Memo on the Events around Al-Aqsa Mosque Compound July 2017

Jerusalem July 31st, 2017

On the current Al-Haram Ash-Sharif sovereignty crisis, there are three major baskets to be studied and evaluated in order to understand what lies ahead.

FIRST: We passed two phases for now

- a) biting fingers (July 14th 26th). Which was translated with the wonderful steadfastness and prayer in the streets, facing the military and security establishment of the occupier (The street is my carpet of prayer towards Al-Aqsa Mosque, nonviolent masses of youth performing a very disciplined attitude, including the prayer at Al-Magharbi Gate, Jaffa Gate and marching in masses through Mamilla Mall while chanting national and religious songs for the first time in decades.
- b) removing electronic gates and cameras/ and empowering national dignity/ maintaining Palestinian sovereignty on Al-Haram Ash-Sharif (July 26th - 27th)

We are now in phase (c) tug-of-war in which each side tries to pull the rope in their direction (July 27th - 31st)

As of today, there is no third party TO CUT THE ROPE AND KEEP THE SEPARATION AS IT WAS IN JULY 14th.

Meanwhile, there are unprecedented Israeli security measures in the city with a culture of fear and excessive use of force and arresting most of the activist youth in the old city as well as in the surrounding neighborhoods.

SECOND: In addition to the spread of rumors from all sides regarding the manipulation of the Holy site, there is a public opinion regarding the Israeli agenda as follows:

- a) Implementing the Hebron scenario.
- b) Sharing the site by force and dividing it.
- c) Continuous Jewish presence on the site with different performance i.e. Religious, political and militarily.
- d) For the time being (a) and (b) are on hold, but (c) is in the making.

THIRD: On the other hand, the major seven components who have a direct role in the shaping the evolution of the crisis and their agenda should be taken seriously into consideration in spite of the differences in their political weight and influence on the ground:

- (1) Amman/Islamic Waqf institution.
- (2) Ramallah/Fatah faction.
- (3) Palestinian youth/inside the old city, surrounding the city and the neighborhoods.
- (4) Palestinians of 1948/ Islamic movement, national trends and unorganized masses of youth.
- (5) Institutions/churches and sofa factions/ individual spoilers and thugs.
- (6) Israeli establishment/collaborators, rumors, infiltrations and military closure.
- (7) The new "religious notables" address in Jerusalem representing four Islamic institutions and have been the umbrella leading the society in this crisis taking the full responsibility in the absence of the others. It is worth mentioning that in spite of their personality differences and their different references, their four public appeals succeeded in maintaining the unity of the society because the focus and the general consensus has been directed on one goal: Al-Agsa mosque.

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