illegally being enforced. See: <http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Planning-Petition-ENG.pdf>.

⁹ Of whom only one was Palestinian – architect Senan Abdelqader.

¹⁰ The usual procedure would have been for the new plan to be deposited for final review. But in this case, Minister of Interior Eli Yishai, members of the Jerusalem municipal council and other officials delayed the procedure by claiming that the plan differed substantially from the one recommended for deposit previously. The main accusation was that the new version discriminated against the Israeli population because housing for the Arab population was designated in areas initially designated to remain green and open. As a result, the Minister of Interior (who holds overall responsibility for planning policy) delayed approval of the plan. It has been argued that since the deposition decisions were not executed, they have expired and are no longer valid, and since no other statutory decision regarding the Master Plan has been taken, the authorities responsible – West Jerusalem municipality and its bodies, Minister of Interior – obviously do not deem it worthy of deposition and approval. *Ibid.*

¹¹ The Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, *Aggressive Urbanism - Urban Planning and the Displacement of Palestinians within and from Occupied East Jerusalem*, December 2009.

MAP 63

¹ *Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2013.

² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³ While President Abbas insisted that Kerry's 'framework agreement' should explicitly mention a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, Prime Minister Netanyahu stressed that he would not accept an agreement that outlined any part of

Jerusalem, no matter how small, becoming the capital of Palestine. See Ravid, R. "Netanyahu rejects inclusion of Jerusalem in Kerry's framework deal," *Haaretz*, 10 January 2014, at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/premium-1.567877> [accessed 22.05.2014].

⁴ For a summary of the advisory opinion see "Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004," *International Court of Justice*, 9 July 2004, at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1677.pdf> [accessed 22.05.2014].

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁶ *Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2013.

⁷ *Ibid.* See Map 62 for details. For a translation of the 2004 version of the Master Plan see "Jerusalem Master Plan (unofficial translation)," *Palestinian Counseling Center*, at http://www.pcc-jer.org/arabic/Publication/jerusalem_master_plan/jerusalemplan_eng.html [accessed 22.05.2014].

⁸ The UN General Assembly has adopted various resolutions that condemn Israel's settlement activities in East Jerusalem. See for example UNGA Resolution A/RES/67/120 (14 January 2013). The July 2004 ICJ advisory opinion mentioned above also referred to the settlements in East Jerusalem, concluding that they were illegal. See "Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004," *International Court of Justice*.

⁹ Between 2003 and 2012, Israeli authorities issued over 8,000 tenders for the building of settlement structures in East Jerusalem, see *Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader*, p. 66. The Israeli government has facilitated settlement expansion in East Jerusalem through various policies, including the implementation of a 2010 bill giving the city of Jerusalem a national priority status in the housing, employment and education sectors. See "New legislation to give national priority to Jerusalem," *The Jerusalem Post*, 24 October 2010, at <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/New-legislation-to-give-national-priority-to-Jerusalem> [accessed 22.05.2014]. As a result of this legislation, construction projects in all Jerusalem neighborhoods, including the settlements in East Jerusalem, are to be given priority over projects elsewhere. At the same time, Israel has been pursuing discriminatory housing policies that firstly make it nearly impossible for Palestinian residents in Jerusalem to acquire building permits and secondly force Palestinians who live in homes built without a permit to choose between destroying their own home or paying a high fine to the Jerusalem municipality which will then destroy it for them, see "Discrimination in Planning, Building, and Land Expropriation," *B'Tselem*, 1 January 2011, at http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/discriminating_policy [accessed 22.05.2014]. See also Gilbert, S. "Palestinians forced to demolish own homes," *Al Jazeera*, 23 March 2014, at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/palestinians-forced-demolish-own-homes-israel-201432094848315964.html> [accessed 22.05.2014].

¹⁰ "9 Months of Talks, 9 Months of Settlement Development," *Peace Now*, 29 April 2014, at <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/9Months> [accessed 22.05.2014].

¹¹ "Settlements in East Jerusalem," *Foundation for Middle East Peace*, at http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/settlements-in-east-jerusalem [accessed 22.05.2014].

¹² *Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2013, p. 54.

¹³ *Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader*, p. 62.

¹⁴ "Jerusalem: General Facts and Statistics," *The Civic Coalition of Palestinian Right in Jerusalem*, at http://www.civic-coalition-jerusalem.org/system/files/jerusalem_-_general_facts_and_statistics_final.pdf [accessed 24.05.2014].

¹⁵ *Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader*, p. 182.

¹⁶ "Statistics on demolition of houses built without permits in East Jerusalem," *B'Tselem*, 1 January 2011 (updated on 21 May 2014), at http://www.btselem.org/planning_and_building/east_jerusalem_statistics [accessed 24.05.2014].

¹⁷ PASSIA, *Diary 2014*, p. 442.

¹⁸ "Neglect of Infrastructure and Services in Palestinian Neighborhoods," *B'Tselem*, 1 January 2011, at http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/infrastructure_and_services [accessed 24.05.2014].

¹⁹ PASSIA, *Diary 2014*, p. 442.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 433.

²¹ Surprisingly, the separation barrier is ignored entirely in the Master Plan. See *Arab East Jerusalem: A Reader*, p. 166.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*


6

Special Issues

(Maps 64-70)

ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES

Administrative Boundaries under the Ottomans



Prior to the British Mandate, Ottoman Palestine was made up of three Sanjaks, or sub-provinces, each ruled by a Mutasarrif (provincial governor). Of these, the Sanjak of Acre and that of Balqa', or Nablus, fell within the larger Vilayet (province) of Beirut, while the largest, Jerusalem -owing to its religious and historical status- was independent, with its governor responsible directly to the Sultan.

The British administered Palestine through a series of 16 sub-districts, each responsible to the High Commissioner in the capital, Jerusalem. These sub-districts were adjusted once, in the late 1930s, but remained operational throughout the Mandate. Following the 1947-1949 War, Jordan administered the West Bank according to similar set of sub-districts, placing the villages surrounding its 11 principal towns under local governors responding to Amman via Jerusalem, which remained the Palestinian capital and was also declared the 'second capital' of Jordan.

Israel's occupation in 1967 saw these reasonably organic sub-divisions replaced by a streamlined system of military ruled through seven large governorates, which denied the existence of Palestinian Jerusalem both as a city and as Palestine's central administrative sub-division.

In 1995, the Palestinian Authority adopted new administrative sub-divisions, returning to boundaries more in keeping both with historical fact and local Palestinian socio-economic and cultural factors, forming an 11 governorate system in the West Bank and dividing, for the first time, the populous Gaza Strip into five governorates. Each PA governorate was placed under a local authority which administered both Area A and B through branches of 'national' ministerial and welfare services, except in the re-designated Jerusalem governorate, where the lack of an Area A presence limited PA governmental activity.

MAP 64

Administrative Boundaries under the British Mandate, 1940s



Administrative Boundaries in the West Bank under Jordan, 1948-1967



West Bank and Gaza Strip According to the Israeli Administration after 1967



West Bank and Gaza Strip According to the Palestinian Authority Governorate Divisions, 1995



SURFACE WATER

Access to, and control over, the region's limited water sources has always been a source of dispute in the Middle East. In the context of the Palestine-Israel conflict, two principal sources of water are at stake – the groundwater aquifers of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the permanent surface water flowing through the Jordan River and its three major tributaries: the Hasbani, Dan and Baniyas rivers. The surface water reaching or flowing through the Jordan River Basin is by rights the shared resource of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian West Bank – these being legally classified as 'riparians' by virtue of their territorial location within the Basin area.¹ International conventions and the principles of International Customary Law forbid unilateral measures taken by states to seize control over shared water sources such as those of the Basin, and supposedly guarantee the rights of all parties sharing water sources to "equitable and reasonable" levels of utilization.²

In contravention of these laws, and (later) the conventions governing the role of an occupying force, Israel has - since 1951 - pursued a series of national plans aimed at exploiting the Jordan River Basin's waters unilaterally and extensively. The primary mechanism Israel employs to divert these waters is its National Water Carrier, a series of canals, tunnels and pipes inaugurated in 1964, which transports 420-450 million cubic meters (mcm) a year from Lake Tabariya (the Sea of Galilee) through the country's coastal plain and south to the Negev desert.³ The Carrier is connected to several regional Israeli systems and distributes 66% of all the Basin water exploited by Israel. In addition to the Carrier, Israel diverts 130 mcm per year from the Upper Jordan, and a further 90 mcm from Lake Tabariya directly to the surrounding agricultural and urban centers. Israel's total of 640 mcm per year represents 58% of all the water exploited in the Basin area, while in terms of the Jordan River itself, Israel currently diverts at least 75% of the river's waters before they reach the West Bank.

The 1967 occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights left Israel in control of most of the Basin's headwaters and rendered its control of Lake Tabariya exclusive. Syrian access to the water sources of the Basin has subsequently been confined to the Yarmouk River, which flows along its border with Jordan and is shared by the two states. The 1994 Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty saw Israel yield to the Jordanians a mere 20 mcm per year from the Jordan River, and agree to transfer a further 10 mcm of desalinated water. From 1960 to 2010 alone, the Jordan River flow has depleted from 1,300 mcm to 100 mcm. In lean periods the flow of the lower Jordan River is even less than 10% of the annual flow (sometimes as low as 1 mcm per month).⁴

Following the occupation of the West Bank in 1967 Israel destroyed or confiscated the 140 pumping units located along the Jordan River in the West Bank.⁵ The diversion by Israel of three quarters of the river's flow has since left the Lower Jordan unviable as a water source even should Israel agree to eventual Palestinian sovereignty in the area, as the salinity level is high and the rate of flow already critically low. The river is no longer even capable of replenishing the Dead Sea, which is gradually receding as a result. Military Order (MO) 92 of August 1967, transferred authority over water sources in the West Bank (both ground and surface waters) to the military, and was followed the same year by MO 158, banning all construction of infrastructure relating to water. In 1982, Israel's national water company (Mekorot) took over from the military, and today continues to control the flow and infrastructure of all the waters of or in the OPT. The Palestinians have been denied absolutely any access to the shared resources of the Jordan River Basin and as a result have remained entirely dependent on the groundwater of the hill aquifers and the minimal 'run off' waters in the West Bank valleys during winter.

Denial of access to natural resources and failure to provide for the needs of an occupied population from such resources represents a serious violation of both the 1910 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention and has consequently been the subject of numerous UNGA and UNSC resolutions.⁶ In 1972, UNGA Resolution 3005 recognized that the Palestinian right to self-determination and statehood embodies the right to the natural resources of the OPT, including its water. During the negotiating process, the water issue was postponed to the final status talks, although the PA was able to establish the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), which operated as an administrative body but left Israel in absolute control over the flow, price and development of the water network. The 2000-2001 final status talks did not progress beyond the arrangements broached in the Interim (Oslo II) Agreement, which referred to Israeli provision of immediate water needs according to a quota system but did not yield flow control or come close to presenting the Palestinians with an "equitable and reasonable" level of utilization. As of 2013, West Bank Palestinians have access to less water per capita than they did in 1993 and their reliance on purchasing high-priced water from Israel has steadily increased.⁷ Future access to, and use of, the surface waters of the Jordan River Basin remains a Palestinian necessity for sustainable development, particularly given Israel's drastic reduction in the yield and quality of the other major water sources – the OPT groundwater aquifers.

MAP 65



Utilization of the Shared Surface Waters of the Jordan River Basin - 2002 (mcm per year)

Exploited by Israel	From the Upper Jordan	130
	Diverted from Lake Tabariya through the National Water Carrier	420
	Used in the Tabariya Basin area	90
Exploited by Syria	From the Yarmouk River	160
Exploited by Jordan	From the Yarmouk River	90
	From the Zarka River and eastern valleys	200
	Transferred from Israel according to 1994 Peace Treaty (20 mcm from Jordan River and 10 mcm from desalinated water)	30
Exploited by Palestinians	Denied all access or utilization	0

GROUNDWATER

With no ability to utilize the surface waters of the Jordan River Basin, Palestinians are highly dependent on groundwater. There are eight groundwater basins in Israel and the OPT, four of which lie within Israel proper (Tiberias, Western Galilee, Carmel, and Negev basins), with the other four partially or fully in the West Bank (North-Eastern, Eastern, and Western Aquifer) and Gaza Strip (Coastal Aquifer). The water available from all the eight basins together is estimated at approximately 2,989 mcm per year, of which 1,454 mcm/yr emerges from groundwater, 1,320 mcm/yr is Jordan River surface water and 215 mcm/yr is runoff. Of these resources, Israel exploits 89.5% while the Palestinians' share is only 10.5% (271 mcm).¹ Groundwater is the *only* source for Palestinian water supply. Israel controls all aquifers in the country, of which two major ones are shared with Palestine: the Northeastern and the Western Aquifer, even though 83% of the annual rainfall replenishment of these two and the Eastern Aquifer occur entirely within the OPT.² Palestinians utilize only 15% of water from the ground water aquifers while Israelis, including settlers, utilize the remainder, 85%.

The Gaza segment of the larger Coastal Aquifer is the only water source in the Gaza Strip. Currently, Gaza utilizes approximately 18% of this aquifer while Israel utilizes the remaining 82% of water.³ The safe annual yield for the Gaza segment of the coastal aquifer was reduced to 55 mcm after Israel blocked the flow of the Wadi Gaza replenishment source, which ran west from Hebron. Additionally, Israeli over-pumping in the sections of the coastal aquifer beyond Gaza and the 10 mcm a year consumed by the over 6,000 settlers of the Gaza Strip before the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005, created a severe reduction in water quality. As of 2014, only 5% of the Aquifer is considered fit for human consumption by WHO standards. The Gaza aquifer is already over-extracted, leading the UN to estimate that Gaza will have no drinking water within 15 years. It is widely believed that the Gaza Aquifer has already passed the point of no return and needs to be regenerated before it can be sustainably used again.⁴

Israeli settlement policy has been guided from the outset by the imperative of securing control over the high-yield areas of the aquifers. As a result, the settlement master plans of past and present Israeli governments conform in many respects to the outlines of the West Bank mountain aquifers.⁵ With the signing of the 1995 Interim (Oslo II) Agreement, these settlement plans were translated into the cartography of the A, B, and C zones of jurisdiction, seeing Israel's intense urban settlement along the Western Aquifer, its outpost settlements upon the Northeastern Aquifer and its agricultural settlement in the Jordan Valley each rewarded with maintained dominance over West Bank groundwater and its recharge areas. Article 40 of Oslo II produced the only substantive agreement on groundwater usage of the Oslo process, but dealt with the issue in terms of an immediate and temporary quota allocation and not in terms of equitable or shared long-term control over the flow. The domestic consumption quotas this agreement created allotted West Bank Palestinians one sixth the annual per-capita rate assigned the West Bank settlers and left Gaza Palestinians with 30 times less water per-capita than the settlers living there.⁶ From all shared water resources Palestinians currently utilize no more than 10%, while Israel exploits the rest.⁷

Strategic schemes drawn up in Israel concerning the final status arrangements discussed in the Oslo period, took as their starting point the premise that, "Israel must maintain exclusive control over its potential pumping areas," and that "the Palestinians cannot be allowed any further drillings..."⁸ In seeking to preserve the inequitable and illegal status quo even in the context of a treaty with the Palestinians, Israel seeks to legitimize its own continued reliance on seized Palestinian groundwater sources, while some 60,000 Palestinians currently living in Area C lack any access to running water and must pay high prices – up to one-sixth of their income – to bring in water tankers, which in turn require special permits from the Israeli authorities.⁹ Moreover, the Israeli separation barrier and settlements divest Palestinians of their water rights; this is most apparent with regard to the Ariel and Kedumim 'fingers' near Qalqilya, which stretch 22 km into the northern West Bank, covering only 2.2% of the occupied West Bank, but some of its most valuable water resources.¹⁰ The Barrier isolates 28 groundwater wells in the West Bank as well as 17 springs and has resulted in the *de facto* appropriation of agricultural wells in the West Bank.¹¹ The damage inflicted on the once prevailing Palestinian agricultural sector through the theft of groundwater has already been evinced in a decline in the contribution of the agricultural sector to the Palestinian economy from 24% in 1966, to 4.8% in 2013.¹² Control of the water means that while Israel's large industrialized and irrigated farms enjoy the economic benefits of crop diversity and guaranteed quota production, nearly the entire Palestinian agricultural sector relies on rain-fed, low yield and low value seasonal production.

Israel's theft of Palestinian water sources – both ground and surface water – has left the Palestinians of the OPT, where sufficient and replenishable high quality water is available, with the lowest per capita consumption rate in the region by far, a dilapidated and incomplete network (with an estimated 30% loss through leakage¹³) and an increasingly saline, falling water level that offers little to no prospect for future drilling even should Israel take the unlikely step of allowing this.¹⁴

MAP 66



Israeli vs. Palestinian Utilization of 'Shared' Aquifers (mcm/yr)*

Aquifer Basin	Annual Recharge	Israeli Water Use	Settlement Water Use	Palestinian Water Use	Total Water Use
Western	362	340	10	22	372
Northeastern	145	103	5	42	150
Eastern	172	40 from wells	50	54	144
Coastal Aquifer	250	260	0	0	260
- of which Gaza	55	0	5-10	110	120

Source: PASSIA, *Water - Special Bulletin*, p. 3.

PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

Following the 1948 War, the UN Conciliation Commission estimated that 726,000 Palestinians (75% of the Arab population of Palestine) had been forced to flee, or had been expelled outside of what became Israel to neighboring Arab countries and elsewhere (known as the 1948 refugees).¹ Of the 800,000 Arabs originally living in the area that became Israel, only some 100,000 remained, becoming an Arab minority in Israel. Up to 531 villages and towns were destroyed or resettled with Jews.²

In addition to the refugees, some 30-40,000 internally displaced Palestinians were expelled from their villages - located in what became Israel - during the war and were not allowed to return to their homes. They were placed under military rule to facilitate the expropriation of their land. Israel has never recognized internally displaced Palestinians, whose number (including their descendants) is now estimated at over 335,000.³ Palestinians who were expelled or fled the violence in and around 1948 were effectively denationalized when the Knesset passed the Israeli Nationality Law in 1952 (which required proof of citizenship pre-1948). Properties belonging to refugees were seized and transferred to the state of Israel.

In the course of the June War of 1967 (the *Naqsa*), the remaining parts of Palestine (along with the Syrian Golan Heights and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula) came under Israeli occupation. The UN estimated the number of new refugees (1967 refugees or 1967 displaced persons) as a direct result of the war at around 350,000.⁴ Other estimates suggest that of a pre-war population of 1.4 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, approximately 430,000 fled their homes. Of these, 240,000 persons were displaced for a first time and 193,500 for a second time. The majority ended up in Jordan,⁵ where UNRWA established additional refugee camps to accommodate them.

Today, the total Palestinian refugee population is estimated at around 7.4 million (about 64% of the worldwide Palestinian population, making Palestinians the largest single group of refugees in the world).⁶ These refugees include⁷:

- 5.3 million persons registered with UNRWA;
- 335,000 internally displaced persons in Israel (from 1948) and their descendants;
- some 940,000 displaced persons from 1967;
- and over one million refugees who are not registered because of UNRWA's narrow definition of who is a Palestine refugee,⁸ including refugees who fled to countries where UNRWA does not operate, who fled but were not in need for assistance, or who missed the deadline to register.


The majority of refugees live in the West Bank and Gaza (where they account for 44.2% of the total population)⁹ or neighboring countries. Some 29% of registered refugees live in one of the 59 UNRWA camps, while the remainder lives outside the camps.¹⁰ Around half of the refugees are stateless and 40-50% of refugees are under the age of 15.¹¹

Following the Oslo Accords, all camps in the West Bank and Gaza, apart from Shu'fat camp in Jerusalem, came under the control of the PA. According to UNRWA, as of July 2013 there were 1,970,009 registered refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They account for 44.2% of the total population (27% of the total West Bank and 67% of the total Gaza population).¹² Outside the OPT, the refugees' situation has always varied depending on their respective host country.¹³

Israel has always refused to accept any moral or historical responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem and as such rejected the refugees' right to return and to compensation, which is enshrined in international conventions and particularly in UN Resolution 194 of 1948, which has been affirmed by the UNGA over 110 times.¹⁴ Postponing the refugee issue to final status talks - along with the core issues of settlements, water, borders and Jerusalem - marginalized the plight of the refugees and ignored the fact that without a just solution to the refugee problem there can be little hope of ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The three key concepts that have shaped the discussion in negotiations so far are *Repatriation* (implementation of UN Resolution 194, i.e., the right of return), *Compensation* (various scenarios for financial reparation),¹⁵ and *Resettlement* (either in the Palestinian state, as naturalization in host countries with improved living conditions, or in third countries).

In the recent (meanwhile stalled) talks to draw up a framework peace agreement, US Secretary of State John Kerry reportedly proposed to President Abbas the return of 80,000 Palestinian refugees to Israel, a number Abbas wanted to increase to 200,000.¹⁶ Leaks from the talks suggested that Palestinians were offered a land swap deal by which they would be given part of the Negev to settle refugees in exchange for giving up settlement blocs and the right of return.¹⁷ Compensation for 1948 refugees was also discussed, although combined with that of compensation for Jews forced to leave their homes in Arab nations.¹⁸

MAP 67



HEBRON

As one of the four holiest cities of Islam (along with Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem) as well as one of the four holiest cities of Judaism (along with Jerusalem, Safed and Tiberias), the status of the city of Hebron is an important issue to be settled under any final status arrangement aimed to resolve the Palestine-Israel conflict.¹ The religious significance of Hebron stems mainly from the fact that both Muslims and Jews believe that Abraham (Ibrahim for Muslims), the father of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is buried there in the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque (Cave of the Patriarchs or Machpela for Jews), together with his son Isaac and his grandson Jacob.² Before the 1930s, Hebron was a predominantly Muslim Arab city with a small Jewish minority. However, as Jewish immigration to and Zionist activities in the city (and country) increased from the second half of the 19th Century, tensions between Muslims and Jews rose, eventually escalating into violence during the Al-Buraq riots³ of 1929, when 67 Jews were killed in Hebron.⁴ After the beginning of the Arab Revolt in 1936, the Jewish community left the city in its entirety.⁵ Hebron then remained an all-Arab city until Jewish settlers established the Kiryat Arba settlement on its outskirts in 1968, a year after the Six-Day War.⁶ In 1979, a small group of settlers from Kiryat Arba entered the city center and founded a new settlement there, after which three more settlements were established in central Hebron, the last of them in 1984.⁷


The 1994 Al-Ibrahimi Mosque Massacre in Hebron led the Israeli authorities to impose a new regime of security arrangements on Hebron that eventually resulted in the formal division of the city under the 1997 Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron into Palestinian zone H1, which comprises about 80% of the city, and Israeli zone H2 (see Map 29).⁸ The first of these security measures imposed by Israel on Hebron – officially with the aim of preventing Palestinian revenge attacks on Israeli settlers⁹ – were the imposition of a month-long house curfew on Palestinian citizens in Hebron¹⁰ and the indefinite closure of about 520 Palestinian businesses in the heart of the city.¹¹ Eventually Israel closed off Ash-Shuhada Street, the major commercial thoroughfare in Hebron, in its entirety. As of 2014, it remains cordoned off, with the shop fronts sealed shut.¹²

This closure and the division of the city since the 1997 Hebron Protocol have resulted in the near total collapse of the Hebron economy, leading thousands of Palestinians to leave the city in search of economic opportunities elsewhere.¹³ A 2004 citywide survey showed that over 1,000 houses in central Hebron – making up more than 40% of the Palestinian residences in the area – had been vacated since the 1994 massacre. Furthermore, over 1,800 Palestinian businesses in the city center (more than 75% of the total number) had closed.¹⁴

In March of 2007, 30 Jewish settler families and 14 individuals moved into an unfinished multi-story building – dubbed Beit HaShalom – on the "Worshippers Way" linking Kiryat Arba, the Cave of the Patriarchs and the four H2 settlements.¹⁵ While then Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz initially stated that the settlers would only be allowed temporarily, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert later declared that he would not allow Peretz to evacuate them if they had legally acquired ownership of the structure.¹⁶ However, in November 2008 the Israeli High Court ordered the evacuation of the settlers because their ownership documents were forged.¹⁷ In response to the court decision, the settlers in Beit HaShalom vowed to "go to war" to prevent their evacuation.¹⁸ A week of settler violence against Palestinians followed, until Beit HaShalom was finally evicted after a surprise raid of the Israeli army on the compound in early December 2008.¹⁹ Contrary to the earlier ruling of the Israeli High Court, however, the District Court ruled in 2012 that the settlers had purchased the structure legally, despite having forged ownership documents.²⁰ This ruling was confirmed by the Israeli Supreme Court in March 2014.²¹ It is now up to the current Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon to decide whether Beit HaShalom can be established as the fifth official settlement in H2 or not.

Over the years, the settler population of Kiryat Arba has grown to over 7,500,²² while the Israeli controlled H2 zone in Hebron is currently populated by about 800 Jewish settlers, 200 of which are Yeshiva students.²³ Thousands of Israeli soldiers are stationed in Hebron to protect these settlers.²⁴ The 40,000 Palestinians living in H2²⁵ as well as the Palestinian residents of the surrounding H1 areas have seen their freedom of movement severely restricted by means of 18 permanently staffed checkpoints throughout the city as well as over 120 physical obstacles that have been deployed by the Israeli army.²⁶ Palestinians are not allowed to drive on a number of roads without special permission, which is near to impossible to obtain, and on at least one street Palestinian foot traffic is segregated from Israeli traffic.²⁷ While most of the restrictions were introduced after the 1994 massacre, many were intensified during the Second Intifada that began in 2000.²⁸ Today, the Palestinians living in this area continue to be subject to the "harshest restrictions on movement of any population in the West Bank."²⁹ Worst off are the approximately 6,000 Palestinians living in the "restricted zones" surrounding the four Israeli settlements in H2, since they are not only prohibited from moving around freely within their own city, but also "face serious challenges in accessing basic services, including schools, emergency health services, and water and sanitation."³⁰ To make things worse, Palestinians in Hebron are regularly confronted with violence by Jewish settlers as well as Israeli forces.³¹

MAP 68



ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE JORDAN VALLEY

The Jordan Valley is a stretch of land that extends over 2,400 km² from the Dead Sea in the south to Bisan in the north, along the border between the West Bank and Jordan and entirely lying below sea level. It accounts for 28.5% of the total West Bank territory.¹ Some 87% of the Jordan Valley lies in Area C, comprising approximately 42% of all Area C, and is thus under full Israeli control.² The remainder - designated as Areas A or B - includes enclaves of Palestinian communities and the city of Jericho. The Jordan Valley is the most fertile and resource-rich area of the West Bank, with key land reserves for natural expansion. It is known for its rich agricultural production, warm climate, abundant water resources, and also attracts tourism with over 80 historical and cultural sites.

Since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967, successive Israeli governments have pursued various measures to annex this territory *de facto*. In violation of the basic principles of international humanitarian and human rights law, Palestinians are effectively prevented from developing their communities, their homes are systematically destroyed, they are denied access to water, and their freedom of movement is severely restricted.³

Today, there are 30 Israeli settlements and nine illegal outposts in the Jordan Valley with a settler population of approximately 11,000.⁴ Moreover, about 20% of Jordan Valley land have been 26 declared nature reserves (only four are open to the public), and Israel has instituted a regime of permits and harsh restrictions on the movement of Palestinians, who must pass through four checkpoints, eight dirt mounds, six trenches and four agricultural gates. Palestinians who do not reside in the Jordan Valley are not allowed to enter the area.⁵ Some 46% of the Jordan Valley land is declared closed military zones from where Palestinians communities were ordered to leave. As a consequence of these policies, the Palestinian population in the Jordan Valley has decreased from 320,000 people in 1967 to 56,000 people in 2011.⁶

Some 54% of the Jordan Valley territory is currently declared 'state land' and used for military purposes while, respectively, 22% and 15.5% of the Jordan Valley are declared either conservation areas or are used for Israeli settlement and infrastructure projects. Despite the fact that only 8.5% of the territory in question remains available for Palestinian towns and cultivation, Israel is intensifying its efforts to curb residency for Palestinians.⁷

Unlike East Jerusalem, where annexation is an officially-declared policy, Israel's silent illegal policies in the Jordan Valley, i.e. displacement and depopulation of Palestinian communities as well as increased isolation of the area from the rest of the West Bank, aim at uprooting Palestinian populations from Area C and transferring them to Area A and contribute to what is effectively becoming the valley's de-facto annexation into Israel.⁸ In fact, supporters of these policies have pointed out that there is nothing that should prevent Israel from annexing the Jordan Valley completely, unlike the 2.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank, the 60,000 Palestinians living in the Jordan Valley won't pose a demographic problem.⁹


While former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert offered in his 2008 peace plan to evacuate Jewish settlements in the area and return the Jordan Valley to the Palestinians in exchange for security guarantees, current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly argued that security considerations would preclude an Israeli withdrawal from the Jordan Valley however a peace agreement with the Palestinians may look like.¹⁰ He unequivocally declared that "Israel will never cede the Jordan Valley. Israel would never agree to withdraw from the Jordan Valley under any peace agreement signed with the Palestinians. And it's vital - absolutely vital - that Israel maintain a long-term military presence along the Jordan River."¹¹

A number of mediators have suggested several proposals such as the deployment of UN peacekeepers or NATO troops to police the Jordan Valley and reassure Israel were not deemed sufficient. Others have suggested land-leasing schemes to let Israel remain in the Jordan Valley for a decade or so, to build confidence - they hope - between Arab and Jews.¹² However, Netanyahu demands Israeli military presence along the entire valley for dozens of years, thus justifying Palestinian fears of an 'endless occupation'. Indeed, it seems more likely that if there were to be a future Palestinian state at all, Netanyahu's vision of this state is one being surrounded indefinitely by Israeli controlled territory along the Jordan Valley.


MAP 69

ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE JORDAN VALLEY



- 1967 Boundary ("Green Line")
- Palestinian city, town, or village
- Palestinian cultivation
- Local Palestinian road
- Wall route (approved by Israel's cabinet as of 30 April 2006)
- Israeli-declared state land and closed military area
- Israeli settlement built-up area (area: ~ 0.43% - pop.: ~10,000 settlers)
- Israeli settlement municipal area
- Israeli-declared natural reserve
- Israeli settlement cultivation
- Israeli settlement area west of Jordan Valley
- Israeli settler / bypass road
- Israeli checkpoint



Palestinian Land Restricted by Israeli Settlements & Military Closure



Exploitation of Palestinian Resources: Water Extraction in the Jordan Valley



Area C

The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), signed on 28 September 1995, created - as an interim, five-year measure - three distinct zones in the West Bank: Areas A, B, and C - each with different security and administrative arrangements:

- Area A: full Palestinian control; mainly urban areas (cities & towns, such as Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus, Tulkarem, and Qalqilya): PA police patrol the streets.
- Area B: Palestinian civil and Israeli security control; mainly villages on the outskirts of Area A cities.
- Area C: full Israeli military and civil control; includes settlements, roads, strategic areas, areas adjacent to Israel proper. Area C is home to 150,000 Palestinians in over 500 communities and to some 325,000 Israeli settlers in over 200 settlements and outposts.¹ It holds 63% of the West Bank's most fertile and resource-rich lands and almost all of the Jordan Valley, which contains the largest (uninhabited) land reserves of the West Bank and much of its natural resources.²

The Oslo Accords mainly aimed to gradually transfer Area B and Area C from Israeli to Palestinian control (Area A). However, since 1999, none of the land in Area C has been transferred to the PA, and the entire West Bank remains occupied territory with Areas A (17.2% of the West Bank) and B (23.8%) consisting of 227 non-contiguous enclaves, cut off from one another as well as from their land and other resources. Approximately 40% of Area C is privately owned Palestinian land on which illegal settlements have been built.³


Israel retains full control over building and planning in Area C, leaving 70% of it (about 44% of the West Bank) classified as settlement areas, firing zones, or nature reserves⁴ and thus off limits to Palestinians.⁵ In the remaining 30% construction is heavily restricted, with less than 1% eligible for Palestinian development, of which a large portion is already built-up.⁶

Israeli goals in Area C are clear cut: to drive out as many Palestinians as possible by making their lives so unbearable that they will seek a better livelihood in Areas A or B. On average, 500-600 Palestinian structures (shelters, water infrastructure, schools, clinics, storages and animal shacks) are destroyed annually in Area C,⁷ while the Israeli authorities are denying building permits for Palestinians.⁸ As a result any form of local socioeconomic development is severely hampered and thousands of Palestinians are at immediate risk of displacement.⁹

With the exception of those located in East Jerusalem, all Israeli settlements are located in Area C; their actual municipal area comprises some 9.3% of the West Bank territory, but this figure grows to 40% if the settler road network and restrictions on Palestinian access to land are taken into consideration.¹⁰ The planned expansion area of the Area C settlements is nine times larger than their actual built-up area.¹¹ In 2012, the settler population in Area C had more than tripled since Oslo, reaching 350,000 - more than double the Palestinian population of the area.¹² Many of them live in remote areas and under substandard conditions with inadequate access to basic social services and assistance.¹³ However, Israel's policies in Area C also impact Palestinians from other areas who own land in Area C, or Area B residents who are encircled by Area C, and, more generally, the entire West Bank population which face territorial interruption and severe restrictions on access and development.¹⁴

Many observers believe that Israel aims at an eventual annexation of Area C, with the remaining Palestinian population being possibly offered Israeli citizenship. The report of the government-appointed so-called Levy Committee, published in July 2012, recommended *de facto* annexation of more than half of the West Bank, concluding that Israel was neither an occupying power nor were the settlements illegal, and that outposts should be legalized. A recent poll conducted by Dialog, according to which a large majority of the Jewish public - 69% - objects to giving 2.5 million Palestinians the right to vote if Israel were to annex the West Bank, and 74% favor separate roads for Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank. The survey indicates that a third to half of Jewish Israelis want to live in a state that practices formal, open discrimination against its Arab citizens. An even larger majority wants to live in an apartheid state if Israel annexes the territories.¹⁵

MAP 70



THE GLOBAL BDS MOVEMENT

In 1945, the Arab League introduced a large scale boycott strategy to defend the Palestinian cause by shunning Zionist goods and services in Mandatory Palestine.¹ After Israel gained international recognition as a state in 1948, the Arab League officially redirected the boycott against the new state as well as its economic partners and supporters. While the Arab League never officially ended the boycott, several of its members have signed agreements to end their support of it.² The Palestinian leadership renounced the boycott with the signing of the 1993-1995 Oslo Accords when the PLO committed itself to economic cooperation with Israel (see Map 27). As of today, the impact of the boycott is believed to be negligible since it is only "sporadically applied and ambiguously enforced."³

When the Israeli response to the Al-Aqsa Intifada brought death and destruction to the OPT from September 2000 onwards, Palestinians began to look for (new) non-violent strategies aimed at pressuring Israel into supporting the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, as alternatives to the violent means being employed, which increasingly proved themselves to be counterproductive.⁴ The idea of a grassroots boycott campaign targeting Israel quickly gained popularity and resulted in preliminary calls for academic and cultural boycotts in 2002 and 2003, which lay the groundwork for the establishment of the 'Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel' (PACBI) in April 2006 and its official call for boycott two months later.⁵

On 9 July 2005, exactly one year after the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion calling on Israel to dismantle the separation barrier in the West Bank since it was illegal under international law, the PACBI was supplemented by a more general economic boycott campaign when a coalition of Palestinian civil society actors issued the call for "Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions [BDS] against Israel Until it Complies with International Law and Universal Principles of Human Rights."⁶ The BDS movement called on civil society organizations and individuals all around the world to initiate and support such "non-violent punitive measures" – which resembled the international boycott of South Africa's apartheid regime in the second half of the 20th Century – until Israel recognizes the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and complies with its obligations under international law by first of all "ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall," secondly "recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality" and thirdly "respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194."⁷


The call for BDS was initially endorsed by over 170 Palestinian civil society organizations, including "all major political parties, refugee rights associations, trade union federations, women's unions, NGO networks, and virtually the entire spectrum of grassroots organizations."⁸ With the growth of the BDS movement the need for some form of general coordination increased, leading supporters to organize the first Palestinian BDS conference in November 2007,⁹ which, in turn, brought about the establishment of the BDS National Committee (BNC) tasked with the coordination of the BDS campaign.¹⁰

As of 2014, the BDS campaign has not gained explicit support from any national government, but South Africa's ruling African National Congress (ANC) party declared support for the movement in 2012,¹¹ and various prominent individuals, grassroots movements, NGOs, corporations, churches, and academic institutions around the world have endorsed the BDS movement.¹² A number of (inter)national trade union federations have also expressed support for BDS, including those of Belgium, Brazil, Ireland, Norway, Scotland, South Africa, Sweden and the UK, as well the African Regional Organisation of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC-Africa), representing 56 national trade union federations from 45 countries.¹³

The BDS campaign has been heavily criticized by Israel, with Prime Minister Netanyahu accusing the movement of propagandizing anti-Semitism and the destruction of the "Jewish state."¹⁴ The US government also opposes the movement.¹⁵ Other national administrations that have voiced opposition against the BDS campaign include those of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland and Sweden.¹⁶ While Palestinian President Abbas has criticized the BDS movement for boycotting Israel as a whole, he has called on the international community to boycott companies operating in Israeli settlements.¹⁷ Similarly, the governments of the UK, the Netherlands, Norway and Romania have opposed a full boycott of Israel, while actively discouraging national corporations and/or laborers from operating in Israeli settlements.¹⁸ Furthermore, in July 2013 the EU adopted a new policy of guidelines regarding economic cooperation with Israel, according to which the EU will no longer fund Israeli entities that operate in the settlements.¹⁹

While opponents of the BDS campaign have accused it of advocating anti-Semitism²⁰ and the destruction of Israel, supporters have stressed that the movement opposes discrimination in any form and supports a peaceful resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict but "does not adopt any specific formula and steers away from the one-state-versus-two-states debate."²¹ Currently, the BDS movement includes both supporters who advocate a one-state solution as well as proponents of two-state solution to the conflict.²²

MAP 71



PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD

The Palestinian people's struggle for independence dates back to at least the early 19th Century, when Palestinian Arabs became pioneer members of the Arab national movement that advocated freedom and independence from the Ottoman Empire.¹ During the British Mandate years, opposition to Zionist immigration and the British rule acted as a powerful catalyst in the consolidation of Palestinian national consciousness and the development of a specific Palestinian nationalist movement.² Palestinian nationalism resurged after the War of 1948/*An-Naqba* (see Map 12), leading to the establishment of various nationalist political parties and resistance groups as well as, in 1964, the PLO as an umbrella organization and policymaking body.³

Collapse of popular faith in pan-Arabism following the disastrous 1967 Six-Day War and subsequent occupation by Israeli forces of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip (in addition to the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights) contributed further to the 'Palestinization' of the liberation struggle. Throughout the 1970s, the PLO started developing an institutional infrastructure to support the future Palestinian state and slowly began to gain international recognition throughout the 1970s and 1980s.⁴

In 1988, King Hussein renounced Jordan's claims to the West Bank and the PLO subsequently assumed responsibility for the OPT (even declaring an independent state of Palestine in November that year) and implicitly recognized the right of Israel to exist. This paved the way for the Oslo peace process starting in 1993, which led to Israeli recognition of the PLO, the allocation of a limited political autonomy to the Palestinians, and further international recognition of their national aspirations.⁵

The failure of Oslo and the Camp David Summit together with the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 made the international community increasingly realize that Palestinian statehood was necessary to achieve peace. However, Israel continued to create "facts on the ground" to make Palestinian statehood as remote as possible - a strategy that spoiled all subsequent peace talks and initiatives.⁶

Nevertheless, Palestinian institution-building efforts were successful in laying down the foundations of a sustainable *de facto* state⁷ and were praised by the international community.⁸ This, in combination with the collapse of direct Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in 2010, encouraged the Palestinian leadership to work on an alternative plan for statehood that would bypass the stalemate of the peace process by seeking collective recognition at the UN.⁹ In May 2011, President Abbas publicly confirmed this aim and a campaign was launched to gain the support from UN member states. Criticizing this new Palestinian approach, Israel and the US organized a counter-campaign aimed at persuading UN members to block the Palestinian bid. Although it had become clear that Palestine was losing the diplomatic battle when the EU shifted towards the US-Israeli position,¹⁰ Abbas submitted, on 23 September 2011, the official application for the admission of Palestine as a full member of the UN on the basis of the 4 June 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital.

According to the UN rules of admission the bid needed the support of the UNSC before it could go to a vote in the UNGA. However, unless Palestine got the support of at least nine UNSC members, a US veto would certainly block the UNGA vote, and it could be deduced from previous official announcements and media reports that the Palestinian bid was only supported by eight UNSC members. Therefore, the Palestinian leadership eventually agreed not to go to a vote at the UNSC, missing an opportunity, according to detractors, to confront US-biased support for Israel.¹¹ However, it did not abandon its objective and, realizing that time was running out and that the institution-building achievements towards an independent state could be jeopardized by the persistence of the *status quo*¹², decided to apply for non-member state status at the UN.

Although the idea behind the PA strategy was that this limited form of UN recognition would still place Palestinian negotiators on a *par* with their Israeli counterparts during future talks and would allow Palestine to join international treaties and organizations, the Palestinian public was largely skeptical about the potential benefits of the new strategy.¹³

As with the 2011 bid for full UN membership, the PA's lobby campaign for their non-member state bid was being countered by US and Israeli efforts. However, the Palestinians gained increasing international support for their UN bid, especially after Israel launched 'Operation Pillar of Defense' on the Gaza Strip in November 2012.¹⁴ When the Palestinian application for UN non-member observer state status was eventually brought to the UNGA on 29 November 2012, the vote succeeded, with 138 UN members voting in favor, 41 abstaining and only 9 states voting against.¹⁵ Consequently, 65 years after the UN Partition Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947, the international community officially recognized Palestine as a state - albeit still a state under occupation whose prospects for achieving true independence are still remote considering Israel's ongoing colonization and subjugation of Palestinian lands and rights.¹⁶ While the status upgrade has largely symbolic value, it does provide Palestine with leverage against Israel, since it now has the possibility to join the International Criminal Court, where it could file a case to legally challenge Israel's presence in the OPT.¹⁷

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX: MAPS 64-72

MAP 65

¹ Riparian states are also referred to as “Drainage Basin States” or “Watercourse States” in international conventions and laws. See, PASSIA, *Water - Special Bulletin*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, July 2002, p. 1.

² In terms of Customary International Law, riparian states are, in normal situations, entitled to “equitable and reasonable utilization of shared water resources,” are expected to “cooperate and negotiate,” observe a “duty of prior consultation [with other riparians]” and are prohibited from causing “significant harm” to the resources of the sharing states. Israel’s belligerent occupation of the Syrian Golan and the Palestinian territories makes it additionally subject to the Hague Regulations of 1910 and Geneva Convention of 1949. These oblige the occupier to “safeguard the natural resources of the occupied country and to provide the original citizens with their needs from these resources.”

Summary of legal rules and conventions, in *ibid.*, p. 7

³ All statistics presented are as reproduced in PASSIA, *Water - Special Bulletin*.

⁴ Sundeep, Waslekar, *The Blue Peace: Rethinking Middle East water*, Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2011.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

⁶ See note 2.

⁷ PASSIA, Water & Environment, *Diary 2014*, p. 369.

MAP 66

¹ PWA, *National Sector Strategy for Water and Waste Water in Palestine 2011-2013*, March 2010.

² *Ibid.*

³ PCBS, *Press Release on World Water Day*, March 2011 and 2013.

⁴ PASSIA, Water & Environment, *Diary 2014*, p. 371.

⁵ A particularly extreme example of this pursuit of control over the natural resources of the West Bank can be found in the settlements of Ganim and Qadim, to the east of Jenin. These two settlements have a combined total population of 306 (as of 2001), yet their location directly over the Northeastern Mountain Aquifer secured Israel’s continued control over the majority of that aquifer’s 145 mcm per year even through the Oslo process and continues to safeguard 22% of all the groundwater exploited by Israel in the West Bank. These two isolated settlements were simultaneously responsible for ‘justifying’ Israeli control over much of the inter lying and surrounding Palestinian territory during the Oslo period. The settlers themselves belong to the tiny minority of OPT settlers who have repeatedly called upon the government to evacuate and compensate them, but here Israel’s water imperative renders their demands incompatible with the national program and they remain Israel’s key to controlling the land and its water. See PALDIS-LDC, *Ideological Settlement in the West Bank: Areas of Exclusion Enforced upon the Palestinian Population*, pp. 30-31.

⁶ Settler-Palestinian consumption calculated according to 2000-2001 population and consumption figures. See PCBS population data, cited in PASSIA, *Diary 2002*, p. 263; Also PWA and Israeli CBS consumption data, cited in PASSIA, *Water - Special Bulletin*, p. 3.

⁷ PWA, *Palestine: The Right to Water*, 2012

⁸ Gvirtzman, Haim, *Maps of Israeli Interests in Judea and Samaria Determining the Extent of Additional Withdrawals*. Online: <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/maps.htm>, 1998.

⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Separate and Unequal- Israel’s Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*, Dec. 2010.

¹⁰ PLO-NAD. Barrier to Peace: Assessment of Israel’s Wall Route, July 2008

¹¹ ARIJ, Water Resources Allocation in the OPT: responding to Israeli Claims, 2012, <http://www.arij.org/files/water.pdf>.

¹² CEPR, *CEPR Memo: Agriculture in Palestine: a post-Oslo analysis*, 2012, p.1

<http://thecepr.org/images/stories/pdf/memo%20agriculture.pdf>, and PASSIA *Diary 2014*, p. 378.

¹³ The water loss - leakage from mains, utilities storage tanks, and service connections amounts to 30% of the total domestic water supply in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip, see PWA, *Annual Status Report*, December 2012.

¹⁴ The domestic per-capita consumption rate in the OPT as of 2000 stood at between 50-70 liters per day, while Israel enjoyed a rate of 350 liters per day. However, including agricultural and industrial use, brought the total per-capita rate in the OPT to 115 cubic meters (cm) per year; to compare: in Jordan the figure was 213 cm; in Israel 375 cm; in Syria 385 cm; and in Lebanon 1,200 cm. World Bank figures from 1995 and 1999, cited in PASSIA, *Diary 2002*, p. 271. More recently, the World Bank estimates that West Bank Palestinians currently consume an average of 50 liters of water per day (l/c/d), while the Palestinian Water Authority talks about 70 l/c/d on average and as little as 20 l/c/d in some areas such as the Jordan Valley and southern Hebron Hills. The PCBS puts the average daily per capita consumption of water at 135 liters for Palestinians, 353 liters for the Israelis and 900 for settlers. Daily amounts for Palestinians range from 297.6 l/c/d in the Jericho Governorate (highest) to as low as 47 l/c/d in Tubas. See PCBS, *Press Release on World Water Day*, 2011.

MAP 67

¹ UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East: An Approach to Economic Development in the Middle East, Part I.*, 28 December 1949.

² Abu Sitta, Salman, *The Palestinian Nakba 1948, The Register of Depopulated Localities in Palestine*. London: The Palestinian Return Centre, 2000. Benny Morris lists 369 ethnically cleansed Palestinian localities (see Morris, Benny, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Walid Khalidi and a team of Palestinian researchers list 418 (see Khalidi, Walid, *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1982).

³ *Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (2008-2009)*, Bethlehem: Badil Center, 2010.

⁴ These included:

- some 200,000 persons (of whom 95,000 were already UNRWA-registered refugees) who had moved from the West Bank to the East Bank in Jordan;
- about 110,000 persons according to Syrian sources and not more than 85,000 according to Israel sources (including 17,000 UNRWA-registered refugees); and
- about 55,000 (5,000 of them UNRWA-registered from Gaza) who had moved across the Suez Canal or to Sinai.

See UN Doc. A/6797 of 15 September 1967, point 159; also UN, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Official Records of the General Assembly, 22nd Session, Supplement No. 13, 1 July 1966-30 June 1967 (A/6713). New York, 1967.

⁵ Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights, *Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 2008-2009*, Appendix 1.1; Takkenberg, Lex, *The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 17. Israeli sources put the total number of refugees displaced for the first time in 1967 significantly lower at 140,000. See for instance, Efrat, Moshe, *The Palestinian Displaced Population from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the East Bank of Jordan*. Tel Aviv: Israeli International Institute for Applied Economic Policy Review, 1996.

⁶ Badil, *Factsheet: Background on Palestinian Refugees & IDPs*, May 2008.

⁷ Badil, *Survey of Palestinian Refugees and IDPs 2008*.

⁸ According to the definition only those persons are recognized whose "normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict" and who took refuge in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Jordanian-ruled West Bank or the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip. The descendants of male Palestine refugees are also eligible for registration. For UNRWA's full eligibility rules see: <http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2010011995652.pdf>.

⁹ PCBS, *Press Release on International Refugee Day*, June 2013.

¹⁰ UNRWA in Figures, July 2013.

¹¹ In Palestine some 41% of refugees are under 15 years of age. PCBS, *Press Release on International Refugee Day*, June 2013.

¹² PCBS, *Special Bulletin on the 65th Anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba*, May 2013; PCBS, *Press Release on International Refugee Day*, June 2013.

¹³ For political and socioeconomic reasons, most Arab host governments have not actively supported the assimilation of Palestinian refugees into their societies. In Jordan, where Palestinians make up 60% of the population, only 18% of the 2,133,756 UNRWA-registered refugees live in camps (UNRWA in Figures, July 2013). As of March 2014, 11,438 additional Palestinian refugees from Syria had registered with UNRWA in Jordan. See UNRWA, Syria Crisis Response Update, Issue No. 71, 9 March 2014). Since 1954 most of the refugees in Jordan have been granted citizenship and the right to work in all fields, including public sectors. They are entitled to vote and participate equally in the Jordanian parliament. Syria hosted the second largest Palestinian Diaspora community, made up mainly of 1948 refugees from the north, as well as 1967 refugees from the Golan Heights. Today, they number 546,646 people, of which 30% live in camps (UNRWA in Figures, July 2013). Prior to the civil war in 2011, Syria was generally perceived to provide the best conditions for Palestinian refugees. Due to the civil war Palestinians in Syria have once again become victims. As of March 2014 over half of them are estimated to have been displaced – 270,000 within the country itself and some 80,000 outside its borders (UNRWA, RSS in Syria, March 2014: <http://www.unrwa.org/activity/rss-syria>). Of those dispersed, 51,000 are in Lebanon, 11,000 in Jordan, 5,000 in Egypt and smaller numbers in Gaza, Turkey or elsewhere ("UNRWA Syria Regional Crisis Response Plan 2014: A Briefing on Recent Developments," 23 January 2014). The 478,740 registered refugees in Lebanon, mostly originating from the Galilee and coastal towns, face the harshest conditions; half of whom live in camps, they hold Lebanese travel documents, but are stateless, must obtain work permits, are not allowed to work in the public sector, nor in 20 professions, cannot own or inherit property nor open a business, and are denied any social rights.

¹⁴ *Inter alia*, UNGA Resolution 194 "Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible."

¹⁵ For details see PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, *Return and Compensation* (<http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=44>).

¹⁶ "Kerry proposes return of 80,000 Palestinian refugees to Israel: official," 7 January 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2014-01/07/c_133023026.htm

¹⁷ Eichner, Itamar, "New details from peace talks: Americans offer parts of Negev to Palestinian refugees," *YNET*, 2 February 2014 (<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4483738,00.html>).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

MAP 68

¹ "Hebron," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 10 July 2013, at <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/259126/Hebron> [accessed 04.06.2014].

² The wives of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, respectively Sarah, Rebecca and Leah are also believed to be buried here. Muslims believe that the grave of Jacob's son Joseph (Yusuf) is located at the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque site as well. See Abdullah, G.N. "Patriarchs' Ibrahimi Mosque Sacred to Muslims, Christians and Jews," *The Islamic Post*, 12 June 2013, at http://www.islamicpostonline.com/article/patriarchs_ibrahimi_mosque_sacred_muslims_christians_and_jews-522 [accessed 04.06.2014].

³ See the *Glossary* of this book.

⁴ See "Hebron," *Encyclopædia Britannica* and Cohen, H. "How the 1929 Hebron massacre invigorated the Zionist movement," *+972 Magazine*, 5 March 2013, at <http://972mag.com/how-the-1929-hebron-massacre-invigorated-the-zionist-movement/67101/> [accessed 04.06.2014].

⁵ "Hebron," *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

⁶ Friedman, L. & Etkes, D., "Hebron - Settlements in Focus." October 2005, at <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/hebron-settlements-focus> [accessed 03.06.2014].

⁷ "Hebron Settlements," Temporary International Presence in Hebron, at http://www.tiph.org/en/About_Hebron/Hebron_today/Settlements/ [accessed 03.06.2014].

⁸ The 1994 massacre also led to the establishment of the Temporal International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), a group of international observers from six countries (Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey) tasked by Israel and the PLO with monitoring the developments in Hebron as well as "promoting stability and restoring normal life in the city." See "The Establishment of TIPH," Temporary International Presence in Hebron, at http://www.tiph.org/en/About_TIPH/TIPH_background/ [accessed 03.06.2014].

⁹ Friedman, L. & Etkes, D. "Hebron - Settlements in Focus," *Peace Now*, October 2005.

¹⁰ Paine, R. "Behind the Hebron Massacre, 1994," *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (February 1995), pp. 8-15.

¹¹ Wiles, R. "Remembering the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre," *Al Jazeera*, 24 February 2014, at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2014/02/remembering-ibrahimi-mosque-ma-2014223105915230233.html> [accessed 03.06.2014].

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ "Hebron City Center," B'Tselem, 1 January 2011, at <http://www.btselem.org/hebron> [accessed 03.06.2014].

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ See Foundation for Middle East Peace, "Living Without a Solution - Forty Years of Occupation and Settlement," *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May-June 2007) at <http://www.fmep.org/reports/archive/vol.-17/no.-3/PDF> [accessed 03.06.2014] and Klein, M.A. "50 Knesset Members Opposed Hebron Eviction - No Supreme Court Order for It Was Given," *Zionist Organization of America*, 12 December 2008, at <http://zoa.org/2008/12/102324-50-knesset-members-opposed-hebron-eviction-no-supreme-court-order-for-it-was-given/> [accessed 03.06.2014].

¹⁶ Foundation for Middle East Peace, "Living Without a Solution - Forty Years of Occupation and Settlement."

¹⁷ Harel, A. "Hebron settler mob caught on video clashing with IDF troops," *Haaretz*, 20 November 2008, at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/hebron-settler-mob-caught-on-video-clashing-with-idf-troops-1.285468> [accessed 03.06.2014].

¹⁸ Weiss, E. "We'll go to war over Hebron house, warn settlers," *Ynet News*, 17 November 2008, at <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3623990,00.html> [accessed 03.06.2014].

¹⁹ See "A Disaster-in-the-Making: The (Potential) New Settlements in Hebron," *Peace Now*, 12 March 2014, at <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/HebronContentionHouse> [accessed 03.06.2014]; Harel, A. "Hebron settler mob caught on video clashing with IDF troops" and McCarthy, R. "Israeli forces evict settlers from disputed Hebron home," *The Guardian*, 4 December 2008, at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/04/israel-hebron-eviction> [accessed 03.06.2014].

²⁰ "A Disaster-in-the-Making: The (Potential) New Settlements in Hebron," *Peace Now*.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² "Qiryat Arba," Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012, at http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/pop_in_locs/pop_in_locs_e.html?MIval=%2Fpop_in_locs%2Fpop_in_locs_e.html&Name_e=QIRYAT+ARBA [accessed 03.06.2014].

²³ See "Hebron (Jewish settlement in Hebron)," *Peace Now*, at <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/hebron-jewish-settlement-hebron> [accessed 03.06.2014] and Wilder, D. "Responses to: Frequently Asked Questions about Hebron and Shuhada Street," *The Jewish Community of Hebron*, 23 February 2010, at <http://www.hebron.com/english/article.php?id=632> [accessed 03.06.2014].

²⁴ Strickland, P. "Living in fear in Hebron," *Al Jazeera*, 18 February 2014, at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/02/living-fear-hebron-2014218114052729956.html> [accessed 03.06.2014].

²⁵ "The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlements in Hebron City," UN OCHA oPt, November 2013, at <http://www.ocha.org>

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Activestills "PHOTOS: 20 years since Cave of the Patriarchs Massacre," *+972 Magazine*, 25 February 2014, at <http://972mag.com/photos-20-years-ince-cave-of-the-patriarchs-massacre/87599/> [accessed 03.06.2014].

²⁸ "Hebron settlements make Palestinian life nearly impossible," *The Electronic Intifada*, 10 September 2007, at <http://electronicintifada.net/content/hebron-settlements-make-palestinian-life-nearly-impossible/7138> [accessed 03.06.2014].

²⁹ "Hebron (Jewish settlement in Hebron)," Peace Now.

³⁰ "The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlements in Hebron City," UN OCHA oPt.

³¹ Strickland, P. "Living in fear in Hebron."

MAP 69

¹ Ma'an Development Center, "Eye on the Jordan Valley," May 2007), at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/opt_districtprofile_maan_jordanvalley_1_may_2007.pdf [accessed 28.04.2014]. See also <http://www.jordanvalleysolidarity.org/index.php/info-maps-2/geography-population> [accessed 28.04.2014].

² B'Tselem, "Background on the Jordan Valley," http://www.btselem.org/jordan_valley [accessed 28.04.2014].

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ B'Tselem, "Israel has de fact annexed the Jordan Valley," 13 February 2006, at http://www.btselem.org/settlements/20060213_annexation_of_the_jordan_valley [accessed 25.06.2013]. See also, Donald Macintyre, "Israel 'has annexed Jordan Valley and shut out Palestinians,'" *The Independent*, 14 February 2006, at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-has-annexed-jordan-valley-and-shut-out-palestinians-466549.html> [accessed 25.06.2013].

⁶ The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, "The Path to Annexation," 2011 Fact Sheet, at http://www.icahd.org/sites/default/files/jordan_f.pdf [accessed 24.06.2013].

⁷ The Economist, "A dry bone of contention," 25 November 2010, at http://www.economist.com/node/17581571/print?story_id=17581571 [accessed 24.06.2013].

⁸ Akiva Eldar, "Israel effectively annexes Palestinian land near Jordan Valley," *Haaretz*, 18 November 2011, at <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-effectively-annexes-palestinian-land-near-jordan-valley-1.396225> [accessed 24.06.2013]. See also Al Haq, "Written Statement to the Human Rights Council."

⁹ Michael Harris, "Israel should annex the Jordan Valley," *The Jerusalem Post*, 7 January 2013, at <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Israel-should-annex-the-Jordan-Valley> [accessed 25.06.2013].

¹⁰ Jonathan Lis, "Netanyahu: Israel will never cede Jordan Valley," *Haaretz*, 2 March 2010, at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-israel-will-never-cede-jordan-valley-1.266329> [accessed 25.06.2013].

¹¹ In an address to the US Congress in May 2011, quoted in The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, "The Path to Annexation."

¹² The Economist, "A dry bone of contention."

MAP 70

¹ See EU Heads of Missions report on Area C, December 2011, and OCHA, *Special Focus: Displacement and Insecurity in Area C of the West Bank*, August 2011.

² Currently, some 90% of the Jordan Valley is off limits to development for the 65,000 Palestinians residing in 29 communities and the additional 15,000 Bedouins there, while the area's 30 settlements with their 9,400 settlers grow water-intensive crops for export and enjoy swimming pools. See B'Tselem, *Dispossession and Exploitation: Israel's Policy in the Jordan Valley and Northern Dead Sea*, May 2011 (<http://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/dispossession-and-exploitation-israels-policy-jordan-valley-northern-dead-sea>).

³ <http://peacenow.org/images/112106PNReport.pdf>. According to Peace Now, in 2012 alone, construction for 6,676 residential settlement units was approved (compared to 1,607 units in 2011), see <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/2012-summary>.

⁴ The 1998 Wye River Memorandum foresaw that the PA should be handed over land reserves (some 3% of the West Bank) to be used as 'Green Area/Nature Reserve,' but to date the PA has not been allowed to utilize this area.

⁵ PA has some authorities concerning the delivery of services in Area C, such as health and education, excluding those that require infrastructure and construction.

⁶ Some 94% of Palestinian permit applications to construct infrastructure have been rejected in recent years. See UN OCHA, *Restricting Space: The Planning Regime Applied By Israel in Area C of the West Bank*, OCHA Special Focus, 2009; OCHA, *Humanitarian Factsheet on Area C of the West Bank*, July 2011.

⁷ According to ICAHD, 486 structures were destroyed during 2011, 171 of them residential, displacing 887 people, over half of them children (see ICAHD, *Demolitions Overview Table*, 26 Oct. 2011). Similarly, house demolitions are implemented at an unprecedented level with an estimated 3,000 demolition orders remaining in place in Palestinian communities of Area C, see OCHA, *Humanitarian Factsheet on Area C of the West Bank*, July 2011. According to the UN OCHA Displacement Working Group, a total of 1,570 structures were demolished in Area C between 2009 and July 2012, leaving 2,371 people displaced (275 in 2009, 439 in 2010, 580 in 2011, and 358 as of July 2012); see The Displacement Working Group, OCHA, *The Monthly Humanitarian Monitor*, July 2012. Between 2009 and 2011, Israeli

forces have also demolished over 100 water and sanitation structures in the West Bank. See <http://www.lifeforce.ps/english/water-in-palestine/area-c/>; OHCHR news release, *West Bank: demolitions and attacks against Palestinians must stop – UN experts*, 27 September 2011.

⁸ Of 444 building permit applications Palestinians submitted in 2010 in Area C, only four (less than 1%) were approved, and only about 15 building plans have been implemented over the past decade. "The Battle for Area C," *Al-Jazeera*, 10/8/2012 (<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/201289105546220691.html>).

⁹ Quoted in EU Heads of Missions Report on Area C, December 2011. Only in 2012, the Israeli government announced several plans to forcibly displace Palestinian villagers in the southern Hebron hills and Jordan Valley under the pretext that the land was needed for military training exercises. See, for example, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/201289105546220691.html>.

¹⁰ B'Tselem. *Access Denied: Israeli Measures to Prevent Palestinian Access to Land around Settlements*, see http://www.btselem.org/english/publications/summaries/200809_access_denied.asp.

¹¹ OCHA, *Humanitarian Factsheet on Area C of the West Bank*, July 2011, see http://ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_Area_C_Fact_Sheet_July_2011.pdf.

¹² The exact Palestinian population residing in Area C is unclear due to communities overlapping Areas A, B, and C. Of the estimated 150,000 Palestinians living in Area C, some 18,500 live in villages and 27,500 in Bedouin communities located entirely in Area C. See: EU Heads of Missions Report on Area C, December 2011.

¹³ OCHA, Response Plan Fact Sheet, 3 September 2010, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_area_c_humanitarian_response_plan_fact_sheet_2010_09_03_english.pdf.

¹⁴ As of June 2012, there were 542 internal checkpoints and other physical impediments to Palestinian movement inside the West Bank, which exist primarily to protect settlers and facilitate their movement. OCHA, *West Bank Movement and Access Update*, Special Focus, September 2012.

¹⁵ "Survey: Most Israeli Jews Would Support Apartheid Regime in Israel," *Haaretz*, 23 October 2012, <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article32833.htm>.

MAP 71

¹ Weiss, M. A., "Arab League Boycott of Israel," Congressional Research Service, 19 December 2013, at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33961.pdf> [accessed 07.06.2014].

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴ Masri, M. "Israel's Wall, Displacement, and Palestinian Resistance in the West Bank," in D. Coleman, E. Goheen, W. Hasan & A. Kramer-Hamstra (eds.), *Countering Displacements: The Creativity and Resilience of Indigenous and Refugee Peoples*, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2011, pp. 59-86.

⁵ "History," Palestinian Campaign for the Academic & Cultural Boycott of Israel, at <http://pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=868> [accessed 07.06.2014]. For the full text of the call for boycott, see "Call for Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel," Palestinian Campaign for the Academic & Cultural Boycott of Israel, 6 July 2004, at <http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=869> [accessed 07.06.2014].

⁶ For the full text of the call for BDS, see "Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS," BDS movement, 9 July 2005, at <http://www.bdsmovement.net/call> [accessed 07.06.2014].

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Barghouti, O., *Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights*. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011, p. 5.

⁹ "Palestinian BDS National Committee," BDS movement, at <http://www.bdsmovement.net/BNC> [accessed 07.06.2014].

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Gordin, J., "South Africa's ruling party endorses BDS campaign against Israel," *Haaretz*, 21 December 2012, at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/south-africa-s-ruling-party-endorses-bds-campaign-against-israel.premium-1.486195> [accessed 07.06.2014].

¹² The growing support for the BDS movement has led various international corporations and organizations to withdraw from projects in Israel and/or sever ties with Israeli partner organizations. In one prominent example of this, efforts of the BDS movement contributed to the liquidation of Carmel Agrexco, Israel's largest agricultural export company, in 2011. Since the initiation of the BDS campaign in 2005, supporters of the movement in various European countries had started to undermine the activities of Agrexco in Europe by pressuring supermarkets to stop selling its products, calling on customers to boycott the brand and even filing lawsuits against the company due to its illegal activities in the West Bank. As a result of this, Agrexco had an increasingly hard time selling its products in European markets and was eventually ordered into liquidation. For an elaborate discussion of these events, see "Palestinian civil society welcomes Agrexco liquidation, calls for celebration of this BDS victory," BDS movement, 12 September 2011, at <http://www.bdsmovement.net/2011/palestinian-civil-society-welcomes-agrexco-liquidation-calls-for-celebration-of-this-bds-victory-8096> [accessed 07.06.2014]. For a discussion of other successes of the BDS campaign, see "BDS Victories," BDS movement, at <http://www.bdsmovement.net/victories> [accessed 07.06.2014] and "Timeline," BDS movement, at www.bdsmovement.net/timeline [accessed 07.06.2014].

¹³ BDS Victories," BDS movement. See also "Adopted Resolutions," ITUC-Africa Congress, November 2011, at http://www.ituc-africa.org/IMG/pdf/Adopted_Resolutions.pdf [accessed 07.06.2014].

¹⁴ Black, I., "Israel boycott movement is anti-Semitic, says Binyamin Netanyahu," *The Guardian*, 18 February 2014, at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/18/israel-boycott-movement-antisemitic-netanyahu> [accessed 7.06.2014].

¹⁵ When US Secretary of State Kerry referred to the BDS movement in February 2014 by stating that Israel was facing an "increasing delegitimization campaign" which included calls for sanctions, a spokesman later clarified that Kerry had not meant to express support with that remark and had only warned Israel of ongoing developments, since he was "staunch opponent" of the campaign. See Fiske, G., "Kerry was warning Israel, not supporting boycotts, US says," *The Times of Israel*, 2 February 2014, at <http://www.timesofisrael.com/kerry-boycott-remarks-were-warning-not-support-us-says/> [accessed 07.06.2014].

¹⁶ "Governments Against BDS," *NGO Monitor*, 27 September 2011, at <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article.php?id=3508> [accessed 07.06.2014].

¹⁷ Kuttab, D., "At Mandela funeral, Abbas says he opposes boycott of Israel," *Al-Monitor*, 13 December 2013, at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/originals/2013/12/abbas-attacks-bds.html#> [accessed 07.06.2014].

¹⁸ Eldar, A., "Israeli government turns blind eye to boycott snowball," *Al-Monitor*, 19 February 2014, at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/boycott-law-israel-economy-settlements-products-right-wing.html> [accessed 7.6.2014].

¹⁹ Ravid, B., "EU's new policy on Israeli settlements: The full guidelines," *Haaretz*, 16 July 2013, at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.536155> [accessed 07.06.2014].

²⁰ The recurring criticism of BDS as being an anti-Semitic movement is rather odd, since many Jews actually support and are part of the movement. For example, in 2008 a group of Jewish and Arab Israelis formed the 'Boycott from Within' movement in support of the Palestinian BDS campaign. It stressed that it considered the BDS movement as "a critical stance against the occupation, including explicit BDS actions taken by individuals and organizations, are not Anti-Semitic" and that "only resistance of this kind as part of the struggle for peace based on justice and equality will enable a common future for Arabs and Jews in the region." See "Points of Unity: Boycott! Supporting the Palestinian BDS Call from Within," Boycott from Within, at <http://boycottisrael.info/node/2/> [accessed 07.06.2014].

²¹ Barghouti, O., *Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights*, 2011, pp. 51-52. See also Barghouti, O., "Why Israel Fears the Boycott," *The New York Times*, 3 January 2014, at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/opinion/sunday/why-the-boycott-movement-scars-israel.html?_r=0 [accessed 07.06.2014] and Cohn, M., "BDS: Non-Violent Resistance to Israeli Occupation," *The Huffington Post*, 24 March 2014, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marjorie-cohn/bds-nonviolent-resistance_b_5018866.html [accessed 07.06.2014].

²² Derfner, L., "After Kerry, only BDS may save the two-state solution," *+972 Magazine*, 19 May 2014, at <http://972mag.com/after-kerry-only-bds-may-save-the-two-state-solution/91048/> [accessed 07.06.2014].

MAP 72

¹ PASSIA (2012). *The Road to Palestinian Statehood: A Review of a People's Struggle for National Independence*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, p. 1. Although the British had pledged support for the Arab call for independence in 1915, the British and French governments secretly signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement in May 1916, dividing the Arab provinces of the collapsing Ottoman Empire among them, with the area of Palestine falling under British rule (see Map 3). The British Mandate for Palestine came officially into force on 29 September 1923, after having been approved by the League of Nations one year earlier (see Map 5). *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4. The rise of Palestinian nationalism culminated in the outbreak of the Arab revolt in 1936 and the formation of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) that same year, as a unified body aimed at conveying Palestinian demands to the British and coordinating nationalist efforts. *Ibid.*, p. 9. In 1937, the Palestinian revolt intensified in opposition to the Peel Commission, which envisioned the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state (see Map 7). While the Great Rebellion, which ended by Arab decision in 1939, resulted in the British government abandoning the recommendations of the Peel Commission, the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement suffered a serious blow in 1937 when Britain outlawed the AHC. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

³ The PLO's legislative branch, the PNC, adopted a 'Basic Law' and the Palestine National Charter, set up a Palestinian National Fund and the Palestinian Liberation Army, and introduced an oath, a national anthem and an official Palestinian flag. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17.

⁴ Including recognition as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by the Arab League and obtaining observer status at the United Nations, both in 1974, as well as gaining full membership in the Arab League in 1976. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-32.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-49. However, domestically the PLO's performance was poor and in the international context it became increasingly clear that Israel (and the US) remained opposed to the eventual establishment of an independent Palestinian state. With Israel failing to live up to its obligations under the Oslo Accords and Israeli-Palestinian tensions rising at the end of the 1990s, the Oslo peace process collapsed, leaving the Palestinians disillusioned and frustrated. *Ibid.*, p. 49-54.

⁶ Such as the 2001 Taba talks, the 2003 Road Map and the 2007 Annapolis Conference. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-79.

⁷ Based on PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's new strategy, unveiled in 2009, which consisted of the creation of a *de facto* Palestinian state in two years. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-85. For example, in February 2010 French Foreign Minister Kouchner and Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos praised the Palestinian state-building reforms and called on the EU to collectively recognize the Palestinian state; in September of that year the World Bank released a report concluding that “assuming the PA maintains its performance in institution-building and delivery of public services [...], it is well-positioned for the establishment of a Palestinian state at any point in the near future;” and that same month US President Obama made a historic recognition of Palestinian rights by declaring: “Those of us who are friends of Israel must understand that true security for the Jewish state requires an independent Palestine – one that allows Palestinian people to live with dignity and opportunity.”

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-85.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-110.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-123.

¹² Since Israel still did not show any willingness to negotiate in good faith on a settlement to the conflict and a number of international reports were warning that the maintenance of the Israeli occupation could definitively threaten the prospect of Palestinian statehood.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 127-132. According to a survey published on 20 September 2012 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), 71% of Palestinians (73% of Israelis) believed that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to Israel in the next five years were low or non-existent.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 133-145.

¹⁵ The full result of the vote was as follows. *In Favor*: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Canada, Czech Republic, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federal States of), Nauru, Panama, United States of America.

Abstain: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Estonia, Fiji, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, United Kingdom, Vanuatu.

Absent: Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Liberia, Madagascar, Ukraine.

Furthermore, the Holy See, which in its quality of observer state does not have the right to vote, officially declared its support for the upgrade of Palestinian status in the UN. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-151.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

¹⁷ In addition to this, Palestine could also use the ICC to accuse former and current Israeli officials of war crimes and other violations of international law, a prospect which Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has privately expressed concern about. “Q&A: Palestinians' upgraded UN status,” *BBC*, 30 November 2012, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13701636> [accessed 21.06.2014].

Glossary

Glossary

ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW Israeli Law adopted in March 1950, classifying anyone who was a citizen or resident of one of the Arab states or a Palestinian citizen on 29 Nov. 1947 but had left his place of residence, even to take refuge within Palestine, as an 'absentee'. Absentee property was vested in the custodian of absentee property who then 'sold' it to the Development Authority, empowered by the Knesset. This authorized the theft of the property of a million Arabs, seized by Israel in 1948.

ALIYAH Jewish immigration to Israel (lit.: ascent). Plural: *Aliyoth*

ANNAPOLIS CONFERENCE International peace conference held on 27 Nov. 2007 in Annapolis, US, to set up a timetable for future negotiations on final status issues.

ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE Established in 1936, during the Arab Revolt, as a representative umbrella body formed of the heads of all Palestinian political parties and headed by the Grand Mufti, Haj Amin Al-Husseini. Banned by the British shortly after its establishment, its leading members were arrested, exiled and imprisoned for their vocal opposition to the Mandate and its support for Zionist immigration and land acquisition

ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE Launched at the March 2007 Arab League summit in Riyadh on the basis of the Saudi peace plan of spring 2002. Calls for Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967, an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in return for normalization of relations with Israel.

ARAB REVOLT (1916-1920) Arab uprising that began June 1916 against the Ottoman Empire, triggered by the British promise (Hussein-MacMahon correspondence) to create a great Arab Kingdom (Hijaz, Syria and Iraq), if the people of the region revolted against Istanbul. The Arab revolt left its marks, incl. the colors of its flag black, green, white and red (used today by Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait and Palestine).

AREA A, B, C Jurisdictional divisions created in the West Bank in 1995, with the Oslo II Agreement. Area A, initially being the urban centers only, came under PA administrative and internal security responsibility and eventually comprised 17.2% of the West Bank; Area B, being the built-up areas of the remaining principal villages and eventually 23.8% of the West Bank, remained under Israeli military occupation, but the PA became responsible for services and civilian administration; Area C, eventually being 59% of the West Bank, remained under exclusive Israeli civil and military administration. Areas A, B & C considered operational until late 2001, whereafter Israeli military incursions and reoccupations eroded the currency of the jurisdictional divisions. Israel had retained *overall* security responsibility for all areas, including the right to 'hot pursuit' into area A, throughout the Oslo process.

BALFOUR DECLARATION Letter sent on 2 Nov. 1917 by British Foreign Sec. Arthur James Balfour to Baron de Rothschild pledging British support for the establishment of a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine.

BLACK SEPTEMBER Military confrontation between the Jordanian army and Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan in Sept. 1970 after a PFLP commando hijacked four airplanes. The

civil war-like confrontation was King Hussein's answer when challenged by PLO attempts to create a 'state within a state'. The fighting left some 2,000 dead and led to the expulsion of the PLO leadership and troops from Jordan. When the PLO set up its new bases in Beirut, Israeli retaliatory air raids on Lebanon began.

BRITISH MANDATE Based on the decision of the 1920 San Remo Conference awarding the mandate for Syria and Lebanon to France and of Palestine, Trans-jordan and Mesopotamia (Iraq) to Britain. Approved by the League of Nations Council on 24 July 1922 - without the consent of the Palestinians - and becoming official on 29 Sept. 1923. Sir Herbert Samuel was appointed first High Commissioner. In 1947, Britain decided to terminate the Mandate and submitted the Question of Palestine to the UN. On 15 May 1948, the Mandate officially ended.

CAIRO AGREEMENT see *Gaza-Jericho Agreement*

CAMP DAVID The US presidential retreat outside Washington where numerous Middle East negotiations have been held, incl. Egyptian-Israeli talks in 1978, brokered by Pres. Jimmy Carter, that led to the Egyptian -Israeli peace treaty. More recently, Camp David refers to the failed attempt by Pres. Bill Clinton in 2000 to achieve a similarly historic final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

CHALUKKAH Traditional system of rabbinic distribution of remittances from Jewish communities abroad to religious communities in Palestine - especially Jerusalem. The primary source of income for the Jewish communities in Palestine until the advent of Zionist immigration and production-based economic activities.

CITY OF DAVID Site in Silwan outside the Old City, where Israelis claim King David created Jerusalem over 3,000 years ago and undertake extensive digs.

CLINTON PARAMETERS Guidelines for final negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis formulated by then Pres. Clinton in Dec. 2000. They served as the basis for the Jan. 2001 Taba Talks and proposed a non-militarized sovereign, viable Palestinian State, Israeli security requirements, land swaps, a solution for the refugees combining return, resettlement and compensation, an international presence, and "fair and logical propositions" regarding Jerusalem to remain an open and undivided city while applying the principle 'what is Arab should be Palestinian' and 'what is Jewish should be Israeli'.

CORPUS SEPARATUM (lit.: separate body) The status proposed for Jerusalem and its environs (incl. Bethlehem) by the UNGA within the Partition Plan of November 1947. The city, within an area of 258 km² was to be internationalized under a UN trusteeship, which was to guarantee freedom of access to holy places, provide an international police force and remain responsible for foreign affairs. After a ten-year period, a plebiscite was to be held, whereafter further recommendations would be discussed by the trusteeship council.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DoP) Agreement reached between PLO members and Israeli government officials, secretly negotiated in Oslo and signed in Washington, DC, on 13 Sept. 1993. Provides the guidelines for future negotiations as well as for a Palestinian five-year interim autonomy in the WBGS, followed by a permanent settlement based on UNSC Res. 242 and 338. Postponed difficult issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, water, security and borders.

DOHA AGREEMENT Fateh-Hamas deal of Feb. 2012 aimed at forming a transitional government of independent technocrats with a limited mandate (preparing for presidential and legislative elections and starting Gaza reconstruction) with diplomacy resting with the PLO.

DUNUM Unit of land area used in Palestine (1 dunum = 1,000 sq. meters = approx. 1/4 acre).

E-1 PLAN (EAST 1 PLAN) Longstanding pending Israeli plan to build a large new Israeli neighborhood on 12,000 dunums of land in the undeveloped land corridor running east of Jerusalem, thus making a *viable* future Palestinian state impossible.

EAST JERUSALEM Area comprising the 6.5 km² of the pre-1967 Arab East Jerusalem municipal boundaries and 70 km² of West Bank land belonging to some 28 surrounding villages that was occupied and subsequently annexed by Israel following the 1967 War.

ERETZ ISRAEL Hebrew for 'Land of Israel', covering the territory, which were part of the Jewish Kingdom(s), i.e., Palestine and part of today's Jordan. Though there is no call for the establishment of the State of Israel in all of Eretz Israel, right-wing and other parties reject Israeli withdrawal from any territory of Eretz Israel currently under Israeli control.

FATEH Acronym for *Harakat At-Tahrir Al-Filistiniya* (Palestinian Liberation Movement), with the first letters in reverse order giving (Fateh = conquest). Formally founded in Kuwait in 1959 by Yasser Arafat and associates (incl. Salah Khalaf, Khalil Al-Wazir, Mohd. Yousef An-Najjar, Kamal Adwan), it grew out of a clandestine organization formed by Palestinian students in 1957; advocated armed struggle to liberate all of Palestine by Palestinians, while remaining independent of all Arab govts. Headed by Arafat ever since and is the largest and strongest PLO faction. Initially a network of underground cells, it reorganized with a central committee in 1963 and took control of the PLO as the largest single bloc at the 5th PNC in Cairo in 1969. Fateh adopted the principle of political pluralism within the PLO. Until the 1970s, it followed a guerrilla strategy (with its military wing Al-Assifa and squads operating underground in the OPT known as Fateh Hawks and Black Panthers). Formulated a new policy at the 1972 congress putting guerrilla warfare as only one of various means of struggle. Fateh advocates a democratic, secular, multi-religious state. Played a central role in the *Intifada* and was a member of the UNLU. Represented in the Exec. Committee by three members, incl. Arafat, and remains Arafat's power base (Pres.: Yasser Arafat, Sec.-Gen.: Faruq Qaddumi).

FELLAHIN Peasants or skilled agricultural workers

FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS Provided for in the 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP), to be the second part of a two-phase timetable. The negotiations were supposed to begin "as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period," i.e., in May 1996, and to cover "remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest."

GAZA-JERICHO AUTONOMY AGREEMENT Also referred to as Cairo or Oslo I Agreement; signed on 4 May 1994, outlining the first stage of Palestinian autonomy - in Gaza and

Jericho - incl. Israeli redeployment and the establishment of a Palestinian self-government authority. Israel remains in control of the settlements, military locations, and security matters. The stipulated interim period ended on 4 May 1999 and triggered a heated debate among the Palestinians as to whether to declare unilaterally a Palestinian state.

GOLAN HEIGHTS Militarily and strategically important region that Israel captured from Syria in the Six-Day War of 1967.

GREEN AREA Areas zoned by municipal authorities for open space in which no construction is allowed so as to maintain a minimum of greenery in a city. Often used, however, to block Palestinian development and absorb the land for settlement expansion.

GREEN LINE Term used following Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 to refer to the post-1948 War cease-fire line (proper name is '1949 Armistice Line'), i.e., the "border" separating pre-1967 Israel from the OPT. The demarcation line (laid down in the Armistice Agreements of 1949) is the internationally recognized border (it is worth noting that Israel has not specified the boundaries of its state until this day).

GUSH EMUNIM ('Bloc of the Faithful'). Israeli extraparlimentary religious lobby that believes the 'Greater Land of Israel' is the fulfillment of the Zionist dream and a step in the messianic redemption process and, therefore, opposes the return of territory conquered by Israel in 1967. Since 1967, the single most active settlement movement in the OPT, with over half of all settlements in the West Bank affiliated with its various administrative, ideological and pedagogic divisions.

HAGANAH Clandestine Jewish organization for armed self-defense in Palestine under the British Mandate, that eventually became the nucleus of the Israeli army. Set up in 1920 by the Jewish Trade Union Movement Histadrut and under its authority until its split in April 1931 over whether the Histadrut or the Jewish Agency should rule the body. The split off became known as Irgun Zvei Le'umi (also named Irgun B or Haganah Le'umit).

HALACHA (adj. halachic) Normative Jewish law, custom, practice, or established rite ratified by authoritative rabbinic jurists and teachers.

HAMAS (ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT) (Arabic: abbreviation of *Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyya*; English: *Zeal*) Hamas served as the Muslim Brotherhood's link to the First Intifada and emerged shortly after its outbreak in Jan. 1988. Its formation and development was tolerated, if not encouraged, by Israel as an alternative or counterforce to the PLO.

HARAM ASH-SHARIF The Noble Sanctuary, one of the three most important sites in Islam spread over 135 dunums comprising nearly 1/6th of Jerusalem's Old City. Both Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock are located on the compound, which in its entirety is regarded as a mosque. Jews refer to the area as "Temple Mount", claiming it is the location of the "Second Temple," destroyed by the Romans.

HEBRON AGREEMENT Reached on 15 Jan. 1997; Israel agreed to withdraw from 80% of the city (H1), but retained control over an enclave with 450 settlers and 35,000 Palestinians in the city's center (20%, H2). H2 includes the Old City, Ibrahimi Mosque and seven settlements (Abraham

Avino, Bet Hadassah, Bet Romano, Ramat Yashai - Tel Rumaida, Nahum Horse/ Yehuda Barqoush, Bet Hashasha, Rachel Salonique).

HISTADRUT Jewish Labor Federation/Trade Union Movement, inaugurated in Dec. 1920 in Haifa. Set up a national defense organization (Haganah) "to safeguard the national and social content of popular defense in this country" and controlled it until its split in 1931.

HOLY BASIN (also: *Historical Basin*) Concept introduced by Israel during the Camp David negotiations in July 2000 and picked up in the Taba talks in early 2001 with regard to the area embracing the Old City of Jerusalem and adjacent localities, including the Mt. of Olives, Mt. Zion, the City of David, the Kidron Valley and the settlement area of Shimon Hatzadik in Sheikh Jarrah, which contain sites holy to Jews, Muslims and Christians.

HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION OF INQUIRY into the Palestinian uprisings in 1929. The Commission recommended in Aug. 1929 that Jewish immigration and land purchase should be restricted as it threatens Arab agriculture and development.

HUSSEIN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE The July 1915-Jan. 1916 correspondence between Sherif Hussein of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, which concluded with an understanding on Arab post-war independence from the Ottoman Empire, including Palestine. Based on this correspondence, Sherif Hussein launched the Arab Revolt and declared Arab independence from Ottoman rule in June 1916.

INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP Also referred to as Taba or Oslo II Agreement. Concluded in Taba on 26 Sept. 1995 and signed in Washington on the 28th. Outlines the 2nd stage of Palestinian autonomy, extending it to other parts of the West Bank, which is divided into Area A (full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security), Area B (full Palestinian civil jurisdiction, joint Israeli-Palestinian internal security), and Area C (Israeli civil and overall security control). Furthermore, the election and powers of a Palestinian Legislative Council were determined. (Oct. 1997 was the target date for the completion of further redeployment and Oct. 1999 for reaching a final status agreement.)

INTIFADA ('Civil Uprising'; Arabic, lit.: 'shaking off')

(1) What is today referred to as "**first Intifada**" erupted in Gaza on 9 Dec. 1987 after four Palestinians were killed when an Israeli truck collided with two vans carrying Palestinian workers. Ensuing clashes spread rapidly to the rest of the OPT. The Intifada was carried by youth and directed by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising - a coalition of the main factions, with the goal to end the Israeli occupation and establish Palestinian independence. Israel's heavy-handed response included closing universities, deporting activists, destroying homes, but also stirred the international community into finding a permanent solution. With the signing of the Oslo accords, the Intifada came to an end; casualties were high with over 1,500 Palestinians dead, and tens of thousands injured.

(2) Also referred to as **Al-Aqsa Intifada**; Began on **28 Sept. 2000** when Likud opposition leader Ariel Sharon made a provocative visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque, with thousands of security forces deployed in and around the Old City. Ensuing clashes with Palestinian protestors left in the first two days alone five Palestinians dead and over 200 injured. The incident soon sparked a widespread uprising in the WBGS, inside Israel

and the Arab World, and brought the peace process to a halt. After one year, the death toll among Palestinians had reached almost 700, with over 15,000 injured and unprecedented destruction to Palestinian infrastructure and economy.

IRGUN (full name: Irgun Zvei Le'umi - National Military Organization), Jewish underground movement also referred to as Haganah Le'umit (National Defense) or its abbreviation Etzel (derived from the pronounced initials of its Hebrew name). Established by dissident Haganah commanders in April 1931. Split in June 1940 into Avraham Stern's Irgun Zvei Leumi Be'yisrael (National Military Organization in Israel, later known as Lohamei Herut Yisrael - Lehi - or Stern Gang) which saw the British as the main enemy, and David Raziel's Irgun Zvai Leumi Be'erez Yisrael (National Military Organization in Eretz Israel), whose main targets were Arabs and who were close to Jabotinsky's Revisionist party. Disbanded following the establishment of the state of Israel and integrated into the army of the new state.

JEWISH AGENCY Organization formed by virtue of Article IV of the British Mandate for Palestine terms of reference in 1920-21 as the formal representative of the Jewish community vis-à-vis the British mandatory gov't. After the establishment of the State of Israel, it shifted its focus to issues common to the state and to Jewish communities abroad, encouraged and organized the immigration of Jews and assisted in their integration.

JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION Organization founded in 1891 to assist Jewish emigration from countries of persecution or depressed economies to Israel, where it led the initial process of formative Zionist land acquisition and settlement.

JEWISH NATIONAL FUND The land purchase and development fund of the World Zionist Organization, founded in 1920.

JUDEA AND SAMARIA Biblical names for areas approximating the current northern (Samaria) and southern (Judea) portions of the West Bank, applied by Israel to the West Bank and forming the main administrative division under which the Israeli military, settlements and occupation authorities classify the West Bank's smaller sub-divisions.

KING-CRANE COMMISSION International Commission of Inquiry, led by the Americans Henry King and Charles Crane, to examine the situation in Palestine in June-July 1919; their report, warning against the effects of unrestricted Jewish immigration and Zionist plans on Palestinian Arabs, was kept secret for three years and remained unpublished until 1947.

KNESSET Israeli Parliament.

LABOR PARTY Israeli political party formed by the union of Mapai, Akhdut Ha'avoda and Rafi parties; is aligned with a fourth party, Mapam.

LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES Established on 22 March 1945 by the then independent Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Yemen) as a forum for concerted action on major issues its members face. Today has 22 members and represents over 200 million people. In 1964, the Arab League decided to establish the PLO "to organize the Palestinian people enabling them to play their role in the liberation of their country and to achieve self-determination", and at the 7th summit meeting in Rabat in Oct. 1974, it recognized the PLO as the "sole representative of the Palestinian people". In 1976, the PLO was admitted as

a full member, and since 1989 it has been a member as 'the State of Palestine'. Current Sec.-Gen. of the Arab League is Amr Musa.

LEHI (abbr. for Hebrew 'Lohamei Herut Israel' = Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) Jewish anti-British armed underground organization in Palestine, founded in 1940 as a split off from Irgun. Also known as Stern Gang after its founder Avraham Stern. The group was responsible for many terror acts on British and Arab targets, as well as for the assassination in 1948 of UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte. Among the leading members was later PM Yitzhak Shamir. Although Zionist historians later distanced the normative Israeli military agencies from Lehi, referring to the organization as a 'rogue' terror outfit, from the outset of 1947 hostilities, Lehi joined forces and command-structure with the Jewish Agency's Haganah, cooperating in combined offensives and numerous well-documented atrocities (incl. the massacre at Deir Yassin) throughout the war. As such, Lehi contributed both regular and irregular soldiers to the nascent Israeli army and maintained high political representation in the new state.

LIKUD Israeli political alignment, incl. the nationalist-populist Herut Party, the centrist Liberal Party, and several smaller parties.

LITTLE TRIANGLE Area within Israel abutting the north-western border of the West Bank, having been ceded without Palestinian consent to Israeli forces by Jordan during the 1949 armistice agreements. Sparsely settled by Zionists prior to the war, the area remains the densest area of Palestinian demography in Israel and suffers consequently from serious deficiencies in terms of infrastructure and development. Its principal towns are Umm Al-Fahm, Khadeira and Kufr Qara', between which lie numerous small Palestinian villages.

MADRID CONFERENCE Middle East Peace Conference opened in Madrid on 30 Oct. 1991 under the co-chairmanship of the US and the Soviet Union (instead of the long wanted UN-sponsored international conference). Initiated two tracks: bilateral talks (started in Washington on 9 Dec. 1991) and multilateral talks (started in Moscow on 28 Jan. 1992).

MASTER PLAN JERUSALEM 2000 On 13 Sept. 2004 then-mayor of Jerusalem Uri Lupoliansky disclosed a Town Planning Scheme for a "united Jerusalem," known as Master Plan 2000, which would serve as a mandatory map for land use and a blueprint for other municipal planning purposes until the year 2020. The 'stated' target of the plan is a city population made up of 70% Jews and 30% Palestinians, while the current trend suggests a population ratio of 60:40 by 2020. The plan provides for the establishment of additional Jewish settlements and public institutions, while hampering Palestinian development and isolating Palestinian suburbs.

MEKOROT Israeli Water Company founded in 1937. Since 1982, it controls all water issues in Palestine.

MITCHELL REPORT Fact-Finding Committee to investigate the events of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, how to prevent their recurrence, how to rebuild confidence and resume negotiations. The Committee, headed by former US senator George J. Mitchell, was formed following the summit at Sharm Ash-Sheikh (17 Oct. 2000), attended by Israel, the PA, Egypt, Jordan, the US, UN, and EU, that took place in the wake of the Intifada. Members of the committee were: ex-senator Warren Rudman, former Turkish Pres. Suleiman Demirel, the EU's Javier Solana and Norwegian FM Thorbjorn Jagland. Recommendations of the report, completed on 30 April 2001 and

published on 20 May 2001, included a "freeze of all settlement activity, including the 'natural growth' of existing settlements", a call on both sides to reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements, immediate unconditional cessation of violence and resumption of security cooperation.

MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION Formed by the UN in 1949 as a component of the Jordanian-Israeli armistice, with the aim of supervising and monitoring the implementation of the terms of the armistice. Included a sub-committee on Jerusalem, charged with ensuring access to holy sites, securing transit between no man's land zones and liaising with the UN's other bodies, as well as the Jordanian and Israeli governments.

MORRISON-GRADY PLAN Federal solution for Palestine proposed by British Dep. PM Herbert Morrison and US Amb. Henry Grady in July 1946: to convert the British Mandate into a trusteeship and to divide the country into a Jewish and an Arab province and two districts (Jerusalem and Negev). Palestine Roundtable Conference in Sept. in London rejects the plan; Arab delegates propose unitary state of Palestine, in which Jews would have full civil rights.

MUTASSARIF Ottoman title for the administrative governor of a Sanjak, or sub-province. The Mutassarif was responsible to a Vali, being the ruler of a wider Vilayet, or province, and thereafter to the Sultan in Istanbul. Sanjaks were in turn sub-divided into Kazas, or districts, each governed by a Kaimakam.

NO-MAN'S LAND UN demilitarized buffer zones between Israeli occupied territory and Jordanian-controlled territory in Jerusalem and the Latrun Area and between Israeli and Jordanian demilitarized zones on Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem, that were created by the 1948/1949 cease-fire agreements.

OPERATION 'CAST LEAD' Israel military operation that began on 28 Dec. 2008 allegedly in response to the latest series of Hamas rocket attacks against southern Israel; however, the operation was planned six months earlier by Defense Minister Ehud Barak. The Israeli attack involved aerial bombings, including the use of phosphorus bombs, and ground invasions. Operation 'Cast Lead' left over 1,300 Palestinians dead and over 4,000 wounded.

OPERATION 'PEACE FOR GALILEE' Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, including a two-month siege and bombardment of Beirut, until PLO forces agreed to leave. Some 18,000 people were reported killed and 30,000 injured, the vast majority of whom were civilians. Israeli forces occupied Beirut until July 1983 when they withdrew to the 'security zone'.

OSLO I AGREEMENT see Gaza-Jericho Agreement

OSLO II AGREEMENT see Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip

OSLO (PEACE) PROCESS Series of peace talks that began with secret negotiations in Norway between PLO members and Israeli officials and led to the DoP in Sept. 1993, outlining the way for further bilateral negotiations hoped to bring a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

OUTPOSTS (also: *settlement outposts*) Structures, often uninhabited containers or a few mobile homes, erected by the settler movement without official recognition on the part of the Israeli government. Outposts often serve as precursors to new settlements or settlement expansion and are discreetly funded by the Israeli government.

PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (PLC) Elected on 20 Jan. 1996 in accordance with the Oslo I and II Accords. Made up of 88 members elected in 16 electoral districts of varying sizes (voter turnout: 79%). Of the 88 seats, 49 are held by Fateh, 15 by independents affiliated with Fateh, 4 by independents affiliated with Islamist movements, 17 by independents, and 3 by others. Responsible for drafting a Palestinian constitution as well as legal and regulatory frameworks. All legislation and acts must be transmitted to the Israeli authorities for approval. The PLC has no powers in terms of foreign relations and agreements. Its members automatically become members of the PNC.

PALESTINIAN ARAB CONFERENCE (Occasionally 'Congress') Umbrella organization formed in 1919 originally by leaders of the Palestinian Christian community, expanded to include regional representatives from political parties, Palestinian notable families and religious figures. Activities took the form of conferences and public statements of Palestinian unity in opposition to the British mandatory policies.

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY (PA) Established on the basis of the DoP signed by the PLO and Israel on 13 Sept. 1993 and governs Palestinian affairs in the self-rule areas. It consists of the elected President (Yasser Arafat), the appointed cabinet (executive committee currently composed of 32 PNA Ministers) and the Palestinian Legislative Council (88 elected members). The PNA is subject to the agreements signed with Israel and as such has no foreign relation powers. It will be responsible for negotiating the permanent status issues towards a final settlement with Israel.

PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (PLC) Palestinian parliament first elected on 20 Jan. 1996. Initially made up of 88 members. The second elections - on 25 Jan. 2006 - increased the number to 132, 74 of which were won by Hamas.

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) Legislative and decision-making body of the PLO, which represents Palestinians worldwide, formulates policies and guidelines for the Executive Committee and elects it, as well as a speaker, two deputies and a Secretary. Currently comprised of 669 members, headed by Salim Za'noun. The council meets every two years, and resolutions are passed by a simple majority, however 2/3^{rds} of members must attend for quorum.

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL FRONT (PNF) Formed in Jan. 1973 by the PNC to act as an organizational framework and autonomous PLO affiliate to coordinate activities of nationalist resistance forces in the OPT. It formed the nationalist bloc for candidates in the 1976 elections and won 18 out of 24 city council seats. It was declared illegal by Israel in Oct. 1978, and then absorbed by its successor, the **National Guidance Committee**, which coordinated opposition to Camp David and the Begin administration (outlawed by Israel in May 1982).

PALMACH (Abbr. for Pelugot Mahatz, in Hebrew: assault or shock forces) A special unit in the Haganah for commando operations during the British Mandate (until 1948).

PARTITION PLAN On 29 Nov. 1947, the UNGA passed the Partition Plan (UN Res. 181) dividing Palestine into a Jewish and Arab state, with Jerusalem and Bethlehem as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime. The idea of partition was first suggested by the Peel Commission in 1937. The plan granted the Jews 56.47% of Mandatory Palestine - at a time when they owned less than 7% of the

land - with a population of 498,000 Jews and 325,000 Arabs, and the Palestinians 43.53% of Palestine, with 807,000 Arab inhabitants and 10,000 Jewish inhabitants. For Jerusalem, where the population was 100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs, an international trusteeship and free access to the Holy Places was foreseen.

PEEL COMMISSION The Palestine Royal Commission, led by Lord Peel, to examine the working of the British Mandate and make proposals for the future. Concluded its report in July 1937 stating that the Mandate in Palestine was unworkable, that there was no hope of any cooperative national entity comprised of Arabs and Jews, and that both sides could not live in peace together in one state. In conclusion, it suggested the partition of Palestine into two states: one Jewish and one Arab.

PLAN DALET Master Plan (containing various sub-operations) launched in April 1948 by Zionist military forces to capture as much Palestinian/Arab territory as possible before the end of the British Mandate.

PLO - PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION Following an Arab League decision, the PLO was founded by 422 Palestinian national figures, chaired by Ahmed Shuqairi, in May 1964 in Jerusalem. They also set up the Palestine National Council (PNC), the PLO Executive Committee, a National Fund and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) and drafted a National Covenant and Basic Law. When Fateh, led by Yasser Arafat, took over the PLO in 1969, it became an umbrella organization for various Palestinian factions and acquired a more central role in mobilizing Palestinians as well as international support. The PLO created a number of organizations to provide education, health, and other relief services and formed a quasi-govt. with security bodies, a military, a financial system, information offices and foreign relations. On 14 Oct. 1974, the PLO was recognized by the UNGA as the representative of the Palestinian people (Res. 3210, which also granted observer status), and on 28 Oct. 1974 by the Arab League Rabat Summit. In 1975, the PLO was granted access to the UNSC. On 15 Nov. 1988, it declared Palestinian independence at the 19th PNC in Algiers, and in Dec. 1988, it announced the recognition of Israel's right to exist and renounced terrorism. The PLO headquarters were in Amman until the 'Black September' confrontation with the Jordanian army (1970), Beirut until the PLO's evacuation in the course of the 1982 Israeli invasion, and then Tunis. The PLO remains the political umbrella for the PNA in the Palestinian self-rule areas (Gaza and West Bank) following the DoP of 13 Sept. 1993 and subsequent accords.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) (Arabic: *Al-Jabha Al-Sha'biyya li-Tahrir Filastin*) Faction established in 1967 by the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). In the 1970s, the PFLP became known for hijacking actions, but became more moderate and today advocates the establishment of a democratic state.

POPULAR RESISTANCE COMMITTEES (PRC) (Arabic: *Moqawamah*) Coalition of local activists that emerged in Gaza during the early days of the Al-Aqsa Intifada to resist Israel's assaults. The PRC is among those responsible for firing rockets from Gaza.

"PRICE TAG" POLICY Policy launched in April 2008 by extreme right-wing settlers across the West Bank, in which settlers seek revenge ("a price") for each evacuation of outposts by harming Palestinians (e.g., beatings, attacking

homes, throwing stones, burning fields, uprooting trees, killing livestock, and poisoning wells).

QUARTET Panel comprised of the Foreign Ministers of the US and Russia and senior representatives from the UN and EU. Was formed in Madrid in April 2002 with the mandate to design a road map to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement based on the phased formula enunciated in the Mitchell Report, including the establishment of a Palestinian state. Former British PM Tony Blair serves as Quartet Special Envoy since June 2007.

AL-QUDS BRIGADES (Arabic: *Saraya Al-Quds*) Military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad; responsible for launching Al-Quds rockets from Gaza at Israel.

RECONCILIATION TALKS Ongoing meetings between Palestinian factions since Hamas seized control of Gaza in June 2007, in a bid to eventually form a unity government. Key points of contention are modes of election, security responsibilities and composition of the envisioned unity government.

REVISIONISTS Large faction within the Zionist movement, led by its founding ideologue, Poland's Vladimir Jabotinsky until his death in 1940. The Revisionists rejected the pragmatism of the WZO and JA leadership, demanding the terms of the British Mandate be *revised* so as to encourage Jewish colonization throughout the area of Transjordan as well as Palestine. Split from the WZO in 1935, and commenced a violent campaign against the British and Palestinians in 1937. Today, the Revisionist's constituent factions have reformed to make up the Likud bloc in Israeli politics.

RIGHT OF RETURN One of the key Palestinian demands relating to the peace process. Right of Return refers to the right of Palestinian refugees and their descendants to return to their pre-1948 homes in Israel and the WBGs. Legal reference to the right is UNGA Resolution 194 of 11 Dec. 1948, which states, "Refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so."

ROAD MAP (full: *Performance-Based Road Map and Goal-Driven Road Map*) Plan put together by the Quartet in Dec. 2002, and issued on 30 April 2003 after Mahmoud Abbas was sworn in as first Palestinian PM. The road map aims to find a "final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005" based on a full two-state solution, beginning with an end to Palestinian terrorism, a freeze on Israeli settlements, and other steps to normalize conditions. Includes "clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian and institution-building fields" and has monitoring groups under the auspices of the Quartet. It envisaged a Palestinian state by 2005.

ROGERS PLAN Peace plan announced by US Sec. of State William Rogers on 9 Dec. 1969, comprised of two parts: a call for an Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire agreement along the Suez Canal and an attempt to move the Israeli-Jordanian, and Israeli-Egyptian negotiations forward, based on UNSC Res. 242. Israel rejected the US initiative, while Jordan and Egypt accepted.

SAN REMO CONFERENCE Took place in April 1920, confirmed the Sykes-Picot Agreement awarding the administration of the former Turkish territories of Syria and Lebanon to France and of Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia (Iraq) to Britain.

SANJAK Ottoman territorial administrative sub-province, being a sub-division within a larger Vilayet, or province.

SEPHARDI(M) Jews who have their roots in the Balkans, Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa.

SHARM ESH-SHEIKH AGREEMENT Agreement for the implementation of the Wye River Memorandum. Signed by the new Israeli PM Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat in Sharm Esh-Sheikh on 4 Sept. 1999, witnessed by US Sec. of State Albright, Egyptian Pres. Mubarak and Jordans' King Abdullah II. Stipulated that Israel will withdraw in three stages from another 11% of West Bank land, release some 350 Palestinian political prisoners, open the safe passages, and begin permanent status talks on 13 Sept. 1999 to reach a framework for a settlement by Feb. 2000 and a final peace agreement by Sept. 2000. Israeli redeployments are split as follows:

- 15 Sept. 1999: Transfer of 7% from Area C to B.
- 15 Nov. 1999: 3% from C to B, and of 2% from B to A (put on hold at press time).
- 20 Jan. 2000: 1% from C to A, and of 5.1 % from B to A.

Like the Wye Accord, however, no official map detailing the areas to be transferred by Israel is part of the deal.

SHAW COMMISSION British-appointed Commission of Inquiry, led by Sir Walter Shaw, to investigate the Al-Buraq disturbances (Arab-Jewish riots in 1929 after a British govt. White Paper confirmed the status of the Western Wall as Moslem property). Their report led to the issuing of the 1930 White Paper recommending the restriction of Jewish immigration.

STERN GANG see **LEHI**.

SUNNIS (from sunna, meaning orthodox) Adherents of Islamic orthodoxy, the largest group in Islam; Sunnis accept the Islamic tradition (sunna), and the legitimate authority of the caliphs as the Prophet's successors. They support the traditional method of election to the caliphate and accepted the Umayyad line, on which issue they divide from the Shi'as (*q.v.*) in the first great schism within Islam.

SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT Secret agreement (named after the British orientalist Sir Mark Sykes and the former French CG in Beirut Charles Georges Picot) signed by Britain and France in May 1916, dividing the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire among them, assigning Lebanon and Syria to France and Jordan and Iraq to Britain; Palestine was to be internationalized.

TABA AGREEMENT see Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip

TABA TALKS Talks held at the end of Barak's govt. between Israeli and Palestinian delegations in Taba in Jan. 2001 to follow up on Camp David and to try to reach an understanding prior to the Israeli elections in Feb. 2001.

TENET PLAN Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire and security plan, proposed by CIA director George Tenet to end the violence in the region; took effect on 13 June 2001, but was never really implemented. Foresaw that Israel and the PA will immediately resume security cooperation, take measures to enforce a ceasefire, share information on terrorist threats, prevent acts of violence, etc., followed by IDF redeployment to positions held before 28 Sept. 2000, lifting of internal closures and border crossings.

TIPH (TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON) International observer unit set up by an Israeli-PLO agreement (reached in Cairo on 31 March 1994) in the aftermath of the massacre of some 30 Palestinian worshippers at the Ibrahimi Mosque by an Israeli settler (25 Feb. 1994) to provide a normal life and a sense of security for the Palestinians in Hebron. The mission lasted only a few months. A further agreement was concluded on 9 May 1996, setting the framework of a TIPH mission after the partial Israeli redeployment in Hebron. TIPH is only accountable to a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee and to an ad hoc liaison committee comprised of the participating countries.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 181 see *Partition Plan*

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194 Adopted on 11 Dec. 1948, stating the right of return: *The refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.*

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 303 Resolution adopted on 19 Dec. 1949, restating the UN's intention to place Jerusalem under a permanent international regime which should envisage appropriate guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places within and outside Jerusalem, and confirm the provisions of the Partition Resolution 181 of 1947.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 Adopted on 22 Nov. 1967, calling on Israel to withdraw its army from territories occupied in the course of the War of 1967.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 Adopted unanimously on 22 Oct. 1973, calls for the immediate implementation of UNSC Res. 242 with a view to establish peace.

UNIT 101 Israeli assassination unit established in semi-secrecy in August 1953 and led by Ariel Sharon. Unit 101 gained notoriety for a succession of massacres committed on civilian targets, aimed at instilling fear and instability in Palestinian society. It was also the leading force in brutalizing and expelling the Palestinian Bedouin from the Negev.

UNRWA The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East was established by UNGA Res. 302 of Dec. 1949 to give emergency assistance to Palestinians displaced by the War of 1948 and began to operate in May 1950. Its mandate, to provide essential education, health and relief services to Palestine refugees living in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the WBGS, has been renewed repeatedly ever since. Headquarters are in Gaza.

UNSCOP UN Special Committee on Palestine appointed in April 1947 at the close of a special UN session on Palestine, to investigate the situation and propose solutions. The majority of members recommended partition, while a minority advocated a federal solution. The Arab Higher Committee rejected the partition plan, the Jewish Agency accepted it.

VILAYET Ottoman provincial administrative division, ruled by a Vali, responsible to the Sultan in Istanbul and in turn sub-divided into Sanjaks and then Kazas.

WAILING WALL Name traditionally applied to the portion of the Western Wall of Al-Haram Ash-Sharif where Jewish prayer services have been centered in recent decades. In Arabic, Muslim parlance the area, being a stretch of 28 m is known as Al-Buraq Ash-Sharif and was, until the Israeli occupation of and expropriations within the Old City of Jerusalem in 1967, a property of the Waqf. The terms 'Wailing Wall' and 'Western Wall' are mistakenly considered interchangeable; they are not. The Western Wall of Al-Haram Ash-Sharif runs beyond the Wailing Wall and continues to a length of 485 m within today's Muslim Quarter. In 1967, Israel confiscated 155 m of the Western Wall, incl. the 28 m of Al-Buraq, declaring the total as a state property and not as a registered holy site. Politically motivated misuse of the terms in reference to holy sites and demands for sovereignty thereover makes the distinction vitally important.

WAQF Islamic charitable pious foundation; administers holy sites as well as state lands and other property passed to the Muslim community for public welfare.

WOODHEAD COMMISSION Technical Commission of Inquiry sent by Britain in 1938 to make a detailed plan for partition, based on the Peel Commission's report. Published its findings in Nov. 1938, reversing the Peel Commission report saying that partition was impracticable.

WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO) Founded in Aug. 1897 at the First Zionist Congress in Basel, called by Theodore Herzl. Named after Mount Zion in Jerusalem. Designed to establish in Palestine a national home for Jews. Established the Jewish Agency in 1929. After 1948 mainly worked on promoting unity of the Jewish people and raising funds. Until 1960 its formal name was Zionist Organization.

WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM Agreement for the implementation of the Oslo II Agreement and the resumption of the final status talks, signed on 23 Oct. 1998. Divided the 2nd redeployment provided by Oslo II (to be completed in April 1997) into three phases totaling 13% of the WB. Other main points were: changes in the PLO Charter, opening of the Gaza airport and the safe passage, reduction in the number of Palestinian police, and release of Palestinian prisoners. Subsequently, Israeli withdrew from 2% near Jenin, the Gaza airport was opened, and some detainees were released, though most of them turned out to be criminals rather than political prisoners. The Dec. 1998 Knesset vote for early elections (May 1999) suspended the further implementation of the Wye Agreement. Wye did not include an official map detailing the areas to be transferred by Israel to PA control; there were only informal assurances that the transfer of land out of Area C would take place mainly in the northern West Bank (first redeployment), Ramallah area (second), and around Hebron (third).

YOM KIPPUR WAR Arab-Israeli war fought in Oct. 1973, following a Syrian and Egyptian-led surprise attack on Israel on Yom Kippur.

Timeline

- 1915** Hussein-McMahon correspondence begins.
- 1916** Sykes-Picot Agreement signed; Sharif Hussein launches the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans.
- 1917** Balfour Declaration; Ottomans surrender to British.
- 1918** Armistice effectively ends the Ottoman Empire.
- 1919** King-Crane Commission; 1st Palestinian National Congress in Jerusalem demands independence.
- 1920** San Remo Conference; British civil administration begins; Haycraft Commission
- 1922** League of Nations approves British Mandate of Palestine; 'Churchill' White Paper.
- 1923** British Mandate comes into effect.
- 1928** British Gov't White Paper confirms the status of the Wailing/Western Wall as Muslim property.
- 1929** Al-Buraq riots; Shaw Commission; Hope-Simpson Commission.
- 1933** General strike in Palestine against Jewish immigration.
- 1936** Arab Revolt; Arab Higher Committee established.
- 1937** Peel Commission.
- 1938** Woodhead Commission.
- 1939** London Conference at St. James's Palace; 'MacDonald' White Paper restricts Jewish immigration, land buys.
- 1946** Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into Jewish immigration; Morrison-Grady Plan.
- 1947** UN Special Committee on Palestine formed; UN Res. 181 (Partition Plan).
- 1948** First Arab-Israeli War (*Naqba*); Birth of the State of Israel; UNGA Res. 194.
- 1949** UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine & UNRWA founded; UNGA Res. 303; Fourth Geneva Convention.
- 1950** Israeli 'Law of Return' and 'Absentee Property Law'; Jordan 'unifies' the East and West Bank.
- 1955** Israeli army attack and massacre in Gaza.
- 1956** Israeli massacres of Qalqilya, Kufr Qassem, and Khan Younis; tripartite invasion (UK, France, Israel) of Egypt (Suez Crisis).
- 1957** Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza.
- 1959** Fateh founded.
- 1963** PLO Draft Constitution at the Arab Summit in Cairo.
- 1964** PLO founded.
- 1965** Israel diverts the Jordan River; first military operation of Fateh in Palestine
- 1967** June or Six-Day War; occupation of Palestine; UNSC Res. 242; Arab League summit in Khartoum.
- 1968** Battle of Karameh.
- 1969** Al-Aqsa Mosque arson attack; Arafat PLO chairman.
- 1970** Black September in Jordan.
- 1973** October or Yom Kippur War; UN Res. 338.
- 1974** UN and Arab League recognize PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.
- 1975** PLO granted access to the UNSC; UNGA Res. 3379 (Zionism as a form of racism).
- 1976** Land Day; West Bank municipal election.
- 1977** Prime Minister Begin's autonomy peace plan.
- 1978** Israeli invasion of South Lebanon; Camp David Accords.
- 1979** Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty; UN Res. 446, 452 condemn Israeli settlement policy.
- 1980** Israel's Basic Law on Jerusalem.
- 1982** Israeli invasion of Lebanon; Sabra and Shatila massacre.
- 1986** 'War of the Camps' (Lebanon).
- 1987** First Intifada begins.
- 1988** Jordan's disengagement; Hamas emerges; Palestinian Declaration of Independence.
- 1991** Gulf War; Madrid Mideast Peace Conference.
- 1992** Multilateral talks; Labor wins Israeli elections.
- 1993** Closure policy begins; Declaration of Principles.
- 1994** Hebron massacre; Oslo I; PA established.
- 1995** Oslo II Agreement.
- 1996** First Palestinian elections; PLC.
- 1997** Hebron Agreement; Sheikh Ahmad Yassin released.
- 1998** Wye River Memorandum.
- 1999** Sharm Esh-Sheikh Agreement.
- 2000** Camp David II Summit; Al-Aqsa Intifada.
- 2001** Taba Talks fail; Sharon defeats Barak, marking the end to Palestinian-Israeli talks.
- 2002** Israel reinvades the West Bank (Operation 'Defensive Shield'); construction of the Separation Barrier begins; Arab peace initiative.
- 2003** Road Map; amendment of PA Basic Law to provide for the post of Prime Minister; Geneva Accord.
- 2004** President Yasser Arafat dies; International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the separation barrier.
- 2005** Israeli "Disengagement" from Gaza.
- 2006** Hamas wins elections; Gaza blockade; Operations 'Summer Rain' and 'Autumn Clouds'; revised route of the separation barrier; settlers peace plan.
- 2007** Hamas takes over Gaza; PA emergency government; tightening of Gaza blockade; Arab League re-adopts Arab Peace Initiative; Annapolis conference.
- 2008** Sana'a Declaration; Sharm Esh-Sheikh meeting; Olmert peace plan; Operation 'Hot Winter'.
- 2009** Operation 'Cast Lead'; Fateh Convention.
- 2010** Resumption of direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations; Gaza flotilla raid.
- 2011** Palestinian statehood bid at the UNSC; Operation 'Pillar of Defense.'
- 2012** Palestinian statehood bid succeeds at the UNGA.
- 2013** Kerry peace talks; Egypt tightens Gaza blockade.
- 2014** Collapse of Kerry talks; Palestinian unity government; Operations 'Brother's Keeper' and 'Protective Edge'; Gaza War.

